4 People

C.
People
1. Three meanings of the word "People"
The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:
a. "People" as Inhabitants
Art. XIII, Section 1. “The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.”
Art. II, Section 15. “The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.”
Section 16. “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.”
Art. III, Section 2. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, xxx”
Rule: The right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. Under
our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably
applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9
SCRA 27 (1963),
b. “People” as Citizens
Preamble: “We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals
and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and
secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under
the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain
and promulgate this Constitution.”
Art. II, Sec. 1. “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.”
Art. II, Sec. 4. “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all
"citizens" may be required to render personal military or civil service.”
Art. III, Sec. 7. “The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizens subject to limitations provided by law.”
c. “People” as Electors
Art. VII, Sec. 4. “The President and Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the
people xxx.”
Art. XVI, Sec. 2. “The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals,
history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take effect only upon its ratification by
the people in a national referendum.”
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Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of
the Philippines and United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty
by the other contracting party.”
2. Citizenship
A. Who are citizens (Art IV)
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and1
4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.
These citizens are classifiable into (i) natural-born citizens (covering nos. 1, 2, and
3) and (ii) naturalized citizens (covering no. 4).
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis (right of
blood). Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli (right
of the soil) which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political

community. It denotes possession within that particular political community of full
civil and political rights subject to special disqualifications. Reciprocally, it imposes
the duty of allegiance to the political community.2 The core of citizenship is the
capacity to enjoy political rights, that is, the right to participate in government
principally through the right to vote, the right to hold public office and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.3
Historical Background4
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws
on citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws
of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,

promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; however,
three royal decrees were indisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines
- the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
2
specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, and
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1
Under the 1935 Constitution- ARTICLE IV Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:… 4.Those whose
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution - ARTICLE III Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:.. 3 Those who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
2
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines A Commentary, 2009 Edition, p. 629.
3
id pp. 629-630
4
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER

finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions
of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special
laws.
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
of any town of the Monarchy.
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States. The Treaty came into effect on April 11, 1899when the documents of
ratification were exchanged. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain
in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their
rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of
its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as
are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted
the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the
United States.
3
The term "Citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
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Philippine Bill of 1902(enacted by the United States Congress on July 1, 1902),also

commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive
legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in
said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant
of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who
was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers
on or before 11 April 1899.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the
time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in
the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by

law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other
insular possession of the United States, and such other persons residing in the
Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens"
had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft,
the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of
it in his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy
Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except
such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided,
That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives
of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could
become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if
residing therein."
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Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11
April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil
law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children
of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status
of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to have
renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
5

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"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
Summary
 NOVISIMA There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish
RECOPILACION, regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."
promulgated (Spain)
16 July 1805
 ORDER DE LA
REGENCIA , 14
August 1841,
 ROYAL DECREE of
23 August 1868
 LEY EXTRANJERA
DE ULTRAMAR of
04 July 1870
CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN -18 Spanish citizens. -

December 1889
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
The TREATY OF PARIS Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
was entered into on 10 United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
December 1898 Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects
(came into effect on April
11, 1899) "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the
territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
the Congress."
Philippine Bill of 1902 The term "Citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first
(enacted by the United time.
States Congress on July 1,
1902) A "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the
Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899.
The term "inhabitant" was taken to include
1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and
3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April
1899.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July
1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines
23 March 1912, the "Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
Congress of the United provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
States madeamendment to natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
the Philippine Bill of 1902 provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who
would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."
6
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In 1916, Philippine Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was
Autonomy Act, (the Jones deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was
Law) restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899,
Bill of 1902 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and,
3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
1935 Constitution "Section 1, Article III, The following are citizens of the Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,
before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together

with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire
that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority.
1973 Constitution "Section 1, - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

January 17, 1973 "(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
Section 2. "A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien

retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she
is deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."
Article IV, 1987 Section I, now provides:

Constitution
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
Case: On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President5of the Republic
of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the then
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
7
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan"
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Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
5
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election”

Petitioner initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition before the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted
a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second,
even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the
birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that
could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that –
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the
age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born
sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue
that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and
Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other
place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated
to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound
to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death
was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898
to 1902.6
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to
petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted
marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of
marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on
20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a
year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his
mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano
vs. Vivo (20 SCRA 562, Paa vs. Chan 21 SCRA 753)
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it
did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an
alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise parental
authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice
or discriminate against him.
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Page
6
Note Philippine Bill of 1902 – “ that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were
Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands”

The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935 Constitution,
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never
be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly
are none provided.
In Sum - In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the
COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.
1. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
2. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ.
3. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the foregoing action. G.R. No. 161434 March
3, 2004 MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs. COMELEC, ,
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER
Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata7
In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, this Court declared that: “Every time the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.”
Exception;
An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA
248 [1973]), viz:
“We declare it to be a sound rule that
1. where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or

by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy,
2. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor

General or his authorized representative, and
3. this finding or the citizenship of the party is affirmed by the Supreme Court,
The decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's citizenship
9
in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a decision
Page
7
A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit

on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in
any other case or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure
herein stated.”
Some cases:
Rule: Cases involving issues on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual
is put into question, it necessarily has to be threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo
v. Commission on Elections, we said that decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes recognized
by law for the purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by
the courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government
should not be precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when
the same has never been threshed out by any tribunal.
Citizenship proceedings, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not
obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever
the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following
concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus
soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We
agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s
citizenship. However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle of jus soli in the case of Tan
Chong v. Secretary of Labor.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.
Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to
confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he
automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is our considered view that absent any
evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established
rule could not be applied to him.
On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his irregular election
of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this
jurisdiction, is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges
granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may
misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and privileges of citizens of this
country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court
that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state. 598 SCRA
266 September 4, 2009 GO SR. vs. RAMOS
10
Rule: We agree with petitioners that the issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has
Page
not attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of

its own and can be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may
be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur:
1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution
thereof; and
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the BI. Judicial review is
permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship,
so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct. G.R. No.
169958 March 5, 2010 GONZALEZ vs. PENNISI*
B. Election of Philippine Citizenship
The following are citizens of the Philippines xxx
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (Section 1, Article III, 1935
Constitution)
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 625 - AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN

WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE
DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with

subsection (4), section 1, Article IV, of the (1935) Constitution shall be
expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned
before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make
the statement herein authorized before any officer of the Government of the
United States authorized to administer oaths, and he shall forward such
statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of Manila.
(Approved, June 7, 1941.)
Note: The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitution is available only to
those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who, had that charter not
been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining
majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1 (3).
Obviously, election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under
the present constitution as she would be considered a Filipino citizen at birth.
Case:: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964. Since
his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On July 17, 1998, Ching after having completed a
Bachelor of Laws course, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a resolution
of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar, subject to the condition that he must submit to the
Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Ching passed the bar but because of his questionable
citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.
11
Issue: Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
Page
majority?

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Sec. 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. (Ching has inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could
perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.)
CA No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election.
However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made...Jurisprudence dictates that this must be done
within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age of majority.
In Cuenco v. Sec. of Justice8It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable
period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that 3 years
is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted
to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. (In Cuenco, petitioner was allowed to elect
7 years after attaining the age of majority.)
The span of fourteen years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of
the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no
reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed
and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only
an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship
and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp .BAR MATTER No. 914
October 1, 1999 RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, VICENTE
D. CHING
Case: The case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch
4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. Therein, among others, she claims that her nationality was
entered in her records as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father
and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is
Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing
Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by
the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the
nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
Rule: Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship
apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was
concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were
never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory
requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since
12
birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
Page
8
G.R. No. L-18069 May 26, 1962

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years
old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004 REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. CHULE Y. LIM
Case: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father,
who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to
the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to
deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration?
Rule: We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements
for such election.
We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of
Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where,
as in petitioners’ case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within
the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond
the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over
half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent
to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is
the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although
a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on
the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. G.R.
No. 183133 July 26, 2010 MA vs. FERNANDEZ, JR.
Case: Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta
Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting
married to Alex Sagun, she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Said document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on December 17, 1992, but was not
recorded and registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her application was
denied due to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth certificate
that she has elected Philippine citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her
election of Philippine citizenship and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City be
ordered to annotate the same on her birth certificate.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship
and such fact should be annotated on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a
Philippine passport.
Rule: As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of

Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether respondent is required under the
law to make an election and if so, whether she has complied with the procedural requirements in
the election of Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution,
which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935
Constitution reads:
13
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Page
xxxx

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of
a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "[t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are
citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to
the 1987 Constitution which states that "[t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers,
who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. It
should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in
the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the
new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.
Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese,
unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that
only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under
the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need
not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the
Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to
be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship,
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
(1) a statement of election under oath;

(2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and
(3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for registration under C.A. No.
625 unless the party exercising the right of election has complied with the requirements of the
Alien Registration Act of 1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien
Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that
respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records indisputably show
that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically,
respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only
documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was
her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s
oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent
attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under
Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the
failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert
that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act
14
of election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. G.R. No. 187567 February 15, 2012 The Republic of the
Page
Philippines vs. Nora Fe Sagun

C. Natural Born Citizens
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 1, “3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;” (Art IV)
What offices under the Constitution require the official to be “Natural Born”?
1. President
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election. (Art VII)
2. Vice –President
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term
of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. (Art VII)
3. Members of Congress
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election. (Art VI)
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (Art VII)
4. Justices of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts
Section 7. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court
must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of
a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (VIII)
Case: Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong (as as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court) through respondent Executive Secretary is patently
unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable,
and that his own birth certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners
add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese
and his mother was also Chinese.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling the appointment issued to
respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this Court.
15
Rule: It is clear, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino
citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Page

Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a

civil register can be made without a judicial order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship
status is a substantial change. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, this Court held that:
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy,
and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted.
Republic Act No. 9048 provides in Section 2 (3) that a summary administrative proceeding to
correct clerical or typographical errors in a birth certificate cannot apply to a change in nationality.
Substantial corrections to the nationality or citizenship of persons recorded in the civil registry
should, therefore, be effected through a petition filed in court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
G.R. No. 177721 July 3, 2007 KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN
FOUNDATION, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG
5. Ombudsman and his deputies–
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for
any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten
years or more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (Art XI)
6. Constitutional Commission Members –
Section 1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed
of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for
public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
elections immediately preceding their appointment. (Art IX-B)
Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have
been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Art IX –C)
Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two

Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not less than
ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members
of the Commission belong to the same profession. (Art IX-D)
7. Central Monetary Authority Members–
Section 20. The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the
members of whose governing board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known probity,
integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall come from the private sector. They shall
also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may be prescribed by law. The
authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit. It shall have
supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be
16
provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing
Page
similar functions. (Art XII)

8. Commission on Human Rights Members–
Section 17. The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the
Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the
Commission shall be provided by law. (Art XIII)
Case: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares Grace Poe was a main contender in the 2016
Presidential elections. This case intended to clarify her citizenship qualification, among others.
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the
Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando
Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition
and ordered that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to
“Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and
DD156616
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. Desirous of being
with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after
the wedding ceremony.
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen.14 She obtained U.S.
Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her
father’s candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines
upon learning of her father’s deteriorating medical condition. Her father slipped into a coma and
eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her
father’s funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.
In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 and without delay, secured a
Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 Under
the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children
on 10 July 2006. As can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner’s petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, the BI
issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner’s name and in the names of her three (3)
children.
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August
2006. She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport.
17
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the
Page
Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Before assuming her post,

petitioner executed an “Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship” before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010, in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225. The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB. From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila
an “Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States.
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a “Certificate of Loss of Nationality
of the United States” effective 21 October 2010.
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections.56
In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen.
Rule: There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore
a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to
her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially
as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but
whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 1289:
The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are
the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also
has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and
an oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a
99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample
probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. The Court, quotes the
Solicitor General;
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may
be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of
not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty – 99.9% – that any child born in the Philippines
would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial
of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable
hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely
exclude foundlings either.
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the
enumeration.
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the
18
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Page
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
9
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters – Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or no¬existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.

believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children
followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place
where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary,
all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the
State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present
charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates
Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x”
and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” Certainly, these provisions
contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a
Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code
which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern
the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the
“Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and
Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,”
all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted.
Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In
the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the
citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to
naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by
one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) has been interpreted by this Court as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. The common
thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from
birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth,
and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws,
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth.
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he
is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on
19
the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
Page
Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930

Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 “United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, this Court
noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the “International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a “generally
accepted principle of international law.” Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban
as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified
by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the
practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and
State Practice in the United States.
Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and
Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of
international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which
the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption,
expressly refer to “Filipino children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who
could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department,
acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by
the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of
foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General’s warning in his opening statement is relevant:
…the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and
conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that the situation of
foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended
up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny
them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.
Note that the SC cites Bengson III v. HRET, saying: “It is apparent from the enumeration of who
are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is
not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode
prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he
is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives” GR 221697 March 8 2016 NATIVIDAD S.
POE-LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC and GR 21698-700 NATIVIDAD S. POE-
LLAMANZARES vs. COMELEC
D. Naturalized Citizens
20
Page

Among those listed in the 1987 Constitution as citizens are those who are Filipinos
by naturalization, which refers to the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the privilege of a citizen.
Under the present laws, the process of naturalization can be judicial or administrative.
Judicially, C.A. No. 473 provides that after hearing the petition for citizenship and
receipt of evidence showing that the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications required by law, the competent court may order the issuance of
the proper naturalization certificate and the registration thereof in the proper civil
registry.
On the other hand, Republic Act No. 9139 provides that aliens born and residing in
the Philippines may be granted Philippine citizenship by administrative proceeding by
filing a petition for citizenship with the Special Committee, which, in view of the facts
before it, may approve the petition and issue a certificate of naturalization.
In both cases, the petitioner shall take an oath of allegiance to the Philippines as a
sovereign nation.
A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is found under Section 15 of CA

473, is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
1. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139 June 08, 2001 - "The Administrative Naturalization Law
of 2000"
Under RA 9139, Aliens born and residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine
citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to certain requirements dictated by
national security and interest.
Qualifications. -
(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and residing therein since birth;
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18) years of age, at the time of
filing of his/her petition;
(c) The applicant must be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitution, and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper
and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly constituted government as well as with the
community in which he/she is living;
(d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and secondary education in
any public school or private educational institution duly recognized by the
Department of Education, where Philippine history, government and civics are
taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum and where enrollment is
not limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should he/she have minor
children of school age, he/she must have enrolled them in similar schools;
(e) The applicant must have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and
if he/she is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her family: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders
but are unable to practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so
21
by reason of their citizenship;

Page

(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people.
The following are NOT QUALIFIED to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this Act:
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or propriety of violence, personal

assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
(f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of
such war; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to be naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
22
Page

23
Page

2. COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 - "Revised Naturalization Law."
Any person having the following QUALIFICATIONS may become a citizen of the
Philippines by naturalization:
a. AGE: age of majority in the country - He must be of majority age on the day of
the hearing of the petition10;
24
b. RESIDENCE: 10 years, 5 years in certain cases - He must have resided in the

Page
Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years. The ten years of
10
CA 473, Sec.2; RA 6809, amending Art. 234 of the Family Code making 18 the majority age. Effective December 18,
1989

continuous residence required shall be understood as reduced to five years for
any petitioner having any of the following qualifications:
o Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or

under that of any of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political
subdivisions thereof;
o Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the

Philippines;
o Being married to a Filipino woman11;
o Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized

private school not established for the exclusive instruction of children of
persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education
or industry for a period of not less than two years;
o Having been born in the Philippines. (refer also to REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139
June 08, 2001, "The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000" as earlier
stated)
c. CHARACTER: good moral character and the usual disqualifications as provided

for by law: polygamy, bigamy, and violence for overthrow of government
He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living.
d. PROPERTY: He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
Rule: Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid
one’s becoming the object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the
members of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard
of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage of our civilization."
25
Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts
should consider only the applicant’s income; his or her spouse’s income should not be included
Page
in the assessment. The spouse’s additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner
11
If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceeding for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration, upon proof of marriage and according to the holding in Moy Yam
Lim, proof of non-disqualification. These are the only requirements because ipso facto, she became a Filipino herself by
marriage. Accordingly, thus;
“Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire
Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file
a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married
to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or
supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not
belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see
attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition”. G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

should be the one to possess ‘some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation’ to
qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant’s
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition. G.R. No. 175430 June
18, 2012 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KERRY LAO ONG
e. EDUCATION: education requirement is not with respect to the petitioner alone,

but also to his minor children. With respect to the petitioner, it only refers to the
language requirement, that he must have known and spoken any of the Philippine
languages. With respect to the children, they must have to study in Philippine
schools, not solely for the foreigners and for the grade schools – must teach Phil.
government and Constitution.
 He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish12and any one of the
principal Philippine languages; and
 He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required
of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
Who are DISQUALIFIED? - The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:
 Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or

group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
governments;
 Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal

assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
 Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
 Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
 Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
 Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to
learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;
 Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines
are at war, during the period of such war;
 Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof.
Case: Petitioner filed a petition for naturalization under C.A.No. 473, the Revised Naturalization
Law with the RTC. During the hearings, petitioner testified to prove his compliance with all the
26
requirements for naturalization and presented, as witnesses, Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C.
Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go ,and Juan C. Go.
Page
12
The language requirement now is the applicant must be able to speak and write Filipino or English and any Philippine
dialect.
Art XIV, Section 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed
and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages.
Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to
initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in
the educational system.

Dr. Anlacan testified that based on the psychiatric examination he conducted on petitioner, he
had no psychiatric abnormality at the time of the test. Dr. Tordesillas, on the other hand, reported
that petitioner’s medical examination results were normal. Ong, a friend of petitioner’s family,
stated that being their neighbor in Sto. Cristo Street, he had known petitioner since childhood
through his association with the family in times of celebration. Teresita claimed that she had
personally known petitioner since birth because he was the son of her brother-in-law. She
described him as a peace-loving person who participated in activities sponsored by his school
and the barangay. Lastly, Juan, a businessman by profession, also claimed that he knew
petitioner personally and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.
After trial was conducted, the RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for naturalization
ruling that the petitioner possessed the qualifications set forth by law. Among these were
petitioner’s lack of a derogatory record, his support for an organized government, his being in
perfect health, his mingling with Filipinos since birth and his ability to speak their language, and
his being a law abiding citizen. The RTC likewise found that petitioner presented convincing
evidence that he was not disqualified for naturalization as provided for under Section 4 of C.A.
No. 473.
On appeal to the CA, the OSG raised the following arguments:
- Petitioner failed to prove that his witnesses were credible;
- Petitioner’s character witnesses failed to prove that he had all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for the grant of Philippine citizenship; and
- Failure to state all former places of residence was fatal to petitioner’s application for
naturalization.
In its assailed decision, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed, without
prejudice, the petition for naturalization. According to the CA, while there was sufficient evidence
from which petitioner’s ability to write English or any of the principal Philippine languages, may be
inferred, he failed to adduce evidence to prove that his witnesses were credible. He was not able
to prove that the persons he presented in court had good standing in the community, known to be
honest and upright, reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, and that their word could be taken at
face value, as a good warranty of his worthiness.
Rule: In judicial naturalization, the application must show substantial and formal compliance with
C.A. No. 473. In other words, an applicant must comply with the jurisdictional requirements,
establish his or her possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications enumerated
under the law, and present at least two (2) character witnesses to support his allegations13. In
Ong v. Republic of the Philippines,14 the Court listed the requirements for character witnesses,
namely:
1. That they are citizens of the Philippines;

2. That they are "credible persons";
3. That they personally know the petitioner;
4. That they personally know him to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by law;
5. That they personally know him to be a person of good repute;
6. That they personally know him to be morally irreproachable;
7. That he has, in their opinion, all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
Philippines; and
8. That he "is not in any way disqualified under the provisions" of the Naturalization Law.
In vouching for the good moral character of the applicant for citizenship, a witness, for purposes
of naturalization, must be a "credible" person as he becomes an insurer of the character of the
27
candidate. The "law requires that a vouching witness should have actually known an applicant for
whom he testified for the requisite period prescribed therein to give him the necessary
Page
competence to act as such. The reason behind this requirement is that a vouching witness is in a
13
Section 7. Petition for citizenship
14
103 Phil. 964 (1958). 111 Phil. 211(1961).

way an insurer of the character of petitioner because on his testimony the court is of necessity
compelled to rely in deciding the merits of his petition. It is, therefore, imperative that he be
competent and reliable. And he is only competent to testify on his conduct, character and moral
fitness if he has had the opportunity to observe him personally, if not intimately, during the period
he has allegedly known him."15 The law, in effect, requires that the character witnesses be not
mere ordinary acquaintances of the applicant, but possessed of such intimate knowledge of the
latter as to be competent to testify of their personal knowledge; and that they have each one of
the requisite qualifications and none of the statutory disqualifications.
The records of the case show that the joint affidavits executed by petitioner’s witnesses did not
establish their own qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. In turn, petitioner
did not present evidence proving that the persons he presented were credible. While there is no
showing that petitioner’s witnesses were of doubtful moral inclinations, there was likewise no
indication that they were persons whose qualifications were at par with the requirements of the
law on naturalization. Simply put, no evidence was ever proffered to prove the witnesses’ good
standing in the community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. As a
consequence, their statements about the petitioner do not possess the measure of "credibility"
demanded of in naturalization cases. This lack of "credibility" on the part of the witnesses,
unfortunately, weakens or renders futile petitioner’s claim of worthiness.
Further, petitioner’s witnesses only averred general statements without specifying acts or events
that would exhibit petitioner’s traits worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship.
It bears stressing that the CA was correct in finding that the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses
only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. While almost all of the witnesses testified that
they knew petitioner since birth and that they had interacted with petitioner’s family in times of
celebration, this did not satisfy the other requirements set by law, that is, a genuine desire to learn
and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions. Besides, both the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt
on petitioner’s alleged social interaction with Filipinos. The background checks done on petitioner
yielded negative results due to the uncooperative behavior of the members of his household. In
fact, petitioner himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents. To the Court, this
is a display of insincerity to embrace Filipino customs, traditions and ideals.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the OSG was correct in arguing that petitioner's failure to state his
former residence in the petition was fatal to his application for naturalization. Indeed, this omission
had deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Differently stated, the
inclusion of present and former places of residence in the petition is a jurisdictional requirement,
without which the petition suffers from a fatal and congenital defect which cannot be cured by
evidence on the omitted matter at the trial G.R. No. 202809 July 2, 2014 DENNIS L. GO vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Procedure:
a. Declaration of intention filed with the OSG one year before actual application.
DECLARATION OF INTENTION: One year prior to the filing of his petition for
admission to Philippine citizenship, the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall
file with the (Office of the Solicitor General) a declaration under oath that it is
28
bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines16

Page
15
Lim Ching Tian v. Republic
16
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Philippines and
have received their primary and secondary education in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty years
or more before filing their application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of intention upon
complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such requirements shall be added that which establishes that the
applicant has given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public schools or in private schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable with
respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines,
and dies before he is actually naturalized.

b. Filing of petition17 for naturalization with the RTC of the province in which the
applicant is a resident for at least one year18.
c. Hearing, except within 30 days before an election. The State is represented by the
Solicitor General or by the fiscal in his behalf. Two witnesses to testify on the
character of the applicant are presented.
d. Decision. Appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court may be made to the
Court of Appeals (Under BP 129).
e. Decision becomes final but not executory, thirty (30) days after notice of the
decision is received by the parties. The notice of the decision must be received by
the OSG; copy furnished to the fiscal is not sufficient to start the running of the 30-
day period.
A favorable decision becomes executory only after 2 years from the finality of the
decision. It shall become executory only after the period of 2 years during which the
petitioner shall continue to be under probation, as it were, so the government can be
doubly sure he is entitled to be naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines. (Republic
Act 530, Section 1)
Sec. 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine

citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the
application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become
executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing,
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds,
that during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has
dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.19
f. Summary hearing after two years, which is really a continuation of the previous
proceedings, to prove that:
i) He did not leave the country during the 2-year period of probation;
ii) He devoted himself to lawful calling;
iii) He was not convicted of any offense of violation of government rules.
iv) He did not commit an act prejudicial to national interest or inimical to a

government announced policy.
g. Oath before the Regional Trial Court.
h. Issuance of a Certificate of Naturalization issued by the Court. (Only a certification

is given because the decision two years before has granted him his citizenship.)
i. Cancellation of ACR before the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
Effect of Naturalization on the Wife

29
Rule: "It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien
wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance
Page
among the members of the family."
17
Section 7
18
Section 8
19
Republic Act No. 530 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 - AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATION

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should
be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband’s interests in property and
business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership
and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit
of the partnership, acquire such interests. G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013 REPUBLIC vs.
AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS
If the wife is (i) legally married to the naturalized husband, and (ii) she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications in Sec. 4, she is entitled to be declared a
citizen as well. What is required is only an administrative proceeding before the
Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration on
the ground that her husband has been recently naturalized.
According to Moya Lim Yao vs. The Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292)
ruling, she need not prove the qualifications, but only that she is not disqualified. The
proceedings may even be with the Department of Natural Resources in relation to a
grant of concession requiring citizenship, where the wife proves that her husband has
become a Filipino.
"Derivative Naturalization” -In its latest pronouncement on this question, the

Supreme Court held that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
should be interpreted to mean only that the alien woman must not be laboring under
any of the disqualifications prescribed by law. Moreover, she can establish her claim
to Philippine citizenship in administrative proceedings before the immigration
authorities only and will not have to file a judicial action for this purpose. She is no
longer required to prove that she possesses the qualifications for naturalization.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No.
9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the

Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may
be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to
prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of
their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
Copying from similar laws in the United States which has since been amended,
the Philippine legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its
intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
naturalization.20
Effect of Naturalization on the Children
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the
Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the
naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen and a
30
foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
Page
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he
20
G.R. No. 183110 October 7, 2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS

begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parents, shall be
considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after reaching the age of
majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate
of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
Hence, to simplify the effect of naturalization on the children;
I. If the child is of age, no effect.
II. If the child is a minor:
A. If born in the Philippines - automatically becomes a citizen upon the

naturalization of the father.
B. If born abroad
1. If before the naturalization of the father.
a. If residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization - automatically

becomes a citizen.
b. If not residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization --- considered

citizen only during his minority, unless he takes permanent residence in the
Philippines before reaching majority age. In other words, he continues to be
a Filipino after reaching 18 years old only if he decides to reside here
permanently before reaching that age.
2. If after the naturalization of the father - Considered citizen on the condition

that upon reaching the age of majority, he takes an oath of allegiance in the
Philippine consulate of the place where he may be. If he fails to register his intent
to continue as Filipino within one (1) year upon reaching 18 years, he ceases to
be a Filipino citizen.
DENATURALIZATION
Com. Act No. 473, Sec. 18
Section 18. Cancellation of naturalization certificate issued.-- Upon motion made in

the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper
provincial fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued
and its registration in the Civil Registry:
(a) If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or

illegally;
(b) If the person naturalized shall, within the five years next following the issuance
of said naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign
country and establish his permanent residence there: Provided, that the fact of the
person naturalized remaining for more than one year in his native country or the
country of his former nationality, or two years in any other foreign country, shall be
considered as prima facie evidence of his intention of taking up permanent residence
in the same;
31
(c) If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

Page

(d) If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate
from a public or private high schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum through the fault
of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to
another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree cancelling the naturalization
certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of the Court to the Office of the President
and the Solicitor-General;
Not when they dropped out because of scholastic performance
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a
dummy in violation of the Constitutional or legal provision requiring Philippine
citizenship, as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.
Procedure: Filed by the Solicitor General before the same Regional Trial Court that
granted his naturalization, regardless of where he may be residing at that time.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Naturalization laws are strictly construed in the government’s favor and against the
applicant.(Republic v. Hong, 520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006); Ong Chia v. Republic, 385
Phil. 487, 498 (2000).) The applicant carries the burden of proving his full compliance
with the requirements of law.(Republic v. Hong,520 Phil. 276, 285 (2006); Tiu v.
Republic, 158 Phil. 1137, 1138 (1974); Que Tiac v. Republic, 150 Phil. 68, 86 (1972).)
Rule: The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with the
highest public interest. Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in
favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon the applicant
to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of law. G.R. No. 175430 June 18,
2012 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. KERRY LAO ONG
Rule: In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to show full and
complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The opportunity of a foreigner to become
a citizen by naturalization is a mere matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the
State; the applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to be admitted
to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to be given the chance to become a
Filipino citizen, is that which the statute confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must
strictly comply with all the statutory conditions and requirements. G.R. No. 197450 March 20,
2013 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LI CHING CHUNG, a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI,
a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG
3. Loss of and re-acquisition of Citizenship
Under the 1987 Constitution
Article IV, Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by
law.
Article IV, Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.
Under the law
Republic Act No. 9225 "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."-
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary

32
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a

foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
Page
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens
of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or

adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizen of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, that they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed

forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner avers that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article
IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rule: From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in
drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino
citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the
33
burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Page

To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for
the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R.
No. 160869 May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice
Case: Petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions…
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law explicitly provides
that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath."
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. While respondent was able to regain his Filipino
Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law when he took his oath of allegiance before the
Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General’s Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is
not enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law mandates
that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. There is no
evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions
of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. G.R. No. 182701 July
23, 2008 EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TESSIE P.
VILLANUEVA
Case: Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen
of the US on 13 December 1989.
Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. He filed a
request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the
Philippine Consulate General of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19
June 2006 an Order of Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27
September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019
recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position
34
of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.

Page

Subsequently, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC
Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US
citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, which reads as follows:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.–Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In his Answer dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that
his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and
the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his
foreign citizenship.
The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is
disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make
a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
Rule: This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to the assertions
made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement
of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct
requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship:
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the
Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a
situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by
also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The law
categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or
before the filing of the certificate of candidacy
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for
those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or
simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections. G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008 NESTOR A. JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL
Case: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija
in the May 14, 2007 elections. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for
disqualification alleging that petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and
resident of the United States of America.
In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, on January 25,
2006, he applied for dual citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. Upon approval of his
35
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on September 6,
2006. He argued that, having re-acquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil
Page
and political rights. As such, he is qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

Petitioner invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections and Mercado v. Manzano,
that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of
allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Rule: We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure to
renounce his American citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have
re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioner falls under the first category, being a natural-born citizen who lost his Philippine
citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen. In the instant case, there is no question
that petitioner re-acquired his Philippine citizenship after taking the oath of allegiance on
September 6, 2006. However, it must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public office, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount
to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Our rulings in the cases of
Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for
more requirements.
Further, in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, the Court ruled that a candidate’s oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with
the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. G.R. No. 180048
June 19, 2009 ROSELLER DE GUZMAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANGELINA
DG. DELA CRUZ
Case: The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents in 1944.
In 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 The application was approved and
the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. In 2006, the
petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued in,
2006 an order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Vice-Mayor in Caba, La Union and obtained the highest numbers of votes
and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private respondents all registered
voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s
eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of
running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
Rule: Under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 2005. At that
36
point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. The year before she initially sought
elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia.
Page
Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)

that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oath.
The language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning and must thus be read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected
through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. Failure to renounce
foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office. G.R. No.
198742 August 10, 2012 TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUA
Case: We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Vivenne K. Tan (Tan)
assailing the 20 April 2010 Decision and the 1 October 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815. The CA found that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95, Quezon
City (RTC), exercised grave abuse of discretion when it reversed the decision of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City (MeTC), to exclude Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-
A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the United
States of America (US.A.). On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in
Quezon City.5 She indicated that she was a Filipino .Citizen by birth. Her application was
approved by the Election Registration Board (ERB) on 16 November 2009 making her a
registered voter of Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City. On 30 November 2009, Tan
took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before a notary public in Makati City.
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.8 She stated in her petition that she lost her
Philippine citizenship when she became a naturalized American citizen. However, Tan executed
a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the U.S.A.9 Thereafter, the BI confirmed her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for the 2010 National Elections to run as congresswoman for the First District of Quezon
City.
On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a petition
before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the exclusion of Tan from the
voter's list because (1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered as a voter; and (2) she
failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.
In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to Filipino
parents on 1 April 1968. Although she became a naturalized American citizen on 19 January
1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had effectively renounced her American citizenship as
she had been continuously residing in the Philippines. She had also found employment within the
country and even set up a school somewhere in Greenhills.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26 October
2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 30
November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB approved her application.
Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a
retroactive effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his or her
Filipino citizenship, and that (2) the reacquisition cured any and all defects, assuming any are
existing, attendant during her registration as a voter.
Rule: In the light of factual circumstances of this case and considering the plain meaning of the
words "reacquire" and "retain," we find it fitting to address the seeming confusion brought about
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225. In other words, by declaring "deemed to have not lost their
Philippine citizenship," does this mean that once Philippine citizenship is reacquired after taking
the Oath of Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the citizenship status retroacts to
the period before taking said oath. We rule in the negative. Once Philippine citizenship is
37
renounced because of naturalization in a foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino citizen
unless and until his or her allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply stated,
Page
right after a Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.

November 8, 2017, G.R. No. 193993,VIVENNE K. TAN vs. VINCENT "BINGBONG"
CRISOLOGO
SC: Naturalization Does not Apply to Dual Citizens by Birth

August 12, 2022
The Supreme Court has held that Filipinos born to one Filipino parent and one foreign parent
are considered dual citizens by birth and not by naturalization, regardless of subsequent acts
performed to confirm the foreign citizenship.
In a Decision penned by Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, the Supreme Court En Banc granted the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Mariz Lindsey Tan Villegas Gana-Carait, and
annulled and set aside the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution dated
September 23, 2021 which denied Gana-Carait’s Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC
First Division’s Resolution dated February 27, 2019. The said COMELEC resolutions denied
the petition to disqualify Gana-Carait as a candidate for Member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the Lone District of Biñan, Laguna for the May 2019 elections, but granted the
petition to deny due course to or cancel her certificate of candidacy (CoC).
On October 17, 2018, Gana-Carait filed her CoC for the May 2019 National and Local Elections.
Two petitions were then filed before the COMELEC against her: one for her disqualification, on
the ground that she failed to renounce her United States (US) citizenship; the other for the
cancellation of her COC, for false representations on her eligibility to run for office given her
American citizenship.
The COMELEC’s First Division resolved the consolidated cases in its February 27, 2019
Resolution, dismissing the petition for disqualification but granting the petition for the
cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, finding that she was a dual citizen by naturalization
because of positive acts subsequently performed by her mother to secure a Consular Report
of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America and a US passport for Gana-Carait.
Thus, the COMELEC held that Gana-Carait must comply with RA No. 9225, or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act, which requires candidates who are dual citizens by
naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to renounce
their foreign citizenship. Gana-Carait moved to reconsider the ruling, but was denied by the
COMELEC En Banc, prompting Gana-Carait to go to the Supreme Court.
In ruling to set aside COMELEC’s cancellation of Gana-Carait’s COC, the Court held that Gana-
Carait, who was born to a Filipino father and an American mother, is a dual citizen by birth, and
not by naturalization.
The Court also found that the subsequent positive acts made by Gana-Carait’s mother to
request confirmation from the United States Consular Service of Gana-Carait’s US citizenship
is not considered a naturalization process but a mere presentation of documentary evidence to
establish the fact that Gana-Carait is an American citizen by birth.
The Court held that since Gana-Carait is a dual citizen by birth, and not by naturalization, she
is not covered by the provisions of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act requiring
candidates who are dual citizens by naturalization to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and to renounce their foreign citizenships in order to become eligible for
elective office. As a dual citizen by birth, Gana-Carait is thus considered a Filipino qualified to
run for public office. Hence, she could not be said to have made a false representation in her
COC, ruled the Court.
The Court also harmonized conflicting provisions under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
(COMELEC Rules) and the Rules of Court on the reckoning point for the 30-day period within
which one can challenge a COMELEC ruling before the Supreme Court through a petition for
certiorari.
38
Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which is based on Section 7, Article IX of the
Constitution, a petition for certiorari shall be filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment,
Page
final order, or resolution to be reviewed. Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules, however,

provides that such petition must be filed within 30 days from the promulgation date. Further,
Section 3 of the same Rule declares that decisions in petitions to cancel COCs become final
and executory after five days from promulgation, unless restrained by the Court.
The Court held that the COMELEC Rules are merely procedural and thus cannot override
substantive law, especially the Constitution. The COMELEC Rules cannot be applied in a way
that would shorten the constitutionally mandated period within which aggrieved parties can
question an adverse COMELEC ruling.
The Court ruled that to harmonize the COMELEC Rules with the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, the proper interpretation of Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is that COMELEC
rulings, in the absence of a restraining order from the Supreme Court, issued within five days
from receipt of the aggrieved party, shall be rendered only executory, but not final.
In the case of Gana-Carait, despite the COMELEC’s issuance of the Certificate of Finality, Entry
of Judgment, and Writ of Execution, the challenged COMELEC ruling did not actually attain
finality since Gana-Carait was able to file the Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court
within 30 days from notice of the COMELEC ruling.21
sc.judiciary.gov.ph
a. Loss of Citizenship
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 63 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED22
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
Read: G.R. No. 167824 July 2, 2010 GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY
CHEU vs. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship or expatriation;
Expatriation is a constitutional right (Go Gullian v Government). No one can be

compelled to remain a Filipino if he does not want to.
Case: Yu was issued a Portuguese passport in 1971, valid for five years and renewed for the
same period upon presentment before the proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his
naturalization as a Philippine citizen in 1978, he applied for and was issued a Portuguese passport
in 1981. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization,
"absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Philippines," he declared
his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed.
Rule: The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioner vs
Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly
and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Yu, with full knowledge and legal capacity,
after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen
resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
39
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had
become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
Page
21
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/29129/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sc-naturalization-does-
not-apply-to-dual-citizens-by-birth&utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sc-naturalization-does-
not-apply-to-dual-citizens-by-birth
22
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost

citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Yu v Defensor-
Santiago (169 SCRA 364)
Case: Emelito Osmena ran for Governor of Cebu in the Jan. 18, 1988 elections. Aznar as Cebu
Chairman of LDP-Laban filed with COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of Osmena on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a US citizen, as evidenced by Osmena's
application for his alien certificate of registration, permit to re-enter the Philippines, immigration
certificate of clearance etc. Osmena on the other hand maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio Osmena, that he is a holder of a valid Phil
passport, that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth & has not gone out
of the country for more than 6 months and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965. The COMELEC decided for Osmena.
Rule: Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken
and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether
or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern
Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost
his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish
this fact.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of
the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and
has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present,
both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a
Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was
24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly
renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact
that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother
named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely
University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this
does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña,
the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as
40
he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of

Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When
Page
We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it

stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied". Aznar v Osmena, COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (May
1990)
Rule: An alien certificate of registration is issued to an individual who declares that he is not a
Filipino citizen. It is obtained only when applied for. It is in a form prescribed by the agency and
contains a declaration by the applicant of his or her personal information, a photograph, and
physical details that identify the applicant. It bears no indication of basis for foreign citizenship,
nor proof of change to foreign citizenship. It certifies that a person named therein has applied for
registration and fingerprinting and that such person was issued a certificate of registration under
the Alien Registration Act of 1950 or other special law. It is only evidence of registration.
Unlike birth certificates registered pursuant to Act 3753 (The Civil Register Law), and much less
like other public records referred to under Section 23, Rule 132, an alien certificate of registration
is not a public document that would be prima facie evidence of the truth of facts contained therein.
On its face, it only certifies that the applicant had submitted himself or herself to registration.
Therefore, there is no presumption of alienage of the declarant. This is especially so where the
declarant has in fact been a natural-born Filipino all along and never lost his or her status as such.
Thus, obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her
original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of
decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien
certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such
express renunciation is lacking in this case. G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149 August 23, 2011
RENALD F. VILANDO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a

foreign country upon reaching the age of majority; Provided, however, that a Filipino
may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the Philippines
is at war with any country.
Case: Appellant Pedro Manayao together with others were charged with the high crime of treason
with multiple murder in the People's Court.. Convicted of the offense charged against him with the
aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a
band in the commission of the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay fine and indemnity of to
the heirs of each of the victims In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends
that appellant was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not
subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the theory that appellant
had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not amenable to the Philippine law of treason.
Rule: It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this appellant, by the
very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him, the doing of which under the
circumstances of record he does not deny, divested himself of his Philippine citizenship and
thereby placed himself beyond the arm of our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would
be the shield that would protect him from punishment. The defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service.. G.R. No. L-322 July 28, 1947 THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. PEDRO MANAYAO, ET AL., PEDRO MANAYAO
(4) By rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign

country.
Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission
in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance
incident thereto, with the consent of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of
his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present:
41
(a) The Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said
Page
foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces in the Philippine territory with
the consent of the Philippines; Provided that the Filipino citizen concerned, at the
time of rendering said service or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with
his service to said foreign country: And provided finally, That any Filipino citizen
who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign
country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) shall
not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Philippines during
the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall
be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine

armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted;
(7) (Under the Art. IV, Sec. 4. 1987 Constitution) Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens, who by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have
renounced their Philippine citizenship.
Note:
Art. XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall
be dealt with by law.
b. Reacquisition
Modes of re-acquiring Philippine Citizenship
(1) Naturalization (CA 63, now CA 473)
(2) Repatriation
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8171 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO
WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS
AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS
Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and
natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children,
on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
provided, that the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of
persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

42
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Page

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate
of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated
citizen.
Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this
Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) Legislative Act - Which is both a mode of acquiring and reacquiring citizenship.
Some Cases:
Case: Three petitions involving the same issues and parties were consolidated. Said cases
questioned the readmission of Juan Frivaldo as a Filipino citizen under CA 63 or the Revised
Naturalization Law as amended by CA 473. Frivaldo became a US citizen allegedly due to the
pressure from the Marcos regime. He came back here, ran for Governor of Sorsogon and won.
Rule: DISQUALIFIED. Frivaldo must vacate his office and surrender the same to the Vice-
Governor.
A former citizen who opts to reacquire Philippine citizenship through naturalization under CA 63
is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by said law, and it is not for him to decide and
select the requirements which he believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between
an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never a citizen.
Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the law rendered null and
void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken.
The Trial Court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of Frivaldo. Under
the law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be published
once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Moreover, the publication and the posting must be in its full text for the Court to acquire
jurisdiction.
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations under Secs. 2 and 6 of the law:
(1) that petitioner is of good moral character; (2) he resided continuously in the Phil. for at least
ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4)
he will reside continuously in the Phil. from date of filing of petition until his admission to Philippine
citizenship; (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from promulgation,
counted from the date of receipt by the OSG of his copy of the decision. Sec. 1 of RA 530 provides
that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until after 2
years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if the applicant has: (1) not left the
country; (2) dedicated himself continuously to lawful calling; (3) not been convicted of any offense
or for violation of government promulgated rules; (4) not committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the country or contrary to government announced policies.
The proceedings in the Trial Court were marred by irregularities. The hearing was set ahead of
the scheduled date upon request of Frivaldo so he could catch up with the last day for filing his
certificate of candidacy, without publication; the petition was heard within 6 months from last
43
publication; Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiance even before the finality of judgment
and without waiting for the 2 year waiting period. G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994 REPUBLIC OF
Page

THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO
Rule: In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. Thus, the mere fact that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do
not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the
loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact
that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for
losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her
Philippine citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water. G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000 CIRILO R. VALLES vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
Case: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was
the 1935 Constitution.
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and
without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 263023. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Rule: The petition is without merit. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualification provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the
court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
44
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.

Page
23
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES. Section 1. Any
person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of
the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the
same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic, we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person
desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in
court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or
where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630, to wit;
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided
in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
The term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution
as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.Two requisites
must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
45
citizenship.
Page

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were
not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos
are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire
it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
the House of Representatives. G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001 ANTONIO BENGSON III, vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ
Case: Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his
citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York
Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina
City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630. The court ruled in
its favor and as such the petitioner was ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171
On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the
OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of
jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization
consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the
implementing agency of R.A 8171.
Finding merit in the Motion of the OSG, the court subsequently, set aside its orders and the herein
petition was ordered DISMISSED
Rule: The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have
been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction
thereover. The court's order was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could be
a source of right on the part of petitioner
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the
repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens
and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political
or economic necessity
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of
Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the
46
repatriated citizen.
Page

Parenthetically, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his
residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999
GERARDO ANGAT vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case: Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171?
He does not. To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the
following:
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and
to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced
his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under
RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a
situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of
a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal
capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election
of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization
separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was
still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization,
petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to
automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or
economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his
"repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor
age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political
reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his. The
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons,
and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation. In sum, petitioner is not
qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire
Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
(Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to
follow the procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for
repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to
process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated
August 22, 1996, G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006 JOEVANIE ARELLANOTABASA, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN
47
4. Dual Citizenship
Page

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. (Art XVI, 1987 Constitution)
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship; (Republic Act No. 7160 October 10, 1991 – Local
Government Code)
Case: The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under Section 40 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running
for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers
to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's
volition.
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States.
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" must be
understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification. G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from implementing
Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire
Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional
as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Rule: What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country.
On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act
No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting
the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a
self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for
the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance. G.R.
No. 160869 May 11, 2007 AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
48
CALILUNG, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice
Page

Bar Exam – November 2018, Item IX
In 1990, Agripina migrated to Canada and acquired Canadian citizenship.
In 2008, Agripina retired and returned to the Philippines to permanently reside in her hometown of Angeles,
Pampanga. A month after returning to the Philippines, Agripina took her oath of allegiance and executed a sworn
renunciation of her Canadian citizenship in accordance with R.A. No. 9225.
In 2009, Agripina filed her certificate of candidacy for Congress for the 2010 elections. Agripina's political rivals lost
no time in causing the filing of various actions to question her candidacy. They questioned her eligibility to run as
member of Congress. Since Agripina had to take an oath under R.A. No. 9225, it meant that she needed to perform
an act to perfect her Philippine citizenship.
Hence, they claimed that Agripina could not be considered a natural-born citizen. Agripina raised the defense that,
having complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, she had reacquired, and was deemed never to have lost,
her Philippine citizenship.
Is Agripina disqualified to run for Congress for failing to meet the citizenship requirement?
Bar Exam – November 2016, Item -XIV
Onofre, a natural born Filipino citizen, arrived in the United States in 1985. In 1990, he married Salvacion, a Mexican,
and together they applied for and obtained American citizenship in 2001. In 2015, the couple and their children --
Alfred, 21 years of age, Robert, 16, and Marie, 14, who were all born in the U.S. -- returned to the Philippines on
June 1, 2015. On June 15, 2015, informed that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship without losing his American
citizenship, Onofre went home to the Philippines and took the oath of allegiance prescribed under R.A. No. 9225.
On October 28, 2015, he filed a Certificate of Candidacy to run in the May 9, 2016 elections for the position of
Congressman in his home province of Pala wan, running against re-electionist Congressman Profundo.
[a] Did Onofre's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship benefit his wife, Salvacion, and their minor children and confer
upon them Filipino citizenship? Explain your answer.
[b] Before the May 9, 2016 elections, Profundo's lawyer filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy against Onofre. What grounds can he raise in his Petition to support it? Explain your answer.
49
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C.

1. Three meanings of the word "People"

The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

A. Who are citizens (Art IV)

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent membership in a political

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

Philippine Bill of 1902(enacted by the United States Congress on July 1, 1902),also

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN -18 Spanish citizens. -

The term "inhabitant" was taken to include

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together

1973 Constitution "Section 1, - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Section 2. "A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien

Article IV, 1987 Section I, now provides:

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Citizenship Proceedings and Res Adjudicata7

“We declare it to be a sound rule that

1. where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a court or

2. after a full-blown hearing with the active participation of the Solicitor

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

B. Election of Philippine Citizenship

The following are citizens of the Philippines xxx

COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 625 - AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Rule: As to the propriety of respondent’s petition seeking a judicial declaration of election of

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:

(1) a statement of election under oath;

Philippines vs. Nora Fe Sagun

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a

4. Justices of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts

Political Law 1 2023 Atty. Edgar Pascua II

Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or correction in an entry in a

5. Ombudsman and his deputies–

6. Constitutional Commission Members –

Section 1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six