ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

HEIRS OF CLEMEA v. HEIRS OF BIEN FACTS: This piece of land (TD 5299, 20,644 sq. m.) was one of 3 lots involved in 2 consolidated cases for recovery of possession and ownership filed in the 1940s by respondents predecessor Irene Bien (Irene) (through her attorney-in-fact Gregorio Clemea) against petitioners predecessor Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (Pedro). The pertinent averments in Irenes complaint read: o [T]he plaintiff is xxx the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in xxx Albay xxx. Declared as Tax No. 5299 and assessed at P310.00 o [T]he plaintiff acquired the above parcel of land by purchase from Victoriano Napa (Napa) as per deed of sale in her favor xxx; and the Napa in turn acquired the same by purchase from Francisco Barrameda (Barrameda) who also bought the said land from the administrator of the estate of Pedro Clemea y Conde (Conde) which sale had been duly authorized and approved by this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. 3410-In re The Estate of Conde xxx; o [T]he defendant ever since he was removed as administrator of the estate of Conde in the year 1939 deliberately continued to occupy and usurp the possession and use of the above described parcel of land xxx, and has ever since refused to relinquish the possession of the same to the lawful owner thereof notwithstanding the fact that he has no right or any color of title over the said land; o [B]y reason of this unlawful occupation and usurpation by the defendant, the plaintiff will suffer damages and in fact has suffered damages beginning this October 1943 harvest at the rate of 25 cavans of palay per harvest or 50 cavans yearly xxx In his answer, Pedro alleged that the land was his and that it was in his exclusive possession. His claim of ownership was similarly based on a sale by the estate of Conde to his predecessor-in-interest. Neither one of the original parties lived to see the end of the trial. o Irene passed away in 1953 and was substituted by respondents. o Petitioners succeeded Pedro who died in 1955. o The cases were re-raffled to Branch 2 of the RTC of Legaspi City in November of 1994. On August 10, 1995, the RTC rendered a decision declaring petitioners to be the absolute owners of the land in TD 5299 and directing respondents to respect petitioners possession. The RTC reconsidered its findings with respect to ownership. It ruled that the contending parties had failed to prove their respective claims of ownership and the land in question still belonged to its original owner, the estate of the Conde. From that order, respondents appealed to the CA. o The CA affirmed the RTCs resolution of the issues relating to the other 2 parcels of land but reversed the ruling on the ownership of the land covered by TD 5299. It proceeded to award respondents P118,000 in damages as compensation for their having been deprived of possession and the owners share in the harvest. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated October 1, 2002. ISSUE/HOLDING: Whether petitioners, the heirs of Pedro Clemea y Zurbano (heirs of Pedro), should be made to pay respondents, the heirs of Irene B. Bien (heirs of Irene), compensatory damages for depriving them of the owners

share of the harvest from a tract of riceland in Bolo, Albay. YES. Petitioners no longer dispute respondents ownership of the property covered by TD 5299. They insist, however, that they cannot be held liable to respondents for the harvest because (1) they never took possession of the property declared in TD 5299 and (2) the evidence the CA relied on to determine the amount of damages, proceeding as it did from one of the plaintiffs, was self-serving and therefore could not have been a proper basis for such an award. RATIO: Petitioners contention that the land was never in their possession should be dismissed outright for 2 reasons. o First, petitioners predecessor Pedro alleged in his answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. That statement, insofar as it confirmed the allegation in the complaint that petitioners predecessor had retained possession of the land in question, took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter contradict it. The exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion and because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the consequences of his admission. Irlanda v. Pitargue: Acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake. Ramirez v. Orientalist Co.: An admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission; and all proof submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the opposite party or not. Cunanan v. Amparo: The allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his pleadings. Petitioners newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession of the land cannot hold up against these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the admission of Pedro, their predecessor in the litigation. Without any showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now contradict it.

Second, the issue of whether petitioners ever had possession of the land is undeniably a question of fact. Questions of this nature cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari as the remedy is confined to pure questions of law. o This rule has been watered down by a slew of exceptions. Petitioners invoke a number of these exceptions, namely: (1) the factual findings of the TC and the CA are contradictory; (2) the decision sought to be reviewed is against the law and in complete disregard of the rules on evidence; (3)

there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; and (4) the CA failed to notice relevant facts and evidence which if properly considered would justify a different conclusion. o But this case does not fall within any of these. For one, petitioners have shown no contradiction between the findings of the CA and the RTC. Our preceding disquisition on the conclusiveness of Pedros admission of the fact of possession makes the rest of the grounds invoked by petitioners undeserving of even passing consideration. o Petitioners next proposition that Gregorio Clemeas testimony was self-serving and an improper basis for the damages awarded to respondents, is just as unworthy. Self-serving evidence, is a concept much misunderstood. The term is employed as a weapon to devalue and discredit a partys testimony favorable to his cause. That is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a grave error. Self-serving evidence is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponents interest. The term refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court, and it does not include testimony that he gives as a witness in court. Evidence of this sort is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is, lack of opportunity for crossexamination by the adverse party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and fabrication. In contrast, a partys testimony in court is sworn and subject to cross-examination by the other party, and not susceptible to an objection on the ground that it is self-serving. Petitioners never alleged that his testimony was inaccurate or untrue. Petitioners objection is founded solely on the mere fact that he was a witness interested in the outcome of the case. It is true that a partys interest may to some extent affect his credibility as a witness. Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the view that a partys testimony favorable to himself must be disregarded on account solely of his interest in the case. Our justice system will not survive such a rule for obdurate cynicism on the part of a court is just as odious to the administration of justice as utter gullibility. National Development Company v. Workmens Compensation Commission: Interest alone is not a ground for disregarding a partys testimony. xxx the interest of a witness does not ipso facto deprive his testimony of probative force or require it to be disregarded, and the trier of facts is entitled to accept as much of the witness testimony as he finds credible and to reject the rest. DBP POOL OF ACCREDITED INSURANCE COMPANIES v. RADIO MINDANAO NETWORK, INC. FACTS: RMNIs properties were covered by fire insurance policies. On July 27, 1988, its radio station, located in SSS Bldg., Bacolod City, was razed by fire. RMNI sought to collect the insurance proceeds from DBP. DBP denied liability on the ground that the cause of the loss was an excepted risk excluded under the insurance policy. The exclusion is brought by DBPs allegation that the fire was caused by members of the CPP-NPA.

Hence, RMNI filed a complaint to claim the insurance proceeds due it. TC & CA: The insurance companies are liable for the loss. The evidence failed to support DBPs allegation that the loss was caused by an excepted risk, i.e. members of the CPP-NPA caused the fire. SC: Affirmed the TC and CA. The insurance company is liable for the loss. RATIO: Ill discuss the different topics for this case based on each piece of evidence presented by DBP. - rom On admissions and confessions: Evidence: a letter of one Celso Magilang who claims to be a member of the NPA and to be responsible for the fire This is an admission of a person who is not a party to the present action. It is inadmissible under Rule 130.26. WHY? An admission is competent only when the declarant or someone identified in legal interest with him is a party to the action. On Burden of Proof v. Burden of Evidence: Burden of Proof: the duty of ANY party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law the party who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment e.g. when the defendant asserts an affirmative defense, as in this case, avoidance of the claim Evidence: Stipulation in the insurance policy, to wit: In any action, suit or other preceding where the Companies allege that by reason of the provisions condition any loss or damage is not covered by this insurance, the burden of proving that such loss or damage is covered shall be upon the Insured. The burden of proof contemplated by this provision actually refers to the burden of evidence (burden of going forward). It refers to the insureds duty to show that the loss or damage is covered by the policy. Still, the burden of proof rests on DBP to prove that the damage or loss was caused by an excepted risk in order to escape liability. On Res Gestae as Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Hearsay Rule: based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence 1. such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation 2. such evidence have not been subjected to crossexamination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-court statement depends Res Gestae: those exclamations or statements made by either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before, during or after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement applies only when the declarant himself did not testify and the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with these requirements: 1. that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence 2. the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood 3. the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances

Evidence: Testimony of the police (Lt. Col. Torres, SFO II Rochar) that the bystanders they interviewed claimed that the perpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. These declarations are not part of res gestae. WHY? It cannot be said that these utterances were made spontaneously by the bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood. These statements were taken by the police while they were making investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted, the bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations. Thus, it cannot be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of truth. That they were mere idle talk is not remote. On Admissibility of Evidence v. Weight and Sufficiency: Admissibility: depends on its relevance and competence Weight: pertains to evidence already admitted and the tendency to convince and persuade Evidence: declaration of bystanders Assuming this is admissible (it is inadmissible), these declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record. Res Gestae and Entries in Official Records: Evidence: police blotter, certifications from the Bacolod Police Station, Fire Investigation Report These may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records. BUT: None of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP-NPA. It only stated in these documents that it was believed or suspected that members of the CPP-NPA were the perpetrators. Suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. PEOPLE v. REYES Appeal; CFI FACTS:

defendant Severino Austria who he pointed out as his treacherous assailant.

c.

Alleged admission made by Gatchalian: Lieutenants Fidel Martinez and Secundino Quintans declared under oath that Vicente Gatchalian admitted before the latter, which under investigation , that he had shot one of the MPs who died later. Gatchalian even showed how he had fired at the MP from the back, posing for a picture (Exhibit H). Alleged confession by Austria: Lieutenant Quintans likewise asserted that Severino Austria had voluntarily signed the confession Exhibit E wherein said Austria made the following statements: Q. What did you do on that same night? A. While we were at the back of the "Cenaculo", Oliveros ordered Pepit and FELIPE SESE to PEPIT and FELIPE SESE did as ordered and came with the information that here are three MP soldiers in the one of the stores near the "Cenaculo". Q. What did you do when you mere informed thus? A. BASIBAS, MAGALLANES, BATUIN, OLIVEROS, and I went to the place where the MP soldiers were and I myself talked with one of the said soldiers, and I asked him to stand and come with me where we could talk together, but he refused, so I drew my pistol and forced him to come with me. OLIVEROS held one of the soldiers, Magallanes held the others and forced them to come with us. Q. Why and where were you taking the MP soldiers? A. To talk with them in front of the house of SEGUNDO GUEVARRA. Q. What happened when you took the soldiers? A. While we were walking about 10 meters from the "Cenaculo" the soldier who was with me tried to grab the pistol that I was holding with my right hand. Suddenly I heard about 4 shots from behind, so I also fired at the soldier who was with me.

d.

1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

On the night of Apr 19, 1946, while attending a pabasa (reading of life story of Christ) in barrio Cacutud, Arayat, Pampanga, three MPs, Benjamin Neri, Alfredo Laguitan and Francisco Orsino, were taken by four armed individuals, brought to the road leading to Cabiao and there shot by them. As a result Neri and Laguitan died. Orsino recovered from his wounds. The accused, in the 2 separate cases of violent death (murder) and one case of physical injuries, were appellants Gatchalian and Austria, Reyes, Perez, G. Due and M. Due Dismissed as to Perez for insufficiency of evidence and Reyes was discharged and used as prosecution witness. G. Due and M. Due have not been arrested or tried. Gatchalian and Austria were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, on the strength of the following:

ISSUE on Res Gestae: WON testimony of Reyes regarding the conversation, which he overheard, between G. Due and Gatchalian is admissible. HELD: Yes PRINCIPLE ON RES GESTAE & ON ADMISSIONS & CONFESSIONS

Enough, however, may be gathered from his (Reyes) testimony in open court to identify Gatchalian as one of the assailants, the conversation he overhead in the rice field being admissible as an admission and as part of the res gestae. Stated otherwise, as in the syllabus: The conversation had among the accused immediately after the shooting, which was overheard in the rice field by the prosecuting witness is admissible as an admission and as part of the res gestae.

a.

Testimony of Pedro Reyes, among others: that he ran to the rice field and there he met Oliveros (Gervasio Due) and Gatchalian talking, the former declaring he was sure the MP he had shot will die and Gatchalian making the same assurance as to the MP he (Gatchalian) had shot in turn. Testimony of Orsino (victim): narrated the incident substantially as described by Reyes, but could not identify the aggressors except the

Conclusion of the Court: We are thus satisfied from the foregoing of the guilty participation of the appellants in this gruesome business. Their defense of alibi is weak and untenable. The Solicitor General's brief substantially proves conspiracy between them and their other co-accused who are still at large. LICHAUCO v. ATLANTIC GULF FACTS:

b.

Appellant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila (Atlantic) is a foreign corporation duly registered and licensed to do business in the Philippines, with its office and principal place of business in Manila. Richard T. Fitzsimmons (Fitzsommons) was the president and one of the largest stockholders of Atlantic when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941. o He was receiving a salary of P3,000 a month. o He held 1,000 shares, of which 545 shares had not been fully paid for, but for which he had executed promissory notes in favor of Atlantic for P245,250, at P450/share. o In 1941, the sum of P64,500 had been credited in his favor on account of the purchase price of the 545 shares out of bonuses and dividends. o Under his agreements with the company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the 545 shares of stock, Atlantic, at its option, may either reacquire the 545 shares by returning to his estate the amount applied, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding number of the company's shares equivalent to the amount paid at P450/share. After the Japanese occupied Manila in January 1942, it seized and took possession of the office and all the properties and assets of Atlantic all its officials, they being American citizens. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomas interment camp (ST), and special proceeding was subsequently instituted in the CFI of Manila for the settlement of his estate. Atlantic resumed business operations in March 1945. Atlantic filed a claim against the estate of Fitzsimmons which, as amended, consisted of the following items: Personal overdraft of Fitzsimmons with Atlantic in current account: P63,000.00 Charges from San Francisco (SF) agent of the company not included in above figure A as of November 30, 1945 (P1,002), less subsequent credit advice from SF agent (P133.33) Atlantic offered to require the 545 shares sold to Fitzsimmons upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid, and asked the court to authorize the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500 returnable to the estate. In his answer to the amended claim, the administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of Fitzsimmons to Atlantic, expressed his conformity to the refund of P64,500 by Atlantic to the estate and the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545 shares of stock, and set up a counterclaim of P90,000 for salaries allegedly due the deceased from the claimant corresponding to the years 1942, 1943, and the first half of 1944, at P36,000 per annum.

A. B.

ISSUES/HOLDING:

1. 2.

Whether appellant's claims of P63,000 and P868.67 have been established by satisfactory evidence. NO and YES, respectively. Whether Fitzsimmons was entitled to his salary as president of Atlantic from January 1942, to June 27, 1944, when he died in ST. NO. I Upon the claim of P63,000, the evidence for the claimant consisted of the testimony of Santiago Inacay (Inacay) and Modesto Flores (Flores), chief and assistant accountant, respectively, of Atlantic.

RATIO:

Inacay o Personal account of Fitzsimmons, as of the last statement of account rendered in the year 1941 was around P63,000. o The last statement of account rendered to Fitzsimmons was that of November, 1941, the office of the company having closed on December 29, 1941. o Asked how it was possible for him to remember the status of the personal account of Fitzsimmons: I have to remember it because it is very shameful xxx when the officers xxx ask me about their balance, I could not tell them the amount xxx. o Asked what would happen at the end of each year to the personal account, and to the status of the personal account of Fitzsimmons: At the each year, after the declaration of dividends on paid shares, bonuses and directors' fees, the account will balance to a credit balance. o On cross-examination, admitted that he could not recollect the amount of the balance, either debit or credit, of each of the Americans and other employees who maintained a current account with the company o On redirect examination, he explained that he remembered the balance of Fitzsimmons because xxx I should have knowledge more or less, of the status of the account of the president, the treasurer, and the rest of the directors. Flores o Fitzsimmons had an account consisting of cash advances and of payments for his account xxx for his personal use. o On the credit side of his account were entered his monthly salaries, dividends declared, bonuses, and director's fees. o When Fitzsimmons withdrew funds by way of cash advances, he signed receipts which were delivered to the cashier, who in turn delivered them to him. o When creditors of Fitzsimmons presented bills to the accounting department for payments, those bills were approved by Fitzsimmons and the company paid them and charged them to his account. o All the books, receipts, papers, documents, and accounts referring to Fitzsimmons were lost during the war. o The personal account of Fitzsimmons on December 29, 1941, was on the debit side, amounting to P63,000 more or less, according to his best recollection. o On cross-examination, he testified that in the absence of the records he could not state what part of the P63,000 represented cash advances and payments made by the company to the creditors of Fitzsimmons. Testimonies of Mr. Henry J. Belden (Belden) and Mr. Samuel Garmezy (Garmezy), vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of Atlantic were objected to by the administrator and the trial court refused to admit their testimony on the ground that they were incompetent under section 26(c) of Rule 123, they being not only large stockholders and members of the board of directors but also vice-president-treasurer and president, respectively, of Atlantic. o Counsel for Atlantic stated in the record that Belden, if permitted to testify, would testify: That Fitzsimmons, xxx, had a current account xxx which, upon the outbreak of the war in December, 1941, had a debt balance against him of P63,000, and that said sum or any part had not been paid. o With regard to Garmezy, counsel for Atlantic also said that if said witness were allowed to testify, he

would testify: That xxx during the last days of November, or the first days of December, 1941, he received a copy of the trial balance sheet, and xxx the personal accounts of each and every one of the officers of Atlantic including himself, and also Fitzsimmons, appear; and that xxx on that occasion he checked up his own personal record with the entries appearing xxx, and he then had occasion to find out that the account of Fitzsimmons xxx was a debit account in the amount of around P63,000, while the personal account of Garmezy, xxx, showed a credit account in the sum of P63,000; and that this account P63,000 owed by Fitzsimmons appeared in that trial balance, xxx, was not paid by Fitzsimmons until the present date. o The offers of proof were ratified by the witnesses Belden and Garmezy and made of record by the trial court. The evidence for the administrator against this claim of P63,000 consisted of Exhibit 1 and the testimony of Mr. Marcial P. Lichauco (Lichauco) explaining the circumstances under which said document was prepared and signed by the Fitzsimmons. o On December 15, 1942, Fitzsimmons sued his wife Miguela Malayto (Malayto) for divorce in the CFI of Manila. On August 9, 1943, the court rendered judgment granting plaintiff's petition and ordering the dissolution of the marriage. Lichauco represented the plaintiff. After the decree of divorce had become final, Fitzsimmons submitted to the court an inventory of the assets and liabilities of the conjugal partnership, with a proposed adjudication or division of the net assets among the ex-spouses and their children. A carbon copy of said inventory, signed by Fitzsimmons on November 9, 1943, and filed in the CFI of Manila was presented by the administrator as Exhibit 1 and admitted by the trial court over the objection of the claimant. Lichauco testified that he prepared the inventory from the data furnished by Fitzsimmons after he had conferred with and explained to the latter why it was necessary; that since Fitzsimmons was married to Malayto in the year 1939, he had to include all the properties acquired by him between the date of his marriage and the date of his divorce, and that all the obligations incurred by him and not yet paid during the same period should be included because they had to be deducted from the assets in order to determine the net value of the conjugal properties; that he made it very clear to Fitzsimmons that he should not forget the obligations he had because they would diminish the amount his wife was going to receive, and that any obligation not included in the inventory would be borne by him alone after his wife had received her share. o According to Exhibit 1 the gross value of the assets of the conjugal partnership between Fitzsimmons and Malayto as of November, 1943, was P174,700, and the total amount of the obligations was P30,082. These obligations consisted of only two items, one of P21,426 in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Company (PBTC) and another of P8,656 in favor of the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC). No obligation in favor of Atlantic was listed in Exhibit 1. And upon that fact the administrator based his opposition to the claim in question. It necessary for us to pass upon the trial court's rejection of the testimonies of Belden and Garmezy and its admission of Exhibit 1. o WON the officers of a corporation party to an action against an executor or administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such

deceased person, under Rule 123, section 26(c), of the Rules of Court, which provides: Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind. This provision was taken from section 383(7), of our former Code of Civil Procedure, which was derived from section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California. City Savings Bank vs. Enos: The provision applies only to parties or assignors of parties, xxx. xxx, interest no longer disqualifies under our law, xxx. xxx section 14, Civ. Code, xxx "person" includes a corporation; xxx, as the corporation can only speak through its officers, the section must be held to apply to all who are officially related to the corporation. A corporation may be conceded to be a person, xxx. To hold that the statute disqualifies all persons from testifying who are officers or stockholders of a corporation would be equivalent to materially amending the statute by judicial interpretation. Plainly the law disqualifies only "parties or assignors of parties," and does not apply to persons who are merely employed by such parties or assignors of parties. Merriman vs. Wickersman: xxx, vice-president and one of its principal stockholders, was allowed to testify to matters and facts in issue. It is contended that the evidence was improperly admitted, in violation of section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure, xxx. At common law, interest disqualified any person from being a witness. That rule has been modified by statute. In this state, interest is no longer a disqualification, and the disqualifications are only such as the law imposes. An examination of the authorities from other states will disclose that their decisions rest upon the wordings of their statutes, but that generally, where interest in the litigation or its outcome has ceased to disqualify, officers and directors of corporations are not considered to be parties within the meaning of the law. Our own statute xxx neither disqualifies parties to a contract nor persons in interest, but only parties to the action; xxx our statute does not exclude from testifying a stockholder of a corporation, whether he be but a stockholder, or whether, in addition, he be a director or officer. The appellee admits xxx where the "dead man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been allowed to testify in favor of the corporation, while xxx where "parties and persons interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the statute, officers and stockholders of the corporation have been held to be incompetent to testify against the estate of a deceased person. Inasmuch as section 26(c) of Rule 123 disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties, we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person.

The trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Belden and Garmezy. It is not necessary, however, to remand the case because their testimonies would be merely corroborative, and if permitted, already appears in the record and we can consider it together with the testimony of the Inacay and Flores who were "the only ones in the best of position to testify on the status of the personal account" of the Fitzsimmons. WON Exhibit 1 is admissible. o Appellant contends that it is a self-serving declaration, while appellee contends that it is a declaration against interest. o A self-serving declaration is a statement favorable to the interest of the declarant. It is not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted. "The vital objection to the admission of this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. Furthermore such declarations are untrustworthy; to permit their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries." o A declaration against the interest of the person making it is admissible in evidence, notwithstanding its hearsay character, if the declaration is relevant and the declarant has died, become insane, or for some other reason is not available as a witness. "The true test in reference to the reliability of the declaration is not whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case with reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, whether the declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify." o We find no merit, that Exhibit 1 was a declaration against the interest of Fitzsimmons. He having since died and therefore no longer available as a witness, said document was correctly admitted by the trial court in evidence. Neither counsel for the appellant nor counsel for the appellee pursued the examination of the witness to determine, if possible, the approximate amount of the dividends, bonuses, and director's fees that would have been credited to Fitzsimmons as of the end of the year 1941. But enough appears in the testimony to warrant the deduction that had the war not forced the corporation to close office on December 29, 1941, dividends, bonuses, and director's fees for the year 1941 would, as of the and of that year, have been declared and credited to the account of Fitzsimmons, which as in previous years would or might have brought that account on the credit side. We are confronted only by the oral testimony of the witnesses for the claimant based entirely on their memory as to the status of Fitzsimmons' account, and not on the other by Exhibit 1. Realizing the frailty and unreliability of human memory, we find no sufficient basis upon which to reverse the trial court's finding that this claim had not been satisfactorily proven. With reference to the item of P868.67, we find it to have been sufficiently proven by Inacay and Flores, supported by documents which establish the fact that in November and December, 1941, the SF agent of the company deposited in the Crocker First National Bank of SF (Crocker) the total sum of $500 to the account of Fitzsimmons, which agent debited against the company. Debit notices of the deposits were not received by the company until after the liberation. o The administrator admitted in his testimony that after the death of Fitzsimmons, he received from Crocker the balance of Fitzsimmons' account in the sum of P1,788.75. Aside from that debit of P1,000 against Atlantic for the account of Fitzsimmons, the agent also paid $1 or P2 for Fitzsimmons'

subscription to the SF Chronicle, making a total of P1,002. From this was deducted a credit of P133.33, consisting of a payment made on June 30, 1946, by a creditor of Fitzsimmons named J. H. Chew as testified to by Flores and supported by Exhibit E, leaving a balance of P868.67. The trial court therefore erred in not allowing said claim. II

There was no resolution either of the stockholders or the board of directors of the company authorizing the payment of the salaries of the president or any other officer or employee of the corporation for the period of the war when the corporation was forced completely to suspend its business operations and when its officers were interned or virtually held prisoners by the enemy. The theory of the appellee, which was sustained by the trial court, is that as long as a corporation officer with a fixed salary retains the office, he is entitled to that salary notwithstanding his inability to perform his duties. o The main case cited by the appellee in support of his theory is Brown vs. Galvenston Wharf Co.: The president of the defendants corporation claimed his salary for a period of almost eleven months, during which he was on an indefinite leave of absence, and the court allowed it, holding that "so long as he remained the president of the company, the salary was an incident to the office, and ran with it for the whole time, although he may have failed to perform the duties of president for any given part of such time." o If such a sweeping pronouncement is to be applied regardless of WON the corporation was in operation during the period covered by the claim for the salary, we cannot subscribe to it. o We know of no principle of law that would authorize the court to compel a corporation, which for a long period was not in operation and did not receive any income, to pay the salaries of its officers during such period, even though they were incapacitated and did not perform any service. To do so would be tantamount to depriving the corporation or its stockholders of their property without due process of law. o The resolutions of the stockholders are invoked by the appellee to support the proposition that Fitzsimmons, during his internment, performed certain acts as president of the corporation, which were ratified and confirmed by the stockholders in their annual meeting on January 21, 1946. But those acts consisted merely of borrowing money for himself and the other officers of the corporation and their respective families to enable them to eke out an existence during their internment. The ratification of those acts by the stockholders had for its purpose to relieve Fitzsimmons of personal liability for the obligations thus contracted by him in the name of the company. To say that by ratifying those acts of Fitzsimmons the corporation became obligated to pay his salaries during his internment aggregating P90,000, would be the height of absurdity. o We are of the opinion that the estate of Fitzsimmons is not entitled to its counterclaim of P90,000 or any part thereof. PEOPLE v. YATCO

FACTS: In an amended information filed by the City Attorney of QC, Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban, and another

whose identity is still unknown, were charged with having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos During the progress of the trial, while the prosecution was questioning one of its witnesses, Atty. Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-judicial confession (allegedly made before him) by Consunji o Counsel for Panganiban interposed a general objection to any evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as against the other accused Panganiban Court below ordered the exclusion of the evidence objected to, but on an altogether different ground o That the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of defendants Consunji and Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances The ff remarks were made: o FISCAL LUSTRE: May we know from counsel if he is also objecting to the admissibility of the confession of Consunji as against the accused Consunji himself? o COURT: That would be premature because there is already a ruling of the Court that you cannot prove a confession unless you prove first conspiracy thru a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances as required by law. Prosecution moved for a reconsideration of the order of exclusion, but the motion was denied Hence this petition for certiorari was brought by the Solicitor General, for the review and annulment of the lower Court's order completely excluding any evidence on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused Consunji and Panganiban without prior proof of conspiracy

a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two accused, nor as evidence against both of them o In fact, the alleged confessions (both in writing and in tape recordings) had not yet even been identified (the presentation of Atty. Xavier was precisely for the purpose of identifying the confessions), much less formally offered in evidence o For all we know, the prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in evidence o Assuming, therefore, that section 12 of Rule 123 also applies to the confessions in question, it was premature for the respondent Court to exclude them completely on the ground that there was no prior proof of conspiracy It is particularly noteworthy that the exclusion of the proferred confessions was not made on the basis of the objection interposed by Panganiban's counsel, but upon an altogether different ground, which the Court issued motu proprio o By so doing, the Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the evidence We see no need for the present to discuss the question of the admissibility of the individual extrajudicial confessions of two or more accused for the purpose of establishing conspiracy between them through the identity of the confessions in essential details o After all, the confessions are not before us and have not even been formally offered in evidence for any purpose o Lower Court should have allowed such confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to prove the charges Prats & Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. o In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where trial objections to the admission of proof are received with least favor o The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should be avoided o In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the Attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected later o A judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this Court is always very loath to take.

ISSUE:

WON the lower Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering the complete exclusion of the prosecution's evidence on the alleged confessions of the accused Consunji at the stage of the trial when the ruling was made? YES

RATIO: Section 14, Rule 123, ROC, is specific as to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession of an accused, freely and voluntarily made, as evidence against him o SEC. 14. Confession. The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him.

Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji's confession may not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of the declarant's own guilt, and should have been admitted as such. Rule cited by the Court below in support of its exclusion of the proffered evidence is Sec. 12 of Rule 123: o SEC 12. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Sec 12 refers to statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises ("during its existence") and in furtherance of its object, and not to

On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial o If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this Court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which the People can no longer appeal. o

HELD: Wherefore, the order excluding the confessions of the accused Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and set aside and the Court below is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law and this opinion. US v. BAY o o o Servando Bay charged w the crime of rape Witnesses for the prosecution: Bay & Florentina Alcones were neighbors he forced himself on her Bay got angry at her resistance & tk out a dagger Boat w ppl passed by & heard her cries, boat came ashore & a person walked over to where they were & asked Bay whats this? Bay didnt explain & just left immediately Alcones, accompanied by some of the ppl from the boat, made a complaint to the councilman Bay admitted to the crime to the councilman case filed accused was convicted based on this evidence Counsel for accused: There are apparent contradictions & inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses TC was erred in accepting as true the testimony of the witnesses & Alcones Emphasized the inherent improbability of the story told by Alcones

o o o o o o

any unexplained delay in instituting criminal proceedings Here, Alcones sought assistance & made a formal & official complaint immediately after the commission of the crime the precludes the possibility btwn conspiracy btwn her & the witnesses to press a false charge She couldnt have anticipated the party on the boat passing by & hearing her cries nor their arrival, had she planned the filing of false charges on Bay o These were fortunate coincidences Theres a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether Bay, when the complaint was made to the councilman, did or did not admit his guilt, and this evidence is so contradictory that its difficult to make an express finding on this But whatever be the truth as to these alleged admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for doubt that neither at the moment when the party in the boat came upon him in company with his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman upon her complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that he had assaulted her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon him Under such circumstances, an innocent man would instantly and indignantly repudiate such a charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions under which she had made the false charge there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the part of Bay any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from an innocent man suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances his conduct at that time was wholly at variance with that which might fairly be expected from him, granting the truth of his testimony and that of the other witnesses for the defense ABALLE v. PEOPLE FACTS: Quirino Banguis, and family went to a birthday party at 7pm, leaving at home alone their 12-y.o. daughter Jennie. When they returned 8.30pm the same night, they found Jennie in the sala, lying dead in a pool of her own blood, with several stab wounds all over her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing. At daybreak of the following day, acting on information furnished by the Quirino, a police team headed by Sgt. Marante sought the accused Peter Paul (Pitoy! Hehehe.) Aballe for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for interrogation. While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout and next door neighbor of the victim, brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot at the "bangera" where he had concealed the death weapon which was a four-inch kitchen knife. Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained red and white striped T-shirt which he claimed he wore during the commission of the crime. Aballe also made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie while under the influence of liquor and marijuana. The sworn affidavit gave details regarding the

Shes more than twice the age of Bay & anything but attractive (sama naman ng lawyer nato!!! Grabe hahaha) charge of rape is a pure fabrication & brought for the sole purpose of wreaking her vengeance and spite on Bay whom she had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his carabaos on her land

I: WON the testimonies are sufficient to prove the guilt of Bay. YES there are contradictions & inconsistencies in the testimonies & difficult to understand why Bay, young & married, cldve been so lost to all sense of right & decency as to assault a woman so much older than him (his neighbor & old frnd of the family) BUT the evidence of Alcones, supported by the other witnesses is so convincing & conclusive in cases of this nature it is the duty of the Cts to scrutinized with the utmost care the story told by the complaining witness and the witnesses called to corroborate her o esp when it appears either that the offended party did not make immediate outcry or that there was

commission of the crime. The affidavit also shows that Aballe was read his Constitutional right to remain silent and right to presence and assistance of counsel, and that Aballe waived these rights. An information charging Aballe with homicide was filed. Aballe pleaded not guilty. He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on the ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the absence of counsel. In spite of this, Aballe was convicted. ISSUES: 1. WON Aballes extrajudicial admission is admissible. No. 2. WON Sgt. Marantes testimony regarding Aballes extrajudicial admission is admissible. Yes. Sub-issues: 1. Is the kitchen knife admissible? No. 2. Is the bloodstained shirt admissible? Yes. Aballes extrajudicial admission Should have been disregarded. At no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown that Aballe was ever represented by counsel.

communal bathroom. When Aballe saw Marante, he tried to hide the bloodstains on his shirt. Marante asked him what those were, then Aballe broke down and confessed. Marante was not in uniform at that time and that he thought Aballe only knew that he was a policeman when he finally took him to the station where they subsequently read him his rights and here the extrajudicial confession was taken.

Rule 130, Sec. 33. (Sec. 30 in the Old ROC): "The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be given in evidence against him."

The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance. (23 C.J.S. 196)(Pp. vs. Tawat)

Since the execution of the extrajudicial statement was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de parte, and the waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel as mandated by the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by the lower court. The kitchen knife Inadmissible because it was recovered from Aballe after his capture and after the police had started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirm interrogation and must consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt

Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim. SC affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty because the crime was mitigated by Aballes minority, but aggravated by dwelling. PEOPLE v. MOLAS FACTS:

1.

Admissible because it is in the nature of an evidence in plain view which an arresting officer may take and introduce in evidence The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause . . . But there is no escape! Marantes testimony finally leads to Aballes doom. Even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession and the fatal weapon the SC agrees with the trial court that Aballes guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Even before the taking of the extrajudicial confession, the accused confessed to Marante that he killed Jennie. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral confession is competent evidence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing. Sgt. Marantes testimony details how he apprehended Aballe. He said that as per info from Jennies father that he suspected Aballe, they subsequently found him at the

Josue Molas was charged with murder for killing 2 women and an 8 year old child. 2. the two women were his girlfriend, Dulcesima Resonable and her mom, Soledad; while the 8 year old child was Dulcesimas younger bro, Abelardo. 3. Upon arraignment, Molas pleaded not guilty. 4. what happened was that when Bernardo (the gfs dad) went home from the farm, he saw his son at the doorway covered with blood. 5. Important fact: Abelardo, (the 8 year old son) told his dad that it was Josue Molas who did the stabbing and that his mom and sister were stabbed as well 6. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in a dried carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He carried her into the house and looked for his wife whose corpse he found near the bench by the door of the house 7. He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain (Labe) and sought help from the authorities in the municipal building of Valencia. 8. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a house on higher ground. Abelardo expired the next day. 9. Molas surrendered to the patrolman Geronimo. And also surrendered the knife he used. He was then jailed. 10. The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any statement to the police 11. Important fact: However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station investigator at the Valencia Police Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely and voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of counsel.

12. In the sworn statement, Molas said that when he went to his gfs house, he saw the mom who told him It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter (in bisaya dialect). The mom then boxed her daughter so Molas tried to stop the mom. But the mom then boxed him then again the daughter. Molas then grabbed the weapon in his waist and stabbed the mom. Abelardo, the younger brother, boxed Molas buttock so Molas also stabbed the child. Dulcesima, the gf, told MOlas How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together (in bisaya dialect) So Molas killed her as well. 13. Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia after the latter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into the Cebuano dialect. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly, after which the judge affixed his own signature thereon. 14. BUT!! During the trial, Molas, testifying as the lone witness in his own behalf, spun a different tale 15. During the trial, MOlas said that when he arrived at the store of the mom, he saw the dead body of Dulcesima beside the dried mud pool and believing she is still alive asked day what is this. There was no response. He saw the mom leaning on the wall and asked her as well. Again there was no response. . He discovered that Soledad was wounded in the neck and bathed with blood. Then he heard someone moaning. He got a lamp and saw his future brother-in-law, Abelardo, under a table, still alive, with a hunting knife stuck in his back. He pulled out the knife, held it, and shouted to Nicolas Resonable for help, but nobody responded. Suddenly, he heard a voice coming from behind the store saying: "Don't shout, Bay, if you don't want to die!" When he looked, he saw three (3) unidentified persons chasing him. During his flight, he stumbled and injured his middle and small fingers with the hunting knife in his hand. He then went home to tell his mom. After that he went to the police station to surrender. While Patrolman Renzal was investigating him, Patrolman Geronimo Vallaga arrived and informed Renzal that Abelardo Resonable tagged Molas as the killer of his mother and his sister so that he was put in the Pamplona Municipal jail. 16. Molas admitted having signed an affidavit on March 10, 1983 but he denied knowing its contents because it was written in English and allegedly was not translated to him.

2.

who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249). The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him credible. Issue # 2 Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying declaration. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (Requisites) a) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; c) that he was a competent witness; and d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427). present when

1.

2.

**All of these circumstances were Abelardo made his dying declaration.

** At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable. ** While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present when he hacked eight-year old Abelardo and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed. PEOPLE v. MAQUEDA Facts leading to the case and procedural facts: Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, & his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza lived in Tuba, Benguet. Aug 27, 1991, during a robbery, Horace was brutally slain & Teresita was badly battered with lead pipes. Sufficient prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims former houseboy, as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

17. RTC

convicted MOlas. His testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. He could not explain, during crossexamination, why he did not shout for help when he was chased by "unidentified persons," and why he "forgot" to tell his mother that Abelardo Resonable, his future brother-in-law, was also wounded. 18. Molas appealed. ISSUES: 1. WON RTC erred in admitting as evidence against him his extra-judicial confession which was executed without the assistance of counsel, as required by the Constitution NO. though the court said that the extrajudicial confession was really inadmissible. The reason given by court here was on a different ground. 2. WON RTC erred in giving full faith and credit to the dying declaration of Abelardo Resonable NO. RATIO: 1. Issue #1 While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons

As to Rene's co-conspirator, the, prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries filed on 19 Nov 1991 with Branch 10 of the RTC of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet. Only Richard Malig was arrested on 22 January 1992, prior to arraignment,

The prosecution filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused Hector Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence subsequently submitted established his complicity in the crime, At the hearing of the motion, the Prosecutor further asked that accused Malig be dropped from the information because further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him.

Motion to drop Malig granted o Warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992 9 April 1992, he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above-entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." 22 April 1992, the prosecution filed an Amended Informations with only Salvamante and Maqueda as the accused. Since Rene Salvamante continues to elude arrest and has remained at large, trial proceeded entered a plea of not guilty on 22 April 1992. RTC Maqueda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries and sentenced him to :

Julieta Villanueva, who was awakened by the shouts of Norie, got out of her bed and upon opening the door of her room, saw a man clad in maong jacket and short pants brandishing a lead pipe standing two meters in front of her who she identified as Maqueda at the trial. She got scared & immediately closed the door. Since the door knob turned as if someone was forcing his way into the room, she held on to it & shouted for help. The shouts awakened Teresita. She rose from her bed and went down the stairs to the dining room and she saw Salvamante & his companion. They rushed towards her and beat her up with lead pipesntil she lost consciousness despite her pleas to get what they want and not to hurt her. During trial, she identified Maqueda as Salvamante's companion. Salvamante also hit Norie with the lead pipe on her back and at the back of her right hand. She fell to the concrete floor, and after she had recovered, she ran to-the garage and hid under the car. After a few seconds, she went near the door of the garage and because she could not open it, she called Julieta. Julieta opened the door and they rushed to their room and closed the door. When they saw that the doorknob was being turned, they braced themselves against the door to prevent anyone from entering. While locked in their room, they heard the moans of Mrs. Barker and the shouts of Mr. Barker: "That's enough, that's enough, that's enough." When the noise stopped, Norie and Julieta heard the sound of water flowing from the toilet and the barking of dogs. At 7:00 a.m. of that same day, Mike Tabayan & Mark Pacio were resting in a waiting shed beside the Asin road at Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, which is only a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. They saw two men approaching them from a curve. When the two men reached the shed, he and Mark noticed that the taller of the two had an amputated left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index finger. This man was carrying a black bag on his right shoulder The taller man asked Mike and Mark in Tagalog whether the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La Union. Mike replied that it did not. Five minutes later, a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City and owned and driven by Ben Lusnong arrived at the waiting shed. The two men boarded it, Mike again noticed that the taller man had the defects above mentioned because the latter used his right hand with only three fingers to hold on to the bar of the jeepney as he boarded it. In the Investigation conducted by the Tuba Police, he identified through a picture the shorter man as Salvamante, and at the hearing, he pointed to Maqueda as the taller man. 9:00 a.m., Norie and Julieta gathered enough courage to leave the room where they had earlier barricaded themselves and proceed to the kitchen to get the key to the gate of the garage. In the dining room, they saw the Barkers bathed in their own blood. Norie and Julieta rushed out of the house and ran to the place of Janet Albon to seek help. After requesting Janet to call the police, they returned to the Barker's house but did not enter it for fear of what they had seen earlier. They just stayed near the road. Soon after, security guards of the Baguio College Foundation (BCF) arrived. A team from the Baguio City Police Station, headed by Police Officer Policarpio Cambod, and which included Dr. Perfecto Micu of the City Health Department, also arrived. They conducted an initial investigation only because it found out that the scene of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the Tuba Police Station, which was difficult to get in touch with at that time. Dr. Perfecto Micu found the body of Mr. Barker inside the Barker house and Cambod prepared a sketch showing its location. They went around the house and found a lead pipe at the toilet, a black T-shirt, and a green hand towel. He also discovered another lead pipe

o
o

Suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and To indemnify the victim, Teresita M, Barker in the amount of P50,000.00 for the death of William Horace Barker, P41,681,00 representing actual expenses, P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

Witnesses for the prosecution: Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker, househelps Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva, Mike Tayaban, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr., Francisco Cabotaje, prosecutor Daniel Zarate, Ray Dean Salvosa, Glen Enriquez, SPO1 Rodolfo Tabadero, and Policarpio Cambod in its evidence in chief and Fredesminda Castrence and SP03 Armando Molleno on rebuttal. Witnesses for the accused: Hector Maqueda took the witness stand and SPO1 Aurelio Sagun, Jr. in his evidence in chief & Myrna Maqueda Katindig as his sour-rebuttal witness. (Sour daw e Ndi sur accdg to the txt Im using) Facts accdg to the prosecution: (I didnt remove a lot from the statement of facts bec maam might ask some questions about it.) Accdg to Maqueda: he was in Manila at the time of the crime teaching other workers about polvoron making in a polvoron factory. B/in 10:30 & 11:00 pm. 26 Aug, the sps went to their bedroom after Teresita had checked the houses main doors if they had been locked & bolted. Around 6:00 a.m. of the ff day, Norie, who shared a room w/ her cousin, Julieta, got up & went to the lavatory to wash her face, & went to the toilet. When she opened the door of the toilet & switched on the light & she saw Salvamante. a former houseboy whom she & Julieta had replaced. Salvamante suddenly strangled her. While she was fighting back, Norie happened to turn her face and she saw a fair-complexioned, tall man with a high-bridged nose at Salvamante's side, whom she identified at the trial as Maqueda. After she broke free, Norie fled towards the garage and shouted for help. Salvamante chased her and pulled her back inside the house.

the back of the door of the house. He then interviewed the two househelps who provided him with descriptions of the assailants. The team then left, leaving behind BCF Security Officer Glen Enriquez and a security guard. Cambod prepared a report of his initial investigation. Enriquez conducted his own investigation. At the master's bedroom, he saw several pieces of jewelry scattered on the floor & an empty inner cabinet. He noticed footprints at the back of the house, particularly at the riprap wall, & observed that the grass below it was parted as if someone had passed through and created a trail amidst the grass down toward the Asin road of Tuba. Upon his request, a security guard of the BCF, Edgar Dalit, was sent to the house to secure the premises. Enriquez then left after Dalit's arrival. 5:00 p.m., members of the Tuba Police Station arrived at the Barker house to conduct their investigation. Enriquez, who in the meantime was called by Dalit, returned to the Barker house. The lead pipes, black T-shirt, and the green hand towel recovered from the Barker house by the Baguio City Police were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, and then to the ct. The body of William Horace Barker was taken to the Baguio Funeral Homes at Naguilian Road, Baguio City, where it was examined by Dr. Francisco P. Cabotaje, Municipal Health Officer of Tuba, Benguet. He found twenty-seven injuries, which could have been caused by a blunt instrument, determined the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock, and then issued a death certificate. Teresita was brought to the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center where she was treated and confined for eight days. The attending physician, Dr. Francisco L. Hernandez, Jr., first saw her at around 11:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991. She was in a comatose state. Dr. Hernandez found that she sustained multiple lacerations primarily on the left side of the occipital area, bleeding in the left ear, and bruises on the arm. One of the muscles adjoining her eyes was paralyzed. She regained consciousness only after two days. Dr. Hernandez opined that her injuries were caused by a blunt instrument, like a lead pipe, and concluded that if her injuries had been left unattended, she would have died by noontime due to bleeding or hemorrhagic shock. 1 Sept 1991, a police team from the Tuba Police Station came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker, showed her pictures of several persons, and asked her to identify the persons who had assaulted her. She pointed to a person who turned out to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr. Hernandez told the members of the team that it was improper for them to conduct it without first consulting him since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered consciousness. Moreover, her eyesight had not yet improved, her visual acuity was impaired, and she had double vision. 3 Sept 1991, the remains of Mr. Barker were cremated. Mrs. Barker was then discharged from the hospital and upon getting home, tried to determine the items lost during the robbery. She requested Enriquez to get back the pieces of jewelry taken by the Tuba PNP. The Tuba PNP gave them to Enriquez. Mrs. Barker discovered that her Canon camera, radio cassette recorder, and some pieces of jewelry were missing. The aggregate value of the missing items was P204,250.00. She then executed an affidavit on these missing items. Mrs. Barker underwent a CT Scan at the St. Luke's Hospital in QC. It was revealed that she sustained a damaged artery on her left eye which could cause blindness. She then sought treatment at the St. Luke's Roosevelt Hospital in New York where she underwent an unsuccessful operation. She likewise received treatment at the New York Medical Center.

29 Nov 1991, Ray Dean Salvosa, EVP of BCF, Enriquez to go to Guinyangan, Quezon, to coordinate with the police in determining the whereabouts of accused Salvamante. In Guinyangan, Enriquez was able to obtain information from the barangay captain, Basilio Requeron, that he saw Salvamante together with a certain "Putol" in Sept 1991;but, they already left. On 21 December 1991, Enriquez, & three others went back to Guinyangan to find out whether Salvamante and "Putol" had returned. Upon being informed by Requeron that the two had not, Enriquez requested Requeron to notify him immediately once Salvamante or "Putol" returned. 4 March 1992, Requeron's daughter called up Enriquez to inform him that Putol / Maqueda, had been arrested in Guinyangan. Enriquez and Maj. Rodolfo Anagaran, Chief of the Tuba Police Station, together with another policeman, went to Guinyangan. The Guinyangan Police Station turned over Maqueda to Maj. Anagaran who then brought Maqueda to the Benguet Provincial Jail. Before Maj. Anagaran's arrival at Guinyangan, Maqueda had been taken to the headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company at Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon. Its commanding officer, Maj. Virgilio F. Rendon, directed SP03 Armando Molleno to get Maqueda's statement. He did so and according to him, he informed Maqueda of his rights under the Constitution. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house. 9 April 1992, while he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then had a talk with Maqueda regarding such statement and asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on 27 August 1991 in entering the house of the Barkers. After he received an affirmative answer, Prosecutor Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the motion for bail since he, Maqueda, was the only accused on trial. When Salvosa visited Maqueda, he narrated to Salvosa that Rene brought him to Baguio, in order to find a job as a peanut vendor; Salvamante then brought him to the Barker house and it was only when they were at the vicinity thereof that Salvamante revealed to him that his real purpose in going to Baguio City was to rob the Barkers; he initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it; when they were in the kitchen of the Barker house, one of the househelps was already there; Salvamante hit her with a lead pipe and she screamed; then Mrs. Barker came down, forcing him, Maqueda, to attack her with the lead pipe provided by Salvamante, After he felled Mrs. Barker, he helped Salvamante in beating up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. the Barkers were already unconscious on the' floor, Salvamante went upstairs and a few minutes later came down bringing with him a radio cassette and some pieces of jewelry. They then changed clothes, went out of the house, walked toward the road where they Saw two persons from whom they asked directions, and when a passenger jeepney stopped and they were informed by the two persons that it was bound for Baguio City, he and Salvamante bearded it. They alighted somewhere along Albano Street in Baguio City and walked until they reached the Philippine Rabbit Bus station where they boarded a bus for Manila.

Accused Hector Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi: denied having anything to do with the crime. He stated that he was at the polvoron factory owned by Minda Castrense located in Muntinlupa. He was employed

as a caretaker since July 5, 1991 and he worked continuously there up to August 27, 1991. It was his sister, Myrna Katindig, who found him the job as caretaker. As caretaker, it was his duty to supervise the Ees in the factory & whenever his Er was not around, he was in charge of the sales. He and his 8 co-employees all sleep inside the factory. Aug 26, 1991, he reported for work although he could not recall what he did that day. He slept inside the factory that night & on Aug 27, 1991, he was teaching the new employees how to make the seasoning for the polvoron. December 20, 1991, he went home to Gapas, Guinyangan, Quezon as it was his vacation time. He was to be back at work after New Year's Day in 1992. Upon alighting from the bus at Guinyangan, he saw Rene, his childhood playmate, having gone to the same elementary school. He had no chance to talk to him that day when he saw him and so they just waved to each other. He again saw Rene after Christmas on the road beside their Renes house. He invited him to go to Calauag, Quezon and roam around. He agreed to go as he also wanted to visit his brother, Jose who resided there. When the two accused were at Calauag, Salvamante asked Maqueda to accompany him in selling a cassette recorder which he said came from Baguio City. Maqueda knew that Salvamante worked in Baguio through Renes mother. They were able to sell the cassette recorder to Salvamante's aunt. They had their meal and went to visit Maqueda's brother. After that, he never saw Rene again. After his Christmas vacation, he went back to work at the polvoron factory until Feb 29, 1992. Roselyn Merca, a coworker and townmate, asked him to accompany her home. He agreed. He was arrested at the house of Roselyn Merca when he brought her home. He was then brought to the Guinyangan municipal jail, then to the Tuba Police Station. There he was told to cooperate with the police so he would not stay long in the Province of Benguet. He was also told that if he would point to accused, he would be freed and he could also become a state witness. He told them that he could attest to the fact that he accompanied accused Rene in selling the cassette recorder. March 5, 1992, he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail at La Trinidad, Benguet where he has remained under detention up to the present. The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector by presenting Fredesminda Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where he worked, who testified that she started her business only on 30 Aug 1991 and thus it was impossible for her to have hired him on 5 July 1991. SP03 Molleno declared that he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he was investigated and that he voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay.

leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant to the exclusion of all Others, as the author of the crime (People vs. Abuyen). The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the accused are: 1. No objection that despite being handicapped, accused could well & easily grip a lead pipe & strike a cement post w such force to a resounding vibration. Not farfetched to conclude that accused could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death. 2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the company of Rene was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. They asked for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were strangers to the place 3. Accused knows or is familiar with Rene Salvamante as they from the same town. By his own testimony, Maqueda has established that they are close friends to the point that they went out together during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and even accompanied Salvamante in selling the black radio cassette recorder. 4. His Motion to Grant Bail contains this statement that he is willing and volunteering to be State witness, the accused in appearing that he is the least guilty. which supports his extrajudicial confession trade to the police although he claims that he just did as he was told to be released from detention, this is a flimsy excuse. Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their signatures up already affixed on the motion. 5. His admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house that morning and to Salvosa as to what he actually did. 6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best a weak defense and easy of fabrication (Ppl vs. Martinado). For alibi to be given credence, it must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (Ppl vs. Pugal,). The defense is easily rebutted as Tayaban placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene. The combination of all these circs plus extrajudicial confession produce the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed Maqueda is guilty of the crime.

The extrajudicial confession referred to is the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SP02 Molleno immediately after Maqueda was arrested. Maqueda seasonably appealed to us his conviction.

ISSUE/HELD: WON Maqueda has been correctly convicted by the TC through the confession and corpus delicti. RATIO: [TOPIC] The accused's arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids were not able to positively identify Magueda, The trial court based his conviction on his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence. He should have focused his attention and arguments on these.

Judgment and Ratio of TC: Although the trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial evidence.

In order to establish the guilt of the accused through circumstantia1 evidence, the following requisites must be present: 1) there must be more than One circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People vs. Pajarit). There must be an unbroken chain of circumstances which

From its ratiocinations, the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confession, the Sinumpaang Salaysay and an extrajudicial admission the, verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission.

There is a distinction between. the former and the latter as clearly shown in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." (AIIIS17 Consti)
o Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent & to counsel, & to be informed of such right . . . No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. o [Wharton] an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged The term admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. o [Wharton] statement by accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue & tending, in connection w proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. An admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt. And under Sec3 of Rule133, extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

ISSUE/HELD: WON the confession can be admissible in evidence. NO.

TC: admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused by saying at the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.

RATIO: While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such filing an accused "no longer Has] the right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right to refuge to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal." If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section 12(1); it would also diminish the said accused's rights under Section 14(2) Article III of the Constitution, The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or

Admissibility of the Sinumpaang Salaysay should not be tested under the aforequoted Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, but on the voluntariness of its execution. Since voluntariness is presumed, Maqueda had the burden of proving otherwise, which he failed to do and, hence, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was admissible against him. In any case, it is settled that when testimony is presented to establish not the truth but the tenor of the statement or the fact that such statement was made, it is not hearsay (People vs. Fule).

US SC in Miranda vs. Arizona: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. o Custodial interrogation, means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. o Prior to any questioning the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. o The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. o If, he indicates in any manner, at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. o If the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. o The mere fact that he may have answered some question or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to a questioned. The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" & "investigation," as in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person" goes to prove that they did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. Clearly then, the second paragraph of Section 20 has even broadened the application of Miranda by making it applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of a person and in custody. In Morales vs, Enrile: At the time a person is arrested, duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the

procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

"the warrant of arrest, if any." means a case had been filed against him in a court of either preliminary or original jurisdiction and that the court had issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. The right to remain silent, to counsel and to be informed thereof are avail to a person at any time before arraignment whenever he is investigated for the commission of an offense. In People vs. Holgado: One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Consti is that "no person shall be-held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In crim cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so impt that it has become a consti right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de officio for him if he so desires & he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. SC: Wrong for the TC to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution is strictly limited to custodial investigation and it does not apply to a person against whom a criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right to remain silent and to counsel. o Following TCs theory, police authorities and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the rights to remain silent and to counsel. Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. The Sinumpaang Salaysay taken after the arrest is wholly inadmissible. o Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights. o The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel. However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a

different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; or restriction on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that governmental power is not unlimited.

They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships between individuals. Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in evidence against him under Sec26, Rule130 of the RoC

In Aballe vs; People, this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admissions. Included in Maqueda's extrajudicial admission is his Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he explicitly stated that "he is willing and volunteering to be a state witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his participation therein. Even disregarding his extrajudicial admissions to Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The ff circumstances were duly proved in this case: 1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house an hour after the crime in question was committed there; 2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs. Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who committed the crime; 3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends; 4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and both left the place sometime in September 1991; 5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and 6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is the least guilty." Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) c)

The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Is Domantays extra-judicial admission to the police admissible? NO. Is Domantays extra-judicial admission to the police admissible? YES. Is abuse of superior strength present? YES. Is cruelty present? NO. Was rape committed? NO.

Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,

i.e. the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. all the requisites of Sec 2, Rule 133 of the RoC are present in this case.

RATIO: On the admissibility of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza: Domantay posits that these testimonies are inadmissible on the ground that the extrajudicial confessions were obtained in violation of Art. III, Sec. 12(1), 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Sec. 12(1), 1987 Constitution applies to the stage of custodial investigation. Custodial Investigation: when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect extended to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been invited for questioning (RA 7438) Extrajudicial Admissions are admissible if they conform to the following requirements: 1. voluntary 2. made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel 3. express 4. in writing As applied to this case: When Domantay was brought to the police station, he was already a suspect. Thus, he was already under custodial investigation. Therefore, the protection accorded by the constitutional provision applies to him. Though Domantay waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. The doctrine of fruit of the poisonous tree applies. The extra-judicial confession and the bayonet are both inadmissible. On the admissibility of the testimony of radio reporter, Manuel: This extra-judicial confession is admissible. Confessions to newsmen are not covered by the protection. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual (People v. Andan). Further, there is no evidence to police beat reporter. There is no acting for the police or that the under circumstances where it is confessed to the killing out of fear. show that Manuel was a showing that Manuel was interview was conducted apparent that Domantay

On the defense of alibi: Defense of alibi fails! The trial court correctly rejected such defense. The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. o It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991. PEOPLE v. DOMANTAY FACTS: Bernardino Domantay was found guilty of raping and killing a six-year old girl, Jennifer Domantay. Relation: cousin of the victims grandfather The police, SPO1 Espinoza investigated Domantay. He apprised Domantay of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangansinense. SPO1 Espinoza testified (over the defenses objection) that Domantay agreed to answer the questions even in the absence of counsel. Domantay confessed to killing Jennifer and that he had given the fatal weapon, a bayonet, to the Casingal spouses. The weapon was thereafter recovered. This confession was not reduced in writing. Celso Manuel also testified (over the defenses objection) that Domantay also made an extrajudicial confession to him. It was recorded on tape as Manuel is a radio reporter. Again, no lawyer was present as this extra-judicial confession was taking place. Complaint: rape with homicide TC: Domantay is guilty of rape with homicide. SC: Domantay is guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. ISSUES:

Also, Domantays extra-judicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely the victims death (Rule 133.3). On the aggravating circumstance of abuse of strength: The victim was only six years old, standing 46. It is clear that she could not have put up much of a defense against Domantays assault, the latter being a fully grown man of 29 years. Further, Domantay had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to have any. On the aggravating circumstance of cruelty:

The victim sustained 38 stab wounds. However, the number of stab wounds is not a test for determining whether there was cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. TEST: Whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victims suffering. There must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before the accused rendered the blow which snuffed out his life. On the alleged rape: There was no sufficient evidence to hold Domantay guilty of raping the victim. True, the physician found that the right side of the victims hymen had been completely lacerated while the surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. However, it was established that the laceration could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ (e.g. fingers). It was also shown by the physical position of the victim when she was found. There was a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her shorts. As Domantay would naturally have to pull down the victims lower garments in order to consummate the rape, then he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the victims shorts and undergarments after the alleged rap, otherwise, the victims shorts would not have been stained so extensively. PEOPLE v. MANTUNG - Automatic Review; RTC; found accused Mantung guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Robbery w/ Homicide; Imposed max penalty of Death FACTS: 1. Employees Maribel and Renjie of the Cebuana Lhuiller Pawnshop (Maywood, BF Paraaque branch), Mayola and Balderas, were found dead inside the pawnshop w/ gunshot wounds on their heads. Taken from the shop were cash and jewelries. 2. Accused Mantung was then the guard on duty. Upon discovery of the crime, he was nowhere to be found. But a letter, addressed to the district manager, was found at the crime scene it was written by Mantung in Filipino; he wrote that he killed Maribel and Renjie because they gave him pork w/c his Moslem religion prohibited him from eating. 3. Authorities searched for him and he was arrested w/o warrant in Sultan Kudarat, Cotabato. Part of the loot was discovered in his possession. 4. After his arrest, Mantung was immediately brought to Paranaque where he was presented to the media at a press conference called by Mayor Joey Marquez. 5. At the said conf, when Mayor Marquez asked Mantung if he was the one who killed the 2 pawnshop employees, he answered in the affirmative and said that he killed them because the victims had induced him to eat pork. 6. News reports about Mantungs admission appeared in the Phil Daily Inquirer and the Mla Bulletin the next day. 7. During the trial, the prosecution presented as evidence the clippings of these reports and pictures of the press conference.

RATIO:

Rule: The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard. Case at Bar:

Although the clippings of the news articles reporting Mantungs confession are indeed hearsay evidence as the writers of the same were not presented to affirm the veracity of the reports, the prosecution nevertheless presented Ricardo Diago, an employee of Cebuana Lhuiller who was at the press conference, as rebuttal witness to prove that accused-appellant indeed claimed responsibility for the killings. Since Diagos testimony was based on his own personal knowledge about the proceedings during the press conference, his affirmation of Mantungs incriminating statements is admissible as evidence against the latter.

ISSUE 2: WON the extrajudicial statements are admissible in evidence when such was made without the assistance of counsel. HELD: YES. RATIO: People v. Andan:

The Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.

8.

Diago, an employee of the pawnshop who was present during the said conference, testified to the testimony of Mantung during the press con.

The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence, we hold that appellants confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court. Never was it raised during the trial that Mantungs admission during the press conference was coerced or made under duress. As the records show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the statements in response to Mayor Marquez question as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung answered in the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because they made him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt compelled to own up to the crime. Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether any participation in the robbery and killings but he did not; thus, accused-appellant sealed his own fate. People vs. Montiero: a confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.

ISSUE 1: WON the admission during the press con called by Mayor Marquez that he killed the victims because they made him eat pork was competent evidence that supports his conviction. HELD: YES.

Section 3 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court prescribe that an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.

Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. In this case, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the corpus delicti was convincingly established by the prosecution. First, it was proven that a robbery with homicide was committed at the Maywood Branch of the Cebuana Lhuiller Pawnshop on August 10, 1996. Second, the concatenation of circumstantial evidence, coupled with the extrajudicial confession of the accused established beyond reasonable doubt that Mantung committed the crime. LADIANA v. PEOPLE

persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, with intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.

1.

During his arraignment, petitioner pled not guilty Prosecution presented 5 witnesses, the ff are their testimonies: CARIDAD MARGALLO SAN JUAN o She is the wife of Francisco San Juan, the victim

The Constitution bars the admission in evidence of any statement extracted by the police from the accused without the assistance of competent and independent counsel during a custodial investigation. However, a counter-affidavit voluntarily presented by the accused during the preliminary investigation, even if made without the assistance of counsel, may be used as evidence against the affiant. FACTS: Petition for Review, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan o WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOSUE R. LADIANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide Petitioner was originally charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan o However, the anti-graft court issued an Order, noting that "besides the allegation that the crime was allegedly committed by the accused while he was taking advantage of his official position, nothing else is in the Information to indicate this fact so that, as the Information stands, nothing except a conclusion of fact exists to vest jurisdiction in this Court over the accused and over the crime for which he is charged. o The Order gave the government sufficient time to amend the Information to show adequate facts to vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over the case. Amended Information, still charging petitioner with murder, was filed: o That on or about the 29th day of December 1989, in the Municipality of Lumban, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the safety of

2.

3.

Francisco was the Barangay Captain of Barangay Salac o She was in her house when an unidentified woman came and told her that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana. o She was aware that her husband was killed by accused Ladiana because this was what the woman actually told her. Moreover, accused Ladiana had given himself up to the police authorities. o She was in her house and that she did not hear any gunshot between 10:30 and 11:00 oclock a.m. Also admitted she did not witness the killing of her husband. o Her husband was with his close friend, a certain Rodolfo Cabrera, and some other persons, and that they went to Jacinto Street to repair the steel humps which were used to block the street during school days for the protection and safety of the school children. PO2 LEOPOLDO DE RAMOS CACALDA, JR. o He is a policeman assigned at the Lumban Police Station o At around 11:00 oclock a.m., somebody, whose name he could no longer recall, reported to him about an existing trouble along Jacinto Street, he responded by going to the scene, where he was accompanied by Alberto Mercado, a member of the CAGFIL. He saw the lifeless body of Francisco lying face up on the road. He did not examine the body of Francisco. He left the place of the incident when SPO2 Gabinete and other policemen subsequently arrived. o Gathered from the people milling around the body of Francisco that it was accused Ladiana who shot and killed Francisco. He was told that Ladiana had already left. Because of this development, Cacalda proceeded to accused Ladianaa house but was told that he had already gone to the police station. Cacalda accordingly went to the police station where he saw accused Ladiana already locked inside the jail. He also saw a stab wound on accused Ladianas right bicep but he did not anymore ask him how he sustained the said injury. DR. ROGELIO JAVAN y MAGRACIA o He is a physician and the Municipal Health Officer

o o

o o

Performed the necropsy on the cadaver of Francisco and prepared the corresponding reports Assailant must be behind the victim when he inflicted Gunshot wound A. As regards Gunshot wound C, the assailant likewise must be behind the victim, at a distance of more than 24 inches away. He was not able to retrieve any bullet during the examination. Gunshot wound A could have been fired first because the trajectory is on the same level that the assailant and the victim could have been both

4.

5.

standing. Gunshot wound C could have been inflicted while the victim was already falling down. Stressed that both wounds are fatal in nature. SPO2 PERCIVAL AMBROSIO GABINETE o Testimony of Gabinete was subsequently dispensed with, upon the admission of the defense that he was part of the group of policemen who proceeded to the place of the subject incident and that he found the body of Francisco lying along the road. MARIO TALAVERA CORTEZ o He is a retired Assistant Prosecutor of Laguna o Emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. He would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit. Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez, the defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. o In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in selfdefense as Francisco was then purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm of accused Ladiana. On August 20, 1996 Ladiana filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence dated August 16, 1995, claiming that: (i) a review of the documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution allegedly failed to show that the accused is guilty of the offense charged; (ii) at best, the evidence submitted by the prosecution are allegedly hearsay in character, considering that the supposed eyewitness in the person of Rodolfo Cabrera was never presented in court; and (iii) the prosecution was allegedly merely able to prove the fact of death of the victim, but not the identity of the person who caused said death. On August 23, 1996, this Court issued an Order holding that the filing of a demurrer to evidence is no longer appropriate considering that accused Ladiana received a copy of this Courts resolution dated May 31, 1995 on the admission of the prosecutions documentary exhibits as early as May 25, 1995. In view of his perception that the evidence submitted by the prosecution is allegedly inadequate to sustain a conviction, accused Ladiana, through counsel, waived his right to present controverting evidence. Instead, he asked for time to file a written memorandum. Thus, both parties were given time within which to do so, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Sandiganbayan ruled: o Prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. o That his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death, may be used as evidence against him. o It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the CounterAffidavit. o The document had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. o However, it found no evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.

ISSUES AND RATIO: (1) WON the Counter-Affidavit executed during the preliminary investigation of this case is admissible proof showing his complicity in the crime? (TOPIC) YES Resolution of this case hinges mainly on the admissibility of the Counter-Affidavit submitted by petitioner during the preliminary investigation

Argues that no counsel was present when the Affidavit was executed. Cites the Art III Consti: SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. It is well-settled that the foregoing legal formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to extra-judicial confessions or admissions obtained during custodial investigations. The rights enumerated in the constitutional provision exist only in custodial interrogations, or in-custody interrogation of accused persons. o Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. o In the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent and independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. SC says no. o A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. A person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial investigation. o SC: A defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation. o His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutors office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under custodial interrogation laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution [now Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason that he is no longer under custodial interrogation. Even in the absence of counsel, the admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not violative of his constitutional rights. o It was not exacted by the police while he was under custody or interrogation. However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor -unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These include:

(1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; (2) the right not to have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; (3) the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution; and (4) while testifying, the right to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.

o o

We do not agree with the Sandiganbayans characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him. In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. o Thus, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession. The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the victim when the latter was attacking him. o [K]aya itong si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan; o Petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led to the latters death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him. We do not doubt the voluntariness of the CounterAffidavit. o Petitioner himself submitted it to the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and originally relied upon in his defense. In general, admissions may be rebutted: o By confessing their untruth or o By showing they were made by mistake.

PJ GARCHITORENA: Well, he will identify the person who took the oath before him. Will you deny that it was your client who took the oath before the Fiscal at the preliminary investigation? ATTY. ILAGAN: We will admit that, your Honor. PJ GARCHITORENA: So in that case we will have no question about the authorship, authenticity and the voluntariness of the execution of the counteraffidavit dated July 31, 1990? Companiero? ATTY ILAGAN: Admitted, your Honor.

The admissions of petitioner made through his counsel cannot be any clearer. In the conduct of their case, clients are bound by the actions of their counsels, save when the latters negligence is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the former are deprived of their day in court. o Also, clients, being bound by the actions of their counsels, cannot complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had their lawyers proceeded differently. o A counsel may err as to the competency of witnesses, the sufficiency and the relevance of evidence, the proper defense, the burden of proof, the introduction or the withholding of witnesses or pieces of evidence, or the manner of arguing the case. o This Court, however, has ruled several times that those are not even proper grounds for a new trial, unless the counsels incompetence is so gross that the clients are prevented from fairly presenting their case. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. o Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration. o The declarations contained in his Counter-Affidavit are admissions that may be used as evidence against him. The Sandiganbayan did not unfairly presume that he had indeed raised the theory of self-defense, because this argument had already been laid out in his Counter-Affidavit. No presumption was necessary, because the admission was clear and unequivocal. Neither do we believe petitioners claim that the antigraft court miserably failed to give equal effect or treatment to all the allegations found in the CounterAffidavit choosing deliberately and without reasonable basis the parts which are incriminating in character, and ignoring without sufficient legal basis the exculpatory assertions of the accused. o The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated statements of petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are utterly insufficient to discharge his burden of proving that the act of killing was justified. o It is hornbook doctrine that self-defense must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained if it is uncorroborated by any separate and competent evidence, and it is also doubtful. The question whether the accused acted in self-defense is

The party may also establish that the: Response that formed the admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or Admission was made in ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Admissions made under oath, as in the case at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing a mistake. Petitioner contends that nowhere in the transcripts of this case can it be found that he has admitted to the authorship, the authenticity or the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. The proceedings in the Sandiganbayan show otherwise:

essentially a question of fact properly evaluated by the lower court; in this case, the Sandiganbayan. By itself, the Counter-Affidavit miserably fails to establish the requisites of self-defense enumerated in the law. o Had petitioner been more vigilant in protecting his rights, he could have presented clear and cogent evidence to prove those elements. o But, as found by the court a quo, he not only failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense; he did not even bother to present any evidence at all. o So, we do not see how the Sandiganbayan could have been selective in its treatment of his CounterAffidavit. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proving the existence of self-defense or of any other circumstance that eliminates criminal liability, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission of the killing. o Upholding this principle does not in any way violate his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. When he admitted to having killed the victim, the burden of proving his innocence fell on him. It became his duty to establish by clear and convincing evidence the lawful justification for the killing. Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent of the crime charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. o The fact of death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.

allegedly told by other people that he had already gone to the police station. o There is no showing that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing. The accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. o In the absence of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. PEOPLE v. ALING

parricide case: Norija Mohamad (Nori) was stabbed by her husband she died 2 days later in the hospital Girlie Aling, relative of Airol Aling, stated in her affidavit that she and Darla Aling (Norija's daughter) brought the victim to the hospital & learned from the police that Norija was stabbed by her husband Airol Aling was investigated by the police - he declared in the Chavacano dialect that he killed his wife o That he was an escapee from San Ramon Prison & Penal Farm (serving sentence for robbery w frustrated homicide) o He proceeded to his dads hse & saw Nori who saw him & ran away o Armed w a bolo wc he was carrying, he chased her & started stabbing her she fell down & he left 2 policemen in their affidavit, affirmed that Aling admitted to Sgt Macrobon, in their presence, that he stabbed his wife bec she had been w other men Aling charged w parricide he pleaded guilty On the witness stand, Aling admitted that he killed Nori & that he admitted this, despite knowledge of the penalty for parricide, bec it was the truth o He said that he understood that by pleading guilty he could be sentenced to death or reclusion perpetua because he was an escaped convict o He wasnt coerced nor cajoled into pleading guilty

(2) WON the Sandiganbayan erred in denying his Motion for Leave to File a Demurrer to Evidence? NO Prior leave to file a demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. And, unless there is grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial, the trial courts resolution may not be disturbed. (3) WON he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? NO He argues that two of the prosecution witnesses testified that he had surrendered to the police authorities after the shooting incident. o Contends that the main reason for his voluntary surrender is that he sincerely believe[d] that he was legally justified in defending himself as a policeman when he fought the victim after he was attacked by the latter. o This statement only reaffirms the admissions contained in his Counter-Affidavit, which he so vehemently tried to discredit. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested, (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent, and (3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are statements made by 2 prosecution witnesses that they were

He Identified his signature in his confession wc was sworn to before the clerk of court TC: guilty! Death penalty! 12k indemnity to heirs of Nori Counsel of Aling: marriage wasnt indubitably proven o testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against his penal interest o it was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage" (S5, R131 ROC)

I: WON the marriage was sufficiently proven. It was Aling alluded in his testimony to his father-in-law = this implies that the deceased was his lawful wife o fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison & her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status I: WON the accused understood the nature & effect of a plea of guilty. YES

record shows that the Trial judge took pains to follow the rule that in case a plea of guilty is entered in a capital case, evidence should be received in order to leave no room for reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and that he had full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his plea of guilty (Ppl vs. Duaban) HERE, the arraignment was postponed 3x in order to enable his counsel to confer with him and explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty o The accused testified & his confession & the affidavit of the policemen who investigated him were presented in evidence

I: WON the crime shld be mitigated by his plea of guilty & lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong & bec hes a non-Christian. NO.

He is a quasi-recidivist & the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism cant be offset by generic investigating circumstances fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and incorrigibility being a non-Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense he understood the gravity of the crime, having obtained some education

HELD: Sentenced to reclusion perpetua (lacked 1 vote for death penalty)