One Word Utterances
One Word Utterances
One Word Utterances
Once the combination of morphemes was no longer considered the criterion for the starting point of language, the origin began to be pushed back earlier and earlier. Single-word utterances became a new focus. Today there remains a strong interest in the study of the childs acquisition of word-meaning at this stage. Lets start with some definitions and descriptions:
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Only 50 % of 24m know yogurt or raisin. Peoples names are frequent; so are action words (up, sit, see, eat, down, go) modifiers (hot, allgone, more), social words (thank you, no).
Overextension
The vocabulary spurt coincides with an increase in overextension or overgeneralization. This happens with about one third of a childs words, more often with familiar words than new ones. Most overextensions are categorical: dada for moma; truck for bus. Some overextensions are analogical: used for a perceptually similar object, not in the same category. Egg for apple. Others are relational: doll for crib. There is less overextension in comprehension (Where is the dog?) than in production.
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Phonological Regression
Children may actually seem to lose their ability to pronounce particular sounds. For example, one child established the words down and stone as [dwn] and [don] (doan). Then, however, when he tried to say other words beginning with oral stops and ending with nasals, he produced them with nasals in both positions. For example, he produced beans as [minz] (means) and dance as [nns] (nance). After a few weeks this nasal assimilation began to take over the established forms for down and stone; soon he was saying [nwn] (noun) and [non] (noan). Another type of regression involves the apparent loss of the ability to say a sound in new words, while the sound is retained in the correct pronunciation of older words.
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or implies a proposition, or stands for a complete thought. While the child may be capable only of uttering a single word, they are conceiving of something more complex. Among those who have argued in favor of the holophrase conception, some have argued that the correct approach is syntactic, others that it should be semantic.
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utterances is very labile (Piaget writes of their disconcerting mobility). And because a one-word utterance relies so heavily on context (as well as paralinguistics such as gesture and intonation) sense and reference are highly inferential.
Ingram (1971) proposed that the structure representing what a child is saying with a one-word utterance must be a semantic one, rather than syntactic. Using Fillmores semantic case grammar, Ingram characterized holophrastic utterances with diagrams like the following: S Modality Proposition Transitivity Agent Act Predication Object State
Only one constituent of this structure is expressed as a word, Ingram proposed. The other constituents may be expressed by gesture, crying, and so on. Patricia Greenfield also viewed one-word utterances as holophrastic. But she emphasized the role of context, rather than accompanying action. Words are being inserted into... a cognitive-perceptual-action framework from the outset, so that the researchers semantic characterization of an utterance must include a description of this (perceived) context. Weve seen that Lois Bloom, in her 1970 research on two-word utterances, considered a semantic characterization a necessary first step towards the goal of writing a Chomskian grammar of a childs speech. The idea was that the child omits material that is, nonetheless, implied in what they say, and that this material needs to be inferred by the researcher, through rich interpretation, so it can be properly included in the linguistic description of the utterance and the grammar of the childs speech. But in her 1973 One Word at a Time, where she studied single word utterances rather than word combinations, Bloom argued against the notion that single word speech is holophrastic. She insisted that there is evidence against the idea that structure is hidden behind the actual word spoken, and proposed instead that at this stage of language acquisition children develop certain conceptual representations of regularly recurring experiences, and then learn whatever words conveniently code such conceptual notions (p. 113). Bloom identified the following semantic notions in one-word utterances: General Relationship Word Function/Meaning
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Existence
Recurrence Disappearance
Nonexistence
A gone no
stop no up up
To point out objects To point out objects, particularly those that startled First to request and later to comment on the recurrence of an activity or object To comment on the disappearance of object which had existed in context. Same as above. To comment on nonexistence where existence had been expected To comment on the cessation of an activity To protest undesired action or comment on forbidden object (e.g. stove) To request the action of being picked up To comment on spatial location.
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But often the assumption has been that children use single-word utterances to name things in the world around them: i.e., to refer.
A. Fast Mapping.
One set of explanations for childrens ability to learn words suggests that there are innate principles or assumptions which make the task feasible. These principles enable very quick, one-trial, learning, in which novel names are attributed to unfamiliar objects. This is called fast mapping, the mapping being the forging of a link between word and world. Specifically, it is suggested that young children assume that: - new words label whole objects, not their parts or properties, or spatial relations or actions (the whole object assumption);
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- new labels should be extended to items taxonomically related to the original item, rather than those thematically related (e.g. bones & people; babies & bottles) (the taxonomic assumption); - objects have only one name (the mutual exclusivity assumption). Sometimes these assumptions may contradict one another, but that is useful, since any one of them alone would produce inaccurate word-learning. This list of assumptions has grown so large that recently Golinkoff et al (1994) have proposed a two-tier model with six principles, to bring some organization to this kind of theory: First Tier (childs assumptions around 12 months): 1. Reference: words map objects, actions, and attributes 2. Extendibility: words label more than original referent 3. Object Scope: words map to whole objects Second Tier (childs assumptions at time of vocabulary spurt): 4. Conventionality: speakers in the community prefer specific agreed upon terms 5. Categorical Scope: words are extended based on category, not perceptual similarity 6. Novel Name-Nameless Category: novel names map to unnamed categories
B. Syntactic cues
Its been suggested that around age 2y children start to become able to use cues in the syntax of a sentence to identify new words and learn them.
C. Social-Pragmatic Explanations
Another kind of explanation emphasizes that child learn language in a social nexus, guided by adults who are linguistic expert. The child is offered pragmatic cues that render the cognitive assumptions listed above unnecessary. Katherine Nelson has argued that Quines problem of reference (remember Gavagai) is not an issue for children; they dont have to guess the reference of a word, because the adults around them are constantly guessing what the child is referring to! Lois Bloom talks of the Principle of relevance: In a typical word-learning situation, infant and adult exploit their mutual signals of ostensive-inferential communication to share a focus of attention and the most likely candidate for what a word means (1993, p. 86) A number of researchers have proposed that around the time of the vocabulary spurt, children have now learned to follow the social cues of adultsmonitoring referential
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cues, and success of their communicative efforts (cf. Baldwins research). In addition children around this age have begun reasoning about peoples intentions.
Explanations of Over-Extension
Several explanations have been offered for the phenomenon of overextension: (1) the childs definitions for these early words are incomplete, (2) there are gaps in the childs lexicon and she uses words she knows to fill these gaps, (3) the child has problems retrieving the appropriate word. Eve Clark has employed the linguistic notion that all word meaning can be analyzed in terms of a universal set of semantic features, such as animate/inanimate, human/nonhuman. These features correspond to perceivable attributes in the environment: attributes such as size, shape, color. Clark suggested that the childs definition of doggie might include semantic features such as four legs, fur, tail, barks. When the child encounters a new animal in the environment, he must check its features to see whether or not they are appropriate for him to apply the label doggie. At first the childs definitions will use only a few features. As the child develops he will add more features and delete inappropriate ones. Overextensions occur when a child infers category membership from a partial match of features. For example, a moose has four legs, fur and a tail; a child has to learn that antlers are a disqualifying attribute for application of the label doggie.
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A study of deaf infants of hearing, but non-signing, parents found they invented spontaneous home signs of two kinds: Indicators (such as pointing) referred to people, objects and places. Characterizing signs referred to actions and object properties: e.g., holding the fist to the mouth and making chewing motion = eat. Holding index finger and thumb in the shape of a circle = round. Acredolo & Goodwyn have found hearing children inventing signs too, and recommend communicating with preverbal infants this way. They have found verbal language accelerated by this. Note that these baby signs are unlike sign language: the latter is conventionalized and includes grammatical rules. Bloom, L. (1970). Language development: Form and function in emerging grammars. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bloom, L. (1973). One word at a time: The use of single-word utterances before syntax. The Hague: Mouton. Bloom, L. (1998). Language acquisition in its developmental context. In D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology. Volume 2: Cognition, Perception and Language, (5 ed., Vol. 2, pp. 309-370). New York: Wiley. Dore, J. (1975). Holophrases, speech acts and language universals. Journal of Child Language, 2(1), 33-. Halliday, M. A. K. (1975). Learning how to mean. In E. H. Lenneberg & E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Foundations of language development: A multidisciplinary approach (Vol. 1, pp. 239-265). New York: Basic Books. Halliday, M. A. K. (1975). Learning how to mean. London: Edward Arnold. Hollich, G. J., Hirsh-Pasek, K., & Golinkoff, R. M. (2000). Breaking the language barrier: An emergentist coalition model for the origins of word learning. Monographs of thr Society for Research in Child Development, 65(3, whole issue). McNeill, D. (1970). The acquisition of language: the study of developmental psycholinguistics. New York: Harper & Row. Nelson, K. (1973). Structure and strategy in learning to talk. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 38(149, whole number). Scollon, R. (1976). Conversations with a one year old: A case study of the developmental foundation of syntax: The University Press of Hawaii. Scollon, R. (1979). A real early stage: An unzippered condensation of a dissertation on child language. In E. Ochs & B. B. Schieffelin (Eds.), Developmental pragmatics (pp. 215-227). New York: Academic Press.