4.1.6. Vatican II and since.

BORDEYNE, P., L'homme et son angoisse: la théologie morale de Gaudium et

spes, Paris, Cerf, 2004.

FUCHS, J., Le renouveau de la théologie morale selon Vatican II, Tournai,

Desclée et Cie, 1968, 138 pp.

FUCHS, J., Moral Theology according to Vatican II, in: Human Values and
Christian Morality, Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1970, pp. 1-55.

KEENAN, J. F., "Vatican II and Theological Ethics", in: TS, 74(2013)1, 162-190.

McCORMICK, R.A., "The moral theology of Vatican II", in: The Future of Ethics
and Moral Theology, Chicago, Argus, 1968, pp. 7-18.

LOBO, G., Christian Living according to Vatican II, Bangalore, Theological

Publications in India, 1980.

ODOZOR, Paulinus Ikechukwu, Moral Theology in an Age of Renewal: A Study

of the Catholic Tradition since Vatican II, Notre Dame, IN: U. of N.D. Press,
2003, 412 pp.

Vatican II recognized that moral theology, as taught in textbooks, was

sclerotic and in need of profound renewal. In its decree on the training of
priests, the Council briefly reviews the various theological disciplines, and
succinctly indicates the direction in which the desired renewal is to take
place. With regard to moral theology, in an oft-quoted text, it states:

Special care will be taken to perfect moral theology, whose scientific

presentation, more nourished by the doctrine of Sacred Scripture, will
highlight the greatness of the vocation of the faithful in Christ and their
obligation to bear fruit in charity for the life of the world. Optatam totius, no.
16.

The emphasis on the vocation of the faithful is reminiscent of B. Häring's

work. Other elements are more surprising. The Council calls for a "scientific
presentation", even though the relationship between science and morality is
far from self-evident; but it also proposes the use of an analytical rather than
a deductive method. The Council stresses the need for moral theology to be
"nourished by the doctrine of Sacred Scripture". The mention of "doctrine",
which is not the Bible's own mode of expression, may come as a surprise. In
another text, the Council asks "that no one, through inattention to the
evolution of things and through inertia, be content with an individualistic
ethic." (Gaudium et Spes, no. 30). By this he means that the moral life is not
just about ensuring the salvation of the individual; it must also ensure that
everyone is committed to the good of all, to the life of the world, as Optatam
totius puts it. This orientation of Christian morality is radically different from
that of textbooks.

Other contributions of the Council are not spelled out in this text. R.A.
McCormick distinguishes eight, which he calls 'methodological premises'.
Their impact on morality is indeed considerable:

1. theological anthropology: the person at the center of God's plan ;

2. the Church takes into account the historicity of the person;

3. the ecumenical perspective determines reflection;

4. the unifying factor is love (Lumen Gentium 42);

5. the contribution of the empirical sciences is recognized;

6. freedom of research and thought (Gaudium et Spes 62);

7. the competence of lay people;

8. experts must be consulted in their various fields.

These "premises" determine an approach to the problems that is very

different from that of the manuals. Most of them can be found in the
Pontifical Biblical Commission's document Bible et morale. Les racines
bibliques de l'agir chrétien (2008). Moralists initially found it difficult to adopt
these perspectives, and for some time were silenced except on special
issues. After a while, and in order to overcome the unease that reigned in
their discipline after the Council and the publication of Humanae vitae, some
moralists produced new manuals, composed according to plans that differed
to a greater or lesser extent from the classic manuals:

J.-M. AUBERT, Vivre en chrétien au XXème siècle, 2 T., Mulhouse, Salvator,

1976-7.

C. H. PESCHKE, Christian Ethics, 3 volumes, Alcester and Dublin, C. Goodliffe

Neale, 1975-78

B. HÄRING, Free and Faithful in Christ, 3 volumes, Middlegreen, St Paul, 1978-

1981.
A. HERTZ, W. KORFF, T. RENDTORFF, H. RINGELING, eds, Handbuch der
christliche Ethik, 4 volumes, Freiburg, Herder, 1978-1982.

G. V. LOBO, Moral theology today, Bangalore, Theol. Publ. in India, 1982.

T. GOFFI and G. PIANA, Corso di Morale, 4 vols, Brescia, Ed. Rinnovata, 1983-
1989

G. GRISEZ, The way of the Lord Jesus, 3 vols, Chicago, Franciscan Herald
Press, 1983-1997.

T. REY-MERMET, Pour une redécouverte de la morale, Croire, vol.IV, Paris,

Droguet Ardent, 1985.

J.-M. AUBERT, Abrégé de la morale catholique, Paris, Desclée, 1987.

M. VIDAL, Moral Fundamental, 3 vols, Madrid, PS Editorial, 1990.

The latest, in the French-speaking world, are:

BRUGUЀS, Jean-Louis, Précis de théologie morale générale, Paris, Parole et

silence, Collège des Bernardins, 2017, 584 pp. (first edition in two volumes,
1995 and 2003)

CAUSSE, Jean-Daniel, and Denis MÜLLER, eds, Introduction à l'éthique.

Penser, croire, agir, Geneva, Labor et Fides, 2009, 673 pp.

DURAND, Guy, L'éthique, une sagesse en actes. Des fondements aux

questions sociales, Montréal-Paris, Médiaspaul, 2021, 279 pp.

THOMASSET, Alain, Interpréter et agir. Jalons pour une éthique chrétienne,

Paris, Cerf, 2011, 422 pp.

TREMBLAY, Réal, and Stefano ZAMBONI, eds, Fils dans le Fils. Une théologie
morale fondamentale, Paris, Collège des Bernardins, Parole et Silence, 2014,
603 pp.

None of these works, with their diverse orientations, has established itself
with an authority equal to that of the old manuals. One might ask whether it
is possible to take their place, insofar as the manuals sought to prescribe
Christian behavior. From now on, the aim is not so much to prescribe as to
motivate, without lapsing into relativism.

More than fifty years after the Council, it is still not clear what form the
teaching of Christian morality should take. In 1993, John Paul II, who had
been a professor of moral philosophy, published an encyclical on the
Church's moral teaching, Veritatis Splendor, in which he intends to "clarify
certain doctrinal aspects which seem decisive for facing up to what is
undoubtedly a real crisis" (n 5). Biblically inspired chapters frame a
doctrinal reflection, but the harmonization of the two approaches is far from
obvious. Above all, the Pope insists on man's obligation to seek the truth and
submit to it. He stresses that recognition of the value of the person must not
lead to subjectivism, but rather to the realization of man's ultimate end,
which is in God. He does not revert to the textbook method, but draws on
various elements of the theological tradition. Above all, he endeavors to
show that certain paths, on which moralists have embarked, are dead ends.
In conclusion, he points out:

It may seem that Christian morality is in itself too difficult, too hard to
understand and almost impossible to put into practice. This is not true, for, to
express it in the simplicity of evangelical language, it consists in following
Christ, abandoning oneself to Him, allowing oneself to be transformed and
renewed by His grace and mercy, which reach out to us in the life of
communion of His Church (n 119).

Indeed, there may seem to be a wide gap between the growing complexity of
moral issues and biblical teaching. Moral theology certainly still has a long
way to go to bridge the gap that seems to separate the two approaches,
biblical and contemporary.

CONCLUSION

Four major historical stages have been identified, before moving on to

the present day: those of the first centuries, the Penitentials, Scholasticism
and the Manuals. These stages seem to show an alternation in the approach
to morality: the Church Fathers indicate which path to follow to reach
salvation; the Penitentials aim to purify sinners; Scholasticism orients
action towards the end it must find in God; the Manuals specify what
can lead humans to their ruin. In other words, attention shifts twice from
God's gift to man's sin. Another way of presenting this alternation might be
to emphasize the passage from anthropocentrism to theocentrism, as
present in the Bible, from the Pentateuch to the Johannine writings, with all
the intermediate stages. This characterization is obviously reductive: it
highlights only one aspect of a complex moral teaching. It is nonetheless
suggestive, showing how moral teaching can move from one approach to
another. This historical overview raises two questions, concerning the point
of departure and the point of arrival of moral issues.
 For Christians, the starting point is obviously the Bible. Even if, in the
course of history, the moral teaching of the Bible has not been decisive in
the systematization of Christian morality, today the Church must strive to
take it into account. A new approach is needed, one that does not fixate on
laws and commandments. The moral teaching of the Bible has something
else to offer. The influence of the spirit of the times is also evident at every
stage. Already in the Bible, the events that marked the history of the Hebrew
people often gave their teaching particular traits. In the same way, moral
theology at different periods in history has sought to respond to the
problems of the moment, using generally accepted methods. The Fathers
sought to find their bearings in a world in transition, penitentials in the feudal
world, scholasticism in academic thought, while manuals saw the world
under a monarchical regime.

The second question concerns the point of arrival, i.e., how does
Christian moral teaching look today? It's clear that contemporary morality
has turned away from the legalistic approach of textbooks. The democratic
spirit has penetrated morality, subjecting its prescriptions to a popular
assent whose ambiguity is acknowledged, but whose authority is
indisputable. Morality has not adopted the theocentric perspective of the
Bible. The most we can say is that the challenge facing us today is this:
without neglecting the anthropocentric aspects of all morality, is the
Christian faith capable of inspiring theocentric morality? And is it appropriate
to do so, in a world where humanist values are the main focus? What's more,
Christianity's moral claims should not be understood as an effort to impose
itself, but as a proclamation of the very meaning of moral action. The highly
individualized approach to morality has been too partial, focusing attention
on sins and confession (penitentials), finality and virtues (Thomistic
scholasticism), and rules of behavior (manuals). The role of culture, society
and the state was ignored. Today, the community dimension of morality is
strongly emphasized, to the point of sometimes ignoring the individual
dimension. The theological anthropology of Gaudium et Spes makes it
possible to recognize this other dimension of morality, giving it a different
orientation from that of traditional treatises.

The division of history into distinct periods, as shown here, is to some extent
arbitrary. Other divisions are possible. Particular instructions have had a
significant influence, such as Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical Rerum novarum on
the condition of workers, Pius X's 1907 decree Lamentabili on the errors of
modernism, and Paul VI's 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae on birth control.
Moreover, other approaches to Christian morality than those presented here
have existed and still exist: Eastern Christianity, in its various churches,
including the Ethiopian Church and the Church of St. Thomas in India, has
undoubtedly developed its own approaches to Christian morality. The
presentation given here does not capture the full diversity of the Christian
heritage.

As it has been done here, the distinction between periods is, to a

certain extent, arbitrary. Other divisions are possible. Historical events that
have marked certain aspects of Christian morality have not been taken into
consideration. The Lutheran Reformation, for example, had an impact on
moral theology, even if the Counter-Reformation often led to Catholicism
turning in on itself. Events at various points in history, such as wars, have
given the Church's moral teaching of a particular period a character of its
own.

The stages presented do not therefore cover the whole of history, but
are sufficient to show that important changes have taken place in the
presentation of Christian morality. A presentation of morality based on the
commandments, as was the rule in textbooks and still in the Catechism of
the Catholic Church, is not the only one possible: morality was also
presented as the path to salvation, as a pursuit of the ultimate end, the
beatitude to which God calls all human beings. Not only does it denounce
sins, it also strives to build the Kingdom of God, by showing how to attach
oneself to Christ. The rather negative presentation to which Christians had
been accustomed did have a basis in the Bible, which is indeed full of
commandments and condemnations, but an essentially positive presentation
is just as much in line with biblical teaching. Christians should not choose
between these two approaches: the Christian faith offers both, and one
should not exclude the other: each finds in the other correctives that help it
to discern the true face of God, and understand what God expects of human
beings.

Throughout the history of Christianity, thought has mostly developed in

a vacuum. The Church has endeavored to present the moral requirements of
the faith without always being aware of historical developments, although
theological reflection in each period has been expressed within the
frameworks of thought then commonly accepted in Western Europe. In this
way, it came to elaborate complex systems of morality that were supposed
to be universal and unchanging. A discussion of the historicity of these
systems should make us aware that moral reflection is always in motion: on
the one hand, it must always reflect the original inspiration of Christianity; on
the other, it must express itself in the language of its time, and
translate for it the interpellation of God. But it must not appeal too
readily to divine authority. The morality taught by the Church is no more
perfect than biblical morality: it is always in search of greater perfection. In
this search, it is not isolated: it enters into dialogue with the world, but
subjects its contribution to its own purpose, which is to establish the
Kingdom of God. In so doing, it does not distance itself from contemporary
thinking, which in many areas is manifesting a search for a certain
transcendence. To make a turn towards a certain theocentrism possible,
thought must recognize that the exaltation of the human does not make it
necessary to reject God.

The Church's morality cannot present itself as the only one: it must accept
dialogue with other morals. It will continue to claim a particular authority, but
without claiming to judge alone what is the right thing to do. Other moral
authorities also have a role to play, which cannot be ignored. They obviously
do not seek to institute a theocentric morality, but their concern for the
common good dictates precepts that are in harmony with those asserted in
the Kingdom of God. A convergence of morals can be presupposed. We need
to find ways of harmonizing human behavior, and thus return to a certain
moral universalism.

4.2. Culture.

AMALADOSS, M., "Faith and cultures", in: Christus, 38, 1991, 150, pp. 159-
170

BAYILI, B., Culture et inculturation. Approche théorique et méthodologique,

Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008, 305 pp.

BAYILI, B., L'inculturation : chemin d'unité et dialogue de résurrection, Paris,

L'Harmattan, 2008, 467 pp.

BAYILI, B., La tierce Eglise du sud et les défis de l'évangélisation en Europe.

L'inculturation comme chemin de catholicité de l'Eglise une dans la diversité,
Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008, 558 pp.

BERE, Z., "Culture et respect de la personne", in: Annales philosophiques de

l'UCAO, 1, 2004, pp. 115-146.
BUJO, B., "Reconstruire l'Afrique à partir de la culture? Interview with prof. B.
Bujo", in: Telema, n° 114, 2003, 2-3, pp. 53-72.

International Theological Commission, "Faith and inculturation", in; DC, n°

1980, 1989, pp. 281-289; RAT, 13, 1989, 26, pp. 245-263; also on the
Internet.

GALLAGHER, M.-P., Clashing Symbols. An introduction to faith and culture,

London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 1997, 170 pp.

GEERTZ, C., The Interpretation of Cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973,
2000, 470 pp.

HARRISON, L.E., and S.P. HUNTINGTON, eds, Culture Matters. How values
shape human progress, New York, Basic Books, 2000, 348 pp.

KASONGO, M., La philosophie de l'interculturel. Discours et méthodes, Paris,

L'Harmattan, 2020, 158 pp.

MAGESA, L., Anatomy of Inculturation. Transforming the Church in Africa,

Nairobi, Paulines, 2004, 311 pp.

MAJAWA, C.C.A., Integrated Approach to African Christian Theology of

Inculturation, Nairobi, Creations Enterpr. 2005, 448 pp.

MALINOWSKI, B., Une théorie scientifique de la culture (1944), Paris,

Maspero, 1970, 183 pp.

NECKEBROUCK, V., "Inculturation and socio-cultural change. Options

missiologiques et modèles anthropologiques", in: ETL, 74, 1998, 1, pp. 45-77.

RAKOTONDRABE, M., "Aspects de l'histoire de l'inculturation à Madagascar",

in: Aspects du Christianisme à Madagascar, 4, 1992, 8, pp. 339-363.

RANGER, T., "L'invention de la tradition en Afrique", in: HOBSBAWM, E. and T.

RANGER, eds. RANGER, eds, L'invention de la tradition, Paris, Ed. Amsterdam,
2006, 370 pp.

ROEST CROLLIUS, A.A., "What is so new about inculturation? A Concept and

its Implications", in: Gregorianum, 59, 1978, pp. 721-738.

The role of culture in the formulation and transformation of moral

standards has been particularly studied by Kwame Anthony Appiah. Born in
1954 to a Ghanaian father and English mother, he grew up in Ghana, and
defended a philosophy thesis in Cambridge, UK. He has taught at several
American universities, most notably, from 2002 to 2013, at Princeton. Since
2014, he has held the Chair of Philosophy and Law at New York University. He
has been awarded numerous academic distinctions. He describes his
research as experimental philosophy. Some commentators classify his
studies as empirical moral psychology. They could also be considered
sociological studies. In other words, they lie at the crossroads of several
disciplines, which have in common that they study the impact of cultures on
behavior. His latest research focuses on the relationship between theory and
practice in the moral life, and on the way religion is conceived (2016
interview, Wikipedia, external links).

In my Father's House. Africa in the philosophy of culture, Oxford, OUP, 1993,

256 pp.

The Ethics of Identity, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton U.P., 2005, 358 pp.

Cosmopolitanism. Ethics in a World of Strangers, New York, W.W. Norton,

2006 ; tr. fr. Pour un nouveau cosmopolitisme, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2008, 261
pp.

Experiments in Ethics, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P., 2008, 203 pp.

The Honor Code. How Moral Revolutions happen, New York, W.W. Norton,
2010; tr. fr. Le code d'honneur. Comment adviennent les révolutions morales,
Paris, Gallimard, 2012, 271 pp.

As If. Idealization and Ideals, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard U.P., 2017, 218 pp.

The Lies that Bind. Rethinking Identity. Creed, Country, Colour, Class, Culture,
London, Profile Books, 2018, 256 pp.

In his latest works, Appiah sets out to analyze how moral systems
actually work. He recognizes that a purely conceptual logic would be
tempted to establish a hierarchy of different systems: God first, then nature,
then culture, and finally individual consciousness. But he notes that, in fact,
cultural laws are often more binding than religious laws, and can even
impose themselves on the conscience. There is therefore no clear hierarchy
between the different normative systems; the authority accorded to each
depends on personal choice. But the person who makes this choice does so
according to his or her identity, which is marked by his or her culture.
Ultimately, then, culture shapes moral judgment. Yet it has no
institutionalized authority, and should not be regarded as a fixed monument.
If it exerts a great influence, it's because behavior generally depends on
what is commonly considered honorable, proper or decent. More than
conformity to moral rules, the individual attaches decisive importance to
"what will people say? humans observe one another. The word "culture"
designates a community's particular way of conceiving life and living
together, at a given moment in its history.

What one person sees in another is then confronted with three data that are
specific to each individual: his or her talents, the circumstances that
determine his or her life, and his or her own preferences. These factors,
together with the ideals forged by the community, determine how the
individual directs his or her actions.

What morality prescribes above all is the answer to the question: what does
human life need to be successful? The answer, I believe, is that a successful
life is one that succeeds in meeting the challenges posed by our abilities, the
situation into which we were born, and the projects we ourselves have
decided are important.

Kwame Anthony APPIAH, The Lies that Bind. Rethinking Identity, 2018, p.
177.

This remark is made almost incidentally, in the course of a systematic

analysis of important elements in a person's identity definition: beliefs,
nationality, skin color, social class, culture. These elements, which are
essentially social in nature, determine each person's idea of himself or
herself. The personal ideal is thus combined with the cultural ideal: to
succeed in life requires being true to oneself, but the self-fulfilment that each
person pursues is part of a context, which determines what each person can
envisage for himself or herself.

The personal ideal is therefore not purely individual; it is strongly determined

by social and cultural aspirations:

Morality depends on what we believe other people are looking for; it is not a
system of arbitrary requirements. What morality prescribes is above all what
other people want: we all want to make a life for ourselves. This is the end
we humans pursue: to make a good life for ourselves, to achieve eudemony.
But we can't pursue this end without understanding what our nature expects
from our culture. And precisely because making a life is an activity, we
should expect to learn more from experiencing life than from experiencing
philosophy.
Kwame Anthony APPIAH, Experiments in Ethics, 2008, p. 203.

The framework in which Appiah situates morality is thus traditional: the

purpose of moral action, for him, is that already recognized by Aristotelian
eudemonism, which holds that the pursuit of well-being is what gives moral
rules their force. But the efforts made by other people, far more than the
rules formulated by any authority, show how to achieve this well-being.

Appiah notes that conceptions of well-being within a community are

not immutable. To discover what makes them evolve, he undertakes an
analysis of what he calls "moral revolutions". He examines what has led
societies to abandon traditional practices. In this way, he successively
studies "the death of the duel" in England, "the abandonment of foot-binding
in China", "the suppression of the Atlantic slave trade", and "wars against
women", i.e., the murder of "dishonored" women in Italy, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In each case, he describes how the "code of honor" in force in
the society concerned made acceptable and even imposed for a long time a
practice whose immorality was commonly recognized. Today, the practices
he analyzes have largely disappeared, but not because morality or religion
has condemned them; what has been decisive is that the code of honor that
imposed them, i.e., an essentially social code, has lost its credibility.

Appiah highlights, for example, how anti-slavery sentiment spread to

such an extent that the British Parliament voted for abolition (1838), despite
the fact that maintaining the system would have been to the country's
advantage: "Far from being conditioned by British economic interests,
abolition actually worked against them, and this was perfectly understood by
those who championed it" (p.124). Already in the mid-18th century, slavery
was widely considered morally reprehensible in the United Kingdom, by both
religious and anti-religious minds. But it was other arguments that
determined the popular abolitionist movement. The country had lost control
of its American colonies (U.S. Declaration of Independence 1776), which
were claiming their right to freedom. But how could Americans claim their
freedom when they were holding part of their population in slavery? The
British, very proud of their own freedom, were aware of the contradiction.
Moreover, and especially among the workers of the nascent industry, another
argument prevailed: the dignity of work. The working classes were generally
despised. On the other hand, rentiers, who lived off the interest on their
fortunes, enjoyed a certain prestige. And for the workers,

nothing better expressed the idea that work was dishonorable than black
slavery on the plantations of the New World. And work was what defined
them (the workers). Slavery associated the slaves' native alienation and
dishonor with the work they did on the plantations and in the slave factories
of the New World. Its unambiguous meaning was that manual labor was to be
equated with suffering and dishonor. The same term could therefore be used
to refer to the sufferings of those who were not, in the literal sense,
enslaved. K.A. APPIAH, Le code d'honneur. Comment adviennent les
révolutions morales, Paris, Gallimard, 2012, p. 143.

By campaigning for the abolition of slavery, the workers were fighting for the
social valorization of work, particularly manual labor. Although their jobs
depended to a large extent on the importation of cotton produced by slaves,
the workers took a stand in favor of abolition.

A real moral change had thus taken place, caused by cultural factors.
Appiah does not attempt to assess the influence that other factors, such as
religion and morality, may have exerted. Nor does he examine the impact of
encounters with other cultures. But his argument shows that we must not
exaggerate the authority of either morality or religion; they will only be able
to impose their demands if social codes agree with them. Religion alone can
rarely impose moral behavior on an entire social group. It was unable to do
so in the case of slavery, just as it was unable to do so in the case of dueling
or the other practices that Appiah has seen disappear.

This analysis does not lead to the conclusion that the moral authority
of culture must be accepted. On the contrary, Appiah wants this authority to
be questioned: isn't it a major cause of social injustice, and therefore of
numerous conflicts? He gives an example of this in the final chapter of In my
Father's House, where he recounts how he had to go against African
traditions at the funeral of his father, whose last wishes he wanted to honor.
This was a departure from the Ashanti traditions of which his father had been
the guardian, and which the customary authorities wished to observe. Appiah
objected, and as the first heir, he won his case. He believes in going against
cultural requirements:

I'm not the only one to question the obligation to respect cultures, rather
than people; and I believe that we only respect people insofar as we consider
them as abstract right holders.

K.A. APPIAH, The ethics of identity, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton U.P.,
2005, p. XV.

To ground moral imperatives, then, we need to look beyond culture.

Presumably, Appiah is wary of cultural judgments because he is homosexual,
and has faced strong social pressure because of this orientation. On the one
hand, he shows that culture cannot be neglected in the study of morality; on
the other, he emphasizes that his judgments are not incontestable. He
seems to make the same judgment about the influence of religion. Appiah
thus defends the thesis that personal morality is not based on norms
imposed by culture or religion, but in individual motivations. He contrasts
cultural and religious norms with individual choice, which he acknowledges is
strongly influenced by culture.

This position is in line with the way the Christian religion today sees its moral
role, that of shaping the individual conscience. But it's true that for a long
time, religion wanted to impose its morality. Appiah doesn't delve into this
aspect of the problem; rather, his own stance seems inspired by the
American individualism that characterizes his background. It is therefore also
a cultural factor that determines his thesis. But his analysis begs the
question: how do culture, morality and religion relate to each other?
Emphasizing the weight of culture in the formation of morality, as Appiah
does, seems justified at first glance. But to give it a predominant role - which
Appiah himself refuses to do - is not justified, because its contribution to
morality is not like a system external to the person: morality is itself
constitutive of culture, and can change, as culture does, if the person deems
it necessary.

The first studies devoted to culture recognized that it encompasses a

multiplicity of domains, including morality and religion:

The word culture or civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense,

designates that complex whole comprising at once the sciences, beliefs, arts,
morals, laws, customs and other faculties and habits acquired by man in the
social state.

E.T. TYLOR, La civilisation primitive, (1871), Paris, Reinwald et Cie, 1876, p.1.

From then on, culture does not intervene in the constitution of morality from
the outside, but from within a complex system whose different elements are
interdependent. In principle, the Church recognizes this; the Second Vatican
Council acknowledged the importance of this interaction, which had been
generally ignored until then:

In the broadest sense, the word "culture" designates everything by which

man refines and develops the multiple capacities of his mind and body;
strives to subdue the universe through knowledge and work; humanizes
social life, both family life and the whole of civil life, through the progress of
morals and institutions; translates, communicates and finally preserves in his
works, in the course of time, the great spiritual experiences and major
aspirations of man, so that they may serve the progress of many and even of
the whole human race. VATICAN II, Gaudium et spes, 1965, n° 53, 2.

The three terms - culture, morality and religion - do not therefore refer to
autonomous systems. Religion gives this end a universal meaning: it wants
to bear fruit for the salvation of the world. It therefore goes further than
culture: "The Word of God cannot, in fact, be identified or linked exclusively
with the elements of culture which bear it. Culture does not in itself
constitute a framework that can determine the specific features of the
systems it encompasses.

The influence of culture on morality is no less undeniable, but the reverse is

also true: morality exerts an undeniable influence on culture. It exists in its
own right, independently of culture. Like religion, it rejects any identification
with a particular culture: both morality and religion claim a transcendent
dimension. They are thus distinct from culture, which does not accept this
dimension. There are African cultures and Western cultures; morality and
religion do not want to be African or Western. If they sometimes seem to be,
it's because their mode of expression is, but the expression doesn't touch on
what's essential to them. Culture, on the other hand, asserts its particularity;
it underlines its originality, which makes it different from other cultures.

The particularity of each culture lies in the fact that it is made up of a

unique choice of values - material, spiritual, aesthetic and others - to which it
gives access to those who draw inspiration from it. It establishes particular
links between these different values, so that each of them is more or less
dependent on the others. The term "culture" thus designates a certain way of
thinking and acting specific to a social group. It defines a particular identity,
which deserves respect as the common work of a human group, but which
cannot claim to be absolutely self-evident.

Even when it asserts its difference, a culture does not necessarily create
separation, isolation from other cultures. It can do so, as history provides
numerous examples. In Africa, over the last century, the tendency to turn in
on oneself was evident for a time in Sékou Touré's Guinea and Nyerere's
Tanzania. At different times in their history, the Chinese and Japanese
cultures turned in on themselves. After the Second World War, communist
countries such as Albania and China sought to do the same. Withdrawal into
oneself may be necessary to assert one's own identity, but in the long run it
leads to stagnation. The same phenomenon can occur at the individual level.
The Bible gives examples: in the book of Job, his well-meaning friends want
to convince him that he must have done wrong for God to permit his
misfortune. Their type of reasoning, as determined by their culture, did not
allow them to admit his innocence. The Pharisees of the Gospels, likewise,
were so sure that their culture was the one willed by God that they could not
accept Jesus' word. They were thus led to make decisions that they knew
were contrary to the precepts of their own culture. These examples show
that, at both social and individual level, the recognition of other values is
always a challenge, insofar as it implies a questioning of one's own identity.

Particularly in the realm of religion, which affirms what is true, and morality,
which declares what is right, the difficulty is keenly felt. Yet morality and
religion call for conversion rather than withdrawal. Confrontation with
external interpellations, or with ideas or practices of one's own that have
hitherto been ignored or had little influence, can lead to criticism of those
that are current and well-established. As indicated by the expression
"aggiornamento", frequently used at the time of the Second Vatican Council,
or today's "Church of awakening", Christianity can recognize that an element
that has remained ignored or dormant needs to be re-emphasized. As the
Pontifical Biblical Commission has admitted, morality and religion can thus
be brought to significant change. In any case, in today's world, changes are
occurring almost continuously, due to the multiplication of intercultural
contacts. Some are ready to accept them; others are not. For some, novelty
outweighs tradition. For others, it challenges the values established by
tradition. The process is therefore a source of tension:

Changing culture basically means changing the ethical reference system that
sustains a society. It means changing the foundations of the frame of thought
on which the entire social imaginary depends. KA MÄNA, L'Afrique va-t-elle
mourir? Paris, Cerf, 1993, p. 204.

But refusing to accept change, and attempting to immobilize a culture in its

current state at a particular moment in its existence, deprives it of the
dynamism that characterizes living things. Those who lock themselves into
one culture become incapable of recognizing its weaknesses, and of
appreciating the richness of other cultures.

For no cultural system realizes all values to perfection: emphases are placed
on one or the other, and develop one at the expense of the others.
Encounters with other systems can lead those who live in one to look to a
value developed in another, which might give them what they can't find in
their own. And when a new element is introduced, the others have to
reposition themselves. They rarely do so deliberately; they respond on a
case-by-case basis to the interpellations addressed to them. Morality and
religion face such challenges: the introduction of a new value, or simply a
new emphasis, can upset the accepted balance of values. A new balance
must then be found.

Particularly in the fields of morality and religion, changes are normally met
with reluctance. For Catholicism, which has built up a complex body of
doctrine, the elements of which are all interdependent, the integration of
new elements is often difficult. Yet renewal does not mean rejecting the old.
The change of one or even several of its elements does not mean that the
old whole is called into question. The mistake made by fundamentalists of all
kinds is to attach themselves to one or more elements, believing that change
affects the meaning of the whole, when on the contrary it calls for a
reaffirmation of attachment to the basic principles that make it truly unique.
Any change, however limited, requires a return to the source, to the very
foundations of the ancient whole, which is then valued rather than
abandoned.

In terms of moral theology, Appiah's analysis represents a real

challenge. The influence of the "code of honor", or, more generally, of
culture, has been virtually ignored by the theological tradition. Yet it was
recognized by St. Paul, when he made the argument of propriety. But if Paul
integrated cultural elements into his moral instructions, the Church in recent
centuries has hardly done so. It has tried to establish a "Christendom", a
homogeneous social body, as the European Middle Ages would have been,
according to some. On a local scale, the Church tried to do the same in the
Christian villages of the Belgian Congo. In trying to establish a homogeneous
environment, the Church sought to reduce the influence of culture: it wanted
to submit everything to faith. Today, it recognizes that the contribution of
culture must not be ignored, but maintains that, like everything human,
culture must allow itself to be challenged by the Gospel:

The Good News of Christ constantly renews the life and culture of fallen man;
it combats and removes the errors and evils that come from the permanent
seduction of sin. It never ceases to purify and elevate the morality of
peoples. With riches from on high, she fecundates as from within the spiritual
qualities and gifts proper to each people and age, strengthening, perfecting
and restoring them in Christ. Thus the Church, in fulfilling her own mission,
already contributes to the work of civilization and encourages it; her action,
even in the liturgy, helps to shape man's inner freedom. Gaudium et Spes,
n° 58,4.

Theology must recognize that its perception of God's call is determined by

the cultural context in which it is received. In accepting the contributions of
surrounding cultures, the Bible confirms their importance, without, however,
regarding them as essential. The pressure exerted by culture may be
considerable, but it is not sovereign.

The churches of Africa have encountered this problem in their own

context, and have recognized the greater authority that religion must have:

Faith is not neutral with regard to the social and cultural life of people: it has
a real impact on them; it uses them as vehicles and plays on their future:
thus faith introduces social ruptures, undertakes intellectual reconstruction
and finally a socio-cultural recovery, what we would call economic and social
development. This does not come without a price: to take root in a culture in
this way is to translate the universality of the Christian message that comes
to heal and save it; as a result, faith can only express itself through the
instruments offered by that culture. Consequently, it knows the richness and
limitations of that culture. A.T. SANON, Message chrétien universel dans la
pluralité culturelle, in: Concilium, no. 155, April 1980, p. 112.

Local cultures do not have an absolute value: they are called upon to
transform themselves, to allow themselves to be challenged by faith, and at
the same time to enrich it. For the Church, the present state of a culture does
not reflect the unchanging identity of a people: it can only be seen as a stage
on the road to greater perfection.

To confine human societies solely to their historical particularity - a prejudice

held by culturalists - is to deprive morals of their human foundation and
legitimacy: it is to deny ourselves the possibility of understanding them as
normative morals, and to reduce them to factual techniques of social
organization.

B. QUELQUEJEU, Diversité des morales historiques, in: Concilium, no. 170,

1981, p. 93.

The Church can and must therefore, on occasion, enter into conflict with
cultures. But it cannot claim to impose its own culture. In principle, it should
seek to collaborate with cultures, to find in them a new impetus. But it
retains its autonomy, often to the great displeasure of existing cultures.
 Culture therefore has a role to play, as does religion, but neither alone
determines the demands of morality. At the outset, egocentrism dominates:
human beings act according to their own well-being. But first personal
experience, and then the education that transmits culture, open up a
different perspective. Christian moral teaching explains the ultimate
meaning of morality, and gives it a theocentric dimension. This teaching
does not necessarily determine the particular requirements of morality, but
gives it an imperative force and an orientation of its own. Moreover, it gives
humanity the assurance that God's grace accompanies it in its quest for
personal and collective fulfillment.

4.4. The State: its impact on morality.

BAYART, J.-F., L'Etat en Afrique. La politique du ventre, Paris, Fayard, 1989,

439 pp.

HANNON, P., Church, State, Morality and Law, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan,
1992, 159 pp.

KUENGIENDA, M., République, religion et laïcité. De l'humanisme aux droits

de l'homme, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2010, 154 pp.

LEON XIII, Encyclical on The Christian Constitution of States, 1890.

MANUEL, P.C., L.C. REARDON and C. WILCOX, eds, The Catholic Church and
the Nation-State. Comparative Perspectives, Washington D.C., Georgetown
U.P., 2006, 283 pp. (with articles by Elisée RUTAGAMBWA and Yvon C.
ELENGA).

MBEMBE, A., Etat, violence et accumulation. Lessons from Black Africa, in: Au
Cœur de l'Afrique, 52, 1989, 1, pp. 22-41

PIE XII, Encyclique Summi Pontificatus, sur la fonction de l'Etat dans le

monde moderne, 1939 (Pius XII was elected Pope on March 2, 1939; on
September 1, Germany invaded Poland, and on September 3, the Allies
declared a state of war. The Pope published this first encyclical on October
20, 1939).

STEIN, Edith, De l'Etat (1925), Paris, Cerf, E.U. de Fribourg, 1989, 178 pp.
(Edith Stein is a German philosopher and theologian of Jewish origin. Born on
October 12, 1891, she converted to Catholicism in 1921, and was admitted
to the Carmelite convent in 1934. Because of her links with the Jewish
community, she was deported on August 2, 1942, interned in the Nazi
extermination camp of Auschwitz, where she was put to death on August 9,
1942. She was canonized by Pope John Paul II on October 11, 1998).

Morality is not only instituted by the Church, by culture or by society. It

is also determined by the State, which specifies what is permitted or
forbidden on its territory. One of its functions is to ensure the reasonable
observance of moral rules deemed normative by the majority of its
population. The State considers that morality also falls within its remit,
because of the impact it has on social organization. However, when it takes
measures that concern morality, it often provokes a reaction from the
Church, which considers that it possesses a superior moral authority.

From the very beginnings of Christianity and throughout its history,

conflicts have arisen between the powers of the state and those of the
Church over moral standards. Yet Paul had recommended obedience to the
authorities:

Let every man be subject to the authorities who exercise power, for there is
no authority except through God, and those that exist are established by
him. So whoever opposes authority is rebelling against God's intended order,
and rebels will bring condemnation upon themselves.

Rom 13:1-2.

Various interpretations have been put forward concerning the identity of the
authorities mentioned in this text: the word could refer only to supernatural
powers. Whatever the case, there can be little doubt that Paul, and the New
Testament in general, do not challenge civil authority. However, when the
Roman Empire later demanded that sacrifices be offered to pagan gods or to
the emperor, many Christians refused to obey, preferring martyrdom. In 313,
the Edict of Milan established freedom of worship for Christians. Then, in 380,
when Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, the
Church appealed to the civil authorities to enforce its most fundamental
moral requirements. It considered that the State possessed a more effective
power of coercion than it did, even if only the Church had the necessary
power of discernment.
During the first centuries of Christian history, the morality upheld by the
Church was rarely challenged by states. When conflicts did arise, they
usually concerned the exercise of power rather than moral prescriptions. But
one famous incident shows that the distinction between domains can cause
problems. In 390, riots broke out in Thessalonica, and the Roman emperor
Theodosius put them down brutally, having part of the population
massacred. Returning triumphantly to Italy, he was nevertheless refused
entry to the church by Saint Ambrose, who demanded that he do penance
publicly. The emperor was forced to submit. Much later, in 1075, the German
emperor had to do likewise, in what has been called the "investiture quarrel".
This conflict was not about morality, but about the control of civil authorities
over the appointment of Church dignitaries. To prevent political
considerations and material interests from determining these appointments,
Pope Gregory VII had issued a decree reserving the right to choose and
invest bishops. To safeguard what he considered his right in this area, Henry
IV, King of the Romans and future German Emperor, had a synod of German
bishops depose the Pope. The Pope reacted by excommunicating Henry IV,
thus releasing all the notables of his kingdom from their duty to obey him.
However, due to a controversial succession, the king's power was not yet
firmly established. Fearing a revolt by the local authorities, the king went to
Canossa in northern Italy, where the pope was in residence, to beg him to lift
the excommunication. After three days of negotiations, the Pope agreed to
his request. The incident remained in the collective memory. Eight centuries
later, in 1872, when the German government decided to introduce civil
marriage, nationalize denominational schools and confiscate ecclesiastical
property as part of what came to be known as the Kulturkampf, Chancellor
Bismarck told the national parliament "We will not go to Canossa", to indicate
that he would not bow to pressure from the Church.

At this point, civil authorities no longer had to fear condemnation by

the Church; the principle of separation of powers was generally accepted.
But although established at the very beginning of Christian history, this
principle has never ceased to pose problems: neither states nor the Church
like to see limits imposed on their power. In the field of morality, Church
teaching began to be criticized during the Renaissance, from the 14th to the
16th centuries. Criticism became more radical during the Reformation in the
16th century. In 1531, the Vatican's stance on the marriage of King Henry VIII
of England led to the establishment of the Anglican Church; since then, the
head of state of the United Kingdom is, at least nominally, also the head of
this Church. In France, Gallicanism between the 15th and 19th centuries
similarly sought to make the internal organization of the church independent
of Roman authority. The 18th century, called the Age of Enlightenment
because it chose to rely on the light of reason rather than religion, more
directly rejected any intervention by the Church in the management of public
affairs, and, among them, morality. And when states began to establish a
'civil status', the function of which, until then, had been fulfilled by parish
registers, they also legislated with regard to marriage; they considered it to
be a contract, and therefore provided for the conditions under which this
contract could be broken. The first to do so was the French state, after the
revolution of 1789; without reference to the Church, it admitted the
possibility of divorce. The last state to follow this example was Ireland, which
in 1995, despite opposition from the Catholic hierarchy, approved a law
permitting divorce by referendum.

In general, in the field of morality, the Church continues to claim an authority

superior to that of the State. It has lost the power to impose its judgment,
but it continues to speak out, and to denounce as immoral certain measures
taken by states. Agreements between states and the Vatican, often called
concordats, ensure that the authority of one institution does not encroach on
that of the other. But the separation of powers is always delicate. Even
today, states obtain a certain right of oversight when appointing
ecclesiastical authorities; a special case is the Vatican's agreement with
China, concluded in 2018 and renewed in 2022. But these agreements do not
normally deal with moral issues.

In Africa, conflicts between states and the Catholic Church have been
numerous, even in colonial times. After independence, states often reacted
against the influence exerted by the Church on their populations. Conflicts
over directly moral issues seem to have multiplied in recent years. States are
taking measures, under pressure from national demands or international
organizations, without any real concern for morality. The Catholic hierarchy
takes a stand, provoking reactions from governments who often declare that
these interventions constitute an illegitimate challenge. But the Church
continues to assert its superior authority in moral matters, and considers
that it must remind its faithful of their duties, even when these run counter
to the decisions of governments. However, the moral judgment of many
Christians is now strongly influenced by civil laws.

What authority does the state have in moral matters? The basic
principle of Church doctrine on this point has already been formulated by the
Fathers of the Church. They recognized that both institutions, civil and
religious, must intervene to regulate the behavior of citizens, but each in its
own domain. A separation of powers was thus instituted: the State must
intervene in temporal matters, the Church in spiritual matters.

This principle was again clearly formulated by Pope Leo XIII in 1885. His
encyclical on the subject was addressed solely to the bishops of the Catholic
world, and not - as are most encyclicals since John XXIII's Pacem in terris
(1963) - to all men of good will. Leo XIII could therefore rely on a well-
established theological doctrine, which affirmed the Church's superior
authority in the field of morality:

God has therefore divided the government of mankind between two powers:
the ecclesiastical power and the civil power; the former in charge of divine
things, the latter of human things. Each in its own way is sovereign; each is
enclosed within perfectly defined limits, drawn in accordance with its nature
and special purpose. There is therefore a circumscribed sphere, within which
each exercises its action jure proprio.

Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, Encyclical Letter on the Christian Constitution of

States, 1885.

The principle is simple, but the delimitation of spheres has always been a
problem. In the same encyclical, the Pope states:

All that is sacred in any way in human affairs, all that concerns the salvation
of souls and the worship of God, either by its nature or in relation to its
purpose, is the responsibility of the Church. As for the other things embraced
by the civil and political order, it is right that they should be subject to civil
authority.

The enumeration of areas which the pope considered to be clearly "divine

matters", and therefore under the authority of the Church, did not prevent
states from authoritatively promulgating rules which concerned them.

Leo XIII published his encyclical at a time when most European states
still had a monarchical regime. The Church has always considered this
regime to be in conformity with God's will. Indeed, the Bible tells us that God
approved the establishment of kingship in Israel, and that a sacred anointing
was essential when a king was enthroned. In the Christian world, the Church
could hope to induce monarchs to make decisions in line with its doctrine. On
the other hand, in the parliamentary regimes which began to take hold in the
19th century, and which were often anticlerical, responsibility for measures
was diluted, and the Church's influence less effective. Yet Leo XIII showed
himself willing to accept republican structures. He declared that the Church
does not condemn changes in political regimes, provided they are instituted
peacefully, and do not seek to enslave and subjugate the Church, diminish
its freedom of action or take away any of the rights conferred on it by Jesus
Christ. Among these rights, the Pope certainly counted that of determining
moral rules. For him, it was obvious that a parliamentary vote could not
intervene in this area. He did not contest the authority of parliaments, but
called on them to accept the moral rules formulated by the Catholic Church:

These principles and decrees, if we are to judge them soundly, do not in

themselves reprobate any of the different forms of government, since there
is nothing in them repugnant to Catholic doctrine, and if they are applied
wisely and justly, they can all guarantee public prosperity. Moreover, it is not
in itself reprehensible that the people should have a greater or lesser share
in government; even this, at certain times and under certain laws, can
become not only an advantage, but a duty for citizens. Leo XIII, Immortale
Dei, 1885.

On the other hand, the Pope was wary of what we today call populism: the
crowd cannot govern, and not only in the moral sphere. Leo XIII specified
what should determine the rules established by the various authorities:

In the political and civil order, laws have the common good as their goal,
dictated not by the will and misleading judgment of the crowd, but by truth
and justice. (...) As for the sovereignty of the people, which, regardless of
God, is said to reside in the people by natural right, if it is eminently suited to
flatter and inflame a host of passions, it rests on no solid foundation and
cannot have sufficient force to guarantee public security and the peaceful
maintenance of order.

The pope therefore opposed the already widespread idea that natural law
would give the people sovereign authority; instead, he emphasized the
criteria of truth and justice. Parliaments passed laws that were to form the
basis of national law, and serve the common good. Leo XIII recognized their
authority, but attacked the "new law, as it is called, which is claimed to be
the fruit of an adult age and the product of progressive freedom". For him,
freedom is submission to the law, which alone prevents anarchy and the
slavery of sin.

To what extent should States take moral requirements into account? Leo XIII
recognizes two points at which the interests of Church and State meet: law
and the common good. Law, as established in conventions, traditions or civil
statutes, has the primary aim of ensuring the order generally accepted by
the populations concerned. But it is also seen as a codification of morality,
even though it can disregard any relationship to morality by making "raison
d'Etat" the justification for its action. Law and morality do not therefore
coincide perfectly:

Law and morality remain closely linked. Morality proposes duties out of a
concern for solidarity, altruism or the need for individual self-improvement;
law imposes obligations for the sake of order and stability in society.

Keba M'BAYE, Le droit en déroute, in: Rencontres internationales de Genève,

La liberté et l'ordre social, Neuchâtel, La Baconnière, 1969, p. 18.

The jurist thus sees the difference in the objective pursued: morality is
concerned with the individual, law with order. Morality does not ignore the
needs of the State, but it has had to admit that social order does not
necessarily coincide with moral order. So the state can accept practices that
morality rejects. Prostitution, for example, although condemned by morality,
is not sanctioned by the State, which nevertheless endeavors to regulate it.
The conquest of new territory may seem good for the state, but may not be
morally justifiable. Sterilization campaigns have been organized by states to
solve the problem of overpopulation, but Christian morality condemns them.
The State can choose to take, or not to take, certain measures, as long as
social peace and the well-being of its populations are assured. But the laws it
promulgates do not in themselves make a practice good or bad.

Morality and public order are mutually related, yet distinct. What is their
relationship? It can be described as follows: morality declares human
conduct to be good or bad. This moral dimension is found in public order,
which serves the ends and goods of human existence. The law must be
concerned with the well-being of the community, which cannot fail to relate
to what is to the advantage or detriment of its individual members, to what is
therefore morally good or bad. However, morality and public order are
distinct, because public order is concerned with the common good, the well-
being of the community. It is only when individual acts have foreseeable
consequences for the maintenance and stability of society (the well-being of
the community), that public order has to deal with them.

R.A. McCORMICK, The critical calling. Reflections on moral dilemmas since

Vatican II, Washington, D.C., Georgetown U.P., 1989, p. 199.
The distinction is often difficult to apply: although primarily concerned with
the individual, morality, like civil law, also seeks to promote public welfare.
The Church, as the guardian of the moral order, normally supports civil
authority. But when the state takes measures that have the effect of
promoting practices she deems wrong, this support can be withdrawn.
Conflicts can thus arise, pitting the two authorities against each other.

A particular problem arose in the sixties of the last century. After the
Second World War, to compensate for the loss of human life, many
governments took measures to encourage population growth. But persistent
famine in some parts of the world soon led them to reverse this policy. In his
encyclical on the development of peoples, Pope Paul VI declared:

It is certain that the public authorities, within the limits of their competence,
can intervene, developing appropriate information and taking suitable
measures, provided that they are in conformity with the requirements of the
moral law and respectful of the just freedom of the couple.

PAUL VI, Populorum Progressio, 1967, n° 37.

The following year, the encyclical Humanae vitae specified that "suitable
measures", "in conformity with the requirements of the moral law", do not
include the use of contraceptives, which the encyclical described as
"practices contrary to natural and divine law". The Pope therefore asks
States to promote other practices:

The way in which public authorities can and must contribute to the solution
of the demographic problem is quite different: it is the way of a far-sighted
family policy, of a wise education of peoples, respectful of the moral law and
the freedom of citizens.

Paul VI, Humanae vitae, 1968, n° 23.

On the one hand, the Pope recognizes that States can, and indeed must,
intervene to control population growth. But on the other hand, he reserves to
the Church the right to judge which means are morally admissible. Many
states obviously do not accept this limitation of their power.

The other criterion, which should enable civil laws and Church laws to accord,
is that of the common good, which both civil and ecclesiastical laws should
serve.
Bishops' Conference of England and Wales, Le bien commun et la doctrine
sociale de l'Eglise Catholique, in: DC, 2/2/1997; n° 2153, pp. 130-145.

CURRAN, C.E., Official Catholic social teaching and the common good, in:
Tensions in moral theology, Notre Dame, U.of N.D. Press, 1988, pp. 119-137.

FESSARD, G., Autorité et bien commun, Théologie 5, Paris, Aubier, 1944, 121
pp.

JOBIN, G., Le bien commun à l'épreuve de la pensée contemporaine, in:

RETM, Mars 1998, n° 204, pp. 129-155.

MARITAIN, J., La personne et le bien commun, Paris, DDB, 1947, 93 pp.

The notion of the common good is not of Christian origin; Aristotle had
already formulated it:

Even if, indeed, there is an identity between the good of the individual and
that of the city, in any case it is a manifestly more important and perfect
task to apprehend and safeguard the good of the city: for the good is
certainly lovable even for an isolated individual, but it is more beautiful and
more divine applied to a nation or to cities. Nicomachean Ethics, I, 2, 8
(1094b)

Having become an integral part of the Church's social doctrine, the notion
was defined by Pope John XXIII as "the totality of social conditions which
permit and favor the integral development of man's personality" (Mater et
magistra, 1961, no. 70). The Pope therefore recognizes the importance of
social conditions, which are the responsibility of the State, but, unlike
Aristotle, he makes it clear that the State cannot ignore the good of the
individual, including his or her eternal salvation, which depends on respect
for moral laws. In practice, however, governments recognize only the
national good, and often only electoral advantage.

Both law and the common good have been invoked in the
establishment of norms, but without leading to the conclusions the Church
draws from them. Indeed, the law has evolved on a number of points. In the
past, for example, abortion was punishable under both African traditions and
the penal codes of Western countries. Considered a crime, it was liable to
prosecution. Over the past few decades, under pressure from various
movements demanding individual freedom, and faced with a growing
number of clandestine abortions, many governments have decriminalized it,
i.e., no longer considered it a crime. The most influential ruling was that of
the US Supreme Court, Roe vs. Wade, in 1973. In France, the 1975 Veil law
adopted a similar position. The effect of this change in position was that in
many countries, people came to see abortion not as a moral evil, but as a
right.

Debates on this subject pit the woman's right to freedom against the child's
right to life. But other arguments are also invoked. African states that
continue to condemn abortion appeal to tradition, while those that
decriminalize it stress the need for development, which would be hampered
by an excessively high birth rate. All these arguments refer to values that
deserve respect; none can simply be dismissed. Agreement therefore
depends not on the weight of the arguments, but on the judgment of the act
itself. On this point, the positions of governments and the Church are often
opposed. The Church considers that by accepting sexual union, the woman
has implicitly assumed the responsibility that comes with conception. This
responsibility is shared by her partner, even if the burden he assumes is not
comparable to that of the woman. States recognize this, and strive to re-
establish a balance when paternity is established. But when states accept
abortion, they cancel out this responsibility for both the woman and the man.
Sexual union and abortion are seen as commodities offered for consumption.
The Church condemns this judgement because it considers that the dignity
of the person is affected: it considers that the State cannot accept that the
life and dignity of one person should be sacrificed, even for the benefit of the
individual freedom of another. Civil law normally accepts this principle, but
disputes that the foetus already has the status of a person.

The conflict between state and church positions took a new turn when, in
June 2022, the US Supreme Court overturned Roe vs. Wade, declaring that
the US Constitution could not provide a basis for banning abortion; only state
laws could do so. This argument is purely legalistic. The Church's judgment,
on the other hand, is strictly moral. On this basis, the Church has always
endeavored to exert sufficient pressure on states to ensure that their legal
systems support its own moral demands, but over the last few centuries, the
gap in the valorization of moral practices has become manifest, and conflicts
between Church and State have multiplied in the field of morality. Today, the
Church strives to influence governments to discourage abortions, notably by
excluding the reimbursement of costs by social insurance. But in this area,
and in others such as homosexuality and euthanasia, the Church's action is
proving to have little effect, and does not determine the moral judgment
even of many Christians. In recent decades, the scandals in which the Church
has been implicated continue to weaken its authority in moral matters. In
general, it cannot prevent states from taking the measures they want. The
most obvious disagreements concern marriage and sexuality, but other
practices, such as the exercise of authority and the use of resources, are also
sources of conflict.

Today, the Church must help people to distinguish between what is legal and
what is moral. This distinction has become necessary for the formation of
moral judgments, but it is difficult to impose. The Church feels obliged to
make its position known, but knows that it can no longer rely on the State to
uphold "its" morality, which it itself is unable to impose. In the past, its moral
authority was hardly contested. In today's pluralistic societies, it must
present arguments that are convincing in their own right.

CONCLUSION

The Church, culture, society and the State are all institutions that have been
presented as possible sources of morality. In fact, they all exert considerable
influence on the institutionalization of certain moral rules. Traditionally,
theology has considered God to be the ultimate source of morality, and the
role of these various institutions has scarcely been considered as actually
contributing to the institutionalization of morality. Here, the limits of
institutional action have been highlighted, not to deny that they have a role
to play, but to help situate it more precisely. It must be recognized that these
institutions do contribute to the advancement of morality. By way of
example, the moral impact of the recognition of the dignity and rights of the
human person can be mentioned; its importance is considerable. The moral
norms that flow from it are today increasingly clearly recognized as
absolutely normative. Christianity has never completely denied them, but the
importance given to them today does not depend solely on its contribution.

These institutions are so diverse in character that it may seem

misleading to equate them in an analysis of the basis of morality. The Church
is a community of faith, culture a community of thought, society a
community of fact, the State a community of law. Nevertheless, they are all
communities, that is to say, they bring their members together in such a way
as to create a certain communion between them. But each community
pursues its own goal. The Church confronts the individual with precepts that
not only take account of earthly goods, but seek to promote union with God.
Culture defines people's identity, while allowing for considerable variation,
even to the point of forming a counter-culture. Society strives to ensure
harmonious coexistence within itself; towards others, it often adopts an
attitude of mistrust. The state is concerned only with its own citizens, whose
well-being it seeks to ensure; even if it enjoys little credit today, due to
endemic corruption, no one can evade the obligations it imposes, if
necessary by force. But despite these obvious differences, we must
recognize a common search for greater unity. A profound agreement with
Christian morality exists, the importance of which must be emphasized.

It is inevitable that different institutions will come to differing moral

judgments on particular points. The management of moral life will therefore
always be difficult. All the more so as diversity does not stop at that of the
large institutions: all human beings also belong to other, less large
institutions, but which often have a considerable moral impact, such as the
family, the ethnic group, the political party, the religious community, various
associations, and even the company in which they work. All these institutions
make their own demands, depending on their particular nature. The
effectiveness of these different institutions as forces for regulating behavior
is highly variable, and depends essentially on their members' sense of
belonging. In most cases, the smallest groups do not impose an all-
encompassing moral code. Their particular prescriptions are situated at a
different level from those of large institutions. But when the various
obligations cannot be reconciled, it's up to individuals to find a solution to
the moral conflicts with which they are confronted. An extreme example of
this is the behavior attributed to members of the Mafia, an organization
whose members, at least originally, called themselves Christians, even
though the Church explicitly condemned its criminal activities. But when a
type of behavior is perceived as a condition of membership in any grouping,
it can be difficult for one of its members not to adopt it. As Appiah
recognized, the individual strives above all, not to do good and avoid evil,
but rather to behave as the grouping in which he recognizes himself wants
him to. Deviant behavior is seen as a denial of one's own identity.

All these institutions have real authority, and all strive to make individuals
behave according to the standards they have set. The Church, of course,
insists that the higher authority is that of God, whose demands it sets forth.
It therefore believes that its prescriptions cannot be questioned by
associations of a lower rank or by individuals. For this claim to be accepted,
its members' sense of belonging to the ecclesial community must be
strengthened. The promotion of grassroots communities, and the use of
concepts such as the Church-family of God, are efforts in this direction. But
the Church is seen as defining vertical communion with God; other
communities and groupings focus their attention on horizontal relationships,
with their neighbors and with the world, and find it difficult to accept that the
Church's prescriptions can have repercussions in the areas they govern. They
assert their autonomy, at least on a local scale and in their own fields. That
they should thus come into conflict with the Church is not surprising.

But there is a meeting point, and that is the good of the individual. No
institution can ignore it entirely. It should therefore be possible to reach
agreement on how to orientate behaviour in line with this reference. But it
quickly proves complicated, and is not always understood in the same way.
The Christian tradition in particular has recognized the presence, in the very
being of the person, of normative principles that map out a path to
fulfillment. These principles, not all of which are universally accepted, will
now be analyzed.

PPCHAPITRE 5. INTERNAL MORAL IMPERATIVES

Christians have always known that their knowledge of moral laws does not
depend solely on the teachings of the Bible or the decrees promulgated by
major institutions. They have always been aware that they have powerful
normative systems within themselves, which prescribe certain behaviors:
these are natural law, conscience and reason, which are perceived as
imposing duties from which they must not evade. These systems are diverse
in nature, but they are all seen as constitutive of the very being of the
person, even though they are not constituted by personal choice.

The Christian is convinced that the norms known through these

channels are in consonance with those that have been revealed, and that
their authority exceeds that of the great institutions. Morality is therefore
individualized: it does not depend entirely on rules that come from outside.
In principle, this moral individualism is accepted; in practice, it can be
contested, because external sources of moral precepts also present their
standards as superior to all others. To avoid conflicts, efforts have been made
to codify all morality, and thus show that a personal interpretation cannot
oppose the prescriptions of the various codes. But the binding power of
internal imperatives has never been entirely denied.
 Yet the autonomy of these internal systems is far from absolute: a
person's behavior is still often determined by the rules inculcated from
outside. The individual is always "networked", and his or her own decisions
are influenced by the environment in which he or she lives. Generally
accepted norms often exert a predominant influence. Occasionally, however,
the individual may not conform to them: particular circumstances are
invoked to justify different behavior. Ultimately, therefore, the perception of
moral obligation is personal, without ignoring the requirements of common
morality.

5.1. Laws of nature and natural law.

Each person has his or her own particularities, which do not, however,
exclude the existence of a nature common to all human beings. Although
each person develops his or her own moral sense, there is a common basis
that has a significant impact on behavior.

This common basis could be biological, and, according to some, even

genetic. A particular approach to the link between the biological make-up of
human beings and morality was developed after the Second World War,
during which humanity's murderous violence manifested itself in an
unprecedented way. In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, several
authors argued that nature itself drives human beings to aggression.
Austrian Konrad Lorenz (1903-1989) was the leading proponent of this thesis.
Along with Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch, he was awarded the 1973 Nobel
Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his studies on "the organization and
demonstration of individual and social behavior patterns". The work of these
three laureates was the starting point of modern ethology, which initially
studied the instinctive behavior of animals. But ethology soon realized that
human behavior is often similar in nature to that of animals. Konrad Lorenz
set out the main conclusions of his research:

1963: L'agression. Une histoire naturelle du mal, Paris, Flammarion, 1969,

314 pp.

1965: Essais sur le comportement animal et humain. Les leçons de

l'évolution de la théorie du comportement, Paris, Seuil, 1970, 484 pp.

1984: Les fondements de l'éthologie, Paris, Flammarion, 1984, 426 pp.

In his latest writings, Lorenz corrected his first thesis, showing that even
before aggressive reactions, which are mainly nurturing or defensive, there is
a tendency for individuals to bond with their fellow creatures. This tendency
is at the root of various forms of association, described in English by the term
"bonding". When sexual in nature, this form of association ensures the
succession of generations, but it also controls many other behaviors. One of
Lorenz's disciples, Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1928-2018), particularly
emphasized its importance:

1967: Éthologie - biologie du comportement, Paris, Ophrys, 2005, 576 pp.

1970: Contre l'agression. Contribution à l'histoire naturelle des

comportements élémentaires, Paris, Stock, 1972, 327 pp. The German title,
Liebe und Hass, translates as: L'amour et la haine).

1973: L'homme programmé. L'inné, facteur déterminant du comportement

humain, Paris, Flammarion, 1976, 256 pp.

1976: Par-delà nos différences, Paris, Flammarion, 1979, 255 pp.

1979: The Biology of Peace and War: Men, Animals, and Aggression, U. of
Michigan, Viking Press, 1979, 294 pp.

These studies are based on the observation of actual behavior, but they are
surprisingly consistent with the theological tradition. Indeed, Thomas
Aquinas had already recognized that humans experience "inclinations",
which lead them to adopt certain behaviors, and to become attached to
other people, and even to God. Another philosophically inspired theory, that
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), is closer to Lorenz's original thesis:
for Rousseau, contact with fellow human beings makes man aggressive. He
believes that, to avoid the harmful consequences of such contact, society
has produced moral norms and given them legal status. This theory does not
sufficiently consider that man never exists on his own. On the contrary, it
retains the idea that, by his very nature, man is not a blank page: a tendency
exists from the outset. But this tendency may fail to determine behavior if it
is not activated, and if conditions are not right.

A text by Nelson Mandela highlights the moral implications of a

conception that recognizes the existence of tendencies inherent in human
beings. In the conclusion to his autobiography, Mandela describes how he
saw apartheid gradually developing. He does not blame nature:

I've always known that deep in the human heart lies mercy and generosity.
No one is born hating another person because of the color of their skin, or
their background, or their religion. People must learn to hate, and if they can
learn to hate, they can also be taught to love, for love is born more naturally
in the human heart than its opposite. Nelson MANDELA, Un long chemin vers
la liberté, Paris, Fayard, 1995, pp. 642-3. Engl. orig.: Long Walk to Freedom,
London, Abacus, 1995, p. 749.

Mandela refers to two sources of moral knowledge: the human heart and
learning. Of these two sources, one is internal, the other external. Mandela is
convinced that hatred is not innate: it is not implanted at birth. On the other
hand, he believes that its opposite, love, appears more naturally. However,
love must be educated to become effective. Nature, then, does not in itself
determine morality: other factors intervene to give it its own shape. None is
absolutely decisive; at one point or another, an individual choice intervenes,
and determines the moral orientation of the person.

Ethology shows, however, that nature can lead to the adoption of certain
behaviours, without involving a deliberate choice. It is generally accepted,
for example, that women feel a natural obligation to take care of their
children. But what is the scope of this law of nature: is it also binding on the
father? And are adult children obliged to care for parents who can no longer
provide for themselves? This example begs the question: to what extent can
a fact of nature impose a moral duty? After all, isn't nature subject to the
domination of humans, who could, and in some cases should, act against its
laws? The scope of natural determinism in behavior remains highly
uncertain. But that biological nature exerts an influence on behavior is
undeniable. Numerous studies have been carried out to determine what it
prescribes:

CHANGEUX, J.-P., Fondements naturels de l'éthique, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1993,

334 pp.

CHANGEUX, J.-P., and P. RICOEUR, Ce qui nous fait penser. La nature et la

règle, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1998, 336 pp.

DIETRICH, J., Les fondements de la morale. Réflexions d'un biologiste, in:

RScR, 64, 1990, 2, pp. 193-202.

KAHN A., Raisonnable et humain, Paris, Nil éd. 2004, 317 pp.

LEDOUX, J., Neurobiologie de la personnalité, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003, 493

pp.

MALHERBE, J.-F., L'éthique entre nature et culture, in: Le Supplément, no.

182-183, 1992, pp. 317-325.
MIETH, D., and J. POHIER, eds, L'éthique dans les sciences de la nature,
Concilium, no. 223, June 1989, 178 pp. (11 arts.).

PINCKAERS, S., L'instinct et l'esprit au cœur de l'éthique chrétienne, in:

Novitas et veritas vitae. Aux sources de la morale chrétienne, Mélanges
offerts au prof. S. Pinckaers, ed. by C.J. PINTO de OLIVEIRA, Fribourg, Ed.
Univ., Paris, Cerf, 1991, pp. 213-233.

THINES, G., Nature, culture et sciences des mœurs, in: Le Supplément, no.
182-183, 1992, pp. 111-134.

WIREDU, K., The biological foundation of universal norms, in: Cultural

Universals and Particulars. An African Perspective, Bloomington, Indiana U.P.,
1996, pp. 34-44.

A particular case that has been much discussed in recent decades is that of
homosexuality, often presented as a natural phenomenon. Some conclude
that acts expressing it cannot be condemned. But this conclusion assumes
that everything natural is good, from a moral point of view, whereas certain
facts of nature clearly are not. The conclusion is that nature does not
determine morality; it merely makes different choices possible. The social
context also exerts an important influence on each individual. These factors
can be just as constraining as nature. But they do not exclude the existence
of individual responsibility.

Not all the choices that nature presents to the individual are qualified
in the same way: some may lead to the adoption of behaviour that morality
rejects. Pedophilia, for example, would also be an orientation that presents
itself to certain individuals, without being morally justified. It must therefore
be admitted that nature does not define morality: it confronts individuals
with choices that are subject to various pressures. Moral judgment concerns
the response that each individual gives to the incentives he or she perceives.

Theology has dealt with the impact of nature on morality in an obviously

different way to ethology: it has not tried to assess the influence of physical
nature, but has considered human nature. Human nature, too, does not
dictate behavior, but in order to achieve the fullness of being towards which
it strives, it must abide by certain rules. Human nature can therefore be
understood as a law. The "laws of nature" and "natural law" should not be
confused: they refer to very different realities.

Actualité ou inactualité du Droit Naturel, Dossier, Revue de Métaphysique et

de Morale, Oct-Dec 2021, no. 4, 6 art. pp. 443-524.
BENEDICT XVI, La primauté de la loi naturelle, Address to the members of the
International Theological Commission, in: DC, 16/12/2007, n 2392, pp.
1084-1086.

BENEDICT XVI, Natural Law and Christian Conscience, Paris, Téqui, 2007, 22
pp.

International Theological Commission, A la recherche d'une éthique

universelle. Nouveau regard sur la loi naturelle, Paris, Cerf, 2009, 181 pp.

CURRAN, C.E., and R.A. McCORMICK, Readings in Moral Theology no. 7:

Natural Law and Theology, New York, Paulist Press, 1991, 465 pp.

DELSOL, Chantal, Peut-on ériger la loi naturelle en loi positive, in: La grande
méprise. Justice internationale, gouvernement mondial, guerre juste..., Paris,
La Table ronde, 2004, pp. 117-126.

GAZIAUX, E., La loi naturelle. Quelques repères historiques et interrogations

contemporaines, in RETM, n°293, March 2017, pp. 53-66.

JOHN PAUL II, Le concept de nature, Discours aux membres de l'académie

des sciences, 27/10/98, in : AAS, 91, 1999, 4, pp. 366-369 ; in DC, 20/12/98,
no. 2194, pp. 1064-1065.

KELLY, A. J., The global significance of natural law. A communications

problem?, in: Studia Moralia, 47, 2009, 1, pp. 141-168.

LAUBIER, P. de, La loi naturelle, le politique et la religion, Paris, Parole et

silence, 2004, 130 pp.

MEDEVIELLE, Geneviève, La loi naturelle selon Benoît XVI, in : Etudes, mars

2009, n 4103, pp. 353-364.

SAHLINS, M., La nature humaine, une illusion occidentale. Réflexions sur

l'histoire des concepts de hiérarchie et d'égalité, sur la sublimation de
l'anarchie en Occident, et essais de comparaison avec d'autres conceptions
de la condition humaine, Paris, Ed. de l'Eclat, 2009, 111 pp.

SCHÜLLER, B., La théologie morale peut-elle se passer du droit naturel, in:

NRTh, 88, 1966, 5, pp. 449-475.

SPICQ, C., Connaissance et morale dans la Bible, Fribourg, Ed. Univ., Paris,
Cerf, 1985, 186 pp. (Chap. III: La connaissance de la volonté de Dieu par la
Loi Naturelle, la Torah et la loi positive, pp. 50-67)
VICINI, A., "The loi morale naturelle : perspectives internationales pour la
réflexion bioéthique contemporaine", in : Transversalités, April-June 2012, n°
122, pp. 125-151.

Of all normative systems, natural law is undoubtedly the most controversial,

yet at the same time a resurgent reference point. When philosophy defends
the use of the concept, it affirms the validity of a law that depends on no
enactment. But there is little agreement as to the basis of this law: the
nature that would be the bearer of a law can encompass the entire material
world (nature as opposed to culture or the supernatural); it can designate a
specific characteristic of the object (the nature of the person) or of
institutions (the nature of marriage, for example), or even of a category of
objects (the things of nature). It can be of the order of phenomena or of
essences, that is to say, it can refer to concrete reality or to abstraction (the
object of either natural science or philosophy). For some, the foundation of
these laws can only be transcendent, while others seek it in immanence.
Some find it a means of moving from is to ought, from the world of fact to
that of moral obligation. Finally, natural law can be distinguished from
natural right: natural law has as its object the good as such, and refers to an
inescapable moral obligation; natural right determines what is just: it evokes
a legal framework that determines human relationships. But many authors
fail to make this distinction, and use the two terms interchangeably.

Which of these understandings of the term "nature" is the one that

determines the meaning given to the expression "natural law"? The Church
teaches that as children of God, called to communion with Him, we must be
attuned to Him. But our corporality also imposes moral duties on us, towards
our society, our relatives and ourselves. What's more, our world, in all its
materiality, imposes duties on us, leading recently to the recognition of
"ecological sins". Our behavior should therefore be determined either by our
end, or by our origins, or by our present situation. The Church is well aware
of the versatility of the expression "natural law":

The conception developed by Ulpian (Roman jurist, A.D. 170-223) reduced

nature to the biological and instinctive aspect of man. In a number of current
theories, we find this temptation to reduce the human being to this purely
material and physical reality, making man a being who behaves only like
other living species. The expansion of the scientific field has led to a
multiplication of the meanings of this term. In some sciences, it refers to the
idea of law or model; in others, it is linked to the notion of regularity and
universality; in still others, it evokes creation in general or according to
certain aspects of the living being; in yet others, it describes the human
person in his singular unity, in his human aspirations.

JOHN PAUL II, The concept of nature. Address to the members of the
Academy of Sciences, 10/27/1998, in: DC, 12/20/1998, no. 2194, p. 1064.

Even if in certain documents the Magisterium may not take full account of
this multiplicity of meanings, it is well aware of the ambiguity of the term.

Different areas can be subject to the authority of natural law. Paul VI and
John Paul II relied heavily on natural law in debates on sexual morality and
bioethics. During the first half of the twentieth century, popes used the
argument as part of their social teaching: natural law was used to justify the
right to private property, gender and racial equality, or national
independence struggles. The argument is generally considered irrefutable:
nature, whose existence is self-evident, would make the law it determines
incontestable. The argument has often been used in this way in Catholic
teaching, which didn't create it: it borrowed it from classical antiquity, first
Hellenic and then especially Roman.

The Bible does not completely ignore the idea, which is present in the
general acceptance that there is an order of things, an order of creation,
which man must respect. Many dietary rules in the Old Testament are based
on this idea. In some New Testament texts, the vocabulary becomes more
explicit: the word φύσις, nature, from which the word 'physical' is derived, is
not found in the Gospels, but it does occur occasionally in Pauline texts:

Therefore God gave them (the pagans) over to debasing passions: their
women exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural intercourse (τὴν φυσικὴν
χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν); men likewise, forsaking natural intercourse with
woman, were inflamed with desire for one another.... (Rom 1:26-27)

Paul's intention is not to prove that homosexuality is reprehensible. The

notion of nature is used in the context of analogical reasoning: Paul only
wants to show that the rejection of God is as absurd as homosexuality,
whose absurdity is self-evident to him and to Jewish tradition. Other texts
seem to refer more explicitly to a foundation of the moral norm:

When Gentiles, having no law, naturally do (φύσει) what the law commands,
they take the place of law to themselves... (Rom 2:14; the official liturgical
translation uses the word "spontaneously")
How did the pagans know what to do? A "natural" knowledge is presumed,
with no real discussion of its precise origin. But it soon becomes clear that
this knowledge is not infallible, as this other passage shows:

Does not nature itself teach you (ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ διδάσκει ὑμᾶς) that it is
dishonorable for a man to wear long hair.... (1 Cor 11:14)

These precepts, which man perceives as derivations of the first precept of

natural law, are imposed because they alone make it possible to realize the
ends proper to the human being. They are not, therefore, based on an
established physical or metaphysical framework, but on a finality: they
situate the person in his or her development, in a dynamism that is only fully
realized in God, but which is already manifest in his or her inclinations.
Thomas's profound optimism can be seen in the importance he gives to
inclination, which can only be towards the good, and ultimately, towards
God. Of course, it can be distorted when it is directed only towards a
particular good; but even then, its essentially positive character must be
emphasized.

Does this mean that judgment about good and evil is innate, and does
not depend on faith or, more generally, on knowledge of God? According to
Thomas, it is not acquired by birth, but neither does it depend on faith. For
him, too quick a recourse to faith as a source of moral knowledge is to be
avoided. The things of faith," he writes, "are beyond human reason, and can
only be attained by grace, which comes to us through Christ. For the things
of morality, human reason is a sufficient guide:

We are directed towards works of virtue by natural reason, which is in a

sense the rule of human activity (...). And therefore, for works of virtue it is
not necessary that some precepts be given which would go beyond the
precepts of the moral law, which are imposed by reason." S.Th., Ia IIae, Q.
108, a.2, ad 1.

The rules of ordinary behavior can be discovered by natural reason. To obtain

sufficient knowledge of good and evil, external revelation is not necessary:
reason, by itself, because it participates in God's reason, can achieve this,
and direct human activity. However, prudent discernment is always
necessary. The new law, i.e. the Gospel, adds only what relates to the
sacraments and the ultimate end.
 In the centuries that followed, natural law did not play an important
role in moral reflection. Luther believed that only the Word of God could
formulate moral requirements; he was too distrustful of reason, corrupted by
sin, to give it any authority in this area. He distrusts even more, it's true, the
authority of the Church, also corrupted, in his opinion. Faith alone must listen
and let God decide. The Catechism of the Council of Trent also rejects the
existence of an autonomous system of morality, but without denying the
existence of a natural law. It states:

For there is no one who does not feel in the depths of his heart a Law which
God himself has engraved there, and which makes him discern good from
evil, just from unjust, honest from unhonest. Now, the nature and scope of
this Law are in no way different from the written Law, and consequently it is
necessary that God, author of the latter, be at the same time author of the
former. We must therefore teach that this interior law, at the time God gave
Moses the written Law, was obscured and almost extinguished in people's
minds by the corruption of morals, and by inveterate depravity; it is
therefore conceivable that God wished to renew and revive an already
existing Law rather than bring in a new one. Catechism of the Council of
Trent, Part Three, Chap. 28, 2.

This position differs from Luther's: Trent affirms that the law engraved on the
heart is not completely obscured, and that, even after original sin, the
existence of free will is maintained. But natural law is not the basis for
particular obligations; it merely confirms the divine origin of revealed laws.

These precepts, which man perceives as derivations of the first precept of

natural law, are imposed because they alone make it possible to realize the
ends proper to the human being. They are not, therefore, based on an
established physical or metaphysical framework, but on a finality: they
situate the person in his or her development, in a dynamism that is only fully
realized in God, but which is already manifest in his or her inclinations.
Thomas's profound optimism can be seen in the importance he gives to
inclination, which can only be towards the good, and ultimately, towards
God. Of course, it can be distorted when it is directed only towards a
particular good; but even then, its essentially positive character must be
emphasized.

Does this mean that judgment about good and evil is innate, and does
not depend on faith or, more generally, on knowledge of God? According to
Thomas, it is not acquired by birth, but neither does it depend on faith. For
him, too quick a recourse to faith as a source of moral knowledge is to be
avoided. The things of faith," he writes, "are beyond human reason, and can
only be attained by grace, which comes to us through Christ. For the things
of morality, human reason is a sufficient guide:

We are directed towards works of virtue by natural reason, which is in a

sense the rule of human activity (...). And therefore, for works of virtue it is
not necessary that some precepts be given which would go beyond the
precepts of the moral law, which are imposed by reason." S.Th., Ia IIae, Q.
108, a.2, ad 1.

The rules of ordinary behavior can be discovered by natural reason. To obtain

sufficient knowledge of good and evil, external revelation is not necessary:
reason, by itself, because it participates in God's reason, can achieve this,
and direct human activity. However, prudent discernment is always
necessary. The new law, i.e. the Gospel, adds only what relates to the
sacraments and the ultimate end.

In the centuries that followed, natural law did not play an important
role in moral reflection. Luther believed that only the Word of God could
formulate moral requirements; he was too distrustful of reason, corrupted by
sin, to give it any authority in this area. He distrusts even more, it's true, the
authority of the Church, also corrupted, in his opinion. Faith alone must listen
and let God decide. The Catechism of the Council of Trent also rejects the
existence of an autonomous system of morality, but without denying the
existence of a natural law. It states:

For there is no one who does not feel in the depths of his heart a Law which
God himself has engraved there, and which makes him discern good from
evil, just from unjust, honest from unhonest. Now, the nature and scope of
this Law are in no way different from the written Law, and consequently it is
necessary that God, author of the latter, be at the same time author of the
former. We must therefore teach that this interior law, at the time God gave
Moses the written Law, was obscured and almost extinguished in people's
minds by the corruption of morals, and by inveterate depravity; it is
therefore conceivable that God wished to renew and revive an already
existing Law rather than bring in a new one. Catechism of the Council of
Trent, Part Three, Chap. 28, 2.

This position differs from Luther's: Trent affirms that the law engraved on the
heart is not completely obscured, and that, even after original sin, the
existence of free will is maintained. But natural law is not the basis for
particular obligations; it merely confirms the divine origin of revealed laws.

Alphonse de Liguori speaks only briefly of natural law, in answer to the

question: How many precepts are there? He distinguishes several types,
including natural law, which he understands essentially as Thomas Aquinas
understood natural law: it is a formal rule that depends on reason, which
comes to us from God:

The natural precept, or natural law, is the edict, or judgment of our reason,
by which, in the light impressed upon us by the author of nature, we rule
what is to be done, and avoided; of this order is this (rule): good is to be
done, evil shunned.

Theologia Moralis, Lib.1, Tract.2, Dub.2, no. 102.

The manuals of the last century take up the same elements, but natural law
becomes more a source of prescriptions:

Natural law is the divine will, manifested by natural light, which prescribes
what is necessary for the respect of the lawful order. This natural law is
nothing other than the eternal law, intimated to rational nature by natural
light, either habitually, by right reason, or presently, by its edict.

I.P. GURY, Compendium theologiae moralis, Tomus primus, ed. 13, Prati,
1898, no. 122.

The reference to "the lawful order" could be inspired by Alphonse de Liguori,

but clearly does not refer to an order instituted by legislation. Rather, the
author considers the order of creation, as the Bible did. His aim is to show
how God, nature and reason work together to create an awareness of moral
obligation.

In the textbooks of the early 20th century, reflection on natural law no

longer confined itself to recognizing an order of divine origin, but came to
formulate laws, the observance of which would assure the faithful that they
would share in eternal beatitude. The aim, then, is to lay the foundations for
a morality of obedience. Natural law comprises

the set of norms governing man's activity towards his ultimate end as a
reasonable being; promulgated by the light of reason, it is intrinsically
immutable.

L. MULLER, Somme de théologie morale, sous forme de code, 3rd edn,

Tournai, Desclée et Cie, 1947, no. 71 (1st edn, 1936).
For the manuals, it is clear that God, nature and reason agree in requiring
the same moral behavior: natural law therefore continues to be understood
as it had been during the earlier tradition. But its function changes: it must
now serve as the basis for moral rules. Natural law gives humans the
knowledge of what morality requires, a knowledge that can also be acquired
through particular revelation or through the "edicts" of the Church. In the
past, reference to natural law worked differently: the argument was that such
and such an obligation, known through revelation, was so fundamental that it
could only come under natural law; a fact was established. From the 19th
century onwards, the argument was used to justify an obligation that even
non-believers had to acknowledge was well-founded.

But, as we have seen, Leo XIII reacted against the use of the notion as a
basis for the people's claim to sovereignty. This restriction does not prevent
him, in Rerum Novarum, from basing on natural law the right to private
property, the right to found a family, and to form private companies or
associations. In an earlier encyclical, in which he attacked the liberalism of
the time, the Pope had presented a slightly more systematic analysis of the
doctrine. Paradoxically, he had taken as the starting point for his argument
concerning natural law the existence of a natural freedom, the aim of which
natural law shows, rather than imposing limits on.

Thus, it is the law that guides man in his actions, and it is also the law that,
through the sanction of rewards and punishments, urges him to good and
turns him away from evil. Such is, in the first place, the natural law, which is
written and engraved in the heart of every man, since it is man's reason
itself, prescribing him to practice virtue and abstain from sin.

LEON XIII, Libertas praestantissimum, On Human Freedom, 1888, I, 2.

Here, as in St. Thomas, natural law is at the service of the good, but the
emphasis is much stronger on the fact that it is a law to be obeyed. The
framework within which such teaching operates is a morality of obedience.

The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council realized that simply referring to
the natural law did not provide the basis for a moral requirement, and they
generally avoided using such an argument. Some fairly general references to
nature have been retained:
It (Christian revelation) leads us to a more penetrating understanding of the
laws of social life, which the Creator has inscribed in man's spiritual and
moral nature (GS, no. 23).

If public authority, exceeding its competence, oppresses citizens...

let them be allowed to defend their rights... respecting the limits drawn by
natural law and evangelical law.... It is fully in accordance with man's nature
that there should be political-legal structures... Gaudium et spes, 1965, n°
74-75.

The intention of the Council Fathers is to show that the laws they refer to are
not peculiar to the Church, but are generally accepted. Yet the Church
continues to present itself as the authorized interpreter of natural law:

She (the Church) helps to strengthen peace and to establish among men and
peoples the solid foundation of a fraternal community: namely, knowledge of
the divine and natural law. Gaudium et spes, 1965, n° 89.

Christ's faithful, in order to form their conscience, must take into serious
consideration the holy and certain doctrine of the Church... her function is ...
to declare and confirm, by virtue of her authority, the principles of the moral
order deriving from the very nature of man.

Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae, 1965, no. 14.

Breaking with the tradition that based many obligations on natural law, the
Council refers to natural law only to confirm the validity of the laws of social
life. And it does not understand nature as primarily physical: the reference is
to the nature of man.

But shortly after the Council, in his encyclical Humanae vitae, published in
1968, Pope Paul VI once again used the argument of natural law, as he found
it in the physical order. On this basis, he banned the use of the contraceptive
pill, which had been introduced a few years earlier, in 1960. In the first
chapter, he justifies his intervention, which proposes

a new and deeper reflection on the principles of the moral doctrine of

marriage: a doctrine founded on natural law, enlightened and enriched by
divine revelation. No member of the faithful will deny that the Church's
Magisterium is also responsible for interpreting the natural moral law. It is
incontestable, in fact, as our predecessors have repeatedly declared, that
Jesus Christ, in communicating his divine authority to Peter and the apostles,
and in sending them to teach his commandments to all nations, constituted
them the authentic guardians and interpreters of the whole moral law: not
only of the gospel law, but also of the natural law, which is also an
expression of God's will, and the faithful observance of which is equally
necessary for salvation.

PAUL VI, Humanae vitae, 1968, no. 4.

In a note, the encyclical refers to the statements of earlier popes: Pius IX,
Pius X, Pius XI, Pius XII and John XXIII, who had indeed used this natural law
argument in their teachings. Paul VI is clearly keen to remain faithful to a
teaching that has been repeated many times. But can this teaching help
solve the problems posed by the new contraceptive "pill"? The Pope recalls
that a commission had been set up to study the problems of the birth rate.
The commission's final report, accepted by the majority of its members, was
presented to the Pope. But the minority was not satisfied and prepared its
own report. It was this report that the Pope generally followed when he
decided to give his own response.

In the second chapter, the Pope analyzes the doctrinal principles that
must be applied in the search for a solution. He argues that the nature of the
matrimonial act, i.e., of sexual union, must be respected: now, nature has
made this act make procreation possible. To render the act incapable of
realizing this end is therefore unnatural.

But the Church, reminding men to observe the natural law, interpreted by
her constant doctrine, teaches that every matrimonial act must remain open
to the transmission of life (HV, n° 11).

This argument had already been used by Pius XI in the encyclical Casti
Connubii (1930), which presented itself as a statement of all "the true
doctrine of Christ concerning marriage". Among other errors contrary to
Gospel doctrine, the encyclical condemned contraception, which at the time
was practised by interrupting sexual intercourse before ejaculation, a
practice then commonly known as 'onanism'. The argument of natural law
justified this condemnation:

Surely no reason, however grave, can make that which is intrinsically

unnatural become conformable to nature and honest. Since the act of
marriage is, by its very nature, destined for the generation of children, those
who, in performing it, deliberately endeavor to deprive it of its strength and
efficacy, are acting against nature; they are doing a shameful and
intrinsically dishonest thing. Casti Connubii, 1930, part 2, § 2.
Humanae vitae adopts the same reasoning: because the matrimonial act can
transmit life, to deprive it of this potentiality is to act against its nature, and
is therefore condemned.

Yet in the third part of the encyclical, the Pope acknowledges that
natural rhythms of fertility themselves space out the possibility of bringing
forth new life. During these natural periods of infertility, the matrimonial act,
"far from harming conjugal love, on the contrary confers on it a higher
human value" (HV, no. 21): it is the expression of the spouses' love. At this
point, nature gives the act a meaning other than that of procreation. Does
the nature of the act change depending on whether it is performed during
one period or another? More generally, can a physical characteristic of an act
determine its moral quality, whatever the circumstances in which it is
performed?

The Pope's use of the natural law argument has been widely criticized.
However, it was not the only argument he cited to justify his decision. The
Pope also feared that a change in the Church's moral teaching would confuse
the faithful. Moreover, in the conclusion to the encyclical, he listed the
serious consequences that widespread use of the pill could have (HV, no.
17). These considerations, which no longer refer to natural law, certainly had
a strong influence on him.

At the beginning of his pontificate, John Paul II closely followed the

argumentation of Humanae vitae, but gradually, in his numerous references
to the problem posed by artificial contraception, the emphasis shifted
towards a more personalist interpretation of natural law: instead of basing
his teaching on consideration of physical nature, he emphasized above all
the characteristics of human nature, which can only find fulfillment by
serving true values (Fides et Ratio, 1998, n 25). He recognizes in man a
thirst for truth, particularly in the realm of ultimate questions (Id., n 29). At
the same time, he maintains that only obedience to the revealed
commandments guarantees the moral quality of human action (Veritatis
splendor, 1993, n 82). This obedience is not blind, but the fruit of a
discernment that involves several arguments. All lead to the same
conclusion:

The primordial and decisive element for moral judgment is the object of
man's act, who decides whether his act can be oriented to the good and to
the ultimate end, which is God. This orientation is found by reason in man's
very being, understood in its integral truth, and therefore in his natural
inclinations, his dynamisms and his ends, which always also have a spiritual
dimension: this is exactly the content of natural law, and therefore the
organic whole of the 'goods for the person' which are placed at the service of
the 'good of the person', the good which is the person himself and his
perfection. (VS, n 79).

He takes up elements of the Thomistic approach: the object of the act, the
ultimate end, natural inclinations; reason is at work, but it only discovers
what God has willed for the good of the person. Elsewhere, the Pope warns
that insisting on the rational character of natural law could lead Catholic
moral theology "to deny that it has God as its author" (VS, n 36).

This argument was intended to enable pastors to instruct Christians seeking

to understand the Church's teaching. The encyclical Humanae vitae was
addressed to "bishops, priests and deacons, religious men and women, the
lay faithful and all people of good will". The two encyclicals Fides et Ratio and
Veritatis Splendor, on the other hand, were addressed solely "to the bishops
of the Catholic Church", who had to be able to recognize the traditional
character of the arguments employed. Taking into account the local context,
the bishops were to show the faithful how the various factors involved in
moral judgment fit together: reason, faith, moral principles and listening to
the Word of God, all of which help discernment.

In his numerous references to natural law, John Paul II does not use the
argument of natural law as the sole foundation of moral precepts: the
argument illustrates above all their fundamental character, and their perfect
accord with the profound needs of the person. For him, nature is the nature
of the person: it is a philosophical concept, no longer driven by biological
considerations, but by a holistic vision of the human being.

When the International Theological Commission took up the issue, from 2006
to 2008, it did not seek to validate one rule or another: its aim was to identify
ethical values that are universally recognized, despite the diversity of
cultures and religions. The peace and happiness of humanity can only be
founded on such a basis. The commission is convinced that a renewed
presentation of the doctrine of natural law will help to achieve this goal. For
this doctrine

... affirms in substance that human persons and communities are capable, in
the light of reason, of discerning the fundamental orientations of moral
action in conformity with the very nature of the human subject, and of
expressing them normatively in the form of precepts or commandments. A
la recherche d'une éthique universelle : nouveau regard sur la loi naturelle,
Paris, Cerf, 2009, n 9.

So it's not just physical nature, nor just the nature of the individual, but also
the nature of human communities that is now being considered. Natural law
thus finds an additional basis. The commission begins by recognizing that
different cultures manifest the existence of a heritage of moral values
common to all men. In African traditions in particular, the basic affirmation is
that of the primacy of life. Its ethical implications are specified:

African ethics is thus revealed as an anthropocentric and vital ethic: acts that
are supposed to be likely to promote the blossoming of life, to preserve,
protect and develop it, or to increase the vital potential of the community,
are therefore considered good: any act presumed to be prejudicial to the life
of individuals or the community is considered bad. Id. at n 16.

The commission wants to show that Christian teaching in this area is not
strictly confessional. It believes that it is possible 'to show how the common
moral values which constitute the natural law are grasped' (n 37). They are
grasped not through the abstract consideration of human nature, but in an
immediate way, because of the mind's connaturality with values (n 44).
Only then does discursive reason intervene: it determines which moral goods
are capable of fulfilling the person. But because it is confronted with
contingent situations, its conclusions remain uncertain. We speak of natural
law, but

The law here designates an orientation of practical reason that indicates to

the moral subject what type of action is consistent with the fundamental and
necessary dynamism of his being, which tends towards its full realization.

Id. n 43.

Natural law is no longer presented as formulating precise precepts.

Moreover, the commission recognizes that the doctrine of natural law only
makes sense within a certain worldview. The vision it presents is clearly
scholastic in inspiration. This vision is complemented by the recognition of
the social nature of the person, all the dimensions of which appear only in
the person of Jesus Christ. In spite of these conditions, because it is
eminently reasonable, this vision allows dialogue with other religions.
 These various interventions have endeavored to restore a certain
effectiveness to the concept of natural law. Shortly afterwards, in 2013, in
preparation for the Synod on the Family, the Roman Curia sent a
questionnaire to all the Bishops' Conferences, asking them to make it
available to all Christians. The second question concerned marriage
according to natural law, and was formulated as follows:

a) What place does the notion of natural law occupy in civil culture, both at
the institutional, educational and academic levels, and at the popular level?
What conceptions of anthropology underlie this debate on the natural
foundation of the family?

b) Is the notion of natural law concerning the union between a man and a
woman commonly accepted as such by the baptized in general?

c) How, in practice and in theory, is the natural law of union between a man
and a woman for the purpose of forming a family contested? How is it
proposed and explored in civil and ecclesial organizations?

The Instrumentum Laboris, prepared in advance of the Synod's Plenary

Assembly, drew conclusions from the responses received:

21 ... For the vast majority of responses and observations, the concept of
"natural law" appears, as such, today, in different cultural contexts, highly
problematic, if not incomprehensible. It is an expression that is perceived
differently or simply not understood...

25. If, on the one hand, we are witnessing a loss of meaning of "natural law",
on the other, as various Episcopal Conferences in Africa, Oceania and East
Asia affirm, in certain regions it is polygamy that is considered "natural", just
as it is considered "natural" to repudiate a woman who is unable to give
children - and, in particular, sons - to her husband. In other words, from the
point of view of the prevailing culture, natural law can no longer be
considered universal, as long as there is no common system of reference.

It has therefore become necessary to rethink the way the doctrine is

presented, and perhaps to rethink the doctrine itself. To achieve this, we
need to ...

30 ... substantially emphasize the role of the Word of God as a privileged

instrument in the conception of conjugal and family life. Greater reference to
the biblical world, its languages and narrative forms, is recommended. In this
sense, the proposal to thematize and deepen the biblically-inspired concept
of the "order of creation" is worthy of note as a means of re-reading "natural
law" in a more existentially significant way (cf. the idea of law inscribed in
the heart in Romans 1:19-21 and 2:14-15). Some also propose an insistence
on accessible languages, such as the symbolic language used in liturgy.
Attention to the world of youth, to be considered as a direct interlocutor,
especially on these themes, is also recommended.

3rd Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum

Laboris, Vatican, 2014.

In line with these conclusions, Pope Francis' apostolic exhortation Amoris

Laetitia, which closes this synodal journey on the family, never uses the
expression 'natural law', except once, in a quotation from the text of the
International Theological Commission, which confirms that the notion cannot
found general norms:

"Natural law cannot therefore be presented as an already constituted set of

rules that are imposed a priori on the moral subject, but it is a source of
objective inspiration for his or her eminently personal approach to decision-
making" Amoris Laetitia, 2016, no. 305, citing In Search of a Universal Ethic:
A New Look at Natural Law (2009), no. 59.

Rather than seeking to base a law, whether on biological nature, on the

nature of the person or of the community, Pope Francis presents Christian
doctrine concerning marriage as based entirely on the demands of love. The
fourth chapter, entitled "Love in Marriage" (nos. 89-164), first draws on St
Paul's hymn to charity (1 Cor 13:4-7) and then considers various aspects of
married life. The fifth chapter, on "Love that becomes fruitful" (n°165-198)
broadens the perspective, considering the love of children and the extended
family. The Pope does not seek to formulate rules, but to show the
fruitfulness of the love to which the Gospel calls human beings.

This historical journey shows that important changes have taken place in the
Church's use of the concept of natural law. The starting point was the biblical
order of creation. Scholasticism took up the concept of natural law from the
Greek tradition to designate the participation of reason in the mind of God,
asserting that human behavior cannot run counter to God's creative will.
Later, textbooks presented natural law as the foundation of a superior,
universal and immutable normative system. Today, rather than calling for the
observance of natural laws, Pope Francis insists on the demands of love. The
meaning given to the notion of natural law, and its use in moral theology,
have thus varied considerably over the course of history. Today, the notion is
no longer understood by the majority of Christians. It should therefore not be
used in Christian pastoral practice.

It has therefore become necessary to rethink the way the doctrine is

presented, and perhaps to rethink the doctrine itself. To achieve this, we
need to ...

30 ... substantially emphasize the role of the Word of God as a privileged

instrument in the conception of conjugal and family life. Greater reference to
the biblical world, its languages and narrative forms, is recommended. In this
sense, the proposal to thematize and deepen the biblically-inspired concept
of the "order of creation" is worthy of note as a means of re-reading "natural
law" in a more existentially significant way (cf. the idea of law inscribed in
the heart in Romans 1:19-21 and 2:14-15). Some also propose an insistence
on accessible languages, such as the symbolic language used in liturgy.
Attention to the world of youth, to be considered as a direct interlocutor,
especially on these themes, is also recommended.

3rd Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Instrumentum

Laboris, Vatican, 2014.

In line with these conclusions, Pope Francis' apostolic exhortation Amoris

Laetitia, which closes this synodal journey on the family, never uses the
expression 'natural law', except once, in a quotation from the text of the
International Theological Commission, which confirms that the notion cannot
found general norms:

"Natural law cannot therefore be presented as an already constituted set of

rules that are imposed a priori on the moral subject, but it is a source of
objective inspiration for his or her eminently personal approach to decision-
making" Amoris Laetitia, 2016, no. 305, citing In Search of a Universal Ethic:
A New Look at Natural Law (2009), no. 59.

Rather than seeking to base a law, whether on biological nature, on the

nature of the person or of the community, Pope Francis presents Christian
doctrine concerning marriage as based entirely on the demands of love. The
fourth chapter, entitled "Love in Marriage" (nos. 89-164), first draws on St
Paul's hymn to charity (1 Cor 13:4-7) and then considers various aspects of
married life. The fifth chapter, on "Love that becomes fruitful" (n°165-198)
broadens the perspective, considering the love of children and the extended
family. The Pope does not seek to formulate rules, but to show the
fruitfulness of the love to which the Gospel calls human beings.
This historical journey shows that important changes have taken place in the
Church's use of the concept of natural law. The starting point was the biblical
order of creation. Scholasticism took up the concept of natural law from the
Greek tradition to designate the participation of reason in the mind of God,
asserting that human behavior cannot run counter to God's creative will.
Later, textbooks presented natural law as the foundation of a superior,
universal and immutable normative system. Today, rather than calling for the
observance of natural laws, Pope Francis insists on the demands of love. The
meaning given to the notion of natural law, and its use in moral theology,
have thus varied considerably over the course of history. Today, the notion is
no longer understood by the majority of Christians. It should therefore not be
used in Christian pastoral practice.

However, the notion is not doomed to disappear: in one form or another, it

resurfaces when the ultimate foundation of morality is studied. The
International Theological Commission proposes replacing it with the more
biblically inspired concept of the order of creation. The analysis of this
concept can lead to the formulation of basic moral precepts. One way of
doing this, mostly used by American theologians, is to show that, according
to the order of creation, behavior must comply with the requirements of the
virtues, particularly justice, temperance, courage - in short, all the virtues
that should enable the world to maintain itself in harmony, and human
beings to reach their fulfillment. Any behavior to the contrary violates the
created order, and must be denounced. If this created order is not respected,
the social order must intervene, and if its intervention remains ineffective,
the believer expects the Creator of the world to restore it himself, as and
when he wishes. This approach to the order of creation does not necessarily
lead to the formulation of very precise norms, but finds in the many
dimensions of charity the foundations of morality. In the past and still today,
Christian morality can find in the analysis of the requirements of virtue the
basic principles for its elaboration.

This link between natural law and virtue has rarely been highlighted in
textbook theology, no doubt because law was assumed to be universal,
whereas virtue is a personal option. Yet the link between the two is quite
obvious: virtues implement natural inclinations, which are themselves
formalized in laws. Natural inclinations are thus given a very broad meaning.
They refer beyond human nature to its Creator. The Bible suggests such an
approach: it recognizes in man the image of God, and makes this image the
first principle of a constitutive morality of humanity: human behavior must
conform to that of God. According to this reasoning, human nature alone is
not normative. Morality cannot simply refer to it: it must go beyond it, to the
will of the Creator. Only in God will humanization be complete, when his
image shines forth in the human face.

Natural law is therefore no longer considered in reference to physical

nature, nor to community, reason, freedom, or any other human quality: the
perception of the human is not invested with moral authority. Moreover,
humanity's perception of itself is constantly being renewed; it is not based on
knowledge of an original nature. It is always conditioned, even if it is
unaware of it. Moreover, it is marked by sin. Rather than clinging to a
present-day perception of nature, we need to embark on the exodus from a
state of sin to the promised land, and thus follow the path God leads us by.

Revealed laws and those promulgated by great institutions do not

depend on such an analysis. For they sometimes promulgate laws that do
not accord with what this analysis presents as God's intended order. Jesus
considers such a case in his debate with the Pharisees over divorce. He
declares: "At the beginning of the world, God made them male and female;
therefore a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife,
and the two shall become one flesh" (Mk 10:6-7; Mt 19:4-5). Jesus corrects
the rule decreed by an institution, Jewish law, by contrasting it with a verse
from the creation story. Based on this text, theology has understood revealed
rules as restoring those of creation, corrupted by sin. The contribution of
institutions can be both good and bad. Like Moses' law on divorce, other
biblical laws, which are often determined by historical context, must be
understood in the light of the whole of revelation. In the Old Testament
narratives, God commands the extermination of Israel's enemies, thus
demonstrating the effectiveness of his covenant. But Jesus commands us to
love them, revealing that God's love excludes no one. Rather than relying on
laws, whether revealed or institutional, moral judgment must strive to
understand God's call, hic et nunc, as it is addressed to the individual in the
precise circumstances in which he finds himself.

Contrary to what has been said in the past, natural law should not be seen as
a normative system whose precepts are immutable and universal. For
nature, whether physical or human, is not a monolith: it is dynamic,
constantly adapting to new conditions. Man, in particular, is more history
than nature. Only the end towards which nature directs us is always the
same: fulfillment in God. To know how to reach it, discernment is always
required. This is the true meaning of natural law, which Pope Francis defines
in a new way:

This innate capacity to discern and order or dispose acts towards their
ultimate end through love, traditionally called "natural law"...

Message of Pope Francis on the occasion of the study days on the theme
'Social ontology and natural law in perspective in Thomas Aquinas', March 7-
8, 2024. Cf. www.vatican, messages.

Natural law is therefore not a set of laws, but a capacity that is indeed
natural: it characterizes man better than laws could.