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INTRODUCTION
In order to help manufacturers of equipment and protective systems intended for use in
potentially explosive atmospheres meet the Essential Safety Requirements relating to EU
Directives 89/392/EC [1] (machinery directive) and 94/9/EC [2] (ATEX 100A) mandated
standards for non-electrical equipment are being prepared by CEN/TC305 Working
Group 2. EN 1127 – 1 Explosive atmospheres – Explosion prevention and protection Part 1:
Basic concepts and methodology [3] is a type A standard and sets out the overall philosophy
of explosion prevention and protection. The standards currently being prepared by WG2 are
type B standards and set out the requirements for specific means of prevention and
protection which can be used for different types of equipment.
The first of these standards provides the basic method and requirements and is the core
document which sets out the philosophy, concepts and requirements for all the standards in
this series while parts 2 to 8 give the requirements for the specific ‘types of ignition
protection’ which may be used.
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EN 13463
Part No: Title Status
SCOPE OF EN 13463-1
Part 1 of the standards for non-electrical equipment for potentially explosive atmospheres
specifies the basic method and requirements for design, construction, testing and marking of
non-electrical equipment intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres of gas,
vapour, mist and dusts. It is valid for atmospheres having pressures ranging from 0,8 bar to
1,1 bar and temperatures ranging from –20 °C to + 60 °C. It also includes atmospheres that
can exist inside the equipment if, for example, the external atmosphere can be drawn inside
the equipment by natural breathing produced as a result of fluctuations in the equipment’s
internal operating pressure, and/or temperature.
The standard may also be used for the design, construction, testing and marking of
equipment intended for use in atmospheres outside the validity range stated above, but in
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this case, the ignition risk assessment, ignition protection provided, additional testing
(if necessary), manufacturer’s technical documentation and instructions to the user, shall
clearly demonstrate and indicate the equipment’s suitability for the conditions it may
encounter.
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demonstrates compliance with the standard. An example of the form for recording the
results for equipment group II is shown in table 2.
Two examples of completed ignition hazard assessments are included in the standard to
help manufacturers and users of the standard.
Table 2. Defined format for recording the Ignition Hazard Assessment (given in EN13463-1)
ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS
The standard includes requirements to prevent the occurrence of electrostatic hazards. These
apply to any non-conductive parts of the equipment exposed to the explosive atmospheres and
susceptible to electrostatic charging. The requirements are based on the recommendations in the
CENELEC report [4]
Occurrence of Highly Efficient Charge Generating Mechanisms (Propagating
Brush Discharges)
Where propagating brush discharges can arise following highly efficient charging of non-
conductive layers and coatings on metal surfaces the standard requires that they shall be
prevented in both Group I and Group II equipment from occurring by ensuring that the
breakdown voltage across the layers is less than 4 kV.
For Group IID equipment to be used only in the presence of dust atmospheres with a
minimum ignition energy of greater than 3 mJ propagating brush discharges can also be prevented
by ensuring that the thickness of the non-conducting layer is greater than 10 mm.
Occurrence of Brush Discharges
The occurrence of brush discharges are prevented by the requirement that the projected
surface areas conductive materials shall be so designed that under normal conditions of use,
maintenance and cleaning, danger of ignition due to electrostatic charges is avoided.
For Group I equipment of both Category M1and M2 this requirement applies when the
surface area projected in any direction of more than 100 cm².
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For Group II equipment the standard requires that it shall be so designed that under
conditions of use, maintenance and cleaning, danger of ignition due to electrostatic charges
is avoided. Three means are provided for satisfying this requirement:
• by suitable selection of the material so that the insulation resistance of the enclosure
does not exceed 1 GΩ at (23 ± 2) °C and (50 ± 5)% relative humidity,
• or by virtue of the size, shape and lay-out, or other protective methods, such that
dangerous electrostatic charges are not likely to occur. For category 2G equipment
this requirement can be satisfied by using the test provided in Annex C of the
standard.
• or by limitation of the surface area projected in any direction of non-conductive parts
of equipment liable to become electrostatically charged as shown in the table 3:
To prevent incendive brush discharges, the thickness of layers or coatings of plastic
(non-conductive) solids on earthed metal (conducting) surfaces which can become charged
in Group IIG equipment shall not exceed 2 mm in the case of gases and vapours of Group
IIA and IIB or 0.2 mm in the case of gases and vapours of Group IIC.
There is no need to prevent brush discharges and hence no restriction on the
thickness of layers or coatings of plastic (non-conductive) solids on earthed metal
(conducting) surfaces which can become charged in Group II equipment intended for use
on potentially explosive dust atmospheres with a minimum ignition energy of greater
than 3 mJ.
Table 3. Permitted maximum projected areas for non-conductive parts of equipment liable
to become electrostatically charged
These values may be multiplied by 4 if the exposed flat areas of plastics are
surrounded by conductive earthed frames.
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Experience has shown that even simple enclosures can prevent a surrounding explosive
atmosphere from reaching ignition sources inside them. flow restricting enclosures are such
simple enclosures, which will prevent, with adequate probability, the atmosphere inside the
enclosures becoming explosive if the atmosphere outside the enclosure becomes explosive
rarely and for a short duration only. For this reason their use is restricted to the fulfilment of
the requirements of Group II - Category 3 equipment.
An explosive atmosphere surrounding an enclosure can penetrate it mainly due to the
influence of three mechanisms, namely: ventilation, equalisation of pressure differences
between the inside and outside (breathing), and diffusion.
If such an enclosure is effectively sealed, but not necessarily gas-tight, it can be
assumed that ventilation and diffusion will not cause a significant short-time exchange of
atmosphere. Under these conditions, an exchange of the external and internal atmospheres
through the seals will only take place if there is a pressure difference across them. Such
pressure differences may be caused by changes in temperature and will result in the
enclosure “breathing” but will not cause a significant flow of atmosphere into or through
the enclosure
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safety factor against ignition and it allows a much more simple method of testing and
verifying its explosion protection properties.
Examples of non-electrical types of equipment that can be protected by flameproof
enclosure include equipment with potentially hot rubbing surfaces exceeding the ignition
temperature of the atmosphere surrounding them, e.g. friction clutches and brake linings.
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transmission belt tension devices, wear detectors on clutches, that detect unacceptable wear
likely to cause frictional heating by incorrect engagement of the clutch.
Such sensor/actuator control devices may be either, continuously active in normal
operation of the equipment (e.g. to control the temperature of category 3 equipment), or be
arranged so that they only to detect abnormal operation (e.g. to detect impending dangerous
over-temperature in category 2 equipment).
Integrity of the Protection System – Functional Failure Rates (FFR)
As malfunction of any of the above sensors/actuator control devices, may result in failure to
apply the appropriate ignition control measure, they must be considered to be safety related
parts of the equipment. This ignition protection standard therefore calls for them to be
assessed and suggests a minimum quality for such devices in the form of a Functional
Failure Rate (FFR) that the equipment manufacturer must attempt to achieve.
Thus, to meet the requirements of this standard, the non-electrical equipment
manufacturer has to perform both the ignition hazard assessment (Required by EN 13463-1),
and additionally, a risk evaluation, to determine the Functional Failure Rate (FFR)
necessary to ensure that the sensors/ignition control actuators function when they are called
upon to contain the ignition risk within tolerable limits.
The Functional Failure Rate (FFR) is defined as a level of risk reduction to be
aimed for by the equipment manufacturer as a result of an evaluation of the ignition risk,
caused by the failure of a sensor or ignition control actuator to perform its intended
function, at the same time as a potential ignition source in the equipment converts into
an effective ignition source in the presence of an explosive atmosphere. Three classes of
FFR are defined depending on the probability of occurrence of the above three events
occurring simultaneously, i.e. the occurrence of the ignition source, the failure of the
control system and the presence of an explosive atmosphere, the latter being defined by
the category of the equipment. FFR1 is defined as a low probability of all three events
occurring simultaneously; FFR2 has a foreseeable probability and FFR3 has a high
probability.
Criteria used in the Different Functional Failure Rate Levels
One of the main difficulties facing a manufacturer in using control of ignition sources as a
means of protection is the selection and classification of integrity of the control system to be
used as there are currently no defined criteria for non-electrical control systems. The
standard therefore specifies criteria which have been based on the concepts used in various
European Standard. Thus EN 954-1 “Safety of Machinery – Safety related parts of control
systems : Part1: General principles for design.” written by CEN/TC/114 to assist
machinery manufacturers, describes 5 categories (B, 1, 2, 3 and 4) that can be applied to
assess the quality of the safety related parts of machinery control systems. Although not
specifically written for the purpose of assessing ignition control devices, some of the
principles described in that standard have been used in the development of the criteria used
in prEN 13463-6.
In the case of electrical control systems, the International Electrotechnical
Commission Standard IEC 61508 “Functional safety of electrical/electronic/
programmable electronic safety-related systems”, was written by IEC/65A to assist
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manufacturers of safety related systems. It contains the requirements for four Safety
Integrity Levels (SIL 1, 2, 3 and 4) that can be applied to describe the quality of the safety
related parts of a control system. Following the recent publication of the seven parts of
IEC 61508, some member state test authorities have announced their intention to offer a
service for checking such safety related components and protective systems and provide
manufacturers with an attestation of its Safety Integrity Level (SIL) rating. In addition
IEC/TC/44 Committee has recently started work on a document that is the equivalent of
EN 954-1 for electrical/electronic and programmable controlled machine safety. This is
based on IEC 61508 and was circulated in September 2000 as IEC draft 44/292/CD. When
published this latter document will give more definitive guidance on the SILs of safety
related parts of machines.
At the present time however, most sensors and ignition control actuators used for the
purpose of this standard will not have been assessed or given a SIL rating, and in addition
these are not applicable to non-electrical control systems. Thus in order to provide a
common classification of the control systems to be used for ignition protected equipment
and in order to easily link these to the 3 categories of equipment the standard specifies three
“Functional Failure Rate ” levels.
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Table 4. Minimum FFR requirements for a single sensor/ignition control actuator used to
protect Group II equipment
It is also be possible to fit a Control of Ignition Source ‘b’ device to normal industrial
equipment, thereby convert it from equipment that is not intended for use in a potentially
explosive atmosphere to a type that meets the definition of category 3 equipment.
In the above cases, the probability of the control actuator failing at the same time as an
explosive atmosphere occurs will be rare and consequently FFR1 has therefore been
assigned by this standard to those ignition control sensors/actuators used to protect
category 3 equipment.
For Category 2 Non-electrical Equipment
This category of equipment needs to be protected against ignition sources occurring in
normal operation and also with foreseeable faults on the equipment. In this case, the
probability of an ignition source developing in the equipment at the same time as its
associated ignition control actuator is faulty and an explosive atmosphere is present is
higher than for category 3 equipment. Nevertheless, the mid-range functional failure rate
will suffice. FFR 2 is therefore been assigned by this standard to those ignition control
sensors/actuators used to protect category 2 equipment.
For Category M2 Non-electrical Equipment
Category M2 equipment needs to be ignition protected and suitable for the severe operating
conditions of use found in gassy mines, but it is intended to be de-energised if an explosive
atmosphere occurs. The probability of an ignition source developing in the equipment at the
same time as its associated ignition control actuator is faulty and an explosive atmosphere is
present is therefore higher than category 3, but not as high as category 2 because of its
intended short time exposure to an explosive atmosphere. A mid-range functional failure
rate will however suffice. FFR 2 has therefore been assigned by this standard to those
ignition control sensors/actuators used to protect category M2 equipment.
For Category 1 and Category M1 Non-electrical Equipment
Category 1 equipment needs to be ignition protected in normal operation, also with
foreseeable faults and rare faults applied to the equipment. Category M1 equipment needs to
be ignition protected to a very high level, also be suitable for the changing conditions in
mines and continued use in an explosive gassy mine atmosphere.
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The definitions and requirements for both categories of equipment also include
reference to such equipment being either safe with more than one fault applied, or double
ignition protected. Thus a commensurate high functional failure rate class is needed. FFR 3
is therefore been assigned by this standard to those ignition control sensors/actuators used to
protect category 1 and category M1 equipment.
A flow diagram shown in figure 2 is provided which illustrates this procedure.
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CONCLUSIONS
The development of standards for non-electrical equipment for use in potentially explosive
atmospheres is progressing satisfactorily with the important first standard on Basic method
and requirements now published. The standard includes many novel aspects when compared
with the equivalent standard for electrical equipment and requires that the manufacturer
carries out an ignition hazard assessment. Requirements are given for both equipment
groups I and II and for the different categories of equipment. In addition specific
requirements are given for non-conductive parts of equipment to protect against the hazards
of electrostatic charging.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author acknowledges the work by the other members of CEN TC/305/WG2 without
whom this standard would not have been possible.
REFERENCES
1. Machinery Directive 98/37/EC
2. ATEX100a (Equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres) Directive
94/9/EC
3. EN 1127 – 1 Explosive atmospheres – Explosion prevention and protection Part 1: Basic
concepts and methodology
4. CENELEC report R044-001 Safety of machinery – Guidance and recommendations for
the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity
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No Is the
equipment capable
of igniting the explosive
atmosphere during
rare malfunctions
?
No
Apply requirements of this standard
and any appropriate ignition protection standard
Figure 1. Methodology for classifying equipment into the different categories of group II
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YES
Figure 2. Flow diagram showing steps in the design of control of ignition sources protection
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