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 CAUSE LAWYERS IN INDONESIA: A HOUSE DIVIDED

TIM LINDSEY
MELISSA CROUCH'

I. LBH and Structural Legal Aid in Indonesia .......... ........ 622

II. The New Legal Aid Law. ............................ 626
III. A Fragmented Profession and the Advocates Law........................627
IV. Religious Freedom and LBH ......................... 634
V. From Radical Cause Lawyer to Radical Islamist: The
Transformation of Munarman ............................. 637
VII. Conclusion: Reform Fatigue? ........... 642

The private legal profession in Indonesia is notable for a

paradox. On one hand, for decades many of its members have shown a
deep commitment to cause lawyering. Lawyers determined to use the
legal system to achieve social justice have always been prominent and
influential, often at the national level.2 A few have even left their mark
on modem Indonesian history as champions of the dramatic
democratization that took place after President Soeharto resigned in
1998.' Many have worked with great intellectual vigor, courage,
determination, and political nous, developing both significant forensic

Tim Lindsey is Malcolm Smith Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for the Study of
Indonesian Law, Islam and Society and Centre for Asian Legal Studies in the Law School, The
University of Melbourne. Melissa Crouch is a Research Fellow in the Law Faculty at the
National University of Singapore and an Associate of the Centre for the Study of Indonesian
Law, Islam and Society. Our observations in this paper are based on our own experiences of
working from many years with colleagues in Indonesia's legal sector, including members of
Indonesia's many non-government associations involved in legal aid and law reform. This paper
also draws in part on some material previously published in TIM LINDSEY, Anti-Corruption and
NGOs in Indonesia, in STEALING FROM THE PEOPLE: 16 STUDIES ON CORRUPTION IN INDONESIA,
BOOK 4, THE CLAMPDOWN: IN SEARCH OF NEW PARADIGMS 29-71 (Richard Holloway ed.,
2002); Melissa Crouch, Cause Lawyers, the Legal Profession and the Courts in Indonesia: The
Bar Association Controversy, LAWASIA J., 2011, at 63. The authors are grateful to Professor
Adnan Buyung Nasution for his generosity over many years in discussing cause lawyering in
Indonesia. Our thanks go also to Alison Youssef for research assistance.
2 For an account of such a lawyer, see DANIEL S. LEV, No CONCESSIONS: THE LIFE OF YAP
THIAM HIEN (2011).
See generally SIMON BUTrr & TIMOTHY LINDSEY, THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTION: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 1 - 25 (2012) (detailing the constitutional reforms that delivered in
Indonesia's post-Suharto democratization).
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 621

skill and sophisticated political rationales for their activism, all tied to the
notion of negarahukum, or "rule of law."4 This is particularly true of the
large group of prominent cause lawyers associated with Indonesia's first
legal aid non-government organization (NGO), Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum or, as it is usually known, "LBH."
On the other hand, the private legal profession in Indonesia has
also been notable for its internal divisions, vicious combativeness,
intense factional rivalries, and disunity. In prosecuting struggles for
power within their profession, Indonesian lawyers - including cause
lawyers associated with LBH - have drawn on the same array of skills
they use in their practice, often with devastating effect.' This has been
particularly apparent in the repeated failure of efforts to establish a
single, overarching professional organization for Indonesian lawyers.
The result has been the development of a large, vigorous, and often
deeply divided legal profession without a unifying bar. Its cause lawyers
lack a common cause and their differences are heated, laden with
ideology, and often become matters of national controversy.6
The deeply factionalized nature of the Indonesian legal
profession has also led to repeated failure to develop national consensus
among practitioners around issues of ethics and discipline. It has made it
impossible for lawyers to reform their own profession to create uniform
standards or even minimum expectations. This is a significant obstacle to
the professionalism of lawyers in Indonesia. It also obstructs their ability
to continue to influence the trajectory of the democratic Reformasi
(reform) process that some of them helped usher in after Soeharto's
authoritarian regime fell in 1998.' A decade and a half later, many cause
lawyers fear that these reforms have failed to meet their high
expectations, and may even be vulnerable to those who would prefer to
see them rolled back. Some have become pessimistic about the future of

Negara hukum is a translation of the Dutch rechtsstaat, or 'law state'. Its meaning has often
been contested but is now generally understood in Indonesia as loosely equivalent to 'rule of
law', and as implying separation of powers, an independent judiciary and representative
democracy. See generally, TIM LINDSEY, Indonesia: Devaluing Asian Values, Rewriting Rule of
Law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAw 286-323 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
s For examples of the skills involved in the 'routine' (case law) and 'non-routine' activities (such
as public education seminars and campaigns) of LBH in its first five years of operation, see
ADNAN BUYUNG NASUTION SH, LEGAL AID IN INDONESIA (FIVE YEARS OF THE LEMBAGA
BANTUAN HUKUM) 15-25 (1976).
6 Lev referred to this tension within the profession as the "battle of the lawyers", DANIEL S. LEV,
LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA: SELECTED ESSAYS 319 (2000).
7 See generally EDWARD ASPINALL, OPPOSING SUHARTO: COMPROMISE, RESISTANCE AND
REGIME CHANGE 212 (2004).
622 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

the negarahukum they helped construct in the late 1990s, and a few have
even turned their back on it, seeking other, entirely different, ways to
realize their dreams of social justice.
This paper explores this paradox, the tension between the
Indonesian legal profession's history of activism for social justice causes
and its own incapacity to organize itself in a way that might better
regulate and support the ideals underpinning the post-1998 reforms. We
begin in Parts I and II with an overview of cause lawyering in Indonesia
generally. In Part III we then consider developments after 1998, when
cause lawyers turned their attention again to the long-standing and
elusive objective of a united and disciplined bar. This part of the paper
explores the failure of efforts to unite lawyers and remake them as a
single profession. The remainder of the paper explores the fluid and
dynamic nature of cause lawyering in Indonesia through a case study of
religious freedom. It looks first, in Part IV, at how cause lawyers
working for LBH deal with these issues. In Part V, we then describe how
one prominent cause lawyer, Munarman, rejected the values of the legal
aid and human rights organizations he once led in favor of Islamist
vigilante groups. The paper concludes in Part VII that the splintered
profession as it now stands reflects broader fractures in the wider reform
movement as cause lawyers confront reform fatigue and political
disillusion.

I. LBH AND STRUCTURAL LEGAL AID IN INDONESIA

Sarat and Scheingold have described cause lawyers as "using

their professional work to build the good society."' They are
characterized as the opposite of the "hired gun" lawyer who works solely
for remuneration,"o although in reality there is often movement between
these two extremes. Cause lawyers can, however, be distinguished from
other lawyers by "a willingness to undertake controversial and politically
charged activities and/or by a sense of commitment to particular
ideals."" This definition of cause lawyering fuses law with political
activism, allowing lawyers to engage in sensitive issues of public policy

Like many Indonesians, Munarman uses only one name.

Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
" Id.
"Id. at 7.
Vol 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 623

and politics. In this way, cause lawyers are able to "illuminate the
instabilities in the boundaries between law and politics."l 2 This has been
echoed by Menkel-Meadow, who defines cause lawyering as "any
activity that seeks to use law-related means or seeks to change laws or
regulations to achieve greater social justice - both for particular
individuals (drawing on individualistic 'helping' orientations) and for
disadvantaged groups.""
In Indonesia, the term cause lawyer could be applied to a wide
range of lawyers who work for political and social change. The term is,
however, rarely used in that country. Instead, lawyers who might be
described in the West as cause lawyers usually describe themselves in
Indonesia as aktivis or aktivis hukum (activist or legal activist), and
almost all work for a NGO - either as volunteers or, in many cases, on a
relatively low salary.
Since the 1970s, LBH has been the leading NGO for aktivis
hukum and its lawyers are the ones who most often initiate court action
seeking judicial review of government decisions.14 LBH was established
in 1970 on the initiative of Professor Adnan Buyung Nasution," a

2 Id. at 12.
1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIEs 31, 37 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 1998).
14 For more on the history and role of LBH, see generally Dr. lur Adnan Buyung Nasution,
Professor, Melbourne Law School Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society, Inaugural
Professorial Lecture, Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Oct. 10, 2010) (transcript
available at http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/NasutionPaperl 11020 web2.pdf);
Daniel S. Lev, Legal Aid in Indonesia (Ctr. of Se. Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 44, 1987);
Crouch, supra note 1, at 63-86. For more on the aims, activities and cases handled by LBH
Jakarta, see its annual reports: LBH Jakarta (2012) Paradoks Negara Hukum: Laporan Hukum
dan HAM. Jakarta: LBH; LBH Jakarta (2011) CatatanAkhir Tahun 2011. Jakarta: LBH Jakarta;
LBH Jakarta (2010) Catatan Akhir Tahun 2010 Hukum dan HAM Jakarta: LBH Jakarta; LBH
Jakarta (2009) CatatanAkhir Tahun 2009 Hukum dan HAM Jakarta: LBH Jakarta; LBH Jakarta
(2008) Laporan Hukum dan HAM LBH Jakarta 2008: Penegakkan Hukum, Janji Politik yang
Terabaikan.Jakarta: LBH Jakarta; LBH Jakarta (2007) CatatanAkhir Tahun 2007. Jakarta: LBH
Jakarta; LBH Jakarta (2006) Laporan Hukum dan HAM LBH Jakarta 2006: Kembali ke Titik
Nol. Jakarta: LBH; LBH Jakarta (2005) CatatanAkhir Tahun 2005: Ketika Negara Bersimpuh di
HadapanKuasa Modal.Jakarta: LBH Jakarta.
15 Adnan Buyung Nasution, Towards Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, PAPERS ON
SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, Oct. 2011, at 3, 10, available at
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/files/dmfile/NasutionPaperl 11020 web2.pdf. Professor Dr. lur
Adnan Buyung Nasution is widely regarded as Indonesia's leading advocate and trial lawyer. He
was a pioneer of legal aid and law reform, and is a leading figure in advocacy for human rights
and constitutionalism in Indonesia. In 2010, he was appointed as Honorary Professorial Fellow
of the Melbourne Law School, the University of Melbourne.
624 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

prominent human rights lawyer and activist in Indonesia.'" Under

Soeharto's authoritarian regime (1966-1998), law was largely
meaningless as a weapon against a lawless state." LBH was therefore
based on Nasution's idea that cause lawyering should involve not just
routine casework for the poor but should also extend to what he called
"Structural Legal Aid" (Bantuan Hukum Struktural). This is a broad
notion that includes public interest litigation as well as non-litigation
activities such as legal and political criticism, research, publication, and
community education."
This approach ensured that LBH constantly challenged and
criticized government policy and practice that infringed on legal rights.
LBH, in fact, became an outspoken critic of Soeharto's New Order and
the primary avenue of defense for the accused in subversion trials and
other political cases." With conviction inevitable, these trials usually
became political theater, attracting huge public interest.20 As a result of
the many high profile political trials LBH litigated during the Suharto
regime, it became a source of embarrassment for the government, both
nationally and internationally. Even today it is still the case that one of
the most effective weapons routinely wielded against corrupt officialdom
by LBH is deployed outside the courtroom: media publicity and the
threat of negative coverage.2 ' Under Nasution's leadership, LBH's
strategic use of "Structural Legal Aid" and courtroom theater helped
keep alive the public memory of democratic ideals and the notion of rule
of law during the New Order period. It was so effective, in fact, that
these ideas quickly became the basis for sweeping reforms when
Soeharto eventually fell.22
LBH remains the leading cause lawyer organization in Indonesia
today, but the post-Soeharto removal of restrictions on political activity

16 Dan S. Lev, Legal Aid in Indonesia, 12-13 (Ctr. of Se. Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 44,
1987); see generally Nasution, supra note 15.
1 Tim Lindsey, From Soepomo to Prabowo: Law, Violence and Corruption in the Preman State,
in VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA: ANALYSIS, REPRESENTATION, RESOLUTION 19, 19-36
(Charles A. Coppel, ed., 2006).
18 Nasution, supranote 15, at 9.
19 DANIEL S. LEV, LEGAL EVOLUTION AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN INDONESIA: SELECTED
ESSAYS at 292 (Kluwer Law International 2000).
20 This is also partly a result of the way LBH effectively garnered support from the press, which
ensured wide media coverage for its trials and campaigns, Lev, supranote 16, at 30-31.
21 DANIEL S. LEV, No CONCESSIONS: THE LIFE OF YAP THIAM HIEN, INDONESIAN HUMAN RIGHTS
LAWYER, 322 (2011).
22 Tim Lindsey, DevaluingAsian values, rewriting rule of law, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF
LAW 286, 296-298 (Randall Peerenboom, ed., 2006).
Vol 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 625

led to the dramatic and continuing growth of anti-corruption activity, like

"fungus in the rainy season" as the Indonesian saying has it. As early as
2000, for example, as many as 450 leading legally-oriented NGOs were
identified, but the total numbers were probably in the thousands,
although there is no way to determine this as there was no formal
registration process that could produce reliable records. Some of the
leading legal NGOs today include PSHKI (Pusat Studi Hukum dan
Kebijakan Indonesia, Indonesian Centre for Law and Policy); ICW
(Indonesia Corruption Watch); LelP (Lembaga Kajian dan Advokasi
Untuk Independensi Peradilan - Institute for Study and Advocacy of
Independence of the Judiciary); MTI (Masyarakat Transparensi
Indonesia - Indonesia Transparency Society); and KontraS (Komisi
untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan - the Committee for
the Disappeared and Victims of Violence). Cause lawyers working for
these and thousands of other like-minded civil society organisations deal
with an extremely wide range of issues including: land disputes; labour
disputes; human rights; women's and children's rights; environmental
disputes; religious freedom; and, of course, routine criminal defence
cases.
In career terms, LBH has become something of a rite of passage
for lawyers with a concern for social justice. It is common for law
students and graduates to stay with the organisation for several years and
then move on to another, more specialized, area of the legal NGO sector
or legal profession.2 3 Most NGOs other than LBH now tend to work in
only a few areas, and there is also a growing distinction between those
that only focus on legal research and community education and those that
combine this with the provision of legal advice. Like LBH, the range of
work done by lawyers in these legal NGOs is always very diverse. It
ranges from representing the poor in routine litigation to developing and
delivering community legal education, to the range of other activities that
Nasution would call "Structural Legal Aid." In addition, NGO lawyers
are also active in running public interest litigation - often initiated by
them - in the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), the State
Administrative Courts (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara), and, since 2003,
the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi) (depending on the type
of law under challenge).

23 To give just one example, one of the former directors of LBH Jakarta, Abdul Hakim G
Nusantara, was appointed to WALHI, the country's leading environmental protection non-
government organization, in 1986, Lev, supra note 16, at 30-31.
626 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

Despite the increasing number of organizations in Indonesia's

cause lawyering subsector, LBH remains a leader in both the provision of
legal aid and political activism - particularly in cases concerning human
rights abuse. It is now increasingly common for LBH to act as a
facilitator for public interest litigation in cooperation with other human
rights organizations.24 In high-profile socio-political cases, LBH is
typically the key legal representative and principal coordinator of court
action. These patterns were established under the New Order, when LBH
often seemed like the only active legal NGO in Indonesia.25 They are
unlikely to change any time soon, notwithstanding the recent
introduction of a wide-ranging regulatory scheme for the delivery of
legal aid that aims to establish both accreditation and state funding for all
legal aid providers.

II. THE NEW LEGAL AID LAW

Before Law 16/2011 on Legal Aid, LBH and other legal aid and
public interest law organizations operated without legislative or
regulatory controls. There were directives issued from time to time by
the Supreme Court on the provision of legal aid, but these were usually
of limited effect.26 Most legal NGOs operated independently, often led
by, or acting in conjunction with, LBH. It is therefore not surprising that
while this Law was being drafted, LBH proposed it should be appointed
the sole official legal aid institute in Indonesia, with responsibility for
setting standards and accrediting other legal aid organizations." This was
not accepted by the government, however. Instead the verification and
accreditation process for legal aid organizations that seek government
funding is now conducted by a committee within the Ministry of Law
and Human Rights, although this is unlikely to diminish LBH's status
among other NGOs or its role as a leading national provider of legal aid.
Legal aid is defined in the new Law as "legal assistance that is
given by a legal aid provider free of charge to the recipient of legal
aid."28 A person who receives legal aid is defined as a "poor" person or

24 Crouch, supra note 1.

25 Lev notes, for example, that LBH was not only "the most prominent source of social-legal
criticism in the country", but that at times "there was no other", Lev, supra note 16, at 23.
26 E.g. Guidelines for the Provision of Legal Aid, CIRCULAR OF THE SUPREME COURT No. 10
(2010) (Indon.).
27 interview by Melissa Crouch with lawyers from LBH, Jakarta, Indon. (Feb. 19, 2012).
28 Legal Aid Law, Art. 1(1) (Indon.).
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 627

group, and the provision of legal aid includes criminal, civil, and
administrative matters, both litigious and non-litigious.29 The delivery of
legal aid and its funding is overseen by the Minister of Justice and
Human Rights; and the Minister is required to establish a committee to
oversee the administration and verification and accreditation process. 0 A
legal aid provider must be accredited every three years by meeting
certain requirements (for example, it must be a legal entity (badan
hukum) and have an office). The obligations imposed on legal aid
providers include reporting requirements and education of lawyers." A
person who receives legal aid has certain rights and obligations.32 He or
she must first, however, satisfy certain conditions in the Law, such as
putting his or her complaint in writing and providing evidence of poverty
from the lurah, the head of his or her village, or other local official.33 A
legal aid provider must respond to receipt of complaint from a qualified
person within the very short period of just three days.34 It is a criminal
offence for a legal aid provider to receive money from the client or other
party related to a case, and the maximum penalty is set at imprisonment
for one year prison or a fifty million rupiah fine [USD $4,400]."
It is still too soon to say how the new Law on Legal Aid is
working in practice, and whether it will, in fact, be effective and fully
implemented. If it is, this will likely lead to greater government funding
being made available for legal aid (although that would not include
public interest litigation). This Law certainly has the potential to
strengthen legal NGOs in Indonesia and thus cause lawyering more
generally, depending on the amount of funding offered and how it is
distributed and regulated. We now turn, however, to the regulation of the
wider legal profession in Indonesia, which has so far proved much more
problematic and resistant to regulatory reform.

III. A FRAGMENTED PROFESSION AND THE ADVOCATES LAW

Indonesia has never had a single bar association. Instead, its

legal profession has been characterized by intense squabbling between

29 Legal Aid Law,

Arts. 1(2), 4 (Indon.).
30 Legal Aid Law,
Arts 6, 7 (Indon.).
3' Legal Aid Law,
Art. 10 (Indon.).
32 Legal Aid Law,
Arts. 12-13 (Indon.).
33 Legal Aid Law, Art. 14(1) (Indon.).
34 Legal Aid Law, Art. 15 (Indon.).
3 Legal Aid Law, Art. 21 (Indon.).
628 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

rival independent associations. To a great extent, this is the result of the

Soeharto government's efforts in the 1980s to undermine the nearest
thing Indonesia has ever had to a genuine bar."
PERADIN (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia, Indonesian Advocates
Association) was established in 1963 with the intention of unifying the
Indonesian legal profession and it was marked from the outset by its
commitment to law reform, constitutionalism, and professional
independence." It was also strongly influenced by prominent,
courageous and outspoken cause lawyers including its founder, Yap
Thiam Hien," and Nasution. In 1970, Nasution's proposal to establish
LBH was supported by many lawyers from PERADIN.3 ' After 1978,
when it declared itself a "struggle organization",40 PERADIN became a
target of the New Order administration, and in 1985 the regime
established a rival puppet bar association, IKADIN (Ikatan Advokat
Indonesia, Indonesian Advocates Society), with the clear intention of
undermining PERADIN.4 1
IKADIN itself later split as factions broke away to form other
independent associations, and the heated exchange of allegations of
corruption, dishonesty, and other abuses between a series of fragmented
and constantly fracturing lawyers' associations became standard. This
rivalry and disunity was a pattern encouraged, and often covertly
manipulated, by a government that benefited from a divided profession,
the members of which had greatly differing levels of competence and
integrity.42 In this way, a culture was established of warring associations
within a legal profession of inconsistent quality that lacked a single
disciplinary body but shared a deep suspicion of state intervention. This
culture has meant Indonesia has never had a single, representative body
that could either speak for lawyers in their dealings with the government,
the courts, the legislature or civil society or impose a common model of
ethical conduct or standards of professional skill.

36 LEV, supra note 6, at 315-317.

" Id. at 286-287.
3 On the life and work of Yap Thiam Hien, see Dan S Lev (2011), No Concessions: The Life of
Yap Thiam Hien.
3 LEV, supranote 6, at 290.
40 Crouch, supranote 1, at 70.
41 LEV, supranote 6, at 316.
42 Lev aptly explains the "disorder and disunity" that ensued as the government sought to
destabilize the legal profession, and the 'unlawyerly' reactions of some lawyers, LEV, supranote
6, at 319.
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 629

Nasution, who is still one of Indonesia's leading lawyers, has

witnessed the downward trajectory of the legal profession since he first
entered it as a prosecutor in the 1950s. 43 In the period after the collapse of
the New Order in 1998, he was among a group of senior legal figures
who began to argue for another attempt to unify their profession and
improve standards. As might be expected, many of the leaders of this
group - Todung Mulya Lubis," for example - had also been prominent
LBH lawyers.
At first, it seemed they had been successful in creating a new
unity among Indonesian lawyers. Overarching regulations for the legal
profession are now contained in Law No. 18/2003 on Advocates, which
came into effect on April 5, 2003.45 Prior to the introduction of the 2003
Law, lawyers were divided into several categories, including advocates
who acted as generalist lawyers, legal advisers who specialized in fields
of commercial law, and legal consultants. Each of these professional
groups issued their own regulations. Following the promulgation of the
2003 Advocates Law all qualified, practicing lawyers are now referred to
as 'advocates'." Advocates are defined as individuals in the profession of
providing legal services, both within and outside court, who fulfill
professional requirements set out in the Advocates Law.47 The Law
requires that all advocates must:
Be admitted to the profession by a single Bar Association, which
must issue a declaration of admission to the Supreme Court and the
Ministry (art. 2(2));

43 Cf Nasution, supra note 14, at 3-12.

4 Dr Todung Mulya Lubis was the Director of LBH Jakarta from 1980 to 1983. He is a founder
and Senior Partner of a leading private law firm, Lubis Santosa & Maulana. He has undertaken
many high profile litigation cases relating to human rights, often on a pro bono basis, and is
regarded as one of Indonesia's leading lawyers.
4 Law No. 18/2003 on Advocates (Indon.).
46 Notaries are separately regulated under Law no 30/2004 on Notaries, as well as a more detailed
professional Code of Ethics specific to their profession. "Community advocates" also appear in
the Advocates Law. They are defined in art. I as legal practitioners who lack formal legal
training and are not admitted to the profession but frequently act as advisers or representatives
for poor and disadvantaged clients. Their role is akin to that of the 'bare foot doctor' in the
medical profession, Dan S. Lev, Between state and society: Professional lawyers and reform in
Indonesia, in INDONESIA LAW AND SOCIETY 48, 49 (Timothy Lindsey ed., 2008). They rarely
play a significant part in major public interest litigation but ar crucial in handling day-to-day
cases.
47 Advocates Law, art 1(1) (Indon.).
630 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

Hold a law degree (arts. 2(1) and 3(l)(e));48

Participate in professional advocate special education (art. 2(1));

Have Indonesian citizenship (art. 3(l)(a));

Reside in Indonesia (art. 3(1)(b));

Not work as a civil servant or state official (art. 3(l)(c));

Be at least 25 years old (art. 3(l)(d));

Pass the Bar Association examination (art. 3(l)(f));

Have conducted an apprenticeship of at least two continuous years in

an advocate's office (art. 3(l)(g));

Never have been convicted of a criminal offence (art. 3(l)(h)); and

Demonstrate good behavior, honesty, responsibility, fairness, and

strong integrity (art. 3(1)(i)). 49

The bar association mentioned in article 2 of the new Law was

clearly intended to play a key role in the overall scheme of the Advocates
Law. It is a single independent professional advocate's forum and is
established with the specific aim of increasing the quality of the
profession.o It is intended to be non-partisan and its leadership is
prohibited from involvement in the leadership of political parties." The
bar association's principal responsibility is, as might be expected, to
monitor the legal professionS2 to ensure compliance by its members with
relevant regulations and its professional code of conduct." This is
primarily to be conducted by its Monitoring Commissions. It must also
establish Honor (Professional Conduct) Committees to oversee
professional conduct at both national and regional levels.54 The regional
Honor Committee is to hear cases of professional misconduct in the first

48 According to the penjelasan (explanatory memorandum) to the Law, a relevant law degree can
be obtained from a faculty of law, a faculty of Sharia(Islamic law), an academy of military law
or the police academy.
49 Advocates Law, Arts. 2(l)-(2), 3(l)(a)-(i) (Indon.).
so Advocates Law, Art. 28(1) (Indon.).
s' Advocates Law, Art. 28(3) (Indon.).
52 Advocates Law, Art. 12(1)
(Indon.).
s3 Advocates Law, Art. 29(1) (Indon.) A Code of Ethics was promulgated in 2002 by the
Indonesian Advocates Working Committee prior to the passing of the Advocates Law in the
following year. For more details, see Crouch, supranote 1, at 74-75.
5 Advocates Law, Art. 27(1) (Indon.).
Vol 31, No. 3 CauseLawyers in Indonesia 63 1

instance, while the Central Honor Committee may hear appeals and issue
final decisions."
While the Advocates Law clearly envisages the establishment of
a single bar association that Nasution and his colleagues hoped might
finally fulfill the promise of PERADIN, this has sadly not been achieved.
While the creation of a single regulatory body to monitor and represent
lawyers, establish uniform standards, and monitor their conduct might
seem self-evidently necessary - or at least very useful - the legacy of
disunity and suspicion left by the New Order tactics of dividing lawyers
to rule them has proved more powerful.
At present, a new organization -confusingly of the same name as
its predecessor, but referred to by a slightly different acronym -PERADI
(Persatuan Advokat Indonesia, Indonesian Advocates Association),
claims to be the sole bar association in Indonesia, and had approximately
24,000 members as of September 2011.15 It was formed on December 21,
2004 as a product of the amalgamation of the existing eight bar
associations listed in Article 32(4) of the Advocates Law. This was a
complex process led by an Indonesian Advocates Working Committee
that included members of all these associations." However, it was done
somewhat hastily in order to meet the two-year deadline for its
formation. It is now clear that this was insufficient time to build a clear
consensus among the membership of the eight main bar organizations
regarding the legitimacy of their new governing body. PERADI's claim
to be the nation's sole bar association was, therefore, contested from the
outset. In particular, "allegations of corruption emerged in relation to the
newly-established PERADI."" These soon found support among a group
of highly-regarded and influential lawyers, many of whom were
previously senior figures at LBH. Some of them suspected- rightly or
wrongly- that PERADI had somehow already been suborned by either
the state or private interests.
As a result, many cause lawyers withdrew support from
PERADI, and a number of applications were made to the Constitutional
Court seeking partial revocation of the Advocates Law in order to

5 Advocates Law, Art. 27(2) (Indon.).

6 AM. BAR Ass'N., ACCESS TO JUSTICE ASSESSMENT FOR INDONESIA SOUTH SULAWESI
PROVINCE 27 (2012).
57 Sejarah, PERADI,
http://www.peradi.or.id/in/detail.viewer.php?catid=Oec779fDf6lecd748922bOlaf48e03ce&cgyid
=c980253e8d2fdcd8e8601ae ll3fal5la (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
58 Crouch, supranote 1, at 18.
632 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

dissolve PERADI. In 2006, however, that court rejected a challenge to

the constitutionality of the establishment of a single bar association" and
in subsequent decisions refused to revisit the matter.' This did not
resolve the issue at all, however, and in 2008 around three thousand
lawyers surrendered their membership to PERADI to establish a rival bar
association known as the Indonesia Advocates Congress (KAI, Kongres
Advokat Indonesia).' They did so on the basis of claims that flaws in the
process of its establishment meant PERADI was not validly formed and
did not, in fact, legally exist.62 KAI quickly assumed functions that,
under the Advocates Law, were the prerogative of the official bar
association. These included holding bar exams and issuing membership
cards that it insisted had the same legitimacy as those issued by
PERADI."
The split resulted in fierce rivalry between the two organizations,
marked by a series of legal battles, none of which proved conclusive. In
2009, the issue returned to the Constitutional Court, which this time
stated that, "in its opinion, neither PERADI nor KAI has been accepted
as the sole umbrella organization for legal professionals ... and urged
PERADI and KAI to form one united organization according to the
Advocates Law."' The Court's opinion only added to the confusion and
uncertainty. In frustration, Indonesia's other peak court, the Supreme
Court, entered the fray. In 2010, an accord overseen by the Supreme
Court acknowledged PERADI as the main bar association in Indonesia,
but set out a process for PERADI and KAI to reconcile and work
towards the establishment of a single bar association within two years. 5
A rival faction within KAI quickly emerged, however, which argued that
the accord was not legitimate."

s9 See Decision No. 014/PUU-IV/2006 (Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia Nov. 27,
2006).
6 Crouch, supra note 1, at 22.
61 Indra Sahnun Lubis Terpilih Jadi Presiden Kongres Advokat Indonesia, TEMPOCO (May 30,
2008), http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2008/05/30/055124025/Indra-Sahnun-Lubis-Terpilih-
Jadi-Presiden-Kongres-Advokat-Indonesia.
62 Id.
63 Syarat Keanggotaan, Kongres Advokat Indonesia, http://www.kongres-advokat-
indonesia.org/showdetail.php?mod=red&id-32 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
6 Crouch, supranote 1, at 82.
65 See Circular Letter No.089/KMA/VI/2010, June 25, 2010 (Indon.).
6 Setya Adil, Lawyers Vandalize Court Over Recognition of Rivals, JAKARTA GLOBE (July 15,
2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/lawyers-vandalize-court-over-recognition-of-
rivals/.
Vol 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 633

In any case, it appears that the Supreme Court, which initially

supported PERADI as the principal bar association, is now willing to
recognize KAI-certified lawyers, a move that somewhat defeats the
purpose of the accord. In a 2011 "clarification" of its position, the
Supreme Court stated that PERADI's principal recognition did not
necessarily mean that members of other associations would not be
eligible to take an oath and be sworn into practice," although this seems
to be clearly at odds with a plain reading of the Advocates Law. In any
case, the courts have retained a high degree of discretion as to who can
appear before them. Whatever the merits of the arguments concerning
the two rival associations, it now seems clear that the bold attempt to
establish a single professional bar association through the Advocacy Law
has failed, for now at least.
In 2013, the Legislative Committee of the national legislature,
the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), was working on amendment of the
Advocacy Law and considering the deeply vexed issue of whether to re-
examine the single bar association policy. PERADI has submitted that
any revision should specifically identify it as the sole bar association,"
but KAI has insisted that the requirement for a single association be
removed and that both PERADI and KAI be listed as legitimate bar
associations. Other commentators simply hope, somewhat optimistically,
that the new bill will finally bring an end to the ongoing feud6' and that a
unified - and properly regulated profession - might be created for the
first time in Indonesian history. If this does happen, it would certainly be
a momentous reversal of well-established patterns of division and
discord in which leading cause lawyers have played important parts on
both sides of the argument.
The divisions in Indonesia's legal profession are not limited to
matters of professional organization. They also extend to the ways in
which litigation is handled and to relations with the government and the
judiciary. As might be expected, many of the wider cleavages among
Indonesia's diverse ethnic, religious, and political communities are also
sometimes reflected among its lawyers. Moreover, the combination of
the absence of a single professional association and the degree of
discipline that it can provide, and the culture of conflict and factionalism

67 See Circular Letter No. 052/KMA/HK.O1/II/2011 (Indon.).

68 Lita P. Siregar & Novrieza Rami, Masukan PERADIuntuk Advokat', HUKUM ONLINE.
69 Rofiq Hidayat & Abdul Rasak Asri, Revisi UU Advokat DiharapkanJadi Solusi Perpecahan,
HUKUM ONLINE.
634 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

that has been engrained since at least the 1980s, means these are often
exacerbated.
This is certainly the case with regard to the right to religious
freedom, an area that has been the subject of much controversy in public
life in Indonesia in the last fifteen years." In the balance of this paper we
therefore seek to demonstrate another aspect of the many divisions
among cause lawyers in Indonesia by examining, first, how LBH has
dealt with religious freedom cases and, second, how one prominent cause
lawyer at LBH came to completely reject the position on these issues of
the organization he once led. We conclude with a brief consideration of
what that might suggest about the future of the Reformasi movement in
Indonesia and cause lawyering more generally.

IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND LBH

Since Reformasi began in 1998, LBH has been one of the key
institutions representing religious communities and religious leaders in
cases against government actions. It has long adhered to the view that
religious minorities should be free to worship without harassment, and its
lawyers regularly provide legal advice and representation for individuals
accused of criminal offences against particular religions, primarily
pursuant to Art 156a of the Criminal Code, the so-called "Blasphemy
Law."" LBH usually does so without much hope of success, and, in fact,
it has never won an acquittal in such a case. Even when charges of
blasphemy against the accused are dropped (as has occurred in a handful
of cases), the accused has been convicted of other, related, criminal
offences. As with the political trials it unsuccessfully defended under the
New Order, LBH has, however, routinely provoked widespread media
attention and public debate on the issues involved in blasphemy cases by
defending them vigorously, despite the virtual certainty of conviction.
In 2012, for example, LBH represented Alexander Aan, an
atheist convicted under Law 11/2008 on Electronic Transactions and
Information for a post on the "Minang Atheists" Facebook page that
concerned the Prophet Muhammad and was seen as "blaspheming

70 See generally MELISSA CROUCH, LAW AND RELIGION IN INDONESIA: CONFLICT AND THE
COURTS IN WEST JAVA (2013); TIM LINDSEY, ISLAM, LAW AND THE STATE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
INDONESIA, 401-434 (2012).
71 Presidential Decree No 1/PNPS/1965 on the Prevention of the Miuse/Insulting of a Religion,
converted to statute by Law 5/1969. It is commonly referred to in Indonesia as 'UU Penodaan
Agama', the 'Blasphemy Law'.
Vol 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 635

Islam."72 In 2013, LBH also represented Tajul Muluk, a Shiite convicted

for "blaspheming Islam" under Art 156a of the Criminal Code, simply
for holding Shia beliefs, which are increasingly held to be inherently
"deviant" by mainstream Sunni organizations in Indonesia. Members of
religious minorities facing other criminal charges have also been
represented by LBH. These include Deden Darmawan Sudjana, a
Security Advisor for Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia, a group that many
Muslims see as contravening orthodox Islamic doctrine (as is explained
further below). Sudjana was charged with incitement and attempting to
resist the police under the Criminal Code in relation to the February 2011
Cikeusik incident, when he unsuccessfully sought to fend off attacks by a
large Sunni vigilante mob that killed three Ahmadis and burnt Ahmadi
houses."
In fact, in an era when trials for subversion no longer take place,
the issue of religious freedom has taken their place, defining a large
proportion of LBH's public interest litigation agenda since 1998." In
addition to defending members of religious minorities facing criminal
charges, LBH has also brought cases for judicial review of legislation to
the Constitutional Court, for example, the widely-debated, and ultimately
unsuccessful, 2010 challenge to the Blasphemy Law." Former members
of LBH were likewise key to a second failed challenge to the Blasphemy

72 Aan was convicted under 28(2), which states that "A person who intentionally and without right
spreads information that aims to cause hatred or hostility towards an individual and/or particular
group that is based on ethnicity, religion, race or inter-group relations (SARA)." Under Art
45(2), this offence attracts a penalty of 6 months jail or a fine of up to Rp 1 million. See No.
45/PID.B/2012/PN/MR (Pengadilan Negeri Muaro Putusan, June 13, 2012) (Indon.).
" See No. 69/Pid.B/2012/PN.Spg (Pengadilan Negeri Sampang Putusan, July 11 2012) (Indon.).
74 See Melissa Crouch, Criminal (In)justice in Indonesia: The Cikeusik Trials, 37 ALTERNATIVE L.
J.at 54, 54-6 (2012). Eleven members of the mob that killed the Ahmadis in Cikeusik eventually
faced trial. They were not charged with murder, but inciting hatred under Art. 160 and battery
under Art. 170 of the Criminal Code, which carry six and twelve-year maximum penalties
respectively. They received sentences for breach of Article 170 that ranged from just three to six
months imprisonment. Deden Sudjana received six months imprisonment.
7 In its annual reports, LBH now often includes a section relating to cases and campaigns on
freedom of religion and belief: see for example, LBH Jakarta (2012) Paradox Negara Hukum:
LaporanHukum dan HAM2012. Jakarta: LBH.
76 The challenge was to Presidential Decree 1 of 1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse and/or
Disgracing a Religion, converted to statute by Law 5 of 1969, and commonly referred to in
Indonesia as "UU Penodaan Agama", or the "Blasphemy Law". This Decree inserted art 156a in
the Criminal Code. For an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision, see Melissa Crouch,
Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law, 7 AsIAN J.
Comp. L., at 1-46 (2012). For an analysis of the Constitutional Court decision, see Melissa
Crouch, Law and Religion in Indonesia: The Constitutional Court and the Blasphemy Law, 7
AsIAN J. CoMP. L. 1(2012); See also LINDSEY, supra note 70, at ch. 12.
636 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

Law in 2012-2013."1 LBH has also represented Ahmadiyah in challenges

to decisions of local authorities that were heard in the Administrative
Courts (2005) and the Supreme Court (2011, ongoing)."
These cases may have been doomed, but they are prime
examples of "Structural Legal Aid", and are, in fact, a form of the highly
managed political theater that LBH has - over many decades - refined to
an effective art form. To return to Sarat and Sheingold's definition of
cause lawyering," LBH lawyers are undertaking "controversial and
politically charged activities" by reason of "a sense of commitment to
particular ideals;" they are "fusing law with political activism, to engage
in sensitive issues of public policy and politics." The message they hope
to convey by defending those charged with blasphemy and running
public interest litigation in defense of religious freedom is unambiguous.
As Nasution, himself a Muslim (like more than eighty percent of
Indonesians), puts it:
Indonesian democracy continues to be tested by serious problems.
Religious fundamentalism has become one of the most dangerous of
all . .. [Islamist vigilantes] persist in intimidating and even using
violent means to attack minority faiths, and marginalized "little
people" (orang kecio, as well as activists fighting for religious
freedom ... unfortunately the branches of state authority (executive,
legislative, judicial) seem to have lost their grip, and are ineffectual
in curbing fundamentalist aspiration ... I am afraid that our
politicians have now slipped into an erroneous understanding of
democracy. It is as though ... vox populi vox dei (the voice of the
people is the voice of God) has become the official formula for
democracy in Indonesia: If the majority want it, then let it be so. This
is utterly wrong ... Basing democracy on majoritarianism alone will
inevitably give rise to serious problems. .. Democracy must be
based on a principle of constitutionalism that is intended to limit the
arbitrariness of power, including prevention of the tyranny of the
majority.o80

This message, however, sometimes seems not to be heard in the

din created by the highly-charged politics associated with issues of
religious freedom in Indonesia. The message even seemed entirely lost
when a prominent LBH lawyer switched causes. Like Nasution,

7 See generally Melissa Crouch, The IndonesianConstitutional Courtand Religious Minorities,in

MINORITIES IN MUSLIM-MAJORITY CONTEXTS (Alyn Hine & Pei-Chien Wu, eds.) (forthcoming).
7 See Melissa Crouch, JudicialReview and Religious Freedom: The Case of IndonesianAhmadis,
34 SYDNEY L. REv. 545 (2012).
79 SARAT & SCHEINGOLD, supra note 9.
so Nasution, supranote 14, at 36.
Vol 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 637

Munarman is a well-known figure in Indonesia. From his early

involvement with LBH to his later role in "hard line" (garis keras)
Islamist vigilant organizations, such the Islamic Defenders Front (Front
Pembela Islam, FPI), he has attracted significant media attention. In the
next part, we provide a brief account of his career as an illustration of the
fault lines that weaken cause lawyering in Indonesia, and of the massive
problems that still confront law reformers in that country.

V. FROM RADICAL CAUSE LAWYER TO RADICAL ISLAMIST: THE

TRANSFORMATION OF MUNARMAN

Born in Palembang, Sumatra in 1968, Munarman graduated with

a law degree from Palembang's Sriwijaya University, where he was
known as a devout Sunni Muslim." He then joined the local LBH
branch, and in less than two years went from volunteering to heading
operations in Palembang.82 During this time, he was notable for his
energy, intensity, and the uncompromising nature of his commitment to
help the poor achieve justice in civil legal matters, which he saw as part
of a wider social duty of egalitarianism and altruism."
In 1996, these concerns also led Munarman to become involved
with another prominent national cause lawyers' NGO, KontraS. KontraS
was established in that year by a prominent human rights activist, Munir
Said Thalib, in response to human rights abuses committed by Soeharto's
New Order, then still firmly in power.84 KontraS was particularly
concerned with holding members of the military and political elite
accountable for violence and abductions committed in remote regions as
well as in Jakarta, where students and community organizations were
targeted in the lead-up to the 1997 election." Under Munir's guidance,
Munarman went on to become the coordinator of KontraS. He eventually

81 A Gunawan, Munarman: Aktivitas Kontras yang tak Kondang, TEMPO, available at

tempo.co.id/harian/profil/prof-munarman.html.
82 Id.
83 See Abanggeutanyo, Munarman, Egaliter Nasionalis ke Otoritor Tiranis?, KOMPASIANA,
http://edukasi.kompasiana.com/2013/06/30/dari-egaliter-nasionalis-menjadi-sangar-dan-bengis-
573150.html.
84 KONTRAS was originally established in 1996 as KIP-HAM. It was renamed in 1998. E Mei
Amelia R, Munarman Diberi Waktu 6 Jam Jenguk Bayinya, DETIKNEWS,
http://news.detik.com/read/2008/09/12/102912/1004967/10/munarman-diberi-waktu-6-jam-
jenguk-bayinya.
85 See KONTRAS Profile: Background, KONTRAS,
http://www.kontras.org/eng/index.php?hal=profile.
638 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

headed its Working Committee, and in 2000 relocated to the KontraS

office in Jakarta."
Together Munir and Munarman became well-known for
uncovering human rights abuses by the military, including in the
province of Aceh, where Munarman also lived for a while. The two were
seemingly tireless advocates for human rights and an end to elite
impunity. They were active, effective and outspoken in both the wider
community and among policymakers, frequently to the embarrassment
and annoyance of the latter.
Probably as a result of this, Munir was poisoned with arsenic on
a flight to the Netherlands in 2004 by Pollycarpus Priyanto, a Garuda
pilot who was also an agent of Indonesia's national intelligence agency
(Badan Inteligen Negara, BIN) and eventually received twenty years for
the killing." Munir's death led to a public outcry, and investigations and
reports into the assassination showed it was part of a wide conspiracy.
The then Chief Executive of Garuda, Indra Setiawan, was convicted for
his role in the murder and senior figures in BIN were also implicated,
although none have ever been convicted."
There can be little doubt that Munir's death had a profound
effect on Munarman, and over the next few years he appears to have
become disillusioned with the capacity of cause lawyers and the legal
process to achieve the aspirations of social justice that had motivated him
since his university days.
In 2002, Munarman had refocused his attention on YLBHI
(Indonesian Legal Aid Institute Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum Indonesia), the central umbrella in Jakarta for the regional LBH
offices around Indonesia, and was soon elected its leader by a convincing
margin." His main pledge at the time was to unite and consolidate
YLBHI members, saying that, "To build democracy, we should seek out

86 Gunawan, supranote 81.

87 Putusan Mahkamah Agung No 109PK/Pid/2007, concerning the case of Pollycarpus Budihari
Priyanto, January 25, 2008.
88 DeniedLetter,Activists to Push to Reopen Munir Case,
JAKARTA POST (Jan. 5,2012, 8:56 AM),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/05/denied-letter-activists-push-reopen-munir-
case.html. The court decision convicting Indra Setiawan has not been made publicly available on
the Supreme Court's website, KEPANTrERAAN,
http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/perkara/perkaradetail.php?id-ccbe4780-90a6-10a6-
b3cd-30393338 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
89 T.Z. Simanjuntak, ^Munarman Elected YLBHI Top Executive, JAKARTA POST, available at
http.//www.thejakartapost.comLnew4s/2002/09/25/munarman-elected-ylbhi-top-executive.html.
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 639

our foes, but make friends ... The differences among us are part of our
tradition. YLBHI will never be broken down because of differences. "90
His views, however, changed dramatically over the next few
years, moving from espousing pluralism, democracy, religious freedom,
and the rule of law' ideas implicit in the Indonesian term negarahukum
to openly advocating cultural and religious segregation and the
application of a conservative and literalist interpretation of Islamic law
that is highly intolerant of religious difference. 9'
This shift seems to have taken place in the wake of Munir's
murder, when Munarman became increasingly involved with Hizbut
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), an Islamist organization that calls for the
creation of a worldwide Islamic state and espouses conservative religious
and moral values. 92 In 2006, a HTI poster appeared in Jakarta with
Munarman's face and name on it93 and soon after he gave an interview
stating that "Indonesians must unite and close ranks in order to prepare
for the threats of secular groups," such as United States-funded NGOs. 94
As Mas Achmad Santosa, a YLBHI board member and prominent cause
lawyer has said, the "problems" with Munarman began "when he began
to bring his (Hizbut Tahrir) teachings into the office," as "he did not
reflect the LBH approach that we transcend ethnicity, religion, and race.
There is no room [here] for sectarianism.""
Munarman's public statements and affiliation with HTI soon
made his leadership of YLBHI untenable, and in 2006 he was ousted.96
He was replaced by Patra M. Zen (Ferdianto, 2006), another energetic
and committed young legal aid lawyer, but one more at ease with
YLBHI's long-standing and essentially secular rule of law, legal aid and

9 Id.
91 Magdalena, Munarman SH Soal Pembubaran Ormas Isla: Saya Tahu Persis Siapa yang
Menyuarakan Inii, ERAMUSLIM: MEDIA ISLAM RuJUKAN,
http://www2.eramuslim.com/berita/bincang/munarman-sh-soal-pembubaran-ormas-islam-saya-
tahu-persis-siapa-yang-menyuarakan-ini.htm#.Uc 1WNevDreI
92 TentangKami, HIzBUT TAHRIR INDONESIA, http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/tentang-kami/.
93 M. R. Maslan, Munarman Ancam Lawan Bila Dipecat dari YLBHI, DITEK NEWS,
http://news.detik.com/read/2006/04/06/213342/572258/10/munarman-ancam-lawan-bila-dipecat-
dari-ylbhi?nd771104bcj.
* Magdalena, supra note 91.
* Stephen Fitzpatrick, Rebel Indonesian Lawyer Munarman Turns Himselfln, THE AUSTRALIAN,
June 11, 2008, available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/rebel-lawyer-turns-himself-
in/story-e6frg6t6-1111116594504.
9 Tiarma Siboro, Leading legal aid group head ousted over internal dispute, JAKARTA POST
(April 11, 2006, 9:52 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/04/11/leading-legal-aid-
group-head-ousted-over-intemal-dispute.html.
640 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

human rights agenda, and its clear position in support of the rights of
religious minorities.
Munarman's expulsion from YLBHI saw him become
increasingly preoccupied not only with HTI's aims of legal Islamisation,
but also with the eradication of unorthodox or "deviant" (sesat) Islamic
beliefs, a common concern of conservative Sunni organizations in
Indonesia." Like many other members of such groups in Indonesia,
Munarman was particularly determined to oppose the Ahmadiyah
movement. Ahmadiyah was founded in the 1880s in what is now
Pakistan by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a mystic, and has been active in
Indonesia since the 1920s." Ahmad is believed to have claimed to be a
successor prophet to Muhammad - a claim Sunni Muslims find highly
offensive. Ahmadiyah has therefore been deemed deviant by the
Indonesia Ulama Council (Majelis Ualma Islam, MUI) and other leading
Muslim organizations, and its members face opposition, and even
persecution, in many parts of Indonesia."
After leaving YLBHI, Munarman formed the An Nashr Institute,
the main aim of which was to ban Ahmadiyah beliefs and practices, and
in 2008 began to associate with the Islamic Defenders Front (Front
Pembela Islam, FPI), a vigilante group that is often involved in violence
directed at Ahmadis." As a leader of a FPI subgroup, the Islamic Militia
Command (Komando Laskar Islam, KLI),o' Munarman was implicated
in attacks on Ahmadi groups and their supporters. The most notorious of
these was the National Monument attack in Jakarta on June 1, 2008, and
it shows how far Munarman had now departed from the positions on
religious freedom held by LBH.
On that day, members of the National Alliance for the Freedom
of Faith and Religion (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama
dan Berkeyakinan, AKKBB), including their families, gathered at the

9 This concern is reflected in the fatwa (Islamic legal opinions) issued by some leading Islamic
organizations, including the Indonesian Ulama Council, against so-called "deviant" groups, and
the conviction of leaders of those groups for blasphemy and related religious offences. See
Crouch, supra note 76; LINDSEY, supranote 70, at 147-153, 402-444.
9 See generally SPENCER LAVAN, THE AHMADIYAH MOVEMENT: PAST AND PRESENT (1976).
9 LINDSEY, supra note 70, at 147-153.
10 Chaider S. Bamualim, Islamic Militancy and Resentment against Hadhramis in Post-Suharto
Indonesia: A Case Study of Habib Rizieq Syihab and His Islamic Defenders Front, 31 (No. 2)
COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST 231, at 267-281
(2011).
101 Fatima Astuti, Fallout From Jakarta'sMona Incident, INT'L REL. AND SECURITY NETWORK
(June 12, 2008), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng-en&id=88463.
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 641

monument in Jakarta to celebrate the sixty-third year of the Pancasila

state ideology,102 which emphasizes religious pluralism and freedom.'03
Munarman, along with members of the KLI, FPI and Hizbut Tahrir,
attacked AKKBB members with bamboo poles and other weapons." Up
to thirty-four men, women, and children of a range of religious
affiliations, including Muslims, were injured; also hurt were senior
leaders of moderate Islamic groups.'05 Around a thousand police were in
attendance, but did little to stop the violence. After the incident,
Munarman publicly stated that the attack was a reaction to the Alliance's
statement in several newspapers supporting religious pluralism and the
rights of Ahmadiyah members. 06
On the day after what became known as "The Monas Tragedy,"
President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono condemned the attack, stating that
the perpetrators should be dealt with sternly and face the full force of the
justice system. Munarman fled, but was arrested six days after the
attack.' He was charged with the following offences under the Criminal
Code: ambush; property damage; torture; and provocation.' On October
30, 2008, he received a prison sentence of one and a half years
imprisonment.' The result sparked some protest for its perceived
leniency, but to no avail.
Munarman, however, may well regard the attack as successful, in
that it achieved his aim of securing very significant restrictions on the
right of Ahmadis to worship. On June 9, 2008, a week after the attack, as
Islamist protestors staged large demonstrations against Ahmadiyah in the
center of Jakarta, the Joint Decision of the Minister of Religion, the
Attorney General, and the Minister for Internal Affairs No. 3 of 2008,
KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008 and No. 199 of 2008 respectively, was issued.
Although the text of the Joint Decision is open to different

102 Melissa Crouch, Indonesia, Militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Originsand Implications, in ARC
FEDERATION FELLOWSHIP 'ISLAM, SHARIAH AND GOVERNANCE' BACKGROUND PAPER SERIES
No. 4 12 (2009).
103 M. Syafi'I Anwar, Islam, Pancasila and Atheism, JAKARTA POST, available at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/06/26/islam-pancasila-and-atheism.html.
04 Hard-Liners Ambush Monas Rally, JAKARTA POST (June 2, 2008), available at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/02/hardliners-ambush-monas-rally.html.
10s LINDSEY, supranote 70, at 63-4.
106 Hard-LinersAmbush Monas Rally, supra note 104.
107 Fitzpatrick, supra note 95.
os Criminal Code, art 170(1), 406(1), 351(1), and 160 (Indon.); See also Crouch,supra note 102, at
13-14.
10 CROUCH, supranote 102, at 13-15.
642 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

interpretations,"o it has been widely seen as effectively prohibiting

Ahmadis from publicly practicing their beliefs and has sparked a wave of
similar regulations across Indonesia at the local level."' Munarman had
thus carried out a form of public protest that could be characterised as a
type of "Structural Legal Aid", albeit of a very different nature to that
conducted by LBH. Despite public opposition, Munarman's attack
resulted in a significant regulatory change that greatly disadvantaged the
Ahmadis.
Since his release from prison, Munarman has maintained his
open hostility to the values of the cause lawyer organizations he once
led. He again achieved national notoriety for this in 2013, when he
appeared on a TVOne talk show to discuss police bans on Islamist
vigilante groups conducting so-called "sweeping" raids on bars, gaming
houses, and brothels during Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month.112
During the discussion, a sociologist from the University of Indonesia,
Thamrin Amal Tamagola, mentioned President Yudhyono's promotion
of pluralism and human rights as beneficial for protection of Indonesian
citizens. Munarman responded angrily, throwing water over Tamgola."I
Although Tamgola declined to report the matter to the police, Munarman
steadfastly refused to apologize for his actions, which have been seen by
many as reflecting FPI's "thug-like attributes, camouflaged by
religion."I'

VII. CONCLUSION: REFORM FATIGUE?

Munarman underwent a transformation from cause lawyer to

Islamist vigilante, from being a supporter of pluralism and tolerance and
a critic of violence and human rights abuse to becoming an outspoken
opponent of pluralism and tolerance, a person openly dismissive of such

n0 The key provision is Point 2, which states that 'the organisers of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia
(JAI) for as long as they call themselves Muslims, must cease the spreading of interpretations
and activities that deviate from the main teachings of Islam, that is spreading the belief that
acknowledges a prophet, with a variety of teachings, after the Prophet Muhammad'; See
LINDSEY, supra note 70, at 425-6.
See Crouch, supra note 78. Ironically, one of the drafters of the Joint Decision was Nasution; he
has told the authors that felt he had no choice but to support the repressive regulation given the
atmosphere of political tension and looming mob violence in the city at the time, created by the
groups of which Munarman was a leader.
112 See Activist Slams Water-Throwing Incident, JAKARTA POST (June 29, 2013), available at
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/29/activist-slams-water-throwing-incident.html.

114 id.
Vol. 31, No. 3 Cause Lawyers in Indonesia 643

rights and a willing user of violence. At first glance this seems to be a

complete reversal. However, he may not see it like that.
If we assume that Munarman's motivations remain the same as
they were when he began his career as cause lawyer in Palembang - that
is, to achieve social justice - then he might argue that what has changed
is his understanding of the nature of social justice and the best means to
obtain it. It is not hard to imagine that the murder of his close colleague,
Munir, and the failure to convict any senior BIN figure of the crime
might have seemed stark evidence to Munarman that replacement of the
authoritarian New Order system with a ramshackle democratic system
had resulted in little real progress towards an end to corruption, elite
impunity, and reform of his country's dysfunctional legal system.
That would not be so strange a view. These are, in fact,
increasingly common views among cause lawyers and Reformasi
activists throughout Indonesia. Disillusioned former cause lawyers who
have now sought other careers in commercial practice, academia,
business, politics, or elsewhere sometimes refer to Munir's murder as an
example of why they have done so. They also point to high profile cases
of elite corruption and misbehavior that fill the media every day as well
as dissatisfaction with the state of the judiciary, the police, and the legal
profession."' There is also a perception that the Reformasi has stagnated,
and some even feel that democratisation may now be vulnerable to
unravelling by a hostile post-Yudhoyono government.
If Munarman concluded that the negara hukum ideals of LBH to
which he first committed himself in Palembang have failed to deliver
social justice, then it is perhaps not surprising that he might return to an
extreme form of the conservative Sunni values he had held all his life to
redefine his notions of social justice, and seek a form of activism within
that framework to which he might commit himself with the same
intensity. Muslim groups - particularly mainstream moderate groups -
were heavily involved in the Reformasi movement from the outset.
Indeed, there has long been an influential tradition of modernist Islamic
thinking among some cause lawyers who view governance from a deeply
moral perspective. They are often motivated by a view that corruption is
a wrong per se that the pious person has a duty to prevent. The post-
Soeharto process of democratisation that changed the legal NGOs
clustered around LBH from dissident opposition groups into public cause

" See SImoN BuTT & TIM LINDSEY, Judicial Mafia: Corruption and the Courts in Indonesia, in
THE STATE AND ILLEGALITY IN INDONESIA 189 (Douglas Greenburg et. al. eds., 2011).
644 Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

lawyer organisations therefore also gave a voice to Muslim organizations

and enabled them to participate openly in public life after three decades
of systemic repression under Soeharto. In addition to the mainstream
Muslim organizations in Indonesia that led democratization and strongly
support religious tolerance, social diversity, and human rights there are,
of course, a much smaller number of hard-line (garis keras) Islamist
conservatives who use the freedoms won after Soeharto's fall to promote
what is now a sophisticated legal Islamization agenda as well as a
program of intimidation - and sometimes violence - directed at religious
minorities. These - unlike the mainstream Muslim organizations that are
often keen champions of human rights and representative democracy -
are anathema to what LBH stands for.
This, of course, raises the broader question of the implications of
the shortcomings of legal and political reform in Indonesia, and its
slowing pace, for the future of the open, liberal society developed after
Soeharto's fall in 1998. As mentioned, many cause lawyer NGO leaders
with whom we have met are now increasingly cynical about current
government attitudes to corruption and law reform in Indonesia. Many
see most current national leaders as products of a mindset developed
under Soeharto's rule, inheriting ideas about the role of the state and
commerce that are inimical to good governance. Many NGO leaders
have abandoned the optimism and enthusiasm of the first ten years post-
Soeharto and believe that it will be extremely difficult for the national
leadership to move completely away from New Order attitudes and
practices like those attributed to BIN. Many now have much less faith or
confidence in the state's ability to deliver what it promises, particularly
with regard to human rights and religious tolerance. They also see the
state as passive in the face of the challenges presented, for example, by
extreme Islamist groups like those now associated with Munarman.
Cause lawyers linked to LBH in Indonesia have been, as
Nasution has said, the "locomotive of Democracy" in Indonesia"' or, as
Lev put it, "the most fervent promoters of rule of law ideas ... a highly
sophisticated constitutionalist movement ... at the cutting edge of
political, social and even cultural reform.""' If they now become
disillusioned or even abandon and oppose the rule of law, as did

116 Nasution, supra note 14, at 12.

117 DANIEL S. LEV, Social Movements, Constitutionalism and Human Rights: Comments
from the
Malaysian and Indonesian Experience, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS
INTE CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER 139, at 146 (Douglas Greenberg et. al. eds., 1993).
Vol. 31, No. 3 CauseLawyers in Indonesia 645

Munarman, then Indonesia's post-Soeharto "democratic miracle""' may

be significantly weakened.

"1 This term is in common parlance to describe post-Soeharto Indonesia. See, e.g., Kishore
Mahbubanni, Indonesia's Democratic Miracle, PROJECT SYNDICATE: A WORLD OF IDEAS
(Sept.15,2008), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/indonesia-s-democratic-miracle.