Week 3

Objections, Defences, and more Objections

to Relativism.

3 parts to today’s lecture:

1. Essay topics, and talk on expectations
2. Waluchow on the standard objections to
Relativism and how they are (partially)
misleading
3. Shaw and Waluchow ‘finish-off’
Relativism

Part 2: Waluchow, pgs. 71 – 86

There are said to be three standard problems

with Moral Conventionalism:
1. It precludes the possibility of cross-
cultural moral criticism
2. It does not allow me to criticize the moral
practices of my own culture, because
morality is whatever my culture says it is
3. Whose culture do the standards come
from? That is, which of the many cultures
in a given society, and which of the many
cultural connections of a given individual,
are those that establish moral principles?

There are commonly thought to be two

major problems with Moral Subjectivism.
1. If it were true, then genuine moral
disagreement would be impossible
because we each have our own moral
standards. So while it might appear as
though we disagree on some particular
moral issue, this is only because we
legitimately rely on different moral
standards, so we don’t really disagree, we
just see the issue differently.
2. There is no means of moral reasoning or
judgment because morality just is
whatever I or you or whoever says it is.
If these five objections to the two forms of
Relativism are accurate, then there are solid
reasons for rejecting them. But it is not clear
that either form of Relativism is
incompatible with the commonly accepted
existence of moral critique or judgment. We
still need moral reasoning to assess the
impact of facts, to determine how to apply,
or to ensure consistency between, our moral
principles, irrespective of whether those
principles are objective, cultural or
subjective.

Facts:
What often appears to be moral
disagreement turns out to be disagreement
over how a particular set of facts ought to be
interpreted.
Whatever one’s belief about the facts of a
matter, these beliefs will impact one’s moral
understanding of the situation… Each
person will have to assess these beliefs
against their moral principles, and that is
(one type of) moral reasoning.

What’s more, we can criticize the factual

beliefs that support a particular moral
practice… this may not be a moral criticism,
but if the facts are wrong, and they are the
basis for a nasty cultural practice, we can
develop good (moral) reasons to abandon
that practice.

The Application of Moral Principles:

Everyone will have to apply their principles
in particular situations, even the
Subjectivist, and that will involve, at least in
part, moral reasoning.
And the fact that application principles must
be adopted means that Subjectivists and
Conventionalists both have room for moral
reasoning and criticism.

Logical Consistency:
We must be able to evaluate the consistency
of our moral principles and their relations, as
well as the consistency of the specific
actions those principles require. If the
actions required are not humanly possible,
or I am required to perform two
simultaneously incompatible acts, I would
have to revise my principles.

If my principles conflict, I must revise or

order them in terms of importance. If either
form of Relativism is true, then that would
mean that there would be no objective
standard to which I could appeal in choosing
between, or deciding upon the importance
of, these inconsistent principles. Any choice
I made would be arbitrary.
W.H. Shaw: A refutation of Relativism in all
its forms. (pgs. 12 – 31).

C: There are strong reasons to believe that

‘normative’ moral conventionalism and
moral subjectivism, as well as ‘meta-ethical’
relativism, whether supported by the
Diversity argument or the Demonstrability
argument, are seriously flawed.

Shaw’s piece is a little confusing because he

doesn’t present his argumentative
(rhetorical) strategy, nor does he define his
important terms, from the beginning (a
mistake I’m sure none of you will make in
your essays!!!). So you don’t get a clear
sense of the scope of his conclusion until
pg. 17, when he presents the distinction
between ‘normative’ ethical relativism and
‘meta-ethical’ relativism.
‘Normative’ ethical relativism is, according
to Shaw, the claim that what is right or
wrong is a matter of social convention or
individual choice.
‘Meta-Ethical’ relativism, by contrast, is the
claim that because morality is either a matter
of convention or personal choice, there is no
objective standard to which we can turn to
decide which moral system ought to be
preferred.

Section 1 of Shaw’s article presents and

dismisses ‘normative’ ethical relativism.
Sections 2 through 5 are Shaw’s attempt to
build a case against what he clearly takes to
be the more troubling position, i.e., ‘Meta-
Ethical’ relativism.

Section 1 (pgs 12 – 16)

Starts with an account of normative ethical
relativism that relies on the diversity
argument.
A brief refutation of normative subjectivism
on the grounds that it suggests that just
because we believe something is right, it is
right. Also because we would have no
means to evaluate the rightness of our
decisions.

Refutation of Conventionalism:
 the fact that some society believes an
action to be wrong is not a good reason
to accept that the action is wrong
 undermines the possibility of external
moral criticism
 undermines the possibility of internal
moral reform, which means the majority
will always be right on moral questions

Section 2 (pgs 16 – 19)

Starts with a definition of meta-ethical
relativism that is based on the diversity
argument.
Refutation of Meta-Ethical relativism as
defended by the diversity argument.
 the fact of diversity and fundamental
moral disagreement is not so obvious
because different cultures have different
interpretations of different facts
 even if we grant diversity, the mere fact
of diversity does not show that there
isn’t a right answer – indeed, agreement
has little to do with the existence of an
objective moral truth

Section 3 (pgs 19 – 23)

The key to moral truth is finding the proper
objective standard by which to judge the
value of any specific moral principles…
precisely what Meta-Ethical Relativist’s
who rely on the Demonstrability Argument
claim is not possible.
These last three sections are a progressive
attempt to show that there are objective
standards to which we can turn to help us
decide which moral system is superior or
correct. If Shaw succeeds, then he will have
shown that the demonstrability argument for
meta-ethical relativism is false because there
are objective moral standards by which we
can assess the relative strength of any moral
system.

There have been (broadly speaking) three

attempts to identify a standard by which to
assess moral systems.
1. Naturalism
2. Intuitionism
3. Emotivism
All of these have strengths and weaknesses,
but only the last of these is compatible with
meta-ethical relativism, because emotivism
maintains that there are no moral judgments.
But this connection is precisely what we
typically think morality does involve.
Section 4 (pgs 23 – 26)
Whatever morality is, it is more than just an
accurate collection of empirical facts; we do
reason with and about our moral principles.
And there are limits on what counts as an
acceptable moral reason, reasons with which
we are all in tune inasmuch as we are all
moral agents.

Traditionally, it was believed morality was

immutable and universal, ‘waiting to be
discovered’. The more recent view is that
morality is a practice that changes with
progress in moral reasoning. Morality is a
social enterprise in which we all participate.

Section 5. (pgs 26 – 30).

With this account of morality, we can
confront the relativist claim that there is no
standard by which to choose a moral
system…There have been three attempts to
exclude relativism based on their
misunderstanding morality.
1. Moral judgments and principles are by
definition universalizable/universal
2. Moral discussion presupposes a
commitment to impartiality, rational
benevolence and liberty
3. Morality is a distinct value system, one
that requires taking a moral point of view
that involves regarding others as ends in
themselves

The relativist could still reply that these

definitions are nothing more than their
authors’ own moral codes.

Shaw thinks the best means to an objective

moral standard is to look at the purpose of
morality, i.e., to promote human flourishing.
Moral systems that fail in the promotion of
human flourishing can be said to be lesser
than those that succeed. That is, a moral
code must work, and to the extent that it
does not, it is not a good, or the right, moral
code.
Shaw ends by conceding that he has not
provided a complete refutation of both forms
of relativism because there may be moral
codes that work equally well in a given set
of circumstances. At the very least, he
believes he has reduced the number of
possibly arbitrary (non-morally-reasoned)
choices for a moral system.

Waluchow – Final objections to Relativism

(pgs 86 – 93)

The Diversity Argument:

1. The fact of disagreement does not mean
there’s no right answer.
2. Moral progress seems to be a fact
3. Disagreement is often the result of factual
errors
4. The extent to which there actually is
disagreement may be exaggerated
The Demonstrability Argument:
1. Based on flawed assumption that a
universal standard must yield uniquely
correct answers
2. Exaggerated analogy with the objectivity
of the scientific method
3. We all agree at least that we must first get
our facts straight to tackle moral
problems, and that our moral principles
and their application must be consistent.

The Divine Authority Argument:

1. Morality is not a set of commands

So moral relativism cannot be conclusively

thwarted, but it also seems clear that
morality is more than just a mere matter of
opinion.