1AC---Degrowth

Contention one is Degrowth:

Continued growth is an unsustainable march towards

extinction. The impossibility of decoupling within available
timescales necessitates degrowth.
Diana Stuart, 2021, Associate Professor in the Sustainable Communities
Program and in the School of Earth and Sustainability at Northern Arizona
University, Ryan Gunderson, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Social Justice
Studies in the Department of Sociology and Gerontology and Affiliate of the
Institute for the Environment and Sustainability at Miami University, Brian
Petersen, Associate Professor in the Geography, Planning and Recreation
Department at Northern Arizona University, The Degrowth Alternative, A Path to
Address our Environmental Crisis?, p. 1-33
1 Addressing our environmental crisis

The words “crisis” and “emergency” are increasingly used by scientists and in the media to describe the state of
our environment. For example, in 2019 an article representing the views of 11,000 scientists was published in
BioScience, titled “World Scientists’ Warning of a Climate Emergency” (Ripple et al. 2019). Also, in 2019, the
“Call it a Climate Crisis” campaign urged media organizations to use the words “climate crisis” instead of “climate
change,” resulting in a widespread increase in the use of the term.

The terms “ ecological crisis ” and “ biodiversity crisis ” are also now commonly used
by conservation scientists and in the media. For example, a letter representing almost 100 scientists was
published in October of 2018 titled: “Facts about our ecological crisis are incon-trovertible” (Green et al. 2018). A
year later, a “bleak” United Nations report on biodiversity and ecosystem services (IPBES 2019a) resulted in
scientists publicly calling for rapid funding and intervention to address the “biodiversity crisis” (Malcom et al.
2019).

Are we indeed facing multiple environmental crises? General definitions of a “crisis” include a decisive moment or
crucial time, a critical phase that determines all future events, a condition of danger or precarity, threats to
primary goals, being affected by serious problems, extreme trouble, and a time of great difficulty. In addition,
is a process of transformation where the old
according to Venette (2003: 43), a “crisis

system can no longer be maintained .” Evidence suggests that, in terms of all of these
different meanings, we are in a state of environmental crisis , which includes the dual

crises of climate change and biodiversity loss . We briefly present some of the most recent
and compelling scientific evidence demonstrating the reality and severity of these crises below.

Our presentation of the evidence of these crises is brief, as the overall objective of this book is to examine how we
can best address them. We present some of the most authoritative and boldest statements from scientists about
the possible and likely impacts if we stay on our current course. Then we quickly shift to focus on solutions. For
reasons we will describe, we are skeptical of popularly proposed solutions to tackle these crises and instead seek
out more far-reaching and transformative alternatives. We focus on a key lever in our system that drives the speed
and direction of our material and energy flows, economic growth, and examine degrowth as an alternative to move
us towards a better and more sustainable future.

Evidence of our climate and biodiversity crises

With only a little more than 1°C

Mounting evidence indicates that we are in a climate crisis.
increase in average global temperatures since preindustrial levels, we are
already seeing serious impacts including unprecedented fires , floods , and
hurricanes ; and much more severe impacts are projected as warming
continues. Steffen et al. (2018) explain the real possibility of reaching a critical threshold of
warming or a global tipping point after which additional warming would be
uncontrollable , resulting in a “Hothouse Earth” scenario. In Nature, Lenton et al. (2019:
595) state that climate change “is an existential threat to civilization,” explaining that “the

evidence from tipping points alone suggests that we are in a state of planetary
emergency : both the risk and urgency of the situation are acute.”

Climate impacts are already unfolding and the crisis will amplify with
increasing climate-related disasters , melting ice , and rising sea levels . The 2018
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report Global Warming of 1.5°C contains much
bolder language than previous reports to stress the significant difference in impacts between a 1.5°C and a 2°C
increase in average global temperatures and the need for immediate, unprecedented, and far-reaching action. In
addition, a 2019 report in the Lancet details how climate change is already impacting human health globally and
warns of devastating health impacts as warming continues (Watts et al. 2019). Lastly, Ripple et al. (2019: 1),
representing the Alliance of World Scientists, identify “disturbing” and “worrisome” vital signs of climate impacts
that they state “clearly and unequivocally” illustrates we are in a “climate emergency.”

biodiversity loss (Thomas et al. 2004), it is considered a

Although the climate crisis contributes to
separate, yet related, crisis. Conservation biologists pointed out years ago that we are in the
midst of the sixth global mass extinction event, driven by humans (Barnosky et al.
2011), also referred to as the “ extinction tsunami ” (Lovejoy 2017) or “ biological

annihilation ” (Ceballos et al. 2017). Recent indicators of a biodiversity crisis include half of all
vertebrate populations in decline (Ceballos et al. 2017), a global extinction rate of
approximately 200 species each day (Green et al. 2018), the loss of 29% of birds in North America
since 1970 (Rosenberg et al. 2019), and 1 million species (25%) facing extinction globally (IPBES 2019a). A
comprehensive report from the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
humans are driving global changes in plant and
Services (IPBES 2019a) concludes that

animal life that are unprecedented in history.

The biodiversity crisis will increasingly impact human societies . While many
people overlook human dependency on other species, scientists continue to argue that at
current rates we will alter the natural world in ways that threaten not only human well-
being but also human existence (Ceballos et al. 2015). The concept of ecosystem services
has been used for decades to emphasize the ways that humans benefit from and
depend on ecosystems (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) and projections of global
change reveal the potential severity of social impacts from biodiversity loss. The
IPBES media release (2019b) states that species loss has accelerated to rates that “constitutes
a direct threat to human well-being in all regions of the world.” The United Nations
biodiversity chief warns of ecological thresholds and tipping points that could result in a
cascade of extinctions , collapse , and social impacts (Conley 2019).
If a crisis is a decisive moment, crucial time, or a critical phase that determines future events, then, according to
scientists, we are in a state of environmental crisis. If a crisis is a condition of danger or precarity that poses
serious problems, extreme trouble, and great difficulty, then the science again indicates we are in a climate and
ecological crisis. In addition to scientists, an increasing number of other people now recognize these serious
threats. For example, United States (US) public opinion polls reveal that more than a quarter of Americans
consider climate change a “crisis” with a further 36% defining it as a “serious problem” (CBS News 2019). In
addition, 60% of Americans polled think government should do something to address global warming and 70%
believe environmental protection is more important than economic growth (Marlon et al. 2019). In the United
Kingdom (UK), 85% of citizens are concerned about climate change, 52% are very concerned, and 55% think the
UK should bring emissions to net zero before 2050 targets (Dickman and Skinner 2019).

If we define a crisis as “a process of transformation where the old system can no longer be maintained” (Venette
the status
2003: 43), we also see mounting evidence that we are in a state of crisis. According to scientists,
quo can no longer be maintained and instead “ rapid and far-reaching changes
are needed in all aspects of society” (IPCC 2018). Lenton et al. (2019: 595) explain that “[n]o
amount of economic cost–benefit analysis is going to help us. We need to change our approach to the climate
problem.” Ripple et al. (2019: 3, 4) and the Alliance of World Scientist state that to “secure a
sustainable future , we must change how we live ” and “[t]he good news is that such trans-
formative change, with social and economic justice for all, promises far greater human well-being than does
business as usual.” If we are indeed in a state of crisis, where the old system must be replaced, what kind of new
system do we need? What changes are necessary to minimize ecological and social impacts?

What kind of change is needed?

There is a vast amount of scientific evidence supporting the reality and seriousness of both the climate and
biodiversity crises. We presented only a small portion of this evidence and every week more is produced by
scientists across the globe. Instead of going any further into the science supporting the realities of these crises,
this book focuses on what changes are needed to address them. In other words, if we accept that we are indeed
facing an unprecedented environmental crisis, how can society respond in ways that are effective and just?

There are many proposed solutions to address our environmental crisis. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, popularly
discussed solutions include individual behavior changes, market-based schemes, techno-logical innovations and
efficiency gains, renewable energy creation,1 and geoengineering. But will these be enough? Do they represent
the “far-reaching” changes in all aspects of society called for by scientists? Do they represent the “transformative
change” that scientists call for? In Chapter 2, we present evidence demonstrating the inadequacy of popular
proposed solutions. We also illustrate exactly why these pro-posed solutions will not be sufficient—because they
are not transformative or far-reaching and, most critically, they fail to address the root driver of these problematic
environmental conditions.

Many scientists now agree that a system prioritizing economic growth is a root
driver of both the climate and biodiversity crises . Green et al. (2018: 1), representing nearly
100 scientists, argue that governments have betrayed us “in failing to acknowledge that

infinite economic growth on a planet with finite resources is non-viable .” Steffen

et al. (2018: 5–6) state that “[t]he present dominant socioeco-nomic system, however, is based on high-carbon
economic growth and exploitative resource use” and we need “changes in behavior, technology and innovation,
governance, and values.” The IPBES summary report (2019a: 10) similarly explains:

A key component of sustainable pathways is the evolution of global financial

and economic systems to build a global sustainable economy, steering away
from the current, limited paradigm of economic growth… It would also entail a shift
beyond standard economic indicators such as gross domestic product to include those able to capture
more holistic, long-term views of economics and quality of life.

Lastly, Ripple et al. (2019: 4) state that:

Excessive extraction of materials and overexploitation of ecosystems,

driven by economic growth, must be quickly curtailed to maintain long-
term sustainability of the biosphere … Our goals need to shift from GDP growth and the
pursuit of affluence to-ward sustaining ecosystems and improving human well-being by prioritizing basic
needs and reducing inequality.

Why are these scientists focusing so much on GDP? GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product and represents the
market value of all goods and services produced in a specific time period. GDP was created as an indicator during
World War II, aimed to assess productive capa-bilities for the war effort. Increasing GDP annually was then widely
adopted as a global economic goal, with average yearly increases in the US of around 3%. That means every year
more and more goods are produced and services offered.

producing an ever-increasing amount of goods and services each year

However,

continues to require an increasing amount of materials and energy . It therefore

makes sense that a GDP growth of 1% equals a 0.6% growth in material use (Wiedmann et al. 2015) and a 1%
the
increase in GDP equals a 0.5–0.7% increase in carbon emissions (Burke et al. 2015). It also makes sense that
most notable carbon emissions reductions have occurred during economic
recession due to a reduction in production and consumption (Feng et al. 2015).
Based on their analyses of carbon budgets, Anderson and Bows (2011) find that overall reductions in

economic growth are necessary to effectively address climate change.

production of goods drives higher rates of extraction and

In terms of biodiversity loss, the
use of resources impacting land use , habitat , hunting / harvesting , pollution ,
invasive species , and climate change —all major drivers of extinction (Ceballos
et al. 2017; IPBES 2019a; Otero et al. 2020). The production of beef, soybeans, and biofuels
(Rudell et al. 2009) drives deforestation in the tropics, the leading cause of terrestrial

extinction (Sodhi et al. 2009). In addition, globalized trade has resulted in the
proliferation of invasive species (Mooney and Hobbs 2000; Otero et al. 2020). Czech et al. (2012)
and Sol’s (2019) analyses reveal a strong positive association between GDP growth and species endangerment. In
economic growth increases resource use, trade, land use
a 2020 review, Otero et al. il-lustrate how
change, climate change, and invasive species—all contributing to bio-diversity loss. As the United
Nations biodiversity chief Paşca Palmer explains, this means that to address the biodiversity crisis, “ [w]e need
a transformation in the way we consume and produce ” (Conley 2019). Scientists
increasingly agree that to address climate change and biodi-versity loss we need to rethink and even
recreate our economic system.
Questioning economic growth

The science illustrates that it is not GDP growth that results in in-creased carbon emissions and species
many people
extinction, but the increase in material and energy use associated with economic growth. Thus,
have turned to the idea of decoupling to address this problematic relationship. Decoupling, in
absolute terms, would mean creating a production system where economic growth
could increase without increasing environmental impacts. Yet, as we will detail in Chapter 3,
absolute decoupling remains elusive in terms of resource use and much too
slow in terms of reducing carbon emissions (Hickel and Kallis 2019; Schor and Jorgenson
2019). Those who continue to defend decoupling and the idea of “green growth” largely rely
upon data that fails to take into account imported goods and system
complexities beyond national borders (see Knight and Schor 2014; Schor and Jorgenson 2019).

absolute decoupling for materials is likely impossible

What the evidence shows is that

and that absolute decoupling of carbon emissions is nowhere near the rates
necessary (Hickel and Kallis 2019). What decoupling does provide is a useful concept to rationalize the
continuation of GDP growth and wealth accumulation for a relatively small portion of the population: in 2017, the
wealthiest 1% of individuals held 82% of all global wealth (Oxfam 2018). A small subset of the population has
this system is now increasingly
greatly benefited from a system that prioritizes eco-nomic growth, but
putting all people in danger. Given that decoupling as a solution remains elusive in reality, reliance
on the idea is a risky approach as our environmental crisis continues to escalate
(Schor and Jorgenson 2019).

A key idea in this debate is biophysical limits . Scientists and economists have long disputed the
existence of biophysical or planetary limits. If we assume there are no limits , then we can
continue to prioritize never-ending economic growth and the extraction, production, and
consumption to support that growth. If we believe that there are limits , however, then we need to
modify our social systems in ways that stay within these limits or we end up in
“ ecological overshoot ” or exceeding safe “planetary boundaries” (Rockstrom 2009).

our current use of

Ecological economists, scientists, and environmentalists increasingly argue that
natural resources and energy already surpasses the Earth’s biophysical limits
(e.g., Jackson 2009; Daly 2013). According to Rockstrom (2009), we have already surpassed
boundaries related to the nitrogen cycle , biodiversity , and climate (Steffen et al.
2015). Based on the ecological footprint concept, Earth Overshoot Day represents the day each year that
humanity uses more resources and services than can be regenerated in a year. Every year that day comes earlier.
As explained by Pope Francis (EOD 2019):

The fact that has shocked me the most is the Overshoot Day: by July 29th, we used up all the
regenerative resources of 2019. From July 30 we started to consume more resources than the planet can
regenerate in a year. It’s very serious. It’s a global emergency.

Schmelzer (2015) argues that the cause of overshoot is economic growth and “increasing levels of
material production run up to the ecological limits of a finite planet.” Scientists also agree that never-ending
economic growth on a finite planet is “non-viable” (Green et al. 2018). While we are not yet
seeing global resource shortages in line with neo-Malthusian projections, the climate and biodiversity crises
represent warning signs of the non-viability of our current trajectory.

we then need to reduce production and

If we accept that we must live within biophysical limits,
consumption levels in places where people are over-producing and over-
consuming, namely wealthy countries. In these wealthy countries, the goal of increasing GDP has resulted in
increased marketing and the production of unnecessary and purposefully short-lived goods (Hickel 2019a). As
material production has continued to increase in these countries, advertising encourages people to buy more
data continues to show that
additional goods and credit cards and debt enable these purchases. Yet
after basic human needs are met, additional material goods do not increase
happiness and/or well-being (Easterlin et al. 2010). Despite technological innovations and productivity
gains, work time has increased to produce more and more goods per person (Circle Economy 2020). Rauch (2000)
estimated that if we lived off of the productivity from a 40-hour work week in 1975 we would only need to work 23
hours per week, and if we lived off of 1950 productivity levels we would only need to work 11 hours per week. We
are working more to produce more and have more, but we are not any happier and we are heading deeper into
crises.

Does prioritizing economic growth make sense? Kallis (2015a) argues that the idea of never-ending economic
growth is “absurd” and explains, “if the Egyptians had started with one cubic metre of stuff and grew it by 4.5%
per year, by the end of their 3,000-year civilization, they would have occupied 2.5 billion solar systems.” In
terms of entropy law , researchers have quantitatively illustrated the
“ thermodynamic impossibility ” of never-ending economic growth and deemed it
irresponsible to continue on the current trajectory (Earp and Romeiro 2015: 643). Even
with a reasonable assumption of technological innovation and the substitution
of resources , their analysis indicates a catastrophic outcome if we maintain
the status quo.
The possibly catastrophic outcomes bring into question the moral implications of economic growth. Given the
uncertainties of future technological and economic developments, is it moral to assume we will find ways to
continue to support economic growth? If we follow the precautionary principle , the
appropriate approach would be to assume that there are biophysical limits and
unknown thresholds and to act accordingly to reduce the risk of surpassing
them. If we act, we could also change our system in ways that could be socially beneficial. Even if the risks
of these crises are overstated, we could still benefit from changing our system in the
ways necessary to address them. Therefore, the risks associated with assuming there are versus there are no
biophysical limits are substantially different and have vast moral implications.
If, despite the increasing evidence, world leaders continue to act as if there are no biophysical limits and prioritize economic growth before addressing our environmental crisis, the
projected impacts would be unequally experienced and result in clear injustice in terms of racial, economic, intergenerational, and inter-species justice. The rise of a youth climate
change movement has brought new attention to the intergenerational injustice of these crises and activists are calling out the immorality of the economic growth paradigm. For
example, 16-year-old Swedish climate activist, Greta Thunberg spoke to the United Nations, stating:

People are suffering. People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction. And all they can talk about is money and
fairytales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!

If we listen to the scientists and acknowledge the improbability of “science fiction” level technology saving us from the environmental crisis (Earp and Romeiro 2015: 649), then
continuing with the status quo becomes clearly immoral. Mounting evidence more than justifies deeply questioning economic growth and examining alternative paths forward.

Degrowth for a better future?

We, the authors, are three social scientists who have been studying environmental issues for many years, especially issues related to climate change, biodiversity conservation, and
agriculture. After studying social and ecological impacts and identifying the causes and drivers of these impacts, we were left questioning the adequacy of dominantly proposed
solutions and seeking more effective alternatives. Upon being convinced by the evidence that the economic growth imperative is a key driver of the problems we study, we stumbled
upon a whole body of literature and scholarship presenting another way forward: degrowth.

We approach degrowth from a position of great concern over how to justly address our climate and biodiversity crises. We are convinced that a system prioritizing economic growth is
a key driver of these crises, so we seek to understand how we can change our society to move away from growth. Degrowth is a planned downscaling of pro-duction and consumption
in wealthy, overconsuming countries to transition to a steady-state economy that exists within biophysical limits and can be sustained. It is living with enough and reproducing that
level of enough, not producing more and more for the sake of GDP growth. It is working less, producing less, and consuming less unnecessary things. Degrowth also has the potential
to substantially increase equality, health, and well-being. There are also legitimate questions and concerns about degrowth, including the use of the term “degrowth,” which we will
discuss later in this book.

Degrowth does not aim to decrease GDP but abandons it as a societal goal and aims to reduce the material and energy throughput pushing us over biophysical limits. In this way, it
would alleviate many of the stressors causing the climate and biodiversity crises. It would also present an opportunity to restructure society around new goals aimed at improving
social and ecological well-being. Jackson (2009) argues that due to ecological limits it is not a matter of if the economy will contract but when. With degrowth, we can choose a
transition to a more sustainable system rather than wait for the climate and biodiversity crises to trigger possible economic and social collapse.

In the following chapters, we examine how a degrowth transition could address our climate and biodiversity crises. We transparently take a normative position: protecting current and
future generations of humans and other species is important and a worthy reason to re-think our social and economic system. In Chapter 2, we summarize evidence showing that
mainstream solutions to these crises are insufficient. In Chapter 3, we present evidence that challenges the economic growth paradigm and illustrates the problems in continuing with
the status quo. Chapter 4 describes degrowth, including key principles, policy proposals, and associated lifestyle changes. Chapter 5 discusses some of the primary critiques of
degrowth. Our final chapter examines how a degrowth transition might actually come about and the challenges and opportunities moving forward.

Our overall goal in this book is to examine degrowth as a way to minimize the impacts associated with our environmental crisis and to offer a more just future. While we will present
substantial evidence that supports a degrowth transition, we will also at times take critical positions and question certain proposals and ideas. Our overall examination focuses on
what might result in the best possible future. We are indeed in a clear state of crisis: it is a decisive moment and a crucial time in history, we face serious dangers and challenges
ahead, our decisions today will have far-reaching impacts into the future, and our current system can no longer be maintained. In this book, we ex-amine degrowth as an alternative to
address this crisis and support a better future. Gills and Morgan (2019: 13), argue “We need to start thinking about degrowth as responsible and not radical. We need to start thinking
of it as the realistic option.” This book aims to further the consideration of degrowth as a viable alternative and to examine how it could be used to create a more sustainable and just
future.

[[CHAPTER 1 NOTE OMITTED]]

[[CHAPTER 2 BEGINS]]
2 Beyond false solutions

A primary reason to consider degrowth as a response to the climate and biodiversity crises
is the mounting evidence illustrating that other proposed solutions will either be
insufficient or too risky and therefore represent “false solutions.” While some current solutions
do indeed offer positive contributions, they remain insufficient because the economic

growth imperative undermines their potential. Solutions that ignore the relationship between
the system that drives economic growth and our environmental crisis leave the primary driver intact.

The false solutions we examine here include individual behavioral changes (without
market-based solutions
changing the social systems in which individual behaviors are structured),
through carbon pricing , improving energy and carbon efficiency (without pursuing
total reductions in energy consumption), expanding renewable energy (but not simultaneously
reducing fossil fuel use and total energy consumption), and lastly geoengineering (which is too risky).
The first two mainstream solutions are common in both climate change and biodiversity efforts while the last three
are specific to climate change. Some of these solutions overlap. For example, many suggested individual
behavioral changes are “market-based solutions” in that they recommend changes in consumptive habits,
assuming that this will influence market dynamics in environmentally beneficial ways.

We have purposefully chosen the straightforward and polemical term “false solutions” because alone these
solutions are empty promises. They are “false” either because they are (1) inadequate or (2) too risky and (3)
divert attention and funding away from adequate, more just, and less risky solutions. By “inadequate,” we mean
the solution is characterized by one or more of the following:

Too slow or small in impact to meet prominent emissions reductions targets.

Too slow or small in impact to dramatically slow or halt biodiversity loss.

Paradoxically increases environmental pressure (as in the case of the “Jevons paradox”).

solar geoengineering, may have the potential to adequately address global

One of the false solutions,
warming but is simply too risky to pursue when compared to alternative pathways .

Our other criterion of a false solution, that it diverts attention and funding from adequate solutions, deserves
qualification. Some of these solutions, especially individual behavioral changes and the expansion of renewable
energy, are essential for a degrowth transition if combined with the strategies outlined in Chapter 5. For example,
changing the in-dividual behaviors of large groups of people is of critical importance to significantly reduce
carbon emissions and slow or halt biodiversity loss. We do not object to changing individual behaviors, but given
the evidence we do not believe that changing individual behaviors within the current social formation will meet
ecological goals and are also skeptical of the assumption that changes in individual behaviors will lead to system-
level changes. The following sections summarize the inadequacies and/or risks of these solutions and provide
evidence that they divert funding and attention away from more effective and less risky solutions.
Individual behavioral changes

The call to “go green” usually implies changing our lifestyle and every-day routines to address environmental problems, including switching to energy-efficient lightbulbs,
weatherproofing homes, driving less or buying a hybrid car, carpooling, taking shorter showers, and buying “greener” products. Yet increasing evidence shows that individual
behavioral changes are inadequate responses to our environmental crisis and, more importantly, divert attention, and even reduce support for, more effective system-altering
responses.

We recognize there are clear benefits to adopting environmentally friendly behaviors. However, as a solution (1) greening one’s lifestyle is inadequate when pursued alone or even
when paired with other false solutions, (2) the focus on individual consumptive practices misunderstands relations between production and consumption and reproduces the social
system that drives biodiversity loss and climate change, and, most importantly, (3) the narrow focus on changing lifestyles in main-stream narratives overlooks the structural basis of
the ecological crisis, thereby diverting attention from more effective and just solutions.

While we are unaware of any empirical studies that assess the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of lifestyle changes on biodiversity conservation, there is evidence of their inadequacy
for addressing climate change, also a known driver of biodiversity loss. Individual- to household-level changes have been estimated to be able to reduce emissions by around 7% (Dietz
et al. 2009) to 22% (Jensen 2009) in the US. However, to avoid catastrophic warming and limit warming to 1.5°C, the US should reach net-zero emissions by 2030 (Climate Action
Tracker 2019). Lifestyle changes within the existing system cannot reduce emissions at the rate and scale necessary to avoid catastrophic warming. It is important to again emphasize
that we are not against individual behavioral changes, we are merely pointing out that they are insufficient, as supporters of this strategy know (Dietz et al. 2009).

A second reason individual behavioral changes are a false solution is due to the focus on changing consumptive behavior. “Going green” often means “shopping green.” However, as
Galbraith (1958) and others (Schnaiberg 1980) argued long ago, production drives consumption, primarily through advertising and the creation of false needs via the culture industry
(Marcuse 1964; Horkheimer and Adorno 1969). A system that requires constant growth must keep expanding pro-duction and also increase consumption to create buyers for more and
more products. The focus on “greening” consumption cannot address this relationship because it assumes the relationship is inverted (i.e., that consumption drives production).
Relatedly, the marketed “green-ness” of most green commodities is questionable. For example, food, textile, and woods-products companies who use at least one form of “sustainable
sourcing practice” (52%) (e.g., third-party organic certification) typically only address one or a few inputs (71%) and rarely address environmental issues (Thorlakson et al. 2018).

The third and most important reason individual behavioral change should be considered a false solution is that this focus diverts attention away from the structural and system-level
changes needed to adequately address our environmental crisis (Brulle and Dunlap 2015). As Szasz argues in Shopping our way to safety (2007), the attempt to protect ourselves from
environmental hazards through shopping leads to “political anesthesia,” or “a false sense of security undercutting political support for reform,” thereby reproducing the existing social
order (Szasz 2007: 202). For example, the option of implementing household actions to reduce emissions makes people less likely to support carbon taxes (Werfel 2017). Further,
there is empirical evidence that individual behavioral changes may have other counterintuitive effects: when re-cycling options are available people increase resource use (Catlin and
Wang 2013) and purchasing “green” products leads to less altruistic actions (Mazar and Zhong 2010). Relatedly, the financial savings gained from reducing one’s carbon footprint
often fund other activities that act to shift the impacts elsewhere (Wapner and Willoughby 2005).

Market-based solutions

In climate change
Market-based solutions are common in both climate change and biodiversity policy.
policy, carbon markets usually consist of cap-and-trade and or carbon offset
programs, implemented or under consideration in many regions from city to interstate levels, including
Australia, California, the European Union (EU), New Zealand, Quebec, Canada, and South Korea (Muȗls et al.
2016). Cap-and-trade programs set emissions limits and freely distribute or auction off “allowances” to emit to
companies, who then trade their right to pollute, while carbon offset programs allow emitters to invest in carbon
mitigation projects, many in developing countries, to “offset” their own carbon emissions.
The largest and longest continuous carbon market is the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). Assessments of the
EU ETS vary considerably depending on methodological choices (see Martin et al. 2016), ranging from the
argument that most reductions in emissions resulted from other factors such as the global financial crisis and
expanded renewable energy (Nicolas et al. 2014) to a 2.4–4.7% reduction in total emissions from 2005 to 2007
along with slight decreases in emission intensity during Phase II (2008–2012) (see Muȗls et al. 2016: 5). A more
favorable recent study estimates a ~10% decrease in emissions between 2005 and 2012 in four participating
countries (France, the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK) at a firm-level, specifically when comparing the
emissions of non-ETS installations to ETS installations (e.g., power stations). In other words, even the most
favorable assessment does not analyze all countries, merely compares dirtier installations to slightly less (a tenth
less) dirty installations and does not analyze the ETS’s im-pact on total emissions (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2018).
Along with insufficient reductions in emissions, carbon markets have led to
paradoxical and even scandalous outcomes , including accidentally
incentivizing firms involved in a carbon offset scheme to produce more of a
highly potent greenhouse gas byproduct (HFC-23) in order to destroy it to gain
emissions credits to sell to polluters (for review, see Klein 2014).

Coupled with their negligible impacts , a more important reason that carbon
markets should be understood as false solutions is they reproduce the system
that drives climate change and divert attention from alternative social solutions
(e.g., Lohmann 2005, 2010; Foster et al. 2009; Stuart et al. 2019). This is not only a theoretical argument.
Lohmann (2005) shows how the Kyoto Protocol’s emphasis on emissions trading, pushed by the US who ironically
did not ratify the treaty, redirected attention in the form of intellectual and financial resources from alternative
policies and social changes that have the potential to actually significantly reduce emissions. Criticisms of the
Protocol in favor of strong policies were scorned as a “do-nothing” stance. Similarly, a corporate watchdog non-
profit makes the case that the mere existence of the EU ETS continues to undermine the ability of new emissions
regulations to take hold (Corporate Europe Obser-vatory 2015).

Market-based solutions are also common in biodiversity conservation, from biodiversity offsets—where the
degradation of habitats, species, ecosystem functions, etc. in one location are “offset” in an-other location (Bull et
al. 2013)—to ecotourism, where ecologically minded tourists supposedly create incentives for residents to engage
in nature conservation (Duffy 2008). Not only is the actual effectiveness of “neoliberal conservation” dubious, the
underlying problem with these approaches is they reproduce and expand the system that drives biodiversity loss
(Igoe and Brockington 2007; Brockington and Duffy 2010; Igoe et al. 2010; Büscher et al. 2012). The destruction
of nature due to profit accumulation is interpreted as a new accumulation strategy, which has contradictory
outcomes.

Robertson’s (2004, 2006) analysis of wetland mitigation banking serves as an excellent illustration. A “No Net
Loss to Wetlands” policy was put in place under the George H.W. Bush administration, with the aim of total
wetland acreage remaining constant by “offsetting” degraded wetlands in different geographical areas. The policy
allowed developers to buy “wetland mitigation credits” from owners of an undeveloped wetland or companies who
restore degraded wetlands (“wetland mitigation banks”). A developer who fills a wetland to build condos, for
example, can buy wetland credits from an off-site mitigation bank. Quantifying and commensurating the “value”
lost at the development site and the “value” gained at the mitigation banking site created a contradiction.
Mitigation banks measured their value-gained as “bundles” of “ecological functions” while acreage was the proxy
measure for bundles of ecological functions at the development site. The mitigation banks began to
opportunistically ex-ploit created ecological functions (i.e., superfluous fabricated markets) which clashed with the
mitigation permit market’s need for quantitative abstraction (Robertson 2004).

While individual behavior changes and market-based solutions are common in climate and biodiversity
conservation, the next three false solutions—efficiency gains, renewable energy without rapid reductions in fossil
fuel use, and geoengineering—are all specific to climate policy—yet as stated earlier, climate change also drives
biodiversity loss.

Energy and carbon efficiency

Because of its ubiquity in climate policy, it may strike the reader as strange to label improving energy efficiency
(energy use per dollar) and carbon efficiency (emissions per dollar) as “false solutions.” The goals of improving
efficiency or, put differently, reducing carbon in-tensity, are so widespread in climate change discourse that they
are taken for granted. However, there is a fundamental limitation of this approach: the Jevons paradox.
The Jevons paradox —named after the economist William Stanley Jevons for his finding that improved
efficiency of steam engines in-creased total coal consumption (Clark and Foster 2001)— refers to a
commonly found association between increased resource use despite
improved efficiency (e.g., Alcott 2005; Sorrell 2007; Polimini et al. 2008; York et al. 2009, 2011; York
2010; Clement 2011; York and Mc-Gee 2016). The Jevons paradox is a paradox because the usual assumption is
that improvements in efficiency will decrease total resource use because fewer resources are used per economic
unit. To be clear, not all “rebound effects”—when the benefits of efficiency gains are partially or fully consumed by
changes in resource use—are “backfires,” rebound effects above 100% (Santarius 2012). Further, the Jevons
paradox refers to an association between improved efficiency and increased emissions, which is not necessarily a
causal association (York and McGee 2016). However,causal drivers have been identified,
including improvements in efficiency reducing prices per economic unit, which
increases the use of the given resource or investment in the use of other
resources (for review, see Santarius 2012; York and McGee 2016).
Regardless of the magnitude of the rebound effect and the causal drivers of the Jevons
paradox, it is clear that improving efficiency is an inadequate route to tackle

climate change for the simple reason that, in general, global carbon efficiency has
improved while total emissions increased (York 2010). Nations with higher levels
of efficiency generally have higher rates of CO2 emissions , electricity
consumption , and energy use (York and McGee 2016). In the US, individual state emissions
increase in general despite improving carbon intensity by around 30% (Clement 2011).

The data are clear that improving energy and carbon efficiency is associated with counterintuitive results. Then
why is a reliance on efficiency still so common in climate policy? One reason is that it ap-peals to economic
interests. Following the US’s non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol despite getting what they wanted (carbon
markets) (see above), the George W. Bush administration then turned to carbon in-tensity as a more economically
friendly climate change strategy, one that allows for and even encourages continued economic growth and does
not restrict future emissions (i.e., does not impose any real cap) (Roberts and Parks 2006: 142ff). This approach
appeals to economic interests and reproduces and expands rather than challenges the driv-ers of climate change
precisely because economic growth and emis-sions are linked (see Chapter 3). For the latter reason, coupled with
the problem of the Jevons paradox, improving efficiency in the current system remains a false solution.

Renewable energy without reducing fossil fuel use and total energy consumption

To be clear at the outset of this section, we support the development of renewable energy (see Gunderson et al.
2018c). A massive expansion of renewable energy, especially in wind and solar, is a prerequisite to a sustainable
society that supports relatively large-scale human organi-zations. While renewables have their own negative
environmental im-pacts that are often ignored (Zehner 2012), these impacts are negligible compared to the
continued use of fossil fuels. Renewable energy is a false solution only when it is promoted without also (1)
promoting re-ductions in fossil fuels and (2) reductions in total energy consumption. We discuss each point below.

Calls for the expansion of renewables often assume that one new unit of
renewable energy will displace one unit of fossil fuel -based energy. However,
this is not the case. Only a “very modest” displacement of fossil fuel-generated energy
sources with renewable energy sources occurred in the last five decades in most countries
(York 2012). The problem is made clear by York and Bell (2019): fossil fuel development has
steadily increased despite the comparably slight expansion of renewables. In fact, without
simultaneously reducing fossil fuel development, renewable energy development may contribute
to increases in energy use by increasing supply , thereby spurring demand
(Zehner 2012; York 2016). As long as the call to expand renewables does not explicitly tackle the problem of the
simultaneous expansion of fossil fuels and renewables, renewables will remain a false solution.
A second common oversight in the climate policy emphasis on expanding renewable energy is the
fact that renewables have much lower energy return on energy invested ( EROEI )
ratios (e.g., 60:1 for coal compared to 18:1 for wind and 6:1 for solar) (Hall et al. 2014). This
means that the amount of usable energy output ( energy return ) relative to the energy
that went into procuring that energy ( energy invested ) is much lower for
renewables than fossil fuels. Further, renewables have lower power densities, meaning
that they take up more space than fossil fuel sources (e.g., wind and solar require around
90–100 times more area than natural gas) (van Zalk and Behrens 2018; for summary, see Leiden University 2018).

Neither lower EROEI ratios nor lower power densities are reasons to avoid transitioning to renewables. However,
it is unlikely that a nearly 100% renewable energy supply is
for these reasons and others,

possible in a constantly growing economy and, instead, would require

reductions in total energy use and a smaller overall economy (Trainer 2007; Kallis
2017; Hickel 2019a; see Chapter 5). To clarify, rapidly developing renewables is critical, yet to be an effective
solution it must also be accompanied by simultaneous and significant reductions in fossil fuel development and
overall reductions in energy consumption.

Geoengineering

“Geoengineering” or “climate engineering” refers to “a broad set of methods and technologies that aim to
deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate impacts of climate change” (Boucher et al. 2013).
There are two broad categories of geoengineering strategies: (1) Carbon Dioxide
Removal (CDR) or “carbon geoengineering,” strategies to remove CO2 from the atmosphere or
at sources of fossil fuel combustion1 and sequestering it underground or under the ocean (U.S. National Research
and (2) Solar Radiation Management (SRM) or “solar geoengineering,” strategies to
Council 2015a)
redirect incoming solar radiation back into space (U.S. National Research Council 2015b).
These strategies are appealing to many as they are framed as “quick-fix,” easy, and cheap solutions to the climate
crisis (Gunderson et al. 2018b, 2019).

While we do not review all carbon and solar geoengineering strategies here (e.g., The Royal Society 2009; U.S.
National Research Coun-cil 2015a, 2015b; Zhang et al. 2015), we focus on the two most widely discussed
techniques from each category: bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), a form of carbon
geoengineering, and stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), a form of solar geoengineering. We make the case that
BECCS is currently too ineffective to be considered a viable climate change strategy, at
least in the short term, and SAI is far too risky to be considered a viable response. We then argue that

geoengineering diverts attention and resources away from more effective and
safer alternatives.
BECCS is a carbon geoengineering strategy based on burning crops for power generation (“bioenergy”), such as
big trees, and, while burning them in power stations, capturing and storing the carbon emissions (“with carbon
capture and storage”) (Fridahl 2017). The ap-proach is appealing because plants are carbon sinks, which reduces
atmospheric CO2 and CCS would prevent the carbon released when burning these plants from reentering the
The bulk of
atmosphere. In theory, the outcome would be negative emissions (Pour et al. 2017).
empirical evidence is from separate bioenergy and CCS facilities and a single
ethanol-based BECCS demonstration plant (Anderson and Peters 2016; Turner et al. 2018). In
other words, the technology remains largely unproven (see Fuss et al. 2014).

Another major barrier facing BECCS is locating suitable land area to grow biomass
crops—requiring acreage up to three times the size of India to meet climate
goals (Anderson 2015; for other barriers, see Baik et al. 2018; Turner et al. 2018). This much area used
for growing bioenergy crops may compete with land used for food crops (National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018). For these reasons and others, BECCS has been called a
“dangerous distraction” (Fuss et al. 2014) and “high-stakes gamble” (Anderson and Peters 2016: 183) that diverts
attention away from tested and effective mitigation strategies.

solar geoengineering strategy due to its low cost, is a proposal

SAI, the most prominently discussed
to inject sulfur particles into the stratosphere to redirect incoming solar radiation
back into space (Keith 2013; U.S. National Research Council 2015b). It is the only strategy we categorize as a
Risks include unknown impacts on
“false solution” on the grounds that it is far too risky.

weather , plants , and clouds ; the potential for droughts and famine ; potential
to exacerbate the ozone hole ; an increase in acid rain and air pollution ;
problems emanating from potential commercial control and military use ; and, most
frighteningly, the possibility for a “ termination effect ,” where, if SAI cannot be

maintained after being implemented, temperatures could increase rapidly due to a

build-up of background emissions (see Robock 2008a, 2008b; Robock et al. 2009, 2010; Boucher et
al. 2013; Ferraro et al. 2014).

In addition to its serious risks, which could permanently alter global cycles, SAI is also a false
solution because it diverts attention away from more effective and just
responses. While solar geoengineering scientists push for increasing mitigation efforts and are usually
cautious about their support for geoengineering (Reynolds et al. 2016), there is good reason to anticipate that SAI
may be implemented in order to reproduce the current social priorities and system that drives climate change
(Gunderson et al. 2019). Not only are economic justifications for SAI common (e.g., that it is much cheaper than
reducing emissions), which will appeal to those with the power to implement climate policy, but there is some
evidence of support for SAI from the elite (e.g., Bill Gates), fossil fuel industry representatives, and even climate
denialist organizations (e.g., the Heartland Institute) (Hamilton 2013; Gunderson et al. 2019). SAI could very well
rationalize the continued extraction and use of fossil fuels (Gunderson et al. 2019).

While individual geoengineering strategies must be evaluated separately and we find some forms of carbon geoengineering to have some potential to
reduce carbon concentrations if embedded in different social conditions (see Stuart et al. 2020), geoengineering currently is broadly labeled a false
solution here due to its reliance on untested technology and, in the case of SAI, association with unjustifiable risks. Further, geoengineering strategies
divert attention and resources away from effective and just climate change solutions.

Addressing systemic contradictions

This chapter argues that commonly discussed solutions to biodiversity loss and climate change are “false solutions” in the sense that they are
inadequate and divert attention away from more effective and just solutions or, in the case of SAI, are far too risky and divert attention away from more
just and less risky solutions. We conclude with a brief explanation as to why these approaches are likely to continue to be inadequate.

Mainstream climate policy leaves the current social priorities and system unquestioned or assumes its unchangeability and/or desirability. However, as
we explain in Chapter 3, it is the basic structures and dynamics of our current social and economic system—prioritizing economic growth—that drives
climate change and biodiversity loss. These solutions will remain inadequate because their implementation does not transform but, instead, reproduces
the social order that accelerates our environmental crisis. The problem with reproducing rather than transforming the contemporary model of society is
that it also reproduces fundamental social-ecological contradictions that are intrinsic to the dynamics of this model. In Chapter 5, we further examine
these contradictions and how growth relates to capitalism as well as socialism.

Failing to get at the engine that keeps driving us deeper into crisis undermines the potential of solutions. For example, efficiency and renewable energy
have the potential to reduce total emissions, but in an economy that must grow the result is an overall increase in energy use and emissions. As we
examine in later chapters, in a system that does not require increasing levels of production and consumption, these solutions can play a key role in
addressing our environmental crisis. However, a prerequisite to their effective implementation is abandon-ing the economic growth imperative that
continues to constrain their potential.

[[CHAPTER 2 NOTE OMITTED]]

[[CHAPTER 3 BEGINS]]
3 The case against economic growth

As mainstream solutions to the climate and biodiversity crises are increasingly deemed insufficient and leading
scientists continue to identify economic growth as a key driver of these crises, it seems plausible that society may
reconsider prioritizing economic growth. However, there remains substantial social and political resistance to the
notion that growth is harmful. Economic growth as something desirable and “good” for society has been
normalized to the degree that many people cannot imagine a world with different priorities. The underlying belief
that a prosperous society must always have increasing wealth accumulation supports a system with ever
increasing levels of production, sales, and consumption. The assumption is that this production-consumption
engine must keep going or else the whole system will breakdown. Yet the data reveals that the vast majority of
wealth created from this system continues to go to a small portion of the population, while the ongoing
production-consumption engine is driving us all further into environmental crisis and toward possible social
collapse.

As stated by Hickel and Kallis (2019: 15), “As scientists we should not let political expediency shape our view of
facts. We should assess the facts and then draw conclusions, rather than start with palatable conclusions and
ignore inconvenient facts.” For those faithful to the idea of never-ending economic growth, we present three key
evidence from the past and present suggests
reasons to question these convictions. First,

that life with less or no economic growth can be prosperous in terms of social
and ecological well-being and that prioritizing GDP growth can actually reduce
measures of standards of living and social well-being. Therefore, we should deeply question
the assumption that GDP growth is a requirement for a thriving society.

Second, there is substantial evidence illustrating that GDP is positively correlated

with material and energy use , carbon emissions , environmental
degradation , and species extinction . The dominant solution to address this problematic
relationship is “decoupling” economic growth from environmental harm (via green growth), yet research
shows that there is no evidence of the necessary decoupling in material
resource use and no evidence supporting that the decoupling of carbon emissions
can be accomplished at the rate necessary to meet the IPCC’s 1.5°C or 2°C targets
(Hickel and Kallis 2019; Parrique et al. 2019; Schor and Jorgenson 2019).

Beyond the empirical evidence, a third argument focuses on the moral implications of increasing GDP growth
when the known risks of doing so are great and there are no existing solutions to sufficiently address these risks.
Thelikely impacts to current and future generations of humans and other species
are severe and irreversible . We discuss the moral implications of relying on the unproven idea of
rapid decoupling and promoting the ideology of green growth. Should we err on the side caution, even when it
goes against indoctrinated ideas of progress?

These three arguments are described and supported below. We especially draw from several key recent
publications (Hickel and Kallis 2019; Parrique et al. 2019; Schor and Jorgenson 2019) that more clearly and
convincingly support these arguments than any previous evidence. Lastly, we illustrate how these arguments lead
“degrowth,”
us towards the conclusion that an overall reduction in production and consumption in line with
is a necessary pathway to best protect current and future generations of
humans and other species from an otherwise catastrophic trajectory.
Do we need economic growth?

The economy is generally defined as the production , distribution , and

consumption of resources—or the use of material resources to satisfy human
needs or values (Kallis 2018). Economies have existed for thousands of years using systems of reciprocity,
sharing, barter, or money as the basis of resource exchange. We can imagine a society with an economy that does
not include the concept of accumulating profit, where resources are exchanged, given, traded, or shared based on
need. If poverty is a lack of profit accumulation, then this society would be deemed poor. But if poverty is a lack of
food, shelter, leisure time, health, and well-being, then this could be a very wealthy society.

For thousands of years economies existed without continual accumulation of wealth

and material goods, yet for the past 200 years the global economy has been increasingly
geared toward growing levels of accumulation . Our modern economy is defined
by this prioritization of never-ending profit and wealth accumulation rather than
the exchange of resources for use (see Chapter 5). This is the ultimate driver of growth, as more goods and
services sold increases profit accumulation. Increasing the production of goods and services may seem justified to
meet the needs of a growing population, yet as we detail below, resource use per person has
increased. Increased consumption is necessary for the increased production and sales to support greater
levels of profit accumulation. However, this does not mean that wealth is accumulated equally or that everyone
has the resources they need (see Hickel 2017).
To support rising levels of profit accumulation, there has been an increase in human productivity as well as the total goods per person produced and consumed over time. In the past
century, global per capita resource use has doubled (Parrique et al. 2019). In addition, global material use has quadrupled since 1970, growing twice as fast as the human population
(Circle Economy 2020). More materials and energy are being used per person over time, far beyond what is justified based on population growth and human needs. As productivity
rates have in-creased, prioritizing growth has mandated that these gains be invested in further production and profitability. Yet as Schor and Jorgenson (2019: 325) explain, this need
not be the case:

The optimal rate of growth depends on workers’ preferences for goods and leisure. If workers want to take their productivity growth in the form of shorter hours, the
labor market will equilibrate with fewer hours supplied.

We should not assume a system with increasing levels of accumulation is a “natural” system simply because we are accustomed to it. Although the primary driver of increases in
material and energy throughput is the structural characteristics of our current economic system (see Chapter 5), it is critical that we understand the origins of GDP growth as a social
priority and also question if it should remain a priority.

It was not until the 1950s that economic growth in terms of GDP be-came a policy priority for the US and other nations (Victor 2010). The concept of GDP emerged during the Great
Depression when Simon Kuznets was asked to create a way to track the productive power of a country. GDP was specifically used during World War II to assess productivity for the
war effort. Yet, after the war ended, policymakers continued to use GDP as a positive indicator based on the assumption that if people are making and buying goods at an increasing
rate, then society is flourishing. However, as quoted in Semuels (2016) even Kuznets doubted the use of GDP in this way, warning: “[t]he welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred
from a measure of national income.” Despite Kuznets’ skepticism, GDP has remained the primary indicator of social progress and the goal of increasing GDP has driven global policy.

Do high levels of GDP growth indicate that a society is flourishing? Increasing evidence suggests it does not. Despite an average 3% increase in GPD in the US, at least 43 million
Americans are still living in poverty, wages have not considerably increased since the 1980s and even with positive GDP growth the median income of households has declined
(Semuels 2016). In addition, many countries with lower rates of GDP growth, such as Scandinavian countries, actually have higher levels of equality, health, education, and well-being.
In places where ample resources are available, it makes little sense to focus on increasing production (and GDP) when remaining problems are related to distribution and the adequate
provisioning of social services (Hickel 2019a).

economists agree that GDP is a problematic indicator of progress

A growing number of
and well-being (e.g., Victor 2010; Daly 2013; Dietz 2015; Stiglitz 2019a,b). GDP does not distinguish
between costs and benefits; it only includes flows of money, not stocks of resources; it fails to include activities
with no market value; and it does not provide information on how wealth is distributed. Critics point out that an
event causing significant harm, such as a natural disaster or oil spill, can increase GPD. Increased production
does not translate into increased social well-being. Easterlin et al. (2010), among others, have shown that
economic growth that goes beyond satisfying basic needs does not lead to increased happiness. More evidence
GDP has actually undermined qualitative goals, such as social and
supports the position that
ecological well-being (O’Neill 2012; Stiglitz 2019a). Alternative indicators, such as the Index of
Sustainable Economic Welfare and the General Progress Indicator, illustrate how GDP can increase while
measures of well-being decrease. Relatedly, economic growth does not increase human well-being per unit of
environmental pressure after a certain level of affluence (Dietz et al. 2012), despite the fact that mainstream
economics views “increasing affluence . . . as essentially equivalent to human well-being” (Dietz 2015: 125). As
argued by Nobel award winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2009), not only is GDP a poor measure of well-being
but “chasing GDP growth results in lower living standards .”
Stiglitz has been increasingly vocal about the risks of using GDP as the primary indicator of progress, calling for
alternative indicators that better support social and ecological well-being. Stigltiz (2019b) states that “we need
better tools to assess economic performance and social progress” and explains that his concerns about GDP “have
now been brought to the fore with the climate crisis.” Her further argues “[i]f we measure the wrong thing, we
will do the wrong thing.” Not only is chasing GDP growth leading us further into environmental crisis, but it also
prevents the flourishing of other positive conceptions of social progress. As explained by Daly (2013: 24), while it
is largely believed that “without economic growth all progress is at an end . . . [o]n the contrary, without growth . .
. true progress finally will have a chance.”

Economic growth and our environmental crisis

Chapter 1 included many examples of leading scientists identifying GDP growth as a primary driver of the climate
and biodiversity crises. While all of the examples given will not be restated here, in both cases, scientists have
found positive correlations between GDP growth and environmental degradation. This makes sense when we
increasing production results in increasing levels of resource use ,
acknowledge that

pollution , and carbon emissions . GDP growth of 1% equals a 0.6% growth in material use
(Wiedmann et al. 2015) and a 1% increase in GDP equals a 0.5–0.7% increase in carbon emissions (Burke et al.
2015). It is not a coincidence that the most notable reductions in carbon emissions
have occurred during economic recessions (Feng et al. 2015; Hickel and Kallis 2019; Parrique
et al. 2019). In addition, studies show a strong positive association between GDP

growth and species endangerment (Czech et al. 2012; Sol 2019), as many activities that
create wealth result in habitat loss , pollution , deforestation , and other
negative impacts to a range of species (Cavlovic et al. 2000).
Despite these environmental impacts, GDP growth is defended and maintained as a global priority largely based
on the concept of “decoupling” as a remedy to these problematic relationships. Decoupling refers to the idea that
we can create conditions where increases in GDP do not result in negative environmental impacts. Thus, there can
be “green growth.” Promoting green growth through decoupling has been the primary strategy of many global
governing bodies to support “progress” and “development” while addressing our escalating environmental crisis.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) officially adopted decoupling as a goal in
2001 followed by the European Commission, United Nations Environment Programme, and the World Bank
(Parrique et al. 2019). Decoupling also remains a specific target in the United Nations Sustainable Development
Goals (see Hickel 2019b).

Decoupling depends on the use of green technologies that are more efficient and based on alternative energy
sources as well as a transition away from material goods and towards a service and information-based economy
Relative
(Hoffman 2016). Jackson (2009) makes the distinction between relative and absolute decoupling.
decoupling refers to reduced environmental impact per unit of economic output,
whereas absolute decoupling refers to the overall reduction of environmental impacts.
While relative decoupling (per unit output) can be seen in many cases, increases in total
production continue to increase overall environmental degradation —making
absolute decoupling more elusive (Parrique et al. 2019). However, it is absolute decoupling
that is necessary to reduce overall environmental impacts (Jackson 2009).

Evidence indicates that decoupling remains largely a theory rather than an

empirically proven solution to the climate and biodiversity crises. Daly (2013) explains that
decoupling is limited by the interdependence of production between different
economic sectors and by the fact that expanding service and information sectors will
not substantially reduce the use of energy and material goods. In addition, efficiency
gains are not indefinite and increasing levels of production to support GDP
growth undermine efficiency gains (Ward et al. 2016). Thus far, the evidence supports
these explanations. Cases where absolute decoupling has been identified are often
based on territorial material use or emissions, not on overall consumption
which includes materials imported and carbon emissions related to imports
(Knight and Schor 2014; Hickel and Kallis 2019; Parrique et al. 2019). In addition, identified decoupling
in many cases is temporary and recoupling occurs when conditions change
(Hickel and Kallis 2019; Parrique et al. 2019). To effectively address our environmental crisis,
decoupling would need to be absolute , permanent , global , and occur at a rate
fast enough to meet the IPCC’s 1.5°C target (IPCC 2018).

More studies are concluding that there is no evidence that global absolute
decoupling of material resource use has occurred or can occur in the future. On
average, every 10% rise in GDP has been accompanied with a 6% increase in material footprint (Wiedmann et al.
2015). Efficiency gains cannot be realized when the material footprint of OECD nations has increased
by 50% between 1990 and 2008—they are “ trumped by increases in volume ” (Parrique et al.
2019: 23). As stated by Hoffman (2016: 36), “dematerialized growth remains an illusion.” The
material intensity of GDP per capita increased by 60% between 1900 and 2009
(Bithas and Kalimeris 2018). This evidence supports Hickel and Kallis’ (2019: 7) conclusion that: “green growth
theory—in terms of resource use—lacks empirical support.” Resource use has direct implications
for carbon emissions and biodiversity loss , as use of water , forests , energy ,
and other resources increase with GDP (Cavlovic et al. 2000; Czech et al. 2012; Sol 2019).
In terms of carbon emissions, there is limited evidence supporting the success of current decoupling efforts and
global decoupling cannot occur at rates fast
mounting evidence supporting the conclusion that
enough to stay within 1.5°C or 2°C of warming. Jorgenson and Clark (2012) demonstrate a strong
relationship between per capita carbon emissions and GDP per capita in developed nations that is stable over
Despite
time. Mardani et al. (2019) illustrate a bidirectional coupling between GDP and carbon emissions.
carbon markets and increases in efficiency and renewable energy sources, Granados
and Spash (2019) find that carbon emissions in the US are still significantly correlated

with economic growth . Hickel and Kallis (2019) identify countries where territorial decoupling has
occurred and state that absolute decoupling is technologically possible; however, once import-related

emissions have been included almost no countries have thus far achieved
permanent absolute decoupling (Schor and Jorgenson 2019).

modest decoupling in developed nations has been a

Studies using empirical data illustrate how
result of increased carbon-intensive production in developing nations (Jorgenson and
Clark 2012; Knight and Schor 2014; Schor and Jorgenson 2019). In other words, environmental impacts
are being exported . Knight and Schor (2014) report:

once
While we find some reduction in the linkage between economic growth and territorial emissions,
we account for high-income countries’ offshoring of emissions, there is no
evidence of decoupling.

Based on mounting evidence, Parrique et al. (2019: 24) conclude that there has “never been a global
pattern of absolute decoupling of CO2 from economic growth.”

Even with the possibility of absolute decoupling of carbon emissions through significant
investment in energy efficiency and renewable energy , this decoupling would
need to occur at a rate fast enough to keep warming from passing dangerous
critical thresholds (Parri-que et al. 2019). We are currently on a trajectory for warming of
4.2°C ( 2.5–5.5°C ) by 2100, yet leading scientists argue we need to keep warming below 1.5°C (IPCC 2018).
The important question then becomes: what level and rate of decoupling is necessary to accomplish this goal?
Hickel and Kallis (2019: 8) examine this question in depth and argue:
absolute reductions in carbon emissions are possible to achieve . . . however, the objective is not simply to reduce emissions (a matter of flows), but to keep total
emissions from exceeding specific carbon budgets.

This is a matter of achieving absolute decoupling at a fast-enough rate. Hickel and Kallis (2019) explain that the only climate scenarios that keep warming below 2°C rely on BECCS
for negative emissions. Yet, as we argued in Chapter 2, this technology is not yet developed and assumptions about negative emissions remain unproven. Including BECCS in
scenarios, however, has allowed for a larger carbon budget and continued support for green growth.

Perhaps more clearly than ever, Hickel and Kallis (2019: 10, 11) explain how absolute decoupling of carbon emissions to stay within 1.5°C or even 2°C targets while sustaining
economic growth is not only highly unlikely but likely impossible:

Without BECCS, global emissions need to fall to net zero by 2050 for 1.5°C, or by 2075 for 2°C. This entails reductions of 6.8 per cent per year and 4 per cent per year,
respectively. Theoretically, this can be accomplished with (a) a rapid shift to 100 per cent renewable energy to eliminate emissions from fossil fuel combustion (Jacobson
and Delucchi 2011); plus (b) afforestation and soil regeneration to eliminate emissions from land use change; plus (c) a shift to alternative industrial processes to
eliminate emissions from the production of cement, steel, and plastic.

If we assume global GDP continues to grow at 3 per cent per year (the average from 2010 to 2014), then decoupling must occur at a rate of 10.5 per cent per year for
1.5°C, or 7.3 per cent per year for 2°C. If global GDP grows at 2.1 per cent per year . . . then de-coupling must occur at 9.6 per cent per year for 1.5°C, or 6.4 per cent
per year for 2°C. All of these targets are beyond what existing empirical models indicate is feasible.

we need a 45% reduction in

Parrique et al. (2019: 15) agree with this conclusion, finding that if
carbon emissions by 2030 (IPCC 2018), then “even the decrease of emissions achieved in
the most successful national cases of absolute decoupling are far from being
sufficient to keep global warming from passing a critical threshold .” Hickel (2019a)
also argues that even under the most optimistic assumptions, continued GDP growth

will push us past the carbon budgets for both 1.5°C and 2°C targets. This supports Anderson
and Bows (2011) earlier work illustrating that the necessary emissions reductions are incompatible with continued
economic growth. Anderson estimates that as of 2019 wealthy nations need to re-duce emissions by 12% per year
to stay within a 2°C target (Hickel and Kallis 2019), yet emissions reductions any greater than 3–4% per year are
incompatible with economic growth (Anderson and Bows 2011).

If we cast aside the unsubstantiated assumption that BECCS can be a highly effective negative emissions
technology (see Chapter 2), then we are left with only one possible way to stay within the IPCC’s (2018) 1.5°C
target. Only one scenario in the IPCC special report (2018) did not rely on BECCS. This scenario was published by
Grubler et al. (2018) and stays within 1.5°C of warming through reducing total global energy use by 40% (by
2050), reducing total global material production and consumption by 20%, afforestation projects, and
dematerialization through an increase in sharing material goods and commodities (see Hickel and Kallis 2019).
Given a lack of any evidence that BECCS can result in the projected negative emissions, the Grubler scenario
represents a more feasible and realistic approach.

Parrique et al. (2019) make an important point: these findings in no way mean that we should oppose the
efficiency gains and a transition to renewable energy that would support a decoupling strategy. In fact, these are
important and even essential to reduce total carbon emissions. Yet, they are not sufficient to reduce emissions at
the rate necessary. This would also require reducing total production and consumption. They promote
“complementing efficiency-oriented policies with sufficiency policies, with a shift in priority and emphasis from
the former to the latter even though both have a role to play” (Parrique et al. 2019: 3). In other words, as we
explained in the previous chapter, the potential of our best technological solutions can only be realized if we
simultaneously reduce production and consumption.

The moral implications of green growth

Greengrowth proponents argue that even though we currently lack concrete

evidence that decoupling at the rate necessary is possible , future technological
innovation will be able to rapidly increase the rate of decoupling. This faith in human
technological advancement is widespread, as seen through techno-optimist and eco-modernist positions
we agree that there will surely be some advances in technology
(Grunwald 2018). While

in the short and long term that could help to address our environmental crisis ,
the extent of technological advancement necessary is significant and cannot be
assumed. As Parrique et al. (2019: 51) explain,
relying only on technology to mitigate climate change implies extreme rates of eco-innovation
improvements, which current trends are very far from matching, and which, to our knowledge, have
never been witnessed in the history of our species.

the pace of technological evolution necessary has no precedent in

In other words,

human history and therefore cannot be depended upon to address the urgency
of the climate crisis.

multiple factors that are likely to impede decoupling

Parrique et al. (2019: 55) also identify

in the future and undermine green growth as a solution. These factors include: “(1)
Rising energy expenditures, (2) rebound effects, (3) problem shifting, (4) the
underestimated impact of services, (5) the limited potential of recycling in a
growing economy, (6) insufficient and inappropriate technological change, and (7)
cost shifting.” They explain each of these factors and how they undermine decoupling. Given that each of
these factors independently could impede possible decoupling, together they should
raise significant skepticism about green growth strategies. Parrique et al. (2019: 55) state that due
to these factors, “the decoupling hypothesis appears highly compromised, if not clearly
unrealistic .”
Given the lack of evidence in support of sufficient decoupling as well as the many obstacles preventing a rapid
As
green growth pathway, Hickel and Kallis (2019) and Parrique et al. (2019) support a precautionary approach.
the stakes are extremely high (e.g., possible ecological and social collapse ), and
the future remains incredibly uncertain (e.g., are there critical thresholds? what are they? what
are the impacts?), the most responsible and moral pathway is to be cautious . Hickel
and Kallis (2019: 15) explain:

[o]ne may insist that green growth hasn’t occurred because it has not been tried, the fact that it hasn’t
been empirically observed till now then becoming irrelevant. We follow instead a more precau-tionary
approach.

The evidence demonstrates a clear positive relationship between GDP growth and our environmental crisis. In
there are no known solutions that can be employed to continue to support
addition,
economic growth and sufficiently address this crisis. Therefore, is it moral to rely on unproven
or non-existent technological fixes? When leading scientists agree on the drivers of these crises, why do our
political leaders knowingly allow these drivers to continue?
Throughout human history those in power attempt to retain power. This has been called “elite rigidity” (Geyer and Rihani 2012) or “social reproduction” (Wright 2010). In many ways
our current political system is currently rigid and unchanging in order to protect the individuals and corporations who benefit most from the current fossil fuel-based, profit-
maximizing system (Klein 2015). This is one reason the US has been demoted to the status of a “flawed democracy” (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Green growth is an ideology
promoted to protect the current system and conceal the underlying contradictions leading us further into environmental crises (Gunderson et al. 2018c). However, is it moral to
protect the economic interests of the few, through promoting false solutions, while putting all people, eco-systems, and other species at risk? Youth environmental activists
increasingly demand that world leaders protect their future and “put people before profits,” drawing attention to the immorality of continuing with business as usual. The fact that the
current system is unable to respond to a moral imperative that resonates with nearly all humans reveals the need to radically change the system.

The ongoing failure to address our environmental crisis contributes to multiple forms of injustice. Failing to provide a safe climate and environment for future generations of humans
results in generational injustice. Causing widespread species extinction and population collapse is an issue of interspecies injustice and ecocide. In addition, those who are and will
continue to be most impacted by these crises are primarily poor people in the Global South, or the “global majority.” Our environmental crisis will increasingly be experienced
unequally, hurting those who are most vulnerable. Yet it is wealthy countries who are most responsible for this crisis, who continue to overproduce and overconsume resources, and
who need to do the most to urgently change course. As global injustices multiply, false solutions need to be exposed for what they are: unsubstantiated faith in technological solutions
and green growth pathways that protect the current system and benefit the economic interests of the few.

Beyond economic growth

As stated by Hickel and Kallis (2019: 15), “policy should be made on the basis of robust empirical evidence, rather than on the basis of speculative theoretical possibilities.” The
evidence presented in this chapter makes a strong case that adhering to policies prioritizing economic growth not only limits the effectiveness of mitigation measures but ultimately
undermines efforts to sufficiently address our environmental crisis. Relationships between GDP growth and increasing carbon emissions and biodiversity loss are clear and there is
ample evidence that reducing overall material and energy consumption in wealthy countries would increase the success of efforts to address the climate and biodiversity crises.

Models and projections illustrate how reducing economic growth even slightly
increases possible decoupling and emissions reductions . As Hickel and Kallis (2019: 7)
explain in terms of resource use, “[a]s the growth rate approaches zero, absolute decoupling
becomes more feasible, and is likely to last longer .” Lower rates of production and
consumption (resulting in lower GDP), would also allow for more success in climate mitigation efforts. Yet to keep
warming within 1.5°C or 2°C targets substantial reductions are necessary. Schroder and Storm (2018) find that
emissions reduction to limit warming to 2°C can be only accomplished if economic growth is reduced to 0.45%
annually. However, a 1.5°C target has not been shown to be possible without a degrowth scenario (Hickel and
Kallis 2019). Grubler et al. (2018) and Van Vuuren et al. (2018) both not only contain scenarios of keep-ing
temperatures within 2°C, but also rely on reducing material and energy throughput. Lastly, Hickel (2019a) cites
additional scenarios that illustrate the feasibility of reaching environmental targets and in-creasing social well-
being with degrowth pathways (i.e., D’Allessandro et al. 2018; Victor 2019).

Given the evidence undermining the reality of effective and fast green growth, we need to rethink economic
growth. As stated clearly by Hickel and Kallis (2019:15), “ [i]t
is more plausible that we will be able
to achieve the necessary reductions in resource use and emissions without
growth than with growth.” Parrique et al. (2019: 59) similarly argue that in contrast to unproven
negative emissions technologies and green growth strategies, “reducing production and consumption is not an
abstract narrative.” We know that the necessary reductions are possible and even desirable. Ecological
economists and others ar-gue that letting go of economic growth as a priority will allow space for other types of
growth to flourish, increasing health, happiness, and environmental (and therefore human) sustainability (Daly
2013; Stiglitz 2019a,b).
The impact is converging catastrophes that cause extinction---
oxygen, disease, disasters
Bill McKibben, 4-9-2019, Schumann Distinguished Scholar at Middlebury
College, leader of the climate group 350.org, Advisory Council Member of the
National Center for Science Education, Foreign Policy inaugural winner of the top
100 most important global thinkers, "This Is How Human Extinction Could Play
Out," https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/bill-mckibben-falter-
climate-change-817310/

if the world’s oceans kept

In 2015, a study in the Journal of Mathematical Biology pointed out that

warming , by 2100 they might become hot enough to “ stop oxygen production by
phyto-plankton by disrupting the process of photosynthesis .” Given that two-
thirds of the Earth’s oxygen comes from phytoplankton, that would “likely result in the
mass mortality of animals and humans .”

a heat wave thawed a reindeer carcass that had been

A year later, above the Arctic Circle, in Siberia,
trapped in the permafrost . The exposed body released anthrax into nearby water
and soil , infecting two thousand reindeer grazing nearby, and they in turn infected some humans; a
twelve-year-old boy died. As it turns out, permafrost is a “very good preserver of microbes

and viruses , because it is cold, there is no oxygen , and it is dark” — scientists have managed
to revive an eight-million-year-old bacterium they found beneath the surface of a glacier. Researchers believe
there are fragments of the Spanish flu virus, smallpox , and bubonic plague
buried in Siberia and Alaska.

Orconsider this: as ice sheets melt, they take weight off land, and that can trigger
earthquakes — seismic activity is already increasing in Greenland and Alaska. Meanwhile, the added
weight of the new seawater starts to bend the Earth’s crust . “That will give you
a massive increase in volcanic activity . It’ll activate faults to create
earthquakes , submarine landslides , tsunamis , the whole lot,” explained the director of
University College London’s Hazard Centre. Such a landslide happened in Scandinavia about eight thousand years
ago, asthe last Ice Age retreated and a Kentucky-size section of Norway’s continental shelf
gave way, “plummeting down to the abyssal plain and creating a series of titanic waves that roared forth with
a vengeance,” wiping all signs of life from coastal Norway to Greenland and “drowning the Wales-sized
landmass that once connected Britain to the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany.” When the waves hit the
Shetlands, they were sixty-five feet high.

if we keep raising carbon dioxide levels, we may not be able to

There’s even this:

think straight anymore. At a thousand parts per million (which is within the realm of possibility
for 2100), human cognitive ability falls 21 percent. “The largest effects were seen for Crisis
Response, Information Usage, and Strategy,” a Harvard study reported, which is too bad, as those skills are what
we seem to need most.

changing something as
I could, in other words, do my best to scare you silly. I’m not opposed on principle —
fundamental as the composition of the atmosphere, and hence the heat balance of the

planet, is certain to trigger all manner of horror , and we shouldn’t shy away from it. The dramatic
uncertainty that lies ahead may be the most frightening development of all; the physical world is going from
backdrop to foreground. (It’s like the contrast between politics in the old days, when you could forget about
Washington for weeks at a time, and politics in the Trump era, when the president is always jumping out from
behind a tree to yell at you.)

But let’s try to occupy ourselves with the most likely scenarios, because they are more than disturbing enough.
Long before we get to tidal waves or smallpox, long before we choke to death or stop thinking clearly, we will
need to concentrate on the most mundane and basic facts: everyone needs to eat every day, and an awful lot of us
live near the ocean.

FOOD SUPPLY first. We’ve had an amazing run since the end of World War II, with crop yields growing fast
enough to keep ahead of a fast-rising population. It’s come at great human cost — displaced peasant farmers fill
many of the planet’s vast slums — but in terms of sheer volume, the Green Revolution’s fertilizers, pesticides, and
machinery managed to push output sharply upward. That climb, however, now seems to be running into the brute
facts of heat and drought. There are studies to demonstrate the dire effects of warming on coffee, cacao,
most of
chickpeas, and champagne, but it is cereals that we really need to worry about, given that they supply
the planet’s calories: corn , wheat , and rice all evolved as crops in the climate of
the last ten thousand years, and though plant breeders can change them, there are limits to
those changes. You can move a person from Hanoi to Edmonton, and she might decide to open a Vietnamese
restaurant. But if you move a rice plant, it will die .

A 2017 study in Australia, home to some of the world’s highest-tech farming, found that “ wheat
productivity has flatlined as a direct result of climate change.” After tripling
between 1900 and 1990, wheat yields had stagnated since, as temperatures increased a degree
and rainfall declined by nearly a third. “The chance of that just being variable climate without the
underlying factor [of climate change] is less than one in a hundred billion,” the researchers said, and it meant that
despite all the expensive new technology farmers kept introducing, “they have succeeded
only in standing still, not in moving forward.” Assuming the same trends continued,
yields would actually start to decline inside of two decades, they reported. In June 2018,
researchers found that a two-degree Celsius rise in temperature — which, recall, is what the Paris accords are
now aiming for — could cut U.S. corn yields by 18 percent. A four-degree increase — which is where our current
trajectory will take us — would cut the crop almost in half. The United States is the world’s largest producer of
corn, which in turn is the planet’s most widely grown crop.

Corn is vulnerable because even a week of high temperatures at the key moment can
keep it from fertilizing. (“You only get one chance to pollinate a quadrillion kernels of corn,” the head of a
commodity consulting firm explained.) But even the hardiest crops are susceptible .
Sorghum, for instance, which is a staple for half a billion humans, is particularly hardy
in dry conditions because it has big, fibrous roots that reach far down into the earth. Even it has
limits, though, and they are being reached. Thirty years of data from the American Midwest show
that heat waves affect the “vapor pressure deficit,” the difference between the water vapor in the sorghum leaf’s
interior and that in the surrounding air. Hotter weather means the sorghum releases more moisture into the
atmosphere. Warm the planet’s temperature by two degrees Celsius — which is, again, now the world’s goal —
and sorghum yields drop 17 percent. Warm it five degrees Celsius (nine degrees Fahrenheit), and yields drop
almost 60 percent.

It’s hard to imagine a topic duller than sorghum yields. It’s the precise opposite of clickbait. But people have to
in the human game, the single most important question is probably “What’s for
eat;
dinner?” And when the answer is “Not much,” things deteriorate fast . In 2010 a
severe heat wave hit Russia, and it wrecked the grain harvest, which led the
Kremlin to ban exports. The global price of wheat spiked, and that helped trigger
the Arab Spring — Egypt at the time was the largest wheat importer on the planet. That experience set
academics and insurers to work gaming out what the next food shock might look like. In 2017 one team imagined
a vigorous El Niño, with the attendant floods and droughts — for a season, in their scenario, corn and soy yields
declined by 10 percent, and wheat and rice by 7 percent. The result was chaos: “quadrupled commodity prices,
civil unrest, significant negative humanitarian consequences . . . Food riots break out in urban areas across the
Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. The euro weakens and the main European stock markets lose ten
percent.”

even if you can

At about the same time, a team of British researchers released a study demonstrating that
grow plenty of food, the transportation system that distributes it runs through just
fourteen major choke-points , and those are vulnerable to — you guessed it — massive
disruption from climate change. For instance, U.S. rivers and canals carry a third of the world’s corn
and soy, and they’ve been frequently shut down or crimped by flooding and drought in recent years. Brazil
accounts for 17 percent of the world’s grain exports, but heavy rainfall in 2017 stranded three thousand trucks.
“It’s the glide path to a perfect storm,” said one of the report’s authors.

Five weeks after that, another report raised an even deeper question. What if you can figure out how to grow
the food itself has lost much
plenty of food, and you can figure out how to guarantee its distribution, but
value? The paper, in the journal Environmental Research, said that rising carbon dioxide levels,
of its
by speeding plant growth, seem to have reduced the amount of protein in basic
staple crops, a finding so startling that, for many years, agronomists had overlooked hints that it was
happening. But it seems to be true: when researchers grow grain at the carbon dioxide levels we expect for later
minerals such as calcium and iron drop by 8 percent, and
this century, they find that
protein by about the same amount. In the developing world, where people rely on
plants for their protein, that means huge reductions in nutrition : India alone
could lose 5 percent of the protein in its total diet, putting 53 million people at new risk for protein
deficiency. The loss of zinc, essential for maternal and infant health, could endanger
138 million people around the world. In 2018, rice researchers found “significantly less protein” when
they grew eighteen varieties of rice in high–carbon dioxide test plots. “The idea that food became less nutritious
was a surprise,” said one researcher. “It’s not intuitive. But I think we should continue to expect surprises. We are
completely altering the biophysical conditions that underpin our food system.” And not just ours. People don’t
depend on goldenrod, for instance, but bees do. When scientists looked at samples of goldenrod in the
Smithsonian that dated back to 1842, they found that the protein content of its pollen had “declined by a third
since the industrial revolution — and the change closely tracks with the rise in carbon dioxide.”

Bees help crops, obviously, so that’s scary news. But in August 2018, a massive new study found something just as
frightening: crop pests were thriving in the new heat . “It gets better and better for
them,” said one University of Colorado researcher. Even if we hit the UN target of limiting temperature rise to
two degrees Celsius, pests should cut wheat yields by 46 percent, corn by 31 percent, and rice by 19 percent.
“Warmer temperatures accelerate the metabolism of insect pests like aphids
and corn borers at a predictable rate,” the researchers found. “That makes them hungrier[,] and
warmer temperatures also speed up their reproduction.” Even fossilized plants from fifty
million years ago make the point: “Plant damage from insects correlated with rising and falling temperatures,
reaching a maximum during the warmest periods.”

That outweighs nuclear war.

Samuel Miller-McDonald, 1-4-2019, M.A. in Environmental Management
from Yale University, B.A. in Human Ecology from College of the Atlantic, “Deathly
Salvation,” The Trouble, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-
salvation

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the
mushroom cloud . First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably
result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the
earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science . There’s no reliable model that can
determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans
extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices .
An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade
realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures,
providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and
subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive.

In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters.
Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion
necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy
transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could
provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and
transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization,
one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the
atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the
opposite effects. Who knows?

humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a

What we do know is that

nuclear one . Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change .

Growth drives zoonotic disease.

Naveen Arora, 5-13-2020, Department of Environmental Sciences, Jitendra
Mishra, School for Environmental Sciences, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar
University, Lucknow, “COVID-19 and importance of environmental sustainability,”
NIH, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7220565

A pandemic of unprecedented magnitude has rocked the mankind. As per the reports
and research the sight of origin of the outbreak of this pneumonia-like disease has been identified
as Wuhan , Hubei province of China (Wang et al. 2020). The respiratory illness was found to be associated
with a novel coronavirus (COVID-19) which was later specifically named as “acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2” (SARS-CoV-2) by World Health Organization (WHO) (Lu et al. 2020). Millions of people around
the globe have been infected , and several thousands have already perished . Apart

from direct infections, almost every human on earth is going to be affected by

this pandemic in one way or the other. The pandemic is going to inflict huge economic
damages and the impact will be far-reaching , which is very difficult to assess as of now. In
fact, this pandemic is going to have the biggest effect on mankind after the second world

war catastrophe. Almost every country on the globe, except for a few island nations, have already been battered
by the pandemic. However, looking at the magnitude of the situation, so far, no concrete scientific opinion is
available to explain the original route of the transfer of coronavirus to humans. According to some reports, the
origin of the deadly outbreak was found to be linked to Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market, a wet market in
Wuhan, China (Salata 2020). Although the transfer route of the virus is not certain, one thing is assured that
reservoir of coronavirus are some wild animals such as civets, bats, pangolins, etc.
and most probably these are the source of this deadly virus to humans. As per World
Livestock 2013 report of United Nation’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 70% of the novel

pathogens /diseases emerging in humans are zoonotic in nature. According to the available data
consumption of animal meat is increasing by the day, and some exotic wild animals have become part of the
human platter; particularly in some parts of the world their demand is increasing as important portion of the diet.
With most of the novel pathogens coming from animal sources this pandemic has
raised several questions for mankind and its future .
In the year 2003, a respiratory illness known as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerged in China. Like
COVID-19, it was also caused by a coronavirus, named SARS-CoV. The virus affected over 8000 people worldwide
and killed almost 800. Early epidemiologic investigations indicated that masked palm civets (Paguma larvata) and
horseshoe bats of the genus Rhinolophus, as natural reservoir of SARS-CoV (Wang 2007). Similarly, during 2013–
2016, Ebola outbreak emerged in middle Africa and then spread to other countries in Western Africa resulting in
28,652 human infections and 11,325 deaths (WHO 2017). The transmission of the virus was sought to be a contact
of humans with infected animals such as fruit bats, chimpanzees, gorillas, monkeys, forest antelope, or
porcupines. Deadly influenza pandemics have emerged many times in recorded history. Data suggests that about
9% of the world’s population is annually affected by influenza with up to 1 billion infections, 3–5 million severe
cases, and 300,000 to 500,000 deaths each year (Clayville 2011), and many of these also have reservoirs in
animals/birds.

the average amount of meat consumed per person has nearly

In the past 50 years, globally

doubled and hence production rate (of meat) is also growing much faster
(Godfray 2018). FAO warned that a growing number of meat consumers will be leading to a

heightened risk of new pandemics.1 Moreover, the risk is very high in various parts of
Central Asia and Africa to spread the novel pathogens/pandemics as wildlife is one of the important sources of
ever-increasing livestock
meat and income for the population in these regions. Man-animal conflicts,

cultivation (particularly near the wild habitats), intermingling of cultivated and wild

animals , and cultivation of wild animals are important reasons for spread of
the novel pathogens to humans. All these factors relate to environmental instability
which we have created on earth.

Rising meat demand, wet markets and global trade are only some of the directly
visible reasons of the emergence of novel zoonoses in the human population.
However, there are many important factors linked to the environment and the

damage caused to it due to ever-increasing anthropogenic activities (Arora et

al. 2018) which can be the root causes of pandemics such as COVID-19. Global warming

and climate change , extreme levels of pollutants in the environment (soil, water and air),

deforestation , fragmentation of natural environments , intensive farming ,

and globalization are the factors contributing to the emergence and spread of new
wave of deadly pandemics . It is very clear that the spread of novel infectious diseases like

COVID-19 is an outcome of a growing global population and overexploitation of

natural environments. Deforestation and land use for intensive farming have significantly

amplified the risk of zoonoses . Due to habitat loss and inclusion of exotic
species in the platter, contact with wild animals and their body fluids has
increased . As per reports about 60% of subtropical and 45% of tropical forests have
vanished from the earth just because of human activities. The reduction of forest cover in such
a high proportion is directly related to a higher risk of pandemics. For example, due to forest loss in West Africa,
wild mammals including bats came in contact with humans and the Ebola outbreak emerged. Some studies
indicate that “zoonotic spillover” are found to be more associated with threatened and endangered species that
are increasingly being targeted for hunting and wildlife trade. These exotic species may carry new pathogens (of
Incidences
humans) that were not in our contact in the past and can play havoc as novel coronavirus is doing.
of zoonotic spillover are increasing rapidly and mainly driven by environmental
degradation , because humans are trespassing natural habitats and deliberately
coming in contact with wildlife. Climate change that includes rise in
temperatures , sea levels , change in pH of oceans, and altering patterns of
rainfall/droughts are also impacting the incidences of zoonotic diseases. A slight
increase in global temperature is expected to upsurge the risk of vector-borne diseases in new habitats/regions.
For example, global temperature rise has resulted in migration of mosquitoes to new regions and this resulted in
the transmission of Zika virus and dengue fever to new places where they were not previously reported. This
clearly shows that global warming is resulting in the transfer of human pathogens (through vectors) to countries
where they were not reported earlier. In some countries due to flooding events and rise in temperatures,
incidences of vector-borne diseases such as malaria and dengue have also increased by 30% and 14% respectively
(Struchiner et al. 2015; Boyce et al. 2016). Frequency of droughts has also increased due to climate change and
this has resulted in increased dependency on meat from livstock and wild animals. Ever increasing levels of
pollutants in the ecosystems is resulting in fast pace of mutations in microorganisms including human pathogens.
Due to the unprecedented release of recalcitrant and xenobiotic pollutants ,
including radiations, microbial pathogens can mutate or evolve very quickly ,
resulting in the development of novel strains , which can be far more dangerous
due to lack of immunity in the population against such microbes . Recently, Zhang et
al. (2020) indicated that high-level of arsenic (III) load due to heavy metal pollution in water rapidly enhanced
bacterial antibiotic resistance (BAR) and posed as a potential epidemiological threat to the public. There are
numerous such examples of multiple drug resistant ( MDR ) microbes which are becoming more
and more common now.

Humans are perturbing the habitats of wild animals and the normal cycle of
pathogens and their hosts. In such circumstances, we are becoming more and more
susceptible to new diseases. A human pathogen like Coronavirus is not fully
understood till date and there can be several other strains of this virus (and many other
viruses and bacteria) in nature or their reservoir hosts of wild animals which can be a matter of global health
security in future as well. COVID-19 pandemic is raising questions on our ongoing effort to improve the earth’s
environment. Frequent outbreaks of zoonotic diseases and their global spread through human to human contact
have made it even more important to achieve the targets of sustainable development goals (SDGs). There should
be more emphasis on adopting strict wildlife trade regulations and comprehensive measures for the protection of
Most important is to rethink on holistic approaches for
the natural environment.

improving our relationship with the environment that will lead us towards
sustainability . Agricultural sustainability and reducing dependency on animal products is one such
example.

Also, there are some key lessons to be learned from COVID-19. These are related to our survival ,
preparedness, and responsibility towards nature which will lead to the control of future pandemics. Various types
of shutdowns are proving to be effective not only in breaking the chain of infections but also healing of
environment and ecosystems. Air and water pollution levels have come down in several regions of the globe and
nature has started to reassert itself. Important is what we as mankind learn from this. Will we reduce the
greenhouse gas emissions drastically, will the unnecessary travel be curtailed, will we reduce the dumping of
pollutants in ecosystems to let the nature breathe, will we adopt sustainable agriculture practices, and stop
disturbing the wild habitats. Most importantly, will all the stake holders including governments, organizations and
individuals, unite together to fight the environmental pandemic which is going on since decades and resulting in
loss of life and biodiversity. Sooner or later, the deadly coronavirus, and the most explosive pandemic in a century,
will be tackled by vaccines or other methods, by the united efforts across the borders of countries and continents.
But this is not the first novel pathogen to hit us and also not going to be the last one. A fresh perspective is
required to address some key issues that we learnt from this pandemic. Mankind has to intercept the route causes
The way to tackle such pandemics in advance is to go all
of these pandemics in unison.

out to achive the targets of environmental sustainability .

Disease cause extinction.
Eleftherios Diamandis 1-29-2022, Division Head of Clinical Biochemistry at
Mount Sinai Hospital and Biochemist-in-Chief at the University Health Network
and is Professor & Head, Clinical Biochemistry, Department of Laboratory
Medicine and Pathobiology, University of Toronto, B.Sc. in Chemistry, Ph.D. in
Analytical Chemistry and M.D. from the University of Athens, Greece and a
Diploma in Clinical Biochemistry from the University of Toronto, “The Mother of
All Battles: Viruses vs Humans. Can Humans Avoid Extinction in 50–100 Years?”,
Open Life Sciences, 17(1), https://doi.org/10.1515/biol-2022-0005
Abstract

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID-19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about
the dangers of human suffering through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID-19 pandemic is now
being partially controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics, and vaccines, it became clear that our
We now have to start
current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term.

thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just
overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could

strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race ? The
answer is unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses found in bats, pangolins, and other
the
exotic animals that live in remote forests to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that
human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses that are capable of affecting the
function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, or heart. It is
remotely possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to
contagious viruses , which can cause pandemics , leading to the destruction of vital organs,
causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart, and kidney failures.
Thesediseases could result in the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably
the gradual extinction of the human race . This essay will comment on a few independent
pieces of scientific facts, and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all)
hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction, in the hope that these hypothetical
scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes.

Keywords: pandemics; contagious diseases; human race extinction; viruses; microbiome; COVID-19; blindness
1 Introduction

Le Chatelier’s Principle: Named after the French chemist, Le Chatelier’s principle posits that “When an external stress (change in pressure, temperature or concentration) is applied to a system in chemical equilibrium, the
equilibrium will change in such a way as to reduce the effect of the stress.” In other words, a change in a system will evoke a counter-change, which will bring the equilibrium to a new point. This principle operates with almost
every human or other activity. For example, it is known that when fruit production in the Serengeti ecosystem is reduced, the number of elephants, which feed on these fruits, is reduced proportionally. In the context of this essay,
I hypothesize that human-made changes in climate, the atmosphere, water, soil, and all other planet-living organisms, will likely evoke counter-changes that may be highly consequential to human life. Due to the complexity of our
ecosystem, humans do not know exactly how these changes will affect them in the end. Consequently, they choose to disregard them because lifestyle adjustments may cost money and convenience or loss of well-established
pleasures.

1.1 The earth is changing rapidly

What is changing on the earth that could induce a potentially catastrophic counter-change? The answer is everything is changing[1], from the living inhabitants (humans, other species, and plants) to the atmosphere, water, soil,
climate, among else.

The changes caused by human activity are sometimes dramatic. For example, it has been estimated that about 1 million out of 8.5 million species of plants, animals, and other organisms are in imminent danger of extinction [1].
Other estimates show that 50% of the organisms that existed 50 years ago have already gone extinct, not to consider additional species that are gone before we even identify them. Soon, we will likely be losing more than 80% of
the world’s species due to human overdevelopment and its associated consequences. The major reasons for species extinction are habitat destruction, pesticide poisoning, and illegal hunting [1].

2 Global warming

Some may choose to believe what the politicians are debating about: that climate change is a fact or fiction, but the data say that the last 6 years were the warmest on record [2]. Overall, the planet was 1.25°C warmer than in
preindustrial times (in the 1950s). Warmer oceans are melting ice sheets and rising sea levels by almost 5 mm per year. In Australia, record-setting heat and drought were responsible for the bushfires that destroyed almost 25%
of southeastern Australia’s forests and their living inhabitants, such as koalas. If we cannot slow down earth’s heating by reducing emissions, the current increase of about 0.2°C per decade will likely be rapidly surpassed. How
will the planet react? Likely with more catastrophic fires, tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods. The human homeostatic changes to increased temperatures are very complex and include many vital organs [3]. Global warming may
also cause changes in the biology of our candidate foes, the viruses, bacteria, and parasites that live in our gut and skin (see Section 2.2).

2.1 How much human-made environmental damage has been done already?

Humans are now the undisputed masters of the planet and cannot be easily stopped from actively destroying it, consciously or unconsciously. An interesting question is how much damage has been claimed to be done already, and
do we have the data to support these claims? Elhacham et al. have recently compared the natural biomass that exists on the earth with the human-made (anthropogenic) mass [4]. They found that each person on the globe
produces a mass that is about equal to their body weight every week! Is that too little or too much? Let us first define biomass and anthropogenic mass. The majority of the earth’s biomass is represented by trees and bushes. The
majority of the man-made mass is represented by buildings and infrastructure such as roads and consists of concrete, bricks, asphalt, metals, and plastic. Just consider that the total global mass of produced plastic so far is greater
than the overall mass of all terrestrial and marine animals combined!

So, how do we fare when comparing biomass to anthropogenic mass production? In the 1900s, the latter represented only 3% of global biomass; but now, in the 2020s, the two masses are about equal. The projection is that if we
go on with more deforestation, buildings, streets, plastics, cars, and so on, by 2040, it is likely that anthropogenic mass will almost triple the earth’s biomass. Will there be enough resources and clean air and water to sustain the
life of the projected 9 billion inhabitants? Anthropogenic mass production is difficult to slow down since this activity is considered part of our evolving civilization and way of living.
2.2 Human microbiome

The human body consists of approximately 30 trillion cells, but the microbiota population in the human gut is estimated to be 300 trillion [5]! In addition, there is another microbiota in the skin and other organs. It was initially
thought that these microbiota act locally (e.g., only in the gut or skin), but new evidence suggest that the effects of microbiota may be global, reaching every cell in the body. This can be achieved with various mechanisms, one
being the transmission of signals mediated by proteins that can travel through anatomically distinct structures such as the vagus nerve. For example, a protein called curli can travel through the vagus nerve and reach the brain,
where it can promote abnormal aggregation of proteins such as a-synuclein, one major pathogenetic player in Parkinson’s disease [5,6]. Another and even more likely mechanism includes the diffusion of bacterial or viral proteins
(some could be toxins to various organs) or pathogenic viruses into the bloodstream. From there, they can travel around the body. This is reminiscent of cancer cell metastasis by the hematogenous route. One piece of evidence
for that happening is that about half of the human metabolome (the collection of all metabolites in the blood) is derived by host bacteria [5]. Bacteria or virus-derived metabolites could also pass through the placenta and reach the
fetus, including the fetal brain, possibly causing diseases such as autism.

Despite skin not being as hospitable to microorganisms as the gut, a typical person may have about 1,000 species of bacteria on their skin [7]. These microbial communities continue to grow and diversify until puberty when
hormonal and developmental changes reach a plateau. The balance between host and bacteria in the skin is determined by the production of skin-derived microbial nutrients, microbiome-derived skin nutrients, skin, and
microbiome-derived antimicrobial peptides, and by the interaction of the microbiome with the host’s immune system. Similar as in the gut, there is a delicate balance between beneficial and potentially harmful bacteria and the
host immune system. It is remotely possible that our future enemies may derive from the gut, skin, or other organs harboring microorganisms. In addition, the skin is more sensitive to environmental changes such as climate
change as it is directly exposed to the environment.

In conclusion, bacterial, viral, and parasite-derived proteins or pathogenic viruses thrive locally (e.g., in the gut or skin) but are capable of acting globally.

2.3 Human viruses and how they could cause disease

Many strains of gut bacteria are harmless, but they can become dangerous pathogens under certain conditions, such as antibiotic use [8]. It is well known that gut bacteria can harbor many viruses (bacterial phages) [9]. If they
do not immediately kill the infected bacteria, these viruses incorporate into the bacterial genome and stay latent for extended periods (they are known “prophages”). These prophages can be reactivated under certain
environmental or other factors and act like pathogenic viruses. It is rather surprising that, in general, viruses are so many that they qualify as the most abundant biological entities on the planet. Sometimes, gut bacteria use their
activated prophages as weapons to gain an advantage and kill other competing bacteria. Phages could also assist in bacterial evolution as the latter become more virulent [10]. The gut bacteria also seem to interact with the host
immune system and can influence the efficacy of cancer immunotherapy [11,12,13]. The microbiome has been blamed for playing direct or indirect roles in many human diseases, including cancer, metabolic syndrome, diabetes,
dementia, and others [14].

The outcomes regarding health and disease depend on the balance of powers among the gut/skin/other organ viruses, the gut/skin/other organ microbiomes, and the host immune system. If this balance is disturbed, a biological
war between these players will be initiated, and the outcome will be unpredictable.

In conclusion, scientific evidence supports the idea that phages in the mammalian intestine, skin, or elsewhere, not only can be engulfed by certain eukaryotic cells but also might escape from the gut or skin, enter the
bloodstream, and make their way into other parts of the body, with as yet undiscovered consequences.

2.4 Viral variants

Viruses evolve continuously, eventually leading to more transmissible variants, which sometimes can be more lethal than the original strains. The SARS-CoV-2 is an excellent contemporary example. Multiple variants of SARS-CoV-
2 are rapidly spreading and are becoming dominant in certain geographic areas [15,16]. For example, the B.1.1.7 variant (United Kingdom) has 23 mutations and 17 amino acid changes; variant 501Y.V2 (South Africa) has 23
mutations and 17 amino acid changes; and P.1 variant (Brazil) has approximately 35 mutations with 17 amino acid changes.

In April 2021, when this document was first written, I speculated verbatim that “ new variants with
additional mutations could become able to evade our currently available vaccines
by weakening the ability of vaccine-induced antibodies to neutralize/block viral
entry, and by strengthening the ability of the virus to enter the cells via surface receptors.” The so-called
“omicron variant,” isolated in November 2021, already fulfilled this prediction.
2.5 How COVID-19 and possibly other viruses affect the brain

In general, viral invasion of the central nervous system may be achieved by several routes, including transsynaptic transfer across infected neurons, entry via the olfactory nerve, infection of vascular endothelium, or leukocyte
migration across the blood–brain barrier. SARS-CoV-2 invades endothelial cells via transmembrane angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor binding and a subsequent proteolytic event, facilitated by transmembrane
protease serine 2 [17]. Is there evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can enter the brain? The answer is yes [18]. As already mentioned, one route is by migrating from the cribriform plate along the olfactory tract [19] or through vagal
pathways. Another route may include viral entry into brain capillary endothelial cells via the ACE2 pathway. Viral RNA was detected in the medulla and cerebellum by reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction. However,
viral proteins seem to be absent from neurons and glial cells. Consequently, the adverse events of the virus on the brain, including altered neurotransmission and neuronal damage, are likely mediated by neuroinflammation and
hypoxic injury through cytokines and other proinflammatory mediators.

2.6 SARS-CoV-2 and possibly other viruses can affect the senses

Viruses can affect our senses. For example, SARS-CoV-2 causes anosmia (loss of smell) and ageusia (loss of taste) in 40–70% of COVID-19 patients [20]. These effects persist, but it is unknown for how long. Other neurological
symptoms include headache, stroke, impairment of consciousness, seizure, anxiety, and encephalopathy.

Current evidence suggests that SARS-CoV-2-related anosmia may be a new viral syndrome specific to COVID-19. This syndrome is likely mediated by intranasal inoculation of SARS-CoV-2 into the olfactory neural circuitry. Since
the olfactory sensory neurons do not express ACE2 receptor, the likely explanation for the loss of smell is the damage of accessory cells supporting these neurons.

Although anosmia is not a lethal or severe disease, other neurological damage such as blindness could be devastating [21,22].

3 Adverse scenarios

Fifty years ago, one adverse scenario regarding a pandemic was presented in the film “The Andromeda strain,” which describes a pandemic caused by a pathogen of extraterrestrial origin [23]. Here, I present an alternative
hypothetical scenario that involves an endogenous virus. Obviously, there is a myriad of similar scenarios, and the one given below can be currently classified as fictional but not impossible.

A prophage, which was residing dormant for years in the genome of the commensal gut bacterium Bifidobacterium infantis suddenly, and without an apparent reason, has undergone induction and started to produce viral
proteins, which were subsequently assembled into whole phages. After cell lysis, these phages infected other neighboring cells. This cycle was repeated many times, and millions of free virions were released, some entering the
systemic circulation (viremia). Some virions reached the lung endothelium and entered the endothelial cells through an, as yet, unknown receptor and started replicating and lysing these cells. The resulting mucous caused the
host to cough, thus facilitating the transfer of the virus to other humans through aerosol droplets. Soon, the virus was able to infect, first a few hundred, then thousands, then millions of other unsuspected people through
coughing and sneezing. The virus was able to travel all over the world as the pulmonary manifestations were mild, and most infected individuals thought it was a common flu or a similar ailment.

Scientists isolated the virus that caused this flu-like disease and determined from its genomic sequence that it was a novel member of influenza virus B, which usually causes seasonal flu. Despite the pandemic nature of the
infection, nobody died, and governmental bodies were not highly concerned.

Six months later, one individual reported a weakening of his vision, which, within 3 months, progressed to total blindness. This unusual form of blindness quickly spread to other people until scientists performed epidemiological
studies, which linked the blindness to the previously mentioned mild flu. Soon afterward, scientists isolated and identified the virus from the brains of blind and subsequently succumbed individuals and confirmed that the
sequence matched the virus that caused the unusual flu. More elaborate studies had shown that there was unusual and very severe neuroinflammation around the occipital lobe of the brain (Brodmann area 17), an area
responsible for the interpretation of visual signals arriving from the optic nerve. Several therapeutics were tried, but none was proven to be effective. Twelve months into the pandemic, 10 million people lost their vision, and
within 18 months, without any success in developing therapies or a vaccine, the blindness had spread to whole nations.

3.1 Blindness

The selection of blindness as a chronic consequence of an acute pandemic was deliberate. In 1995, Portuguese author Jose Saramago published a fictional novel entitled “Blindness” (ISBN: 9780151002511), which contributed to
him winning the Nobel Prize in literature in 1998.

Blindness, as portrayed in the book, is a highly detailed story of a mysterious mass epidemic that caused blindness of a whole nation and the social breakdown that followed. The blindness pandemic, in many respects, is
reminiscent of the current COVID-19 pandemic. Blindness caused widespread panic, anarchy, and government lockdowns. The life of the blind people was characterized by filthiness, aggressive manners, disrespect of others, and
a struggle to survive by any possible means. The breakdown of society was near total. Law and order, social services, government, schools could no longer function. Families have been separated and could not find one another.
People squat in abandoned buildings and scrounge for food. Violence, disease, and despair threaten to overwhelm human coping. One of Saramago’s quotes, describing life after blindness, is reproduced here

“Perhaps humanity will manage to live without eyes, but then it will cease to be humanity, the result is obvious…”

3.2 Other ailments

Acute pandemics could cause many other chronic diseases that can threaten the sustainability of our present society. Although COVID-19 causes loss of smell and taste, these are considered nonlife-threatening ailments. However,
in the long run, the permanent absence of smell and taste will mean the loss of innumerable current pleasures associated with the consumption of food and drinks. Clearly, loss of hearing will not be compatible with current
societal functions or human achievements. Acute viral diseases are also associated with innumerable organ-specific diseases such as heart, kidney, and reproductive failures and disturbance of other vital functions that can
paralyze our current society, economy, and culture. Even a minor weakening of our memory (mild cognitive impairment) could result in chaotic situations that authors of fiction, such as Saramago, attempt to describe in detail in
future books.
3.3 Epilog

Humans have learned to take for granted what they currently have and enjoy. Perhaps, we did not realize that the
human race’s spectacular advances are dependent on several potentially volatile abilities (senses, brain function)
and that even one loss, or diminution of such abilities, could be detrimental, causing a collapse of our civilization.
The COVID -19 pandemic helped us realize that we may be sitting on a time bomb ,
which might explode if we continue disturbing the current equilibrium between humans and other
planetary partners. In addition to viruses of a rather exotic origin , such as SARS-CoV-

2, billions of other viruses and other infectious agents in our gut, skin, and elsewhere are
waiting for the right time to attack us. The lessons learned from COVID-19 should be a wake-up call for
humans to stop disturbing the equilibrium with actions that favor the well-being of humans but put in danger
the existence of other inhabitants of planet earth . Human migration, also known as “travel,”
has facilitated the travel of our foes, along with us, in every conceivable corner of the world.

Simulations, empirics, and surging connectivity prove.

Kiseong Kim, 3-26-2021, Ph.D. in Bio and Brain Engineering from the Korea
Institute of Science and Technology, et al., “Network Analysis to Identify the Risk
of Epidemic Spreading,” Applied Sciences, 11(7), p. 2997,
https://doi.org/10.3390/app11072997

Severalepidemics , such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threaten ed
human life throughout history ; however, it is unclear if humans will remain
safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases . Moreover, the
transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered . In this study, we
present the results of a n epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship
between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and
impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and
the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of
human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below
100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social
certain diseases can potentially infect all
networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless,

nodes in the human social networks , and these diseases cause a pandemic when
the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that
certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human
contact.

1. Introduction

The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human
extinction event , and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies
regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5],
Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome ( SARS ) [8],
and Ebola [9], have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of
pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility between cities, nations,
and continents, thereby threatening humankind [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the

epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however,
extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic
effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been
proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network
structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic
spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR)
[19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are
epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and
infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the
pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26].

In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to
identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental
when the epidemic spreads to all nodes of the network and the fatality rate
hypothesis states that

is 100%, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free
network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the
network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that
the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten
humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the
relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of
determining information flow during an epidemic.

2. Materials and Methods

We designed an epidemic simulation process to identify the relationship between pandemic

risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free
network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic
spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of
the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We
have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials.

Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free
networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic
spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network.
We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal
of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially
We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the
infected. (C)
transition from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady
state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed.

2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model

We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts,
respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical
systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in
the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The
parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the
degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing
human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with
three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After
network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks
with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000).

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k).

2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model

For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential
equations [21]:

[EQUATIONS OMITTED]
where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be
infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the
epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters
in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of
infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We
express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the
probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery.

2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method

The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the
value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of
epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time
period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3).

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of
infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node
transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4).

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease.
Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined
whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective
node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents
epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread.

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
2.4. Simulation Parameters

We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95
and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random
processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data
from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain.

The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains
both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the
recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk.

3. Results

Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In
the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as
Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high
“extinctive spread”.

pandemic risk . In the real world, extinctive spreading indicates that the disease will
infect every person in the society . From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread
score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we
identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined
by β, γd, and k (Figure 6).

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread
becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause
extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In
contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive
spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new
infective nodes.
Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and
Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic
number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics.
Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For
example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various
k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be
threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in
quantifying the risk of epidemics.

[TABLE 1 OMITTED]
4. Discussion

Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the
dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases. They investigated the distribution of susceptible,
infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and
MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. However, they did not conduct a
quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact
between people . To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an
SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, we consider various

connectivity and disease characteristics on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic
parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. The results reveal ed that certain

infectious diseases can lead to extinction . Moreover, even if the disease band extends over
the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality
rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The
risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading
infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our
results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this
study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic
parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, human extinction is possible. For
example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people,
human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact
between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health
perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of
strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished
by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to
the society, thereby avoiding human extinction.

Additional considerations may improve our analysis. First, large population size and various proportions of initial infective nodes were not considered in
the experiments. We have confirmed that the result was consistent when the proportion of initial infective nodes was 0.05% of the total population;
however, this can vary depending on the distinct proportion of initial infective nodes in a different population. To achieve robust results, we need to
perform additional experiments for various parameters; however, we could not address this issue due to computational complexity. Second, we did not
consider numerous known epidemic diseases. We calculated the transmission rates of epidemic diseases using the known infectious periods and
reproduction numbers of the epidemics from evidence in the literature. In the present study, we only considered five epidemic diseases, since the
information on infectious periods and reproduction numbers of diseases was mostly unavailable for other epidemic diseases. Third, this study only
considers the SIR model on scale-free networks in epidemic simulation. Since the dynamics of epidemic diseases can be varied in different models or
networks, it is important to experiment in various simulation environments to confirm the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, these limitations can
be considered in future experiments or using improved computational methods. With these further improvements, our approach can be used as a
computational tool to analyze the risk of epidemic diseases.

5. Conclusions

In this study, we analyzed the risk of epidemic diseases by creating an epidemic simulation on a scale-free
network. Based on the simulation results for various epidemic parameters, we confirmed
that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction and can be prevented by minimizing

human contact. We believe that identifying potential candidate diseases that may lead to human

extinction is crucial in addressing epidemic prevention activities such as quarantine.

Growth-oriented AI ensures extinction---but degrowth solves.

Pueyo ’18 [Salvador; October 1; Department of Evolutionary Biology, Ecology,
and Environmental Sciences, Universitat de Barcelona; Journal of Cleaner
Production, “Growth, Degrowth, and the Challenge of Artificial Superintelligence,”
vol. 197, pp. 1731–1736]

The challenges of sustainability and of superintelligence are not

independent . The changing 84 fluxes of energy, matter, and information can be
interpreted as different faces of a general acceleration 2 85 . More directly , it is
argued below that superintelligence would deeply affect 86 production technologies and

also economic decisions, and could in turn be affected by the 87 socioeconomic and

ecological context in which it develops. Along the lines of Pueyo (2014, p. 88 3454), this paper
presents an approach that integrates these topics. It employs insights from a 89 variety of sources, such as
ecological theory and several schools of economic theory. 90 The next section presents a thought experiment, in
which superintelligence emerges after the 91 technical aspects of goal alignment have been resolved, and this
occurs specifically in a neoliberal 92 scenario.Neoliberalism is a major force shaping current
policies on a global level, which urges 93 governments to assume as their main role
the creation and support of capitalist markets, and to 94 avoid interfering in their
functioning (Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal policies stand in sharp contrast 95 to degrowth
views : the first are largely rationalized as a way to enhance efficiency and production 96 (Plehwe, 2009), and
represent the maximum expression of capitalist values. 97 The thought experiment illustrates how

superintelligence perfectly aligned with capitalist 98 markets could have very

undesirable consequences for humanity and the whole biosphere . It also 99
suggests that there is little reason to expect that the wealthiest and most powerful people would be 100 exempt
from these consequences, which, as argued below, gives reason for hope. Section 3 raises 101 the possibility of a
broad social consensus to respond to this challenge along the lines of degrowth, 102 thus tackling major
technological, environmental, and social problems simultaneously. The 103 uncertainty involved in these scenarios
if a non-negligible probability is assigned to 104 these two futures, little
is vast, but,
room is left for either complacency or resignation . 105 106 2. Thought experiment:
Superintelligence in a neoliberal scenario 107 108 Neoliberalism is creating a very special

breeding ground for superintelligence, because it strives 109 to reduce the role of
human agency in collective affairs. The neoliberal pioneer Friedrich Hayek 110 argued that the
spontaneous order of markets was preferable over conscious plans , because
markets, 111 he thought, have more capacity than humans to process information
(Mirowski, 2009). Neoliberal 112 policies are actively transferring decisions to

markets (Mirowski, 2009), while firms' automated 113 decision systems become an integral part of the
market's information processing machinery 114 (Davenport and Harris, 2005). Neoliberal globalization is locking
governments in the role of mere 115 players competing in the global market (Swank, 2016). Furthermore,
automated governance is a 116 foundational tenet of neoliberal ideology (Plehwe,
2009, p. 23). 117 In the neoliberal scenario, most technological development can be expected
to take place either in the context of firms or in support of firms3 118 . A number of
institutionalist (Galbraith, 1985), post119 Keynesian (Lavoie, 2014; and references therein) and evolutionary
(Metcalfe, 2008) economists 120 concur that, in capitalist markets, firms tend to maximize their
growth rates (this principle is related 121 but not identical to the neoclassical assumption
that firms maximize profits; Lavoie, 2014). Growth 122 maximization might be interpreted as expressing
the goals of people in key positions, but, from an 123 evolutionary perspective, it is thought to result from a
mechanism akin to natural selection 124 (Metcalfe, 2008). The first interpretation is insufficient if
we accept that: (1) in big corporations, the 125 managerial bureaucracy is a coherent social-psychological system
with motives and preferences of 126 its own (Gordon, 1968, p. 639; for an insider view, see Nace, 2005, pp. 1-10),
(2) this system is 127 becoming techno-social-psychological with the progressive incorporation of decision-making
128 algorithms and the increasing opacity of such algorithms (Danaher, 2016), and (3) human mentality
129 and goals are partly shaped by firms themselves (Galbraith, 1985). 130 The type of AI
best suited to participate in firms' decisions in this context is described in a 131 recent review in Science: AI
researchers aim to construct a synthetic homo economicus, the 132 mythical perfectly rational agent of
neoclassical economics. We review progress toward creating 133 this new species of machine, machina
economicus (Parkes and Wellman, 2015, p. 267; a more 134 orthodox denomination would be Machina
oeconomica). 135 Firm growth is thought to rely critically on retained earnings
(Galbraith, 1985; Lavoie, 2014, p. 136 134-141). Therefore, economic selection can be
generally expected to favor firms in which these are greater. The aggregate

RE=FE(R,L,K)-w⋅L-(i+δ)⋅K-g. (1) 139 Bold symbols represent vectors (to indicate multidimensionality).
retained earnings4 137 RE of all firms in an economy can be expressed as: 138

F is an aggregate production 140 function, relying on inputs of various types of natural resources R, labor L and
capital K (including intelligent machines), and being affected by environmental factors5 141 E; w are wages, i are
returns to 142 capital (dividends, interests) paid to households, δ is depreciation and g are the net taxes paid to
143 governments. 144 Increases in retained earnings face constraints, such as trade-offs
among different parameters of 145 Eq. 1. The present thought experiment explores the
consequences of economic selection in a 146 scenario in which two sets of
constraints are nearly absent: sociopolitical constraints on market 147 dynamics are
averted by a neoliberal institutional setting, while technical constraints are
overcome 148 by asymptotically advanced technology (with extreme AI
allowing for extreme technological 149 development also in other fields). The
environmental and the social implications are discussed in 150 turn. Note that this scenario is not

defined by some contingent choice of AIs' goals by their 151 programmers : The
goals of maximizing each firm's growth and retained earnings are assumed to 152
emerge from the collective dynamics of large sets of entities subject to
capitalistic rules of 153 interaction and, therefore, to economic selection .

Otherwise, misalignment is both maximal and existential.

Growiec ’22 [Jakub; September 8; Professor and Head of Department of
Quantitative Economics at SGH Warsaw School of Economics; Frontiers in
Economic History book series, Accelerating Economic Growth, “The Force
Unleashed,” p. 31–41]

4 Will AI Become a Filter ?

Tools and machines always allowed humankind to increase the span of our control over the environment.
Why would it?
Unfortunately, advanced artificial intelligence may put this reassuring regularity in question.
—one may ask—If AI is just a set of optimization algorithms created by human programmer s ,
then it can only pursue goals set by human programmer s . It is then just one more external device

augmenting our abilities. So far this has always been the case; alas, it may change in the future.

There is an emerging general trend that as our technology becomes more and more
complex , we agree to sacrifice some of our control at lower levels in exchange for
more control at higher levels . For example, many of us no longer wish to know how various devices
work as long as we know how to operate them and find the results useful. Who cares about microwave physics
when the appliance is just so easy to use: you click here, wait a minute and your food is hot. Information
technologies, in particular, are now beyond comprehension of virtually anyone in the world. Yet, click, and you
watch an interesting movie or connect with a distant colleague who also has just logged on to Facebook. That’s
very empowering.

An important class of human capability augmentations is the ones that feature their own optimization algorithms.
For millennia the only representatives of this class were domesticated animals. Cattle, pigs, sheep, horses, as well
as our pets such as cats and dogs, are descendants of wild beasts that have evolved as local control maximizers,
but we have learned to hijack their capabilities and channel them toward our own good. As the optimization power
of animal brains is limited and constant over time, our superior position over them is unquestionable.

AI algorithms which are also goal maximizers and thus—like

Things look different, though, with

biological species—are subject to instrumental convergence (Bostrom, 2012). This is

because unlike the animal species, their algorithmic complexity and computing
power of the hardware on which they are run has been strongly increasing since the
19 80s . A systematic trend has also emerged that AI increasingly makes decisions on

our behalf and we are less and less able to understand the premises for these
decisions—which may regard not only issues such as spending the next few hours of your free time (beware of
the Internet binge) but also choosing the politicians you’d like to vote for (beware of fake news campaigns), and
sometimes even your life partner (beware generally). As Arthur C. Clarke puts it, “ any sufficiently
advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic ”. Our digital technologies are clearly
on track to become such in the near future.

People often underestimate how much progress has been obtained in the field of AI. Does
anyone remember 19 90s web search engines like AltaVista? It was nearly impossible to
find the desired results. Now it’s exactly the opposite : if ten top finds on Google don’t
exhaust the topic you’re interested in, you’ve probably made a wrong query . Check your typos.
And it may even get frightening when AI algorithms provide answers at a level of complexity that is far

beyond our comprehension. For example, DeepMind AlphaZero exhibits vastly superhuman

performance at chess, shogi (Japanese chess) and Go, and learned all that in a few hours (OK,
on vast Google tensor processing units, but still), only by self -play, without using any human
knowledge. Its performance stuns grandmasters and suggests a qualitative improvement in the game play
compared to the strategies invented by professional chess and Go players over centuries (Silver et al., 2017,
2018).

Nevertheless, the algorithms developed so far are still narrow AI, confined to relatively limited
action spaces. If we want, we can switch them off and do things our way. They don’t yet have the capability to
expand the space of actions which are searched in order to maximize the objective. AlphaZero is vastly
it is unable to go from there and beat the stock market or
superhuman at chess, shogi and Go, but

master nanotech nology. It can’t push its constraints , self-rewrite and go rule (let

alone, navigate) the world. But we shouldn’t exclude the possibility that one day an artificial
general intelligence (AGI) might be able to do that.

The quest for AGI opens the threat that machine intelligence will one day obtain the capability to
search a very broad space of actions while maximizing some objective which to some (even
tiny) extent opposes our human local control. By the logic of intelligence explosion via a cascade

of r ecursive s elf- i mprovements (Yudkowsky, 2013; Hanson and Yudkowsky, 2013; Bostrom, 2014), this AGI
may quickly develop itself to be orders of magnitude faster and more accurate at

decision making than people. We are, in the end, limited by the cognitive capacities of our
brains that we cannot rewire, and victims of our puny data communication abilities based only on speech and
writing. (Just compare that to a modern broadband Internet connection.) Then, one day we may realize that the
objectives we had programmed into the AGI have led to unintended consequences which cannot be corrected
anymore: theAGI would be already superintelligent and would always outsmart the
humans, successfully protecting its original objective. In this way, we may fall victim to our own
incompetence , myopia and dynamic inconsistency of actions: the AGI may get out of hand ,
giving the humankind a very narrow (or zero ) time margin for reaction .

AGI becomes technically possible, it will be built . Whether a

As an economist I expect that if one day

technological corporation , government agency or an open-source software community,

someone will eventually do it—and thereby become rich, famous and powerful, with lots and lots of
local control. Economic incentives for developing AGI are crystal clear. After all, the biggest
fortunes in the world are already made in the software business, and developing machine intelligence is a big
growth driver there, as evidenced by the global position of Google, Facebook and Amazon.

So, will the rise of AGI constitute the next filter in the development of the human civilization?
There are at least two reasons why it may indeed be. First, the orthogonality thesis: any level of intelligence can
be coupled with more or less any final goal (Bostrom, 2012). Thus, as AI gradually approaches the human
If an
intelligence level we must be extremely careful in choosing the goals of our strongest AI algorithms.
intelligence explosion (hard AI takeoff) occurs and we get the goals wrong , we’ll
never get a chance to correct them. In this regard, Nick Bostrom devised a fascinating but deeply
disappointing doomsday scenario of apocalypse by paperclips . It goes as follows. Imagine that a
group of AI researchers have come up with a new promising AI architecture but are not sure how well it will work.
They thought that the best way of checking how strong it is, is by letting its first practice on a trivial goal that is
easy to monitor. So they said, OK, for starters let’s try the following: think of a most efficient way of making
paperclips. They plugged the computer into the Internet , switched the program on and went to
sleep. But they badly underestimated the power of their new algorithm. Overnight it managed to rewrite its code
multiple times, dramatically improving its own performance, and learned how to harness the computing power of
most devices connected to the Internet. In the morning no human on Earth was able to switch it off anymore. But
the algorithm assessed that disabling the off switch is not enough. It realized that the most important security
threat, with the potential to compromise its goal, is due to the homo sapiens. Logically, it decided that security
threats must be eliminated. At the same time, it also began to—conscientiously, ingenuously and unhumanely
the Earth into a huge laboratory aimed at perfecting
quickly—turn the art of making
paperclips .
The orthogonality thesis implies that we can’t be comforted that the AI would act like a human once it reaches
AI doesn’t need to gain
human-level intelligence. Most likely it won’t. Moreover, the
consciousness or ability to reflect on its own goals before it can become
dangerous to humans. These are antropomorphizations characteristic for science-fiction movies. In reality,
one should rather expect some variant of apocalypse by paperclips. The challenge of building a safe AGI is

really huge and involves, in particular, the necessity of including human prosperity, well-

being, and everything that we value directly in the AI’s goal. Behavioral rules and optimization
constraints are useless in this regard because a smart algorithm will always find its way around them, for example
by adding new dimensions and finding surprising re-interpretations of ambiguous concepts (Hanson and
Yudkowsky, 2013). Another major problem is that the goal has to remain invariant under recursive self-
improvements of the algorithm. And it doesn’t help that we don’t quite know the goals of our lives yet.

AGI can be a filter to the humankind lies in the sheer power that
The second reason why

comes with intelligence. It is certainly healthy to be cautious about voluntarily setting

ourselves in the position of an entity with inferior intelligence. After all, what was the fate of
 homo sapiens? Well, they’re not with
other hominins when confronted with the (slightly) more intelligent

us anymore! The Neanderthals and Denisovans have become extinct even though
their relative disadvantage in brainpower and social skills was probably small . Then it doesn’t
take much imagination to believe that a s uper i ntelligent AI will resist our attempts at
switching it off or changing its goals, and it will possibly decide to eliminate us altogether, if not
through deliberate genocide then for example by depriving us of the resources that we need for

survival but it needs for building its paperclips.

It outweighs all other extinction scenarios---scope, speed, and

diversity of ASI threats are categorically distinct.
Czarnecki ’20 [Tony; July; MA, Sciences, scholar at the Chatham House, Royal
Institute of International Affairs; “Federate to Survive! Who Will Lead Humanity to
Defend It from Superintelligence, Climate Change and Other Existential Threats?”
ISBN: 9798654293619]

The events from 2045 onwards will start to evolve very rapidly . Very soon after it has been
created, Superintelligence , embodied in whatever form, will be capable of redesigning

itself. Repetitions of this cycle will result in the so called runaway effect, or an intelligence

explosion , where such a smart machine designs successive generations of increasingly improved, powerful
copies of itself, creating intelligence far exceeding human intellectual capacity. Once

Superintelligence has reached that capability it may be impossible for a human to comprehend and

even less so, to control it. Humanity will have reached the point known as Technological Singularity. Ray

Kurzweil predicts that Technological Singularity event will happen by 2045 .

If we manage toturn Superintelligence into our friend and let it arrive at the Technological
Singularity event, assuming we would still have control over its evolution (e.g. via linking its goals
to our most important human values ), then the question is what will be our choice. For example, we can
let it evolve itself and, so to speak, let it fly off and leave us alone. That may be possible. However, it is unlikely we
will choose this option, since as someone said, ‘one cannot uninvent the atomic bomb’. We are inquisitive and
innovative beings and it is difficult to imagine we would like to return to ‘less developed’ world if it was at all
possible.

We have to assume thatonce the Technological Singularity is there, it will become our Master
by default , even if our values will have been embedded in its overall decision-
making pattern. Its knowledge , choices of important decisions for humanity and overall
comprehension of the world around us and the Universe in general, will be unimaginably greater
than our own capabilities.
So, we shall have two options (assuming there are both possible). The first one is to upload (copy) our personality,
memories, and consciousness by reading our brain (although that may not be enough) onto a digital platform (a
chip embedded in some material resembling our bodies). The second option is to merge our minds in a digital
form with Superintelligence. From then on it is a pure speculation about how Humanity might evolve into the
long, long future. However, in the next few decades we may be forced to make that biggest decision in the history
of Humanity on how we want to evolve as a species. Therefore, let me take you on my own journey into the
unknown because the conclusions may be useful for making such a decision.

Chapter 2
The risk arising from a hostile Superintelligence

I would now like to concentrate on the risk for Humanity arising from the advent of Superintelligence. The key
aspect of the assessment of that risk for Humanity is to ask a basic question about key values that define
Humanity, what is good and what is right. I will develop this argument further on. So, paradoxically,
Superintelligence forces us to answer these questions more meaningfully than ever before.

In my view, S uper i ntelligence represents the most dangerous risk . Why?

Because it is almost certain to happen, if we do nothing, unlike natural pandemics that
may not happen at all, even if we do not apply any counter measures, since it is a lottery type
risk . The second reason why it is so dangerous is that it may happen much earlier than the risk
mostly talked about in recent years – the climatic catastrophe . The risk coming from

Superintelligence is more likely to happen in the next 50 years rather than next
century . On the other hand, I believe that if we manage to produce the so called “ friendly ”
S uper i ntelligence, then instead of becoming the biggest risk, it itself can help us reduce
other anthropogenic risks, such as climate change.
The Superintelligence is defined as a type of artificial intelligence that would surpass even the smartest humans.
The threat stems, from even the slightest misalignment of our values and Superintelligence’s
objectives, or its “values”. If this happens, even when the corresponding goals appear benign, it could be
disastrous . Nick Bostrom quotes a scaring example that involves a Superintelligence programmed to
“maximize” the abundance of some objects, like paperclips. This could lead Superintelligence to
harvest all available atoms , including those in human bodie s , thereby destroying
humanity (and perhaps the entire biosphere (77). In addition, there are multiple ways that
Superintelligence could become outright malevolent toward humanity, as University of Louisville computer
scientist Roman Yampolskiy outlines in a recent paper (78).

 Preventing humans from using resources such as money, land , water , rare
elements , organic matter, internet service or computer hardware;
 Subverting the functions of local and federal governments , international
corporations , professional societies, and charitable organizations to pursue its own ends, rather
than their human-designed purposes;
 Constructing a total surveillance state (or exploitation of an existing one), reducing
any notion of privacy to zero – including privacy of thought;
 Enslaving humankind, restricting our freedom to move or otherwise choose what to do with our
bodies and minds, as through forced cryonics or concentration camps ;

 Abusing and torturing humankind with perfect insight into our

physiology to maximize amount of physical or emotional pain , perhaps combining it
with a simulated model of us to make the process infinitely long .

It would be impossible to provide a complete list of negative outcomes of an AI

agent with general reasoning ability that he would be able to inflict. We can expect a lot of these sorts
of attacks in the future. The situation is even more complicated once we consider systems that exceed human
capacity. S uper i ntelligence may be capable of inventing dangers we are not even

capable of predicting or imagining.

 Superintelligence poses perhaps the most difficult long-
So, we have to accept that the creation of

term risks to the future of Humanity . Phil Torres identifies several issues here, saying that the first
one is the amity-enmity problem: the AI could dislike us for whatever reason, and therefore try to kill us. The
second risk is the indifference problem: the AI could simply not care about our well-being, and thus destroy us
because we happen to be in the way. And finally, there is yet another problem, which he calls “the clumsy fingers
problem”: the AI could inadvertently nudge us over the cliff of extinction rather than intentionally pushing us. This
possibility is based on the assumptions, which states that higher levels of intelligence aren’t necessarily correlated
with the avoidance of certain kinds of mistakes. He warns that the fruits of our ingenuity — namely, dual-use
technologies — have introduced brand new existential risk scenarios never before encountered by Earth-
Superintelligence, e.g. it could manipulate matter
originating life. Given the immense power of

in ways that appear to us as pure magic , it would be enough to make a single error for such a being
to trip humanity into the eternal grave of extinction (79).

American industrial ag culminates in extinction.

Sanderson ’21 [Matthew R. and Stan Cox; May 17; social scientist at Kansas
State University; research scholar in ecosphere studies at The Land Institute; “Big
Agriculture Is Leading to Ecological Collapse,”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/17/big-industrialized-agriculture-climate-change-
earth-systems-ecological-collapse-policy]

Today, there is more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere than at any point in the
past 3.6 million years. On April 5, atmospheric carbon dioxide exceeded 420 parts per million—
marking nearly the halfway point toward doubling the carbon dioxide levels measured
prior to the Industrial Revolution, a mere 171 years ago. Even amid a pandemic -induced
economic shutdown—during which global annual emissions dropped 7 percent— carbon dioxide and

methane levels set records in 2020. The last time Earth held this much carbon dioxide
in its atmosphere, sea levels were nearly 80 feet higher and the planet was 7

degrees Fahrenheit warmer . The catch: Homo sapiens did not yet exist .
Change is in the air. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines announced climate change is “at the
Business-as-usual is no longer a viable
center of the country’s national security and foreign policy.”
strategy as more institutions consider a future that will look and feel much different. In this context, it is
striking to read a recent piece in Foreign Policy arguing “big agriculture is best.”

“Big agriculture is best” cannot be an argument supported by empirical evidence. By

now, it is vitally clear that Earth systems —the atmosphere, oceans, soils, and biosphere—

are in various phases of collapse , putting nearly one-half of the world’s gross domestic product at
risk and undermining the planet’s ability to support life . And big , industrialized

ag riculture— promoted by U.S . foreign and domestic policy — lies at the heart of the
multiple connected crises we are confronting as a species .

The litany ofindustrial agriculture’s toll is long and diverse. Consider the effects of industrial
animal agriculture, for example. As of this writing, animal agriculture accounts for 14.5

percent of total anthropogenic g reen h ouse g a s emissions annually. It is also the

source of 60 percent of all n itrous ox ide and 50 percent of all methane
emissions, which have 36 times and 298 times, respectively, the warming potential of
carbon dioxide. As industrial animal agriculture has scaled up, agricultural emissions of methane and nitrous
oxide have been going in one direction only: up.

Efforts to scale industrial ag riculture are undermining the planet’s capacity to

support life at more local scales too. Consider Brazil, home to the Amazon Rainforest , which
makes up 40 percent of all remaining rainforest and 25 percent of all terrestrial
biodiversity on Earth. Forest loss and species extinctions have only increased as
industrial ag riculture has scaled up in Brazil. Farmers are burning unprecedented
amounts of forest to expand their operations in pursuit of an industrial model. In
August 2019, smoke blocked the sun in São Paulo, Brazil, 2,000 miles away from the fires in the
state of Amazonas.

In India,the pace of agricultural industrialization is hastening as indicated

by rising agricultural production and declining employment in agriculture, which now
accounts for less than one-half of India’s workforce. Agriculture has been scaled with all the tools of the Green
Revolution: a high-input farming system comprised of genetically modified seeds

and accompanying synthetic fertilizers and pesticides . As ag riculture has

industrialized in India, the use of pesticides and fertilizers has risen as well.

it has become hard er to find clean

Although it has become more difficult to breathe the air in Brazil,

freshwater in India, where pesticide contamination is rising . There, the costs of

the industrial agriculture model are plainly ecological and human: Unable to drink the water
or pay back the loans they took out to finance their transition to industrial farming, an alarming number of Indian
farmers are drinking pesticides instead. Almost a quarter-million Indian farmers have died by suicide since 2000,
and 10,281 farmers and farm laborers killed themselves in 2019 alone. In Punjab, the country’s breadbasket,
environmental destruction coexists with a raging opioid epidemic ensnaring nearly two-thirds of households in the
state.

there are analogous stories

If the events in Brazil and India sound familiar to U.S. readers, it is because
in the United States—where industrial ag riculture is rendering entire land scapes
uninhabitable . The U.S. Corn Belt , which spans the region from Ohio to Nebraska, produces 75
percent of the country’s corn, but around 35 percent of the region has completely lost its topsoil .
Industrial agriculture has been pursued with special zeal in Iowa, where there are 25 million hogs and 3 million
water from the Raccoon River enters the state capital of Des Moines—home to 550,000 people—
people. There,
with nitrates, phosphorus, and bacteria that have exceeded federal safe water
drinking standards.

nutrient runoff from industrial agriculture in the U.S. Midwest has

At a larger scale,

created a n annual dead zone —a hypoxic area low in or devoid of oxygen—that is the
size of Massachusetts. The ecological consequences of industrial agriculture manifest
alongside a growing human toll. Rural communities are experiencing rising suicide rates,
especially among young people, along with increases in “deaths of despair” from alcohol and drugs—an expanding
human dead zone.

these outcomes are neither inevitable nor natural. They are outcomes of U.S.
Although tragic,
policy choices. Industrialized agriculture has been a hallmark of U.S. foreign policy in the post-World War II
era. Under the guise of development for all and the mantra of “feed the world,” the United States has used policy
to dump surplus grain in low-income countries—undermining markets for smallholder farmers—and cultivate
foreign markets as importers of high-input, industrial agriculture technologies to scale agriculture. At home,
federal policy since the 1970s has explicitly promoted scaling industrial agriculture through the “get big or get
out” imperative.
Society did not arrive at this precipice because agriculture was too small or because industrialized agriculture
we are peering into an abyss of systemic
respected the laws of physics. Instead,
socioecological collapse because every effort has been made to use
industrialization to break through all known ecological and human limitations to scaling
agriculture.

Industrial agriculture simplifies ecosystems , rendering us more vulnerable to

threats. Transformative policies will be required to pull us back from the edge. As a start, the U nited S tates
could set an example for the Global North with a 50-year farm bill.

Growth drives overuse of pesticides, destroying microbial

populations---collapses the biosphere
A. Madhavi et al., 2021, Sri Krishnadevaraya University, “Microbes and Their
Role in Bioremediation of Soil: A Detailed Review,” Advances in Environmental
Engineering and Green Technologies, edited by Junaid Ahmad Malik, IGI Global,
2021, pp. 65–113, doi:10.4018/978-1-7998-7062-3.ch003
ABSTRACT

Soil is the Earth’s shell and is getting polluted in a number of ways in the present scenario.
Human activities are the root cause of different types of soil pollution, which is an alarming issue and has be-
come a major obstacle that needs to be overcome to build a cleaner environment. The area of polluted soil is
widening day by day by virtue of a sharp increase in people from all over the world. It has been expected that the
global population will continue to increase up to 9 billion by 2050, and such prodigious population may be in need
of advanced agricultural and industrial systems, which may inevitably cause soil pollution. Therefore, it is
essential to control soil pollution, and fortunately, the solution for this is microbes that are the real creatures of
life on Earth. In fact, microorganisms play a unique role in the detoxification of polluted soil environments, and in
the last several years, this process has been called bioremediation. Remediation of polluted soils is necessary, and
research continues to develop novel, science-based remediation methods.

INTRODUCTION

Soil on the surface of the earth is a diverse natural entity which is home to a large
amount of living elements , including plants, animals and microbes that communicate with each
other (Dwivedi, 1997). Soil filters water , decomposes waste , stores heat and exchanges

the gases and therefore have great bearing on environmental balance . As the life

on earth mainly concentrates on the top of soil, hence, it is extremely important to

pay attention on pollutants or hazardous substances affecting predominantly the soil ecosystems. In the past
few years an estimated 12.6 million people have lost their lives worldwide from more
than 100 diseases resulting from unhealthy environments such as contaminated soils
(WHO, 2016). The formation of 1 cm top layer of soil requires 100-400 years (Chandra & Singh, 2009). Soil is the
layer of mixture of inorganic and organic material, where inorganic part is composed of fine rock particles
produced as a result of weathering and the organic part is produced by decay of plants and animals. Life is
soil and is an integral part of the environment, ecosystem and
believed to emerge from the
also an important natural resource for plant growth, and is a repository for
biogeochemical cycle. Soil is highly susceptible to environmental
transformations (Yu, 2016) and is often the most important sink for environmental pollution due to its
strong binding capacity (Sun et al., 2017). According to Ro- driguez et al. (2018), soil pollution is defined as the
presence of chemicals or substances in the soil that are inappropriate or at an increased concentration than
normal with deleterious effects on any non-target organism. A contaminant is an unwanted substance introduced
into the environment. Harmful effects by contaminants lead to pollution, a process by which a resource (natural or
man-made) is rendered unsuit- able for use. Plants, animals and aquatic life depend on soil for their survival.
Plants relay upon soil for anchorage, nutrients, water and even oxygen. The soil influences the distribution of
plant species and provides a habitat for a large number of organisms such as both micro and macro organisms.
Soils are essential for biodiversity conservation above and below the ground. Huge amount of chemicals
employed in day to day lives and excessive amounts of urban, industrial and agricultural wastes, mining etc., have
all led to soil contamination across the planet and also leaving it barren and deteriorated.

Industrialization and extensive use of chemical compounds such as petroleum

products, hydrocarbons (aliphatic, aromatic, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), BTEX (benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene), chlorinated hydrocarbons such as polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), trichloroethylene (TCE) and perchloroethylene, nitroaromatic compounds, organophosphorus compounds)
pose an alarming threat to crop production , food safety , and for the health of
citizens. Since soil quality is directly linked to food security , human health and

sustainable economic and social progress , soil pollution management is important

(Esmaeili et al., 2013; Wan et al., 2018). Biological life prevailing in a gram of soil includes tiny microbes such as
algae, actinomycetes, bacteria, bacteriophages, protozoa, nematodes and fungi. The role of these organisms is
highly complex and form an integral part of cycling the nutrients through the environment and they drive the
processes such as decomposition, mineralization, storage and release of nutrients, breakdown of pollutants before
they reach groundwater or surface water, carbon cycling, carbon sequestration, and soil organic matter
transformations, nitrogen cycling (N fixation, denitrification, nitrification).

The biological transformation by the action of microorganisms led to development of abundant nu- trients (Kiflu &
Beyene, 2013). Soil microbes are the principal participants of all the soil biochemical processes. These
biochemical processes are devices for soil quality stabilization, soil organic matter production, hazardous material
decomposition, soil structure formation and physiological cycles. Soil degradation by harmful metals reduces the
microbial properties of the soil, such as soil respiration and enzymatic processes. One of the reasons that impact
life in soils is the degradation of soils by highly poisonous materials attributable to multiple anthropogenic
activities (Prajapati & Meravi, 2014; Zojiali et al., 2014; Baishya & Samra, 2014). Elements with high density and
high relative atomic weight are inherently poisonous elements, exhibiting metallic properties such as ductility,
malleability, conductiv- ity and specificity of the ligand (Algreen et al., 2012). Especially zinc, cadmium and copper
are the potentially toxic elements that may alter the microbiological equilibrium of soil (Olaniran et al., 2013; Liu
et al., 2013; Markowicz et al., 2016; Shi & Ma, 2017). Finally, soil contaminated by such potentially toxic elements
(PTEs) has led to negative impact on the environment. In the soil microbes are the first to react to PTEs and
microbial metabolisms can interfere PTE speciation change (Bolan et al., 2013).

SOURCES OF SOIL POLLUTION

Agricultural Practices

Agriculture is one of the main pillars of economy and principal productive sectors, and the main land use activity
in many countries. Agriculture is a basic industry, which provides endless power for the development of national
economy and it is also the foundation for human survival and development. Agricultural wastes are those
produced by agricultural and livestock practices such as fertilizer containers, agricultural pesticides, feed, harvest
residues, and manure. In soils and sediments, the prolonged application of pesticides
persists where they can directly penetrate the food chain or percolate down to the
water table . Not only in farming areas, but also in schools , parks, highways, houses,
buildings and trees, pesticides are used almost everywhere and it is impossible to find any location
where pesticides are not used - from the can of bug spray under the kitchen sink to the aircraft crop dusting acres
farming activities contribute to the soil pollution with harmful
of farmland. The

substances such as cadmium by the use of mineral phosphate fertilizers or

organic pollutants due to application of pesticides (Kanianska, 2016). Exploitation of
chemical fertilizers and pesticides in crop production brought about soil
pollution . Soil pollution is a result of long-term accumulation and a large
number of pollutants accumulated in the soil, which inturn lead to the extension of
pollution, such as ground water pollution. It appears to be difficult to control soil
pollution. Contaminants from agrochemical sources include pesticides, fertilizers and manure. The crop
protection products and fertilizers are chemicals that are manufactured synthetically and broken down into
numerous soil components and they gradually bring down the fertility and quality of
the soil (Usman, 2018). Pesticide is a generic term that comprises of all the chemicals used to kill or control
pests either in farming sector or in different settings such as store rooms, human houses and gardens as noted by
the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nation (FAO, 2002). The pesticide formulations were
utilized to control, eliminate and in preventing any pests, which includes rodents, nematodes, weeds, birds,
insects and microbes. These chemicals are classified into herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, nematicides and
rodenticides. The annual increase in world- wide pesticides production is 11% from 0.2 million tons in the 1950s
and exceeding 5 million tons by 2000 (Carvalho, 2017). The chemical pesticides applied to farm field in 2012; on
an average is around 3.8 million tons (FAO, 2020). About two million people chiefly, livings in the developing
Pesticides cause
economies are at an elevated health risks because of pesticides utilization (Hicks, 2019).
damage to soil biomass and microorganisms such as bacteria, fungi, and
earthworms. The labile component of organic matter in soil is microbial biomass
which plays a significant role in soil nutrient element cycle (Azam et al., 2003).
Quality of the soil is a major factor for the growth of crop plants and the deciding
factor for the availability of plant nutrients . Microorganisms present in the soil are able to
metabolize and degrade plenty of pollutants and pesticides. Healthy levels of soil microbes are essential for
preserv- ing soil structure and soil fertility. The soil fungi, algae, cyanobacteria and actinomycetes are mainly
involve in the decomposition of organic residues and release the nutrients including phosphorus, which enhance
plant growth and contribute to the pollution control. The biological transformation by the ac- tion of
microorganisms led to accumulation (develop) of abundant nutrients in the soil (Kiflu & Beyene, 2013).
Pesticides may cause considerable changes in the composition , diversity and
basic functioning of important soil microflora (Ahemad & Khan, 2013; Yousaf et al., 2013; Riah
et al., 2014). Soil enzymes help in speedup chemical reactions in soils, regulate cellular metabolism of soil
organisms, participate in the decomposition of organic matter and also play a key role in the formation of humus.
The quality and fertility of soil depend to a great extent on the activity of soil enzymes. Soil enzyme activities
(SEA) are sensitive to management practices (Medeiros et al., 2015).

Microbial infections and monocropping cause extinction.

Dr. Bruce E. Tonn, 2021, Professor of Political Science at the University of
Tennessee, PhD in Urban and Regional Planning from Northwestern University, BS
in Civil Engineering from Stanford University, Senior Researcher in the
Environmental Sciences Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Anticipation,
Sustainability, Futures and Human Extinction: Ensuring Humanity’s Journey into
The Distant Future, p. 33
This second class of existential risks is primarily found in coupled human–natural systems. These could be seen as
extinction-level events in and of themselves, but I think they could be initiating or contributory

events to human extinction (again see the scenario at the end of Chapter 4). Technically, we also
know how to prevent these events or at least how to adapt to them. Here are four to consider:

(1) Significant loss of biodiversity – It is well documented that human behavior is causing a sixth mass
species extinction on the earth.44 This is due to many factors including destruction of habitat, spreading
of disease (e.g., Chytrid fungus in amphibians), pollution, and climate change. The risk to humanity is
that if too many of the species become extinct, global ecosystems could crash, disrupting essential
balances of species needed to support ecosystem services and maybe even threatening global balances of
oxygen and nitrogen.45
 (2)Ag ricultural systems failure – There are numerous additional potentially
catastrophic risks facing the world’s agricultural systems. For example, the
world currently relies up on only about 14 different crops.46 Unanticipated
and unchecked microbial infections could wipe out major portions of the
food supply. Soil erosion, extended droughts, fires, and various other natural disasters could also
seriously impact the food supply and cause widespread famine.47 At least 75% of the world’s food is
dependent in some way on bees for pollination. Currently, the world’s bee population is under extreme
a catastrophic collapse of the world’s bee population could lead
stress.48 Many worry that
to widespread famine and collapse in human population .

Growth breaks the phosphorus cycle---extinction.

Faradji ’16 [Charly; 2/17/16; Doctor of Philosophy Student, Chemistry,
University of Bristol; "How the great phosphorus shortage could leave us short of
food," https://phys.org/news/2016-02-great-phosphorus-shortage-short-food.html]
It's not as well-known as the other issues, butphosphorus depletion is no less significant. After all,
we could live without cars or unusual species, but if phosphorus ran out we'd have to live

without food .

Phosphorus is an essential nutrient for all forms of life . It is a key element in our DNA
there is
and all living organisms require daily phosphorus intake to produce energy. It cannot be replaced and
no synthetic substitute: without phosphorus, there is no life.
Our dependence began in the mid-19th century, after farmers noticed spreading phosphorus-rich guano (bird
excrement) on their fields led to impressive improvements in crop yields. Soon after, mines opened up in the US
and China to extract phosphate ore – rocks which contain the useful mineral. This triggered the current use of
mineral fertilisers and, without this industrial breakthrough, humanity could only produce half the food that it
does today.

Fertiliser use has quadrupled over the past half century and will continue rising
as the population expands. The growing wealth of developing countries allows
people to afford more meat which has a "phosphorus footprint" 50 times higher than
most vegetables. This, together with the increasing usage of biofuels, is estimated to double the demand for
phosphorus fertilisers by 2050.

Today phosphorus is also used in pharmaceuticals, personal care products, flame retardants, catalysts for
chemical industries, building materials, cleaners, detergents and food preservatives.

Phosphorus is not a renewable resource

Reserves are limited and not equally spread over the planet. The only large mines are located in Morocco, Russia,
China and the US. Depending on which scientists you ask, the world's phosphate rock reserves will last for
another 35 to 400 years – though the more optimistic assessments rely on the discovery of new deposits.

phosphorus depletion
It's a big concern for the EU and other countries without their own reserves, and
could lead to geopolitical tensions . Back in 2008, when fertiliser prices sharply
increased by 600% and directly influenced food prices, there were violent riots in 40 different
developing countries.
Phosphorus also harms the environment. Excessive fertiliser use means it leaches from agricultural lands into
rivers and eventually the sea, leading to so-called dead zones where most fish can't survive. Uninhibited algae
growth caused by high levels of phosphorus in water has already created more than 400 coastal death zones
worldwide. Related human poisoning costs US$2.2 billion dollars annually in the US alone.

With the increasing demand for phosphorus leading to massive social and environmental issues, it's time we
looked towards more sustainable and responsible use.

There is still hope

In the past, the phosphorus cycle was closed: crops were eaten by humans and livestock while
their faeces were used as natural fertilisers to grow crops again.

These days, the cycle is broken. Each year 220m tonnes of phosphate rocks are mined, but only a
negligible amount makes it back into the soil. Crops are transported to cities and the waste is not returned to the
fields but to the sewage system, which mainly ends up in the sea. A cycle has become a linear process.

We could reinvent a modern phosphorus cycle simply by dramatically reducing

our consumption . After all, less than a third of the phosphorus in fertilisers is actually taken up by
plants; the rest accumulates in the soil or is washed away. To take one example, in the Netherlands there is
enough phosphorus in the soil today to supply the country with fertiliser for the next 40 years.

Growth ensures cognitive collapse---extinction.

Annunziata ’19 [Marco and Mickey McManus; January 11; former Chief
Economist and Head of Business Innovation Strategy at General Electric; Visiting
Research Fellow at Autodesk, Senior Advisor at BCG; Forbes, “The Great Cognitive
Depression,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcoannunziata/2019/01/11/the-great-
cognitive-depression/#49ed9dc174c1]

We have seen a dramatic increase in the amount of complexity that exists in the
world. Mickey McManus’s book Trillions noted that as early as 2010, the semiconductor industry had reached
the point where they were making more transistors than grains of rice, cheaper. Connectivity has
amplified the global amount of aggregate complexity by enabling it to break
out of any given domain and spread across the world. The rise of the so called
“ Internet of Things ”—starting with mobile devices and now connected products and vehicles and
platforms—is flooding every corner of our homes, factories, and communities.

Everything becomes connected —to everything else and to us.

The global economy has also become inextricably interconnected ; our society is
more and more interdependent . Across multiple fields, our knowledge gets deeper and more
detailed; we solve old problems and create new ones at accelerating speed. No matter our walk of life,
today we are asked to grasp a widening range of increasingly complex issues :
climate change, energy policy, advances in health care, the likely impact of robotics and
Artificial Intelligence.

All these new sources of complexity are increasing the frequency and
amplitude of positive and negative feedback loops into crashing waves and
a torrential flood . There are no signs of this complexity leveling out, quite the
opposite —the waves are getting more erratic and larger and larger . We are
standing on the shores of a trillion-node-network tsunami-like event that has
never been seen before . Worse this isn’t just a rise of passive information, but also a deluge of active
 When trillions of things not only collect billions of bits of information
machine agents.
but also demand our attention and change our environments dynamically on the
fly, our ability to think , make decisions and take actions may be on the verge
of collapse .

The coming together of digital and physical technologies has turned business
models upside down and made it even harder for economic analysis to keep up.
The “prosumer” concept of the 1980s is back with a vengeance as new technologies allow households to produce
electricity and sell it back into the grid, and give them access to manufacturing power with affordable 3D printers.
Economists struggle to explain the collapse in productivity that accompanied the
latest surge in innovations—and that shows compelling inverse correlation to
the rise of connected (and cognitive) devices like mobile phones ; their cacophony of
explanations ranges from the charge that new digital innovations have no economic value to the claim that they
create massive value delivered for free, and hence not recorded in the official statistics.

Our ability to think and make smart decisions is eroding just as our
environment gets more complex and harder to grasp with our traditional tools.
Stone age tools for cognitive age challenges?

this is not the first time we face a rise in complexity and have to contend
But wait,

with multiple disruptions. We’ve faced tough challenges before and built
structures to allow us to manage and make decisions at vast scales . Corporations,
cities, markets, and governments are all technologies we’ve devised to manage complexity and make rational and
we’ve
actionable decisions in a hostile world. Steven Johnson—in his new book Farsighted—points out that
evolved decision and scenario sciences to cope with increasingly complex
issues—from the era of Darwin when he used the simple “pro/con” list to decide if he should get married (a non-
trivial decision) to today’s advanced scenario-planning war games, science fiction foresight tools and other
scalable management techniques.

This time, however, seems different —for a troubling simple reason. This time we face the
rise of powerful new forces that undermine our very ability to react to these
challenges and disruptions: our cognition itself is under attack . These toxic
new forces leverage digital technology to exploit our behavioral biases, pushed by
powerful financial incentives .
The early warning signs

What if the structures we had built to protect us against irrational decisions turn
out to be rickety breakwaters laid down on the shore of a once placid sea and
provide no protection from a 100-year flood? When the art and science of decisions-making
itself collapses might we face a Great Cognitive Depression ?

The early warning signs are troubling to say the least . Authoritarian
governments and despots are enjoying a resurgence. In many democracies,
voters faced with complex issues turn to simple answers and slogans , to the
siren call of populism . They dismiss the experts (think of Brexit as a case in point), they
look for scapegoats and easy fixes .
Could these be examples of human cognition reverting to evolutionary
shortcuts to cope with complex threats? Authority bias is a quick way for us to
decide things when we are faced with tough choices. If something is too
ambiguous or non-deterministic we follow the authority figure with the most
compelling and simple story, instead of doing the thinking for ourselves.
Social scientists have documented upwards of 200+ cognitive short cuts and biases that evolved to help us cope
with danger, make decisions fast, and conserve our precious cognitive resources to fight another day. But
Sometimes our brains lie to us .
sometimes those shortcuts have lived on far past their “sell by” date.

Buying behavior in our simian ancestors seem oddly similar to the ways humans
make choices in markets . We believe we are rational actors but time and
again we find out that it is very hard to see the thinking about our thinking. And
now it’s getting harder .

Here is where we find a dangerous market failure .

A powerful combination of new technologies and financial incentives is fast

overwhelming our old protective barriers.

Digital innovations are creating value. But this value is not given away for free ,
as some economists contend. There is no free lunch.

We all know that digital platforms are after our data . Sometimes they use it to our advantage, with
more personalized offerings; often they sell it to advertisers. For them we are a different kind of “prosumer”:
not a producer-consumer, but rather a product-consumer. We are more a commodity than a true
customer. You might argue that well, almost everyone realizes this, and we still enter these transactions of our
own free will, so what’s the problem?

Butdigital platforms are not just after our data —they crave our unwavering
attention . Higher ratings command higher advertising rates —and the ratings
are determined by how much time we spend with our eyeballs glued to the
screen , our attention absorbed by the apps.

these platforms have a financial incentive to hold our attention , and to

Therefore,

grab it back whenever it drifts away—a powerful financial incentive . Hence the
game of incessant notifications, of addictive updates on likes and shares, of instigations to chase followers, friends
and connections.

See, the fact that digital platforms grab our data in exchange for their “free” services strikes us as a lesser
distortion. The digital platform, be it Google, Amazon, Twitter or Facebook, most likely gets more value from my
individual data than it gives back to me in services. But the truth is, my data is much less valuable to me than it is
to them, because they can aggregate it with others’, whereas I cannot. And unless I find a way to get together
with millions of other users, in a sort of modern trade union of the digital sheep, I will never have enough
bargaining power to extract more of that value. Because as long as everybody else gives their data away, the
marginal value of my data is close to zero. But as I said, my data is of little value to me, in isolation. Little
ventured, little lost in this case.

Cognition is another matter.

Our attention, our cognition, is a very precious resource . We need it to study, to

work, to run our daily lives , to take small and big and life-changing decisions. And it’s a limited
resource . We can fool ourselves that we can multitask. That we have become a lot more
productive as we track our Twitter feed and social media messages while we work, answer emails during
conference calls.

We become less productive , not more . The statistics

Except that we can’t and we don’t.

—as we discussed earlier— bear this out . It should be no surprise. In this more complex world,

we have a lot to study and understand—and we cannot do it in 20-seconds

bursts . When we get distracted, we need over 20 minutes to refocus on the task at hand. In this more
complex and high-tech world, knowledge and understanding have enormous
value . The time and cognition we invest in acquiring knowledge, mastering skills, earning credentials, yields a
very high rate of return in terms of career opportunities, earnings, and personal fulfillment.

Which means that the opportunity cost of every minute we spend looking at a digital ad, “catching up” on various
messaging platforms, or watching a viral video is extremely high.

And the digital drugs we take on a daily basis not only absorb precious time today—
they also erode our ability to concentrate . By pushing us to an obsessive-compulsive habit of
constantly checking for something new online, they gradually destroy our slow-thinking

ability (àla Kahneman), our power of concentration . Our attention spans are
shortening , undermining our future productivity as well.

This could easily become a vicious spiral : powerful financial incentives will keep
pushing digital platforms to grab more and more of our attention. And as the
Internet of Things becomes more pervasive , they will have more and more
tools at their disposal: soon the mirror in your bathroom and smart dust around you as you walk down
the street will also compete for your attention. At the same time, these companies’ tactics exploit
deep-rooted cognitive biases: we are programmed to pay attention to anything
referring to us, to look for news and new things, and to crave the approval of our
community. Left to itself, this is only going to get worse .

Sojust as we enter the most harrowing straits for ourselves and our planet , as
we race to rebalance ever widening gaps between the powerful and the
powerless; as we come to grips with extinction level threats to our way of lives,
the structures we’ve erected to make rational decisions are collapsing . While we
have new decision-making and scenario planning methodologies at our disposal,
we may not have much actual brainpower to notice , care or bring our best
thinking to the table . The Great Cognitive Depression is racing towards us
and we don’t appear to be taking the early warning signs seriously and may
not even notice before it’s too late . The counterfeit attention-based currency
that is flooding our markets may soon bankrupt our cognitive reserves . Bad money
(attention) drives out good, as Gresham’s Law predicts.

We’ve fostered the rise of industries that are rewarded for de-cognition attacks and we have put no incentives or
It is as if our human odyssey has
taxes in place to do what markets can’t or won’t do themselves.
been blown off course , pushed by the rising tide toward the land of the sirens ,
seduced by deceptive songs, hypnotized and driven towards madness. If we do nothing we may
ultimately wash up on the shores from a watery grave .
Global fragmentation and future crises make economic crash
inevitable.
Kristalina Georgieva, 8-22-2023, Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund, "The Price of Fragmentation," Foreign Affairs,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/price-fragmentation-global-economy-shock,
KL
We are living through turbulent times, in a world that has become richer but also more fragile. Russia’s war in
Ukraine has painfully demonstrated that we cannot take peace for granted. A deadly pandemic and climate
disasters remind us how brittle life is against the force of nature. Major technological transformations such as
artificial intelligence hold promise for future growth but also carry significant risks.

international
Collaboration among nations is critical in a more uncertain and shock-prone world. Yet
cooperation is in retreat . In its place, the world is witnessing the rise of
fragmentation : a process that begins with increasing barriers to trade and
investment and, in its extreme form, ends with countries’ breaking into rival
economic blocs —an outcome that risks reversing the transformative gains that global economic
integration has produced.

A number of powerful forces are driving fragmentation. With deepening geopolitical tensions,
national security considerations loom large for policymakers and companies, which tends
to make them wary of sharing technology or integrating supply chains. Meanwhile,
although the global economic integration that has taken place in the past three decades has helped
billions of people become wealthier, healthier, and more productive, it has also led to job losses in some

sectors and contributed to rising inequality . That in turn has fueled social tensions ,

creating fertile ground for protectionism and adding to pressures to shift production back
home.

Fragmentation is costly even in normal times and makes it nearly impossible to manage the tremendous global
challenges that the world now faces: war, climate change, pandemics. But policymakers everywhere
are nevertheless pursuing measures that lead to further fragmentation . Although some of these
policies can be justified by the need to ensure the resilience of supply chains, other measures are driven
more by self-interest and protectionism , which in the long term will put the world
economy in a precarious position .

The costs of fragmentation could not be clearer: as trade falls and barriers rise, global growth
will take a severe hit . According to the latest International Monetary Fund projections, annual global
GDP growth in 2028 will be only three percent—the IMF’s lowest five-year-ahead forecast in the past three
decades, which spells trouble for poverty reduction and for creating jobs among burgeoning populations of young
people in developing countries. Fragmentation risks making this already weak economic picture even worse. As
growth falls, opportunities vanish, and tension builds, the world—already divided by geopolitical rivalries—could
splinter further into competing economic blocs.

Policymakers everywhere recognize that protectionism and decoupling come at a cost. And high-level
engagements between the world’s two largest economies, the United States and China, aim to reduce the risks of
further disintegration. But broadly speaking, when it comes to trying to turn back the tide of fragmentation, there
Another pandemic could once again push the world into
is a troubling lack of urgency.

global economic crisis . Military conflict , whether in Ukraine or elsewhere, could again
exacerbate food insecurity , disrupt energy and commodity markets , and
rupture supply chains . Another severe drought or flood could turn millions more people into climate
refugees. Nonetheless, despite widespread recognition of these risks, governments and the private sector alike
have been unable or unwilling to act.

A more shock-prone world means that economies will need to become much more resilient—not just individually
but also collectively. Getting there will require a deliberate approach to cooperation. The international
community, supported by institutions such as the IMF, should work together in a systematic and pragmatic
manner, pursuing targeted progress where common ground exists and maintaining collaboration in areas where
inaction would be devastating. Policymakers need to focus on the issues that matter most not only to the wealth of
nations but also to the economic well-being of ordinary people. They must nurture the bonds of trust among
countries wherever possible so they can quickly step up cooperation when the next major shock comes. That
would benefit poorer and richer economies alike by supporting global growth and reducing the risk that instability
will spread across borders. Even for the richest and most powerful countries, a fragmented world will be difficult
to navigate, and cooperation will become not only a matter of solidarity but of self-interest, as well.

A FRAGILE WORLD

Two world wars in the twentieth century revealed that international cooperation is critical for peace and
prosperity and that it requires a sound institutional foundation. Even as World War II was still raging, the Allies
came together to create a multilateral architecture that would include the United Nations and the Bretton Woods
institutions—the IMF and the World Bank—together with the precursor to the World Trade Organization. Each
organization was entrusted with a special mandate to address the problems of the day requiring collective action.

What ultimately followed was an explosion of trade and integration that transformed the world, culminating in
what came to be known as globalization. Integration had accelerated in previous historical eras, especially in the
wake of the Industrial Revolution. But during the world wars and the interwar period, it had sharply retreated,
and in the immediate postwar era, the fragmentation of the Cold War threatened to prevent it from recovering.
The international security and financial architecture the Allies built, however, allowed integration to come roaring
back. Since then, that architecture has adapted to massive changes. The number of countries in the world has
grown from 99 in 1944 to nearly 200 today. In the same period, the earth’s population has more than tripled, from
around 2.3 billion to around 8.0 billion, and global GDP has increased more than tenfold. All the while, the
expansion of trade in an increasingly integrated global economy has delivered substantial benefits in terms of
growth and poverty reduction.

These gains are now at risk. After the 2008 global financial crisis, a period of “slowbalization” began, as growth
became uneven and countries began imposing barriers to trade. Convergence in living standards within and
across countries has stalled. And since the pandemic began, low-income countries have seen a collapse in their
per capita GDP growth rates, which have fallen by more than half, from an average of 3.1 percent annually in the
15 years before the pandemic to 1.4 percent since 2020. The decline has been much more modest in rich
countries, where per capita GDP growth rates have fallen from 1.2 percent in the 15 pre-pandemic years to 1.0
Rising inequality is fostering political instability and
percent since 2020.

undermining the prospects for future growth, especially for vulnerable economies and poorer
people. The existential threat of climate change is aggravating existing

vulnerabilities and introducing new shocks . Vulnerable countries are running out
of buffers , and rising indebtedness is putting economic sustainability at risk.
In a more fragile world, countries (or blocs of countries) may be tempted to define their interests narrowly and
retreat from cooperation. But many countries lack the technology, financial resources, and capacity to
successfully contend with economic shocks on their own—and their failure to do so will harm not only the well-
in a less secure world with weaker
being of their own citizens but also that of people elsewhere. And
growth prospects, the risk of fragmentation only grows, potentially creating a vicious
downward spiral .

trade fragmentation—that is,

Should this happen, the costs will be prohibitively high. Over the long term,
increasing restrictions on the trade in goods and services across countries—could reduce global GDP

by up to seven percent , or $7.4 trillion in today’s dollars, the equivalent of the combined GDPs of France
and Germany and more than three times the size of the entire sub-Saharan African economy. That is why
 trade barriers, which have proliferated
policymakers should reconsider their newfound embrace of

at a rapid clip in recent years: in 2019, countries imposed fewer than 1,000
restrictions on trade; in 2022, that number skyrocketed to almost 3,000 .

As protectionism spreads, the costs of technological decoupling —that is, restrictions on the
flow of high-tech goods, services, and knowledge across countries—would only add to the misery,
reducing the GDPs of some countries by up to 12 percent over the long term. Fragmentation
can also lead to severe disruption in commodity markets and create food and
energy insecurity : for example, Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian wheat exports was a key driver behind
the sudden 37 percent increase in global wheat prices in the spring of 2022. This drove inflation in the prices of
other food items and exacerbated food insecurity, notably in low-income countries in North Africa, the Middle
the fragmentation of capital flows , which would see
East, and South Asia. Finally,

investors and countries diverting investments and financial transactions to like-minded

countries, would constitute another blow to global growth. The combined losses from all
facets of fragmentation may be hard to quantify, but it is clear that they all point to lower growth in productivity
and in turn to lower living standards, more poverty, and less investment in health, education, and infrastructure.
Global economic resilience and prosperity will depend on the survival of economic integration.

Debt traps cause economic catastrophe.

Rebeca Grynspan, 2-2-2023, Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, "The world lacks an effective global system to deal with
debt," UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/news/blog-world-lacks-effective-global-system-
deal-debt, KL

Unstable balance sheets are a threat to our collective financial stability

There is an alarming tendency among the international community to regard debts in the
developing world as sustainable because they can, after some sacrifice, be paid off .
But this is like saying a poor family will stay afloat because they always repay their
loan sharks . To take this view is to overlook the skipped meals, the foregone investment in education and
the lack of health spending that forcibly make room for interest payments. This sort of debt trap is a

social catastrophe in the making. Ten years from now, the debt may be repaid, but the family will
be ruined.

This is the dilemma facing many developing countries , both big and small. The
pandemic , cost of living crisis and rising interest rates have brought them to
a point where they can only pay their debts by way of austerity or foregone
investment in the sustainable development goals ( SDGs ). Their debts are sustainable in that they
can be repaid, but unsustainable in every other way .

this full-blown development crisis with debt distress at its core also
Furthermore,

threatens a new lost decade for much of the world economy .

The repeat of a 1980's-style debt crisis that could in turn threaten global financial stability is perceived to be
marginal. But the public debt of developing countries, excluding China, reached $11 .5 tn
in 2021. By some accounts, serious debt problems are largely confined to a small share of this figure, owed by
highly vulnerable low-income countries such as Chad, Zambia or Ethiopia.

Butthe situation is deteriorating rapidly . During the pandemic , government

debt ballooned by almost $ 2tn in more than 100 developing countries (excluding China), as
social spending went up while incomes froze due to lockdowns. Now, central
banks are raising interest rates , which exacerbates the problem. Rising rates
have meant capital flight and currency depreciation in developing economies, as well
as increasing borrowing costs . These factors have pushed countries such as Ghana or Sri Lanka
into debt distress.

In 2021, developing countries paid $400bn in debt service, more than twice the amount they received in official
development aid. Meanwhile, their international reserves declined by over $600bn last year, almost three times
what they received in emergency support through the IMF Special Drawing Rights allocation.

Foreign debts are therefore eating an ever-larger piece of an ever-shrinking

national resources pie. As inflation rises, natural disasters become more
frequent and food and energy imports rise in price , countries need more , not less,
contingency planning assistance.

A much bolder approach is needed. Recent efforts by the international community to agree on large-scale
emergency debt measures have faltered. This is despite important efforts at the G20 through the now-
discontinued Debt Service Suspension Initiative, and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, which is in
need of crucial improvements, such as suspending payments during negotiations and an extension to middle-
income countries in debt distress.

creditors who
The failure of these efforts has revealed the complexity of existing procedures, characterised by
refuse to engage in restructuring with extraordinary powers of sabotage .
Crisis resolutions are often too little, too late . The world lacks an effective
system to deal with debt.
An independent sovereign debt authority that engages with creditor and debtor interests, both institutional and
private, is urgently needed. At a minimum, such an authority should provide coherent guidelines for suspending
debt payments in disaster situations, ensuring SDGs are considered in debt sustainability assessments, and
providing expert advice to governments in need.

Furthermore, a public debt registry for developing countries would allow both lenders and borrowers to access
debt data. This would go a long way in boosting debt transparency, strengthening debt management, reducing the
risk of debt distress and improving access to financing. Progress on both these fronts could begin with an
independent review of the G20 debt agenda: India’s presidency may bring a historic opportunity to succeed where
others have faltered.

the current global debt crisis is not only a moral imperative. In a context of
Tackling
growing climate and geopolitical distress, it is one the biggest threat s to
global peace and security and financial stability . Without supporting countries
to become sustainable , their debts will never be realistically repayable.

Innovation has peaked for every technology. Growth will soon

become history.
Vaclav Smil, 2-16-2023, professor emeritus of environmental science at the
University of Manitoba, "Tech Progress Is Slowing Down," WSJ,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-progress-is-slowing-down-b7fcaee0, KL
Title: Tech Progress Is Slowing Down
Nothing has affected, and warped, modern thinking about the pace of technological invention more than the rapid
exponential advances of solid-state electronics. The conviction that we have left the age of gradual growth behind
began with our ability to crowd ever more components onto a silicon wafer, a process captured by Gordon
Moore’s now-famous law that initially ordained a doubling every 18 months, later adjusted to about two years. By
2020, microchips had more than 10 million times as many components as the first microprocessor, the Intel 4004,
released in 1971.

Moore’s law was the foundation for the rapid rise of businesses based on electronic data processing, from PayPal
to Amazon to Facebook. It made it possible to go in a lifetime from bulky landline phones to palm-size
smartphones. These gains are widely seen today as harbingers of similarly impressive gains in other realms, such
as solar cells, batteries, electric cars and even urban farming.

Bestselling tech prophets like Ray Kurzweil and Yuval Noah Harari argue that exponential growth will allow us to
disrupt our way into a future devoid of disease and misery and abounding in material riches. In the words of
investor Azeem Azhar, creator of the popular newsletter Exponential View, “We are entering an age of abundance.
The first period in human history in which energy, food, computation and much else will be trivially cheap to
produce.”

The problem is that the post-1970 ascent of electronic architecture and performance has no counterpart in other
Exponential growth has not taken place in the fundamental
aspects of our lives.

economic activities on which modern civilization depends for its survival —

agriculture , energy production , transportation and large engineering
projects . Nor do we see rapid improvements in areas that directly affect
health and quality of life , such as new drug discoveries and gains in longevity.
To satisfy Moore’s law, microchip capacity has increased about 35% annually since 1970, with higher rates in the
early years. In contrast, during the first two decades of the 21st century, Asian rice harvests increased by 1% a
year, and yields of sorghum, sub-Saharan Africa’s staple grain, went up by only about 0.8% a year. Since 1960, the
average per capita GDP of sub-Saharan Africa has grown no more than 0.7% annually.

Growth rates in productive capacity have been similarly restrained . Most of the world’s
electricity is generated by large steam turbines whose efficiency improved by about 1.5% a
year over the past 100 years. We keep making steel more efficiently, but the annual decline in energy
use in the metal’s production averaged less than 2% during the past 70 years. In 1900 the best battery had an
energy density of 25 watt-hours per kilogram; in 2022 the best lithium-ion batteries deployed on a large
commercial scale had an energy density 12 times higher, corresponding to growth of just 2% a year.

The impressively declining cost of solar photovoltaic cells (PVs) has raised expectations that we are approaching a
breakthrough in solar electricity generation. If the cost of PVs were the only determinant of the actual cost of
power generation, solar generation would soon be too cheap to meter. In reality, detailed U.S. data for residential
PV systems show that the cost of the solar panels is now only about 15% of the total investment. The rest is
needed to cover structural and electrical components, labor, permitting and inspection, and taxes.

None of those components is tending to zero, and hence the overall cost of solar power—measured in dollars per
watt of direct current delivered—shows a distinctly declining rate of improvement. Between 2010 and 2015 it fell
by 55%, between 2015 and 2020 by just 20%. Even as the costs of renewable electricity generation have been
plummeting, the three EU countries with the highest share of energy from wind and solar—Denmark, Ireland and
Germany—have the continent’s highest electricity prices.

The conclusion that progress is not accelerating in the most fundamental human activities is
supported by a paper published in 2020 by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors, four
American economists led by Bryan Kelly of the Yale School of Management, studied innovation across American
industries from 1840 to 2010, using textual analysis of patent documents to construct indexes of long-term
the wave of breakthrough patents in furniture, textiles,
change. They found that

apparel, transportation , metal, wood, paper, printing and construction all

peaked before 1900 . Mining, coal, petroleum, electrical equipment, rubber and
plastics had their innovative peaks before 1950 . The only industrial sectors with post-1970
peaks have been agriculture (dominated by genetically modified organisms), medical equipment and, of course,
computers and electronics.

Even the rapid exponential growth of many microprocessor-enabled activities has already entered a more
moderate expansion stage. Printing with ever-shorter wavelengths of light made it possible to crowd in larger
numbers of thinner transistors on a microchip. The process began with transistors 80 micrometers wide; in 2021
IBM announced the world’s first 2-nanometer chip, to be produced as early as 2024. Because the size of a silicon
atom is about 0.2 nanometers, a 2-nanometer connection would be just 10 atoms wide, so the physical limit of this
50-year-old reduction process is in sight.

Between 1993 (Pentium) and 2013 (the AMD 608), the highest single-processor transistor count went from 3.1
million to 105.9 million, a bit higher than prescribed by Moore’s law. But since then, progress has slowed. In 2008
the Xeon had 1.9 billion transistors, and a decade later the GC2 packed in 23.6 billion, whereas a doubling every
two years should have brought the total to about 60 billion. As a result, the growth of the best processor
performance has slowed from 52% a year between 1986 and 2003, to 23% a year between 2003 and 2011, to less
For computers, as for every other technology
than 4% between 2015 and 2018. before, the period
of rapid exponential growth will soon become history .

Chinese economic collapse will wreck growth globally.

IMT, 8-23-2023, World Congress of the International Marxist Tendency, "The
world in 2023: crisis, war and revolution," In Defence of Marxism,
https://www.marxist.com/the-world-in-2023-crisis-war-and-revolution.htm, KL
China

China was previously one of the main motor forces propelling the world
economy. But that has now reached its limits and is turning into its opposite .
The bourgeois economists are watching developments in China with increasing alarm.

In the free markets of the West, financial crises can erupt suddenly , taking governments and
investors by surprise . But in China, where the state still plays an important role in the economy, the
government can deploy political and financial capital to a much higher degree, in order to mitigate or postpone a
crisis.

This gives the appearance of stability, but this is an illusion . Since China has opted to go down
the capitalist road and is now completely integrated in the capitalist world market it is subject to the
same laws of capitalist market economics.

One of the key factors in saving the Chinese and the world economy from a major crisis after the 2008 crash was
the huge amounts of money injected into the economy by the Chinese state.

This amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars, the majority part of which was channelled into infrastructure and
development projects. What we are witnessing now is the end of that model. The Chinese economy is
slowing . The meagre 2.8 percent growth rate in 2022 was the lowest level since 1990. In 2021 GDP grew at
the rate of 8.1 percent.

A large part of this investment was dedicated to LGFVs ( local government

financing vehicles), which have built up a huge $7. 8tn mountain of debt s that
threatens the stability of the entire Chinese economy. A vast amount of these
debts are hidden , as part of the semi-legal shadow banking sector, which state
owned enterprises and banks are heavily involved with.
That debt is the equivalent of nearly half of China’s total GDP in 2021, or about twice the
size of Germany’s economy. With declining local government incomes, a devastating

domino of defaults looks increasingly likely .

State intervention only serves to distort the market mechanism, but cannot remove its fundamental
contradictions. It can delay a crisis, but when that eventually emerges – which, sooner or later it must – it will
have an even more explosive, destructive and uncontrollable character.

A financial crash in China would have a devastating impact on the world

economy as a whole . It would also create a very explosive situation inside
China.

China needs an annual rate of growth of at least 8

It has always been assumed that

percent , to maintain social stability . A rate of growth of 2.8 percent is

therefore wholly inadequate . And a major economic crisis , triggered by a
collapse of the property market , would set the scene for major social
upheavals .
China faces a social explosion

It is in this context that we must see the 2022 congress of the Chinese “Communist” Party, where Xi Jinping
strengthened his grip on power. By the old Party rules, Xi should have been stepping down as leader at that
congress, but instead he is aiming to be leader for life.

It is no accident that Xi has been concentrating all power into his hands. China is a totalitarian state that
combines capitalist market economics with elements of state control, inherited from the old deformed workers’
state.

In a totalitarian state, where all sources of information are strictly controlled and all forms of opposition ruthlessly
suppressed, it is extremely difficult to know what is going on beneath the surface, until suddenly everything
erupts.

We could see this in the struggle of the workers in the Foxconn mega-factory in
Zhengzhou and the national anti-lockdown protests of November 2022. Bursting
seemingly out of nowhere, these movements took an explosive form , and in the case of anti-
lockdown protests, spread to hundreds of locations nationwide within a matter of hours. These events
signal the beginnings of the breakdown of the social equilibrium in China.
The ruling elite, however, is very well aware of this. It has a powerful repressive apparatus and a huge network of
spies and informers who are present in every factory, office, apartment block, school and university.

China now spends more every year on internal security than on national defence, and is increasing both. Xi and
his clique are well aware of the enormous dangers of popular unrest and are taking steps to anticipate it.
Nevertheless, their highly advanced online censorship regime was unable to prevent the spreading of information
about the recent protests, despite the fact these only involved a few hundred people in each city. A mass
movement of the working class would overwhelm this system.

To a great extent, that explains the crushing of the 2019 mass protest movement in Hong Kong. If it had been left,
it would have soon spread to the mainland.

The magnificent scope of that movement – before it was hijacked and led into a blind alley by the pro-western
liberal elite – gives one a slight idea of what a proletarian revolution in China will look like, only that it will be on a
far vaster scale.

Napoleon Bonaparte is alleged to have said: “China is a sleeping dragon. Let China sleep, for when she wakes, she
will shake the world.” There is much truth in that saying. But we should introduce a small change.
The Chinese proletariat is the biggest and potentially strongest in the world. It is indeed like a sleeping dragon
that is about to awake. And when that happens, it will indeed shake the world.

A huge social explosion is being prepared in China, although it is impossible to say when it
will occur. But one thing one can predict with absolute certainty. It will occur when it is least expected.

And once it begins, there will be no stopping it. No amount of repression or intimidation will
suffice. Just as when the Yangtze River overflows its banks, it will sweep all before it.
 1AC---Plan
The United States federal government should adopt a federal
jobs guarantee, financed by fiscal policies designed to facilitate
degrowth.
 1AC---Transition
Contention two is Transition:

A degrowth job guarantee is crucial to shift the social fabric of

society, reducing production and consumption.
Dr. Brandon Unti, 1-1-2020, Professor of Economics at Bellevue College, PhD in
Economics and Social Science, “Money, Work, and Mass Extinction:
Transformational Degrowth and the Job Guarantee,”
https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/74003/Unti_umkc_01
34D_11584.pdf?sequence=1, DG = Degrowth, TD = Top-down, BU = Bottom-up
Catalyst, Precondition, Platform

This paper has already examined how and why calls forvoluntary simplicity, frugality or downshifting
may not represent viable pathways for economy-wide transition without something
like a JG in place. This criticism stems from recognition that many people are currently living

lives of such economic precarity that they have no choice to trade money for
time. In this case, a JG (or something like it) becomes a prerequisite . Through its provision
of economic security , the JG transforms voluntary simplicity into a viable, universal, and therefore
scalable DG strategy. However, voluntary simplicity is not the only strategy that a JG supports. A JG can be
usefully applied to the initiation, acceleration, and perpetuation of a number of DG proposals including: 56
Reduced Hours, Re-Localization and community development, Sharing Economies, Care and decommodification.

Reduced Hours

Reducing the work week is one of the most popular proposals within the DG movement and seems to be one of the
most simple and obvious ways of achieving the mutual aims of improved well-being and reduced environmental
impact. If we all work fewer hours, then production and throughput decrease. With additional leisure time, people
will have more time to develop relationships, engage in civil society, learn new skills, volunteer, pursue education,
exercise, and enjoy life (Schor 2010, 102). Overall, the aim is to exchange traditional throughput-intensive forms
satisfaction via consumption, for time-intensive forms of satisfaction via learning, socializing, community
engagement, and play.

While a JG is not a necessary policy for achieving reduced hours, it may serve as a useful pathway for that goal. As
proposed,a DG JG will require reduce d productivity and the easiest way to achieve this is to
reduce hours of work. If for example, a JG is implemented as a 30-hour workweek then even if JG
workers produce as much per unit of time as their counterparts in the private sector, the JG sector still achieves
reduced productivity. Assuming a JG is politically attainable, it may be easier to implement a 30-hour week within
the JG, than to impose it as a nation-wide standard. Nonetheless, a 30-hour week in the JG is likely to result in
a shorter
pressure on private sector employers to make work-time concessions to their employees. Moreover,
work week in the JG is likely to be one of the most significant non-monetary benefits of
the JG that will help to retain JG workers over the cycle ensuring that the JG grows as
a share of aggregate employment . In any case, if the private sector matches reduced
hours this achieves the same aim of reducing overall production .

Finally, the JG will achieve a central goal of DG in terms of politicizing or re-politicizing the economy. As Alcott
(2013) notes, a JG is an important step in this re-politicization. Politicizing jobs and establishing employment as a
right is crucial step toward democracy and autonomy and away from heteronomy with respect to economic
institutions.

Re-Localize
The localization of the economy serves the aims of DG on a number of fronts. By fostering face-to-face
relationships, community, trust, cooperation, and relations of reciprocity, re-localizing economic activity helps
reverse the damage done to the social fabric by the logic and values of global capital. Reducing the social and
spatial distance between those interacting in relations of production and consumption serves to humanize the
economy. When producers know the consumers of their products, they experience a sense of accountability.
Similarly, when consumers live in proximity with producers and production, they develop an understanding of
methods, environmental impacts, working conditions, etc. This means that consumers will be better situated to
make informed choices, in turn, pressuring producers to comply with community standards. Perhaps the most
obvious advantage of localizing production and consumption is the massive reduction of energy use and emissions
associated with reduced transport.

A JG can and should be used to re-localize the economy. Administered at a community level the JG
will focus on employing members of the community in ways that serve the
community . This means local work , reduced commutes , and reduced energy
consumption in the transportation of goods and services. As an example, the JG
might undertake local food production via community farms and gardens . This
will provide meaningful work , healthy food , and curtail energy use in terms
of transport, processing, and refrigeration.
Another example might be JG public arts and entertainment via music, poetry readings, dance, and theater. Here
again the JG fulfills multiple functions, providing meaningful-enjoyable work, fostering community, and creating
opportunities for public consumption to replace high throughput private consumption. For instance, rather than
everyone purchasing a television to plug-in and watch at home, community members can walk to the local theater.
It should be noted that this kind of public consumption is likely harmful to the health of a capitalist economy via
its impacts on aggregate demand, profits, and employment. Given capitalism, it is desirable that everyone
purchases a television (and better yet a new model each year) because it helps to fuel sales and jobs. Thus, public
consumption poses a threat to employment. In this case, that threat is pre-empted by a JG.

Care

Speth (2012) argues that we must create a new economy that makes sustaining people, communities, and the
environment the objective of economic activity. This contrasts with the existing system which views such goals as
the by-products of market success and growth. Speth notes if there is a watchword for this new economy that
“watchword is caring: caring for each other, the natural world, and the future” (Speth 2012, 183).

Care work ,
Care is also positioned as part of the struggle for social justice and equality in the DG discourse.

central to social and economic reproduction, is often unpaid , invisible , and

undervalued . As non-market activity it has no money value and therefore, according to economics no value
at all. This is a legacy of patriarchy, which by denying wages to a class of work traditionally reserved for women,
ensures their dependence and subservience to male breadwinners (Picchio 2003). It is also a reflection economics’
“productivism” which values 59 only the activity recorded in market transactions while ignoring all the
unrecorded work which actually make market transactions possible (D'Alisa, Deriu and Demaria 2015, 63-66).

JG can be used to increase our commitment to care , while addressing issues of

The

equity and justice . Care work such as raising children , maintaining a

household , caring for the elderly and infirm , preparing food , and serving as a
companion or assistant to those in need, are precisely the kinds of activities that JG
workers should perform in a DG model. By providing a wage for such work, the JG will help to break
the stigma, dependence, and inequity traditionally associated with these roles. Moreover, a JG can be used to halt
the destructive commodification of care work which has begun under neoliberalism.

The commodification of care work is destructive because it reduces what are deeply personal, emotional, and
human relations to instrumental market transactions. Instead of parents raising their own children, a daycare
center or professional baby-sitter receives a paycheck to perform the work. This changes the nature of caregiving
and removes from the equation deep emotional connection. As Sandel explains, markets are not neutral conveyors
of goods and services. To the contrary markets, “mark” goods and express or change our attitudes towards them.
“When we decide that certain goods may be bought and sold, we decide, at least implicitly, that it is appropriate
 Under a JG, parents
to treat them as commodities, as instruments of profit and use?” (Sandel 2012).
would receive wages to raise their own children . Similarly, family members could be
paid to take care of their aging parents and grandparents rather than sending
them off to a nursing home .
In sum, a JG will re-localize care and build a more robust network of care-giving that relies on personal bonds and
community embeddedness to ensure quality. By ensuring care workers are paid, a JG should increase the overall
amount of care in absolute terms and as a share total employment. It is crucial that care work becomes a central
part of a DG economy because it provides meaningful work, helps to cultivate social bonds, serves a vital need in
every community and requires low levels of throughput.

Sharing

Next to reduced hours the simplest, most obvious, and direct way of achieving
reduced production and consumption, is to pursue institutions that expand
opportunities for sharing . Employing Boulding’s framework for welfare, sharing allows us to increase
the amount of satisfaction we receive from the existing capital stock while minimizing both consumption and
production. In addition to its obvious impact on throughput, sharing has tremendous potential to build and
strengthen community bonds. But what exactly is meant by sharing? And if it’s so wonderful why don’t we do it
now?

With the aims of DG in mind, sharing in every possible form ought to be explored. This may include co-housing,
work-sharing, expansion of commons, and public goods. On a more basic level, we can look to the existing
institution of the library to understand how sharing might work. Except instead of limiting the function of the
library to books, it should be extended to every possible good and service. The most obvious goods for library
sharing would include those that most people use only at occasionally. Tools and recreational equipment are
excellent examples of sharing models that currently exist on small scales. Many cities are now home to tool
libraries, where community members can borrow tools to complete a project. Similarly, many university campuses
offer recreational equipment libraries, providing students and community members access to a variety of outdoor
equipment on demand.

It is easy to imagine expanding networks of sharing to include many more items from computers and electronics
sharing and the use of libraries offers great potential
to cars and home appliances. In every case,

to reduce our production , consumption , and overall demand on the planet.

First, and most obviously, if instead of everyone purchasing one of everything, we simply share a smaller pool of
resources, fewer items need to be produced and sold. Second, and less obviously, when all of the tools, appliances,
cars, and recreational equipment we need are available from a library, there is no need to store them in our
homes. This would enable people to build and live in much smaller dwellings, reducing throughput for
construction, heating and cooling.

Finally, libraries bring people together. They are hubs of community engagement, culture, and the diffusion of
knowledge. It is easy to see tool libraries hosting courses on safety, crafts, and home-repair, or creating bulletin
boards for people seeking volunteers to help with local construction projects. Similarly, as happens around
existing recreational libraries, courses are offered teaching people how to use, maintain, and repair equipment,
and group outings are organized to build community around shared hobbies.

So, where does a JG fit in? As in other cases, the JG contributes to the sharing economy in a variety of ways. First
JG overcomes the problem of unemployment . A significant
and foremost a

commitment to libraries and sharing would be devastating to a capitalist

economy. While it is obviously not necessary and—in light of the ecological crisis
it is downright insane — that we all buy one of everything, the consequence of not
doing so is economic crisis . As Krugman notes:
“There is one very powerful argument that can be made on behalf of recent American consumerism: not
that it is good for consumers, but that it has been good for producers. You see, spending may not produce
happiness, but it does create jobs, and unemployment is very effective at creating misery. Better to have
manic consumers American style, than depressive consumers of Japan . . . There is a strong element of
rat race in America’s consumer-led boom, but those rats racing in their cages are what keeps the wheels
 of commerce turning. And while it will be a shame if Americans continue to compete over who can own
the most toys, the 62 worst thing of all would be if the competition comes to a sudden halt” (Krugman
1999).

Without
So, in this sense, the JG may be viewed as a prerequisite to the wide-spread adoption of sharing.
a JG in place, sharing is not a socially sustainable option. A JG may also be
something like

used to initiate or catalyze the sharing economy and the establishment of libraries.
Construction and administration of libraries will create numerous jobs. Similarly, the maintenance and upkeep of
library assets will require regular employees. Once again, a JG can and should offer employment carrying out
It provides meaningful work, that serves local communities,
precisely this type of work.
while helping to foster social bonds, and reducing levels of production and
consumption.

The guarantee prioritizes ecological practices.

Hickel ’21 [Jason; February 23; anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal
Society of Arts; Foreign Policy, “Stimulus Is an Environmental Disaster Waiting to
Happen,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/23/stimulus-is-an-environmental-
disaster-waiting-to-happen/]

To keep global warming under 1.5 degrees Celsius without relying on speculative negative
emissions technologies, high-income nations need to be cutting emissions by at least

10 percent per year. There is no scenario in which this is feasible to achieve

while growing the economy at usual rates, given the relationship between growth and energy. For
this reason, scientists— thousands of them—have called on the world’s governments to

abandon GDP growth as an objective and focus on human well-being and

ecological stability instead.
But this leaves us with a hard question: What about jobs? How can we possibly hope to address mass
unemployment without economic growth? Fortunately, there’s a straightforward solution. We can fix the problem
directly without needing additional growth by introducing a progressive , public job guarantee
program, as proposed by economists like Stephanie Kelton, Pavlina Tcherneva, and a growing chorus of others.
The idea is that anyone who signs up can train to do dignified , socially useful work
(the opposite of “bullshit jobs”) and be paid at a living wage .

This would end unemployment and ensure good livelihoods for all , thus
solving the immediate social crisis ; but it would also allow us to mobilize the
labor that’s needed for an ecological transition. There’s a lot of work to be done toward this end,
and it needs to be done quickly. We need to ramp up renewable energy capacity by

installing solar panels , wind turbines , and batteries . We need to retrofit

houses to improve insulation and replace gas boilers. We need to restore degraded
ecosystems , plant forests , and rewild land . We need to expand public
transportation networks. And we need to shift to regenerative farming methods
to restore soils and biodiversity , sequester carbon , and provide healthy ,
local food . All of this requires labor, and it’s not going to happen on its own. We need a public
program run both at a national level (for big projects like railways, power lines, and national
forests) as well as at a decentralized community level (to meet specific local needs).

With a public job guarantee program, we can transform existing unemployment centers from grim places that are
designed to humiliate people into hopeful, life-changing places that give people real skills and empower them to
contribute to the most important collective projects of our generation. By paying a living wage , we
can not only put an end to poverty , but we can also set a standard that the rest of the economy will
have to follow. Private firms would have to pay living wages too—and would have to offer equally enriching work—
if they want to retain staff. Why would anyone agree to flip burgers at McDonald’s for poverty wages when they
could make a real living doing something more meaningful and important?

We can also use the job guarantee program to shorten the working week . If we set
hours at 30 instead of the usual 40, private employers would be under pressure to follow suit. Research has shown
that shortening working hours is a powerful way to reduce emissions and has a positive impact on people’s health
and quality of life.

This approach would also strengthen the bargaining power of labor and therefore go a
long way to reduc ing inequality —another major crisis of our age. And reducing inequality

helps us further reduce the need for perpetual economic growth . Politicians say we
need growth to improve people’s lives; but the problem isn’t that there’s a deficit of income, but that it’s all
captured at the top. By distributing existing wealth more fairly, high-income nations can improve people’s lives
right now—without any growth at all. A job guarantee program can help us get there.

This is a much more rational, ecologically coherent way to address the present economic crisis. Trying to grow the
economy to create jobs is effectively busywork. Almost by definition, jobs created this way are in industries we
don’t really need to expand, and expanding them, in turn, creates pressures for needless consumption. A job
guarantee program does the opposite: It mobilizes labor and resources around things that our communities—and
ecology—actually need and which the private sector is unlikely or unable to provide.

For those who support the idea of a basic income, there’s no reason such a policy could not be integrated in some
form alongside a job guarantee program. But the latter enables us to mobilize labor for an ecological transition,
and it has the benefit of being resoundingly popular. A YouGov survey found that 72 percent of people in Britain
support a job guarantee program and even in the United States, it polls as high as 69 percent. Better yet, it’s not
expensive to implement because it partly pays for itself. Drawing on data from the Levy Economics Institute of
Bard College, Tcherneva reported that rolling out a job guarantee program in the United States would cost only
about 1 to 2 percent of its GDP, and it could be funded with the very same mechanism that governments are
presently using to bail out corporations and prop up stock markets: quantitative easing but this time for people
and planet.

Having a job guarantee program would transform how we think about the economy. For too long, we’ve been
locked into believing that all sectors of the economy must grow all the time, regardless of whether or not we
We even find it
actually need them and how much destruction they might cause. Why? Because jobs.
difficult to contemplate closing down things like coal mines because of the impact it
might have on employment . Indeed, this is why governments have come under
pressure to bail out oil companies and airlines in the middle of a climate
emergency—to prevent the chaos of mass layoffs .

The job guarantee program takes this question off the table . It cuts through the
Gordian knot . We know that if we want to achieve a rapid transition to renewables, high-income nations
need to reduce aggregate energy use. This means having an open, democratic conversation about scaling down
ecologically destructive and socially expendable parts of the economy (things like fossil fuels, SUVs, McMansions,
The job guarantee program
private jets, personal arms, advertising, and planned obsolescence).
allows us to do this without worrying about the specter of unemployment and
ensures affected workers can retrain for jobs in a better, cleaner, fairer economy
without skipping a beat.
In this sense, the job guarantee program is one of the single most transformative policies that a government could
implement. It would liberate us from the straitjacket of growthism and free us to build
an economy that’s organized around human well-being and ecological regeneration rather than around perpetual
expansion.

The degrowth job guarantee supplants the private sector.

Hickel ‘20 [Jason; September 23; economic anthropologist whose research
focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political
economy, “Degrowth and MMT: A Thought Experiment,”
https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2020/9/10/degrowth-and-mmt-a-thought-
experiment]
All of this raises a question. If governments can create and spend money so easily, then why have they so long told
us otherwise? Well, according to MMT economists, the narrative of “fiscal responsibility” is a ruse that’s intended
in large part to prevent people from demanding that governments provide job guarantees and universal public
services (remember, governments are happy to create money when it comes to financing wars and pumping up
asset values, but when it comes to paying for public services, they say it’s not possible). Why would governments
if people have access to a public job guarantee doing socially
do such a thing? Because

useful work, and if they have access to high-quality universal services , then
why on earth would they ever agree to do socially unnecessary ,
meaningless or degrading labour for private firms , if the goal of such firms is primarily to
accumulate profit for the holders of capital? They wouldn’t .

Aligning a job guarantee with progressive fiscal policy locks in

degrowth.
Xavier Vence, 4-20-2021, Professor of Applied Economics at the University of
Santiago de Compostela with more than 30 years of research experience,
coordinator of the ICEDE Research Group and coordinator of the USC Master’s
Degree program in Economic Development and Innovation, “Taxation for a
Circular Economy: New Instruments, Reforms, and Architectural Changes in the
Fiscal System,” Sustainability, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13084581

There is a broad consensus regarding the importance of fiscal policy and the
tax system as a fundamental tool for promoting transformations aimed at
meeting environment al challenges. However, the proliferation of new, specific, and relatively
marginal taxes with environmental objectives is proving to be a failure . Their
modest results have fallen far short of expectations and fail to mitigate the serious environmental problems
affecting the planet and society today. Furthermore, the capacity to even collect these taxes has decreased over
the years.

the inherited fiscal architecture of the past reinforces the

It is increasingly evident that

unsustainability of the linear economic model. The transition towards a circular economy
implies systemic changes that affect all aspects of economic life and require implementation of a policy mix that
integrates a wide range of policies and instruments. The question is, what kind of changes in the tax system can
effectively contribute to this transition? Systemic change towards CE must be accompanied by
systemic change in the architecture of the tax system. However, here we suggest the need
for a strategic roadmap that sets out a sequence of gradual, step-by-step changes that allow for major but feasible
changes in the short term, clearly oriented to the objectives of long-term architectural change.

The strategic proposal, which can be implemented in the medium to long term, is based on the idea of prioritizing
taxes on non-renewable resources (“Georgian taxes”) and eliminating or reducing the tax on renewable resources
a general and transversal tax
(including labor, which is considered the most renewable resource). Alternatively,
could be created that reflects the combined value of all the externalities associated
with each product or the chain of activities involved in its production, from the extraction of the raw
material to consumption. Favorable tax treatment of renewable versus non-renewable resources would change
relative prices in favor of the former, giving economic agents direct incentives to change towards a circular
economy and sustainability. This radical shift towards circularity in the fiscal architecture would entail replacing
current large taxes—designed within the framework of the linear economy and beneficial to it—and introducing
new types of circular tax with great collection capacity.

When introducing radical structure changes to the tax system, powerful barriers will inevitably arise. Defining and
refining policies, then gaining minimum international consensus among relevant countries, is a long and arduous
social and policy process. With such formidable obstacles to overcome, these ambitious proposals could suffer the
same fate as their green economy predecessors have since the 1990s.

Given the urgency of the serious environmental challenges we face, waiting is

not an option. It, therefore, seems reasonable to propose changes to the current tax system that are feasible
and viable in the short term and that will foster the transition towards a circular economy and sustainability. The
starting point is an essentially dysfunctional fiscal framework, given the principles on which large taxes are based
and because many tax benefits are available to key sectors of the linear economy that
have a high environmental impact. In moving towards a circular economy, the first steps
should focus on ambitious reform and make use of available tax expenditure
measures, including the many tax benefits, exemptions, deductions, and allowances applicable to existing
large taxes (e.g., VAT , income tax , corporate tax , etc.). Due to the current huge presence of tax

expenditure in the general tax policy (mainly with nonenvironmental purposes) they could be reshaped

and used to promote the transition towards a circular economy, in line with the proposals discussed
above. First of all, we must do away with all environmentally harmful subsidies and

tax benefits and replace them with a tax treatment favorable to all circular and sustainable
activities.

Such a transition would be reinforced by measures to facilitate the shift from the
current taxation of labor-related activities to taxation of resources , non-
renewable energy, and GHGs . This would substantially increase the
coverage of the environmental tax base and progressively increase the
applied tax rates.

Degrowth taxes shape mindsets.

Tim Jackson, 2017, Professor of Sustainable Development at the University of
Surrey, and Director of the Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity
(CUSP), was Economics Commissioner on the UK Sustainable Development
Commission for seven years, “The Progressive State,” Chapter 10, Prosperity
without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow, 2nd Edition, Routledge
Government as a commitment device
None of this is to suggest that governance for prosperity can be reduced to the community management of
common pool resources. David Harvey has suggested that a ‘political praxis’ should strive for conditions under
which the ‘opposition between private property and state power is displaced as far as possible by common rights
regimes’. When a Marxist economist begins to talk about dissolving ‘the class opposition between capital and
labour’, there is clearly hope that the old ideological divisions are giving way to more practical visions of
governance.12

there is still clearly some role for an

But even within a polycentric approach to governance,

effective state – for example, in establishing ecological limits and supporting

common rights regimes; in using its power to tax and spend to stabilise
economic cycles and achieve full employment ; and finally in helping to shift the
social logic that has us trapped in the ‘iron cage’ of consumerism (Chapter 6).
This last claim is clearly contentious in a modern democracy. Policy makers are (perhaps rightly) uncomfortable
with the idea that they have any role in influencing people’s values and aspirations. But the truth is that
governments intervene constantly in the social logic of consumption, whether they like it or not.

Where (and how)

One of the most dramatic ways in which this occurs is through social investment.
governments invest has a huge influence on infrastructure , on tech nology, on
access and ultimately on lifestyle . Health, education and public transport are archetypically public
concerns, in which social investment is demonstrably vital.13

But government also plays a role in shaping technological innovation, as the Italian-born economist Mariana
Mazzucato has pointed out. It’s a common myth, she argues, to suppose that innovation is best suited to the
private sector. On a closer inspection, the reality is very different. Private capital doesn’t like risk and new
technologies are inherently risky. Mazzucato documents example after example where government investment
technology that makes the iPhone smart and not stupid
was vital to commercial success. ‘[E]very

owes its funding to both basic and applied research funded by the State ’, she points
out.14

The influence of the state is not confined to technological innovation. A myriad different signals are
sent out by the way in which education is structured, by the importance accorded to economic indicators, by
public sector performance indicators, by procurement policies, by the impact of planning guidelines on public and
social spaces, by the influence of wage policy on the work–life balance, by the impact of employment
policy on economic mobility (and hence on family structure and stability), by the presence or absence of
product standards (on durability for example), by the degree of regulation of advertising and the
media, and by the support offered to community initiatives and faith groups.

In all these arenas, policy shapes and co-creates the social world . And the idea that it is
legitimate for the state to intervene in changing the social logic of consumerism is far less problematic than is
often portrayed.

Only by avoiding economic collapse and reducing

unemployment can transition be sustainable and permanent.
Mark Diesendorf, 2023, Honorary Associate Professor in the Environment &
Society Group, School of Humanities & Languages at UNSW Sydney. Originally
trained as a physicist, he broadened out into interdisciplinary energy and
sustainability research. From 1996 to 2001 he was Professor of Environmental
Science and Founding Director of the Institute for Sustainable Futures at
University of Technology Sydney, Rod Taylor, “Transforming the Economic
System,” Chapter 7, The Path to a Sustainable Civilization: Technological,
Socioeconomic, and Political Change, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-0663-5

Planned degrowth is not the same as economic collapse , which can result from an
ecological disaster,45 the failure of neoclassical economics in a financial crisis, war, internal conflict, and poor
governance, including economic and political exploitation.46 Planned degrowth, as conceived by many ecological
economics practitioners, is a planned program to reduce the use of energy, materials and land, and to stabilise
population, initially in the rich countries. The goal of planned degrowth is a sustainable, steady-state economy.

To be truly sustainable , planned degrowth must increase human

wellbeing while protecting and restoring the environment, in other words, to foster sustainable prosperity.
Social justice demands that low-income countries must grow their economies and hence

consumption. Therefore, high-income countries must undergo plan ned degrowth. In the
saying attributed to Mahatma Gandhi: “The rich must live more simply so that the poor can simply live”. The
following definition of planned degrowth by economic anthropologist Jason Hickel makes these considerations
explicit: “Degrowth is a planned reduction in less-necessary production in rich countries that is socially just and
achieved in a democratic manner”.47

We have defined planned degrowth in biophysical terms, because that’s the environmental imperative. Of primary
importance is to develop a strategy to protect our life-support system and facilitate the wellbeing for all people
Within a sustainable degrowth
(see Sect. 7.5). The fate of GDP is of secondary importance.

program, some industries will expand —for example, renewable energy , energy
efficiency, electric vehicles , public transport , bicycles, aged care, child care ,
public health facilities, housing , medical care , public education and training,
the arts, nature conservation , and plantation forestry in appropriate locations—while
others will contract —for example, fossil fuels , road-building, logging of native
forests, high-GHG-emission agriculture , tobacco, armaments for attack rather
than defence , advertising and financial services . The net effect must be to reduce
biophysical impacts and this may in turn reduce GDP. In contrast, green growth would allow GDP and hence net
biophysical impacts to increase, albeit not as rapidly as business-as-usual growth.

To what extent does physical degrowth imply monetary degrowth, that is, a reduction in GDP? In the jargon of
economics, to what extent is there decoupling between monetary economic activity and physical economic activity
and hence environmental impact? Several studies have established that on average GDP and biophysical impact
are coupled, although there are exceptions observed over short periods of time in specific locations for particular
environmental impacts.48 Clearly, all economic activity depends on at least some physical activity and hence has
some environmental impact. For example, education in a school requires a building and equipment for teaching
and learning. Writing a book nowadays requires a computer, internet connection and a server. However, the total,
life-cycle environmental impacts of school-teaching and book-writing are generally much less than those of owning
and operating a private jet aircraft. Therefore, while shifting to ‘greener’ economic activities will result in less
environmental impact (i.e. relative decoupling), there is no absolute decoupling. Therefore, green growth must be
rejected as insufficient. The Sustainable Civilisation needs both greener economic activities and planned
degrowth.

Environmental economist Peter Victor investigated scenarios for no-growth and monetary degrowth of the
Canadian economy, defined in terms of a reduction in GDP. Creating a macroeconomic model, Victor found that,
as expected, simply reducing GDP resulted in increasing unemployment . However, in
scenarios where reducing GDP was combined with other policies—for example, working time

reduction, increased government expenditure on poverty reduction and health

care , government investment in green infrastructure , ending population growth—an

economy with reduced GHG emissions , reduced unemployment and reduced
poverty can be achieved.49
An alternative approach was taken by Graham Turner, using a biophysical method, the Australian Stocks and
Flows Framework, to model physical degrowth in the Australian socio-economy.50 Stocks are quantities of
physical items, such as land, livestock, people and buildings at a point in time. Flows are the rates of change over
a period, for example, net addition of agricultural land, new computers, births, deaths and immigration. Although
he used an entirely different method, Turner obtained similar results to Victor’s.

Simone D’Alessandro and colleagues constructed a simulation model for planned degrowth in France
that combined environmental and radical social justice policies, together with a reduction in consumption and
policies included greater energy efficiency , renewable
exports. The environmental

energy and a carbon tax . The social justice policies comprised a job guarantee , working
time reduction and a wealth tax . They obtained a viable sustainable economy at the ‘cost’ of
substantial levels of public expenditure.51 While cost may be a political problem for governments that follow the
prescriptions of neoclassical economics and neoliberalism, it is not necessarily an economic problem within the
macroeconomics framework of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), as discussed in the next section.

Degrowth at home opens the possibility for economic

diplomacy abroad.
Thomas Meaney, 1-17-2020, fellow at the Quincy Institute, "What U.S. Foreign
Policy Will Look Like With a Socialist in the White House," Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/socialist-us-foreign-policy-democratic-
socialism/, KL

What U.S. Foreign Policy Will Look Like With a Socialist in the White
Title:

House
But a left international economic agenda wouldn’t end at industrial policy. It would recognize that, at least since
the main weapon in
the Dawes Plan of 1924, which managed the debt payments of Weimar Germany,

America’s arsenal has been the U.S. Treasury . The U nited S tates most commonly
expresses its power by allowing and barring access to the U.S. economy. This is
an area where a left administration could make a major difference . Loans (and
the denial of loans), debt forgiveness , offshore tax havens , currency
inflation —these affect the lives of far more people than America’s missiles and
bombs.
Instead of tying aid to indicators such as the protection of property rights and other rubrics designed by
a left admin istration could instead make aid more
conservative and liberal think tanks,

contingent on the pursuit of a redistributive domestic agenda or the

environment al record of the government in question. Carbon taxes on imports
alone could encourage foreign trading partners to put in place more
environmentally sustainable domestic policies. Any U.S. left agenda worth the name
would need to consider the social welfare of foreign populations in conjunction
with taking care of its own.
There are uncomfortable political areas that no left administration should shy away from. The history of social
democracy’s relationship with the environment has been a rocky one. Much of the movement’s success in the past
has been linked to enormous amounts of resource extraction, from the Ruhr in Germany, where the coal furnaces
formed one of the backbones of early social democracy, to the great success of Workers’ Party social programs in
Brazil, which were in part insulated from right-wing attack because they relied on a vast energy boom that did not
require redistributing their wealth.
Earlier generations of socialists and social democrats generally did not understand the effect they were having on
the climate, but the American working class’s relationship to economic growth must be rethought if its citizens
are to flourish in the next century. Left foreign-policy practitioners should still prioritize the equitable distribution
of resources across society, but they may need to accept that such resources won’t be an ever-increasing bounty.
This shift in popular values, away from the ideology of growth to the necessity of sustainability, may prove to be
the left’s most defining challenge.

The second dilemma for any left foreign policy is what to do with fellow movements that are affirmatively socialist
in character but under threat from an internal or external power. Should the United States intervene on behalf of
the single social democratic entity in the Middle East, the Kurdish statelet of Rojava? What should a social
democratic administration do about reactionary coups against social democratic regimes, such as in Brazil, or
freedom movements such as Hong Kong’s? Would the United States not have the responsibility to help its friends?

The problem is that, in most cases, any form of explicitly militarist intervention would spell disaster. The age-old
question of whether socialism means pacificism or noninterference is unlikely to ever be resolved. But
domestic clarity can provide orientation : By working toward a social
transformation at home , building up the legitimacy of the American state and
the moral legitimacy of its economy , the U nited S tates increases its ability to
marshal diplomatic pressure on behalf of allies around the world.
There is also the inverse dilemma: What should a left administration do when nominally socialist governments
such as Cuba or Venezuela repress their own people? There will always be pressure in Washington to do
something in such cases, which at the bare minimum tends to mean backing the opposition, with the possibility of
military intervention dangling in the background. Yet left foreign-policy practitioners must have the forbearance
to recognize that such solutions generally have little practical promise. Often the opposition groups hailed in
Washington have impressive storage space for liberal values but small local followings. Meanwhile, the track
record of U.S. military interference in South America has mostly given rise to autocracies. A new foreign policy
should instead focus on diplomatic openings, including the possibility that a figure like Venezuela’s Nicolás
Maduro might have opponents with large public followings to his left.

Which brings us to China. One worrying aspect of the 2020 presidential race is that every serious contender
across the spectrum—from Sanders and Warren to Trump himself—have staked out a hostile stance on China.
(Michael Bloomberg and Deval Patrick, the candidates most directly involved in international capitalism, may turn
out to be the exceptions.) This hostility is not merely about intellectual property or American wages or the
hollowing out of the U.S. industrial core or cyberwarfare. There is also a growing sense among many left-of-center
Americans that China’s repressions on its borderlands must be met head on. Among human rights advocates, a
clear agenda is coming into view, which involves activating Uighurs and Hong Kongers and the people of
Guangdong to fight Beijing and to help them balance the scales of dignity.

But pursuing such a course would be counterproductive. Chinese President Xi Jinping is in the middle of
transforming an industrial-agrarian economy into a massive consumer economy—much as U.S. economists have
long advised Beijing to do. The overheating of the Chinese economy has not only resulted in the Belt and Road
Initiative as a way of sending excess capital out of the country but also the directed spillover of Mandarin-
speaking populations into Hong Kong (where their presence only aggravates competition over higher education
and housing) and the ongoing colonization of Xinjiang. With such an economic transformation underway, it makes
good sense for Xi to deflect from this hard reality with speeches about cleansing China of foreign ideologies and
undergoing a new round of ideological hygiene. The idea that this world-historical development can be decently
improved by any military swagger or hard-line approach seems deluded at best.

More valuable would be to recognize the United States’ own role in this unfolding
China of the present. The American and Chinese economies are locked in an
embrace that can only be dealt with as a totality, rather than piecemeal. Only through diplomacy
with China would, for instance, any attempt at forging a serious environmental pact be
achievable. No human rights cause in China can be furthered by the U nited S tates if
it does not use the real economic power at its disposal: fining U.S. companies for
doing business in Xin-jiang, forcing Apple to comply with U.S. labor regulations abroad, shifting the
emphasis of World Bank loans from Chinese corporations to individual Chinese
migrants leaving the countryside en masse. Meanwhile, the demonization of China will likely
continue to be a profitable hypocrisy for American politicians to engage in.

Studies confirm latent support for degrowth.

Andrew Ringsmuth, 1-11-2022, PostDoc at the Wegener Center for Climate
and Global Change, the University of Graz, “Lessons from COVID-19 for managing
transboundary climate risks and building resilience,” Climate Risk Management,
Vol. 35, pg. 7
Title: Lessons from COVID-19 for managing transboundary climate risks and building resilience

A growing literature is now exploring options for so-called degrowth , which aims to promote human
wellbeing and ecological resilience without requiring GDP growth (Hickel et al., 2021, Kallis, 2017, Keyßer and
COVID -
Lenzen, 2021, Wiedmann et al., 2020, Kallis, 2020). The experiences of the last few years, including

19, may have shifted public understanding and opinion on these issues, especially in

richer countries, which are best placed to lead with new policies . In a recent
survey of people in G20 countries, 74% of respondents supported the idea that their
priorities should move beyond profit and increasing wealth to
country’s economic

focus more on human wellbeing and ecological protection (Gaffney et al., 2021).
Overcoming the research-implementation gap remains a challenge, however. We do not yet know how degrowth
policies could be adopted at scale or how they would interact with our current economic processes and patterns of
behaviour. Nonetheless, our climate predicament demands openness to new approaches. To better understand the
options, further research into basic relations between societal metabolism and social-ecological wellbeing is
crucial (Haberl et al., 2019, Hagens, 2020, King, 2020, Leiva and Schramski, 2020, Schramski et al., 2015, West,
2018, Fischer-Kowalski and Haberl, 2015, Garrett et al., 2020, Giampietro et al., 2013, Ringsmuth et al., 2016).
Although the many challenges and risks associated with a fundamental economic transition are formidable,
arguably, they may be overcome on the time scale of a human life (decades).4 Conversely, the risks associated
with ever more radiative forcing as we avoid adequately reducing emissions include transitions of the Earth
system to inhospitable states that may not be reversible on the time scales of civilisations (centuries to millennia)
The growing literature on tipping dynamics in
(Lenton et al., 2019, Steffen et al., 2018).

socioeconomic systems may offer reasons for optimism about societies’ potentials for a
timely rise to the challenge of systemic transformation (Otto et al., 2020, Lenton, 2020).

Tariffs force shifts, and a successful model is emulated.

Herman Edward Daly, 7-17-2022, American ecological and Georgist economist
and professor at the School of Public Policy of University of Maryland, best known
for his time as a senior economist at the World Bank from 1988 to 1994, David
Marchese, columnist at The New York Time, "This Pioneering Economist Says Our
Obsession With Growth Must End," The New York Times;
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/07/18/magazine/herman-daly-
interview.html, Pen-MK

Let’s say that tomorrow the U nited S tates government says it recognizes the
need for ecological balance and is going to de- emphasize grow th.7
Wouldn’t every other country have to make the same decision for it to have the desired ecological effect? That’s a
very difficult question. If you try to enact laws for counting the ecological costs of your production in the United
States and then you enter into trading relations with another country that does not count the costs, they have a
competitive advantage. They may ruin themselves in the long run, but in the short run they’re going to undersell
you. This creates huge problems for the free traders because the answer to the problem is to have a tariff to
protect the U.S. industry. At one time I would have tended to favor moving toward a global government. I don’t
know what changed my mind. Perhaps spending six years at the World Bank made me think that global
governance looks like a chimera. I think you’re stuck with nation-states. But this is globalism versus
internationalism. Globalism says to erase national boundaries. Let’s have one global system that we manage
globally. Internationalism says national boundaries are important, but they’re not the ultimate thing. This was the
philosophy behind the Bretton Woods agreements.

We said we have a world of interdependent nations, which are fundamentally separate but try to be cooperative.
the best road forward is for nations to try to move
That’s the model that we’re stuck with. So

toward a steady state and accept the fact that you’re going to need to have some
tariffs and hope that the resulting benefits are sufficient to convince other
nations to follow suit .