Davis Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-10184 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 07/30/2024 Page: 1 of 40
[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10184
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
versus
JOHNNIE LEEANOZG DAVIS,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cr-00101-MHT-JTA-1
____________________
2 Opinion of the Court 23-10184
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRASHER, Cir-
cuit Judges.
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
The main question in this appeal is an issue of first impres-
sion about Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a geofence
warrant. Johnnie Davis was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 of
committing a string of carjackings in the Montgomery, Alabama,
area. Before trial, Davis moved to suppress two pieces of evidence
(1) the location of his girlfriend’s phone that the police obtained
from Google through a geofence warrant and (2) inculpatory state-
ments Davis made after being arrested on state charges. At trial,
Davis moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the
government failed to prove his intent to cause death or serious
harm to his victims. The district court denied these motions.
Davis raises the same three arguments on appeal. He argues
that the geofence warrant that led the police to identify his girl-
friend’s phone did not adequately define the places and things to be
searched. He argues that he should have been presented to a
United States magistrate judge before being interviewed, even
though he was in state custody. And he argues that his use of a gun
to commit the carjackings was insufficient to establish the intent
element of the crime.
We reject these arguments. We agree with the district court
that Davis lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the
geofence warrant because the search did not disclose any infor-
mation about the data on his own electronic device, reflected only
23-10184 Opinion of the Court 3
his limited movements in public areas, and did not encompass his
home. Because we cannot say the district court clearly erred in find-
ing that federal law enforcement did not improperly collude with
state law enforcement in arresting and interviewing Davis, we like-
wise agree with the district court that the federal presentment re-
quirements set out in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) did not apply when Davis was in state custody.
Finally, we agree with the district court that Davis’s use of a gun
during the carjackings sufficiently established Davis’s intent to
cause death or serious harm.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
The Montgomery Police Department began investigating a

string of carjackings and robberies that occurred between 2014 and
2017 in the Montgomery, Alabama, area. In 2017, the MPD sought
assistance from the FBI to seek warrants for cell tower location in-
formation to further the investigation. Nathan Faggert, who served
as a Sergeant with the MPD and as a task force officer with the FBI,
initiated an FBI investigation into thirty-five incidents he believed
were committed by the same suspect. Faggert worked the investi-
gation in a dual capacity, and the MPD and the FBI collaborated
through him and another MPD detective. Faggert regularly up-
dated his supervisors at the MPD and the FBI about the progress of
the investigation and how the FBI could best support the MPD—
the FBI primarily focused on digital information gathering while
the MPD responded to robberies, interviewed witnesses, and de-

veloped leads.
During the ongoing investigation, four more robberies and
three more carjackings occurred on January 23, 2020, October 30,
2020, and November 11, 2020. Law enforcement suspected that the
same person responsible for the crimes under investigation also
committed the three new offenses.
The carjacking and robbery on January 23, 2020, involved a
masked man who approached a vehicle, gestured toward a gun in
his waistband, and demanded the vehicle, telling the driver not to
move and that he wanted her car. The victim testified that she be-
lieved the robber would have shot her had she not complied. Later
that night, a masked man used the stolen car to rob a gas station in
the area. The MPD obtained video surveillance of the area where
the suspect dumped the stolen vehicle, and the video showed the
suspect get into another car to make his escape. The getaway vehi-
cle’s license plate was registered to Stacey Gilbert, the sister of Da-
vis’s girlfriend, Portia Gilbert.
Faggert prepared and presented a geofence warrant to
Google, seeking information on Google devices and accounts lo-
cated within forty to one hundred meters of six locations on Janu-
ary 23 and 24, around the time of the carjacking and robbery oc-
curred. The times and locations corresponded with video surveil-
lance that captured the suspect in action.
Google responded to the warrant by providing an anony-
mized list of devices and accounts that connected to its services at
the times and locations designated in the warrant. Faggert analyzed

this data and identified three devices relevant to the investigation.
Google “unmasked” those devices, i.e., disclosed the identifying in-
formation, and Faggert determined that only one device appeared
to be related. Specifically, Google identified a Gmail account open
on a device in the getaway car as it was captured by video surveil-
lance at the areas of the carjacking, business store robbery, and
where the carjacked vehicle was abandoned. The device belonged
to Portia Gilbert, and the Gmail account was registered to Gilbert’s
daughter.
Another carjacking and robbery occurred in the Montgom-
ery area on October 30, 2020. A man and his fifteen-year-old son,
who had pulled over to switch drivers, were approached by a
masked man, who put two pistols in the son’s face and told them
to run. The father later testified that the man probably would have
shot his son if they had not given up the car. That same night, the
stolen car was used in a robbery at a nearby Dollar General.
MPD obtained video surveillance from the night of October
30 that showed a man exit a vehicle in the area of the carjacking
and walk towards the scene of the carjacking. MPD obtained other
video surveillance that showed the same vehicle at a gas station.
MPD determined that the vehicle was rented to Davis, pulled the
GPS data for the vehicle, and discovered that it was near the car-
jacking on October 30. The police used the cell phone number Da-
vis listed in the rental agreement to obtain a warrant that allowed
police to track the phone in real time.
A final carjacking and robbery took place on November 11,

2020. A masked man approached the victim’s vehicle, stuck a gun
through the window, and told the driver, “don’t think about it.”
The perpetrator stole the car, and the victim later said that he be-
lieved he could have been shot. Later that night, a masked man
used the car to rob a Fresh Market and a Dollar General store in
the area. Upon learning of these new crimes, law enforcement
checked the status of Davis’s phone and discovered that it was pre-
sent at both the Fresh Market and the Dollar General during the
crimes.
The next day, Faggert and another Montgomery Police De-
tective sought and executed state search and arrest warrants for
Davis and residences he was known to frequent. Faggert arrested
Davis on eight state charges related to the string of robberies and
carjackings. The MPD took Davis into custody and placed him in a
holding cell. He was provided lunch, waived his Miranda rights,
and gave a statement to Faggert and an FBI special agent about
eight hours after he was initially detained. He confessed to the Oc-
tober 30 and November 11 crimes but denied involvement in the
January 23 crimes.
Faggert initiated this federal case by filing a complaint
against Davis on December 3, 2020. A grand jury of the Middle Dis-
trict of Alabama returned a 10-count indictment against Davis and
later returned a 14-count superseding indictment. Davis was tried
on the superseding indictment, which alleged three counts of car-
jacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; four counts of Hobbs Act
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; and seven counts of bran-

dishing a firearm during those crimes of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
Davis moved to suppress his post-arrest inculpatory state-
ments admitting to two of the carjackings and three of the rob-
beries. He argued that they were obtained in violation of his right
to presentment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) and
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) because the investigation and his arrests were
federal in nature and his statements took place about eight hours
after he was detained. The magistrate judge found that Davis was
in custody only on state charges at the time he gave the statements
and that state law enforcement did not improperly collude with
federal law enforcement to deny his presentment rights. The dis-
trict court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
tion to the extent that it found Davis lacked a federal right to pre-
sentment.
Davis also moved to suppress the evidence that the govern-
ment obtained via the geofence warrant. He argued that the war-
rant was invalid, and the Leon good faith exception did not apply.
The magistrate judge held two hearings on the motion and recom-
mended that the district court deny it, concluding that Davis lacked
Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the warrant because he
had no privacy interest in the search of his girlfriend’s phone or her
daughter’s Google account. It also concluded that even if Davis had
Fourth Amendment standing, his challenges to the warrant failed
because the Leon good faith exception applied. The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
At the end of trial, the district court dismissed the Hobbs Act
robbery counts and accompanying brandishing counts because the
government did not establish an interstate nexus for those crimes.
The jury convicted Davis on the remaining counts, and Davis was
sentenced to 315 months of imprisonment. This timely appeal fol-
lowed.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

under a mixed standard, reviewing the district court’s findings of
fact for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo.
See United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th 1317, 1322 (11th Cir. 2023). We
review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo but
“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
and draw[] all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor
of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026
(11th Cir. 2007).
III.
Davis raises three issues in his appeal. First, he argues the

district court erred in allowing the evidence obtained from the
geofence warrant. He says that he has Fourth Amendment stand-
ing to challenge the geofence warrant because the search invaded
his reasonable expectation of privacy. He also challenges the merits
of the warrant and says the Leon good faith exception does not
apply. Second, he argues the district court erred in denying his mo-
tion to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to law en-
forcement after his arrest because the government violated his
right to presentment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
5(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). He says that the federal presentment
rules apply even though he was arrested on state charges and taken
into state custody because the investigation and his arrest were fed-
eral in nature due to improper collusion between federal and state
authorities. Third, Davis argues the district court should have
granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the govern-
ment did not present sufficient evidence of his intent to kill or seri-
ously harm his victims under 18 U.S.C. § 2119. We address each
argument in turn.
A.
We begin with Davis’s argument that the district court erred

in denying his motion to suppress the information law enforce-
ment discovered via the geofence warrant. His argument is two-
part. First, he says that the district court erred in concluding that
he lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the warrant.
Second, he says the warrant was invalid and that the Leon good
faith exception does not apply to excuse the lack of a valid warrant.
We agree with the district court that Davis lacks Fourth Amend-
ment standing to challenge the geofence warrant, so we need not
consider whether the warrant was defective or if the Leon good
faith exception applies.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-
ernment officials.” Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and Cnty. of S.F., 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus, Fourth Amendment protection “ex-
tend[s] to any thing or place with respect to which a person has a
‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’” United States v. Ross, 963 F.3d
1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)). Conversely, “an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights are not infringed—or even implicated—by a
search of a thing or place in which he has no reasonable expectation
of privacy.” Id.
We refer to “whether an individual has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the object of the challenged search” as Fourth
Amendment standing. Id. But Fourth Amendment standing is
nothing more than “a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that
a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in
the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional
search.” Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410–11 (2018). It “should
not be confused with Article III standing, which is jurisdictional and
must be assessed before reaching the merits.” Id.
Whether and when a geofence warrant affects a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is an issue of first impression for
our circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 2022 WL 3009240, at *7
(M.D. Ala. July 1, 2022) (explaining that district courts in our circuit
are “in unchartered territory in light of the paucity of decisions”
from the Eleventh Circuit on geofence warrants (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
3007744 (M.D. Ala. July 28, 2022). So we will first explain how a
geofence warrant generally operates and then consider the Fourth
Amendment implications.
1.
A geofence warrant is a specific type of warrant used to col-

lect information on the presence of a cell phone or other device
within a specific area during a set time frame, typically correspond-
ing with the timing and location of a crime. See, e.g., Matter of Search
of Info. That is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google LLC, 579 F.
Supp. 3d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 2021). These warrants seek data from a
company, like Google, that has access to device location through
the company’s users. See United States v. Rhine, 2023 WL 372044, at
*66–67 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2023). Geofence warrants are particularly
useful when investigators know the location and time of a crime
but cannot identify a suspect. Id. at *66.
Although a court may order a company to turn over data in
other ways, geofence warrants served on Google have typically fol-
lowed a three-step process. See, e.g., United States v. Chatrie, No. 22-
4489, ___ F. 4th ___, 2024 WL 3335653, at *2–3 (4th Cir. July 9,
2024). First, law enforcement specifies the geographic area and
timeframe for the search, directing the company where and when
to gather data. Second, the company provides law enforcement
with an anonymized list of users or devices that match the war-

rant’s temporal and geographical criteria. At this point, law en-
forcement may seek additional information about specific users
outside of the initial search parameters. Third, law enforcement
analyzes that information and requests that the company “un-
mask” certain users and release further identifying information.
Law enforcement then uses that identifying information to deter-
mine whether any of the users may be connected to the crime.
Law enforcement and Google followed that process here.
The geofence warrant directed Google to gather user information
within fifteen to forty minutes, and within a forty-to-one-hundred-
meter radius of six specified locations. These times and locations
corresponded to video surveillance and other evidence from the
January 23, 2020, robbery and carjacking, and each location was a
section of a public road the suspect travelled on in carrying out the
crimes. Google provided an anonymized list of users present at the
specified times and locations. Law enforcement identified three de-
vices on the list that appeared to be connected to the investigation,
and Google “unmasked” the identifying information for those de-
vices.
A Gmail account on one of those devices was open in the
getaway car when video surveillance captured the suspect entering
the car. The device belonged to Davis’s girlfriend, and the Gmail
account on the device was registered to her daughter. Law enforce-
ment later determined that the device was in the areas where the
January 23 carjacking and robbery occurred, as well as in the area
where the stolen car was later recovered. This is the evidence that
Davis seeks to suppress.
2.
We now turn to whether Davis has Fourth Amendment

standing to challenge the search of Google’s records. The Fourth
Amendment’s protections “extend to any thing or place with re-
spect to which a person has a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy[.]’”
Ross, 963 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211). We thus
answer the standing question by deciding whether Davis has a cog-
nizable Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the place, items, or
property searched under the geofence warrant. We hold that he
does not.
We will start with the third-party doctrine. A geofence war-
rant authorizes the government to search information in the data-
base of a communications company, not in the possession of the
user. Ordinarily, a person cannot challenge the search of a third
party, even if it divulges “information he voluntarily turn[ed] over
to [that] third part[y].” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44
(1979); see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)
(“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not
be vicariously asserted.”). The government routinely makes infor-
mal requests and issues subpoenas to businesses to get information
about their customers, such as bank records. The background pre-
sumption in our law is that the government may access voluntarily
disclosed electronic data in the same way without implicating an
individual’s privacy interest. See United States v. Trader, 981 F.3d
961, 967–68 (11th Cir. 2020) (third-party doctrine allows govern-

ment to find email address and internet protocol address that were
disclosed to Kik); United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 610 (7th
Cir. 2019) (no Fourth Amendment “search” when T-Mobile volun-
tarily shared cell-site data). In other words, we start from the pre-
sumption that an individual like Davis cannot challenge a search of
Google’s records.
Davis argues that, notwithstanding Google’s status as a third
party, he has a privacy interest that allows him to challenge this
geofence warrant. Specifically, he argues that he “possessed a pri-
vacy interest in the tracking of his movements through the move-
ments of” his girlfriend’s phone. We disagree. We consider the ap-
plicability of three individual privacy interests and hold that none
of them apply to the geofence search at issue in this appeal.
First, and most obviously, the third-party doctrine does not
apply to a search of a person’s private information in the possession
of a third party if that person did not voluntarily disclose that infor-
mation to the third party. The Supreme Court has recognized that
we have a privacy interest in the “digital content on cell phones.”
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). But, under the third-
party doctrine, this interest is not protectible if the individual vol-
untarily disclosed that information to the third party that is the tar-
get of the search.
In the usual case, we would need to assess whether the in-
formation in Google’s possession was voluntarily disclosed. But we
need not address that question here because the geofence warrant
revealed a third party’s Gmail account registered in someone else’s

name on a phone that Davis did not own or exclusively use. Even
if a person has a privacy interest in the data on his own phone, he
does not have that interest in the data on someone else’s phone.
Because the geofence revealed the location of an open program
that was not Davis’s and was not on a phone in his exclusive pos-
session or control, he cannot argue that he had a privacy interest in
this data that gives him Fourth Amendment standing to challenge
the search. In other words, because the information that Google
disclosed wasn’t Davis’s to begin with, it doesn’t matter whether
the information was voluntarily or involuntarily provided to
Google.
Second, Davis argues that a geofence warrant may invade
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy if it effectively
tracks that individual’s movements over an extended period of
time. The Supreme Court has held that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the whole of his physical movements that
may be implicated by near-constant electronic surveillance. See
Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310–13 (2018); United States
v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 430
(Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Because we are so attached to
our cell phones, “when the Government tracks the location of a
cell phone” for an extended period, “it achieves near perfect sur-
veillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s
user.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311–12.
Again, however, this geofence warrant doesn’t implicate

those Fourth Amendment concerns. As the district court explained,
the scope of this search was far more restricted than “near perfect
surveillance.” That is, the geofence warrant captured only infor-
mation within one hundred meters of specific locations for fifteen
to forty minutes at each location. Cf. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 316 (de-
clining to address “tower dumps” or “a download of information
on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a
particular interval”). One of our sister circuits recently agreed that
a limited search via a geofence warrant served on Google that seeks
a user’s location history does not implicate the same privacy con-
cerns raised in Carpenter. See Chatrie, 2024 WL 3335653.
Moreover, this warrant did not track Davis’s personal move-
ments because the information it returned was not linked to his
own cell phone, an account in his name, or something he exclu-
sively used. Instead, the location of Davis’s girlfriend’s phone could
“be translated” into Davis’s location “only indirectly,” and Davis
lacks a privacy interest in this kind of indirect location data in the
records of a third party. Trader, 981 F.3d at 968.
Third, it is axiomatic that a person has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his home. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33
(2001). And that reasonable expectation of privacy generally pre-
vents the government from using new technology “to explore de-
tails of the home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion.” Id. at 40.
Of course, the geofence warrant here did not seek data from
Davis’s home or any other area in which Davis had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The warrant sought Google user location
information for six public locations and up to one hundred meters
around those areas. To the extent the warrant returned infor-
mation about someone’s private property, it was not Davis’s. Ac-
cordingly, Davis cannot establish that he had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy based on the areas searched via the geofence war-
rant.
Although Davis lacks any of these interests, he argues that
he has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search be-
cause he has a Google account, even though it was not the account
that Google identified and disclosed to law enforcement. Davis’s
theory is that Google’s initial search of its internal data touched all
Google accounts that exist, as it culled that data for accounts within
the geofence parameters. Even though only a subset of that data
was turned over to law enforcement, Davis argues that every
Google account holder has Fourth Amendment standing to chal-
lenge the geofence warrant that caused Google to look at its data.
We disagree for two reasons.
First, there is no evidence in the record to support Davis’s
claim that the geofence warrant required Google to search every
existing Google account. The warrant requested information only
for devices and accounts present within certain areas and during
specific times. The record does not establish how Google compiled
that information, so Davis’s assertion that his account must have

been implicated is speculative.
Second, even if Google did have to search every single ac-
count when it sought to determine which devices were subject to
the warrant, that search would not implicate Davis’s Fourth
Amendment rights. The Constitution is not concerned with a pri-
vate party’s search of its own records. See, e.g., Walter v. United
States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); Chatrie, 2024 WL 3335653, at *8,
n.16 (explaining that “Carpenter . . . held that a search only occurs
once the government accesses the requested information.”). It is un-
disputed that no information related to Davis’s device or account
was divulged to the government. The initial trove of data that
Google released was not only anonymous but also limited to the
areas and times specified in the warrant. Nothing in the record sug-
gests that Davis had a Google account or device within the
searched locations, and even if he did, neither Davis’s devices nor
his account were later “unmasked.” Even if Davis’s Google account
was swept up in Google’s preliminary review, the government’s
search did not touch on a privacy interest because the government
never received any information about his account.
To sum up, Davis lacks standing to challenge this geofence
warrant. The background presumption is that an individual has no
standing to challenge the search of records that he voluntarily gave
to a third party. And no arguable exception to that presumption
applies here. The mere fact that Google may have reviewed Davis’s
Google account is irrelevant if Google did not disclose information
about that account to law enforcement. Because the geofence war-

rant did not implicate Davis’s expectation of privacy in anything,
he lacks Fourth Amendment standing to challenge it.
B.
Davis next argues that his inculpatory statements to law en-

forcement after his arrest should be suppressed because the gov-
ernment violated his right to timely presentment under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).
Rule 5(a) imposes a duty on law enforcement to present a
person to a federal magistrate “without unnecessary delay” when
the person is arrested for a federal offense. Corley v. United States,
556 U.S. 303, 308 (2009). Section 3501(c) operates as a six-hour “safe
harbor” period following a person’s arrest or detention, wherein
statements made “shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay
in bringing such person before a magistrate judge.”
18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). That period may extend beyond six hours if the
delay in presentment to a judicial officer is “reasonable considering
the means of transportation and the distance to be traveled to the
nearest available such magistrate judge or other officer.” Id. Thus,
if a defendant makes incriminating statements beyond the safe har-
bor period and before presentment to the magistrate judge, those
statements must be suppressed if the delay was unreasonable or
unnecessary. See Corley, 556 U.S. at 322.
The general rule is that the presentment requirements of
Section 3501(c) and Rule 5(a) do not apply “[u]ntil a person is ar-
rested or detained for a federal crime.” United States v. Alvarez-
Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358 (1994) (emphasis added). This is true
even when the person is arrested and held on state charges but of-
ficers “believe or have cause to believe that the person also may
have violated federal law.” Id. Indeed, “[a]s long as a person is ar-
rested and held only on state charges by state or local authorities,”
Section 3501(c) and Rule 5(a) are not triggered. Id.
An exception to this general rule “might” exist “if the de-
fendant [can] demonstrate the existence of improper collusion be-
tween federal and state or local officers.” Id. at 359 (citing Anderson
v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943)). Such a situation may arise “if
state or local authorities, acting in collusion with federal officers,
were to arrest and detain someone in order to allow the federal
agents to interrogate him in violation of his right to a prompt fed-
eral presentment.” Id. But “routine cooperation between local and
federal authorities” does not rise to this standard because “[o]nly
by such an interchange of information can society be adequately
protected against crime.” Id. at 360 (internal quotations omitted).
We have explained that “[t]he necessary inquiry is whether the co-
operation between state and federal officials had as its purpose a
mere interchange of information and resources between two legit-
imate investigations, one state and the other federal, or to permit
in-custody investigation and interrogation by federal officials with-
out compliance with Rule 5(a).” Barnett v. United States, 384 F.2d
848, 858 (5th Cir. 1967). That purpose is to be “determined objec-
tively from all surrounding circumstances,” and neither “[a] high
degree of cooperation by state officials in making the subjects avail-
able for interrogation by federal officers” nor the fact “that the
individuals were taken into state custody because of information

furnished to state officials by federal officers” is conclusive. Id. The
burden is on the defendant to prove a violation of Rule 5(a). Id. at
859.
About eight hours after he was detained, Davis made incul-
patory statements admitting to two of the three carjackings. Alt-
hough he was arrested by state law enforcement officers for state
law offenses, he alleges that there was improper collusion between
state and federal officials, such that Rule 5(a) and Section 3501(c)
make his statements inadmissible. Davis points to federal and state
officials working together on the investigation; state law enforce-
ment obtaining federal warrants from a federal judge; Faggert, who
led the investigation, working as a state officer and an FBI agent,
aware of potential federal prosecution; and the case ultimately pro-
ceeding on federal charges instead of state charges. Thus, Davis
says that the federal presentment rules apply, that law enforcement
violated those rules in obtaining his inculpatory statements, and
the statements should therefore be suppressed. We disagree.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings
that there was no evidence of improper collusion between federal
and local authorities. We cannot say that these findings were
clearly erroneous. The magistrate judge found that in 2014 the lo-
cal authorities began to investigate the robberies and carjackings
Davis committed and the FBI did not begin its investigation until
three years later. It also found that the testimony established that it
was routine for local law enforcement to arrive at crime scenes,
gather evidence, and interview witnesses before involving the FBI,

so there was no evidence the FBI initiated the state investigation.
Additionally, the magistrate judge noted that Davis was arrested
and detained for state offenses at the time he made his inculpatory
statements. Thus, the magistrate judge concluded that Davis did
not establish that the FBI manipulated its collaborative relationship
with local law enforcement, a collusion between local and federal
authorities to cause his confession, or that he would not have been
arrested had the FBI not assisted the investigation.
On these facts, we agree with the district court that this is an
investigation and prosecution where there was “routine coopera-
tion between local and federal authorities” that should be encour-
aged to “adequately protect[] [society] against crime.” Alvarez-
Sanchez, 511 U.S. at 360. State law enforcement began its investiga-
tion into the string of carjackings and robberies three years before
any federal involvement. When federal law enforcement did be-
come involved, it was to provide additional resources to supple-
ment the state investigation. True, Faggert played a large role act-
ing both as a state and a federal law enforcement officer. Yet the
federal and state authorities maintained different responsibilities
throughout the investigation—state authorities focused on re-
sponding to the crimes, interviewing witnesses, and developing
leads, and federal authorities focused on gathering digital infor-
mation. Thus, although the federal resources played a key role in
Davis’s arrest, there is no evidence suggesting that the state would
not have pursued Davis but-for the federal investigators’ efforts.
The record establishes the opposite: Davis was arrested by state
authorities on state warrants for state crimes and held in state cus-
tody. That federal authorities could have and did bring federal
charges is of no consequence. See id. at 358.
Davis has not satisfied his burden to establish that federal
and state law enforcement improperly colluded in the investiga-
tion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of his motion
to suppress his inculpatory statements made to law enforcement
after his arrest.
C.
Finally, we turn to Davis’s argument that the district court

should have acquitted him of carjacking. A federal carjacking con-
viction under 18 U.S.C. § 2119 requires the government to prove
the defendant “(1) with intent to cause death or serious bodily
harm (2) took a motor vehicle (3) that had been transported,
shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce (4) from the
person or presence of another (5) by force and violence or intimi-
dation.” United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1096 (11th Cir. 2001).
Section 2119’s intent element is objective: “[t]he intent of the de-
fendant . . . is to be judged objectively from the visible conduct of
the actor and what one in the position of the victim might reason-
ably conclude.” United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1344 (11th
Cir. 1982).
Davis says the government did not meet this burden for the
three carjacking counts because the evidence does not support the
inference that the victims could have reasonably believed Davis
would kill or seriously harm them. We disagree. We have held that
Section 2119’s intent element is satisfied when the government pre-

sents evidence that the defendant put a gun to a victim’s face and
told the victim to get out of the car, and the victim testified that he
feared for his life. See United States v. Fulford, 267 F.3d 1241, 1244
(11th Cir. 2001). The government presented similar evidence here
for each of the carjackings. During the January 23, 2020, carjacking,
Davis gestured towards a gun in his waistband and demanded the
vehicle. The victim testified that she believed that if she did not
comply, Davis would have shot her. During the October 30, 2020,
carjacking, Davis pointed two pistols at the 15-year-old victim’s
face and demanded the car. The victim’s father was at the scene
and testified that, if they had not given up the car, Davis probably
would have shot his son. During the November 11, 2020, carjack-
ing, Davis pointed a gun at the victim’s head and told him, “don’t
think about it.” The victim testified that he thought he would have
been shot if he did not comply.
This evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude
that Davis had the intent to kill or seriously harm each of the vic-
tims of the three carjackings.
IV.
The district court is AFFIRMED.

23-10184 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

I join all of the court’s opinion except for Part III.A. As to
Part III.A, I concur in the judgment. Although I agree that Mr. Da-
vis lacks an enforceable Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
that entitles him to suppression of the evidence at issue, my rea-
soning differs somewhat from that of the court.
I
Geofence warrants present difficult constitutional issues, as
evidenced by the Fourth Circuit’s recent 2-1 ruling that such a war-
rant does not result in a Fourth Amendment search. See United
States v. Chatrie, No. 22-4489, ___ F. 4th ___, 2024 WL 3335653 (4th
Cir. July 9, 2024). If a challenge to a geofence warrant reaches this
court in the future, we need to be precise in describing the technol-
ogy on the ground and the way companies respond.
Let’s start with the basics. “A geofence warrant is based on
the concept of a selected virtual perimeter along with the tradi-
tional notion of a search warrant. It seeks cell phone location in-
formation that is stored by third-party companies and identifies
everyone at a location (provided that they have a cell phone and it
is turned on) during a particular time. In other words, law enforce-
ment officials use a geofence search warrant to target a crime scene
instead of a specific suspect, striving to work backwards in the
hopes of developing a suspect[.]” Brian L. Owsley, The Best Offense
is a Good Defense: Fourth Amendment Implications of Geofence War-
rants, 50 Hofstra L. Rev. 829, 833 (2022).
2 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-10184
A
Geofence warrants served on Google follow a three-step
process, but that’s only because Google has required law enforce-
ment to follow its own three-step internal procedures. See United
States v. Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 914 (E.D. Va. 2022). See also
Haley Amster & Brett Diehl, Against Geofences, 74 Stan. L. Rev. 385,
389 (2022) (“In response to increasing government requests for in-
formation, Google has crafted a three-step, self-directed process for
law-enforcement officials trying to obtain user data.”). A former
Google legal specialist explained in the Chatrie case that the com-
pany “instituted a policy of objecting to any warrant that failed to
include deidentification and narrowing measures”—e.g., the com-
pany’s own three-step process. See Declaration of Sarah Rodriguez,
D.E. 96-2 at ¶ 5, United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19cr130 (E.D. Va.).
Google’s ability to comply with geofence warrants has his-
torically relied on a feature called Location History (LH). Google
developed the three-step “narrowing protocol” to comply with
geofence warrants reliant on LH data “[i]n light of the significant
differences between [cell site location information (CSLI)] and
Google LH data”—namely that LH data “can be considerably more
precise” than CSLI. See Brief for Google LLC as Amicus Curiae Sup-
porting Neither Party Concerning Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Evidence from a “Geofence” General Warrant, 2019 WL 8227162,
at 15, 17, filed in United States v. Chatrie, No. 3:19cr130 (E.D. Va.)
(Google Amicus Brief).1
As described in Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 914–16, here’s how
Google’s three-step process works. At step one, “law enforcement
obtains legal process compelling Google to disclose an anonymized
list of all Google user accounts for which there is saved LH infor-
mation indicating that their mobile devices were present in a de-
fined geographic area during a defined timeframe.” Google Amicus
Brief at 17. Once Google returns the anonymized list, “the govern-
ment reviews the anonymized production version to identify the
anonymized device numbers of interest.” Id. At step two, law en-
forcement can compel the company to provide additional infor-
mation outside the initial search parameters. See id. See also Chatrie,
2024 WL 3335653, at *3 (explaining that at step two, “the original
geographical and temporal limits no longer apply,” and “for any
user identified at [s]tep [o]ne, law enforcement can request infor-
mation about his movements inside and outside the geofence over
a broader period”). At step three, “the government can compel
Google to provide account-identifying information for the anony-
mized device numbers that it determines are relevant to the inves-
tigation”—typically, Gmail address and the first and last name pro-
vided on the account. See Google Amicus Brief at 19.
1 CSLI is the data that was at issue in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296
(2018).
B
It may be true, as some noted, that “Google’s process has
effectively become the current way geofence warrants are carried
out.” Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and Geofence Warrants: A
Critical Look at United States v. Chatrie, The Volokh Conspiracy
(Mar. 11, 2022), https://reason.com/volokh/2022/03/11/the-
fourth-amendment--and-geofence-warrants-a-critical-look-at-
united-states-v-chatrie. But there are at least three reasons why the
Google paradigm cannot generally describe how law enforcement
authorities will seek, or how judges will word, geofence warrants
for other providers or how those other providers will respond to
such warrants.
First, we only know how Google processes geofence war-
rants and how many it receives because Google has chosen to share
process details and related data. One recent law review article sum-
marized Google’s publicly available data this way:
According to data released by Google, geofence war-
rants “recently constitut[ed] more than 25% of all
[U.S.] warrants” received by the company. Google
disclosed that it received 982 geofence-warrant re-
quests in 2018. . . . In 2019, the number of geofence
warrants received by Google increased by a further
755% over the previous year to 8,396.14 In 2020, the
last year for which specific statistics are publicly avail-
able at the time of writing, Google received 11,554
geofence warrants.
Amster & Diehl, Against Geofences, 74 Stan. L. Rev. at 389–

90.
There is some data available regarding other companies, but
it is marginal. For example, Apple publishes some data on how
many geofence warrants it receives, but also states that it “does not
have any data to provide” in response to them. See Apple Transpar-
ency Report: Government and Private Party Requests, January 1–June 30,
2023 at 17–18 (last accessed Jul. 15, 2024), www.apple.com/le-
gal/transparency/pdf/requests-2023-H1-en.pdf (reporting that Ap-
ple received 16 geofence warrant requests in the first half of 2023).
No other company’s processes or data is as well-known or
well-understood as Google’s. We know that companies like Apple,
Uber, Lyft, Microsoft, and Yahoo have received geofence warrants,
but the details about how they respond are sketchy. See generally
Emily Brodner, Navigating the Terrain of Geofence Warrants, 7 Ariz.
L.J. Emerging Tech. 2, 4–5 (2024) (describing what is known about
Uber, Lyft, Microsoft, and Yahoo). We also don’t know if any fed-
eral or state enforcement authorities adhere to any specific proto-
col(s) when they serve geofence warrants on companies other than
Google. In short, we don’t have enough information to say that
there is a standard or across-the-board paradigm for geofence war-
rants.
Second, in December of 2023 Google limited its ability to
comply with geofence warrants by changing the way location data
is stored. See Marlo McGriff, Updates to Location History and New
Controls Coming Soon to Maps, Google: The Keyword (Dec. 12, 2023)
(explaining that Google users’ location history data will now be

stored on each user’s device and, when backed up on the cloud,
will be encrypted “so no one can read it, including Google”); Cha-
trie, WL 3335653, at *43 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (“Ironically, court
decisions like this one could also hinder legitimate law enforce-
ment efforts. Shortly after oral arguments in this case, Google—
apparently predicting the majority opinion's flawed reading of Car-
penter—shut down the technology that permits geofence intru-
sions, thereby reducing the potential for legitimate investigatory
uses of this innovative technology, even with a warrant.”). But it
is unclear whether this change will prevent Google from comply-
ing with geofence warrants going forward. See Brodner, Navigating
the Terrain of Geofence Warrants, 7 Ariz. L.J. Emerging Tech. at 3–4
(“Google continues to collect and store substantial amounts of lo-
cation data through other means and will likely still be able to re-
spond to geofence warrants. For instance, even if Location History
is saved on the user’s device, Google’s privacy policy states: ‘Loca-
tion History doesn’t impact how location information is saved or
used by Web & App Activity or other Google products, e.g., based
on your IP address. You may still have other settings that save lo-
cation information.’ Despite the policy change, Google is likely still
equipped to respond to geofence warrants.”).
Third, Google’s three-step process may guide some
geofence responses, but there is no meaningful guarantee that this
process will always be followed. Though “all geofence warrants
provide a search radius and time period, they otherwise vary
greatly.” Note, Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, 134
Harv. L. Rev. 2508, 2514 (2021). And even Google noted in its ami-
cus brief in Chatrie that at step two it may be compelled to provide
additional information outside the initial search parameters. See
Google Amicus Brief at 18 (“[L]aw enforcement can compel Google
to provide additional contextual location coordinates beyond the
time and geographic scope of the original request.”). Bounds,
therefore, are sometimes pushed:
Some, for example, will expand the search area by
asking for devices located “outside the search parame-
ters but within a ‘margin of error.’” They also vary in
the evidence that they request. Some ask for an initial
anonymized list of accounts, which law enforcement
will whittle down and eventually deanonymize. Oth-
ers ask for lists of all implicated users, their phone
numbers, IP addresses, and more.
Note, Geofence Warrants, 134 Harv. L. Rev. at 2514–15. “Google
purports to ‘always push back on overly broad requests,” but it is
“unclear how Google determines whether a request is ‘overly
broad.’” Id. at 2515 & n.67. 2
2 In at least one case where a geofence warrant was issued to Google, law
enforcement authorities devised a modified two-step process to narrow the
list of individuals whose data they would obtain. See In re Search of Information
that is Stored at the Premises Controlled by Google LLC, 579 F. Supp. 3d 62, 87
(D.D.C. 2021) (“[A]ny overbreadth concerns raised by the requested geofence
are further addressed by the warrant’s two-step search procedure, which en-
sures identifying information associated with devices found within the
geofence will be produced only pursuant to a further directive from the
In sum, geofence warrants do not typically play out in a cer-

tain way.
C
The court says that “there is no evidence in the record to
support [Mr. Davis’] claim that the geofence warrant required
Google to search every existing Google account.” But the court is
mistaken on this point. As the Fourth Circuit recognized, Google
does have to search every one of its accounts in order to comply
with a geofence warrant for a particular location during a specific
time window. See Chatrie, 2024 WL 3335653, at *2 (“Google does
not keep any lists like this on-hand. So it must first comb through
its entire Location History repository to identify users who were
present in the geofence.”).
Indeed, that Google has to look at all of its accounts is a mat-
ter of public record—one that Google has explained in detail in
court filings. See Google Amicus Brief at 19 (“Google has no way to
identify which of its users were present in the area of interest with-
out searching the LH information stored by every Google user who
has chosen to store that information with Google.”) (emphasis
added). See also Rodriguez Declaration at ¶ 7 (“Google must con-
duct the search across all LH data to identify users with LH data
during the relevant timeframe, and run a computation against
every set of stored LH coordinates to determine which records
Court.”). So even for Google geofence warrants the three-step process is not
always followed.
match the geographic parameters in the warrant. Google does not

know which users may have such saved LH data before conducting
the search and running the computations.”). The literature on
geofence warrants also demonstrates that Mr. Davis’ assertion is
correct. See, e.g., Note, Geofence Warrants, 134 Harv. L. Rev. at 2515
(“[B]ecause it has no way of knowing which accounts will produce
responsive data, Google searches the entirety of Sensorvault, its lo-
cation history database, to produce an anonymized list of the ac-
counts—along with relevant coordinate, timestamp, and source in-
formation—present during the specified timeframe in one or more
areas delineated by law enforcement.”); Amster & Diehl, Against
Geofences, 74 Stan. L. Rev. at 401 n.74 (“Geofence warrants do not
necessarily limit the data searched to the subset of users actually
present in the geofence. Depending on how a corporation indexes
data, all accounts may need to be queried to identify records that
match the warrant’s specified place and time. This is the case for
Google, which has stated that its database is structured such that it
requires a search of all users to produce the initial data dump.”).
Sgt. Faggert, who requested the geofence warrant in this
case, seemed to understand the breadth of his requested search. As
the magistrate judge explained, “[Sgt.] Faggert testified that this
first set of results could have included anyone within the specified
geographical coordinates and timeframe who possessed a cellular
device enabled with Google’s location capabilities.” D.E. 138 at 7.
Specifically, Sgt. Faggert recognized that “the warrant ask[ed]
Google to search its database for users that are identified in that
area with the established parameters for information,” and agreed
that “the reason a geofence warrant is requested is because law en-

forcement cannot identify a suspect at the time of the investiga-
tion.” D.E. 120 at 12.
Finally, the magistrate judge’s report, which was adopted by
the district court, details the three-step process as it was explained
in the warrant. See D.E. 138 at 5–6. Step one, mirroring Google’s
own language, provides that “Google shall query location history
data based on the Initial Search Parameters.” D.E. 138 at 5. Based
on what we know, it is not clear to me how Google could be ex-
pected to comply with step one—to find which accounts (and
thereby potentially which users) were present within the geofence
during the specified time period—without searching all accounts
to see which ones fell into the “Initial Search Parameters.” After
all, Google cannot know, without first reviewing all of its accounts,
which ones satisfy the search parameters.
In sum, Mr. Davis is correct in asserting that Google
searches all of its accounts in order to respond at step one to a
geofence warrant which seeks to learn which users were within a
particular geographic location during a specific period of time.
D
The court characterizes the six searched areas as “public lo-
cations.” I’m not sure this is completely accurate. It is true that
there is no evidence in the record that any of Mr. Davis’ own pri-
vate spaces (such as a business or home) was electronically
searched, but at least some of the six searched areas included
homes and private businesses. Sgt. Faggert acknowledged as much
at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. See D.E. 120

at 22–24 (testifying that homes are present in some of the specified
areas). For example, Location 3 covered the following geographic
area, which clearly and visibly included houses:
D.E. 131-14 at 3, 7 (warrant requesting a geofence with the initial

parameters of the third location as “[b]etween 01/23/2020 at 2106
hours Central Time or 01/24/2020 at 0306 hours UTC and
01/23/2020 at 2146 hours Central Time or 01/24/2020 at 0346
hours UTC located within the geographical region bounded by and
within the geographical radius of 100 meters of (32.350394, -
86.234718)”).
So, though the geofence warrant here may not have impli-
cated Mr. Davis’ dwelling—the “first among equals” for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013)—

the record shows that some people’s homes and businesses were
within the geographic areas that were the subject of the warrant. I
leave for another day the constitutional implications of this reality,
but I do not think it is correct to characterize the areas targeted
here as purely public. Cf. Elizabeth N. Jones, Crim Pro, Rewired:
Why Current Police Practices Require Candor in the Classroom, 21 Seat-
tle J. Social Justice 541, 562 (2023) (“If one’s home is within a police-
generated geofence location, can the data from a cell phone inside
the house be gathered?”).
II
The magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Davis had not
shown that “any of his data was in the parameters” of the search
undertaken by Google in response to the geofence warrant. See
D.E. 138 at 19. That statement, however, is only partly correct.
Nevertheless, I conclude that the geofence warrant here did not
cause an invasion of Mr. Davis’ privacy in the Fourth Amendment
sense so as to warrant suppression.
A
As a general matter, a defendant seeking to suppress evi-
dence under the Fourth Amendment must show that he had an ex-
pectation of privacy in the place searched. See Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (“Petitioner, of course, bears the burden of
proving not only that the search of Cox’s purse was illegal, but also
that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that purse.”);
United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008) (“The
accused bears the burden of demonstrating a legitimate expecta-

tion of privacy in the area searched.”). For Mr. Davis, that required
some evidence that he had a Google account such that Google’s
step one search would have required a review of his account.
In the district court, Mr. Davis claimed that he possessed a
Google account, but that assertion was made only in his reply to
the government’s response to his motion to suppress, see D.E. 110
at 1, or by his counsel to the magistrate judge, see D.E. 135 at 58,
and was not supported by any testimony of his own. “[A]bsent a
stipulation or agreement, unsupported factual statements in a
memorandum of law do not constitute evidence[.]” McKenny v.
United States, 973 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2020). The same goes
for counsel’s “factual assertions at a . . . hearing.” United States v.
Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013).
Mr. Davis did not take the stand at the suppression hearing.
And because there was no testimony from him that he had a
Google account, the magistrate judge concluded that he did not
show “that any of his data was in the parameters of the Google . . .
search” or that “a device that was associated with his data was
somehow searched or seized.” D.E. 138 at 19.
This conclusion, however, was only partially correct. At the
suppression hearing, Sgt. Faggert testified that he had requested a
search warrant for multiple Gmail accounts belonging to Mr. Da-
vis. See D.E. 120 at 46 (testimony); D.E. 131-11 (FBI 302 report ex-
plaining that a search warrant was issued for several Gmail ac-
counts). And he confirmed that “Mr. Davis was a Google
subscriber or account holder.” D.E. 120 at 46–47. This testimony

was sufficient to establish that Mr. Davis had one or more Google
accounts and that, as a result, his accounts were reviewed by
Google at step one of its response to the geofence warrant. Those
accounts, though, were not the subject of Mr. Davis’ motion to
suppress.
B
Under the exclusionary rule, “evidence seized as the result
of an illegal search may not be used by the government in a subse-
quent criminal prosecution.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308,
1312 (11th Cir. 2002). The evidence that Mr. Davis sought to sup-
press was not information related to or gleaned from his own
Gmail accounts with Google. Instead, Mr. Davis asked the district
court to suppress the evidence obtained from Google at step three
of the geofence warrant showing that a device with an accessed
Gmail account—described as the “Yonna Gmail account—that he
was not associated with was located in a sedan that the suspect
used to depart the area of a robbery on January 23, 2020. See D.E.
138 at 8–9 & n.11.
In order for Mr. Davis to successfully mount a Fourth
Amendment challenge based on a protected expectation of privacy,
he had to at least show that he owned or used the “Yonna Gmail
account” or that he borrowed or used the cellphone which had that
account open within the time periods specified in the geofence
warrant. See Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104. But Mr. Davis did not tes-
tify to either of these matters at the suppression hearing, and
therefore failed to carry his burden on expectation of privacy. Cf.

United States v. Gibson, 996 F.3d 451, 462 (7th Cir. 2021) (expressing
skepticism that the defendants had a Fourth Amendment expecta-
tion of privacy given that “[t]here was no evidence . . . that either
defendant personally possessed or used the -5822 phone during the
90-day tracking period” or “ever used the phone for personal, ra-
ther than commercial, purposes”); United States v. Beaudion, 979
F.3d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 2020) (explaining a defendant’s assertion
that he sometimes used his girlfriend’s phone for personal activities
did not confer a reasonable expectation of privacy when “[t]here
[wa]s no indication that [he] ever used or possessed the phone out-
side of [his girlfriend’s] presence”); United States v. Dore, 586 F.
App’x 42, 46 (2d Cir. 2014) (“As Dore conceded below, he did not
submit an affidavit establishing that the cell phones in question be-
longed to him or that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in
them. Nor did Dore assert a privacy interest in the cell phones in
some other manner. Consequently, Dore does not have standing
to assert Fourth Amendment rights in those phone records.”).
The court goes further and says that “[e]ven if a person has
a privacy interest in the data on his own phone, he does not have
that interest in the data on someone else’s phone.” I’m not sure
this dicta is correct. A person can open up his or her own data (say,
for example, a Gmail account or an app) using a cellphone bor-
rowed from someone else, and it seems to me that such a person
may maintain an expectation of privacy in the data. In any event,
because Mr. Davis presented no evidence suggesting that he used
the “Yonna Gmail account” or borrowed the cellphone which had
the account open, there is no need to discuss any other aspects of

the privacy question.
C
I have concerns about the lack of particularity in the
geofence warrant issued in this case, largely for the reasons set out
in Chatrie, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 927–36, and in In re Search of Infor-
mation Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, 481 F. Supp. 3d 730,
740–56 (N.D. Ill. 2020). I also have concerns about the fact that the
geofence warrant that was filed with the clerk of court was not the
same version that Sgt. Faggert served on Google. See D.E. 138 at
11. But because Mr. Davis lacks a protected expectation of privacy
in the “Yonna Gmail account” and in the cellphone which accessed
that account, I do not reach these issues.
III
I concur in the judgment as to Part III.A and join the rest of
the court’s opinion.

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USCA11 Case: 23-10184 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 07/30/2024 Page: 1 of 40

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appeal from the United States District Court

2 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 3

The Montgomery Police Department began investigating a

4 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

the MPD responded to robberies, interviewed witnesses, and de-

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 5

the times and locations designated in the warrant. Faggert analyzed

6 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

A final carjacking and robbery took place on November 11,

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 7

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951; and seven counts of bran-

8 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

Davis raises three issues in his appeal. First, he argues the

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 9

We begin with Davis’s argument that the district court erred

10 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 11

A geofence warrant is a specific type of warrant used to col-

12 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

with an anonymized list of users or devices that match the war-

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 13

We now turn to whether Davis has Fourth Amendment

14 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

961, 967–68 (11th Cir. 2020) (third-party doctrine allows govern-

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 15

revealed a third party’s Gmail account registered in someone else’s

16 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

Again, however, this geofence warrant doesn’t implicate

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 17

18 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

that information, so Davis’s assertion that his account must have

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 19

about that account to law enforcement. Because the geofence war-

Davis next argues that his inculpatory statements to law en-

20 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 21

individuals were taken into state custody because of information

22 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

gather evidence, and interview witnesses before involving the FBI,

23-10184 Opinion of the Court 23

Finally, we turn to Davis’s argument that the district court

24 Opinion of the Court 23-10184

Section 2119’s intent element is satisfied when the government pre-

The district court is AFFIRMED.

23-10184 JORDAN, J., Concurring 1

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring:

2 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-10184

23-10184 JORDAN, J., Concurring 3

4 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-10184

23-10184 JORDAN, J., Concurring 5

Amster & Diehl, Against Geofences, 74 Stan. L. Rev. at 389–

6 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-10184

(explaining that Google users’ location history data will now be

23-10184 JORDAN, J., Concurring 7

8 JORDAN, J., Concurring 23-10184