CASE OF S.A.S. v. FRANCE

GRAND CHAMBER
CASE OF S.A.S. v. FRANCE
(Application no. 43835/11)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
1 July 2014
S.A.S. v. FRANCE JUDGMENT 1
In the case of S.A.S. v. France,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber
composed of:
Dean Spielmann, President,
Josep Casadevall,
Guido Raimondi,
Ineta Ziemele,
Mark Villiger,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Ledi Bianku,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Angelika Nußberger,
Erik Møse,
André Potocki,
Paul Lemmens,
Helena Jäderblom,
Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Erik Fribergh, Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 November 2013 and 5 June 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 43835/11) against the
French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a French national (“the applicant”), on 11 April 2011. The
President of the Fifth Section, and subsequently the President of the Grand
Chamber, acceded to the applicant’s request not to have her name disclosed
(Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
2. The applicant was represented before the Court by Mr S. Sharma, a
solicitor practising in Birmingham, Mr R. De Mello and Mr T. Muman,
barristers practising in Birmingham, and Mr S. Singh Juss, a barrister
practising in London.
The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their
Agent, initially Ms E.. Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, then Mr F. Alabrune from May 2014.
2 S.A.S. v. FRANCE JUDGMENT
3. The applicant complained that the ban on wearing clothing designed

to conceal one’s face in public places, introduced by Law no. 2010-1192 of
11 October 2010, deprived her of the possibility of wearing the full-face veil
in public. She alleged that there had been a violation of Articles 3, 8, 9, 10
and 11 of the Convention, taken separately and in conjunction with Article
14 of the Convention.
4. The application was assigned to the Fifth Section of the Court
(Rule 52 § 1). On 1 February 2012 notice of the application was given to the
Government.
5. On 28 May 2013 a Chamber of the Fifth Section, composed of Mark
Villiger, President, Angelika Nußberger, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Ganna
Yudkivska, André Potocki, Paul Lemmens and Aleš Pejchal, judges, and
Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of
the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected (Article 30 of the
Convention and Rule 72).
6. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in
accordance with the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention
and Rule 24.
7. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the
admissibility and merits of the case.
8. The non-governmental organisations Amnesty International, Liberty,
Open Society Justice Initiative and ARTICLE 19, together with the Human
Rights Centre of Ghent University and the Belgian Government, were given
leave to submit written comments (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and
Rule 44 § 3). The Belgian Government were also given leave to take part in
the hearing.
9. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on 27 November 2013 (Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the respondent Government

Ms E. BELLIARD, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Agent,
Ms N. ANCEL, Head of the Human Rights Section,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Co-Agent,
Mr S. FOURNEL, Drafting Officer, Human Rights Section,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr R. FERAL, Drafting Officer, Human Rights Section,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms P. ROUAULT-CHALIER, Head of the General Legal
and Litigation Section, Ministry of Justice,
Mr E. DUMAND, Head of the European, International
and Institutional Law and Litigation Department,
Ministry of the Interior, Advisers;
(b) for the applicant

Mr R. DE MELLO,
Mr T. MUMAN,
Mr S. SINGH JUSS, Counsel,
Mr E. BJORGE,
Ms A. VAKULENKO,
Ms S. BERRY, Advisers;
(c) for the Belgian Government

Ms I. NIEDLISPACHER, Co-Agent.
The Court heard addresses by Ms Belliard, Mr De Mello, Mr Muman and

Ms Niedlispacher, and the replies of Ms Belliard and Mr De Mello to
questions from judges.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
10. The applicant is a French national who was born in 1990 and lives in
France.
11. In the applicant’s submission, she is a devout Muslim and she wears
the burqa and niqab in accordance with her religious faith, culture and
personal convictions. According to her explanation, the burqa is a full-body
covering including a mesh over the face, and the niqab is a full-face veil
leaving an opening only for the eyes. The applicant emphasised that neither
her husband nor any other member of her family put pressure on her to dress
in this manner.
12. The applicant added that she wore the niqab in public and in private,
but not systematically: she might not wear it, for example, when she visited
the doctor, when meeting friends in a public place, or when she wanted to
socialise in public. She was thus content not to wear the niqab in public
places at all times but wished to be able to wear it when she chose to do so,
depending in particular on her spiritual feelings. There were certain times
(for example, during religious events such as Ramadan) when she believed
that she ought to wear it in public in order to express her religious, personal
and cultural faith. Her aim was not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace
with herself.
13. The applicant did not claim that she should be able to keep the niqab
on when undergoing a security check, at the bank or in airports, and she
agreed to show her face when requested to do so for necessary identity
checks.
14. Since 11 April 2011, the date of entry into force of Law
no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 throughout France, it has been prohibited
for anyone to conceal their face in public places.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. The Law of 11 October 2010 “prohibiting the concealment of

one’s face in public places”
1. Legislative history
(a) Report “on the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory”
15. The conference of Presidents of the National Assembly, on 23 June
2009, established a parliamentary commission comprising members from
various parties with the task of drafting a report on “the wearing of the full-
face veil on national territory”.
16. The report of some 200 pages, deposited on 26 January 2010,
described and analysed the existing situation. It showed, in particular, that
the wearing of the full-face veil was a recent phenomenon in France (almost
no women wore it before 2000) and that about 1,900 women were
concerned by the end of 2009 (of whom about 270 were living in French
overseas administrative areas); nine out of ten were under 40, two-thirds
were French nationals and one in four were converts to Islam. According to
the report, the wearing of this clothing existed before the advent of Islam
and did not have the nature of a religious precept, but stemmed from a
radical affirmation of individuals in search of identity in society and from
the action of extremist fundamentalist movements. The report further
indicated that the phenomenon was non-existent in countries of central and
eastern Europe, specifically mentioning the Czech Republic, Bulgaria,
Romania, Hungary, Latvia and Germany. It was not therefore a matter of
debate in those countries, unlike the situation in Sweden and Denmark,
where the wearing of such veils nevertheless remained marginal. Moreover,
the question of a general ban had been discussed in the Netherlands and in
Belgium (a Law “to prohibit the wearing of any clothing which totally or
principally conceals the face” has since been enacted in Belgium, on 1 June
2011; see paragraphs 40-41 below). The report was also critical of the
situation in the United Kingdom, where it pointed to a sectarian trend driven
by radical and fundamental Muslim groups, who were taking advantage of a
legal system that was very protective of individual fundamental rights and
freedoms in order to obtain recognition of rights that were specifically
applicable to residents of Muslim faith or origin.
17. The report went on to criticise “a practice at odds with the values of
the Republic”, as expressed in the maxim “liberty, equality, fraternity”. It
emphasised that, going beyond mere incompatibility with secularism, the

full-face veil was an infringement of the principle of liberty, because it was
a symbol of a form of subservience and, by its very existence, negated both
the principle of gender equality and that of the equal dignity of human
beings. The report further found that the full-face veil represented a denial
of fraternity, constituting the negation of contact with others and a flagrant
infringement of the French principle of living together (le “vivre
ensemble”).
The report, thus finding it necessary to “release women from the
subservience of the full-face veil”, advocated a three-pronged course of
action: to convince, protect women and envisage a ban. It made the
following four proposals: first, to adopt a resolution reasserting Republican
values and condemning as contrary to such values the wearing of the full-
face veil; secondly, to initiate a general survey of the phenomena of
amalgamation, discrimination and rejection of others on account of their
origins or faith, and of the conditions of fair representation of spiritual
diversity; thirdly, to reinforce actions of awareness and education in mutual
respect and diversity and the generalising of mediation mechanisms; and
fourthly, to enact legislation guaranteeing the protection of women who
were victims of duress, which would strengthen the position of public
officials confronted with this phenomenon and curb such practices. The
report emphasised that among both the parliamentary commission’s
members and those of the political formations represented in Parliament,
there was no unanimous support for the enactment of a law introducing a
general and absolute ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public
places.
(b) Opinion of the National Advisory Commission on Human Rights “on the
wearing of the full-face veil”
18. In the meantime, on 21 January 2010, the National Advisory
Commission on Human Rights (Commission nationale consultative des
droits de l’homme – CNCDH) had issued an “opinion on the wearing of the
full-face veil”, stating that it was not in favour of a law introducing a
general and absolute ban. It took the view, in particular, that the principle of
secularism alone could not serve as a basis for such a general measure, since
it was not for the State to determine whether or not a given matter fell
within the realm of religion, and that public order could justify a prohibition
only if it were limited in space and time. The opinion also emphasised the
risk of stigmatising Muslims and pointed out that a general prohibition
could be detrimental to women, in particular because those who were made
to wear the full-face veil would additionally become deprived of access to
public areas.
19. That being said, the CNCDH observed that support for women who
were subjected to any kind of violence had to be a political priority; it
advocated, in order to combat any form of obscurantism, encouraging the

promotion of a culture of dialogue, openness and moderation, with a view to
fostering better knowledge of religions and the principles of the Republic; it
called for the strengthening of civic education courses – including education
and training in human rights – at all levels, for both men and women; it
sought the strict application of the principles of secularism and neutrality in
public services, and the application of existing legislation; and it expressed
the wish that, in parallel, sociological and statistical studies should be
carried out in order to monitor the evolution of the wearing of the full-face
veil.
(c) Study by the Conseil d’État on “the possible legal grounds for banning the
full veil”
20. On 29 January 2010 the Prime Minister asked the Conseil d’État to
carry out a study on “the legal grounds for a ban on the full veil” which
would be “as wide and as effective as possible”.
21. The Conseil d’État thus completed its “study on the possible legal
grounds for banning the full veil”, of which the report was adopted by the
Plenary General Assembly on 25 March 2010. It interpreted the question put
to it as follows: can we envisage a legal ban, for particular reasons and
within prescribed limits, on the wearing of the full veil as such, or are we
required to address the more general issue of concealment of the face, with
the wearing of this garment being just one example?
22. The Conseil d’État first observed that existing legislation already
addressed this issue in various ways, whether through provisions whose
effect was to ban the wearing of the full veil itself by certain persons and in
certain circumstances, by imposing occasional restrictions on concealment
of the face for public order reasons, or by envisaging criminal sanctions for
the instigators of such practices. It noted, however, that the relevant
provisions were varied in nature and that comparable democracies were like
France in not having national legislation imposing a general ban on such
practices in public places. In view of this finding, the Conseil d’État
questioned the legal and practical viability of prohibiting the wearing of the
full veil in public places, having regard to the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution, the Convention and European Union law. It
found it impossible to recommend a ban on the full veil alone, as a garment
representing values that were incompatible with those of the Republic, in
that such a ban would be legally weak and difficult to apply in practice. It
observed in particular that the principle of gender equality was not intended
to be applicable to the individual person, i.e. to an individual’s exercise of
personal freedom. It further took the view that a less specific ban on the
deliberate concealment of the face, based mainly on public order
considerations and interpreted more or less broadly, could not legally apply
without distinction to the whole of the public space under prevailing

constitutional and Convention case-law.
23. However, the Conseil d’État believed that, in the present state of the
law, it would be possible to enact more coherent legislation, which would be
binding and restrictive, comprising two types of provision: first, stipulating
that it was forbidden to wear any garment or accessory that had the effect of
hiding the face in such a way as to preclude identification, either to
safeguard public order where it was under threat, or where identification
appeared necessary for access to or movement within certain places, or for
the purpose of certain formalities; secondly, strengthening enforcement
measures that would particularly be directed against individuals who forced
others to hide their faces and thus conceal their identity in public places.
(d) Resolution of the National Assembly “on attachment to respect for
Republic values at a time when they are being undermined by the
development of radical practices”
24. On 11 May 2010 the National Assembly adopted, by a unanimous
vote, a Resolution “on attachment to respect for Republic values at a time
when they are being undermined by the development of radical practices”.
In this Resolution the National Assembly made the following statements:
“1. Considers that radical practices undermining dignity and equality between men
and women, one of which is the wearing of the full veil, are incompatible with the
values of the Republic;
2. Affirms that the exercise of freedom of expression, opinion or belief cannot be
relied on by anyone for the purpose of flouting common rules, without regard for the
values, rights and duties which underpin society;
3. Solemnly reaffirms its attachment to respect for the principles of dignity, liberty,
equality and fraternity between human beings;
4. Expresses the wish that the fight against discrimination and the promotion of
equality between men and women should be a priority in public policies concerning
equal opportunities, especially in the national education system;
5. Finds it necessary for all appropriate means to be implemented to ensure the
effective protection of women who suffer duress or pressure, in particular those who
are forced to wear the full veil.”
(e) Bill before Parliament

25. The draft of a law prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in
public places was deposited in May 2010, the Government having
considered that the other options (mediation and parliamentary resolution)
were not sufficiently effective and that a ban limited to certain places or
circumstances would not have been an appropriate means of safeguarding
the principles in question and would have been difficult to implement (Bill
prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public places, impact
assessment, May 2010).
The bill contained an “explanatory memorandum”, which reads as

follows:
“France is never as much itself, faithful to its history, its destiny, its image, than
when it is united around the values of the Republic: liberty, equality, fraternity. Those
values form the foundation-stone of our social covenant; they guarantee the cohesion
of the Nation; they underpin the principle of respect for the dignity of individuals and
for equality between men and women.
These are the values which have today been called into question by the development
of the concealment of the face in public places, in particular by the wearing of the full
veil.
This question has given rise, for about a year now, to a wide public debate. The
finding, enlightened by testimony and the report of the National Assembly’s
commission, is unanimous. Even though the phenomenon at present remains
marginal, the wearing of the full veil is the sectarian manifestation of a rejection of the
values of the Republic. Negating the fact of belonging to society for the persons
concerned, the concealment of the face in public places brings with it a symbolic and
dehumanising violence, at odds with the social fabric.
The decreeing of ad hoc measures has been envisaged, entailing partial bans limited
to certain places and, if appropriate, to certain periods or for the benefit of certain
services. Such a solution, in addition to the fact that it would encounter extreme
difficulties in its implementation, would constitute no more than an inadequate,
indirect and circuitous response to the real problem.
The voluntary and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is
quite simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’ in
French society.
The defence of public order is not confined to the preservation of tranquillity, public
health or safety. It also makes it possible to proscribe conduct which directly runs
counter to rules that are essential to the Republican social covenant, on which our
society is founded.
The systematic concealment of the face in public places, contrary to the ideal of
fraternity, also falls short of the minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for
social interaction.
Moreover, this form of public confinement, even in cases where it is voluntary or
accepted, clearly contravenes the principle of respect for the dignity of the person. In
addition, it is not only about the dignity of the individual who is confined in this
manner, but also the dignity of others who share the same public space and who are
thus treated as individuals from whom one must be protected by the refusal of any
exchange, even if only visual.
Lastly, in the case of the full veil, worn only by women, this breach of the dignity of
the person goes hand in hand with the public manifestation of a conspicuous denial of
equality between men and women, through which that breach is constituted.
Having been consulted about the legal solutions that would be available to the
public authorities in order to curb the development of this phenomenon, the Conseil
d’État envisaged an approach based on a new conception of public order, considered
in its ‘non-material’ dimension.
Whilst it found such an approach too innovative, it did so after noting that it was
reflected in certain judicial decisions, particularly in a decision where the
Constitutional Council had found that the conditions of ‘normal family life’ secured to
aliens living in France could validly exclude polygamy, or indeed the case-law of the
Conseil d’État itself, which allowed certain practices, even if consensual, to be
proscribed when they offended against the dignity of the person. This is especially
true where the practice in question, like the concealment of the face, cannot be
regarded as inseparable from the exercise of a fundamental freedom.
These are the very principles of our social covenant, as solemnly restated by the
National Assembly when it adopted unanimously, on 11 May 2010, its resolution on
attachment to respect for Republican values, which prohibit the self-confinement of
any individual who cuts himself off from others whilst living among them.
The practice of concealing one’s face, which could also represent a danger for
public safety in certain situations, thus has no place within French territory. The
inaction of the public authorities would seem to indicate an unacceptable failure to
defend the principles which underpin our Republican covenant.
It is for the sake of those principles that the present bill seeks to introduce into our
legislation, following the necessary period of explanation and education, an essential
rule of life in society to the effect that ‘no one may, in public places, wear clothing
that is designed to conceal the face’.”
26. The bill was supported by the National Assembly’s Delegation on
the rights of women and equal opportunities (information report registered
on 23 June 2010, no. 2646) and the Standing Committee on Legislation
(Commission des lois) issued a favourable report (registered on 23 June
2010, no. 2648).
27. The Law was passed by the National Assembly on 13 July 2010 with
335 votes in favour, one vote against and three abstentions, and by the
Senate on 14 September 2010, with 246 votes in favour and one abstention.
After the Constitutional Council’s decision of 7 October 2010 finding that
the Law was compliant with the Constitution (see paragraph 30 below), it
was enacted on 11 October 2010.
2. Relevant provisions of Law no. 2010-1192

28. Sections 1 to 3 (in force since 11 April 2011) of Law no. 2010-1192
of 11 October 2010 “prohibiting the concealment of one’s face in public
places” read as follows:
Section 1
“No one may, in public places, wear clothing that is designed to conceal the face.”
Section 2
“I. - For the purposes of section 1 hereof, ‘public places’ comprise the public
highway and any places open to the public or assigned to a public service.
II. - The prohibition provided for in section 1 hereof shall not apply if the clothing is
prescribed or authorised by primary or secondary legislation, if it is justified for health
or occupational reasons, or if it is worn in the context of sports, festivities or artistic or
traditional events.”
Section 3
“Any breach of the prohibition laid down in section 1 hereof shall be punishable by
a fine, at the rate applying to second-class petty offences (contraventions) [150 euros
maximum].
An obligation to follow a citizenship course, as provided at paragraph 8 o of Article
131-16 of the Criminal Code, may be imposed in addition to or instead of the payment
of a fine.”
The provisions for the obligation to follow a citizenship course can be
found in Articles R. 131-35 to R. 131-44 of the Criminal Code. The purpose
of the course is to remind the convicted persons of the Republican values of
tolerance and respect for the dignity of the human being and to make them
aware of their criminal and civil liability, together with the duties that stem
from life in society. It also seeks to further the person’s social integration
(Article R. 131-35).
29. Law no. 2010-1192 (section 4) also inserted the following provision
into the Criminal Code:
Article 225-4-10
“Any person who forces one or more other persons to conceal their face, by threat,
duress, coercion, abuse of authority or of office, on account of their gender, shall be
liable to imprisonment for one year and a fine of 30,000 euros.
Where the offence is committed against a minor, such punishment shall be increased
to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 60,000 euros.”
B. Decision of the Constitutional Council of 7 October 2010
30. The Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel), to which the

matter had been referred on 14 September 2010 by the Presidents of the
National Assembly and of the Senate, as provided for in the second
paragraph of Article 61 of the Constitution, declared Law no. 2010-1192
compliant with the Constitution, subject to one reservation (point 5), in a
decision of 7 October 2010 (no. 2010-613 DC), which reads as follows:
“... 3. Article 4 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789
proclaims: ‘Liberty consists in being able to do anything which does not harm others:
thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no bounds other than those
which ensure to other members of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These
bounds shall be determined solely by the law’. Article 5 of the same Declaration
proclaims: ‘The law shall prohibit solely those actions which are harmful to society.
Nothing which is not prohibited by law shall be impeded and no one shall be
compelled to do that which the law does not prescribe’. Article 10 proclaims: ‘No one
shall be harassed on account of his opinions and beliefs, even religious, on condition
that their manifestation does not disturb public order as determined by law’. Lastly,
paragraph 3 of the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946 provides: ‘The law shall
guarantee women equal rights to those of men in all spheres’.
4. Sections 1 and 2 of the statute referred for review are intended to respond to
practices, which until recently were of an exceptional nature, consisting in concealing
the face in public places. The legislature was of the view that such practices might be
dangerous for public safety and fail to comply with the minimum requirements of life
in society. It also found that those women who concealed their face, voluntarily or
otherwise, were placed in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that was patently
incompatible with the constitutional principles of liberty and equality. In passing the
statutory provisions referred for review, the legislature thus complemented and
generalised rules which were previously reserved for ad hoc situations for the purpose
of protecting public order.
5. In view of the purposes which it sought to achieve and taking into account the
nature of the sanction introduced for non-compliance with the rule it has laid down,
the legislature has passed statutory provisions which reconcile, in a manner which is
not disproportionate, the safeguarding of public order and the guaranteeing of
constitutionally protected rights. However, prohibiting the concealment of the face in
public places cannot, without excessively contravening Article 10 of the 1789
Declaration, restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places of worship open to the
public. With this reservation, sections 1 to 3 of the statute referred for review are not
unconstitutional.
6. Section 4 of the statute referred for review, which punishes by a term of one
year’s imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 euros any person who forces another person
to conceal his or her face, and sections 5 to 7 thereof concerning the entry into force
of the statute and its implementation, are not unconstitutional. ...”
C. Prime Minister’s Circular of 2 March 2011
31. Published in the Official Gazette of 3 March 2011, the Prime

Minister’s Circular of 2 March 2011 on the implementation of Law
no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010 prohibiting the concealment of the face
in public places contains the following indications:
“... I. Scope of the Law
1. Factors constituting the concealment of the face in public places
The concealment of the face in public places is prohibited from 11 April 2011
throughout the territory of the Republic, both in metropolitan France and in French
overseas administrative areas. The offence is constituted when a person wears an item
of clothing that is designed to conceal his or her face and when he or she is in a public
place; these two conditions are necessary and sufficient.
(a) Concealment of one’s face
Extent of the ban
Items of clothing designed to conceal the face are those which make the person
impossible to identify. The face does not have to be fully concealed for this to be so.
The following are prohibited in particular, without this list being exhaustive: the
wearing of balaclavas (cagoules), full-face veils (burqa, niqab, etc.), masks or any
other accessory or item of clothing which has the effect, whether separately or in
combination with others, of concealing the face. Since the offence is classified as a
petty offence (contravention), the existence of intent is irrelevant: it is sufficient for

the clothing to be designed to conceal the face.
Statutory derogations
Section 2 of the Law provides for a number of derogations from the ban on
concealing one’s face.
First, the ban does not apply ‘if the clothing is prescribed or authorised by primary
or secondary legislation’. This is the case, for example, under Article L. 431-1 of the
Road-Traffic Code, which requires the drivers of motorcycles to wear crash-helmets.
Secondly, the ban does not apply if the clothing ‘is justified for health or
occupational reasons’. The occupational reasons concern, particularly, the subject-
matter covered by Article L. 4122-1 of the Employment Code: ‘the employer’s
instructions shall stipulate, in particular where the nature of the risks so justify, the
conditions of use of any equipment, any means of protection, and any dangerous
substances and concoctions. They shall be appropriate to the nature of the tasks to be
performed’.
Lastly, the ban does not apply if the clothing ‘is worn in the context of sports,
festivities or artistic or traditional events’. For example, religious processions, when
they are of a traditional nature, fall within the scope of the derogations from the ban
laid down by section 1. There is also a derogation in respect of the face protections
that are prescribed in a number of sports.
The provisions of the Law of 11 October 2010 apply without prejudice to any
provisions which may otherwise prohibit or govern the wearing of clothing in certain
public services and which remain in force.
This is the case for Law no. 2004-228 of 15 March 2004, which regulates, in
accordance with the principle of secularism, the wearing of symbols or clothing
displaying religious affiliation in State schools, both primary and secondary (Article
L. 141-5-1 of the National Education Code and implementing circular of 18 May
2004). Other provisions remaining applicable are those of the charter of hospitalised
patients, annexed to the circular of 2 March 2006 on the rights of hospitalised patients,
and those of the circular of 2 February 2005 on secularism in health institutions.
(b) Definition of public places
Section 2 of the Law states that ‘public places comprise the public highway and any
places open to the public or assigned to a public service’.
The notion of the public highway requires no comment. It should be pointed out
that, with the exception of those assigned to public transport, the vehicles that use
public highways are regarded as private places. A person who conceals his or her face
in a private car is thus not committing the offence referred to in the Law. That
situation may, however, be covered by the provisions of the Road-Traffic Code
stipulating that the driving of a vehicle must not present any risks for public safety.
Places open to the public are those places to which access is unrestricted (beaches,
public gardens, public walkways, etc.) and places to which access is possible, even
conditionally, in so far as any person who so wishes may meet the requirement (for
example, by paying for a ticket to enter a cinema or theatre). Commercial premises
(cafés, restaurants, shops), banks, stations, airports and the various means of public
transport are thus public places.
Places assigned to a public service are the premises of any public institutions, courts
and tribunals and administrative bodies, together with any other bodies responsible for
providing public services. They include, in particular, the premises of various public
authorities and establishments, local government bodies and their public
establishments, town halls, courts, prefectures, hospitals, post offices, educational
institutions (primary and secondary schools, universities), family benefit offices,
health insurance offices, job centres, museums and libraries.
2. Lack of restriction as regards freedom of religion in places of worship
Where they are open to the public, places of worship fall within the scope of the
Law. The Constitutional Council has found, however, that ‘prohibiting the
concealment of the face in public places cannot, without excessively contravening
Article 10 of the 1789 Declaration, restrict the exercise of religious freedom in places
of worship open to the public’.
3. Sanction for the offence of concealing one’s face
Section 3 of the Law provides that any breach of the prohibition of face concealment
in public places is punishable by a fine, at the rate applying to second-class petty
offences (150 euros maximum). The imposition of this fine falls within the
jurisdiction of the community courts (juridictions de proximité).
An obligation to follow a citizenship course may also be imposed by the same courts
in addition to or instead of the payment of a fine. Such courses, adapted to the nature
of the offence committed, must, in particular, ensure that those concerned are
reminded of the Republican values of equality and respect for human dignity.
4. Sanction for the use of duress
The fact of concealing one’s face in a public place may be the result of duress
against the person concerned, and the third party will then have committed the offence
of forcing a person to conceal his or her face.
This offence, provided for in section 4 of the Law (inserting a new Article 225-4-10
into the Criminal Code), is punishable by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of
30,000 euros. Where the offence is committed against a minor, such punishment is
increased to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 60,000 euros.
The punishing of such conduct is part of the public authorities’ policy to combat
with vigour any form of discrimination and violence against women, which constitute
unacceptable infringements of the principle of gender equality.
II. Requisite conduct in public services
(a) Role of the director
In the context of the powers that he or she holds to ensure the proper functioning of
the department, the director will be responsible for ensuring compliance with the
provisions of the Law of 11 October 2010 and with the measures taken, in particular
the updating of internal rules, for the purposes of its implementation.
It will be the director’s duty to present and explain the spirit and logic of the Law to
the staff under his or her authority, to ensure that they observe its provisions and are
in a position to enforce compliance therewith, in the best possible conditions, by the
users of the public service.
It will also be for the director to ensure that the appropriate information envisaged
by the Government in the form of posters and leaflets is made available on premises
that receive or are open to members of the public.
(b) Restriction of access to premises assigned to public services
From 11 April 2011 staff responsible for a public service, who may already have
had to ask individuals to show their faces momentarily to prove their identity, will be
entitled to refuse access to the service to anyone whose face is concealed.
In the event that the person whose face is concealed has already entered the
premises, it is recommended that staff remind that person of the applicable rules and
ask him or her to observe the Law, by uncovering the face or leaving the premises. A
person whose face is concealed cannot benefit from the delivery of public services.
However, the Law does not confer on staff, in any circumstances, the power to
oblige a person to show his or her face or leave. The exercise of such constraint would
constitute an illegal act and could entail criminal proceedings. It is therefore
absolutely forbidden.
When faced with a refusal to comply, the staff member or his or her line manager
must call the police or gendarmerie, who are exclusively entitled to take note and
make a report of the offence and, if appropriate, to verify the identity of the person
concerned. Specific instructions are addressed for this purpose by the Interior Minister
to the police forces.
Denial of access to a service can be reconsidered only to take account of particular
emergencies, in particular those of a medical nature.
III. ― Informing the public
The period leading up to the entry into force of the ban on the concealment of the
face should be used to ensure that members of the public are suitably informed.
(a) General information
A poster, distributed on paper or electronically by ministries, within their respective
networks, will have to be displayed, in a visible manner, on premises open to the
public or assigned to a public service.
The poster carries the slogan ‘facing up to life in France’ (‘la République se vit à
visage découvert’) and indicates that the ban on concealing the face in public places
will enter into force on 11 April 2011.
This poster may be supplemented, for the benefit of those who wish to have more
precise information on the provisions of the Law, by a leaflet distributed in the
various services in the same manner and according to the same procedure as the
poster.
For travellers wishing to visit France, this leaflet will also be available in English
and Arabic at French consulates abroad.
These two documents providing general information will also be accessible via the
website www.visage-decouvert.gouv.fr, which will also include a section providing
answers to the various questions raised by the implementation of the Law.
(b) Information for persons directly concerned by face concealment
A scheme for the provision of information to the persons concerned has been
prepared by the Ministry for Towns and Cities, in coordination with the Ministry for
Solidarity and Social Cohesion and the Interior Ministry.
The aim of this information, awareness and individual support scheme is to foster
dialogue, in order to persuade the small minority who conceal their face to comply
with the ban laid down by Parliament. This dialogue is not a negotiation; the idea is to
bring those concerned, by a process of explanation, to renounce, of their own accord,
a practice which is at odds with the values of the Republic.
The scheme, about which specific instructions have been issued by the Minister for
Towns and Cities, relies in particular on associations and community networks in the
field of women’s rights, in particular the network of information centres on women’s
rights (centres d’information des droits des femmes – CDIFF), the 300 ‘prefect’s
delegates’ and ‘relay adults’ working in local communities. It will also mobilise all
those working in social mediation, especially the mediators of the national education
system.
The aim is to provide full information on the Law and personal support to those
individuals who cover their face. ...”
D. Other circulars
32. On 11 March 2011 the Minister of Justice and Freedoms issued a

Circular “concerning the presentation of the provisions on the offence of
concealing one’s face in public places”. It was addressed, for action, to
public prosecutors at the appellate and lower courts, and for information, to
the presidents of the appellate courts and of the tribunaux de grande
instance, among others. The Circular presented the offence of concealing
one’s face in public places. It also contained indications as to the
implementation of the new punitive provisions, with regard to the policy for
establishing the offence and prosecuting the offender and the organisation of
the citizenship courses.
33. On 31 March 2011 the Minister of the Interior, Overseas
Administration, Local Government and Immigration addressed to the
Commissioners of Police, prefects and High Commissioners (of Overseas
Territories) a Circular for the purpose of “giving instructions to officials
within [that Ministry], and in particular to police forces, for the application
of the Law of 11 October 2010”. It contained, in particular, indications
about the notion of concealing one’s face and about the places in which the
ban applied, emphasising that a person present in a place of worship for the
observance of religion was not liable to be charged, and “recommend[ing]
that police forces avoid any intervention in the immediate vicinity of a place
of worship which could be interpreted as an indirect restriction on freedom
of worship”.
E. Judgment of the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation of

5 March 2013
34. The Court of Cassation was called upon to examine an appeal on

points of law (no. 12-808091) against a judgment of the Community Court
of Paris, dated 12 December 2011, in which a woman had been ordered to
follow a two-week citizenship course for wearing the full-face veil with the
aim of protesting against the Law of 11 October 2010 in the context of a
demonstration for that purpose outside the Elysée Palace. Examining the
arguments submitted by the appellants under Article 9 of the Convention,
the Criminal Division found as follows on 5 March 2013:
“...whilst the Community Court was wrong to disregard the religious reasons for the
impugned demonstration, the judgment should not be overruled in so far as, although
Article 9 of the Convention ... guarantees the exercise of freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, paragraph 2 thereof stipulates that this freedom is subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; ... this is the case for
the Law prohibiting the full covering of the face in public places, as it seeks to protect
public order and safety by requiring everyone who enters a public place to show their
face; ...”
III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and Viewpoint
of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe
1. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on Islam,
Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe
35. Adopted on 23 June 2010, Resolution 1743 (2010) states, in
particular:
“14. Recalling its Resolution 1464 (2005) on women and religion in Europe, the
Assembly calls on all Muslim communities to abandon any traditional interpretations
of Islam which deny gender equality and limit women’s rights, both within the family
and in public life. This interpretation is not compatible with human dignity and
democratic standards; women are equal to men in all respects and must be treated
accordingly, with no exceptions. Discrimination against women, whether based on
religious traditions or not, goes against Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention, Article
5 of its Protocol No. 7 and its Protocol No. 12. No religious or cultural relativism may
be invoked to justify violations of personal integrity. The Parliamentary Assembly
therefore urges member states to take all necessary measures to stamp out radical
Islamism and Islamophobia, of which women are the prime victims.
15. In this respect, the veiling of women, especially full veiling through the burqa or
the niqab, is often perceived as a symbol of the subjugation of women to men,
restricting the role of women within society, limiting their professional life and
impeding their social and economic activities. Neither the full veiling of women, nor
even the headscarf, are recognised by all Muslims as a religious obligation of Islam,
but they are seen by many as a social and cultural tradition. The Assembly considers
that this tradition could be a threat to women’s dignity and freedom. No woman
should be compelled to wear religious apparel by her community or family. Any act
of oppression, sequestration or violence constitutes a crime that must be punished by
law. Women victims of these crimes, whatever their status, must be protected by
member states and benefit from support and rehabilitation measures.
16. For this reason, the possibility of prohibiting the wearing of the burqa and the
niqab is being considered by parliaments in several European countries. Article 9 of
the Convention includes the right of individuals to choose freely to wear or not to
wear religious clothing in private or in public. Legal restrictions to this freedom may
be justified where necessary in a democratic society, in particular for security
purposes or where public or professional functions of individuals require their
religious neutrality or that their face can be seen. However, a general prohibition of
wearing the burqa and the niqab would deny women who freely desire to do so their
right to cover their face.
17. In addition, a general prohibition might have the adverse effect of generating
family and community pressure on Muslim women to stay at home and confine
themselves to contacts with other women. Muslim women could be further excluded
if they were to leave educational institutions, stay away from public places and
abandon work outside their communities, in order not to break with their family
tradition. Therefore, the Assembly calls on member states to develop targeted policies
intended to raise Muslim women’s awareness of their rights, help them to take part in
public life and offer them equal opportunities to pursue a professional life and gain
social and economic independence. In this respect, the education of young Muslim
women as well as of their parents and families is crucial. It is especially necessary to
remove all forms of discrimination against girls and to develop education on gender
equality, without stereotypes and at all levels of the education system.”
36. In its Recommendation 1927 (2010), adopted on the same day, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe asked the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, in particular, to:
“3.13. call on member states not to establish a general ban of full veiling or other
religious or special clothing, but to protect women from all physical and
psychological duress as well as to protect their free choice to wear religious or special
clothing and ensure equal opportunities for Muslim women to participate in public life
and pursue education and professional activities; legal restrictions on this freedom
may be justified where necessary in a democratic society, in particular for security
purposes or where public or professional functions of individuals require their
religious neutrality or that their face can be seen.”
2. Viewpoint of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of

Europe
37. The Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe,
published the following “Viewpoint” (see Human rights in Europe: no
grounds for complacency. Viewpoints by Thomas Hammarberg, Council of
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe Publishing,

2011, pp. 39-43):
“Prohibition of the burqa and the niqab will not liberate oppressed women, but
might instead lead to their further exclusion and alienation in European societies. A
general ban on such attire constitutes an ill-advised invasion of individual privacy
and, depending on its terms, also raises serious questions about whether such
legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Two rights in the Convention are particularly relevant to this debate about clothing.
One is the right to respect for one’s private life and personal identity (Article 8). The
other is the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief ‘in worship, teaching, practice
and observance’ (Article 9).
Both Convention articles specify that these rights can only be subject to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Those who have argued for a general ban of the burqa and the niqab have not
managed to show that these garments in any way undermine democracy, public safety,
order or morals. The fact that a very small number of women wear such clothing has
made such proposals even less convincing.
Nor has it been possible to prove that women wearing this attire are victims of more
gender repression than others. Those interviewed in the media have presented a
diversity of religious, political and personal arguments for their decision to dress as
they do. There may of course be cases where women are under undue pressure to
dress in a certain way – but it has not been shown that a ban would be welcomed by
them.
There is of course no doubt that the status of women is an acute problem – and that
this problem may be particularly true in relation to some religious communities. This
needs to be discussed, but prohibiting the supposed symptoms – such as clothing – is
not the way to do it. Dress, after all, may not reflect specific religious beliefs, but the
exercise of broader cultural expression.
It is right and proper to react strongly against any regime ruling that women must
wear these garments. This is in clear contravention of the Convention articles cited
above, and is unacceptable, but it is not remedied by banning the same clothing in
other countries.
The consequences of decisions in this area must be assessed. For instance, the
suggestion that women dressed in a burqa or niqab be banned from public institutions
like hospitals or government offices may result in these women avoiding such places
entirely, and that is clearly wrong.
It is unfortunate that in Europe, public discussion of female dress, and the
implications of certain attire for the subjugation of women, has almost exclusively
focused on what is perceived as Muslim dress. The impression has been given that
one particular religion is being targeted. Moreover, some arguments have been clearly
Islamophobic in tenor and this has certainly not built bridges nor encouraged
dialogue.
Indeed, one consequence of this xenophobia appears to be that the wearing of full
cover dress has increasingly become a means of protesting against intolerance in our
societies. An insensitive discussion about banning certain attire seems merely to have
provoked a backlash and a polarisation in attitudes.
In general, states should avoid legislating on dress, other than in the narrow
circumstances set forth in the Convention. It is, however, legitimate to regulate that
those who represent the state, for instance police officers, do so in an appropriate way.
In some instances, this may require complete neutrality as between different political
and religious insignia; in other instances, a multi-ethnic and diverse society may want
to cherish and reflect its diversity in the dress of its agents.
Obviously, full-face coverage may be problematic in some occupations and
situations. There are particular situations where there are compelling community
interests that make it necessary for individuals to show themselves for the sake of
safety or in order to offer the possibility of necessary identification. This is not
controversial and, in fact, there are no reports of serious problems in this regard in
relation to the few women who normally wear a burqa or a niqab.
A related problem arose in discussion in Sweden. A jobless Muslim man lost his
subsidy from a state agency for employment support because he had refused to shake
the hand of a female employer when turning up for a job interview. He had claimed
that his action was grounded in his religious faith.
A court ruled later, after a submission from the ombudsman against discrimination,
that the agency decision was discriminatory and that the man should be compensated.
Though this is in line with human rights standards, it was not readily accepted by the
general public and a controversial public debate ensued.
It is likely that issues of this kind will surface increasingly in the coming years and it
is healthy that they should be openly discussed – as long as Islamophobic tendencies
are avoided. However, such debates should be broadened to include the promotion of
greater understanding of different religions, cultures and customs. Pluralism and
multiculturalism are essential European values, and should remain so.
This in turn may require more discussion of the meaning of respect. In the debates
about the allegedly anti-Muslim cartoons published in Denmark in 2005, it was
repeatedly stated that there was a contradiction between demonstrating respect for
believers whilst also protecting freedom of expression as stipulated in Article 10 of
the European Convention.
The Strasbourg Court analysed this dilemma in the famous case of Otto-Preminger-
Institute v. Austria in which it stated that ‘those who choose to exercise the freedom to
manifest their religion ... cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism.
They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even
the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith’.
In the same judgment the Court stated that consideration should be given to the risk
that the right of religious believers – like anyone else – to have their views respected
may be violated by provocative portrayals of objects of religious significance. The
Court concluded that ‘such portrayals can be regarded as malicious violation of the
spirit of tolerance, which must also be a feature of democratic society’.
The political challenge for Europe is to promote diversity and respect for the beliefs
of others whilst at the same time protecting freedom of speech and expression. If the
wearing of a full-face veil is understood as an expression of a certain opinion, we are
in fact talking here about the possible conflict between similar or identical rights –
though seen from two entirely different angles.
In Europe, we seek to uphold traditions of tolerance and democracy. Where conflicts

of rights between individuals and groups arise, it should not be seen in negative terms,
but rather as an opportunity to celebrate that rich diversity and to seek solutions which
respect the rights of all involved.
A prohibition of the burqa and the niqab would in my opinion be as unfortunate as it
would have been to criminalise the Danish cartoons. Such banning is alien to
European values. Instead, we should promote multicultural dialogue and respect for
human rights.”
B. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
38. In its General Comment No. 22, concerning Article 18 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (freedom of thought,
conscience and religion), adopted on 20 July 1993, the Human Rights
Committee emphasised as follows:
“... 4. The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised ‘either
individually or in community with others and in public or private’. The freedom to
manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching encompasses
a broad range of acts. ... The observance and practice of religion or belief may include
not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as ... the wearing of distinctive
clothing or headcoverings ...
8. Article 18 (3) permits restrictions on the freedom to manifest religion or belief
only if limitations are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. The
freedom from coercion to have or to adopt a religion or belief and the liberty of the
parents and guardians to ensure religious and moral education cannot be restricted. In
interpreting the scope of permissible limitation clauses, States parties should proceed
from the need to protect the rights guaranteed under the Covenant, including the right
to equality and non-discrimination on all grounds specified in articles 2, 3 and 26.
Limitations imposed must be established by law and must not be applied in a manner
that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. The Committee observes that
paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on
grounds not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other
rights protected in the Covenant, such as national security. Limitations may be applied
only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and must be directly related
and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions may
not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner.
The Committee observes that the concept of morals derives from many social,
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the freedom to
manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on
principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition. Persons already subject to
certain legitimate constraints, such as prisoners, continue to enjoy their rights to
manifest their religion or belief to the fullest extent compatible with the specific
nature of the constraint. States parties’ reports should provide information on the full
scope and effects of limitations under article 18 (3), both as a matter of law and of
their application in specific circumstances. ...”
The Human Rights Committee also stated as follows in its General

Comment No. 28, concerning Article 3 (equality of rights between men and
women), adopted on 29 March 2000:
“13. [Regulations on clothing to be worn by women in public] may involve a
violation of a number of rights guaranteed by the Covenant, such as: article 26, on
non-discrimination; article 7, if corporal punishment is imposed in order to enforce
such a regulation; article 9, when failure to comply with the regulation is punished by
arrest; article 12, if liberty of movement is subject to such a constraint; article 17,
which guarantees all persons the right to privacy without arbitrary or unlawful
interference; articles 18 and 19, when women are subjected to clothing requirements
that are not in keeping with their religion or their right of self-expression; and, lastly,
article 27, when the clothing requirements conflict with the culture to which the
woman can lay a claim.”
The Human Rights Committee has also adopted General Comments on
freedom of movement (General Comment No. 27), and on freedom of
opinion and freedom of expression (General Comment No. 34).
39. The Human Rights Committee has, moreover examined a number of
cases in which individuals complained of measures restricting the wearing
of clothing or symbols with a religious connotation. It found, for example,
that “in the absence of any justification provided by the State party” there
had been a violation of Article 18 § 2 of the Covenant where a student had
been expelled from her University on account of her refusal to remove the
hijab (headscarf) that she wore in accordance with her beliefs (Raihon
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, 18 January
2005). However, it has not yet ruled on the question of a blanket ban on the
wearing of the full-face veil in public places.
IV. THE SITUATION IN OTHER EUROPEAN STATES
40. To date, only Belgium has passed a law that is comparable to the
French Law of 11 October 2010, and the Belgian Constitutional Court has
found it compatible with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion (see paragraphs 41-42 below). However, the question of a ban on
concealing one’s face in public has been or is being discussed in a number
of other European States. A blanket ban remains a possibility in some of
them. In particular, a bill has been tabled to that end in Italy: although it has
not yet passed into law, it appears that the discussion is still open. In
Switzerland the Federal Assembly rejected, in September 2012, an initiative
of the Canton of Aargau seeking to ban the wearing in public of clothing
covering all or a large part of the face, but in Ticino there was a vote on
23 September 2013 for a ban of that kind (the text still has to be validated,
however, by the Federal Assembly). Such an option is also being discussed
in the Netherlands, notwithstanding unfavourable opinions by the Council
of State (see paragraphs 49-52 below). It should also be noted that the
Spanish Supreme Court has ruled on the legality of a ban of that kind (see
paragraphs 42-47 below).
A. Belgian Law of 1 June 2011 and judgment of the Belgian

Constitutional Court of 6 December 2012
41. A Law “to prohibit the wearing of any clothing entirely or

substantially concealing the face” was enacted in Belgium on 1 June 2011.
It inserted the following provision into the Criminal Code:
“Art. 563bis. Persons who, unless otherwise provided by law, appear in a place that
is accessible to the public with their faces completely or partially covered or hidden,
such as not to be identifiable, shall be liable to a fine of between fifteen and twenty-
five euros and imprisonment of between one and seven days, or only one of those
sanctions.
However, paragraph 1 hereof shall not concern persons who are present in a place
that is accessible to the public with their faces completely or partially covered or
hidden where this is provided for by employment regulations or by an administrative
ordinance in connection with festive events.”
42. Applications for the annulment of this Law were lodged with the
Constitutional Court on the basis, inter alia, of Article 9 of the Convention.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the applications in a judgment of
6 December 2012, finding in particular as follows:
“... B.17. It can be seen from the explanatory memorandum to the bill which became
the Law at issue ... that the legislature sought to defend a societal model where the
individual took precedence over his philosophical, cultural or religious ties, with a
view to fostering integration for all and to ensuring that citizens shared a common
heritage of fundamental values such as the right to life, the right to freedom of
conscience, democracy, gender equality, or the principle of separation between church
and State.
... the legislative history shows that three aims were pursued: public safety, gender
equality and a certain conception of ‘living together’ in society.
B.18. Such aims are legitimate and fall within the category of those enumerated in
Article 9 of the Convention ..., comprising the maintaining of public safety, the
protection of public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
B.19. It remains for the court to examine whether the conditions of necessity in a
democratic society and proportionality in relation to the legitimate aims pursued have
been satisfied.
B.20.1. It can be seen from the drafting history of the Law at issue that the
prohibition of clothing that conceals the face was largely driven by public safety
considerations. In this connection the issue of offences committed by persons whose
face is concealed was mentioned ...
B.20.2. Section 34(1) of the Law of 5 August 1992 on police duties empowers
police officers to verify the identity of any person if they have reasonable grounds to
believe, on account of the person’s conduct, any material indications or the
circumstances of time and place, that the person is wanted, has attempted to commit
an offence or is preparing to commit one, or is likely to cause a breach of public order

or has already done so. This identity check could be hindered if the person concerned
has his or her face concealed and refuses to cooperate with such a check. In addition,
persons who conceal their face would in general not be, or hardly be, recognisable if
they commit an offence or a breach of public order.
B.20.3. That being said, it is not because a certain type of conduct has not yet
attained a level that would endanger the social order or safety that the legislature is
not entitled to intervene. It cannot be blamed for anticipating such risks in a timely
manner by penalising a given type of conduct when its generalisation would
undoubtedly entail a real danger.
B.20.4. In view of the foregoing, the legislature was entitled to take the view that the
ban on concealment of the face in places accessible to the public was necessary for
reasons of public safety.
B.21. The legislature further justified its intervention by a certain conception of
‘living together’ in a society based on fundamental values, which, in its view, derive
therefrom.
The individuality of every subject of law (sujet de droit) in a democratic society is
inconceivable without his or her face, a fundamental element thereof, being visible.
Taking into account the essential values that the legislature sought to defend, it was
entitled to take the view that the creation of human relationships, being necessary for
living together in society, was rendered impossible by the presence in the public
sphere, which quintessentially concerned the community, of persons who concealed
this fundamental element of their individuality. Whilst pluralism and democracy entail
the freedom to display one’s beliefs, in particular by the wearing of religious symbols,
the State must pay attention to the conditions in which such symbols are worn and to
the potential consequences of wearing such symbols. To the extent that the
concealment of the face has the consequence of depriving the subject of law, a
member of society, of any possibility of individualisation by facial appearance,
whereas such individualisation constitutes a fundamental condition related to its very
essence, the ban on the wearing of such clothing in a public place, even though it may
be the expression of a religious belief, meets a pressing social need in a democratic
society.
B.22. As to the dignity of women, here too the legislature was entitled to take the
view that the fundamental values of a democratic society precluded the imposing of
any obligation on women to conceal their face, under pressure from members of their
family or their community, and therefore their deprivation, against their will, of their
freedom of self-determination.
B.23. However, ... the wearing of the full-face veil may correspond to the expression
of a religious choice. That choice may be guided by various reasons with many
symbolic meanings.
Even where the wearing of the full-face veil is the result of a deliberate choice on
the part of the woman, the principle of gender equality, which the legislature has
rightly regarded as a fundamental value of democratic society, justifies the opposition
by the State, in the public sphere, to the manifestation of a religious conviction by
conduct that cannot be reconciled with this principle of gender equality. As the court
has noted in point B.21, the wearing of a full-face veil deprives women – to whom
this requirement is solely applicable – of a fundamental element of their individuality
which is indispensable for living in society and for the establishment of social
contacts.
B.24. The court must further examine whether recourse to a criminal sanction to
guarantee compliance with the prohibition imposed by the Law has no
disproportionate effects in relation to the aims pursued.
B.25.1. The impugned provision was inserted into the Criminal Code, under the
category of fourth-class petty offences, and it provides for a fine of between fifteen
and twenty-five euros, with imprisonment of between one and seven days, or only one
of those sanctions.
Pursuant to Articles 564 and 565 of the Criminal Code, where the offender has
already been convicted, within the preceding twelve months, for the same petty
offence, the court is authorised to sentence him or her, independently of the fine, to
imprisonment for up to twelve days.
Article 566 of the same Code permits a reduction of the fine to below five euros, but
in no case less than one euro, where there are mitigating circumstances. ...
B.28. In so far as the individualisation of persons, of which the face is a fundamental
element, constitutes an essential condition for the functioning of a democratic society,
of which each member is a subject of law, the legislature was entitled to consider that
the concealment of the face could endanger the functioning of society as thus
conceived and, accordingly, should be punished by criminal sanctions.
B.29.1. Subject to the exception under point B.30, to the extent that the impugned
measure is directed at individuals who, freely and voluntarily, hide their faces in
places that are accessible to the public, it does not have any disproportionate effects in
relation to the aims pursued, since the legislature opted for the most lenient criminal
sanction. The fact that the sanction may be harsher in the event of a repeat offence
does not warrant a different conclusion. The legislature was entitled to take the view
that an offender who is convicted for conduct punishable by criminal sanctions will
not repeat such conduct, on pain of a harsher sentence.
B.29.2. Moreover, it should be observed, as regards those persons who conceal their
face under duress, that Article 71 of the Criminal Code provides that no offence is
constituted where the perpetrator has been compelled to act by a force that he or she
could not resist.
B.30. The impugned Law stipulates that a criminal sanction will be imposed on
anyone who, unless any statutory provisions provide otherwise, masks or conceals his
or her face totally or partially, such that he or she is not identifiable, when present in a
place that is accessible to the public. It would be manifestly unreasonable to consider
that such places should include places of worship. The wearing of clothing
corresponding to the expression of a religious choice, such as the veil that covers the
entire face in such places, could not be restricted without encroaching
disproportionately on a person’s freedom to manifest his or her religious beliefs.
B.31. Subject to that interpretation, [the ground of appeal is unfounded] . ...”
B. Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 6 February 2013
43. On 8 October 2010 the Ayuntamiento (municipality) of Lérida – like

other municipalities – adopted an amendment to the ordenanza municipal de
civismo y convivencia (general municipal ordinance on civic rights and
responsibilities and living together), authorising reglamentos (specific by-
laws) to limit or prohibit access to municipal areas or premises used for
public services for persons wearing full-face veils, balaclavas, full-face

helmets or other forms of clothing or accessories preventing or hindering
identification and visual communication. On the same day, it amended to
the same effect its specific by-laws relating to the municipal archives,
municipal offices and public transport.
44. Relying inter alia on Article 16 of the Constitution – concerning
freedom of opinion, religion and worship – and referring to Article 9 of the
Convention, an association unsuccessfully lodged an application for
annulment with the Catalonia High Court of Justice.
45. Ruling on an appeal on points of law, the Supreme Court quashed
the judgment of the Catalonia High Court of Justice and annulled the
amendments to the general municipal ordinance and to the specific by-laws
concerning the municipal archives and municipal offices.
46. In its judgment of 6 February 2013 (no. 693/2013, appeal
no. 4118/2011), it first pointed out that under Spanish constitutional law,
fundamental rights could be limited only by a law in the formal sense.
47. It then observed that the Catalonia High Court of Justice had
wrongly found that the limitations in question pursued legitimate aims and
were necessary in a democratic society, whilst explaining that it did not
wish to prejudge any legislative intervention. On the first point, it took the
view that, contrary to the findings of the court below, it could not be said
that “legitimate aims” were constituted by the protection of “public
tranquillity”, “public safety” or “public order”, since it had not been shown
that the wearing of the full-face veil was detrimental to those interests. It
made the same observation for the “protection of rights and freedoms of
others”, since the term “others” did not designate the person who sustained
an interference with the exercise of the right to respect for freedom of
religion but rather third parties. On the second point, it expressed its
disagreement with the finding of the Catalonia High Court of Justice to the
effect that, whether or not it was voluntary, it was hard to reconcile the
wearing of the full-face veil with the principle of gender equality, which
was one of the values of democratic societies. The Supreme Court took the
view that the voluntary nature or otherwise of the wearing of the full-face
veil was decisive, since it was not possible to restrict a constitutional
freedom based on the supposition that the women who wore it did so under
duress. It thus concluded that the limitations in question could not be
regarded as necessary in a democratic society. Lastly, referring to academic
legal writings, it stated that a ban on the wearing of the full-face veil would
have the result of isolating the women concerned and would give rise to
discrimination against them, and would thus be incompatible with the
objective of ensuring the social integration of groups of immigrant origin.
48. The Supreme Court further found, however, that it did not need to
abrogate the amendment of the specific by-law concerning public transport.
It observed that this amendment merely obliged users who enjoyed reduced-
rate tickets to identify themselves from time to time, and that this did not
constitute a restriction on fundamental rights.
C. Opinion of the Netherlands Council of State, 28 November 2011
49. The Council of State of the Netherlands gave four opinions – all
negative – on four separate bills before Parliament which concerned,
directly or indirectly, a ban on wearing the full-face veil in public. The first,
issued on 21 September 2007, concerned a private member’s bill expressly
aimed at banning the burqa; the second, issued on 6 May 2008
(unpublished), concerned a private member’s bill for the banning of all
clothing covering the face; and the third, issued on 2 December 2009
(unpublished), concerned a bill to introduce a ban on such clothing in
schools. The fourth opinion, adopted on 28 November 2011 and published
on 6 February 2012, concerned a bill seeking to ban, on pain of criminal
sanctions, the wearing in public places and places accessible to the public
(except those used for religious purposes) of clothing completely covering
the face, leaving only the eyes visible or preventing the person’s
identification.
50. The Government of the Netherlands justified the fourth bill by the
need to guarantee open communication – essential for social interaction –,
the safety and “feeling of safety” (veiligheidsgevoel) of members of the
public, and the promotion of gender equality.
51. In its opinion of 28 November 2011 the Council of State first
indicated that it was not convinced by the usefulness and necessity of such a
ban. It observed that the Government had not stated how the wearing of
clothing covering the face was fundamentally incompatible with the “social
order” (maatschappelijke orde), nor had they demonstrated the existence of
a pressing social need (dringende maatschappelijke behoefte) justifying a
blanket ban, or indicated why the existing regulations enabling specific
prohibitions hitherto deemed appropriate were no longer sufficient, or
explained why the wearing of such clothing, which might be based on
religious grounds, had to be dealt with under criminal law. As regards the
argument about gender equality, the Council of State took the view that it
was not for the Government to exclude the choice of wearing the burqa or
niqab for religious reasons, as that was a choice to be left to the women
concerned. It added that a blanket ban would be pointless if the aim was to
prohibit the coercion of others into wearing the burqa or niqab. Lastly, the
Council of State found that the subjective feeling of insecurity could not
justify a blanket ban on the basis of social order or public order (de
maatschappelijke of de openbare orde).
52. The Council of State further indicated that, in view of the foregoing,
the bill was not compatible with the right to freedom of religion. In its view,
a general ban on wearing clothing that covered the face did not meet a
pressing social need and was not therefore necessary in a democratic

society.
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
A. Whether the applicant is a “victim”
53. The Government called into question the applicant’s status as a

“victim”. In their submission, she has not adduced evidence to show that she
is a Muslim and wishes to wear the full-face veil for religious reasons, does
not claim even to have been stopped by the police for wearing the full-face
veil in a public place, and has not proved that she wore it before the entry
into force of the Law in question. They also cast doubt on the seriousness of
the consequences of the ban for the applicant, given that she had admitted to
refraining from wearing such a veil in public when it would raise practical
obstacles, in the context of her professional life or when she wished to
socialise, and had said that she wore it only when compelled to do so by her
introspective mood, her spiritual feelings or her desire to focus on religious
matters. In the Government’s view, the application amounted to an actio
popularis. They added that the notion of “potential victim” undermined the
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies and that an extensive application of
this notion could have highly destabilising effects for the Convention
system: it would run counter to the drafters’ intention and would
considerably increase the number of potential applicants. In their view,
whilst in certain specific cases the Court might take account of very
exceptional circumstances to extend the notion of “victim”, the exception
should not be allowed to undermine the principle that only those whose
rights have effectively and concretely been breached may claim such status.
54. The applicant submitted that she fell within the category of
“potential victims”. She pointed out in particular, in this connection, that in
the Court’s judgments in Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom (22 October
1981, Series A no. 45), Norris v. Ireland (26 October 1988, Series A
no. 142) and Modinos v. Cyprus (22 April 1993, Series A no. 259), the
Court had recognised homosexuals as victims on account of the very
existence of laws imposing criminal sanctions for consensual homosexual
activity, on the ground that the choice they faced was between refraining
from prohibited behaviour or risking prosecution, even though such laws
were hardly ever enforced. She observed that, in S.L. v. Austria
(no. 45330/99, ECHR 2003-I), a seventeen-year-old boy complaining of
legislation prohibiting homosexual acts between adults and minors had been
recognised by the Court as having victim status, despite the fact that only
adult partners were liable to prosecution and no such prosecution was
actually at issue.
In the applicant’s submission, her faith is an essential element of her
existence, she is a devout believer and the wearing of the veil is
fundamental for her. She found it inappropriate for the Government to
require her to prove that she was a Muslim and that she wished to wear the
veil for religious reasons. She failed to see what proof she could give and
observed that it would have been strange to expect applicants in the above-
mentioned cases to prove their homosexuality. She added that there could be
no doubt that there was an established school of thought within Islam that
required women to cover their faces in public, and that, according to the
Court’s jurisprudence, it was not for the State to assess the legitimacy of the
applicant’s ways of manifesting her beliefs. In her submission, even
supposing that it could be doubted that she had worn the full-face veil
before the entry into force of the Law, she is a victim of that Law in so far
as it prevents her, on pain of sanctions, from wearing it in public when she
so desires; the Law affects her directly on account of the fact that she is a
devout Muslim woman who conceals her face in public.
55. The Court observes that this objection primarily concerns the status
of the applicant as a victim under Article 9 of the Convention. It would
point out in this connection that, as guaranteed by that provision, the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion denotes only those views that
attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance.
However, provided this is satisfied, the State’s duty of neutrality and
impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the
legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are
expressed (see Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10,
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, § 81, ECHR 2013, and the references
indicated therein).
It is also true that an act which is inspired, motivated or influenced by a
religion or beliefs, in order to count as a “manifestation” thereof within the
meaning of Article 9, must be intimately linked to the religion or beliefs in
question. An example would be an act of worship or devotion which forms
part of the practice of a religion or beliefs in a generally recognised form.
However, the “manifestation” of religion or belief is not limited to such
acts; the existence of a sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act
and the underlying belief must be determined on the facts of each case. In
particular, applicants claiming that an act falls within their freedom to
manifest their religion or beliefs are not required to establish that they acted
in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the religion in question (ibid., § 82, and
the references indicated therein).
56. It cannot therefore be required of the applicant either to prove that
she is a practising Muslim or to show that it is her faith which obliges her to
wear the full-face veil. Her statements suffice in this connection, since there
is no doubt that this is, for certain Muslim women, a form of practical
observance of their religion and can be seen as a “practice” within the
meaning of Article 9 § 1 of the Convention. The fact that it is a minority
practice (see paragraph 16 above) is without effect on its legal
characterisation.
57. Furthermore, the applicant admittedly does not claim to have been
convicted – or even stopped or checked by the police – for wearing the full-
face veil in a public place. An individual may nevertheless argue that a law
breaches his or her rights in the absence of a specific instance of
enforcement, and thus claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of
Article 34, if he or she is required either to modify his or her conduct or risk
being prosecuted, or if he or she is a member of a category of persons who
risk being directly affected by the legislation (see, in particular, Marckx
v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 27, Series A no. 31; Johnston and Others
v. Ireland, 18 December 1986, § 42, Series A no. 112; Norris, cited above,
§ 31; Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378/05, § 34, ECHR 2008;
and Michaud v. France, no. 12323/11, §§ 51-52, ECHR 2012). This is the
case under the Law of 11 October 2010 for women who, like the applicant,
live in France and wish to wear the full-face veil for religious reasons. They
are thus confronted with a dilemma comparable mutatis mutandis to that
which the Court identified in the Dudgeon and Norris judgments (both cited
above, § 41 and §§ 30-34, respectively): either they comply with the ban
and thus refrain from dressing in accordance with their approach to religion;
or they refuse to comply and face prosecution (see also Michaud, cited
above, § 52).
58. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed.
B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
59. The Government argued that, in the absence of any domestic

proceedings, the application should be declared inadmissible for failure to
exhaust domestic remedies.
60. The applicant observed that applicants were not required to exhaust
any domestic remedies which would be ineffective or pointless.
61. In the Court’s view, this question is devoid of relevance in the
context of the French legal system, in so far as it has found that the
applicant is entitled to claim victim status in the absence of any individual
measure. As a subsidiary consideration, it would observe that, whilst it is
true that the complaints submitted to the Court had not previously been
examined by domestic courts in the context of remedies used by the
applicant, the Constitutional Council ruled on 7 October 2010 that the Law
was compatible with (inter alia) freedom of religion (see paragraph 30
above). The Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation has also given a
ruling on the matter: in a judgment of 5 March 2013, in the context of

proceedings which had nothing to do with the applicant, it rejected a
complaint under Article 9 on the ground that the Law of 11 October 2010
had the aim, in accordance with the second paragraph of that Article, of
“protecting public order and safety, by requiring anyone present in a public
place to show their face” (see paragraph 34 above). From the latter
judgment it can, moreover, be seen that, if the applicant had been convicted
pursuant to the Law and had subsequently appealed on points of law on the
grounds of a violation of Article 9, her appeal would have been dismissed.
The Court must therefore dismiss this objection.
C. Abuse of the right of individual application
62. The Government criticised “an improper exercise of the right of

individual application”. They described the application as containing “a
totally disembodied argument, lodged on the very day the prohibition on
concealing the face in public came into force by an applicant who ha[d] not
been the subject of domestic proceedings and of whom nothing [was]
known, except what she [had] seen fit to say about her religious opinions
and about her uncertain way of expressing them in her behaviour”. They
observed that two other applications which were very similar in form and
substance had been lodged by the same United Kingdom lawyers who were
representing the applicant. They added that “questions [might] well be
asked about the seriousness of the case” and that it “in no way involve[d] a
normal use of the right of individual application” but amounted to an actio
popularis.
63. In the applicant’s view, this argument had to be rejected for the same
reasons as those that she gave for the dismissal of the objection that she was
not entitled to claim victim status.
64. The Government thus seem to have suggested that the applicant is
merely being used as a cover. The Court has taken their observations into
account on this point. It would observe, however, that its Registry has
verified the name and address on the application and has ensured that the
lawyers who drafted it have produced the authority form duly signed by the
applicant.
65. The Court considers that the Government’s argument should
otherwise be examined in terms of Article 35 § 3 (a), which allows the
Court to declare inadmissible any individual application that it considers to
be “an abuse of the right of individual application”.
66. The Court reiterates in this connection that the implementation of
this provision is an “exceptional procedural measure” and that the concept
of “abuse” refers to its ordinary meaning, namely, the harmful exercise of a
right by its holder in a manner that is inconsistent with the purpose for
which such right is granted (see Miroļubovs and Others v. Latvia,
no. 798/05, § 62, 15 September 2009). In that connection, the Court has
noted that for such “abuse” to be established on the part of the applicant it
requires not only manifest inconsistency with the purpose of the right of
application but also some hindrance to the proper functioning of the Court
or to the smooth conduct of the proceedings before it (ibid., § 65).
67. The Court has applied that provision in four types of situation (see
Miroļubovs and Others, cited above, §§ 62-66). First, in the case of
applications which were knowingly based on untrue facts (see Varbanov
v. Bulgaria, no. 31365/96, § 36, ECHR 2000-X), whether there had been
falsification of documents in the file (see, for example, Jian v. Romania
(dec.), no. 46640/99, 30 March 2004) or failure to inform the Court of an
essential item of evidence for its examination of the case (see, for example,
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963/99, § 89, 20 June 2002, and Kerechashvili
v. Georgia (dec.), no. 5667/02, 2 May 2006) or of new major developments
in the course of the proceedings (see, for example, Predescu v. Romania,
no. 21447/03, §§ 25-27, 2 December 2008). Secondly, in cases where an
applicant had used particularly vexatious, contemptuous, threatening or
provocative expressions in his correspondence with the Court (see, for
example, Řehák v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208/01, 18 May 2004).
Thirdly, in cases where an applicant had deliberately breached the
confidentiality of negotiations for a friendly settlement (see, for example,
Hadrabová and Others v. the Czech Republic (dec.), nos. 42165/02 and
466/03, 25 September 2007, and Deceuninck v. France (dec.), no. 47447/08,
13 December 2011). Fourthly, in cases where applicants had repeatedly sent
quibbling and manifestly ill-founded applications resembling an application
they had previously lodged that had been declared inadmissible (see Anibal
Vieira & Filhos LDA and Maria Rosa Ferreira da Costa LDA v. Portugal
(dec.), nos. 980/12 and 28385/12, 13 November 2012; see also the
Commission decisions M. v. the United Kingdom, no. 13284/87, 15 October
1987, and Philis v. Greece, no. 28970/95, 17 October 1996). The Court has
also stipulated that, even though an application motivated by publicity or
propaganda is not, by that very fact alone, an abuse of the right of
application, the situation is different where the applicant, driven by political
interests, gives an interview to the press or television showing an
irresponsible and frivolous attitude towards proceedings that are pending
before the Court (see Miroļubovs and Others, cited above, § 66).
68. The Court would first observe that the present application does not
fall into any of those four categories. Moreover, even supposing that it could
be considered that an application which amounts to an actio popularis is
thereby rendered “manifestly at odds with the purpose of the right of
application”, the Court would refer back to its previous observations about
the applicant’s victim status and its conclusion that the present case cannot
be described as an actio popularis (see paragraphs 57-58 above).
Furthermore, there is no evidence capable of leading the Court to consider
that, by her conduct, the applicant has sought to hinder the proper
functioning of the Court or the smooth conduct of proceedings before it.
Also taking into account the fact that the inadmissibility of an application on
the ground that it constitutes an abuse of the right of application must
remain an exception, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION,

TAKEN SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 14
69. The applicant complained that, since the wearing in public of

clothing designed to conceal the face was prohibited by law on pain of a
criminal sanction, if she wore the full-face veil in a public place she would
expose herself to a risk not only of sanctions but also of harassment and
discrimination, which would constitute degrading treatment. She relied on
Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
She further complained of a violation of Article 14 of the Convention
taken together with Article 3. Article 14 reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
70. The Court observes that the minimum level of severity required if
ill-treatment is to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Ireland v. the United
Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 162, Series A no. 25) is not attained in the
present case. It concludes that the complaint under this Article is manifestly
ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. This
also means that, as the facts at issue do not fall within the ambit of Article 3
of the Convention (see, for example, X and Others v. Austria [GC],
no. 19010/07, § 94, ECHR 2013), Article 14 of the Convention cannot be
relied upon in conjunction with that provision.
71. Accordingly, this part of the application is inadmissible and must be
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION,

TAKEN SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE 14
72. The applicant complained that the statutory ban on wearing clothing
designed to conceal the face in public deprived her of the possibility of
wearing the Islamic full-face veil in public places. She alleged that there had
been a violation of her right to freedom of association and discrimination in
the exercise of that right. She relied on Article 11 of the Convention, taken
separately and together with the above-cited Article 14. Article 11 reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.”
73. The Court observes that the applicant did not indicate how the ban
imposed by the Law of 11 October 2012 would breach her right to freedom
of association and would generate discrimination against her in the
enjoyment of that right. It concludes that, being unsubstantiated, this part of
the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (see, for example, Özer v. Turkey
(no. 2), no. 871/08, § 36, 26 January 2010) and is, as such, inadmissible. It
must therefore be dismissed pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8, 9 AND 10 OF THE

CONVENTION, TAKEN SEPARATELY AND IN CONJUNCTION
WITH ARTICLE 14
74. The applicant complained for the same reasons of a violation of her
right to respect for her private life, her right to freedom to manifest her
religion or beliefs and her right to freedom of expression, together with
discrimination in the exercise of these rights. She relied on Articles 8, 9
and 10 of the Convention, taken separately and in conjunction with
Article 14. Those first three Articles read as follows.
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 9
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 10
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A. Admissibility
75. The Court finds that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be
declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant
76. In the applicant’s submission, she was born in Pakistan and her
family belongs to a Sunni cultural tradition in which it is customary and
respectful for women to wear a full-face veil in public. She claimed to have
sustained a serious interference with the exercise of her rights under
Article 9 of the Convention, as the Law of 11 October 2010, which sought
to prohibit Muslim women from wearing the full-face veil in public places,
prevented her from manifesting her faith, from living by it and from
observing it in public. She added that, while the interference was
“prescribed by law”, it did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in the
second paragraph of that provision and was not “necessary in a democratic
society”.
77. The applicant began by observing that this interference could not be
said to have the legitimate aim of “public safety” as it was not a measure
intended to address specific safety concerns in places of high risk such as
airports, but a blanket ban applying to almost all public places. As to the
Government’s argument that it sought to ensure respect for the minimum
requirements of life in society, because the reciprocal exposure of faces was
fundamental in French society, the applicant objected that it failed to take
into account the cultural practices of minorities which did not necessarily
share this philosophy or the fact that there were forms of communication
other than visual, and that in any event this bore no relation to the idea of
imposing criminal sanctions to prevent people from veiling their faces in
public. She submitted, moreover, that the Government’s assertion that for
women to cover their faces was incompatible with the principle of gender
equality was simplistic. She argued that, according to a well-established
feminist position, the wearing of the veil often denoted women’s
emancipation, self-assertion and participation in society, and that, as far as
she was concerned, it was not a question of pleasing men but of satisfying
herself and her conscience. Furthermore, it could not be maintained that
because of wearing the veil the women concerned were denied the right to
exist as individuals in public, when in the majority of cases it was worn
voluntarily and without any proselytising motive. She added that other
member States with a large Muslim population did not prohibit the wearing
of the full-face veil in public places. She also found it ironic that an abstract
idea of gender equality could run counter to the profoundly personal choice
of women who decided to wear veils, and contended that imposing legal
sanctions exacerbated the inequality that was supposed to be addressed.
Lastly, she took the view that in claiming that the prohibition had the
legitimate aim of “respect for human dignity” the Government were
justifying the measure by the abstract assumption, based on stereotyping
and chauvinistic logic, that women who wore veils were “effaced”.
78. Under the heading of “necessity”, the applicant argued that a truly
free society was one which could accommodate a wide variety of beliefs,
tastes, pursuits, customs and codes of conduct, and that it was not for the
State to determine the validity of religious beliefs. In her view, the
prohibition on wearing the full-face veil in public and the risk of criminal
sanctions sent out a sectarian message and discouraged the women
concerned from socialising. She pointed out that the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, in its General Comment No. 28, had found that any
regulation of clothing that women could wear in public might breach the
principle of equal rights for men and women, and in its decision in Raihon
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan (cited above), had observed that the
freedom to manifest one’s religion encompassed the right to wear clothes or
attire in public which were in conformity with the individual’s faith or
religion. She further observed that, while the Law of 11 October 2010 had
been passed almost unanimously, the above-cited cases of Dudgeon, Norris

and Modinos showed that a measure might have wide political support and
yet not be “necessary in a democratic society”.
Moreover, even supposing that the aims pursued were legitimate, the
impugned prohibition could not fulfil that condition where they might be
achieved by less restrictive means. Thus, to address the questions of public
safety, it would be sufficient to implement identity checks at high-risk
locations, as in the situations examined by the Court in the cases of Phull
v. France ((dec.), no. 35753/03, ECHR 2005-I) and El Morsli v. France
((dec.), no. 15585/06, 4 March 2008). As to the aim of guaranteeing respect
for human dignity, it was still necessary to weigh up the competing
interests: those of members of the public who disapproved of the wearing of
the veil; and those of the women in question who, like the applicant, were
forced to choose between acting in a manner contrary to their beliefs,
staying at home or breaking the law. The rights of the latter were much
more seriously affected than those of the former. In the applicant’s view, if
it were considered, as the Government argued, that it was necessary to
criminalise not only the coercion of another into veiling but also the fact of
voluntarily wearing the veil, on the ground that women might be reluctant to
denounce those who coerced them and that constraint might be diffuse in
nature, that would mean disregarding the position or motivation of women
who chose to cover their faces and therefore excluding any examination of
proportionality. Such an attitude was not only paternalistic, but it also
reflected an intention to punish the very women who were supposed to be
protected from patriarchal pressure. Lastly, the applicant found irrelevant
the Government’s comment that freedom to dress according to one’s wishes
remained very broad in France and that the ban did not apply in places of
worship open to the public, pointing out that her beliefs precisely required
her to cover her face and that it should be possible to manifest one’s religion
in public, not only in places of worship.
79. In the applicant’s submission, the fact that she was prevented by the
Law of 11 October 2010 from wearing the full-face veil in public also
entailed a violation of her right to respect for her private life under Article 8
of the Convention. Her private life was affected for three reasons. Firstly,
because her ability to wear the full-face veil was an important part of her
social and cultural identity. Secondly because, as the Court had pointed out
in its judgment in Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 59320/00, §§ 50 and 69,
ECHR 2004-VI), there was a zone of interaction of a person with others,
even in a public context, which might fall within the scope of private life,
and the protection of private life under Article 8 extended beyond the
private family circle and also included a social dimension. The third reason
was that if she went out of the house wearing the full-face veil she would
probably encounter hostility and would expose herself to criminal sanctions.
Thus, being obliged to remove it when she went out and only being able to
wear it at home “as if she were a prisoner”, she was forced to adopt a
“Jekyll and Hyde personality”.
Furthermore, referring back in essence to her observations on Article 9 of
the Convention, the applicant argued that the interference did not pursue any
of the legitimate aims enumerated in the second paragraph of Article 8 of
the Convention. She added that, even supposing that one of those aims
could be accepted, the impugned interference could not be regarded as
necessary in a democratic society, especially as the requirements of the
second paragraph of Article 8 were, in this connection, stricter than those of
the second paragraph of Article 9.
80. The applicant further argued that the ban on wearing clothing
designed to conceal the face in public, which undoubtedly targeted the
burqa, generated discrimination in breach of Article 14 of the Convention
on grounds of sex, religion and ethnic origin, to the detriment of Muslim
women who, like her, wore the full-face veil. In her view this was indirect
discrimination between Muslim women whose beliefs required them to
wear the full-face veil and other Muslim women, and also between them
and Muslim men. The exception provided for by the Law of 11 October
2010, according to which the ban did not apply if the clothing was worn in
the context of “festivities or artistic or traditional events” was also, in her
view, discriminatory, in that it created an advantage for the Christian
majority: it allowed Christians to wear in public clothing that concealed
their face in the context of Christian festivities or celebrations (Catholic
religious processions, carnivals or rituals, such as dressing up as Santa
Claus) whereas Muslim women who wished to wear the full-face veil in
public remained bound by the ban even during the month of Ramadan.
(b) The Government
81. The Government admitted that, even though it was formulated in
general terms, the ban introduced by the Law of 11 October 2010 could be
seen as a “limitation”, within the meaning of Article 9 § 2 of the
Convention, on the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs. They
argued, however, that the limitation pursued legitimate aims and that it was
necessary, in a democratic society, for the fulfilment of those aims.
82. In the Government’s submission, the first of those aims was to
ensure “public safety”. The ban satisfied the need to identify individuals so
as to prevent danger for the safety of persons and property and to combat
identity fraud. The second of those aims concerned the “protection of the
rights and freedoms of others” by ensuring “respect for the minimum set of
values of an open and democratic society”. The Government mentioned
three values in this connection. Firstly, the observance of the minimum
requirements of life in society. In the Government’s submission, the face
plays a significant role in human interaction: more so than any other part of
the body, the face expresses the existence of the individual as a unique
person, and reflects one’s shared humanity with the interlocutor, at the same
time as one’s otherness. The effect of concealing one’s face in public places
is to break social ties and to manifest a refusal of the principle of “living
together” (le “vivre ensemble”). The Government further argued that the
ban sought to protect equality between men and women, as to consider that
women, solely on the ground that they were women, must conceal their
faces in public places, amounted to denying them the right to exist as
individuals and to reserving the expression of their individuality to the
private family space or to an exclusively female space. Lastly, it was a
matter of respect for human dignity, since the women who wore such
clothing were therefore “effaced” from the public space. In the
Government’s view, whether such “effacement” was desired or suffered, it
was necessarily dehumanising and could hardly be regarded as consistent
with human dignity.
On the question of gender equality, the Government expressed surprise at
the applicant’s statements to the effect that the practice of wearing the full-
face veil often denoted the woman’s emancipation, self-assertion and
participation in society, and they did not agree with the highly positive
presentation of that practice by the applicant and the intervening non-
governmental organisations. They took note of the study reports presented
by two of the third-party interveners, showing that women who wore or
used to wear the full-face veil did so voluntarily and that those who had
given up the practice had done so mainly as a result of public hostility. They
observed, however, that those studies were based on only a small sample
group of women (twenty-seven in one case, thirty-two in the other) recruited
using the “snowball method”. That method was not very reliable, as it
consisted in targeting various people fitting the subject profile and then,
through them, reaching a greater number of people who generally shared the
same views. They concluded that the reports in question provided only a
very partial view of reality and that their scientific relevance had to be
viewed with caution.
83. As regards the necessity and proportionality of the limitation, the
Government argued that the Law of 11 October 2010 had been passed both
in the National Assembly and the Senate by the unanimous vote of those
cast (less one vote), following a wide democratic consultation involving
civil society. They pointed out that the ban in issue was extremely limited in
terms of its subject matter, as only concealment of the face was prohibited,
irrespective of the reason, and everyone remained free, subject to that sole
restriction, to wear clothing expressing a religious belief in public. They
added that the Law was necessary for the defence of the principles
underlying its enactment. They indicated in this connection that to restrict
sanctions only to those coercing someone else to cover their face would not
have been sufficiently effective because the women concerned might have
hesitated to report it and coercion could always be diffuse in nature. They
further pointed out that the Court afforded States a wide margin of
appreciation when it came to striking a balance between competing private
and public interests, or where a private interest was in conflict with other
rights secured by the Convention (they referred to Evans v. the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 77, ECHR 2007-I). They further took the
view that the penalties stipulated were light – a mere fine of 150 euros
(EUR) or a citizenship course. They noted that both the Constitutional
Council and the Court of Cassation had recognised the “necessity” of the
Law.
84. As to Article 8 of the Convention, the Government indicated that
they were not convinced that this provision applied, since the ban on
clothing designed to cover the face concerned only public places and it
could not be considered that an individual’s physical integrity or privacy
were at stake. Pointing out that the applicant’s arguments related, in any
event, more to her freedom to manifest her beliefs or religion and therefore
to Article 9, they referred back to the arguments that they had set out under
that head as to the justification for the interference and its proportionality.
85. Lastly, the Government found the applicant “particularly ill-placed
to consider herself a victim of discrimination on account of her sex”, as one
of the essential objectives of the impugned Law was to combat that type of
discrimination as a result of women being effaced from the public space
through the wearing of the full-face veil. In their view, the assertion that the
Law had been based on a stereotype whereby Muslim women were
submissive was unfounded and caricatural: firstly, because the Law did not
target Muslim women; and, secondly, because the social effacement
manifested by the wearing of the burqa or niqab was “hardly compatible
with the affirmation of a social existence”. In their opinion, it was not
possible to infer from Article 14 of the Convention a right to place oneself
in a position of discrimination. As to the contention that one of the effects of
the Law would be to dissuade the women concerned from going to public
places and to confine them at home, it was particularly futile in the instant
case since the applicant claimed that she wore this clothing only voluntarily
and occasionally.
The Government added that the Law did not create any discrimination
against Muslim women either. They observed in this connection that the
practice of wearing the full-face veil was a recent development, quite
uncommon in France, and that it had been criticised on many occasions by
high-profile Muslims. The prohibition in fact applied regardless of whether
or not the reason for concealing the face was religious, and regardless of the
sex of the individual. Lastly, they pointed out that the fact that certain
individuals who wished to adopt behaviour which they justified by their
beliefs, whether or not religious, were prevented from doing so by a
statutory prohibition could not in itself be considered discriminatory where
the prohibition had a reasonable basis and was proportionate to the aim
pursued. They referred on this point to their previous arguments.
2. The third-party interveners’ submissions

(a) The Belgian Government
86. The intervening Government stated that the wearing of the full-face
veil was not required by the Koran but corresponded to a minority custom
from the Arabian peninsula.
87. They further indicated that a Law prohibiting the wearing of any
“clothing entirely or substantially concealing the face” had been passed in
Belgium on 1 June 2011 and had come into force on 23 July 2011. Two
constitutional challenges lodged against it had been dismissed by the
Belgian Constitutional Court in a judgment of 6 December 2012, finding –
subject to one reservation concerning places of worship – that the wearing
of such clothing posed a safety issue, was an obstacle to the right of women
to equality and dignity, and, more fundamentally, undermined the very
essence of the principle of living together. They took the view that no one
was entitled to claim, on the basis of individual or religious freedom, the
power to decide when and in what circumstances they would agree to
uncover their faces in a public place. It was necessarily a matter for the
public authorities to assess public-safety requirements. They further noted
that the issue of women’s right to equality and dignity had been raised by
both parties, and acknowledged that the wearing of the full-face veil was not
necessarily an expression of subservience to men. They considered,
however, that the right to isolation had its limits, that codes of clothing
which prevailed in our societies were the product of societal consensus and
the result of a balanced compromise between our individual freedom and
our codes of interaction within society, and that those who wore clothing
concealing their face were signalling to the majority that they did not wish
to take an active part in society and were thus dehumanised. In their view,
one of the values forming the basis on which a democratic society
functioned was the possibility for individuals to take part in an active
exchange.
88. The intervening Government pointed out that the Belgian legislature
had sought to defend a model of society in which the individual outweighed
any philosophical, cultural or religious attachments so as to encourage full
integration and enable citizens to share a common heritage of fundamental
values such as democracy, gender equality and the separation of Church and
State. They referred to the judgment of the Belgian Constitutional Court,
which had found that, where the consequence of concealing the face was to
prevent a person’s facial individualisation, even though such
individualisation was a fundamental condition associated with his or her
very essence, the prohibition on wearing clothing concealing the face in
places accessible to the public, even if it were the expression of a religious

belief, met a compelling social need in a democratic society. They added
that the Belgian legislature had opted for the lightest criminal sanction (a
fine) and observed – again referring to the Constitutional Court’s judgment
– that if certain women stayed at home so as not to go out with their faces
uncovered, that was the result of their own choice and not of an illegitimate
constraint imposed on them by the Law. Lastly, they were of the view that
the French and Belgian Laws were not discriminatory, as they did not
specifically target the full-face veil and applied to any person who wore
items concealing the face in public, whether a man or a woman, and
whether for a religious or any other reason.
(b) The non-governmental organisation Amnesty International
89. Amnesty International observed that the right to wear clothing with a
religious connotation was protected by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, in terms of the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion and the right to freedom of expression. It added that the
Covenant provided for limitations similar to those in Articles 9 and 10 of
the Convention, and argued that public international law required the
provisions of both instruments to be interpreted in a similar manner. It thus
called on the Court to take into account General Comments Nos. 22, 27
and 34 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, together with its
jurisprudence (see paragraph 38 above).
90. The third-party intervener added that the right to freedom from
discrimination was guaranteed by all the international and regional
instruments for the protection of fundamental rights, that a homogeneous
interpretation was also required in that connection, and that, in accordance
with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, States had an obligation to take effective measures to put an end to
discriminatory practices. It further referred to General Comments Nos. 22
and 28 of the Human Rights Committee. It also pointed to the risk of
intersecting discrimination: women might experience a distinct form of
discrimination due to the intersection of sex with other factors such as
religion, and such discrimination might express itself, in particular, in the
form of stereotyping of sub-groups of women. It also observed that
restrictions on the wearing of headscarves or veils might impair the right to
work, the right to education and the right to equal protection of the law, and
might contribute to acts of harassment and violence.
91. In the third-party intervener’s submission, it is an expression of
gender-based and religion-based stereotyping to assume that women who
wear certain forms of dress do so only under coercion; ending
discrimination would require a far more nuanced approach.
(c) The non-governmental organisation ARTICLE 19

92. ARTICLE 19 observed that the wearing of religious dress or
symbols was covered by the right to freedom of expression and the right to
freedom of religion and thought. It also referred to General Comment
No. 28 of the Human Rights Committee. It further mentioned that
Committee’s decision in Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan (cited above),
where it had been found that the freedom to manifest one’s religion
encompassed the right to wear clothes or attire in public which were deemed
to be in conformity with the individual’s faith or religion, and that to
prevent a person from wearing religious clothing might constitute a
violation of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. It referred also to the Committee’s General Comment No. 34 on
freedom of opinion and expression. It added that, in her 2006 report, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief had laid
down a set of guidelines for considering the necessity and proportionality of
restrictions on wearing religious dress or symbols and recommended that
the following questions be answered by the administration or judiciary when
making such an assessment: is the restriction in question appropriate having
regard to the legitimate interest that it seeks to protect; is it the least
restrictive; has it involved a balancing of the competing interests; is it likely
to promote religious intolerance; and does it avoid stigmatising any
particular religious community?
93. The third-party intervener further observed that, as noted by the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief in his
2011 interim report, the prohibition on sex-based discrimination was often
invoked in favour of banning the full-face veil, whereas such prohibitions
might lead to intersectional discrimination against Muslim women. In the
third-party intervener’s view, this could be counterproductive as it might
lead to the confinement of the women concerned in the home and to their
exclusion from public life and marginalisation, and might expose Muslim
women to physical violence and verbal attacks. It further observed that the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in particular, had
recently recommended that member States should not opt for general bans
on the wearing of the full-face veil in public.
94. According to the intervener, international standards on the right to
freedom of expression, to freedom of opinion and religion and to equal
treatment and non-discrimination did not support general prohibitions on
covering the face in public.
(d) Human Rights Centre of Ghent University
95. The Human Rights Centre of Ghent University emphasised that the
French and Belgian Laws prohibiting concealment of the face in public had
been passed on the basis of the assumption that women who wore the full-
face veil did so for the most part under coercion, showed that they did not
wish to interact with others in society and represented a threat to public

safety. It referred to empirical research that had been carried out in Belgium
among twenty-seven women who wore or used to wear the full-face veil
(see E. Brems, Y. Janssens, K. Lecoyer, S. Ouald Chaib and V.
Vandersteen, Wearing the Face Veil in Belgium: Views and Experiences of
27 Women Living in Belgium Concerning the Islamic Full Face Veil and the
Belgian Ban on Face Covering, Human Rights Centre of Ghent University,
2012), together with research carried out in France by the Open Society
Foundations (see paragraph 104 below) and in the Netherlands by Professor
A. Moors, which all indicated that this assumption was erroneous.
96. In the third-party intervener’s submission, this research showed that
the ban did not actually serve its stated purpose: the women concerned
avoided going out, leading to their isolation and the deterioration of their
social life and autonomy, and cases of aggression against them had
increased. It further found the ban disproportionate, because the public
space was defined very broadly, public-safety concerns might be addressed
by the occasional duty to identify oneself by showing one’s face, and in
today’s society there were many forms of social interaction in which people
did not have to see each other’s face.
97. In the third-party intervener’s view, in addition to constituting a
disproportionate interference with freedom of religion, the ban generated
indirect and intersectional discrimination on grounds of religion and sex,
endorsed stereotypes and disregarded the fact that veiled women made up a
vulnerable minority group which required particular attention.
98. Lastly, third-party the intervener asked the Court to examine the
present case in the light of the increase in Islamophobia in various European
countries. It took the view that the adoption and enforcement of a blanket
ban on face covering in public were all the more harmful as this had been
accompanied by political rhetoric specifically targeting women wearing an
Islamic face veil, thus reinforcing negative stereotypes and Islamophobia.
(e) The non-governmental organisation Liberty
99. Liberty observed that, although the Law of 11 October 2010 was
framed in neutral terms, its aim was to prohibit the wearing of the burqa and
it applied to all public places, with the result that the women concerned
faced the agonising choice between remaining at home or removing their
veil. It pointed out that the origins of the Convention were firmly rooted in
the atrocities of the Second World War, that it was the horrors perpetrated
against the Jews that had provided the impetus for embedding the right to
freedom of religion in the list of fundamental rights, and that since then
there had been other crimes against humanity where religion had been at
least a contributory factor. It added that there was a close relationship
between religion and race.
100. The third-party intervener further emphasised that general rules

regulating clothing worn by women in public might involve a violation not
only of a number of fundamental rights but also of international and
regional instruments such as the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities. As regards the Convention, the intervener was of the
view that Articles 8, 9, 10 and 14 applied in the present case. It submitted
that the threefold justification in the explanatory memorandum
accompanying the bill had not been convincing. It further argued that the
ban and the debate surrounding it contributed to stigmatising Muslims and
fuelled racist attitudes towards them.
101. In conclusion, the third-party intervener observed that, while many
feminists, in particular, regarded the full-face veil as demeaning to women,
undermining of their dignity, and the result of patriarchy, others saw it as a
symbol of their faith. In its view, these controversies were not resolved by
imprisoning at home those women who felt compelled to wear it, on pain of
sanctions. This was not liberating for women and in all likelihood would
encourage Islamophobia.
(f) The non-governmental organisation Open Society Justice Initiative
102. Open Society Justice Initiative pointed out that the ban on the full-
face veil had been criticised within the Council of Europe and that only
France and Belgium had adopted such a blanket measure. It emphasised
that, even though the French and Belgian Laws were neutral in their
wording, their legislative history showed that the intent was to target
specifically the niqab and the burqa.
103. The third-party intervener further noted that the aim of the French
Law was to preserve public safety, gender equality and secularism. It
asserted in this connection that reasoning based on public order might easily
disguise intolerance when freedom of religion was at stake. Referring in
particular to the Court’s judgment in Palau-Martinez v. France (no.
64927/01, § 43, ECHR 2003-XII), it added that States might rely on this
notion to justify interference with the exercise of a Convention right only if
they could show that there was concrete evidence of a breach of public
order. As regards the protection of gender equality, it noted that such an
objective was based on the supposition that women who wore the veil were
coerced into doing so and thus disadvantaged, whereas this was not shown
by any of the evidence examined in the legislative process.
104. The third-party intervener further referred to the report of a survey
conducted in France by the Open Society Foundations involving thirty-two
women who wore the full-face veil, entitled “Unveiling the Truth: Why 32
Muslim Women Wear the Full-Face Veil in France” and published in April
2011. It indicated that the women interviewed were not coerced into
wearing the veil, that many had decided to wear it despite opposition from
their families, that one-third did not wear it as a permanent and daily
practice, and that the majority maintained active social lives. The report also
revealed that the ban had contributed to discontent among these women and
had reduced their autonomy, and that the public discourse accompanying it
had encouraged verbal abuse and physical attacks against them by members
of the public. The third-party intervener also submitted a follow-up report
published in September 2013. It noted that, according to that report, the
majority of the women interviewed continued to wear the full-face veil as an
expression of their religious beliefs. It added that the report showed the
significant impact of the ban on their personal and family lives. The third-
party intervener further noted the report’s finding that all women
interviewed had described a decline in their personal safety since the ban,
with incidents of public harassment and physical assaults resulting from a
climate in which the public appeared emboldened to act against women
wearing the full-face veil.
105. In conclusion, the third-party intervener argued that there was a
European consensus against bans on the wearing of the full-face veil in
public. It further stressed the fact that blanket bans were disproportionate
where less intrusive measures might be possible, that public order
justifications must be supported by concrete evidence, that measures
introduced to promote equality must be objectively and reasonably justified
and limited in time, and that measures seeking to promote secularism must
be strictly necessary.
3. The Court’s assessment

(a) Alleged violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention
106. The ban on wearing, in public places, clothing designed to conceal
the faceraises questions in terms of the right to respect for private life
(Article 8 of the Convention) of women who wish to wear the full-face veil
for reasons related to their beliefs, and in terms of their freedom to manifest
those beliefs (Article 9 of the Convention).
107. The Court is thus of the view that personal choices as to an
individual’s desired appearance, whether in public or in private places,
relate to the expression of his or her personality and thus fall within the
notion of private life. It has found to this effect previously as regards a
haircut (see Popa v. Romania (dec.), no. 4233/09, §§ 32-33, 18 June 2013;
see also the decision of the European Commission on Human Rights in
Sutter v. Switzerland, no. 8209/78, Commission decision of 1 March 1979,
Decisions and Reports (DR) 16, p. 166). It considers, like the Commission
(see, in particular, the decisions in McFeeley and Others v. the United
Kingdom, no. 8317/78, Commission decision of 15 May 1980, § 83, DR 20,
p. 44, and Kara v. the United Kingdom, no. 36528/97, Commission decision
of 22 October 1998, unreported), that this is also true for a choice of
clothing. A measure emanating from a public authority which restricts a
choice of this kind will therefore, in principle, constitute an interference

with the exercise of the right to respect for private life within the meaning of
Article 8 of the Convention (see Kara, cited above). Consequently, the ban
on wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in public places, pursuant
to the Law of 11 October 2010, falls under Article 8 of the Convention.
108. That being said, in so far as that ban is criticised by individuals
who, like the applicant, complain that they are consequently prevented from
wearing in public places clothing that the practice of their religion requires
them to wear, it mainly raises an issue with regard to the freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs (see, in particular, Ahmet Arslan and
Others v. Turkey, no. 41135/98, § 35, 23 February 2010). The fact that this
is a minority practice and appears to be contested (see paragraphs 56 and 85
above) is of no relevance in this connection.
109. The Court will thus examine this part of the application under both
Article 8 and Article 9, but with emphasis on the second of those provisions.
(i) Whether there has been a “limitation” or an “interference”
110. As the Court has already pointed out (see paragraph 57 above), the
Law of 11 October 2010 confronts the applicant with a dilemma comparable
to that which it identified in the Dudgeon and Norris judgments (cited
above): either she complies with the ban and thus refrains from dressing in
accordance with her approach to religion; or she refuses to comply and faces
criminal sanctions. She thus finds herself, in the light of both Article 9 and
Article 8 of the Convention, in a similar situation to that of the applicants in
Dudgeon and Norris, where the Court found a “continuing interference”
with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by the second of those provisions
(see Dudgeon, § 41, and Norris, § 38, both cited above; see also, in
particular, Michaud, cited above, § 92). There has therefore been, in the
present case, an “interference” with or a “limitation” of the exercise of the
rights protected by Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.
111. Such a limitation or interference will not be compatible with the
second paragraphs of those Articles unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues
one or more of the legitimate aims set out in those paragraphs and is
“necessary in a democratic society” to achieve the aim or aims concerned.
(ii) Whether the measure is “prescribed by law”
112. The Court finds that the limitation in question is prescribed by
sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Law of 11 October 2010 (see paragraph 28 above).
It further notes that the applicant has not disputed that these provisions
satisfy the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law concerning
Article 8 § 2 and Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.
(iii) Whether there is a legitimate aim

113. The Court reiterates that the enumeration of the exceptions to the
individual’s freedom to manifest his or her religion or beliefs, as listed in
Article 9 § 2, is exhaustive and that their definition is restrictive (see, among
other authorities, Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, no. 77703/01,
§ 132, 14 June 2007, and Nolan and K. v. Russia, no. 2512/04, § 73,
12 February 2009). For it to be compatible with the Convention, a limitation
of this freedom must, in particular, pursue an aim that can be linked to one
of those listed in this provision. The same approach applies in respect of
Article 8 of the Convention.
114. The Court’s practice is to be quite succinct when it verifies the
existence of a legitimate aim within the meaning of the second paragraphs
of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention (see, for example, Leyla Şahin v.
Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 99, ECHR 2005-XI, and Ahmet Arslan and
Others, cited above, § 43). However, in the present case, the substance of
the objectives invoked in this connection by the Government, and strongly
disputed by the applicant, call for an in-depth examination. The applicant
took the view that the interference with the exercise of her freedom to
manifest her religion and of her right to respect for her private life, as a
result of the ban introduced by the Law of 11 October 2010, did not
correspond to any of the aims listed in the second paragraphs of Articles 8
and 9. The Government argued, for their part, that the Law pursued two
legitimate aims: public safety and “respect for the minimum set of values of
an open and democratic society”. The Court observes that the second
paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 do not refer expressly to the second of those
aims or to the three values mentioned by the Government in that connection.
115. As regards the first of the aims invoked by the Government, the
Court first observes that “public safety” is one of the aims enumerated in the
second paragraph of Article 9 of the Convention (sécurité publique in the
French text) and also in the second paragraph of Article 8 (sûreté publique
in the French text). It further notes the Government’s observation in this
connection that the impugned ban on wearing, in public places, clothing
designed to conceal the face satisfied the need to identify individuals in
order to prevent danger for the safety of persons and property and to combat
identity fraud. Having regard to the case file, it may admittedly be wondered
whether the Law’s drafters attached much weight to such concerns. It must
nevertheless be observed that the explanatory memorandum which
accompanied the bill indicated – albeit secondarily – that the practice of
concealing the face “could also represent a danger for public safety in
certain situations” (see paragraph 25 above), and that the Constitutional
Council noted that the legislature had been of the view that this practice
might be dangerous for public safety (see paragraph 30 above). Similarly, in
its study report of 25 March 2010, the Conseil d’État indicated that public
safety might constitute a basis for prohibiting concealment of the face, but
pointed out that this could be the case only in specific circumstances (see
paragraphs 22-23 above). Consequently, the Court accepts that, in adopting
the impugned ban, the legislature sought to address questions of “public
safety” within the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of
the Convention.
116. As regards the second of the aims invoked – to ensure “respect for
the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society” – the
Government referred to three values: respect for equality between men and
women, respect for human dignity and respect for the minimum
requirements of life in society. They submitted that this aim could be linked
to the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, within the meaning
of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.
117. As the Court has previously noted, these three values do not
expressly correspond to any of the legitimate aims enumerated in the second
paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention. Among those aims, the
only ones that may be relevant in the present case, in relation to the values
in question, are “public order” and the “protection of the rights and
freedoms of others”. The former is not, however, mentioned in Article 8 § 2.
Moreover, the Government did not refer to it either in their written
observations or in their answer to the question put to them in that
connection during the public hearing, preferring to refer solely to the
“protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. The Court will thus focus
its examination on the latter “legitimate aim”, as it did previously in the
judgments in Leyla Şahin and Ahmet Arslan and Others (both cited above,
§ 111 and § 43, respectively).
118. Firstly, the Court is not convinced by the Government’s submission
in so far as it concerns respect for equality between men and women.
119. It does not doubt that gender equality might rightly justify an
interference with the exercise of certain rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij
v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 58369/10, 10 July 2012). It reiterates in this
connection that advancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the
member States of the Council of Europe (ibid.; see also, among other
authorities, Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, § 67, Series A
no. 263, and Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 127, ECHR
2012). Thus a State Party which, in the name of gender equality, prohibits
anyone from forcing women to conceal their face pursues an aim which
corresponds to the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” within
the meaning of the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention
(see Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 111). The Court takes the view, however,
that a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice
that is defended by women – such as the applicant – in the context of the
exercise of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be
understood that individuals could be protected on that basis from the
exercise of their own fundamental rights and freedoms. It further observes

that the Conseil d’État reached a similar conclusion in its study report of 25
March 2010 (see paragraph 22 above).
Moreover, in so far as the Government thus sought to show that the
wearing of the full-face veil by certain women shocked the majority of the
French population because it infringed the principle of gender equality as
generally accepted in France, the Court would refer to its reasoning as to the
other two values that they have invoked (see paragraphs 120-22 below).
120. Secondly, the Court takes the view that, however essential it may
be, respect for human dignity cannot legitimately justify a blanket ban on
the wearing of the full-face veil in public places. The Court is aware that the
clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of those who observe
it. It would point out, however, that it is the expression of a cultural identity
which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in democracy. It notes in
this connection the variability of the notions of virtuousness and decency
that are applied to the uncovering of the human body. Moreover, it does not
have any evidence capable of leading it to consider that women who wear
the full-face veil seek to express a form of contempt against those they
encounter or otherwise to offend against the dignity of others.
121. Thirdly, the Court finds, by contrast, that under certain conditions
the “respect for the minimum requirements of life in society” referred to by
the Government – or of “living together”, as stated in the explanatory
memorandum accompanying the bill (see paragraph 25 above) – can be
linked to the legitimate aim of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of
others”.
122. The Court takes into account the respondent State’s point that the
face plays an important role in social interaction. It can understand the view
that individuals who are present in places open to all may not wish to see
practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue
of an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community
life within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept that
the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by
the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of
socialisation which makes living together easier. That being said, in view of
the flexibility of the notion of “living together” and the resulting risk of
abuse, the Court must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of
the impugned limitation.
(iv) Whether the measure is necessary in a democratic society
(α) General principles concerning Article 9 of the Convention

123. As the Court has decided to focus on Article 9 of the Convention in
examining this part of the application, it finds it appropriate to reiterate the
general principles concerning that provision.
124. As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and
religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within the
meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one
of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and
their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics,
sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a
democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends
on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, freedom to hold or not to hold
religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion (see, among
other authorities, Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 31, Series A
no. 260-A; Buscarini and Others v. San Marino [GC], no. 24645/94, § 34,
ECHR 1999-I; and Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 104).
125. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual
conscience, it also implies freedom to manifest one’s religion, alone and in
private, or in community with others, in public and within the circle of those
whose faith one shares. Article 9 lists the various forms which the
manifestation of one’s religion or beliefs may take, namely worship,
teaching, practice and observance (see, mutatis mutandis, Cha’are Shalom
Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 73, ECHR 2000-VII, and Leyla
Şahin, cited above, § 105).
Article 9 does not, however, protect every act motivated or inspired by a
religion or belief and does not always guarantee the right to behave in the
public sphere in a manner which is dictated by one’s religion or beliefs (see,
for example, Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, no. 7050/75,
Commission’s report of 12 October 1978, DR 19, p. 5; Kalaç v. Turkey,
1 July 1997, § 27, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV; and Leyla
Şahin, cited above, §§ 105 and 121).
126. In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within
one and the same population, it may be necessary to place limitations on
freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs in order to reconcile the
interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are
respected (see Kokkinakis, cited above, § 33). This follows both from
paragraph 2 of Article 9 and from the State’s positive obligations under
Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined therein (see Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 106).
127. The Court has frequently emphasised the State’s role as the neutral
and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, faiths and
beliefs, and has stated that this role is conducive to public order, religious
harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. As indicated previously, it

also considers that the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of
religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed (see
Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 26 September 1996, § 47, Reports
1996-IV; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 78,
ECHR 2000-XI; and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey
[GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, § 91, ECHR
2003-II), and that this duty requires the State to ensure mutual tolerance
between opposing groups (see, among other authorities, Leyla Şahin, cited
above, § 107). Accordingly, the role of the authorities in such circumstances
is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure
that the competing groups tolerate each other (see Serif v. Greece, no.
38178/97, § 53, ECHR 1999-IX; see also Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 107).
128. Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a
“democratic society”. Although individual interests must on occasion be
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the
views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which
ensures the fair treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of
a dominant position (see, mutatis mutandis, Young, James and Webster
v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 63, Series A no. 44, and
Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and
28443/95, § 112, ECHR 1999-III). Pluralism and democracy must also be
based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise necessarily entailing various
concessions on the part of individuals or groups of individuals which are
justified in order to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a
democratic society (see, mutatis mutandis, United Communist Party of
Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 45, Reports 1998-I, and
Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above, § 99). Where
these “rights and freedoms of others” are themselves among those
guaranteed by the Convention or the Protocols thereto, it must be accepted
that the need to protect them may lead States to restrict other rights or
freedoms likewise set forth in the Convention. It is precisely this constant
search for a balance between the fundamental rights of each individual
which constitutes the foundation of a “democratic society” (see Chassagnou
and Others, cited above, § 113; see also Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 108).
129. It is also important to emphasise the fundamentally subsidiary role
of the Convention mechanism. The national authorities have direct
democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions,
in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs
and conditions. In matters of general policy, on which opinions within a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic
policy-maker should be given special weight (see, for example, Maurice
v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 117, ECHR 2005-IX). This is the case, in
particular, where questions concerning the relationship between State and

religions are at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek,
cited above, § 84, and Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November
1996, § 58, Reports 1996-V; see also Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 109). As
regards Article 9 of the Convention, the State should thus, in principle, be
afforded a wide margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what
extent a limitation of the right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs is
“necessary”. That being said, in delimiting the extent of the margin of
appreciation in a given case, the Court must also have regard to what is at
stake therein (see, among other authorities, Manoussakis and Others, cited
above, § 44, and Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 110). It may also, if
appropriate, have regard to any consensus and common values emerging
from the practices of the States Parties to the Convention (see, for example,
Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, § 122, ECHR 2011).
130. In the judgment in Leyla Şahin (cited above), the Court pointed out
that this would notably be the case when it came to regulating the wearing
of religious symbols in educational institutions, especially in view of the
diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the issue.
Referring to the judgment in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria
(20 September 1994, § 50, Series A no. 295-A) and the decision in Dahlab
v. Switzerland ((dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V), it added that it was
thus not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the
significance of religion in society and that the meaning or impact of the
public expression of a religious belief would differ according to time and
context. It observed that the rules in this sphere would consequently vary
from one country to another according to national traditions and the
requirements imposed by the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others and to maintain public order. It concluded from this that the choice of
the extent and form of such rules must inevitably be left up to a point to the
State concerned, as it would depend on the specific domestic context (see
Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 109).
131. This margin of appreciation, however, goes hand in hand with a
European supervision embracing both the law and the decisions applying it.
The Court’s task is to determine whether the measures taken at national
level were justified in principle and proportionate (see, among other
authorities, Manoussakis and Others, cited above, § 44, and Leyla Şahin,
cited above, § 110).
(β) Application of those principles in previous cases
132. The Court has had occasion to examine a number of situations in
the light of those principles.
133. It has thus ruled on bans on the wearing of religious symbols in
State schools, imposed on teaching staff (see, inter alia, Dahlab, cited
above, and Kurtulmuş v. Turkey (dec.), no. 65500/01, ECHR 2006-II) and
on pupils and students (see, inter alia, Leyla Şahin, cited above; Köse and
Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 26625/02, ECHR 2006-II; Kervanci v. France,
no. 31645/04, 4 December 2008; Aktas v. France (dec.), no. 43563/08, 30
June 2009; and Ranjit Singh v. France (dec.) no. 27561/08, 30 June 2009),
on an obligation to remove clothing with a religious connotation in the
context of a security check (see Phull, cited above, and El Morsli, cited
above), and on an obligation to appear bareheaded on identity photos for use
on official documents (see Mann Singh v. France (dec.), no. 24479/07,
13 November 2008). It did not find a violation of Article 9 in any of these
cases.
134. The Court has also examined two applications in which individuals
complained in particular about restrictions imposed by their employers on
the possibility for them to wear visibly a cross around their necks, arguing
that domestic law had not sufficiently protected their right to manifest their
religion. One was an employee of an airline company, the other was a nurse
(see Eweida and Others, cited above). The first of those cases, in which the
Court found a violation of Article 9, is the most pertinent for the present
case. The Court took the view, inter alia, that the domestic courts had given
too much weight to the wishes of the employer – which it nevertheless
found legitimate – to project a certain corporate image, in relation to the
applicant’s fundamental right to manifest her religious beliefs. On the latter
point, it observed that a healthy democratic society needed to tolerate and
sustain pluralism and diversity and that it was important for an individual
who had made religion a central tenet of her life to be able to communicate
her beliefs to others. It then noted that the cross had been discreet and could
not have detracted from the applicant’s professional appearance. There was
no evidence that the wearing of other, previously authorised, religious
symbols had had any negative impact on the image of the airline company
in question. While pointing out that the national authorities, in particular the
courts, operated within a margin of appreciation when they were called
upon to assess the proportionality of measures taken by a private company
in respect of its employees, it thus found that there had been a violation of
Article 9.
135. The Court also examined, in the case of Ahmet Arslan and Others
(cited above), the question of a ban on the wearing, outside religious
ceremonies, of certain religious clothing in public places open to everyone,
such as public streets or squares. The clothing in question, characteristic of
the Aczimendi tarikati group, consisted of a turban, a sirwal and a tunic, all
in black, together with a baton. The Court accepted, having regard to the
circumstances of the case and the decisions of the domestic courts, and
particularly in view of the importance of the principle of secularism for the
democratic system in Turkey, that, since the aim of the ban had been to
uphold secular and democratic values, the interference pursued a number of
the legitimate aims listed in Article 9 § 2: the maintaining of public safety,
the protection of public order and the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others. It found, however, that the necessity of the measure in the light of
those aims had not been established.
The Court thus noted that the ban affected not civil servants, who were
bound by a certain discretion in the exercise of their duties, but ordinary
citizens, with the result that its case-law on civil servants – and teachers in
particular – did not apply. It then found that the ban was aimed at clothing
worn in any public place, not only in specific public buildings, with the
result that its case-law emphasising the particular weight to be given to the
role of the domestic policy-maker, with regard to the wearing of religious
symbols in State schools, did not apply either. The Court, moreover,
observed that there was no evidence in the file to show that the manner in
which the applicants had manifested their beliefs by wearing specific
clothing – they had gathered in front of a mosque for the sole purpose of
participating in a religious ceremony – constituted or risked constituting a
threat to public order or a form of pressure on others. Lastly, in response to
the Turkish Government’s allegation of possible proselytising on the part of
the applicants, the Court found that there was no evidence to show that they
had sought to exert inappropriate pressure on passers-by in public streets
and squares in order to promote their religious beliefs. The Court thus
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.
136. Among all these cases concerning Article 9, Ahmet Arslan and
Others (cited above) is the one which the present case most closely
resembles. However, while both cases concern a ban on wearing clothing
with a religious connotation in public places, the present case differs
significantly from Ahmet Arslan and Others in the fact that the full-face
Islamic veil has the particularity of entirely concealing the face, with the
possible exception of the eyes.
(γ) Application of those principles to the present case
137. The Court would first emphasise that the argument put forward by
the applicant and some of the third-party interveners, to the effect that the
ban introduced by sections 1 to 3 of the Law of 11 October 2010 was based
on the erroneous supposition that the women concerned wore the full-face
veil under duress, is not pertinent. It can clearly be seen from the
explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill (see paragraph 25 above)
that it was not the principal aim of the ban to protect women against a
practice which was imposed on them or would be detrimental to them.
138. That being clarified, the Court must verify whether the impugned
interference is “necessary in a democratic society” for public safety (within
the meaning of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention; see paragraph 115
above) or for the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (see
paragraph 116 above).
139. As regards the question of necessity in relation to public safety,

within the meaning of Articles 8 and 9 (see paragraph 115 above), the Court
understands that a State may find it essential to be able to identify
individuals in order to prevent danger for the safety of persons and property
and to combat identity fraud. It has thus found no violation of Article 9 of
the Convention in cases concerning the obligation to remove clothing with a
religious connotation in the context of security checks and the obligation to
appear bareheaded on identity photos for use on official documents (see
paragraph 133 above). However, in view of its impact on the rights of
women who wish to wear the full-face veil for religious reasons, a blanket
ban on the wearing in public places of clothing designed to conceal the face
can be regarded as proportionate only in a context where there is a general
threat to public safety. The Government have not shown that the ban
introduced by the Law of 11 October 2010 falls into such a context. As to
the women concerned, they are thus obliged to give up completely an
element of their identity that they consider important, together with their
chosen manner of manifesting their religion or beliefs, whereas the
objective alluded to by the Government could be attained by a mere
obligation to show their face and to identify themselves where a risk for the
safety of persons and property has been established, or where particular
circumstances entail a suspicion of identity fraud. It cannot therefore be
found that the blanket ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 is
necessary, in a democratic society, for public safety, within the meaning of
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.
140. The Court will now examine the questions raised by the other aim
that it has found legitimate: to ensure the observance of the minimum
requirements of life in society as part of the “protection of the rights and
freedoms of others” (see paragraphs 121-22 above).
141. The Court observes that this is an aim to which the authorities have
given much weight. This can be seen, in particular, from the explanatory
memorandum accompanying the bill, which indicates that “[t]he voluntary
and systematic concealment of the face is problematic because it is quite
simply incompatible with the fundamental requirements of ‘living together’
in French society” and that “[t]he systematic concealment of the face in
public places, contrary to the ideal of fraternity, ... falls short of the
minimum requirement of civility that is necessary for social interaction”
(see paragraph 25 above). It indeed falls within the powers of the State to
secure the conditions whereby individuals can live together in their
diversity. Moreover, the Court is able to accept that a State may find it
essential to give particular weight in this connection to the interaction
between individuals and may consider this to be adversely affected by the
fact that some conceal their faces in public places (see paragraph 122
above).
142. Consequently, the Court finds that the impugned ban can be
regarded as justified in its principle solely in so far as it seeks to guarantee
the conditions of “living together”.
143. It remains to be ascertained whether the ban is proportionate to that
aim.
144. Some of the arguments put forward by the applicant and the
intervening non-governmental organisations warrant particular attention.
145. Firstly, it is true that only a small number of women are affected. It
can be seen, among other things, from the report “on the wearing of the full-
face veil on national territory”, prepared by a commission of the National
Assembly and deposited on 26 January 2010, that about 1,900 women wore
the Islamic full-face veil in France at the end of 2009, of whom about 270
were living in French overseas administrative areas (see paragraph 16
above). This is a small proportion in relation to the French population of
about sixty-five million and to the number of Muslims living in France. It
may thus seem excessive to respond to such a situation by imposing a
blanket ban.
146. In addition, there is no doubt that the ban has a significant negative
impact on the situation of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to
wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs. As stated
previously, they are thus confronted with a complex dilemma, and the ban
may have the effect of isolating them and restricting their autonomy, as well
as impairing the exercise of their freedom to manifest their beliefs and their
right to respect for their private life. It is also understandable that the
women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to their identity.
147. It should furthermore be observed that a large number of actors,
both international and national, in the field of fundamental rights protection
have found a blanket ban to be disproportionate. This is the case, for
example, of the French National Advisory Commission on Human Rights
(see paragraphs 18-19 above), non-governmental organisations such as the
third-party interveners, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (see paragraphs 35-36 above) and the Commissioner for Human
Rights of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 37 above).
148. The Court is also aware that the Law of 11 October 2010, together
with certain debates surrounding its drafting, may have upset part of the
Muslim community, including some members who are not in favour of the
full-face veil being worn.
149. In this connection, the Court is very concerned by the indications of
some of the third-party interveners to the effect that certain Islamophobic
remarks marked the debate which preceded the adoption of the Law of
11 October 2010 (see the observations of the Human Rights Centre of
Ghent University and of the non-governmental organisations Liberty and
Open Society Justice Initiative, paragraphs 98, 100 and 104 above). It is
admittedly not for the Court to rule on whether legislation is desirable in
such matters. It would, however, emphasise that a State which enters into a
legislative process of this kind takes the risk of contributing to the
consolidation of the stereotypes which affect certain categories of the
population and of encouraging the expression of intolerance, when it has a
duty, on the contrary, to promote tolerance (see paragraph 128 above; see
also the “Viewpoint” of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council
of Europe, paragraph 37 above). The Court reiterates that remarks which
constitute a general, vehement attack on a religious or ethnic group are
incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-
discrimination which underlie the Convention and do not fall within the
right to freedom of expression that it protects (see, among other authorities,
Norwood v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI, and
Pavel Ivanov v. Russia (dec.), no. 35222/04, 20 February 2007).
150. The other arguments put forward in support of the application must,
however, be qualified.
151. Thus, while it is true that the scope of the ban is broad, since it
concerns all places accessible to the public (except for places of worship),
the Law of 11 October 2010 does not affect the freedom to wear in public
any garment or item of clothing – with or without a religious connotation –
which does not have the effect of concealing the face. The Court is aware of
the fact that the impugned ban mainly affects Muslim women who wish to
wear the full-face veil. It nevertheless finds it to be of some significance that
the ban is not expressly based on the religious connotation of the clothing in
question but solely on the fact that it conceals the face. This distinguishes
the present case from that in Ahmet Arslan and Others (cited above).
152. As to the fact that criminal sanctions are attached to the ban, this no
doubt increases the impact of the measure on those concerned. It is certainly
understandable that the idea of being prosecuted for concealing one’s face
in a public place is traumatising for women who have chosen to wear the
full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs. It should nevertheless be
taken into account that the sanctions provided for by the Law’s drafters are
among the lightest that could be envisaged, since they consist of a fine at the
rate applying to second-class petty offences (currently EUR 150 maximum),
with the possibility for the court to impose, in addition to or instead of the
fine, an obligation to follow a citizenship course.
153. Furthermore, admittedly, as the applicant pointed out, by
prohibiting everyone from wearing clothing designed to conceal the face in
public places, the respondent State has to a certain extent restricted the
reach of pluralism, since the ban prevents certain women from expressing
their personality and their beliefs by wearing the full-face veil in public.
However, for their part, the Government indicated that it was a question of
responding to a practice that the State deemed incompatible, in French
society, with the ground rules of social communication and more broadly
the requirements of “living together”. From that perspective, the respondent
State is seeking to protect a principle of interaction between individuals,

which in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but
also of tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic
society (see paragraph 128 above). It can thus be said that the question
whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public
places constitutes a choice of society.
154. In such circumstances, the Court has a duty to exercise a degree of
restraint in its review of Convention compliance, since such review will lead
it to assess a balance that has been struck by means of a democratic process
within the society in question. The Court has, moreover, already had
occasion to observe that in matters of general policy, on which opinions
within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight (see paragraph 129
above).
155. In other words, France had a wide margin of appreciation in the
present case.
156. This is particularly true as there is little common ground among the
member States of the Council of Europe (see, mutatis mutandis, X, Y and Z
v. the United Kingdom, 22 April 1997, § 44, Reports 1997-II) as to the
question of the wearing of the full-face veil in public. The Court thus
observes that, contrary to the submission of one of the third-party
interveners (see paragraph 105 above), there is no European consensus
against a ban. Admittedly, from a strictly normative standpoint, France is
very much in a minority position in Europe: except for Belgium, no other
member State of the Council of Europe has, to date, opted for such a
measure. It must be observed, however, that the question of the wearing of
the full-face veil in public is or has been a subject of debate in a number of
European States. In some it has been decided not to opt for a blanket ban. In
others, such a ban is still being considered (see paragraph 40 above). It
should be added that, in all likelihood, the question of the wearing of the
full-face veil in public is simply not an issue at all in a certain number of
member States, where this practice is uncommon. It can thus be said that in
Europe there is no consensus as to whether or not there should be a blanket
ban on the wearing of the full-face veil in public places.
157. Consequently, having regard in particular to the breadth of the
margin of appreciation afforded to the respondent State in the present case,
the Court finds that the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 can be
regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the preservation of the
conditions of “living together” as an element of the “protection of the rights
and freedoms of others”.
158. The impugned limitation can thus be regarded as “necessary in a
democratic society”. This conclusion holds true with respect both to
Article 8 of the Convention and to Article 9.
159. Accordingly, there has been no violation either of Article 8 or of

Article 9 of the Convention.
(b) Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 8 or Article 9
160. The Court notes that the applicant complained of indirect
discrimination. It observes in this connection that, as a Muslim woman who
for religious reasons wishes to wear the full-face veil in public, she belongs
to a category of individuals who are particularly exposed to the ban in
question and to the sanctions for which it provides.
161. The Court reiterates that a general policy or measure that has
disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be
considered discriminatory even where it is not specifically aimed at that
group and there is no discriminatory intent (see, among other authorities,
D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325/00, §§ 175 and
184-85, ECHR 2007-IV). This is only the case, however, if such policy or
measure has no “objective and reasonable” justification, that is, if it does not
pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of
proportionality” between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised (ibid., § 196). In the present case, while it may be considered that
the ban imposed by the Law of 11 October 2010 has specific negative
effects on the situation of Muslim women who, for religious reasons, wish
to wear the full-face veil in public, this measure has an objective and
reasonable justification for the reasons indicated previously (see paragraphs
144-59 above).
162. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 14 of the
Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 or Article 9.
(c) Alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention, taken separately and
together with Article 14 of the Convention
163. The Court is of the view that no issue arises under Article 10 of the
Convention, taken separately or together with Article 14 of the Convention,
that is separate from those that it has examined under Articles 8 and 9 of the
Convention, taken separately and together with Article 14 of the
Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Dismisses, unanimously, the Government’s preliminary objections;
2. Declares, unanimously, the complaints concerning Articles 8, 9 and 10

of the Convention, taken separately and together with Article 14 of the
Convention, admissible, and the remainder of the application

inadmissible;
3. Holds, by fifteen votes to two, that there has been no violation of

Article 8 of the Convention;
4. Holds, by fifteen votes to two, that there has been no violation of

Article 9 of the Convention;
5. Holds, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the

Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 or with Article 9;
6. Holds, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 10 of the

Convention, taken separately or together with Article 14 of the
Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the

Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 July 2014.
Erik Fribergh Dean Spielmann

Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of

the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Nußberger and Jäderblom
is annexed to this judgment.
D.S.
E.F.
S.A.S. v. FRANCE JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION 61
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES

NUSSBERGER AND JÄDERBLOM
A. Sacrificing of individual rights to abstract principles
1. We acknowledge that the judgment, even if no violation has been

found, pursues a balanced approach, carefully ponders many important
arguments of those opposed to the prohibition on concealing one’s face in
public places and assesses the problems connected with it.
2. Nevertheless, we cannot share the opinion of the majority as, in our
view, it sacrifices concrete individual rights guaranteed by the Convention
to abstract principles. It is doubtful that the blanket ban on wearing a full-
face veil in public pursues a legitimate aim (see subheading B below). In
any event, such a far-reaching prohibition, touching upon the right to one’s
own cultural and religious identity, is not necessary in a democratic society
(see subheading C below). Therefore we come to the conclusion that there
has been a violation of Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention (see
subheading D below).
B. No legitimate aim under the Convention
3. The majority rightly argue that neither respect for equality between
men and women, nor respect for human dignity, can legitimately justify a
ban on the concealment of the face in public places (see paragraphs 118-20
of the judgment). It is also correct to assume that the need to identify
individuals in order to prevent danger for the safety of persons and property
and to combat identity fraud is a legitimate aim protected by the Convention
(see paragraph 115 of the judgment), but can be regarded as proportionate
only in a context where there is a general threat to public safety (see
paragraph 139 of the judgment).
4. Nevertheless, the majority see a legitimate aim in ensuring “living
together”, through “the observance of the minimum requirements of life in
society”, which is understood to be one facet of the “rights and freedoms of
others” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and Article 9 § 2 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 140-42 of the judgment). We have strong
reservations about this approach.
5. The Court’s case-law is not clear as to what may constitute “the rights
and freedoms of others” outside the scope of rights protected by the
Convention. The very general concept of “living together” does not fall
directly under any of the rights and freedoms guaranteed within the
Convention. Even if it could arguably be regarded as touching upon several
rights, such as the right to respect for private life (Article 8) and the right
not to be discriminated against (Article 14), the concept seems far-fetched
and vague.
62 S.A.S. v. FRANCE JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION
6. It is essential to understand what is at the core of the wish to protect

people against encounters with others wearing full-face veils. The majority
speak of “practices or attitudes ... which would fundamentally call into
question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships” (see
paragraph 122 of the judgment). The Government of the Netherlands,
justifying a bill before that country’s Parliament, pointed to a threat not only
to “social interaction”, but also to a subjective “feeling of safety” (see
paragraph 50 of the judgment). It seems to us, however, that such fears and
feelings of uneasiness are not so much caused by the veil itself, which –
unlike perhaps certain other dress-codes – cannot be perceived as aggressive
per se, but by the philosophy that is presumed to be linked to it. Thus the
recurring motives for not tolerating the full-face veil are based on
interpretations of its symbolic meaning. The first report “on the wearing of
the full-face veil on national territory”, by a French parliamentary
commission, saw in the veil “a symbol of a form of subservience” (see
paragraph 17 of the judgment). The explanatory memorandum to the French
bill referred to its “symbolic and dehumanising violence” (see paragraph 25
of the judgment). The full-face veil was also linked to the “self-confinement
of any individual who cuts himself off from others whilst living among
them”. Women who wear such clothing have been described as “effaced”
from the public space (see paragraph 82 of the judgment).
7. All these interpretations have been called into question by the
applicant, who claims to wear the full-face veil depending only on her
spiritual feelings (see paragraph 12 of the judgment) and does not consider
it an insurmountable barrier to communication or integration. But even
assuming that such interpretations of the full-face veil are correct, it has to
be stressed that there is no right not to be shocked or provoked by different
models of cultural or religious identity, even those that are very distant from
the traditional French and European lifestyle. In the context of freedom of
expression, the Court has repeatedly observed that the Convention protects
not only those opinions “that are favourably received or regarded as
inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also ... those that offend,
shock or disturb”, pointing out that “[s]uch are the demands of pluralism,
tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no ‘democratic
society’” (see, among other authorities, Mouvement raëlien suisse
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, § 48, ECHR 2012, and Stoll
v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, § 101, ECHR 2007-V). The same must
be true for dress codes demonstrating radical opinions.
8. Furthermore, it can hardly be argued that an individual has a right to
enter into contact with other people, in public places, against their will.
Otherwise such a right would have to be accompanied by a corresponding
obligation. This would be incompatible with the spirit of the Convention.
While communication is admittedly essential for life in society, the right to
respect for private life also comprises the right not to communicate and not
to enter into contact with others in public places – the right to be an

outsider.
9. It is true that “living together” requires the possibility of interpersonal
exchange. It is also true that the face plays an important role in human
interaction. But this idea cannot be turned around, to lead to the conclusion
that human interaction is impossible if the full face is not shown. This is
evidenced by examples that are perfectly rooted in European culture, such
as the activities of skiing and motorcycling with full-face helmets and the
wearing of costumes in carnivals. Nobody would claim that in such
situations (which form part of the exceptions provided for in the French
Law) the minimum requirements of life in society are not respected. People
can socialise without necessarily looking into each other’s eyes.
10. We cannot find that the majority have shown which concrete rights
of others within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 and Article 9 § 2 of the
Convention could be inferred from the abstract principle of “living together”
or from the “minimum requirements of life in society”.
11. In so far as these ideas may have been understood to form part of
“public order”, we agree with the majority that it would not be appropriate
to focus on such an aim (see paragraph 117 of the judgment), as the
“protection of public order” may justify limitations only on the rights
guaranteed by Article 9, but not on the rights under Article 8, whereas the
latter provision is undoubtedly also infringed by the restrictive measure in
question.
12. Thus, it is doubtful that the French Law prohibiting the concealment
of one’s face in public places pursues any legitimate aim under Article 8 § 2
or Article 9 § 2 of the Convention.
C. Proportionality of a blanket ban on the full-face veil
1. Different approaches to pluralism, tolerance and

broadmindedness
13. If it is already unclear which rights are to be protected by the

restrictive measure in question, it is all the more difficult to argue that the
rights protected outweigh the rights infringed. This is especially true as the
Government have not explained or given any examples of how the impact
on others of this particular attire differs from other accepted practices of
concealing the face, such as excessive hairstyles or the wearing of dark
glasses or hats. In the legislative process, the supporters of a blanket ban on
the full-face veil mainly advanced “the values of the Republic, as expressed
in the maxim ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’” (see paragraph 17 of the
judgment). The Court refers to “pluralism”, “tolerance” and
“broadmindedness” as hallmarks of a democratic society (see paragraph 128
of the judgment) and argues in substance that it is acceptable to grant these
values preference over the life-style and religiously inspired dress-code of a

small minority if such is the choice of society (see paragraph 153).
14. However, all those values could be regarded as justifying not only a
blanket ban on wearing a full-face veil, but also, on the contrary, the
acceptance of such a religious dress-code and the adoption of an
integrationist approach. In our view, the applicant is right to claim that the
French legislature has restricted pluralism, since the measure prevents
certain women from expressing their personality and their beliefs by
wearing the full-face veil in public (see paragraph 153 of the judgment).
Therefore the blanket ban could be interpreted as a sign of selective
pluralism and restricted tolerance. In its jurisprudence the Court has clearly
elaborated on the State’s duty to ensure mutual tolerance between opposing
groups and has stated that “the role of the authorities ... is not to remove the
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing
groups tolerate each other” (see Serif v. Greece, no. 38178/97, § 53, ECHR
1999-IX, cited by the majority in paragraph 127 of the judgment). By
banning the full-face veil, the French legislature has done the opposite. It
has not sought to ensure tolerance between the vast majority and the small
minority, but has prohibited what is seen as a cause of tension.
2. Disproportionate interference
15. Even if we were to accept that the applicant’s rights under Articles 8
and 9 of the Convention could be balanced against abstract principles, be it
tolerance, pluralism and broadmindedness, or be it the idea of “living
together” and the “minimum requirements of life in society”, we cannot, in
any event, agree with the majority that the ban is proportionate to the aim
pursued.
(a) Margin of appreciation
16. Although we agree with the majority that, in matters of general
policy on which opinions within a democratic society may differ widely, the
role of the domestic policy-maker should be given special weight (see
paragraph 154 of the judgment), we are unable to conclude that in this
particular situation the respondent State should be accorded a broad margin
of appreciation (see paragraph 155 of the judgment).
17. Firstly, the prohibition targets a dress-code closely linked to
religious faith, culture and personal convictions and thus, undoubtedly, an
intimate right related to one’s personality.
18. Secondly, it is not convincing to draw a parallel between the present
case and cases concerning the relationship between State and religion (see
paragraph 129 of the judgment). As shown by the legislative process, the
Law was deliberately worded in a much broader manner, generally targeting
“clothing that is designed to conceal the face” and thus going far beyond the
religious context (see the study report by the Conseil d’État on “the possible
legal grounds for banning the full veil”, paragraphs 20 et seq. of the
judgment, and its influence on the bill before Parliament). Unlike the
situation in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, § 109,
ECHR 2005-XI), which concerned a regulation on the wearing of religious
symbols in educational institutions, the French Law itself does not expressly
have any religious connotation.
19. Thirdly, it is difficult to understand why the majority are not
prepared to accept the existence of a European consensus on the question of
banning the full-face veil (see paragraph 156 of the judgment). In the
Court’s jurisprudence, three factors are relevant in order to determine the
existence of a European consensus: international treaty law, comparative
law and international soft law (see Marckx v. Belgium, 13 June 1979, § 41,
Series A no. 31). The fact that forty-five out of forty-seven member States
of the Council of Europe, and thus an overwhelming majority, have not
deemed it necessary to legislate in this area is a very strong indicator for a
European consensus (see Bayatyan v. Armenia [GC], no. 23459/03, §§ 103
and 108, ECHR 2011, and A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 235,
ECHR 2010). Even if there might be reform discussions in some of the
member States, while in others the practice of wearing full-face veils is non-
existent, the status quo is undeniably clear. Furthermore, as amply
documented in the judgment, the Parliamentary Assembly and the
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (see
paragraphs 35 et seq. of the judgment), as well as non-governmental
organisations (see paragraphs 89 et seq. of the judgment), are strongly
opposed to any form of blanket ban on full-face veils. This approach is
fortified by reference to other international human rights treaties, especially
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Although the United Nations Human Rights Committee has not made any
pronouncement as regards a general ban on the wearing of the full-face veil
in public, it has concluded, for example, that expelling a student wearing a
hijab from university amounted to a violation of Article 18 § 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (see paragraph 39 of
the judgment) The Committee has stated that regulations on clothing for
women may involve a violation of a number of rights (see paragraph 38 of
the judgment).
20. The arguments drawn from comparative and international law
militate against the acceptance of a broad margin of appreciation and in
favour of close supervision by the Court. While it is perfectly legitimate to
take into account the specific situation in France, especially the strong and
unifying tradition of the “values of the French Revolution” as well as the
overwhelming political consensus which led to the adoption of the Law, it
still remains the task of the Court to protect small minorities against
disproportionate interferences.
(b) Consequences for the women concerned
21. Ample evidence has been provided to show the dilemma of women
in the applicant’s position who wish to wear a full-face veil in accordance
with their religious faith, culture and personal conviction. Either they are
faithful to their traditions and stay at home or they break with their
traditions and go outside without their habitual attire. Otherwise they face a
criminal sanction (see the Resolution 1743 (2010) of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, paragraph 35 of the judgment, the
Viewpoint of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of
Europe, paragraph 37 of the judgment, and the judgment of the Spanish
Constitutional Court, paragraph 47 of the judgment). In our view, the
restrictive measure cannot be expected to have the desired effect of
liberating women presumed to be oppressed, but will further exclude them
from society and aggravate their situation.
22. With regard to the majority’s assumption that the punishment
consists of mild sanctions only (see paragraph 152 of the judgment), we
consider that, where the wearing of the full-face veil is a recurrent practice,
the multiple effect of successive penalties has to be taken into account.
23. Furthermore, as the majority note, there are still only a small number
of women who are affected by the ban. That means that it is only on rare
occasions that the average person would encounter a woman in a full-face
veil and thus be affected as regards his or her possibility of interacting with
another person.
(c) Less restrictive measures
24. Furthermore, the Government have not explained why it would have
been impossible to apply less restrictive measures, instead of criminalising
the concealment of the face in all public places. No account has been given
as to whether or to what extent any efforts have been made to discourage the
relatively recent phenomenon of the use of full-face veils, by means, for
example, of awareness-raising and education. The legislative process shows
that much less intrusive measures have been discussed. The above-
mentioned report “on the wearing of the full-face veil on national territory”
devised a four-step programme with measures aimed at releasing women
from the subservience of the full-face veil, without recommending any
blanket ban or criminal sanctions (see paragraph 17 of the judgment). The
National Advisory Commission on Human Rights also recommended “soft”
measures and called for the strengthening of civic education courses at all
levels for both men and women (see paragraph 19 of the judgment).
D. Conclusion
25. In view of this reasoning, we find that the criminalisation of the

wearing of a full-face veil is a measure which is disproportionate to the aim
of protecting the idea of “living together” – an aim which cannot readily be
reconciled with the Convention’s restrictive catalogue of grounds for
interference with basic human rights.
26. In our view, there has therefore been a violation of Articles 8 and 9
of the Convention.

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GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF S.A.S. v. FRANCE

(Application no. 43835/11)

In the case of S.A.S. v. France,

3. The applicant complained that the ban on wearing clothing designed

(a) for the respondent Government

(b) for the applicant

(c) for the Belgian Government

The Court heard addresses by Ms Belliard, Mr De Mello, Mr Muman and

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE

A. The Law of 11 October 2010 “prohibiting the concealment of

emphasised that, going beyond mere incompatibility with secularism, the

advocated, in order to combat any form of obscurantism, encouraging the

without distinction to the whole of the public space under prevailing

(e) Bill before Parliament

The bill contained an “explanatory memorandum”, which reads as

2. Relevant provisions of Law no. 2010-1192

B. Decision of the Constitutional Council of 7 October 2010

30. The Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel), to which the

C. Prime Minister’s Circular of 2 March 2011

31. Published in the Official Gazette of 3 March 2011, the Prime

petty offence (contravention), the existence of intent is irrelevant: it is sufficient for

32. On 11 March 2011 the Minister of Justice and Freedoms issued a

E. Judgment of the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation of

34. The Court of Cassation was called upon to examine an appeal on

III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE

A. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the

1. Resolution 1743 (2010) and Recommendation 1927 (2010) of the

2. Viewpoint of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of

Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Council of Europe Publishing,

In Europe, we seek to uphold traditions of tolerance and democracy. Where conflicts

B. The United Nations Human Rights Committee

38. In its General Comment No. 22, concerning Article 18 of the

The Human Rights Committee also stated as follows in its General

IV. THE SITUATION IN OTHER EUROPEAN STATES

A. Belgian Law of 1 June 2011 and judgment of the Belgian

41. A Law “to prohibit the wearing of any clothing entirely or

an offence or is preparing to commit one, or is likely to cause a breach of public order

B. Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court of 6 February 2013

43. On 8 October 2010 the Ayuntamiento (municipality) of Lérida – like

public services for persons wearing full-face veils, balaclavas, full-face

C. Opinion of the Netherlands Council of State, 28 November 2011

pressing social need and was not therefore necessary in a democratic

I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS

A. Whether the applicant is a “victim”

53. The Government called into question the applicant’s status as a

B. Exhaustion of domestic remedies

59. The Government argued that, in the absence of any domestic

ruling on the matter: in a judgment of 5 March 2013, in the context of

C. Abuse of the right of individual application

62. The Government criticised “an improper exercise of the right of

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION,

69. The applicant complained that, since the wearing in public of

III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION,

IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8, 9 AND 10 OF THE

1. The parties’ submissions