DYING DECLARATION PEOPLE v.

MOLAS FACTS:

1.

Josue Molas was charged with murder for killing 2 women and an 8 year old child. 2. the two women were his girlfriend, Dulcesima Resonable and her mom, Soledad; while the 8 year old child was Dulcesimas younger bro, Abelardo. 3. Upon arraignment, Molas pleaded not guilty. 4. what happened was that when Bernardo (the gfs dad) went home from the farm, he saw his son at the doorway covered with blood. 5. Important fact: Abelardo, (the 8 year old son) told his dad that it was Josue Molas who did the stabbing and that his mom and sister were stabbed as well 6. He found the lifeless body of his daughter Dulce in a dried carabao mud pool some three (3) arms-lengths from his house. He carried her into the house and looked for his wife whose corpse he found near the bench by the door of the house 7. He ran to report the matter to the barangay captain (Labe) and sought help from the authorities in the municipal building of Valencia. 8. Meanwhile, Abelardo was brought to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital by his brother Nicolas, who lived in a house on higher ground. Abelardo expired the next day. 9. Molas surrendered to the patrolman Geronimo. And also surrendered the knife he used. He was then jailed. 10. The next morning, after he was informed of his Constitutional rights, Molas refused to give any statement to the police 11. Important fact: However, on March 10, 1983, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, the station investigator at the Valencia Police Station, took down the sworn statement which Molas freely and voluntarily gave with the assistance or presence of counsel.

knife, held it, and shouted to Nicolas Resonable for help, but nobody responded. Suddenly, he heard a voice coming from behind the store saying: "Don't shout, Bay, if you don't want to die!" When he looked, he saw three (3) unidentified persons chasing him. During his flight, he stumbled and injured his middle and small fingers with the hunting knife in his hand. He then went home to tell his mom. After that he went to the police station to surrender. While Patrolman Renzal was investigating him, Patrolman Geronimo Vallaga arrived and informed Renzal that Abelardo Resonable tagged Molas as the killer of his mother and his sister so that he was put in the Pamplona Municipal jail. 16. Molas admitted having signed an affidavit on March 10, 1983 but he denied knowing its contents because it was written in English and allegedly was not translated to him.

17. RTC

convicted MOlas. His testimony is riddled with inconsistencies. He could not explain, during crossexamination, why he did not shout for help when he was chased by "unidentified persons," and why he "forgot" to tell his mother that Abelardo Resonable, his future brother-in-law, was also wounded. 18. Molas appealed. ISSUES: 1. WON RTC erred in admitting as evidence against him his extra-judicial confession which was executed without the assistance of counsel, as required by the Constitution NO. though the court said that the extrajudicial confession was really inadmissible. The reason given by court here was on a different ground. 2. WON RTC erred in giving full faith and credit to the dying declaration of Abelardo Resonable NO. RATIO: 1. Issue #1

12. In the sworn statement, Molas said that when he went to

his gfs house, he saw the mom who told him It's good that you have arrived, no one can stop me if I kill my own daughter (in bisaya dialect). The mom then boxed her daughter so Molas tried to stop the mom. But the mom then boxed him then again the daughter. Molas then grabbed the weapon in his waist and stabbed the mom. Abelardo, the younger brother, boxed Molas buttock so Molas also stabbed the child. Dulcesima, the gf, told MOlas How could you do this to my parent, kill me also so we'll all die together (in bisaya dialect) So Molas killed her as well. 13. Molas signed his confession before Judge Celso P. Tayrosa of the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia after the latter and Sgt. Rito Patron, had translated the contents of his affidavit into the Cebuano dialect. Molas did not object to any of the contents of his affidavit as translated. He signed the document willingly, after which the judge affixed his own signature thereon. 14. BUT!! During the trial, Molas, testifying as the lone witness in his own behalf, spun a different tale

2.

While it is true that the appellant's extrajudicial confession was made without the advice and assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible as evidence, it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused (People vs. Carido, 167 SCRA 462; People vs. Feliciano, 58 SCRA 383; People vs. Fontanosa, 20 SCRA 249). The Valencia Police Station investigator, Patrolman Paquito Fetalvero, testifying before the trial court on October 16, 1984, quoted the admissions of the accused. The trial court, which observed his deportment on the witness stand, found him credible.

15. During

the trial, MOlas said that when he arrived at the store of the mom, he saw the dead body of Dulcesima beside the dried mud pool and believing she is still alive asked day what is this. There was no response. He saw the mom leaning on the wall and asked her as well. Again there was no response. . He discovered that Soledad was wounded in the neck and bathed with blood. Then he heard someone moaning. He got a lamp and saw his future brother-in-law, Abelardo, under a table, still alive, with a hunting knife stuck in his back. He pulled out the

Issue # 2 1. Abelardo's statement that it was Josue Molas who inflicted his injuries and also stabbed his mother and sister was given to his father, while he (Abelardo) lay at death's door, bleeding from stab wounds in his colon and spinal cord, as a result of which he expired a few hours later. It was indubitably a dying declaration. 2. To be admissible, a dying declaration must: (Requisites) a) concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; b) that at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of impending death; c) that he was a competent witness; and d) that his declaration is offered in evidence in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the declarant is the victim (Sec. 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court; People vs. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427).

**All of these circumstances were Abelardo made his dying declaration.

present

when

b.

** At any rate, the trial court did not rely solely on the extrajudicial confession of the accused. Even if that confession were disregard, there was more that enough evidence to support his conviction. His act of giving himself up to the police of Pamplona with the murder weapon, his blood-stained clothing at the time of the surrender only hours after the killings, Abelardo's dying declaration, and the testimonies of the policemen in the police stations in Pamplona and Valencia to whom he admitted his guilt constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was he who murdered Abelardo, Dulcesima and Soledad Resonable. ** While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted several mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also present when he hacked eight-year old Abelardo and also Dulcesima who, besides being a woman of lesser strength was unarmed. PEOPLE v. MOLO FACTS: Dominador Molo was found guilty of the murder of Venancio Gapisa. Gapisa was hacked with a bolo while he was asleep. The 1. 2. 3. 4. trial court gave credence to the following testimonies: the victims wife, Simeona (eye and ear witness) the victims son, Alejandro (dying declaration) Alejandros neighbor, Roman Mangaring (dying declaration) Dr. Victorio Benedicto (autopsy)

LAYING THE PREDICATE: It is contended that inconsistencies exist between Simeonas statement given to the police and her testimony, relative to (1) the precise moment when Simeona recognized the accuse and (2) whether there was a conversation between Simeona and the accused.

The records show that the alleged statement given to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to Simeona in order to enable her to explain the discrepancies, if any. Thus, the proper basis (predicate) not laid to impeach Simeonas testimony on the basis of the alleged inconsistencies.

c.

DYING DECLARATION: The ante-mortem statements of Gapisa to Alejandro and Mangaring are dying declarations.

Considering the nature and extent of his wounds, Gapisa must have realized the seriousness of his condition. It can be inferred that he made the incrimination under the consciousness of impending death. On the aggravating circumstance of dwelling: The killing was done in Gapisas house, without provocation on the victims part. On the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and reiteration: Molo had been previously convicted of murder, frustrated murder, grave slander, less serious physical injuries, qualified trespass to dwelling and robbery. On the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender: Molo did not surrender to the authorities. He was arrested by a combined force of policemen and Philippine Constabulary agents at his residents the day after the killing. PEOPLE v. BAUTISTA FACTS: 1. Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of murder by the RTC- Dagupan City.

TC: Molo is guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, recidivism and reiteration with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. SC: Molo is guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, recidivism absent the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. ISSUES:

2.

1.

Is Molo guilty of murder? YES.

a. b. c. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Was Molo positively identified? YES. Can Simeonas testimony be impeached for being inconsistent with the statement she previously gave the police? NO, Rule 132.13 was not followed. Is Gapisas ante-mortem declaration? YES. statement a dying

Is the circumstance of dwelling present? YES. Is the circumstance of recidivism present? YES. Is the circumstance of reiteration present? YES. Is voluntary surrender present? NO.

Conviction based on the ff circumstantial evidence: a. Testi of Peralta: he saw accused holding a gun at the night of the killing and about the same time thereof while on the road walking near the house of the victim, a w/c place he heard a burst of a gun and that he met the accused and accused was carrying a firearm b. Testi of cheating wife, Leticia: she saw accused standing near her husband abt 2m away; accused was holding a gun and the gun was still pointed to the deceased while he was sprawled on the ground and that accused immediately ran away when she had seen him c. When accused was invited to the police HQ, accused went w the police willingly and during the investigation, it was found that accused was the one who killed Bandarlipe In this appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in failing to consider and take into account the dying declaration made by the deceased victim and in not acquitting him. Among the persons who rushed the victim to the hospital was Jose Gagaza, Jr, who in the police blotter said that when he accompanied the victim Cipriano Bandarlipe at

RATIO: On the crime of murder: a. True, there seems to be no motive for the murder, however, Molos identity as the assailant was established by Simeonas testimony (there were reproductions of the testimony in the original case).

3. 4.

5.

the hospital, the victim stated that he was shot by one Domy Feriamil1. The Supreme court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court convicting him of murder not because of the victims dying declaration but because of the loopholes in the statements of witnesses for the prosecution. The Court, however, correctly rejected the ante mortem statement of the victim because the person who allegedly heard the victims ante mortem statement was never presented in court to testify on the matter.

the witness who heard the same or to whom it was made. The entry of the same statement in the police blotter alone will not suffice to confer upon it the desired evidentiary weight.

6.

Entries in police blotters are only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. PEOPLE v. TOLEDO

7.

The Court doubted the credibility of the victims wife who allegedly saw appellant shot his husband. According to the Court, if it were true that she actually saw her husband being shot by appellant, or that her dying husband told her that it was appellant who shot him, the Court cannot understand why she did not report what she saw and heard to the barangay officials who responded to her shouts for help, and, why she was reluctant to file a complaint against the gunman whom she allegedly saw had shot her husband. 8. The facts show that it was not until about ten (10) months later that she executed a sworn statement pointing to appellant as the assailant of her husband. 9. Her acts, according to the Court, were contrary to the natural tendency of a witness closely related to the victim, to report a crime and describe the malefactor at the earliest opportunity. 10. Considering the apparent unreliability of the evidence proffered by the prosecution, the Court was constrained to rule for the acquittal of the appellant. ISSUE: WON the statement in the police blotter that the victim identified Domy Feriamil as his assailant constituted a dying declaration that should have been given due evidentiary weight. HELD: NO. RATIO:

Dying declaration

aka ante mortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis,

Requisites for Admissibility: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4) that the declaration is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry. In the case at bar

FACTS: This is an appeal taken by Eugenio Toledo from a judgment of the CFI of Mindoro, finding him guilty of the crime of homicide Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro o On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. o They engaged in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Morales, who was killed almost instantly. o Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. o From there Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Morales fought. o About one month later, Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight. Disputable point: whether Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Morales o Testified to the presence and participation of Toledo o Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. The theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house. o To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. o The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan. Exhibit 1, originally in Tagalog, translated: AFFIDAVIT Sisenando Holgado, married, of legal age, and resident of this municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro, P. I., after being sworn in accordance with law, state the following: My additional homestead situated in Calingag was cleaned by me and is at present planted with palay (rice), on which I also plant hemp, but the hemp planted by my workers is frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales who claims that said land is his, whereas when I was cleaning said land nobody objected to it, but now that it is already cleaned, Filomeno Morales says that one-half of the land occupied by me is his; for this reason I decided to see Filomeno Morales about this matter and when I talked to him this morning (Wednesday) at about nine o'clock, at the hemp plantation of Victorio Saudan situated in Calingag, he told me that if I should plant there anything he would cut my neck, and to this I answered that if he was going to cut my neck we would fight and thereupon he stabbed me with a penknife and then I slashed at him; after this we separated, and went to Dalmacio Manlisic's house. When we fought, there was nobody present.

trial court correctly rejected statement of the victim.

the

ante

mortem

TOPIC! It has been held that if the dying declaration was made orally, it may be proved by the testimony of
1

Records show that Jose Gagaza, Jr., the person who allegedly heard the victims ante mortem statement, was never presented in court to testify on the matter.

Feriamil appears to be the kabit of victims wife and the employer of accused; accused actually raised the defense of frame up alleging that he caught the accused and the wife of the victim in a woman on top positionto corroborate that, he presented the wifes pink panty w/ the name Letty Bandarlipe embroidered on it, w/c she inadvertently left in her haste to leave. Motive #2 for frame up Feriamil refused to give accused his share in the proceeds of the sale of tobacco. Syempre, he threatened to reveal the illicit affair

Question by president: When you went to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic, did you not meet anybody before reaching said house? Answer: I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic. Question by president: How do you know that the hemp you planted on your land above-mentioned was frequently uprooted by Filomeno Morales? Answer: Because he said as to my worker named Eulogio Supleo. Question by president: Do you have anything more to say about the incident? Answer: No more. In testimony of all that I stated above, I signed this document in the presence of two witnesses and then swore to it in the presence of the municipal president here at Pinamalayan, Mindoro, this June fifteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-seven. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in not admitting in evidence Exhibit 1? YES. RATIO: 3 Different POVs: 1st POV: Acquittal of Toledo no discussion on admissibility of Exhibit 1 The Chief and Mr. Justice Villamor Refrain from all discussion relative to admissibility of Exhibit 1. Confining themselves exclusively to an analysis of the evidence other than Exhibit 1, they find that Eugenio Toledo has not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In reality, there being but one witness for the prosecution who, on account of her relations with Filomeno Morales, and the land troubles, might be expected to exaggerate, and there being on the contrary exculpatory evidence for the defense, even without Exhibit 1, the Government has not made out its case. 2nd POV: Toledo Not Guilty Exhibit 1 should be admitted as part of res gestae Justices Romualdez and Villa-Real Exhibit 1 should have been admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae Exhibit 1 was made by Sisenando Holgado on the same morning that the fight occurred and without the interval of sufficient time for reflection. The declaration of Sisenando Holgado fulfilled the test of the facts talking through the party and not the party talking about the facts. There was such a correlation between the statement and the fact of which it forms part as strongly tends to negative the suggestion of fabrication or a suspicion of afterthought. The nature and circumstances of the statement do not disclose intrinsic evidence of premeditation as revealed in a long, coherent, closely connected story. The modern tendency is toward the extension of the rule admitting spontaneous declarations to meet the needs of justice when other evidence of the same fact cannot be procured. 3rd POV: Acquittal of Toledo Exhibit 1 should have been admitted Justices Street, Malcolm, and Ostrand The court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as the statement of a fact against penal interest. The case calls

for an examination of the right of the courts to receive in evidence documents of the character of Exhibit 1. Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, is excluded by courts in the US that adhere to the principles of the common law. o One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. o Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. o But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine. A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when there are no other eyewitnesses." o But the person accused of a crime, under the same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. o Again admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but not against a penal interest. o We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the truth in the other instance. o Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that in the second. The principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. o Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. o They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth. o "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. o I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. o Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts. Professor Wigmore: o PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; Statement of Fact against Penal Interest, excluded; Confessions of Crime by a Third Person. - It is today commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many judges, that the interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. o All such statements, in that they concerned matters prejudicial to the declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule. o Any statement by a person "having no interest to deceive" would be admissible. o Principle that all declarations of facts against interest (by deceased persons) were to be received.

But in 1884, in a case in the House of Lords, a backward step was taken and an arbitrary limit put upon the rule. It was held to exclude the statement of a fact subjecting the declarant to a criminal liability, and confined to statements of facts against either pecuniary or proprietary interest. This cannot be justified on grounds of policy. The only plausible reason of policy that has ever been advanced for such a limitation is the possibility of procuring fabricated testimony to such a admission if oral. This is the ancient rusty weapon that has always been drawn to oppose any reform in the rules of evidence, viz., the argument of danger of abuse. This would be a good argument against admitting any witnesses at all, for it is notorious that some witnesses will lie and that it is difficult to avoid being deceived by their lies. o The only practical consequences of this unreasoning limitation are shocking to the sense of justice; for, in its commonest application, it requires, in a criminal trial, the rejection of a confession, however well authenticated, of a person deceased or insane or fled from the jurisdiction (and therefore quite unavailable) who has avowed himself to be true culprit. The absurdity and wrong of rejecting indiscriminately all such evidence is patent. It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the rule culprit now beyond the reach of justice. The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. o In other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. o So long therefore as a declarant is available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. o Where, however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable, something else is necessary. o One fact which will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

HELD: Toledo should be given the benefit of the reasonable doubt. The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, and as it appears that he is now confined in Bilibid Prison, an order will immediately issue directing his release.