Democratization

ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Conquering versus democratizing the

state: political Islamists and fourth wave
democratization in Turkey and Tunisia

Murat Somer

To cite this article: Murat Somer (2017) Conquering versus democratizing the state: political
Islamists and fourth wave democratization in Turkey and Tunisia, Democratization, 24:6,
1025-1043, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2016.1259216

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1259216

Published online: 15 Dec 2016.

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DEMOCRATIZATION, 2017
VOL. 24, NO. 6, 1025–1043
https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1259216

Conquering versus democratizing the state: political

Islamists and fourth wave democratization in Turkey and
Tunisia
Murat Somera,b
a
Political Science and International Relations, Koç University, Istanbul, Turkey; bWeatherhead Center
for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA

ABSTRACT
What do we learn from Turkey and Tunisia regarding the relationship between political
Islamism and democratization? Variables identified by current research such as
autonomy, “moderation”, and cooperation with secular actors can cut both ways
depending on various political-institutional conditions and prerogatives. Particularly,
the article argues that preoccupation with “conquering the state from within as
opposed to democratizing it” has been a key priority and intervening variable
undermining the democratizing potential of the main Turkish and Tunisian political
Islamic actors – primarily the AKP and Ennahda. These actors have prioritized
acceptance by and ownership of their respective nation states over other goals and
strategies, such as revolutionary takeover or Islamization of the state and
confrontations with state elites. This has led to a relative neglect of designing
and building institutions, whether for Islamic or democratic transformation. Hence,
while contributing to democratization at various stages, these actors have a
predisposition to adopt and regenerate, reframe and at times augment the
authoritarian properties of their states. Research should ask how secular and
religious actors can agree on institutions of vertical and horizontal state
accountability that would help to address the past and present sources of the
interest of political Islamists in conquering rather than democratizing the state.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 31 May 2016; Accepted 14 October 2016

KEYWORDS Turkey; Tunisia; political Islamism; religious politics; Ennahda; AKP; moderation; statism

Introduction
In order to explain the behaviour of religious political actors during democratization
struggles, current research highlights variables such as autonomy from state, pen-
etration of society, “moderation”, and ability to cooperate with secular actors.1 In
terms of these variables, the main religious actors in Turkey and Tunisia – pending a
more elaborate discussion, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and
the Ennahda Party in Tunisia – should have considerable potential to contribute to
the democratizations of their countries.
The political theologies of these actors have been quite malleable and pragmatic,
responsive to liberal and pro-democratic ideas and discourses, and relatively open to

CONTACT Murat Somer musomer@ku.edu.tr

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
1026 M. SOMER

reinterpreting religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy.2 Both countries have traditions of

Islam many commentators have hailed as relatively tolerant and flexible.3 In so far as
they were not part of the state Islam discussed below, they developed significant finan-
cial and organizational autonomy from their respective states, even though, especially,
Turkish Islamists simultaneously cultivated symbiotic relations with the state. They are
credited with having built highly effective grassroots movements and strong links with
society.4 They have demonstrated considerable ability to cooperate with secular political
actors. Furthermore, many scholars have praised them for their “post-Islamist” orien-
tation and for their argued ability to harmonize Islam, pluralism, and democracy on
ideational grounds.5 Indeed, these actors have at various stages supported their
countries’ democratizations in significant ways.
The record, however, is highly mixed. In addition to their democratic contributions,
these actors have been criticized for their exclusionary behaviour and discourses and a
tendency to compromise with authoritarian state structures. What’s more, in recent
years Turkey has been undergoing a drastic democratic reversal under AKP govern-
ments.6 The dramatic coup attempt in July 2016, which seems to have involved
members of the Islamic Gülen movement, shocked insiders and outside observers
alike. The government had long supported and worked together with Gülenists, but
in recent years has been accusing them, among other alleged crimes, of trying to
seize the state from inside.
What explains this discrepancy between theoretical expectations and actual perform-
ance and what does all this say about the way we should conceptualize and theorize the
relationship between political Islamism and democratization?
This article develops the thesis that Turkish and Tunisian Islamists seem to share a
characteristic, which appears to be a key intervening variable undermining or reversing
the democratic potentials of political Islamic actors. At least partially in response to
their countries’ respective histories and processes of pro-secular nation-state building,
these actors seem to have developed a prerogative, which may be described as “preoc-
cupation with conquering the state as opposed to democratizing it.”
Pending more elaborate discussion later, suffice it to say here that these actors seem
to prioritize gaining the acceptance of state elites and the ownership of their respective
nation states over alternative goals and strategies, such as confronting state elites and
pursuing revolutionary takeover or radical remaking of the state. This is not to say
that other goals, such as various understandings of Islamization and democratization,
are necessarily absent or unimportant. But these other objectives seem to remain
vaguely and flexibly defined and secondary to the ideal of state conquest. The thesis
here develops and complements related arguments in recent research such as “moder-
ation as compromise with a country’s center”, “statism”, and “bargained competition”
as I will expand on below.7
Hence, Turkish and Tunisian religious actors can have considerable democratizing
potential as predicted by extant theories, but this is a contingent capacity. Like their
secular counterparts, they can contribute to both authoritarianism and democratiza-
tion. In order to better gauge their democratizing potential in terms of the argument
developed here, it may be useful to work with a conceptualization of democratization
that highlights state accountability. As we will see, more often than not, Turkish and
Tunisian political Islamists appear to have been preoccupied with the question of
who controls and represents the state rather than the question of how to make the
state more responsive and accountable, whoever governs it.
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1027

Hence, by drawing on relevant definitions, democratization can be conceptualized as

a continuous and non-linear process of social and political-institutional changes. These
should bring about an increasingly more equal and democratic relationship between a
state and its people by developing a well-working balance of vertical and horizontal
accountability mechanisms, among other ways.8 This definition makes clear that demo-
cratization requires meaningful, lasting, and inclusive transformations in a state’s ideol-
ogy as well as institutional-organizational setup. Moreover, these transformations
should improve its level of accountability and nature of interactions (from coercion
to dialogue and accommodation) with its citizens.
Even though Turkey and Tunisia both have had democratic achievements in their
own ways, both countries to differing degrees suffer from severe democratic deficits
in terms of this definition of democratization. The “strong states” in these countries
have maintained their insufficiently transparent structures and their ability to violate
rights and freedoms. Furthermore, the main religious actors in these countries – like
many secular actors – have not been inclined to effectively address these critical deficits.
This has been true, for example in the case of Turkey’s AKP, even during periods when
they made significant contributions to democratization through major legal-political
reforms and greater responsiveness to selected societal groups. A major inhibitor has
been their propensity to pursue state conquest rather than state democratization.
Hence, in order to evaluate the democratization potential of religious actors, I would
argue, it is insufficient to merely ask whether or not they support democracy or
human rights as general concepts. It should be interrogated through which specific
institutional changes and concrete policies they propose to enhance the vertical and
horizontal accountability of the state, which would make formal improvements in
areas such as minority rights and civic freedoms both feasible and sustainable in the
long run.

Turkish and Tunisian Islamists and the notion of state conquest

Disregarding major differences such as different levels of economic development, size,
and geopolitical context, both the Turkish (est. 1923) and Tunisian (est. 1956) nation
states are relatively “strong states” with influential state institutions and traditions.
They harbour unequal and transformative powers vis-à-vis their societies.9 These
powers were used by secularist actors who dominated both states during relatively
long and transformative periods of state-led and pro-secular social-cultural and insti-
tutional modernization/westernization. Hence, in relation to other Arab countries,
“the secular nature of the Tunisian institutional context” makes it among the most com-
parable to the case of Turkey, despite certain differences.10 The main Islamic actors suf-
fered various degrees of social and political exclusion, which generated deep-cutting
secular-Islamic rifts and a sense of alienation among pious and Islamist groups.
Simultaneously and to differing degrees, the interventionist ideologies and insti-
tutional setups of the Turkish and Tunisian states vis-à-vis religion have not entirely
been opposed to the mainly “national” Islamization projects drawn up by the dominant
Turkish and Tunisian Islamists. When secularist actors dominate these institutions,
they may look staunchly secular. But when managed by Islamists, the same interven-
tionist powers can be utilized for promoting social-political Islamization and for rever-
sing social-cultural westernization. At various times, both states tried to develop and co-
opt nationalist versions of Islamism.11 Undoubtedly, these policies were partially
1028 M. SOMER

intended to contain political Islamism, socialism, or both. But they were conceivable
and possible because both regimes are based on particular models of state-religion
relationship. While upholding “laicism” as a major legal-ideological principle, these
models have also enabled these states to intervene in religious affairs so as to both
restrict Islam and promote ostensibly secularism-friendly versions of “state Islam”.12
Hence, Islamists held a sense of alienation from their states in both cases primarily
because of their relative political exclusion from, and the secular identity or image of,
state institutions. Following nationalist struggles to which they significantly contribu-
ted, they felt rejected by mainstream society and secular-westernizing elites. They
were not necessarily estranged because they rejected their states and opposed the unac-
countable state institutions, or because their states excluded Islam per se.13 Islamists
believed that they were the true and dispossessed owners, or leading elites, of the
state, and sooner or later it would be returned to them.
A legacy of this historical context seems to be that “compromising with and con-
quering the state from within” and likewise conquering the secular social-political
institutions became deeply desired prizes for Islamists. As a result, the goal of
state conquest prevails over both what may be called an “Islamist project”, that is,
a revolutionary takeover of the state in the name of Islamization, and what may
be called a democratic-transformative project, that is, a democratization of the
authoritarian state by changing the state–society relation on which it is based
among other ways via reforming and remaking institutions of horizontal and vertical
accountability.
Undoubtedly, the goal of state conquest does not necessarily make Islamists abandon
other objectives, and state conquest itself may serve these other goals Islamists continue
to harbour and pursue, such as various understandings and degrees of Islamization,
democratization, religious liberties, and economic benefits. But the thesis here is that
these other objectives remain relatively ambiguous, flexible, and subordinate to the
goal of conquering the state. Furthermore, their preoccupation with reclaiming
rather than democratizing the state renders religious actors less inclined to fight
against and/or try to reform the fundamental orientation of their states towards their
citizens.
The conceptualization and argument here complement several related concepts and
theses. One is “statism”: accepting “institutionalized participation in the nation-state”
(instead of pursuing universal, for example, “Ikhwani” Islamist priorities), and focusing
on challenging “the claims of the (usually more secularized) establishment to speak for
the nation”.14
Notions of statism usefully distinguish between state-oriented strategies focusing on
politics and bottom-up strategies focusing on social activism. They also depict how
many Islamists are concerned with challenging secular state elites and how they
thereby think and operate within the paradigm of the nation state.15 However, by
itself the concept of statism does not necessarily capture many Islamists’ long-term
ambitions to conquer the state and how this affects the strategies they use in different
political contexts and at different phases of democratization. Furthermore, it may draw
a misleading opposition between “statist” and “social activism-oriented” strategies,
which are often mutually supportive.16 Religious actors’ will to replace the secular
elite in their role of “speaking for the nation” includes an eagerness to replace secular
intelligentsia and social elites, which encourages social activism at both elite and grass-
roots levels. In turn, “institutionalized participation in the nation-state” helps faith-
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1029

based groups to expand their impact in the social sector, which in turn translates into
greater political success.17 Conquering the nation-state apparatus provides advantages
in social activism through government favouritism, clientelism, and formal and infor-
mal agreements between the public sector and religious civil society. As a result, the
latter often loses its autonomy by developing symbiotic interdependencies with the
state.
Another related concept especially insightful during the phase of democratic tran-
sition is “bargained competition” (between Islamists and authoritarian elites): “bargain-
ing on their mutual reintegration and their monopolization of the post-revolutionary
political scene while fiercely competing over political resources through various
(often informal) power-sharing arrangements” rather than “building institutions”.18
“Bargained competition”, however, does not describe other strategies Islamists may
use at various stages of democratization depending on the political and institutional
checks and balances. When Islamists’ primary concern is with state conquest as I
argue here, different strategies may be chosen in pursuit of this goal based on the pol-
itical context. For example, when Islamists are constrained by strong checks and bal-
ances, the will to be included in mainstream institutions may lead them to focus on
bargained competition and the gradual packing of state institutions. When political
opportunities are more permissive, however, the will to conquer the state from
within may encourage them to adopt more direct counter-elite strategies to sideline,
purge, and replace secular elites. Finally, many Islamists tend to harbour a distaste
for horizontal accountability mechanisms (such as powerful constitutional courts and
autonomous bureaucracies) arguably because they were usually exposed to them in
the form of authoritarian and “anti-majoritarian” barriers19 secularist elites built to
prevent them from conquering the state. But this dislike limits their practical ability
to construct pluralist democratic systems based on division of powers even when
they genuinely want to uphold rights and freedoms.
Religious actors’ pursuit of state conquest creates both opportunities for democrati-
zation and autocratic tendencies. On the one hand, it may make Islamists more open to
power-sharing and compromising with secular actors dominating the state. On the
other hand, by being so they may also become more likely to embrace the authoritarian
features of their countries’ mainstream society and politics.20 In other words, they may
be understood as “moderate” in the following sense: willingness to compromise and
cooperate with the mainstream actors and values that represent the political-insti-
tutional, social, and international “center” of their respective countries.21
Since the preoccupation with state conquest generates both democratic and author-
itarian tendencies, it can be argued that institutions of vertical and horizontal state
accountability may make the difference. Such institutions and formal arrangements
of power-sharing between secular and religious elites may allow Islamists to take part
in the ownership of the state while checking the ability of any government to use
these powers to exclude others. Otherwise, Islamic actors may fail to lead a genuine
“passive revolution”22 beyond serving the interests of a religious “counter-elite”.
The AKP and Ennahda do not represent all Islamists in these countries. Tunisian
salafi and jihadi groups pursue more Muslim-universalist and relatively more doctri-
naire projects.23 In Turkey, while jihadi groups multiplied following the Syrian civil
war, a smaller party directly continuing the “National Outlook” political Islam tradition
and a plethora of Sufi movements and pious foundations exist.24 The latter includes the
Gülen faith-based movement, which was implicated in the coup attempt of July 2016
1030 M. SOMER

and has been accused by the AKP of penetrating the state apparatus for years in order to
control it from within. The fact that Gülenists and the AKP had previously been major
allies suggests that the pursuit of state conquest may give rise to partnerships as well as
competition over resources and power, conflicts and fallouts among conquest-seeking
Islamist groups.

Periodization and logic of the comparison

The cases of Turkey and Tunisia during the 2000s help to examine the behaviour of pol-
itical Islamists and the role of preoccupation with state conquest at different levels of
democratization and different degrees of experience with competitive politics.
A newcomer to electoral democracy, Tunisia ended a long period of autocratic rule
only recently, following the Arab uprisings, which began in 2010 in Tunisia.25 Before
that, the experience of Tunisian political Islamists with democracy had been limited
to short-lived periods of political liberalization and illicit, informal, and grassroots pol-
itical mobilization.26 Hence, democratic transition in Tunisia simply refers to transition
to electoral democracy.
Before coming to and then consolidating power, Turkey’s political Islamists had also
been subjected to severe restrictions under Turkey’s restrictive-secularist constitutional
order. By comparison, however, their experience with competitive politics had been
much longer and more extensive than their Tunisian counterparts, Turkey having
been an electoral democracy with periodic military interventions since 1950. Hence,
the conceptualization and periodization of transition in Turkey is a more challenging
task. On the surface, Turkey transitioned from its last formal military junta to electoral
democracy during the 1980s and then appeared to strengthen liberal democracy
between 1999 and 2005 thanks to a series of European Union (EU)-inspired legal-pol-
itical reforms.27 The majority of these reforms were secured under AKP governments.
However, critical accounts have rightly argued that it would be more appropriate to
consider Turkey as a case that had an incomplete or unsuccessful transition to electoral
democracy.28 This is because under the façade of competitive elections and legal-politi-
cal reforms ultimate political power continued to reside with the military due to the
enduring military tutelage. Hence, without underestimating the importance of the
1999–2005 period of democratic reforms, the following analysis conceptualizes the sub-
sequent period of 2008–2010 as the period of actual democratic transition. This is
because the balance of ultimate political power29 seemed to shift from the military to
the AKP-led civilian government in the latter period, even though, as we will see,
this did not necessarily produce a successful democratic transition either, among
other reasons, due to preoccupation with state conquest.
Table 1 summarizes these ideas and periodizes the comparison.

Erosion of authoritarian regime

Ennahda played primarily passive but in the long-run critical roles during the erosion of
the authoritarian regime. Ennahda did not directly confront the regime during this
phase. But it invested in building grassroots support, softened its Islamist demands
and was open to cooperation with secular opposition.
Ben Ali alienated key constituencies including women, the business community
(especially small- and medium-size enterprises), the army, the judiciary, and even his
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1031

Table 1. Comparative periodization of fourth wave democratization in Turkey and Tunisia.

First phase of democratic Second phase of democratic
transition (fall of authoritarian transition (successful transition,
Erosion of authoritarian regime regime) consolidation, or reversal)
Tunisia 2000s Dec. 2010–Oct. 2011 (Elections Oct. 2011–ongoing
Critical challenges of for Constituent Assembly) Critical challenges of
democratization: Critical challenges of democratization: Making a new
Uniting and mobilizing democratization: Bringing constitution and other laws,
opposition; finding space to down the Ben Ali regime and managing two turnovers of
organize; weakening the allowing multiparty politics government through free and
domestic and international fair elections, solving economic
legitimacy of the autocratic problems, containing religious
regime; possible liberalization radicalism, providing order and
security, minimizing religious-
secular conflict and avoiding
the return of old regime
Turkey 1999–2008 2008–2010 2011–ongoing
Critical challenges of Critical challenges of (Democratic reversal since
democratization: Political democratization: Subdue the 2015)
power and will to challenge military, the “deep state” and Critical challenges of
the military-bureaucratic the military-bureaucratic democratization: Ensuring
establishment; political and tutelage without civilian government
discursive strategies to undermining rule of law; accountability; making a new
weaken its domestic and resolving the Kurdish conflict and civilian constitution with
external support; securing EU- and religious-secular strong divisions of power;
led legal-institutional reforms; polarization strengthening vertical and
resolving the Kurdish conflict horizontal accountability;
and overcoming religious- avoiding executive
secular polarization degradation and ruling party
hegemony; maintain free and
fair elections; strengthening
independent-neutral judiciary
and rule of law; resolving the
Kurdish conflict; addressing
religious people’s sense of
disempowerment without
excluding secular groups,
engaging in revanchism and
fuelling religious-secular
polarization

own hegemonic RCD party.30 He lost some external support as US policy in the region
became more associated with democracy promotion and less supportive of autocrats.
The loyal opposition weakened and “so-called secular progressive intellectuals and
co-opted middle-class activists were calling for democratization from within while
often remaining silent about the violent repression meted out to Islamists and the
radical Left”.31
As a result, secularists split. Some major actors came to believe that Ben Ali posed a
greater threat to their interests than Islamists did.32 This enabled Ennahda to cooperate
with some pro-secular opposition actors to stage limited challenges to the regime. These
cooperative experiences would later prove to be very valuable in forming coalitions and
managing politics in the post-transition phases.
A major turning point was the “October 18 Coalition for Rights and Freedoms” that
Ennahda forged together with secular leftist and liberal opposition actors in 2005.33
This marked a major achievement for the Islamists in terms of securing acceptance
by secular political actors. Some secular actors overcame their suspicions that the
1032 M. SOMER

Islamists were disingenuous democrats; they agreed to include the Islamists in the
coalition in order to “impel them toward realism”.34 Following a month-long hunger
strike in Tunis, the coalition agreed on common demands and principles “to end dic-
tatorship”. These efforts reflected “the long-cherished hope (of the opposition) that by
rallying around basic claims, a balance could be reached between the opposition party
… and the opposition forces which remained disparate and hindered by their internal
and external disputes”.35
The alliance brought about little short-term regime change at the time. However, its
long-term consequences were very important. After the fall of Ben Ali, the two parties
with which Ennahda formed a coalition government had been its partners in the 2005
coalition: the liberal Congress for the Republic (CPR) and social-democratic Ettakatol.
The October 18 coalition had some precedence: these three parties together with the
Progressive Democratic Party also agreed in 2003 on a “call from Tunisia” which out-
lined such principles as popular sovereignty, respect for Arab-Muslim values, religious
liberty and gender equality.36 These investments in “political dialogue and bridge build-
ing between secularists and Islamist [opposition] … laid the foundation for collabor-
ation during (and after) the revolution”.37
After its first free and fair elections and transition to democracy in 1950, Turkey suf-
fered four democratic reversals resulting from military interventions, in 1960, 1971,
1980, and 1997. After each intervention, multiparty politics was resumed fairly
rapidly (the longest interruption being the 1980–1983 military rule). But this was a
guided democracy in two main respects. The military’s role as the final arbiter of politics
was institutionalized, especially with respect to sensitive issues of “state security”, which
included the perceived threat of “Islamist reactionism”. Formal and informal rules
helped secular-republican groups dominate high-level state institutions and granted
them “mainstream” status in leading sectors of society such as the media and acade-
mia.38 Meanwhile, state-interventionist policies of laicism – since the state was domi-
nated by secular actors – fostered a sense of “inequality” among the Islamists and the
pious and this feeling of dispossession became part of Turkey’s democratic deficit.
In 1997, a military-inspired secularist campaign forced the Islamist-led coalition
government out of power. Against this background, the erosion of the authoritarian
regime in Turkey meant the removal of the authoritarian and authoritarian-secular
constraints on electoral democracy.
Religious actors’ contribution to weakening authoritarianism was initially limited to
the development of a political discourse – together with liberal secular actors and other
critiques – critical of the military tutelage and of “authoritarian secularism”.39 Similar to
Tunisia, the weakening of authoritarianism resulted from external developments and
the regime’s internal dynamics. It began with a reformist period triggered by
Turkey’s official EU candidacy and the capture of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers
Party) leader in 1999.
Under a coalition government consisting of centre-left, centre-right, and far-right
parties, EU-inspired legal-political reforms and cessation of military clashes in the
Kurdish conflict expanded the space for civilian politics. A possible path emerged
for consolidation of pluralistic democracy via EU integration. During this time, Isla-
mists were regrouping and restructuring following the 1997 coup and crackdown.
The AKP was founded by reformist or “moderate” National Outlook Islamists in
2001.
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1033

The 2001 financial crisis, the gravest economic meltdown in the nation’s history, cri-
tically changed the course of politics. Islamists began to play an important role when the
coalition government fixed the economy, restructured financial institutions, and
handed over power to the AKP in snap elections at the end of 2002, in which voters
left all the parties of the coalition government outside parliament.
AKP governments did not initially confront military-bureaucratic tutelage. Instead,
they focused on gaining the trust of domestic and international secular elites. They did
so by successfully continuing EU-inspired reforms, emphasizing economic development,
and remaining largely silent on sensitive issues such as religion’s public role and the status
of the military. In any case, their power was checked and balanced by the secular presi-
dent, opposition parties, mainstream media, and the military. However, this was not a
period when “state conquest” was abandoned. Rather, it was concentrated on the
gradual packing of the judiciary, autonomous state institutions, and bureaucracy, and
on expanding the Islamist base in business, the media, and civil society.40
Nevertheless, with respect to many aspects of democratization, this was a period of
partial democratization. It was marked by EU-guided reforms, economic growth, and a
foreign policy based on developing mutually beneficial relations with neighbours.
All this convinced many scholars to hail the AKP as Turkey’s “new Muslim demo-
crats” in categorical terms and based on the party’s ostensible ideology and identity.41
The ongoing policy of state conquest and the contingent political-institutional con-
ditions underpinning the AKP’s policies were insufficiently interrogated.

First phase of democratic transition

In Tunisia, the first phase of democratic transition covers the toppling of Ben Ali
through a popular uprising in 2011. Religious actors did not play a prominent role,
at least initially. The revolts were overwhelmingly “civil and non-religious”. Even
though Islamists were among the best organized opposition forces, they mostly
avoided the street.42 Many Islamists and the pious were certainly involved. But
secular leftists, liberals, women, disgruntled masses connected through social media,
and Tunisia’s general labour union UGTT played the leading roles in the mobilization
and sustenance of the riots.43 Many Ennahda leaders and activists were in jail or exile.
Religious actors also shied away from activism lest this invoke the spectre of “Islamist
threat” the regime had long used to legitimize authoritarianism. This relative passivity
was consistent with the thesis in this article: the main Tunisian religious actors do not
seek confrontational engagements with the state that might endanger their goals of con-
quering the state and mainstream society from within.
After Ben Ali fell, however, Ennahda became more active, and took steps that sim-
ultaneously supported and undermined democratization. On the one hand, religious
actors immediately “began to mobilize the free riders”44 of the revolutionary uprisings
and thus helped to strengthen political society, which is a sine qua non for democratiza-
tion. Ennahda and its leader Ghanoushi “traveled to the provinces, urban neighbor-
hoods and villages to hold meetings, establish branches and networks”.45 On the
other hand, Ennahda took actions and joined alliances that helped sidetrack the revolu-
tion and enabled the authoritarian regime elements to maintain their stranglehold on
the system.
Ennahda politicians followed a “two-track strategy” after the revolution. They
worked together with revolutionary actors such as the 14 January Front and helped
1034 M. SOMER

prevent Ben Ali loyalists from monopolizing political power. Simultaneously they
entered into negotiations with the latter allowing them to share power while maintain-
ing control of the state apparatus. These steps disallowed the establishment of “comple-
tely new, popular political institutions”.46 For example, Ennahda (together with UGTT)
endorsed as the interim prime minister Beji Caid Essebsi, who had served as minister
and head of parliament under both Bourgiba and Ben Ali and who was “clearly a crea-
ture of ancient regimes”.47
In Turkey, the first phase of democratic transition unfolds in 2008–2010 when the
AKP subdued the military via electoral successes, political manoeuvring, and legal
battles wherein the government instrumentalized the law and violated due process.
Helped by secular-liberal supporters in the media, academia, and civil society, the
AKP and its Gülenist allies played the leading role during this phase.
The confrontation began after Turkey’s secular state elites and middle class grew
increasingly uneasy about the AKP’s growing power, international support, and “creep-
ing Islamization” in bureaucracy and politics.48 As the end of the secularist president’s
term approached, the opposition felt that the presidency had to be held by a neutral or
pro-secular figure so as to check the power of the AKP.49
For the AKP, however, capturing this highest state position to speak for the nation
was indispensable for state conquest, both symbolically and politically. When the party
nominated its number two politician for presidency, secular unease turned into reac-
tion. The military announced an online ultimatum and millions of protesters attended
anti-government and pro-secular “republican rallies”. The AKP held its ground, elected
Gül to the presidency anyway, unilaterally prepared a new draft constitution, and lifted
the Islamic headscarf ban in universities (a law later annulled by the courts).
This was a moment when the AKP and secular opposition could have advanced
democratization based on consensus, among other things by democratically renegotiat-
ing state-dominated secularism.50 Instead, political bickering escalated and the
chief public prosecutor filed a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court for the party’s
closure. From the point of view of power politics, this was a move by the pro-secular
high judiciary to protect the dominance of the “republican alliance” within the civilian
and military state apparatus.51
This dominance was ended when religious actors responded with a series of counter-
moves. With the help of Gülenists within the judiciary, the AKP launched controversial
lawsuits known as Ergenekon trials against secularist military officers, intellectuals, and
civil society actors, charging them with plotting a coup. This divided the opposition into
those seeing these measures as necessary to curtail military tutelage and those viewing
them as conspiracies to eliminate secularist opposition.52
The AKP then organized a referendum on constitutional amendments, which pack-
aged changes that would end secularist domination of high judiciary and would reduce
military autonomy, together with changes that would simply expand civil liberties.53
This again split the opposition into those who viewed the changes as “insufficient
but desirable for democratization” and those who suspected the government’s inten-
tions and feared AKP hegemony. The government won the referendum with a 58%
majority. Hundreds of military officers were still in jail waiting for their trials to end.
Hence, power de facto shifted from military elites to the religious elites who held the
civilian government.
Arguably because state conquest was a greater priority for political Islamists com-
pared to state democratization, however, the subordination of the secularist military
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1035

and the sacking of secularist officers (who allegedly were at least partially replaced with
pro-Gülen officers) did not necessarily mean that the military as an institution was
made more transparent and accountable.54 Nor were new institutions built to make
the now more autonomous civilian governments more transparent and accountable
to the public.

Democratic consolidation and de-democratization

The second phase of the Tunisian democratic transition refers to the period since the
election of the Constituent Assembly. Since then, the country has been constructing
the formal and informal rules of a democratic regime, made a democratic constitution,
and conducted one parliamentary and one presidential election, both of which were
mainly free and fair.
Religious actors contributed to democratization by taking conciliatory stands and by
cooperating and sharing power with secular actors. After emerging as the first party
from the elections for the Constitutional Assembly, Ennahda formed a coalition govern-
ment with secular parties. In the assembly Ennahda helped to make a democratic con-
stitution by defending parliamentary democracy, which arguably is a more promising
institutional choice for a new democracy, by not insisting that Islam be the source of
Tunisian law, and by accepting legal gender equality.55
In government, Ennahda did not directly support religious radicalism. Nevertheless,
gradual Islamization in bureaucracy, government religious discourse, alleged lenience
towards radicalism – supported by Ennahda officials’ leaked conversations with the
Salafis – and the assassinations of two major secular political figures mobilized the
secular opposition against the government.56
Ennahda helped to avoid a bigger crisis and save the democratization process when it
accepted mediation by the National Dialogue Quartet, a group of four powerful mainly
secular civil society organizations. The government resigned after agreeing on a sche-
dule for ratifying the new constitution and holding parliamentary and presidential
elections.
In the elections, Ennahda came second to Nidaa Tounes, which was formed as a
coalition of leftist and rightist secular actors and moderates of the Ben Ali regime.
Ennahda joined a coalition government with Nidaa even though it was only given
one ministerial post, a step in line with the priority of long-term state conquest via
acceptance by state elites and access to state institutions.
Hence, Ennahda has been criticized for undermining successful democratization in
this period. First, it failed to stem the growth of Salafism within and outside its own
ranks. This not only threatened public security, but also fed religious-secular polariz-
ation.57 Second, Ennahda preferred to compromise with secular state elites instead of
cooperating with revolutionary actors with whom they might have constructed truly
participatory democratic institutions entailing effective vertical accountability
mechanisms.
In early 2016, ideological rivalries and differences, such as those over partnership
with Ennahda and the pardoning and reintegration of business elites involved in the
old regime, produced a split in Nidaa. This was followed by street demonstrations by
dissatisfied citizens and a government crackdown reminiscent of the old regime.58
Hence, the outcome of Tunisia’s transition is still uncertain, despite major achieve-
ments and avoiding a democratic reversal as in Egypt. The government has only
1036 M. SOMER

changed hands once through peaceful elections.59 Major challenges loom large in areas
such as economic stability, public security, secular-Islamic distrust, religious extremism,
and the spectre that authoritarian regime elements may control the political scene via
compromises with Islamists and in the guise of elected governments. While democratic
consolidation is possible, other scenarios such as the emergence of a semi-democratic
system, which would feature multiparty politics as well as an oppressive and unaccoun-
table state, and the return of the old regime are also conceivable.
In Turkey, Islamists’ sense of exclusion was replaced with a new sense of strength
and dominance. This new perception was best manifested when the then Prime Minis-
ter Erdoğan declared following the victorious 2011 election outcome that, ending its era
of “apprenticeship”, the AKP’s next term would be its era of “mastership”.60 Thus began
the second phase of Turkey’s democratic transition. During this phase, Turkey’s chal-
lenge was to ensure civilian government accountability by strengthening horizontal and
vertical accountability in the new political context where elected governments were
stronger and free from military-bureaucratic supervision.
Instead, the AKP grew increasingly Islamist and authoritarian.61 Increasingly, it
oppressed the media, restricted freedoms, and grew intolerant of opposition. It
staffed the judiciary with loyalists, weakened separation of powers, and worked to
form a party state. Turkish democracy heavily suffered in terms of both horizontal
and vertical accountability. The party itself became increasingly less pluralist and
more dominated by charismatic Erdoğan.62 It turned increasingly nationalist and Isla-
mist, bent on employing Turkey’s authoritarian state apparatus in the service of
national-Islamic social engineering.63 Thereby, it seemed to build new alliances with
nationalist state elites.
Hence, the country suffered a democratic reversal in 2015 when the AKP could be
considered an emerging, authoritarian-hegemonic party, blurring the dividing lines
between the party and state, willing to bluntly manipulate the basic fairness of elections
– a hitherto major accomplishment of Turkish democracy – and singlehandedly run by
President Erdoğan in violation of the constitution obliging him to be neutral.64 Turkey
may transition to (stable or unstable) competitive authoritarianism or resume
democratization.65
“The iron laws of oligarchy” and the AKP’s growing self-confidence and emanci-
pation from secularist constraints in a context of weakening vertical and horizontal
accountability mechanisms were some apparent reasons for this authoritarian trans-
formation. The absence of effective civil society mediation, similar to the role the
National Dialogue Quartet played in Tunisia, between the opposition and the govern-
ment contributed to government oppressiveness during and after the pro-secular
Gezi protests in 2013.66 Erdogan and many AKP politicians interpreted these
massive anti-government protests as an existential threat to their long-aspired new
status as the speakers of the nation and as a western-international conspiracy
rather than a home-grown reaction against their heavy-handed policies. In-fighting
within the Islamist coalition, notably the fallout with the Gülen movement, which
levelled major corruption allegations against the government, radicalized Erdogan
supporters and allowed him to sideline his rivals in the party and to crack down
on all opposition.67
Ineffective opposition parties, which were now further enfeebled by the govern-
ment’s authoritarian policies, failed to overcome their disagreements over issues
such as the Kurdish conflict in order to check and balance the AKP. This was best
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1037

manifested when they failed to elect a speaker of parliament and form a government
after the AKP lost its majority in the June 2015 elections. Eventually, the AKP
managed to restore its majority after Erdogan stalled the government formation
process and when the elections were renewed under partially free but unfair electoral
conditions in November.

Conclusions
While the emphasis of this article has been on domestic politics, the international
context has been crucial for both cases in combination with the dynamics discussed
here. Tunisia’s transition was affected significantly by the events in Egypt. Tunisian
secularists and Islamists tried to adopt more conciliatory policies vis-à-vis each other
in order to prevent an Egyptian-style coup and the possible collapse of the Tunisian
state via internal strife. Meanwhile, the stagnation of Turkey’s EU relations due to fail-
ures on both sides and the regional developments in the aftermath of Arab uprisings
contributed to Turkish Islamic actors becoming more authoritarian, nationalist, and
Islamist. Many politicians saw the developments in Syria as an opportunity for
Turkey to gain a position of leadership in the region. The AKP actively backed and
organized the Syrian opposition dominated by the Muslim Brothers. Furthermore,
Turkey was flooded with close to three million Syrian refugees, who included extre-
mists. The AKP has been accused of showing tolerance, if not tacit support for
radical Islamist groups such as Al Nusra and ISIS in Syria. Hence, preoccupation
with state conquest became increasingly inspired by neo-Ottoman state-remaking
with regional-Islamist (pro-ikhwan) aspirations.68
In both Turkey and Tunisia, democratization requires the reformation and remaking
of state institutions so as to create a more egalitarian and democratic relationship
between these relatively “strong” states and their societies. As the main thesis and analy-
sis in this article suggest, their preoccupation with state conquest undermined the
ability of political Islamists in both countries to contribute to this goal. It induced
them to focus on the secular identity of the elites who controlled these states rather
than on the unaccountability of these elites and of the state institutions themselves.
For example, both Ennahda’s and AKP’s ideologies criticize the undemocratic nature
of the state-dominated, laic models of secularism prevailing in their respective
countries, and claim to uphold various versions of more democratic, or civilian
models of secularism. The more the AKP amassed political power, however, the
more it began to expand and strengthen rather than democratize Turkey’s intervention-
ist-laicist state institutions, preferring to utilize them for Islamic social-political
engineering.69
Against this background, the emergence of formal and credible institutional arrange-
ments of power-sharing between religious and secular actors can create opportunities
for successful democratization, by addressing one retrospective and one prospective
driver of state conquest. First, it can help to reconcile a past grievance underlying pol-
itical Islamists’ attachment to state conquest, that is, as discussed, their exclusion from
the processes of state-making during the foundational moments of these states. Second,
if religious and secular actors can agree on effectively working vertical and horizontal
accountability mechanisms, “ownership of state” would cease to be such a desirable
prize. Nor would it be such a fearful outcome if rival actors would dominate state
institutions.
1038 M. SOMER

What does all this imply in regard to discussions of “post-Islamism?” In other words,
to what extent can contemporary examples of Islamic politics appropriately be categor-
ized as transcending “Islamist” politics, emphasizing rights rather than obligations,
seeing people as citizens rather than subjects, and seeking to “establish an electoral
democracy, a secular civil state, while promoting a pious society”?70 Islamic actors’ rela-
tive emphasis on “Islamist” versus “post-Islamist” causes is changeable and contingent
on international and domestic political-institutional context, political agency, and,
often, the availability of political opportunities serving the cause of state conquest.
The case of Turkey shows this, as the AKP began its rule with saliently “post-Islamist”
politics and discourse while simultaneously pursuing state conquest, and in recent years
chose to increasingly draw on authoritarian Islamism after the political-institutional
context changed.

Notes
1. Casanova, “Civil Society and Religion”; Kalyvas, “Unsecular Politics and Religious Mobiliz-
ation”; Haynes, “Religion and Democratizations”; Künkler and Leininger, “The Multi-Faceted
Role of Religious Actors”; Somer, “Does it Take Democrats to Democratize”; Toft, Philpott,
and Shah, God’s Century.
2. Among others, Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism; Cavatorta and
Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion?”
3. Mardin, “Turkish Islamic Exceptionalism”; Cavatorta and Merone, “Post-Islamism, Ideological
Evolution,” 35–7. For a historical review, see Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies.
4. Kumbaracıbaşı, Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP; Kemahlıoğlu, Agents or Bosses?; Van
Hamme, Gana, and Ben Rebbah, “Social and Socio-Territorial Electoral Base.”
5. Bayat, “The Arab Spring.”
6. Among others, Çınar and Sayın, “Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy”; Somer, “Moder-
ation of Religious and Secular Politics”; Başkan, “Turkey’s Islamists ”; Esen and Gümüşçü,
“Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”; Somer, “Understanding Turkey's Democratic
Breakdown.”
7. Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics”; Volpi and Stein, “Islamism and the
State”; Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites.”
8. Donnell, “Delegative Democracy”; Tilly, Democracy. For a recent contribution see Slater,
“Democratic Careening.”
9. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity; Hale and Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy
and Liberalism; Anderson, The State and Social Transformation; Alexander, Tunisia: Stability
and Reform; Chapters 1–2 in Aslan, Nation-Building in Turkey and Morocco; Heydemann,
“Explaining the Arab Uprisings”; Somer, “Understanding Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”
This conceptualization, of course, does not mean that state and society are ever entirely separ-
able concepts.
10. Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’ and Tunisia’s al-Nahda,” 66.
11. Waltz, “Islamist Appeal in Tunisia.”
12. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies; Fox, A World Survey; Somer, “Is Turkish Secularism
Antireligious”; Waltz, “Islamist Appeal in Tunisia”; Mabrouk, “Tunisia.” Notably, both the
old and 2014 Tunisian constitutions declare Islam the state’s religion.
13. Cavatorta and Merone, “Moderation through Exclusion,” 865; Somer, “Moderate Islam and
Secularist Opposition.”
14. Volpi and Stein, “Islamism and the State,” 281; See also Donker, “Re-Emerging Islamism in
Tunisia”; and Cavatorta and Merone, “Post-Islamism, Ideological Evolution.”
15. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States; Kurzman, Modernist Islam.
16. Donker, “Re-Emerging Islamism in Tunisia.”
17. Kaya, “Islamisation of Turkey”; Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity.
18. Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites,” 107.
19. Belge, “Friends of the Court”; Hamid, Temptations of Power, 26.
 DEMOCRATIZATION 1039

20. Volpi, “Pseudo-Democracy”; Çınar and Sayın, “Reproducing the Paradigm of Democracy”;
Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.”
21. Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.” Also see Schwedler, “Can Islamists
Become Moderates?”
22. Tuğal, Passive Revolution. Also see Tezcür, Muslim Reformers.
23. Mabrouk, “Tunisia”; Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?”; Volpi and Stein, “Islamism and the
State.”
24. Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity; Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity.
25. Bayat, “The Arab Spring.”
26. Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’ and Tunisia’s al-Nahda,” 66.
27. Among others, Cebeci, “De-Europeanization or Counter-Conduct.”
28. Rodriguez et al., Democratization Processes in Defective Democracies.
29. For political democratization versus liberalization, see Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, Beyond
the Façade.
30. Angrist, “Understanding the Success.” “While Bourguiba constructed a state corporatist façade
over a highly personalized management style, Ben Ali has constructed a liberal democratic
façade over a centralized and insulated technocracy.” Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and
Reform, 7.
31. Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites,” 110.
32. Angrist, “Understanding the Success,” 549.
33. Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition”; Angrist, “Understanding the Success.”
34. Hajji, The 18 October Coalition, 7. Notably, other secularists sceptical of Islamists’ intentions and
opposed cooperation with them issued their own manifesto in 2006, which was called “Concern-
ing a Drift” and signed by 109 prominent civil society organizations and public intellectuals.
35. Ibid., 1.
36. Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition,” 96.
37. Angrist, “Understanding the Success,” 549.
38. Belge, “Friends of the Court”; Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.” These pri-
vileges were not exclusive and religious-conservative actors gained their own privileged access to
some ministries and other state agencies under centre-right governments.
39. Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.”
40. Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition.”
41. Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy”; Kuru, “Secularism and State Policies toward Religion.”
42. Bayat, “The Arab Spring.”
43. Angrist, “Understanding the Success.”
44. Bayat, “The Arab Spring.”
45. Ibid.
46. Boubekeur, “Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites,” 111.
47. Ibid.
48. Somer, “Whither with Secularism.”
49. Somer, “Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition.”
50. Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.”
51. Belge, “Friends of the Court.”
52. Jenkins, “Ergenekon, Sledgehammer”; Cizre and Walker, “Conceiving the New Turkey.” In
April, 2016, the highest appeal court overturned all the convictions for reasons including “fab-
ricated evidence.” “Turkey Ergenekon: Court Quashes ‘Coup Plot’ Convictions.” BBC News, 21
April 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36099889.
53. Arato, “Democratic Constitution-Making.”
54. Gürsoy, “The Impact of EU-Driven Reforms.”
55. Allani, “The Post-Revolution Tunisian Constituent Assembly.”
56. Allegedly, radical militia groups linked to Ennahda attacked secular opposition groups. El-
Issawi, “After the Arab Spring”; Hachemaoui, Tunisia at a Crossroads, 6.
57. Wolf, “An Islamist ‘Renaissance’?”; International Crisis Group, Tunisia: Violence and the Salafi
Challenge, 36.
58. Williamson, “A Silver Lining.”
1040 M. SOMER

59. In 2013, the Islamist-led “Troika” government resigned and was replaced with a technocratic
interim government largely as a result of a negotiated settlement of a political crisis, not
through elections.
60. Video of speech on AKP party website: https://www.akparti.org.tr/site/video/8471/yarin-
ustalik-donemi-basliyor-tuzla (accessed 11 May 2015).
61. Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular Politics.”
62. Lancaster, “The Iron Law of Erdogan.”
63. Kaya, “Islamisation of Turkey”; Yörük, “Welfare Provision”; Somer, “Whither with Secularism.”
64. As of 2015, Freedom House considered Turkey “partly free” with downward trends and scores
of four and three for civil and political liberties respectively, and the Turkish press “not free”
with the same score as Pakistan and Malaysia. https://freedomhouse.org/search/press%
20freedom (accessed 22 September 2015).
65. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism; Somer, “Moderation of Religious and Secular
Politics”; Esen and Gümüşçü, “Rising Competitive Authoritarianism”; Somer, “Understanding
Turkey’s Democratic Breakdown.”
66. Yörük and Yüksel, “Class and Politics.”
67. Somer, “Turkey’s Way Out.”
68. Onis, “Turkey and the Arab Spring”; Ozkan, “Turkey, Davutoglu”; Cebeci, “De-Europeanization
or Counter-Conduct.”
69. Somer, “Whither with Secularism.” Ennahda’s 2016 declaration to separate politics from
preaching is undoubtedly an important development. The argument here implies that such
declarations may be reversed in the future depending on the political and institutional contexts,
given the ideological flexibility of these actors and their prioritization of state-conquest. The idea
of “takhassus” (specialization), on which the declaration was based, can be interpreted in various
ways. Marks, “How Big were the Changes?”
70. Bayat, “The Arab Spring.”

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa,
Canada, for a research grant; Mirjam Künkler, Monica Marks and Nadia Marzouki for valuable com-
ments; İlker Kocael for excellent research assistance.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Murat Somer is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Koç Univer-
sity, and an Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. His
research on democratization, new authoritarianism, religious and secular politics, ethnic conflict and
polarization, the Kurdish question, and political Islam appeared in books, book volumes and journals
such as Comparative Political Studies, Democratization, The Middle East Journal and Third World
Quarterly.

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