From: OIT-Dispatch, AIRBUS [Airbus.OIT-Dispatch@airbus.

com] Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2009 9:46 PM To: D Bhor (Eng,DEL); Ashwani Acharya (Eng,GBP); BK Bose (Eng,GBP); Sanjeev Grover (Eng,GBP); S C Gupta (Eng,GBP); sisira dash (Eng,DEL); SK Bansal (Eng,GBP) Subject: ATA 34 - Erroneous Radio Altimeter (RA) height indication FROM : AIRBUS CUSTOMER SERVICES TOULOUSE TO : ALL A318/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 OPERATORS

OPERATORS INFORMATION TELEX - OPERATORS INFORMATION TELEX AND FLIGHT OPERATIONS TELEX - FLIGHT OPERATIONS TELEX TO: A318/A319/A320/A321 and A330/340 Operators

SUBJECT: ATA 34 - Erroneous Radio Altimeter (RA) height indication OUR REF: SE 999.0034/09 dated 30 APR 2009 CLASSIFICATION: OPERATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE ADVICE EFFECTIVITY: This OIT/FOT is applicable to all A318/A319/A320/A321 and A330/340 aircraft. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notice: This OIT/FOT covers an operational issue. It is the Operators' responsibility to distribute this OIT/FOT, or the information contained in this OIT/FOT, to all flight crews without delay. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1/ CONTEXT In follow-up to questions received from several Operators, the objective of this OIT/FOT is to remind Operators of the possible consequences of an erroneous Radio Altimeter (RA) height indication. As a reminder, two RAs are installed on the aircraft. These two RAs provide aircraft height above ground to different aircraft systems. * Some aircraft systems, such as AP, A/THR, PFD/ND, WXR radars, FWC, TCAS, receive both RAs but only use one RA. In case of detected failure of one of the RA, the remaining RA is used as a back up. * In AP engagement cases, the active A/THR always uses the same RA as the one that is used by the engaged AP. In dual AP engagement cases, the active A/THR always uses the same RA as the one that is used by the Master AP. * TAWS (EGPWS/ Terrain function of the T2CAS) receive RA 1 only. * All Audio Indicators (Refer to FCOM 1.31.10) based on RA height use RA 1 and

keep RA 2 as back-up in case of detected failure. 2/ OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES / RECOMMENDATIONS 2.1/ Operational consequences: If an RA transmits erroneous height indication, this may have any of the following effects on aircraft systems depending on the flight phase. However, these effects may not necessarily occur in every case of an erroneous RA height indication. * On the Primary Flight Display (PFD), the following effects can be observed: The RA height indication (possibly negative) is frozen and appears in either amber or green depending on the height Discrepancy between both PFDs (RA indications, FD orders, and if both AP engaged, PFD FMAs) * On the System Display (SD) A pulsing Cabin Differential Pressure Advisory appears on CAB PRESS page (No consequence on cabin pressure) * Warnings / Callouts Untimely TAWS (EGPWS/ Terrain function of the T2CAS) alerts Untimely or absence of 'RETARD' callout Untimely 'LANDING GEAR NOT DOWN' warning Absence or interruption of RA automatic callout (height announcement) Activation of 'AUTOLAND' warning light in ILS approach (Refer to FCOM 1.22.30) with AP engaged in LAND or FLARE mode when: * One RA height goes below 200 feet and * The difference between both RA height indications is greater than 15 feet Note: There is no ECAM message or audio warning in association to the AUTOLAND warning light. The AUTOLAND warning can be triggered even if AUTOLAND is not planned. * Auto Flight System (AFS) mode changes (indicated on FMA) 'NAV' mode engagement not possible after take off

During an ILS APPROACH, and depending on the engaged Flight Guidance (FG) modes, the consequences may be: * Untimely/early engagement of the LAND / FLARE / THR IDLE modes if the RA height used by the FG is erroneous and lower than the real height. Note: During ILS approach with AP/ A/THR engaged, THR IDLE (RETARD) mode untimely engagement will be associated with an initial pitch attitude increase due to FLARE mode engagement. * In AUTOLAND, the LAND / FLARE / THR IDLE modes will not engage, if the RA

height used by the FG is erroneous and higher than the real height. * In case of erroneous and very low RA height indication with AP engaged in LOC G/S leading to an early flare engagement and in addition to the above, the consequences will be the following: A318/A319/A320/A321:

* In CONF FULL, the High Angle of Attack autopilot disconnection is not available. If a manual take over is not performed, the angle-of-attack will increase and may reach the stall value. * In configurations other than CONF FULL, the High Angle of Attack autopilot disconnection is available. * Loss of ALPHA FLOOR. * The LOW ENERGY AUDIO WARNING - 'SPEED SPEED SPEED' - remains available. In case of activation of LOW ENERGY AUDIO WARNING, the crew must react as per procedure (QRH 2.03). * In manual flight or after AP disconnection, significant longitudinal sidestick input may be required. A330/A340

* The High Angle of Attack autopilot disconnection is not available. If a manual take over is not performed, the angle-of-attack will increase and may reach the stall value. * Loss of ALPHA FLOOR. * Loss of LOW ENERGY AUDIO WARNING - 'SPEED SPEED SPEED' * In manual flight or after AP disconnection, with high thrust, significant forward longitudinal sidestick input may be required. 2.2/ Operational recommendations: * During all phases of flight, flight crew must monitor and crosscheck all primary flight parameters and the FMA. * During Approach, in the event of any unsatisfactory behaviour, disconnect the AP. Note: If a manual take over is not performed, the angle-of-attack will increase and may reach the stall value depending on flight conditions. Then: * Perform a manual landing AP/FD OFF if sufficient visual references are available, * Or perform a manual go-around. Significant longitudinal sidestick input may be required. * Flight crews must report in the aircraft technical logbook if any of the consequences on aircraft systems due to an erroneous RA height listed in paragraph 2.1 are seen.

3/ MAINTENANCE RECOMMENDATIONS 3.1/ Consequences: In association with the above-noted effects (listed in Part 2.1 of this OIT/FOT), RA fault messages from EFCS may also be recorded in the PFR: RA1/2, source EFCS1/2, Class 2

Note: this PFR message may not necessarily be recorded in every case of an erroneous RA height indication. 3.2/ Recommendations: If flight crews report any consequence (listed in Part 2.1 of this OIT/FOT) due to an erroneous RA height indication: Clean the RA antennas and the adjacent area with cleaning agents (Material N. 11.010) and a lint free cloth If, during any subsequent flight, one or more of the above listed entries is (are) shown in the logbook: * Replace the RA antennas * Inspect the RA antennas coaxial cables. If they are not in correct conditions, repair or replace the defective coaxial cables. These recommendations will be added in new TSM tasks: Task 34-42-00-810-844 (A320 family) or 3442-00-810-862 (A330/340 aircraft). The following issues of the TSMs will be updated to include this information: May 09 Revision (A318/A319/A320/A321) through Temporary Revision July 09 Revision (A330/A340).

You can also refer to TFU 34.42.00.020 (for A320 family) and 34.42.00.022 (for A330/340 family). Note: In case of dispatch with one RA inoperative (under MMEL 34-42-01 Radio Altimeter), do not swap the RA transceiver. 3.3/ Way forward: A new FWC standard is underway, which will improve RA monitoring, to improve detection of anomalies. The new standard will be: FWC F5 (A318/A319/A320/A321) to be certified in June 09. FWC T3 (A330/A340-500/A340-600) to be certified 4th Quarter 09. FWC L12 (A340-200/A340-300) to be certified 4th Quarter 09

4/ FOLLOW-UP PLAN Follow-up of this OIT/FOT will be provided as a result of the on-going investigations. Please submit any questions about the operational recommendations of this

OIT/FOT to: LORRAINE DE BAUDUS / STLS Phone:+33 (0) 5 61 93 11 84 Fax: +33 (0) 5 61 93 29 68 lorraine.de-baudus@airbus.com Fltops.Fbwstd@airbus.com Please submit any questions about the operational recommendations of this OIT/FOT to: SANDRA PREVOT / SEEA4 PHONE: +33 (0)5 61 18 83 19 FAX: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 25 Sandra.prevot@airbus.com Best regards, P. GLAPA Vice President ENGINEERING SUPPORT CUSTOMER SERVICES Capt. Marc PARISIS Head of Flight Operations SUPPORT & SERVICES

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