In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.

Simeon Datumanong
GR no 150274; August 4, 2006
Prospective effect / Retroactive Application of the ROC

Facts:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint against petitioner Tel-
Equen and several others relative to the anomalous payment of P553,900.00
of the bailey bridge components owned by the government. Petitioner was
found guilty and ordered dismissed from service. Petitioner appealed the
decision with the Court of Appeals and then the Supreme Court. Meanwhile,
while the appeal was still pending, DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong
issued a memorandum order dismissing petitioner from service effective
immediately.
Petitioner filed a petition to cite DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong for
contempt of court. Petitioner alleged that Secretary Datumanong committed
a contumacious act when the latter issued a memorandum order dismissing
him from service pending his appeal in the Supreme Court. However, two
events supervened that support the dismissal of the petition: first, the Court
affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Office of the
Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service; second, Section
7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was
amended by Administrative Order No. 17. Under the new provision, the
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. This is essentially
similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.

Issue:
Whether the amended rules of procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
can be made to apply in the pending petition

Held:
Yes; procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and are deemed retroactive in
that sense and to that extent.

As a general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be

considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may
attach to nor arise therefrom.

In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
are clearly procedural and no vested right of the petitioner is violated as he
is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover,
in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

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Colmenar v Colmenar
GR no 252467; June 21, 2021
Prospecitve effect of the Rules of Court

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents avering that he is the
second child of his parents (deceased Francisco and Dorothy Colmenar) who
were later on divorced. When petitioner’s father died, the latter left real
properties registered in its name. When petitioner knew that respondents
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate making it appear that they
were the surviving heirs and sold the properties without his knowledge, he
sent a demand letter to individual respondent invoking his successional right
but to no avail. Hence, the complaint was filed. In the meantime, the 2019
amendments to the ROC took effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action citing Sec
12, Rule 8 of the 2019 amendments to the ROC. Petitioner now allege that
the judge is at fault for applying the amendment despite the clear injustice it
caused to him.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in applying the 2019 amendments to the ROC

Held:
Yes; Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules provides that the amendments shall govern
all cases filed AFTER their effectivity and also all pending proceedings,
except to the extent that “in the opinion of the court, their application would
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under
which cases were filed shall govern”.

In this case, the trial court Judge ignored the injustice caused by the
application of the 2019 Amendment to the case. For as a consequence,
petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative
defense of respondent companies and right to seek reconsideration of the
order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure.

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Labao v Flores
GR no 187984; November 15, 2010
Power of the SC to suspend the ROC

Facts:
The petitioner is the proprietor and general manager of the San Miguel
Protective Security Agency (SMPSA), a licensed security-service contractor.
Respondents were SMPSA security guards assigned to the NPC in Iligan City.
The petitioner issued a memorandum requiring all security guards to submit
pertinent documents for reevaluation in connection with the SMPSA‘s new
service contract with the NPC-MRC. When respondents failed to comply with
the
petitioner‘s directive, despite several notices, the petitioner relieved them
from duty. Respondents filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal and
money claims. The NLRC found that the petitioners were in good faith when
it relieved the respondents because it was for the best interest of the
business enterprise, the SMPSA merely exercised its management
prerogative and discretion. The
respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA set aside
the NLRC resolution finding that the respondents were constructively
dismissed. The respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed 28 days late from
Atty. Plando’s October 13, 2006 receipt of the resolution.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in not dismissing the petition for certiorari despite its
late filing

Held:
Yes; Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.

While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on

reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business.

There are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3)
good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension

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of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal
and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of
substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.

However, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to advance a reasonable and meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.

In the present case, the respondents’ petition for certiorari was filed twenty-
eight (28) days late from Atty. Plando‘s October 13, 2006 receipt of the
September 29, 2006 resolution. The respondents insist that they should not
suffer for Atty. Plando‘s negligence in failing to inform them of the resolution,
and the reckoning date for the 60-day period should be their December 6,
2006 notice.

The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is
when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that
the client is deprived of his day in court. The failure of a party‘s counsel to
notify him on time of the adverse judgment, to enable him to appeal
therefrom, is negligence that
is not excusable. We have repeatedly held that notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal
is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.

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Gios-Samar Inc v Department of Transportation and Communication
GR no 217158; March 12, 2019
Doctrines of Heirarchy of Courts and Continuity of Jurisdiction

Facts:
The DOTC and its attached agency, the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and Bid on the airport
development, operations, and maintenance of some airports in the PH. The
Invitation stated that the Projects aim to improve services and enhance the
airside and landside facilities of the key regional airports through concession
agreements with the private sector. Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc. alleges that
it is a non-governmental organization composed of subsistence farmers and
fisherfolk from Samar, who are among the victims of Typhoon Yolanda
relying on government assistance for the rehabilitation of their industry and
livelihood. It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and
seeks to enjoin the DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of
the same. For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic
fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any
special and compelling reason to allow it to seek relief directly from the
Court. The case should have been filed with the trial court, because it raises
factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown trial. In its reply,
the petitioner argues that it need not wait for the conduct of the bidding to
file the suit because doing so would render useless the very purpose for filing
the petition for prohibition.

Issue:
Whether petitioner violated the doctrine of heirarchy of courts

Held:
Yes; while petitioner asserts that the arguments involve legal issues,
examination
of the petition shows otherwise. Petitioner's arguments against the
constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects are inextricably intertwined
with underlying questions of fact, the determination of which require the
reception of evidence. The Supreme Court, however, is not a trier of fact.

While the Supreme Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to the
Supreme Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for
the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section 18,
Article VII (martial law determination), cases, the resolution of which
depends on the determination of questions of fact, cannot be brought
directly before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is not equipped,
either by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first

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instance; these are the primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory
agencies.
Commission on Audit v Ferrer
GR no 218870; November 24, 2020
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:
During his term as Governor of the Province of Camarines Sur, private
respondent approved several disbursements for various activities and
projects of the provincial government. Upon audit, the COA found several
deficiencies, including noncompliance with the Government Procurement
Act, and unnecessary expenditures. As a result, the COA issued 20 notices of
disallowance on the provincial government’s disbursements for the foregoing
transactions and notices of finality of decision were issued. Private
respondents then filed 2 petitions for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC
assailing the NFDs issued by petitioners and seeking relief against the COA’s
orders of execution implementing the NDs. Petitioners opposed the prayer on
the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter

Held:
No; the principle of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of
the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if
the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction. Courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by that
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
discretion requiring its special knowledge, experience, and services to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In any event, the circumstances of the case do not qualify as one of the
exceptions to the general rule on COA's primary jurisdiction over money
claims against the government:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction
c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice

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(f) where judicial intervention is urgent
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
(k) when strong public interest is involved
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

The Court upheld the courts’ jurisdiction over money claims against the
government if they involve interpretation of the Constitution, determination
of contractual rights and obligations, or if there was unreasonable delay and
official inaction on the part of COA. However, private respondent's petitions
did not raise the same issues and merely dwelt on the supposed impropriety
of the NDs.

The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos Inc v Heirs of Marcos

GR no 225971; June 17, 2020

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Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Facts:
RCBMI is the registered owner of a parcel of land. Upon the enactment of PD
27, portions of the said land were awarded to Marcos. Petitioner sought the
cancellation of the award alleging that the lots were not devoted to rice
production but to social programs which the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
granted. However, respondents failed to surrender possession of the
property which led petitioner to file a complaint for the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction before the PARAD which ruled in its favor and ordering
the respondents to vacate the land. The respondents appealed to the DARAB
then to the CA. The CA denied the petition holding that it was PARAD’s duty
to render a determination of the actions filed before it. Yet, the records of
the case were not remanded to the PARAD. When the case was remanded,
petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution before the
PARAD which was granted. The Heirs of Marcos filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution which was granted. Petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 before the CA but was dismissed on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and that they
should have first filed an appeal before the DARAB.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing RCBMI’s petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

Held:
Yes; the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is
grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative
agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as
well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief
through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and
costly resort to courts. However, there are exceptions:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;

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(i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
(j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) where strong public interest is involved; and
(l) in quo warranto proceedings.

In this case, with the peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted,
RCBMI's action falls within the temporal exempting circumstance, or where
there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant. Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension
of RCBMI's enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by the
MAR in 1982, but to date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.

Tan v Cinco
GR no 213054; June 15, 2016
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

Facts:

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Respondents extended a loan to Tan which was facilitated by Penta Capital
and was secured by Dante‘s shares in the Best World Resources Corporation
(BWRC). When Dante failed to pay the loan, he proposed to settle the same
by selling his shares in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to Simon Lori
Holdings, Inc. (SLHI), the individual lenders, and PentaCapital (respondents).
When he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment, Dante
disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid. The respondents filed an action
for the sum of money against him before the RTC Makati. The RTC Makati
ordered Dante to pay respondents. The levied property of Dante was sold in
an auction sale but, later on, Teresita Tan (Dante‘s wife and petitioner) filed
before the RTC Parañaque a complaint against respondents for the
nullification of the auction sale and the cancellation of the certificate of sale
issued in favor of respondents. The Parañaque RTC initially dismissed the
nullification case on the ground of res judicata. Upon MR, the Parañaque RTC
reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the
certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents.

Issue:
Whether RTC Parañaque violated the doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in nullifying the judgement of RTC Makati

Held:
Yes; the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders
or
judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule
is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction
over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution
and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.

In this case, the Court finds that the Parañaque RTC violated the doctrine of
judicial stability when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case
despite the fact that the collection case from which it emanated falls within
the jurisdiction of the Makati RTC. The judgment rendered by the Makati RTC
in the collection case may not be interfered with by the Parañaque RTC, a
court of concurrent jurisdiction,
Erice v Sison
AM no RTJ-15-2407; November 22, 2017
Doctrine of non-interference or doctrine of judicial stability

Facts:

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Petitioner Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City filed a complaint against
then Mayor Echiverri and other city officials before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension
against Echiverri. The CA affirmed this order of suspension. Petitioner filed a
petition for declaratory relief and the RTC issued an ex-parte order to enjoin
the DILG and Erice from implementing the order of suspension. Erice and the
DILG questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC considering that the object of the
petition for declaratory relif were the CA decision and the order of
suspension of the Ombudsman. When the case was raffled to Judge Sison,
petitioners reiterated their motion to dismiss but still Judge Sison issued an
order extending the TRO notwithstanding the fact that the OSG invoked its
right to cross-examine the witness and has not done so. Respondent was
then charged with gross ignorance of the law.

Issue:
Whether respondent judge undermined the doctrine of judicial stability

Held:
Yes; under the principle or judicial stability or non-interference, where
decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the CA, these
adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions are logically
beyond the control of the RTC.

The Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA

under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases. More so, at the time Judge Sison issued the
TRO and proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction against the
enforcement of the Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the CA had already
affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in its Decision.

Vda. De Ballesteros v Rural Bank of Canaman Inc

GR no 176260; November 24, 2010
Doctrine of adherence of Jurisdiction, Continuity of Jurisdiction

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
Deed of Mortgage and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction

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against her children and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc. (RBCI) before the
RTC. The lawyers of PDIC took over the case of RBCI due to the latter’s’
closure. RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action stating that
pursuant to Section 30 of The New Central Bank Act, the RTC, already
constituted itself as the
liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the liquidation of RBCI. Thus,
the subject matter of Lucia's case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of such
liquidation court. Lucia opposed the motion. The RTC issued an order
granting the Motion to Dismiss. On appeal to the CA, the court ordered the
consolidation of the Lucia's civil case and the liquidation case pending before
RTC-Makati. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether a liquidation court can take cognizance of a case against a bank
ordered closed

Held:
No; As a general rule, when a court has already obtained and is exercising
jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final
determination of the case is not affected by a new legislation transferring
jurisdiction over such proceedings to another tribunal. Once jurisdiction is
vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.

However, this rule does not find application in this case because one of the
exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
Sec 30 of RA 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the
liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in
the adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. Hence, to allow
Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of
favorable judgement and execution thereof against the assets of RCBI would
not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would defeat the
very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted.

Cang v CA
GR no 105308; September 25, 1998
Statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action

Facts:
Petitioners are married and they have three children. Later in their marriage,
when wife Anna Marie found her husband‘s extramarital affair with Wilma

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Soco, she filed a petition for legal separation. Herbert Cang went to the US
where he sought divorce from Anna Marie, had an American wife and later
on, divorced. Spouses Clavano then filed a special proceeding for the
adoption of the Cang children, who at the time, were minors. The petition
bears the signature of then 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his
adoption. Anna Marie, the biological mother, likewise executed an affidavit of
consent alleging that her husband had "evaded his legal obligation to
support" his children. Petitioner‘s consent was lacking in the petition;
however, the fact of abandonment of the children by the petitioner was
sufficiently alleged. Upon learning of the petition, Herbert Cang immediately
went back to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto. The RTC issued
the decree of adoption. The CA affirmed the decree of adoption citing Art 188
of the Family Code which requires the written consent of the natural parents;
however, the written consent of the parent who has abandoned the children
are not necessary.

Issue:
Whether the petition for adoption is defective for not containing the natural
father’s consent

Held:
Yes; when the Clavano spouses filed the petition for adoption, the applicable
law was the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the child. During the pendency of the
petition, the Family Code, which amended the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
took effect. Still, under the Family Code, written consent of the natural
parent is required.
The established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.

Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity "insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws." Notwithstanding the amendment, the written consent of
the natural parent is still a requisite for the validity.

Rule 99 of the Rules of Court provides that the written consent may be
dispensed with if the natural parent has abandoned the child or is insane or
hopelessly intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case
even without the written consent of the parents or one of the parents
provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the
liberality with which
this Court treats the procedural aspect of adoption.

There should be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his
children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to

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adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that
petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and his
children. Based on the evidence presented, which was surprisingly not
considered by the RTC and CA, and contrary to Anna Marie‘s claim, the
petitioner did not abandon his children as to warrant the loss of parental
authority.

Heirs of Dolleton v Fil-Estate Management Inc

GR no 170750; April 7, 2009
Sec 2, PD 1529

Facts:
Petitioners heirs filed before the RTC 8 Complaints, which were later
consolidated, were similarly worded and contained substantially identical
allegations. Petitioners claimed that they had been in continuous, open, and

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exclusive possession of the afore-described parcels of land for more than 90
years until they were forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents.
Petitioners thus sought from the RTC that an order be issued enjoining
respondents from making any developments on the subject properties, to
recognize the rights of the petitioners, to vacate the subject lot and
peacefully surrender possession thereof to petitioners, that TCTs be
cancelled by the
Register of Deeds for Las Piñas, and the payment of moral and exemplary
damages and atty‘s fees. Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to
Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction. They moved for the dismissal of the
eight Complaints on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of
cause of action; and (4) res
judicata.

Issue:
Whether the RTC properly granted respondents’ motion to dismiss

Held:
No; Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a cause of action
as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. It’s
essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendant. In this case, the court is convinced that each of
the complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action.

Thornton v Thornton
GR no 154598; August 16, 2004
Family Courts

Facts:
Petitioner Thornton, American and Respondent Thornton, Filipina were
married and had one daughter before the respondent left the family home
together with their daughter and told her servants that she was going to

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Basilan. Petitioner husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati but was dismissed because the child was
in Basilan. When petitioner went to Basilan, the barangay issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Hence, petitioner
filed another petition for habeas corpus in the CA which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country but his petition was denied
on the ground that the CA did not have jurisdiction over the case since RA
8369 gave family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus.

Issue:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors

Held:
Yes; CA has jurisdiction because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction
to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of
the CA could not be affirmed because it will leave petitioner without a legal
course in obtaining custody as the minor could be transferred from one place
to another and the habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy
since family courts take cognizance only of cases within their jurisdiction.

Manchester Development Corporation v CA

GR no L-75919; May 7, 1987
Docket and Filing Fees

Facts:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter
to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that
City Land forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction

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thereby causing damages to Manchester which amount was not reiterated in
the prayer of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only.
Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action
is primarily for specific performance, hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied
but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages which amount
was however again not stated in the PRAYER.

Issue:
Whether the amended complaint should be admitted

Held:
No; the docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the
proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly
filed which can be
amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the
amended complaint is void.

In this case, based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, the
case is an action for damages and for specific performance. The omission in
the prayer of the amount of damages clearly constitutes an attempt to evade
the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar
irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on,
all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading
but also in the prayer and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted or shall otherwise
be expunged from the record.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd v Asuncion

GR no 79937-38; February 13, 1989
Docket and Filing Fees

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office filed a complaint for the consignation of a
premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioner. Although the

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prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said
amount
may be inferred from the body of the complaint. Only the amount of
P21O.OO was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection, which was disregarded by
respondent Judge. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial
court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the
exclusion of Judge Castro.

Issue:
Whether a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid

Held:
Yes; it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp (IBC-13) v Alonzo Legasto

GR no 169108; April 18, 2006
Docket and Filing Fees

Facts:
For the purpose of putting an end to a suit for sum of money, Salvador and
Intercontinental entered into a compromise agreement alongside which is a
joint manifestation and motion to dismiss. Private respondent filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioner for failure
to comply with the compromise agreement. Petitioner then filed a motion for
the dismissal and/or suspension of all proceedings in the consolidated cases

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alleging that private respondent only paid P8,517.50 in docket fees and he
has unpaid docket fees amounting to more than P5M because his action was
actually one for a sum of money. The RTC held that the deficiency in the
filing fees did not divest it of its jurisdiction which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed for failure to pay the correct docket
fee

Held:
No; jurisdiction was properly acquired in this case. To put a stop to this
irregularity, all complaints, petitioners, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body
of the pleading but also in the prayer and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to
comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record. In the complaint, respondent did not
have a clear basis in computing the exact quantitative value of the
compromise agreement and it just relied on the assessment made by the
docket clerk which turned out to be incorrect.

It is said that upon payment of the assessed fees by the respondent, the trial
court properly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint. Jurisdiction once
acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is terminated. The payment
of docket fees negates any imputation of bad faith or an intent to defraud
the government. Thus, absent intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rules does not apply.

Foronda-Crystal v Son
GR no 221815; November 29, 2017
Docket and Filing Fees

Facts:
Respondent instituted an action for reconveyance and damages against
petitioner alleging that for 12 ½ years, she has been the lawful owner and
possessor of the subject lot. She alleged that she purchased the same from
Arias and since her acquisition, she has been paying the RPT thereon.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC then dismissed the case asserting that the market value of the property
is P 2,830 and thus, jurisdiction over the case lies with the MCTC. However,

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the RTC reconsidered and set aside the complaint stating that the property
was worth P200,000 and hence, it is within the jurisdiction of the RTC which
was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the case

Held:
No; Rule 141 of the Rules of Court concerns the amount of the prescribed
filing and docket fees, the payment of which bestows upon the courts the
jurisdiction to entertain the pleadings to be filed; and second, the
determination of the amount of prescribed filing and docket fees which are
based on the following: (a) the fair market value of the real property in
litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue; or (b) the stated value of the real or
personal property in litigation as alleged by the claimant.

Two tier rule

1. Assessed value of the complaint
2. Attachment to the complaint

A reading of the discourse on this would indicate that the jurisdiction referred
to above does not deal with the delineation of the jurisdictions of the first
and second level courts, but with the acquisition of jurisdiction by the courts
through the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.

In this case, respondent failed to allege in her complaint the assessed value
of the subject property. Rather, what she included therein was an allegation
of its market value amounting to P200,000. In the course of the trial, the
petitioner asserted that the AV as stated in the tax declaration was merely
P1,030.

Radio Communications of the Philippines Inc v CA

GR no 136109; August 1, 2002
Aspects of Jurisdiction; Conferred by Law

Facts:
Manuel Dulawon filed with the RTC a complaint for breach of contract of
lease with damages against petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction contending that it is the Municipal Trial
Court which has jurisdiction as the complaint is basically one for collection of
unpaid rentals, which does not exceed the jurisdiction amount of P100,000
for RTC which was denied. Hence, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for
certiorari.

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Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by private
respondent

Held:
Yes; in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation,
and jurisdiction over the action will depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is one where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, which is
cognizable exclusively by Regional Trial Courts.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred

by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint show that private
respondent’s cause of action is breach of contract. Hence, irrespective of the
amount of rentals and damages sought to be recovered, incapable of
pecuniary estimation and is cognizable exclusively by the RTC.

Spouses Erorita v Spouses Dumlao

GR no 195477; January 25, 2016
Jurisdiction over the subject matter & Estoppel Jurisdiction

Facts:
Respondent spouses Dumlao are the registered owners of a parcel of land
where the San Mariano Academy structures are built. The Spouses Dumlao
bought the property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Because the former
owners, Spouses Erorita, failed to redeem it. The Spouses Dumlao agreed to
allow the petitioners to continue to operate the school on the property. The
Spouses Dumlao alleged that the Eroritas agreed on a monthly rent of
P20,000.00, but had failed to pay rentals since 1990. Later on, the Spouses

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Dumlao asked the petitioners to vacate the property but the latter failed to
comply as they could not immediately close the school without clearance
from the DECS to whom they are accountable. Subsequently, Spouses
Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the RTC. The
Eroritas appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently shows a case
for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.

Issue:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction

Held:
No; The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and
jurisdiction over the case and jurisdiction does not depend on the
complainant’s caption.

Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its
allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case.
Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC's exclusive
jurisdiction regardless of the property's assessed value. In the present case,
the complaint clearly contained the elements of an unlawful detainer case.
Thus, the case
should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no jurisdiction over this
case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void, the
RTC's decision is void.

As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised
at any time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is
the principle of estoppel by laches which may only be invoked to bar the
defense of lack of jurisdiction. Laches refers to the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it. No laches in this case; Hence, jurisdiction may be raised at any
time.
Heirs of Alfredo Bautista v Lindo
GR no 208232; March 10, 2014
Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Facts:
Alfredo Bautista, petitioner’s predecessor, inherited a free-patent land. A few
years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein
respondents. Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for
repurchase against respondents before the RTC, anchoring his cause of
action on Section 119 the Public Land Act which allows the right of
repurchase. During the pendency of the case, Bautista died and was
substituted by petitioners. Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo

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entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they agreed
to cede to Epifania portions of the property as well as to withdraw all claims
and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved by the
RTC. Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
total selling price of all the properties is only PhP 16,500 and that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the complaint in question since the property which
Bautista seeks to repurchase is below the P20,000 jurisdictional ceiling. The
RTC issued the assailed order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners argue that an action for repurchase is not a real
action, but one incapable of pecuniary estimation, it being founded on privity
of contract between the parties.

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction

Held:
Yes; jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.

If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered

capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal
courts or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim. But where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable
of pecuniary estimation. These cases are cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary

estimation, viz:
1. Actions for specific performance;
2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil status;
3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.

The Court finds that the instant cause of action to redeem the land is one for
specific performance. The reconveyance of the title to petitioners is solely
dependent on the exercise of such right to repurchase the lots in question
and is not the principal or main relief or remedy sought. Thus, the action of
petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
reconveyance of the lot
is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation to return the
property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.

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Heirs of Julao v De Jesus
GR no 176020; September 29, 2014
Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

Facts:
Telesforo Julao filed before DENR two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his
death, his applications were transferred to his heirs. Solito Julao executed a
Deed of Transfer of Rights, transferring his hereditary share in the property
to respondent spouses De Jesus where the latter constructed a house. Later
on, the OCT covering a property, was issued in favor of the heirs of Telesforo.
Petitioners representing themselves to be the heirs of Telesforo, filed before
the RTC of Baguio City, a Complaint or Recovery of Possession of Real
Property against respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are the

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true and lawful owners of a parcel of land located at Naguilian Road, Baguio
City and that respondent spouses’ house encroached on 70 square meters of
the subject property, among others. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA
reversed the decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the complaint

Held:
No; the Court held that in an action for recovery of possession, the assessed
value of the property sought to be recovered determines the court’s
jurisdiction.
In this case, for the RTC to exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the
subject property must exceed P20,000.00 (P50,000 if in Metro Manila). Since
petitioners failed to allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the
subject property, the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners
failed to establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be determined
which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In an
action to recover, the property must be identified.

Palmiano-Salvador v Angeles
GR no 171219; September 3, 2012
Jurisdiction over parties

Facts:
Respondent Angeles is one of the registered owners of a parcel of land which
Galiga from 1979 to 1993. Subsequently, petitioner Salvador alleged that she
bought the said land. Then, Angeles through Diaz filed a complaint for
ejectment before the MeTC against Salvador. The MeTC ruled in favor of
respondent Angeles. Petitioner Salvador appealed in RTC averring that Diaz
has no authority whatsoever from Angeles at the time of filling of the suit.
The RTC denied his appeal. When the case was elevated to the CA via
petition for review, the same affirmed.

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Issue:
Whether Diaz may file a complaint in behalf of Angeles

Held:
No; Diaz filed to present proof of his authority to represent Angeles in filing
the complaint. The SPA attached was executed only more than a month after
the complaint was filed.

if a complaint is led for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not
authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. An authorized
complaint does not produce any legal effect. In order for the court to have
authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties. Jurisprudence also provides that
Courts acquire over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint and to be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the court’s
jurisdiction. If no valid complaint was ever filed, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of respondent.

Denila v Republic
GR no 206077; July 15, 2020
Jurisdiction over the Issues

Facts:
Petitioner filed an amended petition for reconstitution of OCT before the RTC
alleging that she is currently in possession of the lands covered by the OCTs
and that the parcels of land covered under said OCTs had no co-owners,
mortgagees and/or lessees and had no corresponding certificates of title
issued to other persons which had been lost or destroyed. The respondent
presented the testimony of Atty. Cruzabra the deputy and acting registrar of
deed. Petitioner objected to the admissibility and probative value of the
Atty’s documents because the copies of the titles are not in their normal
forms issued by the RD but were merely lifted and copied from a local
newspaper. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.

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Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction in granting the petition for reconstitution of
title despite failure of petitioner to comply with some jurisdictional
requirements

Held:
No; Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings defined as the
power and authority — conferred by the Constitution or statute — of a court
to hear and decide a case. Without jurisdiction, a judgment rendered by a
court is null and void and may be attacked anytime.

In adjudication, the concept of jurisdiction has several aspects, namely: (a)

jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) jurisdiction over the parties; (c)
jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and (d) in cases involving property,
jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation.
Additionally, a court must also acquire jurisdiction over the remedy in order
for it to exercise its powers validly and with binding effect.

- Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court.

- Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to make

decisions that are binding on them and is based on due process. This is
acquired through voluntary appearance, in the case of the plaintiff or
petitioner, or through the coercive power of legal processes, in the
case of the defendant or respondent.

- Jurisdiction over the issues pertains to a tribunal's power and authority

to decide over matters which are either disputed by the parties or
simply under consideration. This aspect of jurisdiction is closely tied to
jurisdiction over the remedy and over the subject matter which, in
turn, is generally determined in the allegations of the initiatory
pleading (complaint or petition) and not the result of proof. However,
unlike jurisdiction over the subject-matter, jurisdiction over the issues
may be conferred by either express or implied consent of the parties.

- Jurisdiction over the res pertains to the court's authority over the
object or thing subject of the litigation as well as its power to bind the
same with its judgment.

- Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to authority of a tribunal to take

cognizance and pass upon the propriety of petitioner or complainant's
reliefs sought. The same aspect of jurisdiction is dependent on either
the statute providing for a specific procedure for the recognition of a

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 particular right, or the procedure promulgated by this Court pursuant
to its constitutional powers.

Reconstitution of title is a special proceeding. Being a special proceeding, a

petition for reconstitution must allege and prove certain specific jurisdictional
facts before a trial court can acquire jurisdiction. Conversely, noncompliance
with all jurisdictional requirements in special proceedings (such as
reconstitution of title) adversely affects the trial court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case rendering the whole proceedings null and void. In
this case, petitioner failed to prove all the jurisdictional requirement. Hence,
the proceedings are null and void.

De Joya v Marquez
GR no 162416; January 31, 2006
Jurisdiction over the Res

Facts:
Petitioner Chester De Joya asserts that respondent Judge Marquez erred in
finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused for violation of Art 315(2)(a)
of the RPC. Hence, he filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by
respondent judge against petitioner. He likewise continuously refuses to
submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the case

Held:
Yes; jurisdiction over the issues of the case is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-

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trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the
failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
pleadings.

Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by

the court of the thing in question, placing in cutodia legis, as in attachment
or garnishment.

The court acquired jurisdiction to try the case even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of a non-resident defendant, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of
the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an
interest. In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to
the defendant is merely to comply with due process requirement.

His continued refusal to submit to the lower court’s jurisdiction does not
allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts. Moreover, it gives the Court
more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge. The purpose of a
warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows intent to
circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process.
Notes:
Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition
or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to
him, generally by the service of summons.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) v Citi Appliance MC
Corporation
GR no 214546; October 9, 2019
Jurisdiction over the Remedy

Facts:
Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land where it decided to construct a 16-
storey commercial building on it. The Cebu City Zoning Board (CCZB)
required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level parking area consisting of 26
parking slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a
deep excavation to lay the foundation of the parking lot. In the process, it
discovered telephone lines, cables, and manholes underground, which had
been placed there by PLDT. These encroached on Citi Appliance's property,
preventing it from excavating the land. Citi Appliance wrote PLDT,
demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables, and
manholes, or to shoulder the parking exemption fee. Citi Appliance filed with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) a complaint for ejectment against
PLDT. The MTC granted respondent’s ejectment complaint which was
affirmed by the RTC and the CA. Petitioner maintains that the MTC in Cities

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has no jurisdiction over the case since respondent’s action for forcible entry
has prescribed.

Issue:
Whether the issue on lack of jurisdiction was deemed waived by petitioner
PLDT

Held:
No; Jurisdiction over the remedy is different from jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Jurisdiction over the remedy pertains to the court's competence over
the process. This should not be confused with the relief, that which the party
filing the case wants the court to declare, and which addresses the breach of
the right or obligation.

Generally, jurisdiction over the remedy is provided by the Rules of Court.

Thus, it is mainly a procedural matter which this Court — the authority that
promulgates the Rules of Court — may change ad hoc, or clarify the
application or interpretation of, in proper cases. Meanwhile, the source of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is generally conferred by law. This is why
the doctrine is that this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties.
Laws can only be amended by a subsequent law, and nothing that parties do
in any case can change it. Thus, the question of jurisdiction over the subject
matter can be raised even for the first time on appeal, not simply because it
is jurisdiction over the subject matter, but mainly because it is the law that
prescribes.

Tijam v Sibonghanoy
GR no L-21450; April 15, 1968
Estoppel Jurisdiction

Facts:
Spouses Tijam filed in the CFI of Cebu against spouses Sibonghanoy to
recover
the sum of P1,980. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the
defendants which was countered by a counter-bond of the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co. being the Surety of the Sibonghanoys. The CFI ruled in favor of
the Tijams. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued by the CFI but an
affirmative relief by the Surety company was made. This was likewise denied
by the CFI which prompted the Surety to appeal to the Court of Appeals
wherein the latter affirmed the decision of the CFI. Quickly thereafter, the
Surety filed a motion to dismiss to the CA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
alleging that the Tijams filing to the CFI was not proper since one month
before the filing to the CFI, the Judiciary Act of 1948 was passed into law
wherein it stated that Section 88 of which placed within the original exclusive

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jurisdiction of inferior courts (MTC) all civil actions where the value of the
subject- matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00.

Issue:
Whether the case may be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction

Held:
No; the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late
hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with its active
participation.

Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief

against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy. After voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court.
Lansangan v Caisip
GR no 212987; August 6, 2018
Condition Precedent

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
respondent Caisip. Respondent defaulted in his obligation under a
promissory note to pay and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply.
Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to
declare him in default and for the MCTC to render judgment. MCTC motu
proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with
the requirement of barangay conciliation as mandated by the Local
Government Code. When the case reached the review of the CA, it affirmed
the dismissal of the case.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in upholding the motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint

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Held:
Yes; Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the ROC provides that when a condition precedent for
filing the claim has not been complied with, it is a ground that may be raised
in a motion to dismiss.

The grounds must be invoked by the party-litigant (respondent, in this case)

at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer;
otherwise, such grounds are deemed waived. As an exception, however, the
courts may order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and
prescription of action, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

The motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on petitioner's

failure to refer the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings which in
certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing a case in court. It is a
pre-condition to the filing of a complaint involving any matter within the
authority
of the lupon. The ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e.,
undergoing prior barangay conciliation proceedings, was not invoked at the
earliest opportunity, as in fact, respondent was declared in default for failure
to file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error
for
the courts a quo to order the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said
ground.

Lansangan v Caisip
GR no 212987; August 6, 2018
LGC

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
respondent Caisip. Respondent defaulted in his obligation under a
promissory note to pay and refused to heed petitioner's demands to comply.
Since respondent failed to file any responsive pleading, petitioner moved to
declare him in default and for the MCTC to render judgment. MCTC motu
proprio dismissed without prejudice the complaint for failure to comply with
the requirement of barangay conciliation as mandated by the Local
Government Code. When the case reached the review of the CA, it affirmed
the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

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Whether the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint

Held:
Yes; Under the LGC, disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay [(as in the parties in this case)] shall be brought for amicable
settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

The primordial objective of a prior barangay conciliation is to reduce the

number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of
justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in courts.
Subject to certain exemptions, a party's failure to comply with this
requirement before filing a case in court would render his complaint
dismissible on the ground of failure to comply with a condition precedent,
pursuant to Section 1 (j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.30

Conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement, such that non-

compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant. The non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so
required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be
deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a
responsive pleading.

Abagatnan v Spouses Clarito

GR no 211966; August 7, 2017
LGC

Facts:
Petitioner Abagatnan and his late wife Lydia Capote acquired a parcel of land
designated located at Brgy. Cogon, Roxas City. Respondents were allowed to
construct a residential house subject to the condition that respondents will
vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own use. When
Lydia died, her children succeeded into the ownership of her conjugal share
of said property. Then, the petitioners decided to sell portions of the lot
including the subject property which was then still being occupied by
respondents. Said portion was first offered to the respondents, but the latter
declined. Thereafter, a Demand letter was sent to the respondents requiring
them to vacate the subject

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property within 15 days from receipt but they failed to heed the request.
Hence, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful detainer and Damages
before the Municipal Trial Court. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior
barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a precondition for the
filing
of the case given that not all petitioners are resident of Roxas City (Jimmy
resided in Laguna; Jenalyn resided in Pasig).

Issue:
Whether there is still a need to comply for a prior barangay conciliation
requirement under Sec 412 of the LGC despite the fact that not all real
parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality

Held:
No; Section 412 of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman as a precondition to the filing of a
complaint. One exception would be in cases where the dispute involves
parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to
submit to their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged
that not all the real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas
City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior
referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a pre-condition to its filing
in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already
authorized their sister and copetitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-
fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC.

Chavez v CA
GR no 159411; March 18, 2005
Katarungang Pambarangay or LGC

Facts:
Petitioner Chavez and respondent Trillana entered into a contract of lease
whereby the former leased to the latter his fishpond for a term of 6 years.
The contract provided that respondent shall undertake all construction and
preservation of improvements in the fishpond that may be destroyed during
the period of the lease, at his expense, without reimbursement from
petitioner.
Later, a powerful typhoon hit the country which damaged the subject
fishpond. Three weeks later, respondent was informed by a barangay
councilor that major repairs were being undertaken in the fishpond with the

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use of a crane. Respondent found out that the repairs were at the instance of
petitioner who had grown impatient with his delay in commencing the work.
Respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain.
After conciliation proceedings, an agreement was reached. However, alleging
non-compliance by petitioner with their lease contract and the "Kasunduan,"
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC of Valenzuela
City which rendered a decision in favor of respondent. Petitioner contends
that the CA erred in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed
by respondent considering that the subject matter thereof, his alleged
violation of the lease contract with respondent, was already amicably settled
before the Office of the Barangay Captain.

Issue:
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action filed by respondent
considering that the subject matter was already amicably settled before the
Office of the Barangay Captain

Held:
Yes; The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides that an amicable
settlement reached after barangay conciliation proceedings has the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court if not repudiated or a petition to
nullify the same is filed before the proper city or municipal court within ten
days from its date. It further provides that the settlement may be enforced
by execution by the lupong tagapamayapa within six months from its date,
or by action in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-
month period.

If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand. In exercising the second option under Art. 2041,
the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise
agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may
regard the compromise as already rescinded by the breach thereof of the
other party.

Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent

before the Office of the Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance paved the way for the
which respondent may either enforce the compromise, following the
procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard
it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand by bringing the suit as if
there had never been any compromise agreement. Respondent chose the
latter option when
he instituted a civil case.

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Macasaet v Co Jr
GR no 156759; June 5, 2013
Actions in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem

Facts:
Respondent, a retired police officer, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of
general circulation including its publisher, managing director and columnists,
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners
published in Abante Tonite. The suit was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC,
which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant,
including Abante Tonite, at their business address. One morning, RTC Sheriff
Raul Medina proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service
of the summons on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each
defendant in the address were futile because the defendants were then out

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of the office and unavailable. He returned in the afternoon of that day to
make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed that
petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to resort to substituted
service of the summons.

Issue:
Whether the jurisdiction over petitioners have been acquired

Held:
Yes; Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam is the power of
the court to render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings rendered in the action. It
is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil as well as
criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem.

Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not

required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it
acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action. The
purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the defendant but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due
process.

A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and

obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in
personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility
or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are
suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to
fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one
which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that
an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or
obligations; such action is brought against the person. Actions for recovery of
real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the
claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem
deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which
are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular
parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or

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interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only
upon the parties who joined in the action.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily
appears in court; but when the case is an action in rem or quasi in rem
enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction
over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant
is not essential.

In this case, the substituted service made was valid because the petitioners
were “always out and not available”. And hence, jurisdiction over the
persons were acquired.

Heirs of Tomas Dolleton v Fil-Estate Management Inc

GR no 170750; April 7, 2009
Cause of action; meaning of cause of action

Facts:
Petitioner heirs filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title
and/or Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary
Injunction/Restraining Order and Damages against respondents. Petitioners
claimed that they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of
the afore-described parcels of land for more than 90 years until they were
forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents. Petitioners thus sought
from the RTC that an order be issued enjoining respondents from making any
developments on the subject properties, to recognize the rights of the

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petitioners, to vacate the subject lot and peacefully surrender possession
thereof to petitioners, that TCTs be cancelled by the Register of Deeds.
Respondents filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition. They
moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints on the ground of lack of
cause of action.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners’ complaints for failure to
state a cause of action

Held:
Yes; a cause of action is an act or omission by which a party violates the
right of another. Its essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other appropriate relief.

The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. If
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendant. This Court is convinced that each of the
Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of
action. The Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject
properties by acquisitive prescription. As owners thereof, they have the right
to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties and, if deprived
thereof, they may recover the same.
Multi-Realty Development Corporation v Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation
GR no 146726; June 16, 2006
Right of Action

Facts:
Petitioner Multi-Realty is a domestic corporation engaged in real estate, and
in development and construction of condominiums. It built the 26-storey
Makati Tuscany Condominium. Pursuant to the Condominium Act (RA 4726),
Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. (MATUSCO) was created to manage the
condominium units. A Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions was
executed between Multi-Realty and MATUSCO and was filed with the Register
of Deeds. Multi-Realty then executed a Deed of Transfer to MATUSCO over
the common areas. Subsequently, Multi-Realty sold some parking slots to

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which MATUSCO did not object. Multi-Realty requested that 2 of its
executives be allowed to park in two of the remaining slots, but MATUSCO
denied the request, asserting, for the first time, their ownership over the
common areas. While MATUSCO later on offered the requested slots, Multi-
Realty rejected it. Multi-Realty then sued for Damages and/or Reformation of
Instrument asserting that the ownership of the unnassigned slots remained
with them. MATUSCO alleged that Multi-Realty had no cause of action
against it for reformation since Multi-Realty, by its own admission, sold
parking slots to third parties despite knowledge that such slots, other than
those mentioned in the Master Deed, belonged to
MATUSCO.

Issue:
Whether Multi-Realty had a cause of action against MATUSCO

Held:
Yes; "right of action" is the right to commence and maintain an action. In the
law of pleadings, right of action is distinguished from a cause of action in
that the former is a remedial right belonging to some persons while the latter
is a formal statement of the operational facts that give rise to such remedial
right. The former is a matter of right and depends on the substantive law
while the
latter is a matter of statute and is governed by the law of procedure. The
right of action springs from the cause of action, but does not accrue until all
the facts which constitute the cause of action have occurred.

One has a right of action to file a complaint/petition for reformation of an

instrument when his legal right is denied, challenged or refused by another;
or when there is an antagonistic assertion of his legal right and the denial
thereof by another concerning a real question or issue; when there is a real,
definitive and substantive controversy between the parties touching on their
legal relations having adverse legal interests.
A cause of action must always consist of two elements: (1) the plaintiff's
primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty, whatever
may be the subject to which they relate — person, character, property or
contract; and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been violated.

The statute of limitations then does not begin to run against an equitable
cause of action for the reformation of an instrument because of mistake until
the mistake has been discovered or ought to have been discovered. In this
case, petitioner only became of aware of respondent’s denial of its right
under their true contract after MATUSCO’s denial of its request; hence, Multi-
Realty’s cause of action only arose during this time.

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Consular Area Residents Association v Casanova
GR no 202618; April 12, 2016
Meaning of Cause of Action; Right of Action

Facts:
Congress enacted RA 7227 otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
and Development Act. For this purpose, the BCDA was authorized to own,
hold, and administer portions of Metro Manila military camps that may be
transferred to it by the President. In relation to this, EO 40 was issued
identifying Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for
development and disposition to raise funds for BCDA projects. Located in
Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas. The Local
Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance declaring
that the BCDA had complied with the requirement of "Just and Humane
Demolition and Eviction," for the demolition of structures within the JUSMAG
Area. Petitioner filed a case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which

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they claims are within the diplomatic and consular area, and not the JUSMAG
area.

Issue:
Whether the demolition should be enjoined

Held:
No; in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to
establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and
permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining
order or an injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting
substantial rights and interests, and it is not designed to protect contingent
or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of
adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.

In this case, the Court finds that petitioner has failed to prove that the
structures for which they seek protection against demolition fall within the
Diplomatic and Consular Area. Thus, since petitioner's purported right in esse
is hinged on the premise that the structures do not fall within the JUSMAG
but within the Diplomatic and Consular Area, the petition should already fail.

Danfoss Inc v Continental Cement Corp

GR no 143788; September 9, 2005
Cause of Action

Facts:
MINCI is an agent of Danfoss, Inc.’s products here in the Philippines. CCC
ordered two unit 132 KW Danfoss Brand Frequency Converter/Inverter from
MINCI to be used in the Finish Mill of its Cement Plant. In the terms of
conditions of the original purchase order, the two unit Frequency Converter
shall be delivered by Danfoss within 8 to 10 weeks from the opening of the
letter of credit. The order failed to arrive so CCC manifested its intention to
MINCI to cancel the order. CCC then filed a complaint for damages against
Danfoss and MINCI with the RTC due to the impending delay in the delivery
of its order. Petitioners contend that the case should be dismissed on the
ground that it did not state a cause of action. The RTC ruled in favor of CCC
which was affirmed by the CA.

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Issue:
Whether there was a cause of action in the complaint filed by CCC against
Danfoss

Held:
No; a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another. It is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary right of the plaintiff. In order to sustain
a dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must
appear on the face of the complaint. And the test of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether or
not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
thereon in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

After a careful perusal of the allegations in respondent’s complaint for

damages against petitioner, we rule that the same failed to state a cause of
action. When respondent sued petitioner for damages, petitioner had not
violated any right of respondent from which a cause of action had arisen.
Respondent only surmised that petitioner would not be able to deliver the
two units frequency converter/inverter on the date agreed upon by them.

Colmenar v Colmenar
GR no 252467; June 21, 2021
Failure to State Cause of Action distinguished from Lack of Cause of Action

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents avering that he is the
second child of his parents (deceased Francisco and Dorothy Colmenar) who
were later on divorced. When petitioner’s father died, the latter left real
properties registered in its name. When petitioner knew that respondents
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate making it appear that they
were the surviving heirs and sold the properties without his knowledge, he
sent a demand letter to individual respondent invoking his successional right
but to no avail. Hence, the complaint was filed. In the meantime, the 2019
amendments to the ROC took effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action citing Sec
12, Rule 8 of the 2019 amendments to the ROC.

Issue:
Whether complainant failed to state a cause of action

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Held:
No; there is a difference between failure to state a cause of action and lack
of cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the allegations in the pleadings, while lack of cause of action
refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.

Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss in the old rules or
raised as an affirmative defense, while dismissal for lack of cause of action
may be raised any time AFTER the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against a

defendant is – admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact
made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in the
complaint?

In the case at bar, there was a cause of action because petitioner’s cause of
action hinged on his averment that the individual respondents are not
owners of the properties, hence, they cannot validly sell the same to
respondent companies, nor convey any title to the latter by reason of invalid
sale.

Sanico v Colipano
GR no 209969; September 27, 2017
Failure to state cause of action distinguished from lack of cause of action

Facts:
One Christmas Day, respondent and her daughter were paying passengers in
the jeepney operated by Sanico, which was driven by Castro. Colipano
claimed she was made to sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the rear
entrance/exit of the jeepney with her sleeping child on her lap. And, at an
uphill incline in the road, the jeepney slid backwards because it did not have
the power to reach the top. Colipano pushed both her feet against the step
board to prevent herself and her child from being thrown out of the exit, but
because the step board was wet, her left foot slipped and got crushed
between the step board and a coconut tree which the jeepney bumped,
causing the jeepney to stop its backward movement. Colipano's leg was
badly injured and was eventually amputated. Respondent then filed for
breach of contract of carriage and damages against petitioners.

Issue:

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Whether respondent has cause of action against both petitioners Sanico and
Castro

Held:
No; since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage,
the liability of Sanico is direct as the contract is between him and Colipano.
Castro, being merely the driver of Sanico’s jeepney, cannot be made liable
as he is not a party to the contract of carriage. A complaint for breach of a
contract of carriage is dismissible as against the employee who was driving
the bus because the parties to the contract of carriage are only the
passenger, the bus owner and the operator.

Since Castro was not a party to the contract of carriage, Colipano had no
cause of action against him and the complaint against him should be
dismissed. Although he was driving the jeepney, he was a mere employee of
Sanico, who was the operator and owner of the jeepney.

Misamis Occidental II Cooperative Inc v David

GR no 129928; August 25, 2005
Test of Sufficiency of Cause of Action and its Effects

Facts:
Private respondent David, a supplier of electrical hardware, filed a case for
specific performance and damages against Misamis Occidental II Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (MOELCI II), a rural electric cooperative in Misamis
Occidental predicated on a document attached as Annex ―Aǁ to the
Amended Complaint that according to David is the contract pursuant to
which he sold to MOELCI II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer. MOELCI II
filed its Answer to Amended Complaint which pleaded, among others, lack of
cause of action as the attachment only contains a quotation, there being
allegedly no enforceable contract between David and MOELCI II. The RTC
denied MOELCI II's motion for preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses
and MR. MOELCI II elevated the incident to the Court of Appeals by way of a
special civil action for certiorari. The CA dismissed MOELCI II’s petition
holding that the allegations in David’s complaint constitute a cause of action.

Issue:
Whether there is a cause of action

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Held:
Yes; to determine the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in
the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take
cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their
existence. If the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which
the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless
of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a

cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. In the
case at bar, it has been hypothetically admitted that the parties had entered
into a contract of sale, David bound himself to supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10
MVA Power transformer with accessories plus KV Line Accessories. And that
despite written and verbal demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price
thereof plus the custom duties and incidental expenses. All the foregoing
sufficiently lay out a cause of action.

Marilag v Martinez
GR no 201892; July 22, 2015
Splitting of a single cause of action and its effect

Facts:
Rafael Martinez, respondent's father, obtained from petitioner a loan which
was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered. Rafael
failed to settle his obligation upon maturity and despite repeated demands,
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage before the RTC. The RTC issued a Decision, but records do
not show that this Decision had already attained finality. Meanwhile, prior to
Rafael's notice of the above decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's
obligation to petitioner. After partial payments, he executed a promissory
note but respondent refused to pay the amount covered by the subject PN
despite demands after learning of the decision. This prompted petitioner to
file a complaint for sum of money and damages before the court. The court a
quo
denied recovery on the subject PN. It found that the consideration for its
execution was Rafael's indebtedness to petitioner, the extinguishment of
which necessarily results in the consequent extinguishment of the cause
therefor.
However, the court a quo granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration and

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declared that the causes of action in the collection and foreclosure cases are
distinct. CA held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the
instant case and that the first decision of the RTC should be considered
(extinguishment of which necessarily results in the extinguishment of the
cause).

Issue:
Whether litis pendentia applies

Held:
Yes; Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to
that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties
for
the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would
amount to res judicata in the other.

Splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple

cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers, where
the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia or res judicata, as the case may be.

In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the
creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the debtor
mortgagor, to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for
collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on
the mortgage security.

The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative, or successive, and each
remedy is complete by itself. As petitioner had already instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred
from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of
whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality.

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Sps Yap v First E-Bank Corporation
GR no 169889; September 29, 2009
Splitting a single cause of action and its effects

Facts:
Sammy Yap obtained a P2M loan from PDCP Development bank. As security,
Sammy‘s parents executed a third-party mortgage on the land. Sammy
issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in favor of PDCP as
additional security of the loan. When Sammy defaulted on the payment of
his loan, PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee bank but the said
checks were dishonored. PDCP filed a complaint against Sammy for six
counts of violation of BP 22 but were provisionally dismissed. Later, pursuant
to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was
set. Petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint against PDCP. Petitioner‘s
complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP
waived its right to foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the
BP22 cases against Sammy. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA
reversed the RTC alleging that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right
to foreclose on the property of petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation
of BP22.

Issue:

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Whether PDCP is barred to foreclose the property when it elected to file for
violation of BP 22

Held:
No; prior to the effectivity of Circular 57-97, the alternative remedies of
foreclosure of mortgage and collection of suit were not barred even if a suit
for BP 22 had been filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had been
rendered in the BP 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and
ordering him to pay the amount of the checks. And since PDCP filed the
complaint prior to the adoption of circular 57-97, PDCP is not barred to
foreclose the property.

Umale v Canoga Park Development Corporation

GR no 167246; July 20, 2011
Splitting of a single cause of action and its effects

Facts:
The parties entered into a Contract of Lease whereby the petitioner agreed
to lease, for a period of two years a lot owned by the respondent. Before the
lease contract expired, respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against
the petitioner before the MTC. Respondent used as a ground for ejectment
the petitioner's violation of stipulations in the lease contract regarding the
use of the
property. The MTC decided the ejectment case in favor of the respondent.
The RTC reversed the MTC decision. Thus, the respondent filed a petition for
review with the CA. During the pendency of the petition for review, the
respondent filed another case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner
before another branch of the MTC. This time, the respondent used as a
ground for ejectment the expiration of the parties' lease contract. MTC
decided in favor of the respondent. RTC reversed the decision on the ground
of litis pendentia. CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ruled that there
was no litis pendentia. Thus, the petition.

Issue:
Whether litis pendentia exists

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Held:
No; litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. Litis pendentia exists when the following
requisites are present: identity of the parties in the two actions; substantial
identity in causes of action and in the reliefs sought by the parties; and
identity between two actions should be such that any judgment that may be
rendered
in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.

Even if the respondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground

for ejectment in the first complaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner
in the second case was the expiration of the lease contract. If not for this
subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a second
complaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be
filed within one year after the accrual of the cause of action, which, in the
second case, was the expiration of the lease contract. Also, there can be no
conflict between the decisions because the latter case was on the sole issue
of whether the lease contract between the parties had expired. Although
alleged by the respondent in its complaint, MTC did not rule on the alleged
violations of the lease contract committed by the petitioner.
Perez v Hernano
GR no 147417; July 8, 2005
Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Action

Facts:
Three causes of action were filed by petitioner spouses and Aviso. The first
cause of action was for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between
the spouses and Aviso and Zecson - the latter being the buyer, the second
was for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into
between the spouses and Aviso and Hermano, while the last one was for
damages against all the mentioned defendants. A joinder was made on these
causes of action and
a civil case for Enforcement of Contract and Damages against Zescon Land,
Inc. and/or its President Zenie Sales-Contreras, Atty. Perlita Vitan-Ele and
against respondent herein Antonio Hermano was filed before the RTC.
Hermando denied the allegations and filed a motion with leave to dismiss the
complaint or ordered severed for separate trial which was granted by the
trial court on the ground that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action.
When petitioners filed for reconsideration with the CA, the CA dismissed.

Issue:

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Whether the trial court erred in dropping Hermano in the civil action and
ruling that there was a misjoinder in the causes of action

Held:
Yes; the statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action
is to encourage joinder of actions which could reasonably be said to involve
kindred rights and wrongs. The dominant idea is to permit joinder of causes
of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he
may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem
presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always
to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties.

The joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different
parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be
a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the
same transaction or series of transaction. In this case, there are questions of
fact, whether Zescon indeed misled petitioners to sign the mortgage in favor
of Hermano, which of the four contracts were validly entered into by the
parties and whether Zescon and Hermano committed fraud against
petitioners to make them liable for damages.

Pantranco North Express Inc v Standard Insurance Co Inc

GR no 140746; March 16, 2005
Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

Facts:
One afternoon, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by
his mother Martina Gicale. It was then raining. While driving, a passenger
bus, owned by Pantranco North Express, Inc., driven by Alexander Buncan,
was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along
the highway, the passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the
passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away. Crispin
reported the incident to the Police Station and respondent Standard
Insurance Co., Inc., insurer of the jeepney. Martina Gicale shouldered the
balance of the expense which was not paid by Standard. Thereafter,
Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from
petitioners Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This
prompted respondents to file with the RTC, a complaint for sum of money. In
their answer, petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
case since the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the
same transaction and that there are no common question of law and fact
common to both parties.

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Issue:
Whether there was misjoinder

Held:
No; Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises
out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question
of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder
is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and
venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s
bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of
fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single
transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the

same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action
would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had
respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence
would have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the
filing of the complaints with the court below is in order. Such joinder of
parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and
orderly administration of justice.

Danilo v Pedro
GR no 155736; March 31, 2005
Joinder and misjoiner of causes of action

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Danilo were owners of a parcel of land. The parties
executed a MOA wherein petitioners sold the land to respondent spouses
payable in six installments via post-dated checks. In the MOA, it appeared
that there was a condition that if two of the post-dated checks would be
dishonored by a drawee bank, the respondents would be obliged to reconvey
the property to
petitioners. Later, petitioners filed a complaint against respondents with the
RTC
for annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession, and damages
alleging that the first two checks issued by respondents were dishonored by
the drawee bank. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject
matter of the action. Respondents also averred that the principal action for
the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of possession of the property is a
real action

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and not a personal one, hence it should have been brought in the RTC of
Paranaque City where the property was located and not in the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan where the petitioners resided.

Issue:
Whether Sec5(c), Rule 2 of the ROC was applicable

Held:
No; according to said section, where the causes of action are between the
same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action
falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein.

A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right

of action in a complaint. The main thrust is whether more than one primary
right or subject of the controversy is present. The mere fact that the plaintiff
prays for multiple reliefs does not indicate that he has stated more than one
cause of action. If the complaint shows one primary right and one wrong,
only one cause of action is alleged even though other matters are
incidentally involved. Where two or more primary rights and wrongs appear,
there is a joinder of causes of action.
In this case, petitioners only had one cause of action against the respondents
namely, the breach of the MOA upon respondent’s refusal to pay the first two
installments in payment of the property and turn over to the petitioners the
possession of the real property. The claim for damages suffered by
petitioners on account of the breach of contract are merely incidental to the
main cause of
action and are not independent or separate causes of action.
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc v Mabalacat Institute Inc
GR no 211563; September 29, 2021
Joinder and misjoinder of causes of action

Facts:
Petitioner SVHFI claimed that it is the registered and absolute owner of a
parcel of land issued in the name of Mabalacat Institute Inc (MII) which
occupied the lot without paying rent and only through its tolerance.
Petitioner later on informed MII that it will start charging a rental fee for its
use and occupancy of the subject lot or otherwise, they should vacate the
lot. However, MII refused to comply with the payment. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for collection of a sum of money against MII. While the court’s
proceedings were underway, petitioner field another complaint, now for
ejectment. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
shopping.

Issue:
Whether petitioners violate the rule on forum shopping

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Held:
No; the determinative factor in violations of the rule against forum shopping
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. The rule against
forum shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals
rendering two separate and contradictory decisions.
The elements of forum shopping are:
1. Identity of parties or at least such parties representing the same interest
2. Identity of rights asserted, and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the
same fact
3. Any judgement rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the other
action

Forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of several judicial

remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other courts.

In this case, the second and third elements of forum shopping and litis
pendentia are lacking. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for between a suit for collection of sum of money and an unlawful
detainer case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions would
not amount to res judicata in the other action. The purpose of the ejectment
proceeding is the physical possession while the collection case is for the
payment of its rent in view of its occupancy.
Gaffney v Butler
GR no 219408; November 8. 2017
Who may be parties

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent. He alleged
that Butler, as President, and her husband Anthony, as Treasurer and Chief
Executive Officer, approached and invited him to invest in ActiveFun Corp.
Gaffney advanced amounts representing his initial investment in ActiveFun.
However, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize due to the
passing of Anthony Butler. Thereafter, Gaffney demanded the return of his
investments with Butler, however, despite several demands were made to
Butler the latter failed. In the meantime, Butler filed a Motion to Dismiss Ad
Cautelam contending that the death of her husband did not ipso facto make
her the representative of his estate and that a claim against an estate of a
deceased person is governed by Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, thus, it cannot
be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical
persons may be parties pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the same Rule.

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Issue:
Whether the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving
spouses, could be named as additional defendant

Held:
No; a deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court unequivocally states that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

There can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be
impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack personality. When
Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be
impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As
such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who
cannot
be a party to a civil action. Thus, impleading the deceased Anthony or his
estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him must be
dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his estate in a
proper proceeding.

Evangelista v Santiago
GR no 157447; April 29, 2005
Real parties in interest

Facts:
Petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of land by
virtue of several Deeds of Assignment executed by Favila. According to the
Deeds
of Assignment, the subject property was part of a vast tract of land called
Hacienda Quibiga which extended to several provinces which awarded to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a
Spanish title. Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and successors-in-interest
of Don
Hermogenes. Petitioners learned that the respondent was planning to evict
them from subject property. Their investigation revealed that subject
property was included in TCTs which were now in the name of respondent.
Later, the title was cancelled and a TCT was issued exclusively in the name
of Isabel Manahan. Isabel Manahan transferred the land to her son through a
Deed of Donation. Respondent subsequently secured TCTs in his own name.
Petitioners filed an action for declaration of nullity of respondent‘s TCTs on

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the basis that the OCT was fake and spurious. Respondent claimed that
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the complaint, and thus, the
complaint stated no cause of action. RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that
the plaintiffs were not the
lawful owners of the land thus, they do not have the legal standing to bring
the complaint to RTC.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners have the legal personality to file the complaint
against the respondent

Held:
No; a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on the failure to
state a cause of action. It can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss
based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no
cause of action. Lack of personality refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest. Correspondingly, it can be used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face thereof,
evidently states no cause of action.

Petitioners failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their complaint
aside from possession of the subject property from time immemorial and the
Spanish title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the subject
property. Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the subject property,
petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud or
quieting of title and their complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action.
V-Gent Inc v Morning Star Travel and Tours Inc
GR no 186305; July 22, 2015
Real party in interest; Representatives as parties

Facts:
Petitioner V-Gent bought 26 two-way plane tickets from respondent.
However, V-Gent returned a total of 15 unused tickets but only six of which
were refunded.
V-Gent then filed a money claim against Morning Star for the payment of the
unrefunded tickets before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC). Morning Star
questioned V-Gent’s personality to file the suit asserting that the passengers,
in whose names the tickets were issued, are the real parties-in-interest. The
MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a cause of action stating that as
agent of the passengers who paid for the ticket, V-Gent stood as real party-
in-interest. The RTC set aside the MeTC’s judgment and ordered Morning Star
to pay V-Gent the value of the 9 unrefunded tickets. The CA reversed the
RTC’s decision and held that V-Gent is not a real party-in-interest because it

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merely acted as an agent of the passengers who bought the tickets from
Morning Star with their own money.

Issue:
Whether V-Gent is a real party-in-interest in filing the complaint

Held:
No; every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest – the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit. In suits where an agent represents a party, the
principal is the real party-in-interest; an agent cannot file a suit in his own
name on behalf
of the principal.

Rule 3, Sec 3 of the ROC provides for the exception when an agent may sue
or be sued without joining the principal. Thus, an agent may sue or be sued
solely in its own name and without joining the principal when 1) the agent
acted in his own name during the transaction; 2) the agent acted for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal; and 3) the transaction DID not involve
the property of the principal.

In this case, only the first element is present. However the remaining
elements are absent because V-Gent disclosed the names of the passengers
to Morning Star – in fact the tickets were in their names and the transaction
was paid using the passenger’s money.

Oposa v Factoran
GR no 101083; July 30, 1993
Representatives as Parties

Facts:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents
against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. The complaint alleges that
it was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all before the Court." The petition bears upon the right of Filipinos
to a balanced and healthful ecology. The petitioners sought for the
cancellation of all existing timber license agreements (TLA) in the country as
well as to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, and
renewing all TLA. Factoran, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on
the locus standi of the petitioners.

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Issue:
Whether the minors have legal standing to sue

Held:

Yes; they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. The
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure protection of that
right for generations to come.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait v Reyes

GR no 180771; April 21, 2015
Representatives as parties

Facts:
Petitioners are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean
species, which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are
joined by Gloria Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians
and as friends who allegedly empathize with, and seek the protection of, the
aforementioned marine species. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was also
impleaded as a party due to her express undertaking in the ASEAN charter to
protect the Tanon strait. Respondent Reyes, on the other hand, was the
Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE). The Government of the
Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract with JAPEX. This contract involved geological and
geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait but was later on formally converted
for the exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a

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block covering offshore the Tañon Strait. JAPEX began to drill an exploratory
well which led petitioners to enjoin respondents.

Issue:
Whether petitioners and stewards have the right to file the present suit

Held:
Yes; sec 5 of the rules of procedure for environmental cases allows any
Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations
yet unborn,
to file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
The rationale for this is to further encourage the protection of the
environment.

Although this petition was filed years before the effectivity of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules
of procedure may be retroactively applied to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested rights in
rules of procedure. Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already taken a
permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.

In the matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez

GR no 182645; December 15, 2010
Indispensable Parties

Facts:
Henry, Certeza, and Rosalina filed a petition for Declaration of Heirship and
Appointment of Administrator and Settlement of the Estates of the Late
Hermogenes and Antonio before the RTC alleging that they are the great
grandchildren of Antonio and Hermogenes hence, shall be declared as their
sole and surviving heirs. Absent any opposition, the RTC allowed Henry,
Certeza and Rosalina to submit evidence before a commissioner in support
of the petition. After evaluating the evidence presented, the commissioner
found that Henry, Certeza and Rosalina are the grandchildren in the direct
line of Antonio.
Six groups of oppositors (respondent being one), then entered their
appearances praying that he be appointed regular administrator to the

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estates of Antonio and Hermogenes and be allowed to sell a certain portion
of land included in the estate of Hermogenes. The RTC rendered a decision in
favor of herein Respondent and rendered a decision declaring Carola Favila-
Santos and her co-heirs as heirs of Hermogenes and reiterating ruling
declaring Henry, Certeza, and Rosalina as heirs of Antonio. As a result all
other oppositions including the one filed by Jamie Robles was dismissed for
failure to substantiate their claims of heirship to the late Hermogenes.

Issue:
Whether respondent is an indispensable party in the case

Held:
Yes; an indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction,
which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a
case." Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit or
proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present.
In the case at bar, Robles is an indispensable party since he stands to be
injured or benefited by the outcome of the petition. He has an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect his rights, such that
the courts cannot proceed without his presence. Moreover, as provided for
under the aforequoted Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Robles is
interested in sustaining the assailed CA Decision, considering that he would
benefit from such judgment.
Cerezo v Tuazon
GR no 141538; March 23, 2004
Indispensable Party

Facts:
A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle driven by
respondent Tuazon. He then filed a complaint for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo, bus line owner, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.
The records show that the Cerezo spouses participated in the proceedings
before the trial court. The court granted the motion of Tuazon to litigate as a
pauper, but denied the ex-parte motion requiring new summons filed by the
spouses. After trial, the court held that Mrs. Cerezo was solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s
employee, pursuant
to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court did not hold Atty. Cerezo liable
because Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s business benefited from

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the family, pursuant to the Family Code. The court made no pronouncement
on the bus driver Foronda’s liability because there was no service of
summons on him.
The Cerezo spouses filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, and
questioned, among others, whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom
the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party.

Issue:
Whether Foronda is an indispensable party

Held:
No; An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court‘s
action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is
possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in an action for a
quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not
an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon‘s action for damages
against Mrs. Cerezo.

Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is

indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete
relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even
necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone. It is not
even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate civil action
because he opted to file civil damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily
and directly liable for her own negligence. An employer’s liability based on
quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employee’s liability based on
delict is merely subsidiary.

Foster-Gallego v Spouses Galang

GR no 130228; July 27, 2004
Indispensable Parties

Facts:
Vive Realty Corporation acquired several parcels of land at a public auction
which the Spouses Galang later on purchased. When Romeo Galang came
home from Saudi Arabia, he discovered a hollow block fence along the
perimeter of the property which was built by Lito Gallego. Consequently, the
Spouses Galang filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against
Gallego which was raffled to RTC. Gallego filed his Answer with Counterclaim
alleging that his brother, petitioner Bernabe Foster-Gallego (Bernabe), owned
the property and denied that his brother was delinquent in the payment of
real property taxes. The RTC issued an order declaring Gallego in default
allowing the Spouses Galang to present their evidence ex parte. On the same
day, Bernabe, filed a Motion for Intervention. After due proceeding, the RTC

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granted in favor of Spouses Galang and against Gallego removing any cloud
or quieting of title and ownership over the subject property. On appeal, the
CA held that Bernabe had no legal personality to join Gallego’s appeal o nthe
ground that he never became a party to the case.

Issue:
Whether petitioner Bernabe is an indispensable party to the action for
quieting of title

Ruling:
No; an indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A person is not an
indispensable party if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the other parties, so that he will not
necessarily be injuriously affected by a decree that does complete justice
between the other parties. He is also not indispensable if his presence would
merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the
action or will simply avoid multiple litigations.

In this case, petitioner Bernabe, whose title RTC cancelled, is not an

indispensable party to the action for quieting of title. The assailed decision
quieting title in favor of the Spouses Galang has no appreciable effect on
Bernabe’s title. Further, the assailed decision does not bind him. The rules on
quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title
shall not prejudice persons who are not parties to the actions. Suits to quiet
title are actions quasi in rem, and the judgment in such proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties to the action.

Caravan Travel and Tours International Inc v Abejar

GR no 170631; February 10, 2016
Necessary Parties

Facts:
A Mitsubishi L-300 van was travelling along the east- bound lane opposite
Reyes. To avoid an incoming vehicle, the van swerved left and hit Reyes
which caused her death 2 days after. Alex Espinosa, a witness, went to her
aid and loaded her in the back of the van. Espinosa told the driver of the van,
Jimmy Bautista, to bring Reyes to the hospital. Instead, Bautista left the van
parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes still in the van. The registered
owner of the van was Caravan, which is a corporation engaged in the
business of organizing travel and tours. Bautista was Caravan’s employee
assigned to drive the van as a service driver. Respondent Ermilinda Abejar,
Reyes’ paternal aunt and who raised Reyes since she was 9 years old, filed in
RTC a complaint for damages against Bautista as Caravan’s employee and
Caravan as the registered owner. Caravan argues that Abejar is not a real-

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party-in-interest for she does not exercise legal or substitute parental
authority, nor is she judicially appointed as guardian of Reyes, or her only
living relative.

Issue:
Whether Abejar is a real party-in-interest to file the suit

Held:
Yes; Abejar’s capacity to file a complaint stems from her having exercised
substitute parental authority over Reyes under the FC. Reyes’ parents and
paternal grandparents are deceased. As Reyes’ custodian, Abejar exercised
the statutorily recognized rights and duties of a parent.

Even if Reyes was already 18 years old when she died. While parental
authority
terminates upon emancipation, Abejar continued to support and care for
Reyes. Except for the legal technicality of Reyes’ emancipation, her
relationship with Abehar remained the same. The anguish caused to Abehar
was no different because of the emancipation.
Art. 1902 of the old Civil Code (now Art. 2176) is broad enough to
accommodate even plaintiffs who are not relatives of the deceased. The
article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much less the relation
that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana and the person
who may recover
damages, thus warranting the inference that, in principle, ANYBODY who
suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana, whether a relative or not of the
victim, may recover damages from the person responsible therefor.

Spouses Algura v City of Naga

GR no 150135; October 30, 2006
Indigent Parties

Facts:
Petitioners Spouses Algura filed a verified complaint for damages against the
City of Naga for damages sustained from the alleged illegal demolition of
their residence and boarding house and for payment of lost income derived
from fees paid by their boarders. The Spouses also filed an Ex-Parte Motion
to Litigate as Indigent Litigants. The RTC of Naga found the motion to be with
merit and exempted the petitioners from the payment of filing fees.
Respondents then filed a Motion to Disqualify the Plaintiffs for Non-Payment
of Filing Fees. They asserted that in addition to the more than PhP 3,000.00
net income of petitioner Antonio Algura, who is a member of the PNP, spouse
Lorencita Algura also had a mini-store and a computer shop on the ground

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floor of their residence. The trial court granted the motion and directed
petitioners to now pay filing fees.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are indigent litigants

Held:
No; pauper-litigants include wage earners whose gross income do not exceed
P2,000.00 a month or P24,000.00 a year for those residing in Metro Manila,
and P1,500.00 a month or P18,000.00 a year for those residing outside Metro
Manila, or those who do not own real property with an assessed value of not
more than P24,000.00, or not more than P18,000.00 as the case may be.
Such exemption shall include exemption from payment of fees for filing
appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien
on the monetary or property judgment rendered in favor of the pauper-
litigant.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the pauper litigant shall

execute an affidavit that he does not earn the gross income above
mentioned, nor own any real property with the assessed value, supported by
a certification to that effect by the provincial, city or town assessor or
treasurer.

In this case, petitioners failed to satisfy the 1st requisite as their gross
monthly income because they have an estimate of more than P13,000 gross
monthly income. It is said that the RTC should have called a hearing as
required by Rule 3, Sec 21 of the ROC to enable petitioners to adduce
evidence to show that they did not have the property and money sufficient of
food, shelter, and basic necessities. In that hearing, the respondents would
have the right to refute the allegation that petitioners are indigent litigants.

Republic v Sandiganbayan
GR no 232724-27; February 15, 2021
Nominal, Pro Forma Party

Facts:
In People v Versoza, the office of the special prosecutor charged former first
gentleman Arroyo with plunder for his involvement in the PNP’s anomalous
purchase of two secondhand helicopters. The seller, Lionair, sold the
helicopters as brand new, as required by law, even if they were already used.
Lionair’s President however, testified that Arroyo was the helicopter’s real
owner. To verify the source of the deposits made by Arroyo to Lionair for the
purchase of the helicopters, the prosecutor presented the manager of the
Union Bank where the account was maintained. The manager suggested that
the BSP or the AMLC may have reports on the transactions, as banks are

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required to report covered transaction. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
subpoenaed the Secretariat of the Council to testify and produce Lionair’s
bank records. The Council moved for a motion to quash the subpoena but
was denied, its reconsideration was also denied. The Sandiganbayan noted
that the council was not present during the hearing for the motion for
reconsideration and that the accused and their counsels were not furnished
copies of the pleading. Petitioner points out that it is not required to furnish
the accused or their counsels a copy of its MR because it was only a nominal
party.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is merely a nominal party

Held:
No; a nominal or pro forma party is a person "who is joined as a plaintiff or
defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject
matter or because any relief is demanded, but merely because the technical
rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on the record."

On the other hand, an indispensable party is "a party in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an action without that party
being impleaded." They are parties with "such an interest in the controversy
that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court
cannot proceed without their presence."

Petitioner is not a nominal party as it claims to be. It has an interest in this

case, and the relief respondent prays for is exactly directed at it. This makes
petitioner an indispensable party. As petitioner alleged in its pleadings, it is
the agency directed to act, and it claims that it will suffer injury if the
Subpoena will be implemented. Without petitioner, there can be no relief
accorded.

Divinagracia v Parilla
GR no 196750; March 11, 2015
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Facts:
The subject land is owned by Conrado Nobleza. During his lifetime, he
contracted two marriages wherein the first marriage was with Lolita Palermo
with whom he had two children and his second marriage was with Eusela
Niangar with whom he had seven children. According to Divinagracia, whose
estate represented by herein Petitioner, some of Conrado Sr.‘s heirs, sold
their interests over the subject land to him. However, said document was not
signed by the other heirs who did not sell their respective shares. The
vendor-heirs and petitioner executed a Supplemental Contract whereby the
whole price of the lot will be paid in installments upon partition of the subject

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land. However, petitioner was not able to cancel the title of the property and
register it due to the refusal of the remaining heirs who did not sell their
interest to surrender the said title. This prompted petitioner to file a
Complaint for judicial partition and for receivership which was assailed by the
remaining heirs. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. The CA set aside the
RTC’s ruling and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for judicial partition on the
ground that the latter failed to implead the omitted heirs.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint

Held:
Yes; According to Sec 1, Rule 69 of the ROC, all persons interest in the
property shall be joined as defendants. Thus, all the co-heirs and persons
having an interest in the property are indispensable parties. As such, an
action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.

In this case, while it is conceded that petitioner bought the interests of

majority of the heirs of Conrado, Sr, he merely steps into the shoes of the
vendors-heirs. Since his interest over the subject land is merely derived from
that of the vendors-heirs, the latter should first be determined as co-owners
thereof, thus necessitating the joinder of all those who have vested interests
in such land.

However, it is said that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties,

the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the
court, the court may dismiss the complaint for plaintiff’s failure to comply
with the order. In the case, the proper remedy is to implead the
indispensable parties.

Spouses de la Cruz v Joaquin

GR no 162788; July 28, 2005
Effect of death of party litigant

Facts:
Pedro Joaquin filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership,
the cancellation of title, and damages against the petitioner spouses. Joaquin
alleged that he had obtained a loan from the petitioners and secured the
said loan by executing a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land in favor of
petitioners. Also, a document entitled ―Kasunduan was executed evidencing
that the Deed of Sale to be actually an equitable mortgage. The RTC ruled in
Joaquin‘s favor and declared that the parties had entered into a sale with a
right of

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repurchase. The CA sustained the decision of the RTC and noted that
petitioners had given respondent the right to repurchase the property within
five (5) years from the date of the sale. The CA also ordered a substitution by
legal representatives, in view of Joaquin’s death. Hence, this petition for
review assailing the appellate court’s decision on the ground, among others,
that the RTC lost jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Joaquin.
Petitioners assert that the RTC’s Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction
because respondent died during the pendency of the case.

Issue:
Whether the RTC lost its jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Joaquin

Held:
No; the general rule is that a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary
when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and
present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions negate any
claim that the right to due process was violated. Strictly speaking, the rule
on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement
of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of
the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or
belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a
promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is
not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

The records of the present case contain a "Motion for Substitution of Party
Plaintiff" filed before the CA. Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntary
appeared and participated in the case. The CA had ordered his legal
representatives to appear and substitute for him. The Motion for Substitution
may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted for
the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due process, the
issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial court’s
decision.
San Juan v Cruz
GR no 167321; July 31, 2006
Effect of death of party litigant

Facts:
Loreto San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as
one of the devisees therein. Upon Loreto's death, Atty. Aquino filed a petition
for the probate of the will in the RTC. While the petition was pending, Oscar
Casa
died intestate. The firm of Aquino & Associates entered their appearance as
counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar
Casa and their representative. Later, the probate court issued an Order
denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico

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Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee,
hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative. Later,
Aquino filed a pleading entitled "Appointment of Administrator" signed by the
Casas, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as
administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for
the deceased.
The RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its first
order, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the appointment of
an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee.

Issue:
Whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the
estate of Oscar Casa

Held:
No; According to Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, the heirs may
be allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the
appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified
period a legal
representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel,
within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or
executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.

The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the
appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very
moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as
devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment
of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary
for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of
the estate. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their
representative before the trial court.

Gaffney v Butler
GR no 219408; November 8. 2017
Effect of death of party litigant

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent. He alleged
that Butler, as President, and her husband Anthony, as Treasurer and Chief
Executive Officer, approached and invited him to invest in ActiveFun Corp.
Gaffney advanced amounts representing his initial investment in ActiveFun.
However, the proposed investment agreement did not materialize due to the
passing of Anthony Butler. Thereafter, Gaffney demanded the return of his
investments with Butler, however, despite several demands were made to

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Butler the latter failed. In the meantime, Butler filed a Motion to Dismiss Ad
Cautelam contending that the death of her husband did not ipso facto make
her the representative of his estate and that a claim against an estate of a
deceased person is governed by Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, thus, it cannot
be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical
persons may be parties pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the same Rule.

Issue:
Whether the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving
spouses, could be named as additional defendant

Held:
No; a deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not
be made a defendant in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court unequivocally states that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.

There can be no doubt that a deceased person or his estate may not be
impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack personality. When
Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be
impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As
such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the
pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a
cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who
cannot
be a party to a civil action. Thus, impleading the deceased Anthony or his
estate in the present petition was improper. The action against him must be
dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against his estate in a
proper proceeding.

Uy v Del Castillo
GR no 223610; July 24, 2017
Effect of death of party litigant

Facts:
The present case is an offshoot of an action for quieting of title,
reconveyance, damages, and attorney's fees involving a parcel of land by
Respondent Crispulo Del Castillo against Petitioners Jaime Uy and his wife,
Conchita. However, since Jaime had died 6 years earlier, Crispulo amended
his complaint and impleaded Jaime's children, the Uy siblings, as defendants.
Meanwhile, Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and hence, was
substituted by his heirs. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision
in respondents' favor. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, and

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subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit.
Respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Petitioners
maintained that the RTC had no jurisdiction over them as they were never
served with summons in relation thereto.

Issue:
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners

Held:
Yes; assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons for the
amended complaint, they were nonetheless deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the RTC's jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the amended
complaint and actively participating in the case.

It is settled that the active participation of the party against whom the action
was brought, is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said
party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. After all, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant in civil cases is obtained either by a valid
service of
summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court's authority.

Nocum v Lucio Tan

GR no 145022; September 23, 2005
Venue v Jurisdiction; Venue in civil cases v criminal cases

Facts:
Lucio Tan filed a complaint against petitioner reporters and Inquirer with the
RTC seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and
defamatory imputations contained in a news article. Petitioners alleged that
Tan’s complaint did not state a cause of action and that the venue was
improperly laid. Afterwards, the trial court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice on the ground of improper venue. A motion for reconsideration was
be filed by Tan which was granted by the trial court. It was held that the

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mistake in Tan’s original complaint was cured by the amended complaint. An
appeal
was taken to the CA which affirmed the trial court ruling. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:
Whether the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case upon the
filing of the original complaint for damages

Held:
Yes; it is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. Under Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code, the RTC is specifically designated to try a
libel case. The Supreme Court stated that the petitioners confused venue
with jurisdiction.

The difference of jurisdiction and venue are as follows:

(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the
place where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject
matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue
may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties

Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the action was
instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact,
in civil cases, venue may be waived. Unlike in criminal actions where it is
fundamental that venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of
jurisdiction, the laying of venue in civil actions is procedural rather than
substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of the court over the person
rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction.
It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court and is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as
it relates to the place of trial.

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Radiowealth Finance Co Inc v Pineda Jr
GR no 227147; July 30, 2018
When the rules on venue do not apply

Facts:
Petitioner alleged that it extended a loan to respondents, as evidenced by a
Promissory Note which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage constituted on a
vehicle owned by respondents. Notably, the Promissory Note states that
"[a]ny action to enforce payment of any sums due under this Note shall
exclusively be brought in the proper court within [the] National Capital
Judicial Region or in any place where Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. has
a branch/office, a[t] its sole option." Due to respondents' default, petitioner
demanded payment of the whole remaining balance of the loan. As the
demand went unheeded, petitioner filed a suit for sum of money and

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damages with application for a Writ of Replevin before the RTC, further
alleging that it has a branch in San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC issued a Writ of
Replevin. However, in an Amended Order, the RTC recalled the Writ of
Replevin and ordered the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction since: (a) petitioner's principal place of business is in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila; and (b) respondents' residence is in Porac,
Pampanga, it has no jurisdiction over any of the party-litigants-warranting
the dismissal of the complaint.

Issue:
Whether there was lack of jurisdiction

Held:
No; in this case, the venue stipulation is found in the subject Promissory
Note. It is indeed restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits
the venue of the actions arising therefrom to the courts of: (a) the National
Capital Judicial Region; or (b) any place where petitioner has a branch/office.
In light of petitioner's standing allegation that it has a branch in San Mateo,
Rizal, it appears that venue has been properly laid, unless such allegation
has been disputed and successfully rebutted later on. Finally, even if it
appears that venue has been improperly laid, it is well-settled that the courts
may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.

Jurisdiction is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." Jurisdiction is a matter of
substantive law. Thus, an action may be filed only with the court or tribunal
where the Constitution or a statute says it can be brought. Objections to
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be brought at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. When a case is filed with a court which has no
jurisdiction over the action, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the case.

Venue is "the place of trial or geographical location in which an action or

proceeding should be brought." In civil cases, venue is a matter of
procedural law. A party's objections to venue must be brought at the earliest
opportunity either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise the
objection shall be deemed waived. When the venue of a civil action is
improperly laid, the court cannot motu proprio dismiss the case.

Wrong venue is merely a procedural infirmity, not a jurisdictional

impediment. Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, while venue is a
matter of procedural law.

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Memita v Masongsong
GR no 150912; May 28, 2007
Complaint; How to Contest

Facts:
Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the
distributor of San Miguel Foods, Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products.
Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day payment credit
to Memita’s Store. Masongsong filed a complaint before the trial court and
alleged that from Memita’s credit on goods purchased already reached the
amount of P603,520.50. Masongsong made several demands upon Memita to
pay before Masongsong filed the complaint. Masongsong even sent a
demand letter to Memita but did not receive any reply. At the trial court, the
trial court found that the sales invoices were attached to the complaint but
Memita’s answer failed to explicity deny or contest the genuineness and due
execution of any of the receipts and just alleged that Masongsong might
have manipulated the delivery receipts. The trial court ruled that

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Masongsong was entitled to payments. On appeal, the CA upheld the RTC’s
decision.

Issue:
Whether the sales invoices are admissible

Held:
Yes; Sec 8, Rule 8 of the ROC states that the genuineness and due execution
of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under
oath, specifically denied them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
Under Sec 10, a defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth
the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.

Memita, in alleging "questionable" and "short" deliveries, in effect alleges

that Masongsong committed fraud. As the party invoking fraud, Memita has
the burden of proof. Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction
must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes
ordinary care of his concerns and private concerns have been fair and
regular.

The best evidence of the transaction between Memita and Masongsong are
the sales invoices. The sales invoices show that Memita or his representative
acknowledged receipt of Masongsong's deliveries without protest. Memita
aired his doubts about the amounts only after Masongsong asked him to pay
his credit. Memita’s evidence revela that Memita failed to prove fraud on
Masongsong’s part.

Ridao v Handmade Credit and Loans Inc

GR no 236920; February 3, 2021
Actionable Document

Facts:
Petitioner obtained 2 loans ($4,000 and an additional loan increasing her
loan to $6,167) evidenced by a promissory note with respondent corporation.
Later, respondent filed a complaint with the RTC against petitioner for
collection of sum of money with damages for the latter’s failure to pay on the
due dates despite several demands. In the complaint, Handmade attached
the PNs, Statement of Loan Release and other documents relating to the loan
transactions. In her answer, petitioner admitted that she obtained a loan in
the amount of $4,000 but denied the additional loan which increased her
obligation to $6,167. Ridao pointed out that the annexes attached were
materially altered and the signatures were forged. The RTC ruled in favor of
Ridao stating that the ledger where payment had been acknowledged by

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respondent, not specifically denied under oath by respondent, was deemed
admitted.

Issue:
Whether the ledger is an actionable document

Held:
No; a copy of a page of a ledger is not an actionable document. The ledger
merely indicates that money was received as payment, but it is not an
evidence of the transaction between the parties. The ledger does not provide
for the terms and conditions of the loan transaction from which a right or
obligation may be established.

To qualify as an actionable document pursuant to Section 7, Rule 8 of the

Rules, the specific right or obligation which is the basis of the action or
defense must emanate therefrom or be evident therein. If the document or
instrument so qualifies and is pleaded in accordance with Section 7 — the
substance set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy is attached to
the pleading as an exhibit — then the genuineness and due execution are
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, since the copy of the ledger is not an actionable document,

respondent’s non-filing of a reply, specifically denying the genuineness and
due execution of the ledger, cannot be considered as an implied admission.
Nevertheless, even if the ledger is not an actionable document, it is
admissible as evidence and is sufficient to prove that Ridao made payments
for her loan obligation and that such payments were received by Handmade
Credit.

In civil cases, only a preponderance of evidence or "greater weight of the

evidence" is required. In determining where the preponderance of evidence
or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witness' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial.

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Go Tong Electrical Supply Co Inc v BPI Family Savings Bank Inc
GR no 187487; June 29, 2015
Specific Denial Rule

Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners seeking that the latter be
held jointly and severally liable to it for the payment of their loan obligation.
Respondent alleged that petitioner had applied for and was granted financial
assistance evidenced by a PN by then Bank of South East Asia (BSA), which
was the successor in interest of DBS Bank of the Philippines, and later, the
BPI. As additional security, petitioner also executed a CSA (comprehensive
surety agreement). Upon default of petitioners, respondent bank demanded
payment from petitioners, but to no avail. Hence the BPI Family Savings
Bank filed a complaint. In its Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners denied
the execution of the loan agreement, the PN. Respondent presented Sunio,
the Account officer handling petitioners’ loan accounts, as its witness. He
attested the existence of petitioner’s loan obligation and admitted that he

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had no knowledge of how the PN was prepared, executed, and signed, nor
did he witness its signing.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA discredited
petitioners’ argument that respondent’s sole witness, Sunio, was
incompetent to testify the loan documentary evidence given that the
petitioners did not deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the PN and the CSA thus, are deemed admitted under Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether the loan documents presented as evidence are considered genuine
and duly executed

Held:
YES; with petitioners' admission of the genuineness and due execution of the
loan documents, the competence of respondent's witness Suñio to testify in
order to authenticate the same is therefore of no moment. While Section 20,
Rule 132 of the Rules requires that private documents be proved of their due
execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence, in the
present case, there is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with
respect to the loan documents because of respondent's implied admission
thereof.

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial under
oath” requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper
conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that petitioners had impliedly admitted
the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing their loan
obligation to respondent.

How to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document:

defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that
it is otherwise false or fabricated.

The statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured
by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due
execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the
genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the
instrument upon a ground not affecting either. Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
further requires that the defendant
"sets forth what he claims to be the facts," which requirement, likewise,
remains absent from the Answer in this case.”

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Trans Industrial Utilities Inc v Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co (MBTC)
GR no 227095; January 18, 2021
Specific Denial Actionable Documents

Facts:
By virtue of board resolutions, petitioner’s president applied and was granted
loans by the respondent bank. As security for the loans, petitioner assigned
its rights and title over a parcel of land and it executed a CSA (continuing
surety agreement) with spouses Tiu. When petitioners defaulted in the
payment, they requested for a restructuring of their loan obligation which
was approved. Hence, the parties executed a debt settlement agreement.
When petitioners failed to pay again, respondent bank filed an action for
collection of sum of money against petitioners. Petitioners filed a demurrer to
evidence which was denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA found that
petitioners failed to deny under oath the Secretary’s certificate confirming
the stockholders’ resolution and the debt settlement agreement. Petitioners
then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA.

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Issue:
Whether the non-admission as to the genuineness and due execution of the
secretary’s certification and debt settlement agreement does not make them
valid

Held:
No, the said documents are valid; petitioners already admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the Secretary's Certificate and the Debt
Settlement Agreement when they failed to specifically deny under oath their
genuineness and due execution.

The Secretary's Certificate confirming the stockholders resolution and the

Debt Settlement Agreement are actionable documents. When an action or
defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of
such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit
which shall be deemed to be part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading. In order to contest an actionable
document, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. How to Contest Such Documents. — When an action or defense is founded

upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused.

Records show that petitioners failed to specifically deny under oath the
documents (Secretary's Certificate and Debt Settlement Agreement)
attached in the amended complaint. As established, petitioners' Amended
Answer was not verified. Failure to verify the pleading is tantamount to
failure to specifically deny under oath the documents upon which the
amended complaint was based. There is no doubt that petitioners admitted
the genuineness and due execution of these documents.

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Casent Realty Development Corp v Philbanking Corporation
GR no 150731; September 14, 2007
Specific Denial Actionable Documents

Facts:
Petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory
notes in favor of Rare Realty. These promissory notes were assigned to
respondent Philbanking through a Deed of Assignment. Petitioner failed to
pay the PN despite demands. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for the
collection of sum of money. Petitioner raised the defense of extinguishment
of obligation when the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which conveyed
petitioner’s property to respondent. Petitioner presented a confirmation
statement stating that petitioner no longer had loans with the repsondent.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence,
pointing out that respondent’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which
raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of
the genuineness and due execution of said documents. Respondent, on the
other hand, filed an Opposition stating that since it did not file a Reply, all
new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted, pursuant to
Rule 6, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of extinction of obligation by Dacion
en Pago. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that in resolving petitioner’s

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Demurrer, the trial court erred in considering the affirmative defenses raised
in the Answer.

Issue:
Does respondent’s failure to file a reply and deny the dacion and
confirmation statement under oath constitute a judicial admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the documents

Held:
Yes; Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded
upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure
to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be
made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will
be deemed admitted.

Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence. When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific
verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
Serrano Mahilum v Spouses Ilano
GR no 197923; June 22, 2015
Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted

Facts:
Petitioner Ruby Ruth Serrano Mahilum is the registered owner of a parcel of
land which she entrusted to Teresa Perez, a real estate broker, who claimed
that she can assist petitioner in obtaining a loan with such serving as
collateral. When petitioner demanded the return of the title, Perez admitted
that the title was lost. Thus, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Loss. Later
on, petitioner received a letter from the Registry of Deeds informing her that
the owner’s duplicate copy was not lost but that it was presented to the
registry by respondents, spouses Ilano, who claimed that the property
covered by the title was sold to them. Petitioner confronted respondents,
who showed her documents indicating that petitioner sold the property with
right to repurchase the same within a period of 90 days. Petitioner told
respondents that she did not execute these documents, and that her
purported signatures there were in fact falsified and forged. Petitioner and
her husband Richard instituted against respondents and Perez with the RTC a
Complaint for “annulment of agreement and deed of absolute sale, specific
performance, with damages,”. Respondents alleged that the complaint failed

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to allege that respondents were purchasers in bad faith and absent such
allegation, presumption is that they are in good faith.

Issue:
Whether respondents are purchasers in bad faith

Held:
Yes; in respondents’ amended answer with compulsory counterclaim, they
said that “and another person herein named as ‘Jane Doe’ whose identity is
yet to be established who introduced herself as Ruby Ruth Serrano” came to
their office to obtain a loan because petitioner is in dire need of money.
Thus, they should have not have referred to the supposed seller as another
person if indeed it was petitioner who appeared and signed the agreement
and deed of sale in question.

A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an

affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts
alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying
language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are
denied while the fact itself is admitted. If an allegation is a negative
pregnant, the allegation is deemed admitted.

Colmenar v Colmenar
GR no 252467; June 21, 2021
Affirmative Defenses

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents averring that he is the
second child of his parents (deceased Francisco and Dorothy Colmenar) who
were later on divorced. When petitioner’s father died, the latter left real
properties registered in its name. When petitioner knew that respondents
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate making it appear that they
were the surviving heirs and sold the properties without his knowledge, he
sent a demand letter to individual respondent invoking his successional right
but to no avail. Hence, the complaint was filed. Respondents alleged the
affirmative defense of lack of cause of action. In the meantime, the 2019
amendments to the ROC took effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action citing Sec
12, Rule 8 of the 2019 amendments to the ROC. Petitioner now allege that
the judge is at fault for applying the amendment despite the clear injustice it
caused to him.

Issue:

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Whether the trial court committed an error when it applied the 2019
amendments to resolve the affirmative defenses pleaded by respondents

Held:
Yes;
2019 amendments: Rule 8, Section 12. Affirmative defenses. — (a) A defendant shall
raise his or her affirmative defenses in his or her answer, which shall be limited to the
reasons set forth under Section 5(b), Rule 6, and the following grounds:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
2. That venue is improperly laid;
3. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
4. That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; and
5. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
(b) Failure to raise the affirmative defenses at the earliest opportunity shall constitute a
waiver thereof.
(c) The court shall motu proprio resolve the above affirmative defenses within thirty
(30) calendar days from the filing of the answer.

The records show that when Judge Gil resolved the affirmative defenses on
May 22, 2020, the prescribed 30-day period had long expired.

Rule 144 of the 2019 Rules provides that the amendments shall govern all
cases filed AFTER their effectivity and also all pending proceedings, except to
the extent that “in the opinion of the court, their application would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which case the procedure under which
cases were filed shall govern”.

In this case, the trial court Judge ignored the injustice caused by the
application of the 2019 Amendment to the case. For as a consequence,
petitioner lost his substantial right to be heard on the common affirmative
defense of respondent companies and right to seek reconsideration of the
order of dismissal which were both granted him under the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure.

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Metropolitan Bank v CPR Promotions
GR no 200567; June 22, 2015
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Facts:
Respondent obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered
by fifteen promissory notes all signed by respondent spouses Reynoso as
Treasurer and President of CPR Promotions. To secure the loans, spouses
Reynoso executed two deed of real estate mortgage on separate dates.
Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety agreement
binding themselves
solidarily with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may
have obtained from petitioner MBTC. Upon maturity of the loans, respondent
defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
the real estate mortgage. Wherein, MBTC participated and won as the
highest bidder. Notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties,
petitioner alleged that there remained a deficiency balance. The RTC ruled in
favor of MBTC. However, on appeal, the appellate court found that MBTC was
not able to prove the amount claimed, reversed the lower court’s decision
and ordered a refund. Petitioner asserts that that respondents never set up a
counterclaim for refund of any amount.

Issue:
Whether respondents belatedly raised their counterclaim

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Held:
Yes; Rule 6, Sec 7 of the ROC states that a compulsory counterclaim is one
which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter
of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquired jurisdiction.

A counterclaim is compulsory if:

1. It arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim
2. It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
3. The court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount
and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount

The test to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive:

1. Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim
as well as the defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim,
such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the court? This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess
in the bid price with the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory
counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee
against the debtor-mortgagor.

A defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the

time he files his answer. Failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. In
this case, respondent only claimed this after initially claiming for damages.
When they realized, based on computation, that it should have recovered the
excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim. Unfortunately,
respondents’ belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it did not cure
their failure to timely file their claim.

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Tiongson v National Housing Authority
GR no 166954; October 11, 2005
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Facts:
The NHA filed a complaint for eminent domain with the RTC against
petitioners who are owners of several lots in Tondo, Manila. Tiongson, et al.
filed a motion to
dismiss said complaint with prayer for damages and attorney’s fees. NHA
deposited with the PNB as provisional just compensation for the subject lots.
However, the motion to dismiss of Tiongson, et al. was subsequently
granted. Consequently, their counterclaims against NHA are also dismissed.
Two motions for leave of court to withdraw deposit was filed by NHA, the first
one having failed for failure to set a date for hearing. The trial court
expunged the first motion from the records. It also held that the amount
sought to be withdrawn by NHA constitutes advance payment of the
expropriation proceeds and as indemnity for damages should the
proceedings not succeed, noting that Tiongson, et al. might have sustained
damages in the course of the expropriation proceedings which they could
pursue or waive. On appeal, the CA held that the dismissal of Tiongson, et
al.’s counterclaim barred them from presenting evidence to prove damages.
It ruled that the trial court’s assessment that they suffered damages is
conjectural and inconsistent with the dismissal of the counterclaim.

Issue:
Whether the counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees should stand
regardless of the dismissal of the complaint

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Held:
No; a counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the party
filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the
counterclaimant, the counterclaim is improper and it must be dismissed,
more so where the complaint is dismissed at the instance of the
counterclaimant. In other
words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the dismissal of the
counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to
dismiss the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim
because the grant of the motion ultimately results in the dismissal of the
counterclaim.

In this case, petitioners’ failure to appeal the dismissal of their counterclaim

made the same final and executory.

Alday v FGU Insurance Corp

GR no 138822; January 23, 2001
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Facts:
Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC
alleging that petitioner owed it a sum of money incurred by her in the course
of her work as an insurance agent for FGU. FGU also prayed for exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Alday filed her answer and by
way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment representing direct
commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses and for accumulated
premium reserves. In addition, she prayed for attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly
unfounded action filed by FGU. FGU filed a "Motion to Strike Out Answer With
Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default" because
Alday’s answer was allegedly filed out of time. However, the trial court
denied the motion and similarly rejected FGU’s motion for reconsideration.
FGU then filed a motion to dismiss Alday’s counterclaim which was granted.
The court found Alday’s counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and
that her failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from acquiring
jurisdiction. Alday then filed an MR with the trial court which was denied.
Alday filed an appeal before the CA which sustained the RTC’s decision.
Alday filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.

Issue:
Whether Alday’s counterclaim is compulsory or permissive in nature

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Held:
Alday’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium
reserves is merely permissive while her claims for damages, allegedly
suffered as a result of the filing by FGU of its complaint, are compulsory.

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular

courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction.

The criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim

is compulsory or permissive:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim
absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's
claim as well as defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? (compelling test of compulsoriness)

Tested against the abovementioned standards, Alday’s counterclaim for

commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely
permissive. The evidence required to prove her claims differs from that
needed to establish FGU’s demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities
from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery
of FGU’s claims is not
contingent or dependent upon establishing Alday’s counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the
time and effort of the court and the parties.

However, Alday’s claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the

filing by FGU of its complaint, are compulsory. There is no need for need for
Alday to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the other
hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, Alday is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.

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Carpio v Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas) Inc
GR no 153171; May 4, 2006
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Facts:
Petitioners Spouses Carpio filed with the RTC, a Complaint for annulment of
foreclosure sale and damages against the respondents. In their Complaint,
petitioners alleged that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land.
They obtained a loan from respondent bank secured by a real estate
mortgage over the same property. Respondent bank filed a Petition for Extra-
Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage without prior demand or notice to
petitioners. On the foreclosure sale, respondent bank was the only bidder.
The property was sold then respondent bank executed an affidavit of
consolidation of ownership over petitioners’ property. They claimed that they
were not notified of the foreclosure sale and were not given an opportunity
to redeem their property. Respondent bank filed its Answer. Petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that respondent bank’s
counterclaim was not accompanied by a certification against forum
shopping. The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the
counterclaim for lack of merit which was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the counterclaim needs to be accompanied by a certificate of forum
shopping

Held:
No; Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
required certification is intended to cover an initiatory pleading – meaning an

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incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. Rationale of this
provision is to curb the malpractice of forum shopping - “an act of a party
against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of
seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition."

In the case, the Bank’s Answer with Counterclaim is a responsive pleading,

filed to counter petitioner’s complaint that initiates the civil action. The
provision does not contemplate a defendant’s claim for relief that is derived
from the main action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to
comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the
"dismissal of the case without prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent’s
counterclaim.

Sy-Vargas v Estate of Ogsos

GR no 221062; October 5, 2016
Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim

Facts:
Ogsos Sr and the Heirs of Fermina Pepico entered into a Contract of Lease
covering parcels of agricultural land owned by the latter in Negros Oriental.
Petitioner, who are among the heirs of Fermina, filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against respondents before the RTC claiming that
the lease rentals for some years were not paid. In their answer, respondents
alleged that they had faithfully complied with their obligations as embodied
in the lease contract and its subsequent amendments. And that petitioner
and Kathryn unlawfully took possession of the leased premises and
appropriated for themselves the sugarcane ready for harvest under the
pretext that they would apply the proceeds thereof to the unpaid rent.
Accordingly, respondents filed a counterclaim for these lost profits plus
damages. Petitioner and Kathryn filed a motion to dismiss respondents'
counterclaim arguing that the same were permissive and that respondents
had not paid the appropriate docket fees.
However, the RTC denied the said motion, declaring respondents'
counterclaim as compulsory; thus, holding that the payment of the required
docket fees was no longer necessary. On appeal, the CA ruled that the RTC
was correct in ruling that respondents' counterclaim is not permissive but
compulsory; hence, payment of docket fees was not necessary. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether respondents’ counterclaim for damages is compulsory and not
permissive in nature, and thus, no payment of docket fees is required

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Held:
No; a counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against
an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with
the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same action. On the

other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
It is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another
case.

Respondents’ counterclaim is permissive in nature because: (a) the issue in

the main case, i.e., whether or not respondents are liable to pay lease
rentals, is entirely different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether
or not petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for taking over the
possession of the leased premises and harvesting and appropriating
respondents' crops planted therein; (b) since petitioner and respondents'
respective causes of action arose from completely different occurrences, the
latter would not be barred by res judicata had they opted to litigate its
counterclaim in a separate proceeding; (c) the evidence required to prove
petitioner's claim that respondents failed to pay lease rentals is likewise
different from the evidence required to prove respondents' counterclaim that
petitioner and Kathryn are liable for damages for performing acts in bad
faith; and (d) the recovery of petitioner's claim is not contingent or
dependent upon proof of respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting
separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and
effort of the court and the parties.

Since the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the

courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket fees. However, it must
be clarified that respondents' failure to pay the required docket fees, per se,
should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has long
been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of filing of the initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal
provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and (b) there
was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

The criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is

compulsory or permissive:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely
the same?

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 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well
as defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
(compelling test of compulsoriness)

Casent Realty Development Corp v Philbanking Corporation

GR no 150731; September 14, 2007
Reply, Rejoinder

Facts:
Petitioner Casent Realty Development Corporation executed two promissory
notes in favor of Rare Realty. These promissory notes were assigned to
respondent Philbanking through a Deed of Assignment. Petitioner failed to
pay the PN despite demands. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for the
collection of sum of money. Petitioner raised the defense of extinguishment
of obligation when the parties executed a Dacion en Pago which conveyed
petitioner’s property to respondent. Petitioner presented a confirmation
statement stating that petitioner no longer had loans with the repsondent.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment on Demurrer to Evidence,
pointing out that respondent’s failure to file a Reply to the Answer which
raised the Dacion and Confirmation Statement constituted an admission of
the genuineness and due execution of said documents. Respondent, on the
other hand, filed an Opposition stating that since it did not file a Reply, all
new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed controverted, pursuant to
Rule 6, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of extinction of obligation by Dacion
en Pago. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that in resolving petitioner’s
Demurrer, the trial court erred in considering the affirmative defenses raised
in the Answer.

Issue:
Whether respondent’s failure to file a reply and deny the dacion and
confirmation statement under oath constitute a judicial admission

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Held:
Yes; Yes; Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded
upon a written instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of failure
to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be
made; otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will
be deemed admitted.

Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence. When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific
verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in
evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v BF Homes Inc

GR no 228239; June 10, 2019
Rule 7 - Verification

Facts:
BF Homes, Incorporated filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition
against petitioners alleging that Tierra Grande Farms obtained several loans
from Banco Filipino and to secure the loan, executed a Deed of Mortgage
over BF Homes' properties by virtue of an SPA. Banco Filipino then assigned
the mortgage to the BSP as security for the special liquidity facility loan
obtained. Later, BF Homes found out that BSP applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure and sale of real estate mortgage of its real properties mortgaged
by Tierra Grande. Hence, BF Homes prayed that the RTC make a declaration
of its rights and duties under the Deed of Assignment of Mortgage between
Banco Filipino and BSP and whether the property in the name of BF Homes
mortgaged by Tierra Grande to Banco Filipino can be mortgaged by the latter
to BSP. The BSP filed a motion to dismiss alleging that BF Homes had not
authorized the filing of the Petition, it was not verified and it did not contain
the requisite certification against forum shopping. The RTC ordered the
dismissal of the case for lack of authority to file the petitioner which the CA
reversed.

Issue:
Whether there was substantial compliance by BF Homes as regards the
requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping

Held:
Yes as to the verification and No as to the certification; as a general rule, a
pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically

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requiring the same. However, since the Petition before the RTC prays that a
writ of prohibition be issued commanding the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of the RTC of Las Piñas to desist from conducting further proceedings
in the foreclosure case, the Petition, as provided under Rule 65, is required
to be
verified. That said, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal, not jurisdictional.

Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the

non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is
lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is

generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of the
petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the failure of
the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications
against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a
petition on behalf of the corporation.

Hence, even if the Court excuses the non-compliance as regards the

requirement of verification, the issue of whether the certification against
forum shopping is defective remains.

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Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp v Thick & Thin Agriproducts Inc
GR no 201044; 222691; May 5, 2021
Rule 7 – Verification

Facts:
In its complaint, respondent TTAI alleged that the parties entered into an
agreement where TTAI would supply on credit feeds and other supplies
necessary for petitioner’s hog raising business. Petitioner executed a chattel
mortgage over its hog livestock inventories in favor of TTAI for security.
Later, petitioner failed to pay for the same despite demand. Thus, TTAI
alleged in its complaint that as mortgagee it was entitled to take immediate
possession of the livestock subject of the mortgage. The trial court directed
the dismissal of the complaint for failure to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner by invalid service of summons. Respondent then filed a
petition for certiorari. Later on, petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari. Respondent then contends that Mr. Jorge, the chairperson and
president of petitioner, had no authority to file the petition on behalf of
Jorgenetics at the time of the filing thereof and that the belated submission
of the board resolution indicating his authority and ratifying the filing of the
petition will not cure the defect.

Issue:
Whether Jorgenetics failed to comply with the rules on verification

Held:
No; certain officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification
and certification on its behalf without need of a board resolution, among
those are the chairperson of the BOD and the president of a corporation.
Moreover, the lack of authority of a corporate officer to undertake an action
on behalf of the corporation may be cured by ratification through the

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subsequent issuance of a board resolution, recognizing the validity of the
action or the authority.

Given the foregoing, Mr. Jorge, as the chairperson and president of the
petitioner, is sufficiently authorized to sign the verification and certification
on behalf of Jorgenetics. Any doubt on his authority to sign the verification
and certification is likewise obviated by the secretary's certificate it
submitted which ratified Mr. Jorge's authority to represent petitioner.

The purpose of a verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that

the allegations of a pleading are true and correct, are not speculative or
merely imagined, and have been made in good faith. To achieve this
purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an affidavit or sworn
statement, confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose
allegations are true and correct of the affiant's personal knowledge or based
on authentic records.

Victory Lines Inc v Malinias

GR no 151170; May 29, 2007
Rule 7 – Verification

Facts:
A complaint for sum of money and damages was instituted with the MTC by
respondent against Victory Liner, Inc. and the bus driver due to a vehicular
collision. MTC rendered judgment in favor of Malinias. Through a new
counsel, the petitioner filed an MR. The MTC ruled that the MR had been filed
beyond the reglementary period and that its earlier judgment had long
become final and executory because of the fatally defective MR. A series of
unsuccessful attempts by the petitioner to have the lower courts set aside or
stay the now-final judgment against it ensued and one of which is when
petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to annul judgment under
Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA dismissed the petition.
One of the reasons for such dismissal is because the Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping was signed by the counsel for
petitioner. It ruled that it should be the petitioner, not the counsel, which
should execute the verification and certification against
forum shopping.

Issue:
Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of the verification
and certification against forum shopping

Held:
No; the rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the
contents of the certification against forum shopping. While the lack of
certification against forum shopping is generally not cured by its submission

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after the filing of the petition, and the submission of a certificate against
forum shopping is deemed obligatory, the requirement has been relaxed
under justifiable circumstances under the rule on substantial compliance.
The same characteristics hold true as to the verification requirement. The
fact that the previous authority may have been misplaced or lost, thus
causing petitioner to
authorize a new person to file the necessary pleadings or petitions in the
case involving the respondent, is of no consequence if the new authority is
issued before the filing of the pleading that requires verification or
certification against forum-shopping. Here, the error consisted in petitioner
counsel’s failure to attach the certification of authority to the petition, but
she did submit said certificate to the CA the very next day.

Rule of substantial compliance – compliance with the essential requirements,

whether of a contract or of a statute

Tanyag v Tanyag
GR no 231319; November 10, 2021
Certification against Forum Shopping

Facts:
Arturo married Dolores and their property relations were governed by the
conjugal partnership of gains. Later, Dolores filed a Petition to declare their
marriage null and void due to Arturo's psychological incapacity before the
RTC of QC. During the pendency of the case, Dolores filed a separate Petition
for Declaration of Paraphernal Property before the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet. In this Petition, she prayed that the trial court declare as her
exclusive paraphernal property two parcels of land and that Arturo be
ordered to surrender to her the owner's duplicate of the titles. Arturo alleged
that the Property Case was barred by litis pendentia and that Dolores was
guilty of forum shopping because of the Nullity Case. The RTC of Quezon City
declared the marriage null and void. Meanwhile, Arturo filed a Motion for
Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses in the Property Case, seeking to
have the Petition dismissed on the ground of primary jurisdiction, litis
pendentia, and deliberate forum shopping but his motion was denied. Arturo
appealed to the CA but to no avail.

Issue:
Whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping

Held:
Yes; the rule as provided in Rule 7, Sec 5 of the ROC states that the plaintiff
shall certify under oath in the complaint asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annex thereto and simultaneously filed with:

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 1. That he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein
2. If there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of
the present status thereof
3. If he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within 5 days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed

Failure to comply with the requirements shall not be curable by mere

amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause
for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
noncompliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and
criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.

In this case, upon the filing of the petition for nullity of marriage, the court
also acquired jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the
marriage. Among these is the settlement of the parties’ common properties.

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Heirs of Gabriel v Cebrero
GR no 222737; November 12, 2018
Certification against forum shopping

Facts:
Cebrero, through her attorney-in-fact, executed a real estate mortgage over
the subject property registered under the name of Cebrero's late husband
Virgilio as security for the payment pursuant to an amicable settlement.
Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount, Gabriel filed an action for
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The RTC ruled in Gabriel's favor and
ordered Cebrero to pay or the subject property shall be sold at public auction
in default of payment. Later, Gabriel, being the sole bidder, purchased
Cebrero’s undivided interest. Later, Caniza, allegedly in behalf of Gabriel,
instituted a Complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and of the TCT under
Progressive, a single proprietorship represented by its President and
Chairman, respondent Chua. In their Answer, respondents alleged that
Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was bedridden and confined at
the Makati Medical Center. The complaint should be dismissed because
Caniza signed the verification and certification of the complaint without
proper authority.

Issue:
Whether the verification and certification of the complaint conforms with the
rules since Caniza, as Gabriel’s attorney-in-fact

Held:
No; It is said that the certification against forum shopping must be executed
by the party-pleader, not by his counsel unless for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign. However, when an SPA was
constituted precisely to authorize the agent to file and prosecute suits on

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behalf of the principal, then it is such agent who has actual and personal
knowledge whether he or she has initiated similar actions or proceedings
before various courts on the same issue on the principal's behalf, thus,
satisfying the requirements for a valid certification against forum shopping.

The rationale behind the rule that it must be the "petitioner or principal party
himself ”who should sign such certification does not apply. Thus, the rule on
the certification against forum shopping has been properly complied with
when it is the agent or attorney-in-fact who initiated the action on the
principal's behalf and who signed the certification against forum shopping.
However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to
prove Caniza's supposed authority to file and prosecute suits on behalf of
Gabriel.

Cosco Philippines Shipping Inc v Kemper Insurance Co

GR no 179488; April 23, 2012
Certification against Forum Shopping

Facts:
Respondent insured the shipment of imported frozen boneless beef (owned
by Genosi) which was loaded at a port in Australia, for shipment to Genosi in
the Philippines. However, upon arrival at the Manila port, a portion of the
shipment
was rejected by Genosi, Inc. by reason of spoilage arising from the alleged
temperature fluctuations of petitioner's reefer containers. Thus, Genosi, Inc.
filed a claim against both petitioner shipping company and respondent
Kemper
Insurance Company. Respondent paid the claim of Genosi, Inc and made
demands upon petitioner, but the latter failed and refused to pay the said
amount. Respondent then filed a Complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages
against petitioner before the trial court. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that the same was filed by one Atty. Rodolfo A. Lat, who failed to
show his authority to sue and sign the corresponding certification against
forum shopping. It argued that Atty. Lat's act of signing the certification
against forum shopping was a clear violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Court. The trial court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss. On
reconsideration, respondent’s MR was denied. On appeal to the CA, the CA
reverse and set aside the trial court’s order.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Lat was properly authorized by respondent to sign the
certification against forum shopping on its behalf

Held:

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No; the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal
parties. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the
one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. With respect to a
corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and
on its behalf, by a specifically authorized lawyer who has personal
knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.

In the present case, since respondent is a corporation, the certification must

be executed by an officer or member of the board of directors or by one who
is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors; otherwise, the
complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but
shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same
rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on
behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said
signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.
There is no proof that respondent, a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat,
through a board resolution, to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum
shopping appended to the complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the
dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages against
petitioner.

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Lara’s Gifts and Decors Inc v PNB General Insurers Co
GR no 230429; January 24, 2018
Judicial Affidavit Rule

Facts:
Petitioner leased buildings/warehouses as production and storage areas of its
goods and stocks from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc. The handicraft products,
raw materials, and machineries and equipment of petitioner were insured
against fire and other allied risks with respondent PNB. Later, approximately
hours before the policy was about to expire, a fire broke out and razed the JY
& Sons Compound. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for
the loss and damage of its insured properties but respondents denied such
claim. Resultantly, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and
Damages against respondents before the RTC. During the cross-examination,
petitioner furnished respondents with a copy of the 2 nd supplemental judicial
affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte (the 1st was during the pre-trial). PNB sought to
strike from the records said 2nd supplemental judicial affidavit and all
documents attached thereto for violation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. The
RTC allowed the introduction of the 2nd supplemental affidavit. The CA
reversed the ruling of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether the filing of the 2nd supplemental judicial affidavit is violative of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule

Held:
No; The JA Rule was promulgated to address congestion and delays in courts.
Designed to expedite court proceedings, it primarily affects the manner by
which evidence is presented in court, particularly with regard to the taking of
the witnesses' testimonies. Consequently, in lieu of direct testimony in court,
the parties are required to submit the judicial affidavits of their witnesses
within a given period. Nevertheless, the JA Rule was not devised to supplant

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or amend existing procedural rules; rather, it is designed to supplement and
augment them.

With regard to the admission of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit, Sec.
2 of the JA Rule states that the parties must file with the court and serve on
the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses not later than 5
days before pretrial or preliminary conference. While the belated submission
of evidence is not totally disallowed, it is still, to reiterate, subject to several
conditions, which petitioner failed to comply with since it filed said affidavit
during trial instead of the pre-trial.

Nevertheless, in the pre-trial order of the parties of this case, the parties
reserved their right to present additional documentary evidence in the
course of their trial. Hence, following their pre-trial, the parties waived the
application of the JA rule specifically Sec 2 thereof. Hence, the filing was not
violative of the Judicial Affidavit Rule.

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Lazaro v Brewmaster Intl Inc
GR no 182779; August 23, 2010
Distinguish Ultimate from Evidentiary Facts

Facts:
Respondent is a marketing company engaged in selling and distributing beer
and other products of Asia Brewery, Inc. It filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money
against petitioner Prescillo and petitioner Victorina, with the MeTC. The
complaint alleged that petitioners obtained on credit from respondents beer
and other products which was evidenced by sales invoices. Despite repeated
demands, petitioners failed and refused to pay their obligation. In the sales
invoice, petitioners agreed that in case of litigation, the venue shall only be
at the proper courts of Makati and payment of 24% interest on all overdue
accounts. Prescillo filed an answer with counterclaim, denying any
knowledge of the obligation sued upon. According to Prescillo, he and
petitioner had lived separately and he never authorized petitioner to
purchase anything from respondent. The MeTC dismissed the complaint on
the ground that respondent failed to meet the burnden of proof to establish
its claim by preponderance of evidence. The RTC affirmed the decision of the
MeTC. The CA reversed the decision and ordered payment to Brewmaster.

Issue:
Whether the complaint filed against petitioner lacks cause of action

Held:
No; the basic requirement under the rules of procedure is that a complain
must make a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts on
which the plaintiff relies for his claim.

ULTIMATE FACTS mean the important and substantial facts which either
directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty or directly
make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. They refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the
cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter
or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.

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The test of sufficiency of the facts alleged in a complaint to constitute a
cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
petition or complaint. To determine whether the complaint states a cause of
action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact, be considered,
particularly when referred to in the complaint. We emphasize, however, that
the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations
in the complaint.

Reyes v RTC of Makati

GR no 165744; August 11, 2008
Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind

Facts:
Oscar and private respondent Rodrigo are two of the four children of the
spouses Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar, and Rodrigo each owned shares of
stock of Zenith Insurance Corporation, a domestic corporation established by
their family. Pedro and Anastacia died. Zenith and Rodrigo filed a complaint
with the SEC against Oscar alleging that he illegally acquired the shares of
Anastacia. Oscar then questioned the SEC’s jurisdiction because the
complaint pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia Reyes and
that with the effectivity of R.A. 8799, the SEC’s exclusive and original
jurisdiction over cases in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the RTC as
a special commercial court. Thus, the records of Rodrigo’s SEC case were
turned over to the RTC Makati. Oscar filed a Motion to Declare Complaint as
Nuisance or Harassment Suit claiming that the complaint should be
dismissed, and that the complaint is not a bona fide derivative suit as it
partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial
court. The RTC denied the motion. The CA affirmed the RTC Order and
denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether the trial court, sitting as a special commercial court, has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of Rodrigo’s complaint

Held:
No; whether as an individual or as a derivative suit, the RTC – sitting as
special
commercial court – has no jurisdiction to hear Rodrigo’s complaint since what
is involved is the determination and distribution of successional rights to the
shareholdings of Anastacia Reyes. Rodrigo’s proper remedy, under the
circumstances, is to institute a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Anastacia Reyes, a move that is not foreclosed by the
dismissal of his present complaint.

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Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.

The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and must specify the relief
sought. Section 5, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. These rules find specific
application to
Section 5(a) of P.D. No. 902-A which speaks of corporate devices or schemes
that amount to fraud or misrepresentation detrimental to the public and/or to
the stockholders. Allegations of deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats are largely conclusions of law that, without
supporting statements of the facts to which the allegations of fraud refer, do
not sufficiently state an effective cause of action.

Tested against these standards, the Court find that the charges of fraud
against Oscar were not properly supported by the required factual
allegations. While the complaint contained allegations of fraud purportedly
committed by him, these allegations are not particular enough to bring the
controversy within the special commercial court’s jurisdiction; they are not
statements of ultimate facts, but are mere conclusions of law. In ordinary
cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute
a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars.

** In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate

Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is
essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed
to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the
court’s special commercial jurisdiction. In this case, the complaint will not
show any specifically alleged corporate fraud that will call for the exercise of
the court’s special commercial jurisdiction.

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Momarco Import Co Inc v Villamena
GR no 192477; July 27, 2016
Declaration of Default

Facts:
Villamena filed a complaint for Nullification of Deed of Sale and of the Title
Issued against MOMARCO alleging that she is the owner of a parcel of land
with improvements. MOMARCO sent a letter to Villamena stating that her
TCT over said property has already been cancelled since Villamena’s
husband already sold it to MOMARCO. However, Villamena claims that what
was executed in favor of MOMARCO was a mortgage not a deed of sale.
Later, Villamena filed a motion to declare MOMARCO in default for failure to
file its answer as of said date despite the filing of an Entry of Appearance by
its counsel beyond the reglementary period. MOMARCO still filed its Answer
with Counterclaim, but RTC declared MOMARCO in default and ordered that
the answer be stricken from the records. RTC rendered a judgment nullifying
the deed of absolute sale. The CA affirmed the Decision on the ground that
Villamena has sufficiently established her claim. Hence, this appeal. by the
petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the answer filed beyond the reglementary period, but before an
order of default should be admitted

Held:
No, it should not be admitted; MOMARCO filed its Answer only after a period
of more than four months from when it entered its voluntary appearance and
only after almost a month from when Villamena moved to have it declared in
default.

While the Supreme Court is aware that it is vested with some discretion to
condone procedural errors, we do not find that doing so will serve the best
interests of justice. To remand this case to the court a quo on the invocation
that we must be liberal in setting aside orders of default, would be to reward
MOMARCO with more delay. The RTC had the discretion to permit the filing of
the answer even beyond the reglementary period, or to refuse to set aside
the default order where it finds no justification for the delay in the filing of
the answer. Conformably with the judicious exercise of such discretion, the
RTC could then have admitted the belated answer of MOMARCO and lifted

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the order of default instead of striking the answer from the records.
However, the RTC opted not to condone the inordinate delay taken by
MOMARCO and went on to render the default judgment. Such actions were
fully within its discretion.

Crisologo-Jose v Land Bank of the Philippines

GR no 167399; June 22, 2006
Declaration of Default

Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of various parcels of land covered under separate
titles. According to the petitioner, respondent Land Bank gave these
landholdings which she inherited from her uncle, Alejandro T. Lim. Petitioner
filed a PETITION for determination of just compensation respecting her
landholdings. During petitioner’s presentation of her evidence, the trial court
admitted Land Bank’s ANSWER. The trial court, after due proceedings,
rendered judgment fixing the fair market value which was reversed by the
CA. Petitioner faults the appellate court for relying on and lending credence
to the allegations and defenses that respondent averred in its answer which
it filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Section 11, Rule 11 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioner also blames the trial court for admitting, instead of
expunging from the records, said answer and for not declaring the
respondent in default.

Issue:
Whether the answer filed by the respondent should have expunged from the
records for having been filed beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Sec
11, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court

Held:
No; To admit or to reject an answer filed after the prescribed period is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In fact, Section 11, Rule 11 of
the Rules authorizes the court to accept answer though filed late, thus:

SECTION. 11. Extension of time to plead. – Upon motion and on such terms
as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in these
Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be
filed after the time fixed by these Rules.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v Third Division of the Court of Tax
Appeals
GR no 238093; January 26, 2021
Declaration of Default

Facts:
AZ Contracting System Service, Inc. (ACSSI) filed a petition for review before
the
CTA seeking review of petitioner's denial through inaction of ACSSI's claim
for refund of excess and unutilized creditable withholding taxes. Accordingly,
the CTA issued Summons, directing petitioner to submit his Answer within 15
days from receipt thereof. Petitioner, however, failed to file an Answer. As
such, since
more than 3 months lapsed since the period for petitioner to file an Answer,
ACSSI filed a Motion to Declare Respondent in Default which was granted by
the CTA in its Resolution.

Issue:
Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring
petitioner in default

Held:
No; When a defendant is served with summons and a copy of the complaint,
he or she is required to answer within 15 days from its receipt. The
defendant may also move to dismiss the complaint within the time for but
before filing the answer. Fifteen days is sufficient time for a defendant to
prepare his defenses against the plaintiffs’ allegations in the complaint.

The court may declare the defendant in default on plaintiffs’ motion and
notice to defendant. The court shall then try the case until judgment without
defendant's participation and grant the plaintiff such relief as his or her
complaint may warrant. Under Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, there
are three (3) requirements before the claiming party may have the
defending party declared in default:
(1) that the claiming party must file a motion praying that the court declare
the defending party in default
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare it in default

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(3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party failed to answer
the complaint within the period provided by the rule.

In this case, all the elements for a valid declaration of default are present in
this case. The CTA was correct in granting ACSSI’s motion and declaring
petitioner in default.

Rodriguez v Government of the United States of America

GR no 251830; June 28, 2021
Declaration of Default

Facts:
Respondent, represented by the DOJ, filed before the RTC a Petition for
Extradition. The petition sought for the extradition of spouses Rodriguez from
the Philippines to the US after they allegedly fled from US jurisdiction where
they are wanted to stand trial. Spouses Rodriguez did not file an Answer to
the petition
for extradition. Instead, they filed several motions on various dates touching
matters they alleged as necessary for them to file an answer, will warrant
the dismissal of the petition for extradition, for inhibitions of the presiding
judges, and in matter of bail. Respondent later filed a motion to declare
petitioner in default. After conducting a hearing, RTC issued an order
directing the respondent to present evidence despite the non-filing of any
responsive pleading from the petitioner. Petitioner received the signed copy
of the Order of the RTC. She filed a verified Motion to Set Aside the Order of
Default. The CA upheld the declaration of default of petitioner.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is correctly held in default

Held:
No; Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Court requires 3 requirements
which must be complied with by the claiming party before the court may
declare the defending party in default, to wit:
(1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the
defending party in default
(2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare them in
default and
(3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to
answer within the period provided by the Rule.

In this case, while respondent previously filed a motion to declare petitioner

in default but was already denied by the RTC. Later, respondent's counsel
again sought to declare petitioner in for failure to file her responsive

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pleading despite repeated orders. However, a motion filed for the declaration
of default is expressly required by the rules. Said motion cannot be made
verbally during a hearing such as what respondent's counsel did in this case.
In addition, the oral motion to declare petitioner in default violated the
requirement of notice of such motion to the defending party prior to the
hearing thereof. A notice of the motion to declare a defendant in default is
indispensable to avoid surprises on the opposite party and to give him time
to study and meet the arguments.

Gajudo v Traders Royal Bank

GR no 151098; March 21, 2006
Declaration of Default

Facts:
Petitioner Chua obtained a loan from respondent bank secured by a real
estate
mortgage over a parcel of land owned in common by the other petitioners.
When the loan was not paid, respondent bank commenced extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings on the property. The Sheriff sold the property to the
respondent bank, the highest bidder. The petitioners argue that the other
petitioners failed to redeem the property due to their lack of knowledge of
their right of redemption. However, a big conflagration hit the City Hall of
Quezon City, which destroyed, amongst other things, the records of the case.
After the records were reconstituted, petitioners discovered that the
foreclosed property was sold to the Ceroferr Realty Corporation, and that the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificate of title of the foreclosed
property, had already been cancelled. Upon proof that petitioners had indeed
served respondent bank with a copy of said motion, RTC issued an Order of
default against respondent bank. The trial court thumbed down the motion to
set aside the partial decision by default. CA favored the respondent bank and
ruled that the erroneous docket number placed on the Answer filed before
the trial court was not an excusable negligence by the bank’s counsel.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in failing to apply the provision of Sec 3, Rule 9 of the
ROC

Held:
No; regarding judgments by default, complainants are not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for once the defendants are declared in default.
Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the
relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts proven by the
presenting party. It would be meaningless to require presentation of
evidence if every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would
automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly
according to the tenor of his prayer.

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They are not to be understood as meaning that default or the failure of the
defendant to answer should ‘be interpreted as an admission by the said
defendant that the plaintiff’s cause of action finds support in the law or that
plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. Basic is the rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Thus, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte
under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing their
claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of Rule
133.
Alpha Plus International Enterprises Corp v Philippine Charter Insurance Corp
GR no 203756; February 10, 2021
Effect of Amended Pleadings

Facts:
Petitioner Alpha Plus, a company engaged in optical media business,
obtained two fire insurance policies from respondent PCIC. Later, petitioner's
warehouse was gutted by fire destroying its equipment and pieces of
machinery stored
therein. Thus, it sought to recover from its insurance policies with the PCIC
but its claim was denied. Thus, Alpha Plus filed a Complaint before the RTC
against respondent PCIC and its officers for Specific Performance, Collection
of Sum of
Money and Damages. Later, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint praying
for similar reliefs as stated in its original complaint but, this time, it
specifically claimed the amount of P300 million as actual damages and that
respondents be ordered to pay "two (2) times the legal interest per annum
on the proceeds
of the policies for the duration of the delay." Petitioner argues that its action
has not yet prescribed and that the suit is deemed to have been commenced
on the date that the original was filed, on January 20, 2010

Issue:
Whether prescription barred the petitioner’s complaint

Held:
Yes; When it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that an
action is barred by prescription, the court is mandated to dismiss the same.

An amended complaint supersedes an original one. As a consequence, the

original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the
record. The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not
retroact to the date of the filing of the original pleading. However, when the
amended complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action, or
demands, the suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original
complaint was filed.

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With petitioner's filing of the Amended Complaint which raised new
demands, the original complaint of petitioner must be deemed to have been
abandoned and to have been rendered functus officio. As the Amended
Complaint superseded the original complaint of petitioner, the suit of the
latter is deemed to have been commenced on the date of filing of the
Amended Complaint on February 9, 2010. During this time, prescription had
already set in as petitioner had only until January 24, 2010 within which to
file its insurance claim.

Marcos-Araneta v CA
GR no 154096; August 22, 2008
Amendment as a matter of right

Facts:
Petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of stockholding FEMII and
UEC. The private respondent in response filed a motion to dismiss which one
of the grounds used was venue was improperly laid as the petitioner did not
maintain residence in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The RTC dismissed the complaint
of the petitioner on the ground of improper venue. Pending resolution of her
motion, she filed a motion to Admit Amended Complaint, attaching therewith
a copy of the amended complaint which includes, other new plaintiff who are
resident of Batac, Ilocos Norte. The Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioner
was denied, however, the court admitted the Amendment of the complaint,
and ordered the respondent to submit their Answer. Respondent moved to
dismiss the amended complaint but was denied by the RTC. Respondent
submitted an answer to the amended complaint to evade default but went to
CA to question the acceptance of the Amended Complaint.

Issue:
Whether the amended complaints in the RTC should be dismissed

Held:
No, the admission by the RTC of Irene’s amended complaint is proper.
Section 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may amend
his pleading ONCE as a MATTER OF RIGHT at ANY TIME BEFORE a responsive
pleading is served or in case of a REPLY, at any time within 10 days after it is
served.

RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS are those which seek affirmative relief and/or set up
defenses, like an Answer. A Motion to Dismiss is NOT a responsive pleading
for purposes of Section 2 of Rule 10. Thus, the RTC did not err in admitting
petitioners’ amended complaint, the Benedictos NOT having yet answered
the original complaints when the amended complaint was filed. At that

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precise moment, Irene, by force of Section 2 of Rule 10, had, as a MATTER
OF RIGHT, the option of amending her underlying reconveyance complaints.
Considering that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the
correlative duty of the trial court to ACCEPT the amended complaint;
otherwise, MANDAMUS would lie against it. The trial court’s duty to admit the
amended complaint was PURELY
MINISTERIAL. In fact, respondent should NOT have filed a Motion to Admit
her amended complaint.

Biglang-Awa v Philippine Trust Company

GR no 158998; March 28, 2008
Amendment as a matter of right

Facts:
Herein petitioners, together with their mother filed a Complaint for
declaration of nullity of deeds, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and
recovery with damages before the RTC of Quezon City against respondents.
In the complaint, petitioners and Encarnacion alleged that they are the
legitimate owners of eight parcels of land. Petitioners averred that, without
the knowledge and consent of Encarnacion and through fraudulent
manipulations, misrepresentations and the use of falsified documents,
Tolentino
succeeded in having four of the eight subject parcels of land, which are in
the name of Encarnacion, encumbered by way of mortgage to secure a loan
made by Tolentino with respondent. The RTC dismissed plaintiff’s complaint
with prejudice. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and
subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend complaint and to admit
attached amended complaint which the RTC denied.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the complaint of petitioners should be admitted

Held:
No; Sec 2 of Rule 10 states that a party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the
case of a reply, at any time within 10 days after it is served.

In the present case, prior to petitioners' filing of their Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, respondent
already filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had
already filed its answer, it follows that petitioners may no longer amend their
complaint against the former as a matter of right. They may do so only upon
leave of court, as

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provided under Section 3, Rule 10 of the same Rules, which they did by filing
their Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.

Section 3, Rule 10 states that "the amendment may (now) substantially alter
the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however when
despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense,
the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of
substantial justice and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."

In the case at bar, the resolution of the RTC had already become final and
executory, petitioners are already precluded from claiming otherwise. If
petitioners are permitted to amend their complaint they would, in effect,
alter a factual conclusion of the RTC.

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National Mines and Allied Workers Union v Calderon-Bargas
GR no 157232; December 10, 2007
Amendment as a matter of right

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint with the NLRC for unfair labor practice and
money claims. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued. As the highest
bidder in the execution sale conducted by the Sheriff, NAMAWU acquired title
to the property. Mitra filed a complaint for "Annulment of Final Deed of Sale
against NAMAWU. The case was assigned to public respondent Judge.
NAMAWU averred that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case because it is an offshoot of a labor dispute that had been decided
by the NLRC. Judge Calderon-Bargas issued an Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Upon Mitra’s failure to file an appeal, the
Orders of the RTC dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for
reconsideration became final and executory. Mitra filed a Motion to Admit
Amended Complaint pursuant to an Order stating that there is a need to
amend the complaint, naming NAMAWU as a nominal party and the Register
of Deeds as the indispensable party.

Issue:
Whether Judge Bargas acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order allowing Mitra’s amended complaint

Held:
Yes; Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a
matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or in the
case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served. At this
stage, a party has the absolute right to amend his pleading and may
introduce a new cause of action or change in theory. On the other hand,
substantial amendments after the answer had been filed may be made only
upon leave of court; but such leave may be refused if it appears to the court
that the motion was made with intent to delay.

In the present case, the motion to file an amended complaint was filed one
month after the Order of the trial court dismissing Mitra’s complaint became
final due to the latter's failure to perfect an appeal. As a rule, the aggrieved

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party must perfect his appeal within the period as provided for by law. The
rule is mandatory in character. A party's failure to comply with the law will
result in the
decision becoming final and executory and, as such, can no longer be
modified or reversed. Thus, it is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court
which rendered the decision or order to amend or revoke the same after the
lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period to file an appeal.

Limbauan v Acosta
GR no 148606; June 30, 2008
Amendment as a matter of right

Facts:
Acosta sent a letter to Limbauan demanding that the latter vacate the
property within 5 days from notice for his failure to pay the monthly rentals
but the
latter refused to vacate the property. Acosta then filed a complaint for
"Unlawful Detainer" against petitioner with the MeTC. Acosta then forthwith
filed a "Motion to Approve Attached Amended Complaint" with the Court
which was
granted by the MTC. In his Answer to the Complaint, petitioner alleged, that
Acosta had no cause of action against him because the property is owned by
the government and that the Court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it allowed the amendment under Rule 10, Sec 2 to eliminate the
jurisdiction defect of the original complaint.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the complaint is valid

Held:
Yes; Under Rule 10, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a party has the absolute
right to amend his pleading whether a new cause of action or change in
theory is introduced, at any time before the filing of any responsive pleading.

In this case, when respondent filed his Amended Complaint, no responsive

pleading had yet been filed by petitioner, thus, the MTC validly admitted the
said amended complaint. It is well-settled that amendment of pleadings is
favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order
to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally recognized in order that the real
controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined,
and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay to prevent
circuity of action and needless expense.

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Moreover, as earlier discussed, respondent's original complaint was free from
any jurisdictional flaw and the MTC had jurisdiction over the case to begin
with.

Sante v Claravall
GR no 173915; February 22, 2010
Amendment as a matter of right

Facts:
Respondent filed before the RTC complaint for damages against petitioners.
Respondent alleged that while she was inside a Police Station and in the
presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered
words, which when translated in English are as follows, "How many rounds of
sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin' bitch!". Bert
refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent's friend and one of her hired personal
security guards detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the
killing of petitioners' close relative. Petitioners also allegedly went around
Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the
suspects in the aforesaid killing. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that it was the MTCC and not the RTC that had jurisdiction over the
case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more than the jurisdictional amount of P300,000.00. Respondent then filed
an amended complaint increasing the claim.

Issue:
Whether the amendment of the complaint is valid

Held:
Yes; while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be
allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and
the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here,
the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment
of the complaint was then still a matter of right.

In this case, the complaint filed is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged malicious acts of petitioners. Hence, the other forms of damages
being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney's fees and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main

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action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. The claim
being P420,000, now falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Spouses Lambino v Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 172, Valenzuela City

GR no 169551; January 24, 2007
Supplemental pleadings

Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Lambino secured a housing loan from private respondent
BPI. They executed a Mortgage Loan Agreement (MLA) over their property as
security for the loan. When petitioners failed to pay the monthly
amortizations,
BPI filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the MLA with the RTC.
Petitioners filed for the annulment of the MLA and extrajudicial foreclosure
sale and alleged that BPI had released only P555k out of their P600k loan,
and, despite demand, BPI refused to release the remaining amount of their
loan and to readjust their monthly amortization conformably with the MLA.
Later, petitioners filed a Motion to Admit their Supplemental Complaint
wherein they
prayed that the imposition of escalating and arbitrary rate of interest be
declared null and void/annulled/rescinded and rendered without force and
effect. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion and held that Sec 6, Rule 10
states that only transactions, occurrences, or events which accrued after the
date of the complaint may be set forth in the supplemental complaint.

Issue:
Whether petitioner’s motion to admit supplemental complaint should be
admitted

Held:
No; A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the
original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. A
supplemental complaint must be consistent with, and in aid of, the cause of
action set forth in the original complaint.

The admission or non-admission of a supplemental pleading is not a matter

of right but is discretionary on the court. Among the factors that the court
will consider are: (1) resulting prejudice to the parties; and (2) whether the
movant would be prejudiced if the supplemental pleading were to be denied.

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What constitutes prejudice to the opposing party depends upon the
particular
circumstance of each case. An opposing party who has had notice of the
general nature of the claim or matter asserted in the supplemental pleading
from the beginning of the action will not be prejudiced by the granting of
leave to file a supplemental pleading. A motion for leave to file a
supplemental pleading may be denied if he is guilty of undue delay or laches
which causes substantial prejudice to the opposing party. Here, before they
filed their original complaint, petitioners were already aware of the
deductions made on the proceeds of the loan. They should have sought to
nullify such charges in the original complaint, but they did not. They are thus
proscribed from incorporating the same via a supplemental complaint.

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Ada v Baylon
GR no 182435; August 13, 20120
Supplemental pleadings

Facts:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for partition, accounting, and
damages against Florante, Rita, and Panfila alleging therein that Spouses
Baylon, during their lifetime owned 43 parcels of land. After the death of
Spouses Baylon, they claimed that Rita took possession of the said parcels of
land and refused to effect a partition of the said parcels of land. Florante,
Rita, and Panfila denied that Rita appropriated solely for herself the income
of the estate of Spouses Baylon and expressed no objection to the partition
of the estate of Spouses Baylon but only with respect to the co-owned
parcels of land. During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of
Donation conveyed lots to Florante. Rita died intestate and without any
issue. The petitioners then filed a Supplemental Pleading praying that the
said donation in favor of the respondent can be rescinded in accordance with
the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether an action for rescission of donation can be lumped with an action
for partition through a mere supplemental pleading

Held:
Yes; a supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it
has some relation to the original cause of action set forth in the original
complaint.

A supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or add something to the

primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does
not replace that which it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading
assumes that the original pleading is to stand and that the issues joined with
the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is but a
continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which
justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject
matter as the controversy referred to in the original complaint.

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Here, the issue as to the validity of the donation inter vivos made by Rita in
favor of Florante is a new cause of action that occurred after the filing of the
original complaint. However, the petitioners’ prayer for the rescission of the
said donation inter vivos in their supplemental pleading is germane to, and is
in fact, intertwined with the cause of action in the partition case. The
petitioners’ supplemental pleading merely amplified the original cause of
action, on account of the gratuitous conveyance after the filing of the original
complaint and prayed for additional reliefs.

Roa v Spouses Sy
GR no 221586; September 14, 2021
Bill of particulars

Facts:
Petitioner Roa filed a complaint against the respondents Marie Antoinette
Francisco and Spouses Sy averring that, as evidenced by TCT, she and her
sister Amelia are the legitimate owners of a property located in Makati City.
Later, she learned from a relative that their title had been cancelled by the
RD Makati, and by virtue of a deed of sale, a new TCT was issued in the
name of Francisco. The deed of sale was purportedly executed between her
and her sister Amelia, on the one hand, and their niece Francisco, on the
other. Spouses Sy filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. RTC denied Spouses Sy’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Thereafter, they filed a motion for bill of particulars and later an amendment
motion for bill of particulars.

Issue:
Whether the filing for a motion of bill of particular negates the claim of
spouses Sy that the complaint states no cause of action against them

Held:
Yes; the filing of the motion for a bill of particulars, which in truth is a request
for written interrogatories negates the claim of Spouses Sy that the
complaint states no cause of action against them.

If, however, the complaint contains ambiguity, indefiniteness, or uncertainty,

a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of
any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him or her to properly prepare his or her responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply material
allegations necessary to the validity of a pleading, or to change a cause of
action or defense stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or
defense other than the one stated. Also, it is not the office or function of a
bill of particulars to set forth the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a
rule of evidence on which he intends to rely or to furnish evidential

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information whether such information consists of evidence which the pleader
proposes to introduce or of facts which constitute a defense.
This means that when parties seek a bill of particulars, they in effect admit
that the complaint bears the ultimate facts comprising a valid cause of
action. What they ask for though is simply a specification of these ultimate
facts to enable them to properly prepare their responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Consequently, any challenge against the complaint based
on its supposed failure to state a cause of action is no longer feasible after
the parties have sought a bill of particulars.
Abutin v San Juan
GR no 247345; July 6, 2020
Service on counsel

Facts:
Corazon who had been in a same-sex relationship with Purita passed away
without any surviving ascendants or descendants. Upon her death, Purita
filed with the RTC a petition for the probate of 3 holographic wills executed
and left by Corazon. Respondents then filed an opposition to Purita’s petition
for probate. Both parties, through their respective counsels were served
copies by registered mail of the orders of the RTC to admit the probate of
wills. Convinced that the order had attained finality. Purita filed a motion for
entry of judgement and writ of execution. Later, respondents, through their
new counsel, Atty. Mibolos filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
Attached with their opposition several registry return receipts of service of
pleadings which were addressed to Atty. Ginete, their previous counsel, but
were actually received for him by Capuno, his driver. Respondents claim that
receipt by Capuno does not amount to valid service as Capuno was
supposedly never authorized to receive mail matter for Atty. Ginete.

Issue:
Whether the receipt by Capuno amount to a valid service

Held:
Yes; Sec 9 of Rule 13 states that judgments, final orders or resolutions shall
be served either personally or by registered mail. Sec 10 states that service
by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after 5
days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever
date is earlier. Registered mail is then complete upon actual receipt or 5
days after the postmaster's initial notice. An addressee is given only a
limited period to act on a notice as "the purpose is to place the date of
receipt of pleadings, judgments and processes beyond the power of the
party being served to determine at his pleasure.

In this case, Capuno was certified by the Office of the Postmaster to have
actually received a copy of the Judge’s order on February 9, 2016. Petitioner

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and her mother attached "several registry return receipts of service of
pleadings which were addressed to Atty. Ginete but were actually received
for him by Capuno" to the Opposition they filed. From all indications, Capuno
had long been authorized by Atty. Ginete to receive papers and processes on
his behalf. Consistent with this, Capuno effectively and validly received a
copy of the order on Atty. Ginete's behalf. Rule 13's standards on what
amounts to completed service by registered mail were satisfied the moment
Capuno received the Order on February 9, 2016.
Spouses Gonzales v Marmaine Realty Corp
GR no 214241; January 13, 2016
Notice of lis pendens

Facts:
Spouses Gonzales filed a complaint for Recognition as Tenant with Damages
and Temporary Restraining Order against Marmaine Realty Corp. before the
DARAB. PARAD issued a Resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of Spouses Gonzales. In view thereof, they
filed a Notice of Lis Pendens before the Register of Deeds, which was
annotated in the certificates of title of Marmaine’s properties. Thereafter,
PARAD issued a Decision in the Tenancy Case, dismissing Spouses Gonzales’
complaint for lack of merit.
DARAB affirmed PARAD’s ruling which became final and executory. In view of
the ruling in the Tenancy Case, Marmaine filed a Motion for Cancellation of
Notice of Lis Pendens. PARAD issued an Order directing the RD of Batangas
to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on Marmaine’s certificates of
title. According to PARAD, such cancellation is warranted in view of the final
and executory judgment in the Tenancy Case in Marmaine's favor.

Issue:
Whether the PARAD correctly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the certificates of title of Marmaine’s properties

Held:
Yes; the notice of lis pendens that Spouses Gonzales caused to be annotated
on Marmaine’s certificates of title stemmed from the Tenancy Case. Since
the said case had already been decided against Spouses Gonzales with
finality, PARAD was correct in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens subject of this case.

Lis pendens (pending suit) refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a
court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
the action, and until final judgment. It is intended to keep the properties in
litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and
to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.

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The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of
the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive
alienations; and (b) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject
of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently

Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may
be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be recorded." Case law likewise instructs that a
notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there are
exceptional
circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b) the
litigation was unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of
several continuances procured by petitioner; and (c) the case which is the
basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur on the
part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who
caused such a notation.

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Equitable PCI Bank Inc v South Rich Acres Inc
GR no 202397; May 4, 2021

Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Las Pinas enacted a City
Ordinance which declared Marcos Alvarez Avenue as a public road.
Subsequently, South Rich Acres, Inc. and Top Service filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief and
Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against the City of Las Pinas
alleging that SRA is the present legal owner of the 7 parcels of land which
formed the private road network collectively referred to as Marcos Alvarez
Avenue. In the meantime, the Royal South Subdivision makes use of the
avenue for ingress and egress. SRA and Top Service then filed a Motion for
Substitution of Parties with Motion to Annotate Lis Pendens which were
granted by the RTC. Consequently, EPCIB (now BDO) substituted RAMPI as
intervenor-defendant because all the rights and interests over RSS had
already been assigned by RAMPI to EPCIB. Likewise, the Registry of Deeds of
Las Pinas was directed to annotate a notice of lis pendens in all the titles of
RSS project. The RTC declared the City Ordinance invalid and
unconstitutional. EPCIB filed a Motion to Cancel Notice of Lis Pendens which
was denied. The CA cancelled the notice of lis pendens on the titles of BDO’s
property stating that only the particular properties subject of litigation may
be covered by a notice of lis pendens.

Issue:
Whether the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on all the TCTs of the
RSS Project is proper

Held:
Yes; a litigant may avail himself of the notice of lis pendens in any of the
following cases: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an
action to quiet title thereto; (c) an action to remove clouds thereon; (d) an
action for partition; and (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court
directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the
building thereon.

Before final judgment, the notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order

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of the court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights
of the party who caused it to be recorded. On the other hand, after final
judgment, the notice of lis pendens is rendered functus officio. In this case,
the lots owned by BDO are not the properties subject of litigation in this case
and the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on BDO's titles is not
necessary to protect the rights of SRA. The issue involved in this case is the
constitutionality of City Ordinance which declared Marcos Alvarez Avenue as
a public road. Thus, the properties in litigation in this case are the subject
lots where Marcos Alvarez Avenue is situated.
Sabado v Sabado
GR no 214270; May 12, 2021

Facts:
A Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order, Support and
Support Pendente Lite was filed by Tina against her husband Jay. Tina and
Jay were married. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their
children, depriving them of financial support. As a result of Jay's
abandonment and utter disregard for his family, Tina suffered psychological
and emotional abuse.
Tina prayed for the issuance of a TPO, the grant of P120,000.00 monthly
support to be remitted automatically by Jay's employer, and the eventual
issuance of a PPO. A TPO was issued by the trial court in favor of Tina. The
court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons,
petition, and TPO to Jay at his address but the security guard said he was not
around. He also tried to serve them at the office of his employer, only to be
told that appellant
was abroad for deployment. Atty. Palmero, counsel of Jay in a criminal case
for violation of RA 9262, went to Branch 136 and received a copy of the
Order and Petition as evidenced by the latter's signature therein.

Issue:
Whether the service of summons is proper

Held:
No; Summons is a procedural tool. It is a writ by which the defendant is
notified that an action was brought against him or her. In an action in
personam brought to enforce personal rights and obligations, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is mandatory. In such actions, therefore,
summonses serve not only to notify the defendant of the filing of an action,
but also to enable acquisition of jurisdiction over his person.

When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction or
when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which
has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.

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In the case at bar, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons,
petition, and TPO in Jay's residence and place of employment as per the
Sheriffs Return. However, records show that Jay was out of the country due
to his overseas employment. Since personal service could not be effected
upon him, summons should be served through substituted service,
extraterritorial service, or by publication in accordance with Sections 7, 15
and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court but was not resorted to by Tina.
However, in this case, the invalid service of summons was cured when Jay
voluntarily submitted himself when he filed the entry of appearance with
opposition to the issuance of the PPO.

Sarol v Spouses Diao

GR no 244129; December 9, 2020

Facts:
Petitioner Sarol purchased from a certain Claire Chiu a parcel of land which is
adjacent to the land of Spouses Diao. However, the area, as surveyed, is
erroneous because it included certain square meters of Spouses Diao's
property. When Spouses Diao learned of this overlap, they immediately
demanded Claire Chiu and Sarol to return their portion of the property but to
no avail. Hence, Spouses Diao filed a complaint with the RTC. Summons was
issued for service to
Claire Chiu, her husband Ginghis Chiu, the Register of Deeds of Negros
Oriental, and Sarol. The address of Sarol indicated in the summons states
"Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental," or the location of the
property she purchased from Claire Chiu. Respondent Sheriff Tale issued a
Sheriffs Return of Summons, which states that summons was served on
Claire Chiu but could
not be served to Sarol "on the ground that she is out of the country."
Spouses Diao then moved that summons be served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Dumaguete and in the
Province of Negros Oriental pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court on extraterritorial service of summons. Claire Chiu filed her answer to
the complaint but failed to appear at the pre-trial proceedings. Sarol, on the
other hand, failed to file any pleadings with the RTC. Upon motion of Spouses
Diao, Claire Chiu and Sarol were declared in default in an Order which then
became final and executory allowing Spouses Diao to present their evidence
ex-parte.

Issue:
Whether the summons in the case at bar is valid

Held:
No; the preferred mode of service of summons shall be done personally upon
the defendant or respondent. However, our rules set out other modes of
service. The Rules of Court allows the substituted service of summons if, for

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justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time.
It shall be effected by leaving copies of the summons: (a) at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein;
or (b) at the
defendant's place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
In this case, the Court found that the address in Guinsuan, Poblacion,
Zarnboanguita, Negros Oriental is not Sarol's place of residence. Therefore,
service of summons to Sarol, even by substituted service, should have been
effected in Tamisu, Bais City, Negros Oriental, as evidenced by the deed of
sale and TCT. Assuming that Guinsuan, Poblacion, Zamboanguita, Negros
Oriental is
Sarol's regular place of business, the Court finds that there was no
substituted service effected.

It must be noted that Spouses Diao are not totally without recourse as the
rules allow summons by publication and extraterritorial service. These are
extraordinary modes which require leave of court. In fact, Spouses Diao
moved for the extraterritorial service of summons by publication under
Section 15, (now Sec 17) Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Under this rule, one
of the modes to effect the extraterritorial service of summons is by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which
case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known correct address of the defendant. However,
in this case, the circulation should have been done in Tamisu, Bais City,
Negros Oriental.

To avail this mode, the action or complaint filed against a nonresident

defendant:
- affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to
- the subject of which, is property within the Philippines, in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent
- in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendant from any interest therein
- the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.

The service of summons is vital and indispensable to defendant's right to due

process. A violation of this due process is a jurisdictional defect which
renders null and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in relation to
the case. Thus, the judgment and the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC is
null and void.

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Yap v Tagtapon
GR no 196347; January 23, 2017

Facts:
Respondent Lagtapon instituted a civil suit against petitioner Yap with the
RTC. Summons were issued and as per return of service of summons, the
petitioner refused to acknowledge receipt thereof. As no answer was filed,
respondent Lagtapon filed a motion to declare petitioner Yap in default.
The said motion was granted by the respondent court in an order declaring
petitioner Yap in default and allowing respondent Lagtapon to present her
evidence ex-parte. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental
issued a Notice of Sale on execution. Joey Dela Paz, who mortgaged the
property, found out that the annotated title of the said property is in a Notice
of Embargo. Upon having knowledge to this, petitioner resorted to the court
for the truth, and she found out that she was sued by the respondent.
Petitioner Yap filed the subject Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing
the RTC Decision on the ground that Summons was not validly served on her,
which thus prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over her person.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid service of summon

Held:
Yes; in the absence of clear indication of partiality or malice, the service of
Summons on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. The Return
of Service of Summons as process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie
evidence of the facts set out therein.

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Hence, as far as the circumstance attendant to the service of Summons are
concerned, the Court has the right to rely on the factual representation of
Precioso that service had indeed been made on petitioner Yap in person.

BDO Unibank Inc v Spouses Chang

GR no 250769; May 3, 2021

Facts:
In the Complaint against respondents, BDO alleged that it extended various
credit accommodations to Chemvision which the latter failed to pay despite
repeated demands. The RTC issued an Order granting BDO's application for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. The sheriffs were
appointed to implement the writ of attachment and to serve summons upon
Chemvision and Respondents. In the Sheriff's Partial Report, the sheriffs
narrated the attempts made at personal service of summons. Hence, the
sheriffs resorted to substituted service of summons by leaving copies of the
Summons to security guards. Having received no responsive pleading, BDO
filed a motion to declare Chemvision and Respondents in default. Thereafter,
respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the RTC had no personal
jurisdiction over them as the substituted service of summons was invalid.
They argued that since impossibility of prompt personal service was never
established, then the resort to substituted service was improper.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid substituted service of summon

Held:
No; As a rule, summons must be served personally. Resort to substituted
service may only be made upon the concurrence of two requisites: (1) the
impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time after
diligent efforts at
locating the defendants; and (2) service upon any of the persons identified in
Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.

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Substituted service may be done by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's dwelling house or residence or at the defendant's office or
regular place of business. If substituted service is made at the defendant's
house or residence, the sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a
person of "suitable age and discretion residing therein." If substituted service
is made at the defendant's office or regular place of business, the sheriff
must leave a copy of the summons with a "competent person in charge
thereof." This refers to any person managing the office or the business of the
defendant, such as the president or a manager. In either case, the proof of
return or the sheriffs' report must disclose specific details regarding the
inquiries made and the competencies of the person upon whom copies of the
summons and court processes were given.

In this case, the sheriffs’ report is wanting. Moreover, It is said that service
on the security guard does not amount to compliance with the stringent rules
of substituted service since it was not shown that the security guards therein
who received the summons shared such relation of confidence with the
defendants that the latter would surely receive the summons.

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EUCDI United Construction and Development Inc v De Guzman
GR no 196836; September 16, 2020

Facts:
Respondent de Guzman filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money
and damages with prayer for ex-parte issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioners for failure to fulfill their obligation to
construct a 3-storey residential house. The trial court granted private
respondent's prayer for preliminary attachment. In his Sheriff's Return,
Deputy Sheriff Villanueva reported that he had served copies of the
summons on petitioners through EUCDI's secretary and receiving officer Mhel
C. Marquez. On the same day, he also submitted a Partial Officer's Return,
reporting that his efforts to effect personal
service of summons on petitioners proved to be futile. Petitioners moved to
quash the summons and the writ of attachment/garnishment on the ground
that the substituted service was not validly effected on them.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid substituted service

Held:
Yes; where substituted service of summons on the defendant was questioned
for noncompliance with the Rules, since the summons was not allegedly
served at defendant's residence or left with any person who was authorized
to receive it on behalf of the defendant, the Court upheld the validity of the
substituted service of summons due to defendant's evident avoidance to
receive the summons personally despite the process server's diligent efforts
to effect personal service upon him. Also, the Court relaxed the rules on
service of summons by reason of defendants' devious scheme of evading
personal service.

Here, the Returns having sufficiently established petitioners' wrongful act of

evading personal service, the Court deems the substituted service effected

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on petitioners' secretary Mhel Marquez to be substantially compliant with the
requirements of the law.

CCC Insurance Corp v Kawasaki Steel Corp

GR no 156162; June 22, 2015

Facts:
Kawasaki and FF Mañacop Construction Inc formed a consortium agreement
for the purpose of contracting with the Philippine Government for the
construction of a fishing port network in Pangasinan. Later, FMMCI ceased
performing its work on the project. Kawasaki informed CCCIC about the
cessation of operations of FFMCCI, and the failure of FFMCCI to perform its
obligations in the Project and repay the advance payment made by
Kawasaki.
Unheeded, Kawasaki went to RTC to file a complaint against CCCIC to collect
on the said surety bond and the performance bond, but CCCIC denied any
liability. The RTC issued summons but FFMCCI and Mañacop failed to file any
responsive pleading to the Third-Party Complaint of CCCIC. Upon motion of
CCCIC, the RTC issued an Order declaring FFMCCI and Mañacop in default.
The RTC rendered a decision dismissing the Complaint of Kawasaki and the
counterclaim of CCCIC.

Issue:
Whether service through one of the directors of a corporation is a valid
service of summon

Held:
Yes; Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, which was then in force,
allowed the service of summons upon a director of a private domestic
corporation. Sec. 13 provides that service upon private domestic corporation
or partnership. - If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of
the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

The service of summons on FFMCCI at its principal address at #86 West

Avenue, Quezon City failed because FFMCCI had already vacated said

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premises without notifying anyone as to where it transferred. For this reason,
the RTC, upon the
motion of CCCIC, issued an Order directing the issuance and service of Alias
Summons to the individual directors of FFMCCI. Eventually, the Alias
Summons was personally served upon FFMCCI director Vicente Concepcion.

Since the aforementioned rule does not require that service on the private
domestic corporation be served at its principal office in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the same, the personal service of the Alias
Summons on an FFMCCI director was sufficient for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over FFMCCI itself.

Integrated Micro Electronics Inc v Standard Insurance Co Inc

GR no 210302; August 27, 2020

Facts:
A fire broke out at Integrated Micro's building causing damage to its
production
equipment and machineries. Hence, Integrated Micro filed a claim for
indemnity from Standard Insurance but was rejected on the ground that the
cause of the loss was an excluded peril. Aggrieved, Integrated Micro sought
reconsideration. Almost a year thereafter, Integrated Micro filed a complaint
for
specific performance and damages against Standard Insurance before the
RTC. Standard Insurance moved to dismiss the complaint for invalid service
of summons. Allegedly, the summons was served upon the legal assistant or
the secretary of Standard Insurance's in-house counsel, who was not
authorized to receive summons under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules
of Court. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and directed Standard
Insurance to file a responsive pleading.

Issue:
Whether the service of summons upon the legal assistant of Standard
Insurance’s in-house counsel is invalid

Held:
Yes; Rule 14, Sec 11 provides that when the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. The rule has specifically identified and limited the persons to whom
service of summons must be made. The enumeration under the new rule is
restricted, limited and exclusive following the rule in statutory construction
that expressio imios est exclusio cilterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision
Committeeintended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it

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could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest
intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Heirs of Manguiat v CA
GR no 150768 & 160176; August 20, 2008

Facts:
Petitioners assert that summons was validly served on the Republic of the
Philippines considering that the sheriff's return states that it was "duly
served." They further aver that Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure does not limit service of summons to the Solicitor General but
allows service on other officers as the court may direct. They point out that
the failure to inform the Solicitor General of a civil case can only be
attributed to the gross negligence of the BUTEL. For its part, respondent
Republic of the Philippines contends that summons must be served upon it
through the Solicitor General and that service of summons on an employee
of the BUTEL is insufficient compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court.

Issue:
Whether the service of summons through an employee of the BUTEL is valid

Held:
No; Rule 14, Sec 13 of the ROC provides that when the defendant is the
Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the Solicitor General.
In case of a province, city or municipality, or like public corporations, service
may be effected on its executive head, or on such other officer or officers as
the law or the court may direct.

It is clear under the Rules that where the defendant is the Republic of the
Philippines, service of summons must be made on the Solicitor General. The
BUTEL is an agency attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications created under E.O. No. 546 Furthermore, it is incumbent
upon the party alleging that summons was validly served to prove that all
requirements were met in the service thereof. In this case, the burden was
not discharged by the petitioners. The records show that the sheriff served

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summons on an ordinary employee and not on the Solicitor General.
Consequently, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over BUTEL, and all
proceedings therein are null and void.

Roxas v Asiatrust Development Bank Inc

GR no 203506; January 6, 2020

Facts:
Kamakura Food Corporation was granted a Credit Line by the Asiatrust
Development Bank, Inc. In consideration thereof, its Vice-President, Nancy
Dy, along with its authorized signatories, Alfredo and Cecilia Roxas, executed
a Continuing Suretyship. Upon maturity of the promissory notes and despite
several demands, Kamakura failed to pay its indebtedness. Consequently,
Asiatrust filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against
petitioners before the RTC. Summonses were issued by the court. Several
attempts were made by the sheriff to serve the summonses and the copies
of the complaint to petitioners but to no avail. With prior leave of court,
Asiatrust caused the publication of the summons in Saksi Ngayon. However,
petitioners failed to file their Answers within
the prescribed period and they were declared in default.

Issue:
Whether jurisdiction was acquired over the petitioners

Held:
Yes; jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either through
service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court. Here, the
sheriff attempted several times to serve the summons on petitioners
personally but failed since petitioners' address could not be found and no
one can give their possible location. The impossibility of personal service of
summons warranted
the resort to service by publication pursuant to Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules.

The present Sec. 14 (now Sec 16), Rule 14 of the Rules expressly states that
service of summons by publication applies "in any action." Thus, service of
summons by publication may now be made in any action, whether in
personam, in rem or quasi in rem. In any event, even assuming that the

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service of summons in this case was defective, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioners when they made a voluntary appearance in
the proceedings.

Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules provides that the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Here,
petitioners voluntarily appeared in the action when they filed an entry of
appearance and very urgent omnibus motion to: a) set aside order of default;
and b) admit appended answer. The entry of appearance was made without
qualification or objection to the RTC's jurisdiction. This in itself amounts to
voluntary appearance in the proceedings.

Procianos – Cohen v Heirs of Magdayao

GR no 241558; September 29, 2021

Facts:
A complaint for cancellation and/or Annulment of Deed of Absolute sale and
Transfer with damaged was filed by respondents Heirs of Magdayao against
Cohen claiming that Cohen’s fabrication of the foregoing documents have
deprived them of their property rights over a lot. The RTC issued summons
and a Sherriff’s Return of Summons showed that it was unserved with regard
to defendant Ann Procianos-Cohen. The sheriff attempted to personally serve
the Summons but according to her sisters, Cohen already migrated to the
US. The heirs of Magdayao filed a motion to Leave of court to serve
summons by publication which was granted by the RTC. The newspaper
PINOY TEXT published the complaint but not the summons. Cohen was
declared in default and the heirs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute sale and partition agreement as void.
Later, Cohen file`d a petition for Annulment of Judgement arguing that the
decision was rendered with extrinsic fraud and without jurisdiction over her
person.

Issue:
Whether the service of summon in this case is valid

Held:
No; then Rule 14 section 14 (now Sec 16) permitted service by publication
upon persons whose whereabouts are unknown. Service by publication may
be effected even in actions in personam, provided that personal and
substituted
service was first availed of, but failed, and diligent inquiries were made as to
defendant’s whereabouts.

The complaint filed by the heirs of Magdayao presented an action in

personam for which personal service was required. The Sheriff’s return of

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summons showed how personal service was attempted. However, the heirs
of Magdayao stopped and no longer attempted substituted service of
summons and immediately resorted to service by publication. Neither did
they demonstrate in their motion their diligent inquires to ascertain Cohen’s
whereabouts. The RTC should not have ordered service by publication. The
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd v Dakila Trading Corp

GR no 172242; August 14, 2007

Facts:
Dakila Trading Corporation entered into a Distribution entered into a
Distribution Agreement with Perkin-Elmer Instruments Asia Pte Ltd. (PEIA),
organized under Singapore laws. By virtue of the said agreement, PEIA
appointed the respondent as the sole distributor of its products in the
Philippines. However, PEIA unilaterally terminated the Distribution
Agreement, prompting respondent to file before the RTC, a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ
of Attachment against PEIA and PEIP. Respondent then filed Ex-Parte Motions
for Issuance of Summons and for Leave of Court to Deputize
Respondent's General Manager, Richard A. Tee, to Serve Summons Outside
of the Philippines which the RTC granted. But the said Alias Summons was
served and received by Perkin-Elmer Asia, different from PEIA. Perkinelmer
Asia, on the other hand, through its counsel, sent letters to the respondent
and to the
RTC to inform them of the wrongful service of summons upon Perkinelmer
Asia. Respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Complaint,
together with the Amended Complaint claiming that PEIA had become a sole
proprietorship owned by the petitioner, and subsequently changed its name
to Perkinelmer Asia.

Issue:
Whether the service of summons on petitioner was defective

Held:
Yes; Under Section 15 (now Sec 17), Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, there are only four instances wherein a defendant who is a
non-resident and is not found in the country may be served with summons
by extraterritorial service, to wit:
1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff

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 2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property, within
the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest,
actual or contingent
3. when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines
4. when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within
the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal
service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave
of court; or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the

action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. In the
case at bar, there can never be a valid extraterritorial service of summons
upon petitioner because the case is for collection of a sum of money and
damages is, indeed, an action in personam. Hence, personal service of
summons within the Philippines is necessary in order for the RTC to validly
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, and this is not possible
in this case because the petitioner is a non-resident and is not found within
the PH.

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Barber v Chua
GR no 205630; January 12, 2021

Facts:
Respondent Chua filed a complaint for ejectment of extended structures that
partly occupied the portion of firewall, damage to property with prayer for
moral and exemplary damages with the MTC. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss, claiming that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case and Barber's person. Petitioners also contend that the action being
in personam, summons should have been personally served to Barber. They
alleged that at the time of service, Barber was not in the Philippines as she is
allegedly, a citizen and permanent resident of the United States. They
argued. That the server's return did not contain any explanation as to why
substituted service was resorted to.

Issue:
Whether there was a valid service of summon

Held:
Yes; while service of summons should generally be effected on the defendant
herself, case law allows resort to substituted service for defendants who are
residents but are temporarily out of the country.

Despite Barber's allegation that she is now an American citizen, she

is likewise a Philippine resident who is temporarily out of the country.
Jurisprudence has defined a dwelling, house, or residence as the place where
the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is
made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time.
Indeed, it remains undisputed that Barber stays in the house adjacent to
respondent's property whenever she returns to the Philippines. Under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, service of summons may properly
be made to a person of suitable age and discretion found at defendant's
residence. With all the foregoing, the service of summons to Barber’s aunt,
Norma Balmastro, should be deemed sufficient.

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Belo v Marcantonio
GR no 243366; September 8, 2020

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against respondent.
The
clerk of court then issued summons addressed to respondent. Per the
Sheriff's Return, copies of said summons were left to a certain Giovanna
Marcantonio, respondent's "niece," allegedly because respondent was not at
the given address at that time. No responsive pleading was filed which
rendered the respondent in default. However, before judgement, respondent
learned about petitioner's case against her and filed a Motion to Set
Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open Trial on the ground of defective
service of summons. That she learned about the case only through
petitioner's niece, a certain Mae Zamora. She alleged that she is currently a
resident of Cavite and no longer a resident of Mandaluyong where the
summons was served and that said summons was received by her daughter
Giovanna, who never sent the same to her, being unaware of the
significance thereof.

Issue:
Whether respondent may be granted relief from the RTC’s default order

Held;
Yes; Although the respondent already submitted herself to the court when
the motion was filed, curing the defect in the service of summons, it is not
sufficient to make the proceedings binding upon the respondent without her
participation.

The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the
ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defense [under Section 3,
Rule 18).

In this case, upon respondent's discovery of the case against her and her
property, she filed a Motion to Set Aside/Lift Order of Default and to Re-Open

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Trial, where she averred that her failure to file an answer was due to the
defective service of summons. Such improper service of summons rendered
the subsequent proceedings before the trial court null and void as it deprived
respondent her right to due process.

Uy v Del Castillo
GR no 223610; July 24, 2017

Facts:
The present case is an action for quieting of title, reconveyance, damages,
and attorney's fees involving a parcel of land by Respondent Crispulo Del
Castillo against Petitioners Jaime Uy and his wife, Conchita. However, since
Jaime had died 6 years earlier, Crispulo amended his complaint and
impleaded Jaime's children, the Uy siblings, as defendants. Meanwhile,
Crispulo died during the pendency of the action and hence, was substituted
by his heirs. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision in
respondents' favor. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the CA, and
subsequently, to the Court, but the same were denied for lack of merit.
Respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Petitioners
maintained that the RTC had no jurisdiction over them as they were never
served with summons in relation thereto.

Issue:
Whether the Uy siblings were properly served with summons

Held:
Yes; their counsel Atty. Alan Trinidad stated that they received summons
with a copy of the Amended Complaint, the Answer.

However, assuming arguendo that petitioners did not receive summons of

the Amended Complaint, they are nonetheless, deemed to have voluntarily
submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction by filing an Answer to the amended
complaint and actively participating in the case. One of the Uys, Ericson, was
even presented as witness for the defense. Moreover, they appealed the
adverse RTC ruling in the Quieting of Title case all the way to the Supreme
Court. Active participation of the party against whom the action was brought,
is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and such will bar said party from later on
impugning the court’s jurisdiction. Afterall, JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
OF THE DEFENDANT in civil cases is obtained either by (a) a valid service of
summons upon him; or by (b) his voluntary submission to the court’s
authority.

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Heirs of Sadhwani v Sadhwani
GR no 217365; August 14, 2019

Facts:
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Sadhawani brought a
complaint for reconveyance, partition, accounting, declaration of nullity of
documents, injunction and damages praying that they be declared lawful
owners of the properties as heirs and legitimate children of the Sps.
Sadhwani. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action which the RTC granted stating that since
Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals, hence, they were prohibited under the
Constitution from owning the subject properties and transmitting any rights
over the same to their children upon their deaths. Moreover, respondents
argued that the petition should be dismissed for being the wrong mode of
appeal considering that questions of fact were raised.

Issue:
Whether petitioners availed of the wrong remedy

Held:
Yes; Rule 41, Sec 1 states that no appeal may be taken from an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. In such cases, the remedy available
to the aggrieved party is to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65 of the ROC. The difference of dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal
without prejudice is that the former disallows and bars the refiling of the
complaint. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is
subject to the right of appeal.

Dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause
of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2)
that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading has been paid,
waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on
which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the
statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. The nature of
the dismissal founded on any of the preceding grounds is "with prejudice"
because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo,
dismissals based on the rest of the grounds enumerated in Rule 16, Sec 1

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are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same
action.
A perusal of the assailed Restolution unequivocally shows that the action was
dismissed without prejudice. he RTC's dismissal was was based on Rule 16,
Sec 1 (g), i.e., that the Complaint states no cause of action. As the dismissal
was without prejudice (not having been premised on Sections 1f,h,i of Rule
16), the remedy of appeal was not available. Instead, petitioners should have
simply refiled the complaint through Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Blay v Baña
GR no 232189; March 7, 2018

Facts:
Blay filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
on account of his psychological incapacity and Baña filed her Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. However, Blay later lost interest over the case,
and thus filed a Motion to Withdraw his petition. In her comment/opposition,
Baña invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and prayed that her
counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's independent
adjudication. In turn, Blay filed his reply, averring that Baña's counterclaims
are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file
a manifestation therefor within 15 days from notice of the Motion to
Withdraw, which - according to petitioner – was required under the same
Rules of Court provision. The RTC granted Blay’s Motion to Withdraw petition
and declared Baña's counterclaim "as remaining for independent
adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner 15 days to file his answer thereto.

Issue:
Whether the respondent’s counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted
in the same action

Held:
Yes; as per the second sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if a counterclaim has
been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion for the dismissal - as in this case – the rule is that the dismissal shall
be limited to the complaint. Dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint.

However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the

defendant desires to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is
required to file a manifestation within 15 days from notice of the motion.
Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted in a separate action. Should
the party opt to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action, the court
should render the
corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in
a separate complaint.

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Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action
wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days
from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss.

The rationale behind this rule is that the passing of the 15 day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence bars
the conduct of further proceedings.
Heirs of Sanchez v Abrantes
GR no 234999; August 4, 2021
Dismissal due to fault of Plaintiff

Facts:
A complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of confirmation of absolute sale
was filed by respondent Horacio Abrantes against the petitioners, heirs of
Bartolome Sanchez. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, but before
the RTC could act on the motion, Horacio died. Thereafter, Horacio’s counsel
moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that Horacio’s heirs
were no longer interested to pursue the case. Hence, the RTC dismissed the
case on the ground that plaintiffs were no longer interested to pursue the
case which became final and executory. Later, more than 4 years after the
death of Horacio, his heirs filed a second complaint which involved the same
subject matter, substantially the same parties, the same cause of action, and
the same reliefs sought against petitioner which was dismissed by the RTC
and affirmed by the CA on the ground of res judicata.

Issue:
Whether the first dismissal order is one without prejudice under Sec 2, Rule
17

Held:
Yes; the fundamental test for "failure to prosecute" contemplates want of
due diligence attributable to the plaintiff in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute, as manifested by any of the following instances: (1) plaintiff fails
to appear at the time of trial; or (2) plaintiff fails to prosecute the action for
an unreasonable length of time; or (3) plaintiff fails comply with the Rules of
Court or any order of the court.

In the case, the First Dismissal Order cannot be characterized as one for
failure to prosecute, as the dismissal did not proceed from any of the
foregoing instances. Atty. Battad's claim that Horacio's heirs were no longer
interested in pursuing the case was based entirely on hearsay. More, the
dismissal of the case was sought not by the defendant petitioners, but by
Atty. Battad, counsel for plaintiff Horacio, who moved for the dismissal of the
complaint, which the RTC granted, without any declaration against
respondents' supposed lack of diligence. Not being a dismissal under Section

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3, Rule 17, the First Dismissal Order did not amount to an adjudication on the
merits, as would bar the filing of the Second Complaint.

Philippine National Bank (PNB) v Daradar

GR no 180203; June 28, 2021
Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff

Facts:
Petitioner PNB and respondent Daradar entered into a Deed of Promise to
Sell covering two parcels of land owned by PNB. Due to Daradar's failure to
pay the yearly amortizations and interest due under the Deed, PNB
rescinded the Deed through a Notarial Notice of Rescission. Daradar then
filed an action for Annulment of Rescission against PNB in the RTC. However,
due to respondent's failure to appear at the scheduled hearing, the RTC in an
order, provisionally dismissed the case without prejudice. No motion for
reconsideration was filed against the said Order. After the lapse of four
years, the RTC motu proprio issued finally dismissing the civil case on the
ground of respondent's failure to prosecute the case under Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court, in view of respondent's failure to reinstate or revive
the case despite the lapse of more than four years from the first dismissal.
Later, Daradar filed another complaint for declaration of nullity of notarial
rescission of the Deed with the RTC. The case was dismissed on the ground
of res judicata which was reversed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the civil case could be reinstated

Held:
No; the concept of a provisional dismissal in our jurisdiction contemplates
the temporary dismissal of a criminal action that may be revived within the
period set by the Rules of Court upon compliance with certain requisites.
There is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides
for a provisional dismissal of a civil case. Nevertheless, the present rules
equated a provisional order with an interlocutory order that was subject to
vacation or amendment at any time before final judgement is rendered or
has become executory.

The question of whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute

is mainly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Respondent's
actions clearly demonstrate his lack of interest and due diligence to
prosecute the case. He failed to act on the First Order and allowed the trial
court to issue its Second Order four years later. Respondent's lack of interest
and due diligence to prosecute his case is further highlighted by his failure to

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assail the Second Order and the lapse of another four years before he filed
another complaint based on the same cause of action. All told, we find no
compelling reason to disturb the trial court's dismissal of respondent's
complaint under Rule 17, Section 3.

Dela Cruz v Victa Realty & Development Corp

GR no 218627; June 14, 2021
Pre-trial concept & Effect of failure appear & Effect of failure to file

Facts:
Carmelita, married to Mauro Dela Cruz, filed a complaint for annulment of
title & recovery of possession with damages against respondents involving a
parcel of land which was allegedly sold by Mauro to Victa Realty without
Carmelita's consent. When the case was set for preliminary conference, the
parties were directed to submit their pre-trial briefs at least 3 days before
the scheduled hearing. The RTC, not having received the parties' pre-trial
briefs, dismissed the case and Carmelita moved for reconsideration, but was
denied. Carmelita then filed an appeal before the CA, alleging that the case
had not yet been set for pre-trial but only for preliminary conference.
Without a scheduled pre-trial, the requirement to file a pre-trial brief had yet
to arise, and there is no legal basis to dismiss the complaint. The CA denied
Carmelita's appeal.

Issue:
Whether the case was not set for pre-trial but only for preliminary conference

Held:
No; notwithstanding the RTC's use of the term "preliminary conference," it
was the clear import of the RTC to conduct a pre-trial when it directed the
parties to submit their pre-trial briefs at least 3 days before the scheduled
hearing, in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 18 of the Rules.

The conduct of pre-trial in civil actions has been considered mandatory upon
the effectivity of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device intended to
clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties and to take the trial of
cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering.

The rules on pre-trial are not technicalities that the parties may ignore or
trifle with, its objective being the simplification, abbreviation and expedition
of the trial, if not its dispensation. Rule 18 of the Rules leaves no room for
equivocation; appearance at the pre-trial, along with the filing of a
corresponding pre-trial brief, is not only mandatory, but also the litigant's
duty. While every party to a case must be given the chance to come to court
prepared, they must do so within the parameters set by the rules. Section 6
of Rule 18 of the Rules is clear — failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have
the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial. And, under Section 5 of

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the same Rule, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared
non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear,
then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the
court to render judgment on the basis of plaintiff's evidence.

In this case, both parties failed to file their respective pre-trial briefs despite
notice. However, under the circumstances, Carmelita’s failure to file her pre-
trial brief is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the case with prejudice.
Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.
These are provided to effect the prompt, proper, and orderly disposition of
cases, and thus, effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets.
Considering that this case involves the property rights of Carmelita, and
there was no display of wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement
of the Rules, or scheme to delay the disposition of the case, we find that a
liberal application of the Rules would best serve the ends of justice.

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Domingo v Spouses Singson
GR no 203287 & 207936; April 5, 2017
Notice and appearance; effect of failure to file pre-trial

Facts:
Respondent Singson filed with the MeTC a complaint for ejectment/unlawful
detainer against petitioners. Singson claimed that she is the absolute owner
of the subject property having bought the same from the Spouses Domingo.
Petitioners filed a complaint which sought the nullity of the sale. The
petitioners' counsel failed to appear and the pre-trial was reset on another
day. However, a day before the new date of pre-trial, the petitioners' counsel
informed Renato that he would not be able to attend the pre-trial conference
since he was indisposed and asked the latter to go to the RTC and request
for a resetting of the hearing. When the case was called, the petitioners and
their counsel failed to appear, which thus prompted Singson's counsel to
move for the dismissal of
the complaint and be given time to file the proper pleading. The RTC
dismissed the petitioners' complaint due to their and their counsel's
repeated failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint was proper

Held:
Yes; the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be
dismissed, which shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disregarded or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when for the most
persuasive of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.

The petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which would justify a
relaxation of the rules on pre-trial. That the petitioners' counsel was
supposedly indisposed during the pre-trial does not excuse the petitioners
themselves from attending the pre-trial. Moreover, the· petitioners have
failed to advance any valid justification for their and their counsel's failure to
attend the previously scheduled pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, the trial
court could not be faulted for
dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.

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Pulgar v RTC of Mauban, Quezon Branch 64
GR no 157583; September 10, 2014
Intervention

Facts:
The Municipal Assessor of Mauban, Quezon issued tax declarations on the
the Mauban Plant owned and operated by respondent QPL. Subsequently,
QPL filed with the Municipal Assessor a sworn statement declaring that the
said properties had a lower value than that assessed. QPL tendered to the
Municipal Assessor payment of the RPT as first quarter installment on the
plant, which the latter rejected. Hence, QPL filed a Complaint for
Consignation and Damages before the RTC. Albeit classified as a
consignation and damages case, QPL essentially protested the Municipal
Assessor's assessment. Defendants averred, that QPL was estopped from
denying the authority of the Municipal Assessor since it previously paid realty
taxes for its properties based on the assessment of the latter. Pulgar filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Answer-in-Intervention and Answer-in-Intervention
alleging that as a resident and taxpayer of Quezon Province, he has an
interest in the aggressive collection of realty taxes against QPL. The RTC
dismissed the civil case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing Pulgar’s motion for intervention as a
consequence of the dismissal of the main case

Held:
No; jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main
action. Accordingly, an intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a
court of competent jurisdiction.

In this case, Pulgar does not contest the RTC's dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, but oddly maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a
review of the correctness of the subject realty tax assessment. The cessation
of the principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds at that — means that
Pulgar had, as a matter of course, lost his right to intervene.

Intervention is never an independent action but is ancillary and

supplemental to the existing litigation. The right of an intervenor should only
be in aid of the right of the original party. Where the right of the latter has
ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for; hence, the right of
intervention ceases.

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Office of the Ombudsman v Cerna
GR no 195134; March 24, 2021
Intervention

Facts:
The case originated from the administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service filed
by Ruiz against respondents for violation of Republic Act No. 3019. After due
hearing, the Ombudsman issued a Consolidated Decision finding therein
defendants guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
and meted the penalty of 6-month suspension without pay. Cerna then filed
a petition before the CA which was granted. The CA exonerated him from the
administrative charges lodged against him ruling that he was appointed as a
provisional member of the BAC, hence, it is offensive to hold him liable with
the rest of the regular BAC members. The Ombudsman then filed an omnibus
motion to intervene and motion for reconsideration insisting that it would be
greatly and adversely affected should the CA exonerate Cerna explaining
that it would result to restraining the Ombudsman from exercising its right
under the law as having full disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials. However, such motion was denied by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman has a right to intervene in this case

Held:
No; Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, who is not originally
impleaded in a proceeding, becomes a litigant for purposes of protecting his
or her right or interest that may be affected by the proceedings. Intervention
is not an absolute right but may be granted by the court when the movant
shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing
intervention. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is within
the sound discretion of the court.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a court may allow
intervention (a) if the movant has legal interest or is otherwise qualified, and
(b) if the intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
right of the original parties and the intervenor's rights may not be protected
in a separate proceeding. Both requirements must concur.

Hence, even if the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party in the

proceedings, part of its broad powers include defending its decisions before
the CA. And pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman may validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal
interest on the matter is beyond cavil.

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However, a motion for intervention must be filed prior to rendition of
judgment. Otherwise, it will be dismissed for having been belatedly filed,
unless warranted by certain excepting circumstances. Unfortunately for the
Office of the Ombudsman in this case, not only did it file a motion for
intervention after the CA has rendered a decision, its case does not fall
within the ambit of the excepting circumstances where the rule may be
relaxed.

Rabe-Valeros v Heirs of Marinas

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GR no 196148; October 2, 2019
Computation of Time

Facts:
Respondents Heirs of Mariñas filed before the MTC 3 separate complaints
against petitioners for Ownership, Reconveyance and Damages.
Respondents claimed that they are the exclusive surviving heirs and owners
of a parcel of land in the name of their late maternal grandmother, Juanita
Rabe. And without proper authorization, Juanita's name was erased from the
tax declaration and the name "Angela" was handwritten above it, thus,
reflecting Angela as the landowner. The MTC ruled in favor of respondents
which was reversed by the RTC. Then the CA reversed the RTC on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction to act on petitioners’ appeal as it was filed out of time
since the counsel received copies of the August 18, 2006 decision on
September 1, 2006. Hence, the petitioner’s 15-day period to perfect their
appeal ended on September 16, 2006. And after the motion for extension of
time to file a motion, defendants were granted 5 days of extension which
expired on September 21, 2006.

Issue:
Whether the notice of appeal was filed out of time

Held:
Yes; Under Section 1, Rule 22 of the ROC, where the last day of the period
for doing any act required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. Any extension of time to file the required pleading should
therefore be counted from the expiration of the period regardless of the fact
that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.

In this case, since the original due date for filing their motion for
reconsideration fell on a Saturday (September 16, 2006), petitioners timely
filed their motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration on
the next working day, September 18, 2006. The motion for reconsideration
itself was, however, filed out of time. As clarified by the circular, when a
motion for extension is granted, the due date for the extended period shall
be counted from the original due date, not from the next working day on
which the motion for extension was filed. The MTC granted petitioners an
additional period of five (5) days within which to file their motion for
reconsideration. Reckoned from the original period, September 16, 2006,
they should have filed their motion for reconsideration on September 21,
2006. Unfortunately, petitioners failed to do so.

Santamaria v Cleary

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GR no 197122 & 197161; June 15, 2016
Depositions pending actions

Facts:
Cleary, an American citizen with office address in California, filed a Complaint
for specific performance and damages against petitioner. The complaint
involved shares of stock of Miranila Land Development Corporation. Under
their agreement, any suit, action or proceeding with respect therewith may
be brought in the courts of the State of California, as Cleary may elect in his
sole discretion. Later, Cleary moved for court authorization to take his
deposition before the Consulate-General of the Philippines in LA and be used
as his direct testimony. Petitioners opposed the motion and argued that the
right to take deposition is not absolute. They claimed that Cleary chose the
PH system to file his suit, and yet he deprived the court and the parties the
opportunity to observe his demeanor and directly propound questions on
him.

Issue:
Whether a foreigner plaintiff residing abroad who chose to file a suit in the
PH is allowed to take deposition abroad for his direct testimony

Held:
Yes; as regards the taking of depositions, Rule 23, Section 1 is clear that the
testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral examination
or written interrogatories at the instance of any party.

Depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain
limited purposes. One of which under Rule 23, Sec 4c, that the witness
resides at distance more than 100km from the place of trial or hearing, or is
out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the
party offering the deposition.

The rules and jurisprudence support greater leeway in allowing the parties
and their witnesses to be deposed in the interest of collecting information for
the speedy and complete disposition of cases.

People v Sergio
GR no 240053; October 9, 2019

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Depositions pending actions

Facts:
Mary Jane Veloso, Cristina, and Julius were friends and neighbors in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. Taking advantage of her dire situation and susceptibility,
Cristina and Julius offered Mary Jane a job as a domestic helper in Malaysia.
Cristina gave Mary Jane her plane ticket as well as a luggage to bring on her
trip. She then asked Cristina why the luggage was heavy but the latter
simply replied that because it was new. It was only after she was
apprehended at the airport when Mary Jane realized that it contained
prohibited drugs. The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian
Government to suspend the scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed
the Indonesian Government that the recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane
were already in police custody, and her testimony is vital in the prosecution
of Cristina and Julius. Thereafter, the State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court
to Take the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso by Deposition Upon
Written Interrogatories. " It averred that the taking of Mary Jane's testimony
through the use of deposition upon written interrogatories is allowed under
Rule 23 of the Revised Rules of Court because she is out of the country and
will not be able to testify personally before the court due to her
imprisonment. Cristina and Julius objected to the motion.

Issue:
Whether Rule 23 of the ROC applies to criminal cases

Held:
Yes; nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a
grave offense by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may
be taken to perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The Rules, in
particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of a witness who is unable
to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is
inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may be applied
suppletory in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case,
the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletory the provisions of Rule 23 of
the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and fairness.
Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition by written
interrogatories is in order since one of the conditions of the Indonesia
Government is that Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia.

Ng Meng Tam v China Banking Corporation

GR no 214054; August 5, 2015

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Interrogatories to Parties

Facts:
This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Bank against
petitioners. China Bank alleged that it granted Ever a loan which was backed
by two surety agreements executed by petitioners. When Ever defaulted in
its payment, China Bank sent demand letters collectively addressed to
petitioners. The demands were unanswered. Hence, China Bank filed the
complaint for collection with the RTC. Later, petitioner served interrogatories
to parties pursuant to Sections 1 and 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court to
China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of the Account
Management Group, to answer. George Yap executed his answers to
interrogatories to parties. Petitioner again moved for the hearing of his
affirmative defenses. Because he found Yap’s answers to the interrogatories
to parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against George Yap pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court. When the case was called
for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China Bank objected citing
Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to
testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present George Yap’s
judicial affidavit.

Issue:
Whether the parties complied with Sec 6 of Rule 25 of the ROC

Held:
Yes; it will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to
elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the
witness stand as its witness. Besides, since the calling party is deemed
bound by the adverse party's testimony, compelling the adverse party to
take the witness stand may result in the calling party damaging its own case.
Moreover, the court may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus
prevent the calling party from straying or harassing the adverse party when
it takes the latter to the stand.

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered
interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They
therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before the
present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for Yap to
testify and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand when
China Bank interposed its objection for non-compliance with Section 5 of the
JAR.

Spouses Afulugencia v MBTC

ZJI
GR no 185145; February 5, 2014
Interrogatories to Parties

Facts:
Petitioner spouses filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure,
auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with damages, against
respondents. Upon the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require Metrobank’s
officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses for the
presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative
to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial
foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ land. With this, Metrobank filed an
Opposition arguing that the Motion must be denied for lack of proper notice
of hearing as it is a
litigated motion. Petitioners replied by stating that the lack of proper notice
was cured by Metrobank’s filing of Opposition, hence the defect may be
ignored.

Issue:
Whether the request by any party for the issuance of subpoenas require
notice to other parties to the action

Held:
Yes; under Rule 25, Sec 6, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the
witness is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon
the latter. Since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s
testimony, compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may
result in the calling party damaging its own case.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted
surprises or harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from
conducting a fishing expedition or bungling its own case. Using its own
judgment and discretion, the court can hold its own in resolving a dispute
and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating unfair court practices
such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining their own
cases.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the

witness stand as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents
in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal documentary evidence.
This is improper. Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of
the presentation of their evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s
officers – who are considered adverse parties as well, based on the principle
that corporations act only through their officers and duly authorized agents –
as their main witnesses; nor may they be allowed to gain access to

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Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of making it their own.
This is
tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence of their opponent.
The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if
petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the
adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own
defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to
prevent a failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the
adverse party who has not served written interrogatories. But what
petitioners seek goes against the very principles of justice and fair play. They
would want that Metrobank provide the very evidence with which to
prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may not be allowed
to do.

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Duque v Spouses Yu
GR no 226130; February 19, 2018
Admission by adverse party

Facts:
Spouses Duque were the lawful owners of a parcel of land. They allegedly
executed a deed of donation over the subject property in favor of their
daughter, respondent Capacio who, in turn, sold a portion thereof to Spouses
Yu. With that, spouses Duque lodged a verified complaint for declaration of
non-existence and nullity of a deed of donation against respondents claiming
that the signature in the deed was forged. Capacio admitted that the
signature in the deed of donation was, indeed, falsified but she did not know
the author thereof, Spouse Yu, for their part, refuted Spouses Duque’s
personality to question the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale for it
was their daughter who forged the deed of donation. A motion for admission
was filed by respondent Spouses Yu requesting the admission of the deed of
donation and deed of absolute sale. Spouses Duque were directed to
comment thereon but they failed to do so. By their silence, the trial court
pronounced that they were deemed to have admitted the same.

Issue:
Whether there was an implied admission of the genuineness of the deed of
sale and deed of donation

held:
No; once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any
material and relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such request is
served has 15 days within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In
case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted. This rule, however, admits of an exception, that
is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already
controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading. In
turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the
request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the
implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.

Here, the respondents served the request for admission on the petitioners to
admit the genuineness and authenticity of the Deed of Donation, among
other documents. But as pointed out by petitioners, the matters and
documents being requested to be admitted have already been denied and
controverted in the previous pleading, that is, Verified Complaint for
Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of
Absolute Sale and Cancellation of TD. In fact, the forgery committed in the
Deed of Donation was the very essence of that Complaint, where it was

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alleged that being a forged document, the same is invalid and without force
and legal effect. Petitioners, therefore, need not reply to the request for
admission. Consequently, they cannot be deemed to have admitted the
Deed of Donation's genuineness and authenticity for their failure to respond
thereto.

Lañada (Lanada) v CA

ZJI
GR no 102390 & 102404; February 1, 2002
Admission by adverse party

Facts:
Spouses Hemedez filed a civil case against Nestle praying for indemnity for
the death of their son. The defendants filed their respective Answers denying
liability. Thereafter, the spouses Hemedez served the defendants a request
for admission of the truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and the
genuineness of each of the documents appended thereto. Through their
respective counsel, Nestle and Santos, Capt. Laada, and Alimagno and
Galasao filed their verified answer to the request for admission. Spouses
Hemedez sought the striking out of said answers contending that under
Section 2 of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court the parties themselves and not
their counsel should personally answer the request
for admission and hence the answer filed by their counsel in their behalf was
by nature based on hearsay. On the other hand, the defendants asserted
that they observed the rules in filing their answers, through their lawyers, to
the request for admission.

Issue:
Whether an answer to a request for admission signed and sworn to by the
counsel of the party so requested is sufficient compliance with the provisions
of Rule 26 of the ROC

Held:
Yes; When Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for
admission. It should not be restrictively construed to mean that a party may
not engage the services of counsel to make the response in his behalf.
Moreover, Sec 21 of Rule 138 states that an attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for
his client.

In the case at bar, neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle, and
Santos did not authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the
respective answers requested of them by private respondents in the latter’s
written request for admission. As the Court has said, there is no reason to
strictly construe the phrase the party to whom the request is directed to
refer solely or personally to
the petitioners themselves.

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Air Philippines Corp v Pennswell Inc
GR no 172835; December 12, 2007
Production or inspection of documents or things

Facts:
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods.
For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money with the RTC. In its answer,
petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and
justifiable reasons. In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded by
respondent for its previous sale of four items which were misrepresented by
respondent as belonging to a new line. During the pendency of the trial,
petitioner filed a motion to compel respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and chemical components of the latter’s products. Respondents
contend that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical components
sought because the matter is confidential constituting a trade secret.

Issue:
Whether the petitioner has the right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondent’s products to conduct a comparative analysis of its
products

Held:
No; Sec 1, Rule 27 would show that the production or inspection of
documents or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court
may be availed of by any party upon a showing of good cause therefor
before the court in which an action is pending.

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books,

accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things that may be
produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents must not
be privileged against disclosure.

Trade secrets are of a privileged nature. The revelation of respondent’s trade

secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case pending
with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. And hence, there
is no compelling reason for the court to lift the veil of confidentiality which
shields respondent’s trade secrets.

Castillo v Torres-Aquino
GR no 190034; November 20, 2017

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Refusal to comply with modes of discovery

Facts:
Petitioner alleged that he was the owner of Permanent Piggery Farm which
was granted a Barangay Permit to Operate. He alleged that De Leon always
solicited money from him until he eventually resisted her corrupt practices. A
few months after the grant of the permit, De Leon supposedly spread false
information that the odor coming from his piggery farm was toxic and
hazardous to health. Petitioner alleged that his subsequent application for a
business permit remained unacted upon by the barangay council led by the
successor of De Leon. Hence, petitioner filed a case before the Ombudsman.
The city council, composed of respondents vice mayor and city councilors,
then issued a resolution declaring the piggery farm a nuisance per se and
resolved that the closure order issued by respondent mayor be implemented
within a reasonable time. Thus, petitioner filed a petition before the RTC. The
RTC dismissed the petitioner’s motion to declare respondents in default for
their failure to respondent to the written interrogatories which was affirmed
by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the respondents should be held in default for their failure to
respond to the written interrogatories

Held:
No; Section 5 of Rule 29 of the Rules of Court provides that the court, on
motion and notice, may enter a judgment of default against a party who
willfully fails to serve answers to interrogatories after a proper service
thereof. In this case, the respondents were willing to file an answer to the
interrogatories. More important, respondents had already filed their Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim. Hence, their failure to serve their answer to
the written interrogatories may not necessarily result in an entry of judgment
by default against them. They have already stated in their Answer that
petitioner had no legal right to protect, since he had managed his business
without the requisite city mayor's permit, sanitary permit, and environmental
certificate — a fact admitted even by petitioner.

Deutsche Bank AG v CA
GR no 193065; February 27, 2012
Consolidation or severance of hearing or trial

ZJI
Facts:
Steel Corp, as borrower, entered into a loan agreement with RCBC. Steel
Corp failed to pay its loan obligations as they fell due. Equitable PCI Bank,
Inc. filed a creditor-initiated petition to place Steel Corp under corporate
rehabilitation before the RTC. The RTC approved the proposed Rehabilitation
Plan and ordered the parties to comply strictly with the provisions of the
approved Rehabilitation Plan. During the pendency of the proceedings before
the RTC, RCBC and petitioner Deutsche Bank AG entered into a deed of
assignment. The RTC, upon the motion of Steel Corp, issued its Order,
directing the assignees, including Deutsche Bank AG, to disclose the actual
price or consideration paid by them for the Steel Corp debts assigned and
transferred to them. In another case where DEUTSCHE BANK AG is also the
assignee of debts of Vitarich, the RTC in its Decision approved the Vitarich
rehabilitation plan and upheld the rights of the assignees as subrogees to all
the rights and obligations of the original creditors. Vitarich sought a partial
reversal of the said decision. Vitarich filed a motion to direct the assignees to
disclose the amounts paid by them to their assignors. The cases were then
consolidated on the ground that there exist a common question of law.

Issue:
Whether the consolidation of the two cases is valid

Held:
No; According to Sec 1, Rule 31 of the ROC, for consolidation to be proper,
the cases sought to be consolidated must be related. It is a time-honored
principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried,
in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously
the issues involved.

In the present case, there is no sufficient justification to order the

consolidation inasmuch as the Deutsche Bank AG Petition has no relation
whatsoever to the Vitarich Petition. The Deutsche Bank AG Petition is an
appeal on certiorari from the Order of the RTC Batangas. Vitarich case, on
the other hand, is an appeal on certiorari and mandamus from the Order of
the RTC Bulacan. The fact that Deutsche Bank AG is a party to both cases
does not make the proceedings intimately related. There is no factual
relation between the two proceedings. SteelCorp proceedings originated
from SteelCorp's rehabilitation proceedings which have nothing to do with
the Vitarich proceeding that originated from Vitarich's rehabilitation
proceeding.

Neither are there interconnected transactions, nor identical subject matter in

the Deutsche Bank AG and Vitarich petitions. The former involved issue
resulting from the assignment of credits of RCBC to Deutsche Bank AG

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whereas in the latter, the issue arose from the assignment of the receivables
of various creditors of Vitarich to several corporations and special purpose
vehicles.

Verily, the two petitions having no factual relationship with and no

interconnected transactions on the same subject matter, they cannot be
deemed "related cases." As such, the necessity to consolidate does not
become imperative.

Consolidation aims to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to
the parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice and is
in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results
in the avoidance of the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by
the courts in two or more cases, which would otherwise require a single
judgment.

The consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court

and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of
manifest abuse of discretion.

Colmenar v Colmenar
GR no 252467; June 21, 2021
When no trial will be conducted

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Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents averring that he is the
second child of his parents (deceased Francisco and Dorothy Colmenar) who
were later on divorced. When petitioner’s father died, the latter left real
properties registered in its name. When petitioner knew that respondents
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate making it appear that they
were the surviving heirs and sold the properties without his knowledge, he
sent a demand letter to individual respondent invoking his successional right
but to no avail. Hence, the complaint was filed. Respondents alleged the
affirmative defense of lack of cause of action. In the meantime, the 2019
amendments to the ROC took effect. The trial court dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action citing Sec
12, Rule 8 of the 2019 amendments to the ROC. Petitioner now allege that
the judge is at fault for applying the amendment despite the clear injustice it
caused to him.

Issue:
Whether the case should be dismissed

Held:
No; failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the
allegations in the pleading, while lack of cause of action refers to the
insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer, while
dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions
or evidence presented by the plaintiff.

Failure to state a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action;
the terms are not interchangeable. The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of
cause of action is based on Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides that after
the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be
made before a responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved
only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other
hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be
filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.
In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in
the second situation, the judge must determine the veracity of the
allegations based on the evidence presented.

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Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of action,
respondent must have presented evidence to dispute the presumption that
the signatories validly and intentionally delivered the instrument.

The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause of action against

the defendants is this: admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of
fact made in the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief demanded in
the complaint? Consequently, the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint against ProFriends on ground that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action, an affirmative defense it did not raise, and which is
completely different from what it actually raised, i.e., lack of cause action.
And strictly speaking, lack of cause of action may only be raised after the
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations or
admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Before then, it cannot be
raised; much less can the court dismiss the case on that ground.

Not failure to state a cause of action but only lack of cause of action

Republic v De Borja
GR no 187448; January 9, 2017
Grounds; Demurrer to Evidence

Facts:

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Velasco was the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of PNOC.
Respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew. It appears from the records that
PNOC would regularly enter into charter agreements with vessels and,
pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address
commissions" to PNOC as
charterer, amounting to 5% of the total freight wherein during the tenure of
Velasco, allegedly, no address commissions were remitted to PNOC. Given
the foregoing, petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected
these address commissions on behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the
testimony of Verano. De Borja was further alleged to have acted as Velasco's
dummy,
for corporations he owned and/or controlled, such as DRMC. Respondent De
Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence. The SB held that the plaintiff has failed
to present sufficient evidence to prove that defendant De Borja is liable for
damages as averred in the complaint. Witness Verano admitted that
although he was instructed to deliver two envelopes to the office of De Borja,
he did not know for a fact that De Borja actually received them.

Issue:
Whether the demurer to evidence should be granted

Held:
Yes; a Demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the
effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The
question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence
in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of

"preponderance of evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's
presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence
to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the defendant's
evidence. Hence,
what is crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiff's evidence
entitles it to the relief sought.

In this case, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can
best be described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best.
Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to the
conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving
address
commissions from vessel owners. Moreover, as admitted by Verano himself,
he did not and could not have known what was inside the envelopes when
they were purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same vein,
Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes,

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despite numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed
during the cross-examination of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did
not even deal directly with brokers.

A review of the dismissal of the complaint naturally entailed a calibration of

the evidence on record to properly determine whether the material
allegations of the complaint were amply supported by evidence. This being
so, where the resolution of a question requires an examination of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of
surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations, the
same involves a question of fact.
It is said that factual questions are not the proper subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45, the same being limited only to questions of law. Not
being a trier of facts, the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again
the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. For such reasons,
the Court has consistently deferred to the factual findings of the trial court,
in light of the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the demeanor
and spontaneity of the witness in assessing the credibility of their testimony

GMA Network Inc v Central CATV

GR no 176694; July 18, 2014
Grounds; Demurrer to Evidence

Facts:

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Petitioner, together with the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas,
Audiovisual Communicators, Incorporated, Filipinas Broadcasting Network
and Rajah Broadcasting Network, Inc. (complainants), filed with the NTC a
complaint against the respondent to stop it from soliciting and showing
advertisements in its cable television CATV system, pursuant to Section 2 of
EO 205. Under this provision, a grantee's authority to operate a CATV system
shall not infringe on the television and broadcast markets. The petitioner
alleged that the phrase "television and broadcast markets" includes the
commercial or advertising market. In its answer, the respondent admitted
the airing of commercial advertisement on its CATV network but alleged that
Section 3 of EO No. 436 expressly allowed CATV providers to carry
advertisements and other similar paid segments provided there is consent
from their program providers. After the petitioner presented and offered its
evidence, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence
claiming that the evidence presented by the complainants failed to show
how the respondent's acts of soliciting and/or showing advertisements
infringed upon the television and broadcast market.

Issue:
Whether the demurrer to evidence should be granted

Held:
No; the issue to be resolved in a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to
evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for based on
the facts and the law. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is
that which pertains to the merits of the case, excluding technical aspects
such as capacity to sue. However, the plaintiff's evidence should not be the
only basis in resolving a demurrer to evidence. The "facts" referred to should
include all the means sanctioned by the Rules of Court in ascertaining
matters in judicial proceedings. These include judicial admissions, matters of
judicial notice, stipulations made during the pre-trial and trial, admissions,
and presumptions, the only exclusion being the defendant's evidence.

In granting the demurrer to evidence in the present case, the NTC

considered both the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint and the
insufficiency of the complainants' evidence in light of its interpretation of the
provisions of EO No. 205 and EO No. 436. The petitioner failed to prove by
substantial evidence that the respondent aired the subject advertisements
without the consent of its program providers, as required under EO No. 436.
The NTC, therefore, has issued the assailed order upon a consideration of the
applicable laws and the evidence of the petitioner. On this score, the grant of
the demurrer suffers no infirmity.

However, the NTC further extended its consideration of the issue to the
respondent's pieces of evidence that were attached to its demurrer to
evidence. Rule 33 of the Rules of Court proscribes the court or the tribunal

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from considering the defendant's evidence in the resolution of a demurrer to
evidence. While an administrative agency is not strictly bound by technical
rules of procedure in the conduct of its administrative proceedings, the
relaxation of the rules should not result in violating fundamental evidentiary
rules, including due process. In the present case, the NTC proceeded against
the very nature of the remedy of demurrer to evidence when it considered
the respondent's evidence, specifically the certifications attached to the
respondent's demurrer to evidence.

Duque v Spouses Yu
GR no 226130; February 19, 2018
Effects of Grant and Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Facts:
Spouses Duque were the lawful owners of a parcel of land. They allegedly
executed a deed of donation over the subject property in favor of their
daughter, respondent Capacio who, in turn, sold a portion thereof to Spouses

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Yu. With that, spouses Duque lodged a verified complaint for declaration of
non-existence and nullity of a deed of donation against respondents claiming
that the signature in the deed was forged. Capacio admitted that the
signature in the deed of donation was, indeed, falsified but she did not know
the author thereof, Spouse Yu, for their part, refuted Spouses Duque’s
personality to question the genuineness of the deed of absolute sale for it
was their daughter who forged the deed of donation. A motion for admission
was filed by respondent Spouses Yu requesting the admission of the deed of
donation and deed of absolute sale. Spouses Duque were directed to
comment thereon but they failed to do so. During the trial, instead of
presenting their evidence, respondent Spouses Yu moved for demurrer to
evidence.

Issue:
Whether the Demurrer to Evidence should be granted

Held:
No in view of the Court’s finding that there was no implied admission to
speak of; the defendant is permitted, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event that his motion is not granted, to move for a dismissal
(i.e., demur to the plaintiffs evidence) on the ground that upon the facts as
thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief. If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiffs
evidence is sufficient for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary
evidence, the case still remains before the trial court which should then
proceed to hear and receive the defendants evidence so that all the facts
and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for
adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal.

The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his
demurrer is granted by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed
on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and
he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of
plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court which
reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the
merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence.
In short, defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs' evidence retain
the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them;
if it agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees and
reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their
own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and
render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.
With this Court's denial of the demurrer to evidence, it will now proceed to
rule on the merits of the Complaint solely on the basis of the petitioners'
evidence on record.

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Here, it would appear from the trial court's Order that the evidence for the
petitioners consists mainly of the testimony of the handwriting expert
witness and the Answer of respondent Capacio, which both confirmed that
the signature in the Deed of Donation was, indeed, falsified. With these
pieces of evidence and nothing more, this Court is inclined to grant the
petitioners' Complaint. Being a falsified document, the Deed of Donation is
void and inexistent. As such, it cannot be the source of respondent Capacio's
transferable right over a portion of the subject property. Being a patent
nullity, respondent Capacio could not validly transfer a portion of the subject
property in favor of respondents Spouses Yu under the principle of "Nemo
dat quod non habet," which means "one cannot give what one does not
have." As a consequence, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
respondent Capacio in favor of respondents Spouses Yu has no force and
effect as the former is not the owner of the property subject of the sale
contract.

Comglasco Corp v Santos Car Check Center Corp

GR no 202989; March 25, 2015
Judgement on the Pleadings

Facts:
Respondent Santos is an owner of a showroom which was leased out for a
period of 5 years to petitioner Comglasco, an entity engaged in the sale,
replacement and repair of automobile windshields. Later, Comglasco advised
Santos through a letter that it was pre-terminating their lease contract.
However, the latter refused to accept and instead reminded Comglasco that

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the contract was good for 5 years. Comglasco then vacated the leased
premises
and stopped paying further rentals. Santos sent several demand letters but
were ignored by Comglasco which led Santos to file a suit for breach of
contract.
Comglasco, after being served of summons and copy of complaint, moved to
dismiss for improper service. The RTC dismissed the motion and ordered the
summons served anew. Comglasco filed its Answer and Santos moved for
judgment on the pleadings, which the RTC granted. CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether judgement on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial court
as basis for rendering its decision

Held:
Yes; judgement on the pleadings is to cut short a needless trial. A judgment
on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties
and the accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the
discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if
there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A
genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false issue.

Fernando Medical Enterprises Inc v Wesleyan University Phils Inc

GR no 207970; January 20, 2016
Judgement on the Pleadings

Facts:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and
supplies, delivered to, and installed medical equipment and supplies at the
respondent’s hospital based on several contracts. However, respondent paid
short of its total obligation. Representatives of both parties entered into an
agreement to reduce the claim and be allowed to pay the balance on

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installments for 36 months. Petitioner sent a demand letter, but respondent
failed to pay thus the former filed a collection case before the RTC.
Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. One of the grounds is litis
pendentia. RTC denied the MTD thus respondent filed its answer. Petitioner
filed its Motion for Judgment based on the Pleadings, stating that the
respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus
did not tender any issue as to such allegations which the RTC denied. CA
ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the
outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face
of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the motion for judgement on the pleadings in proper

Held:
Yes; the essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings
is whether or not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings.
Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not depends on how the defending
party's answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the complaint. The
defending party's answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate
facts in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate
facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not require evidence to
establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the
answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence. The answer
admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party's
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations
but also when it omits to deal with them at all. The controversion of the
ultimate facts must only be by specific denial.

In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or

defense is based, which is also known as the actionable document, the
pleader of such document is required either to set forth the substance of
such instrument or document in the pleading, and to attach the original or a
copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall then be deemed to be
a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading. The adverse
party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath and sets
forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.

In this case, the admission of the various agreements significantly admitted

the petitioner’s complaint. To recall, the petitioner’s cause of action was
based on the February 2009 agreement, which was the actionable document
in the case. The complaint properly alleged the substance of such agreement

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and contained a copy thereof as an annex. Upon the express admission of
the genuineness and due execution of the agreement, judgment on the
pleadings became proper.

There is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to

documents the genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the
adverse party. With the consequent admission engendered by petitioners’
failure to properly deny the Acknowledgment in their Answer, coupled with
its proper authentication, identification and offer by the respondent, the
Court believes that judgment may be had solely on the document, and there
is no need to present receipts and other documents to prove the claimed
indebtedness.

Iloilo Jar Corp v Comglasco Corp

GR no 219509; January 18, 2017
Judgement on the Pleadings

Facts:
Petitioner Iloilo Jar, as lessor, and respondent Comglasco, as lessee, entered
into a lease contract over a portion of a warehouse building. The term of the
lease was for a period of 3 years. Later, Comglasco requested for the pre-
termination of the lease effective on the same date. Iloilo Jar, however,
rejected the request on the ground that the pre-termination of the lease
contract was not stipulated therein. Despite the denial of the request for pre-
termination, Comglasco still removed all its stock, merchandise, and
equipment from the leased premises. From the time of the withdrawal of the

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equipment, and notwithstanding several demand letters, Comglasco no
longer paid all rentals accruing from the said date. Iloilo Jar filed a civil action
for breach of contract and damages before the RTC. Comglasco filed its
Answer and raised an affirmative defense, arguing that by virtue of Article
1267 of the Civil Code, it was released from its obligation from the lease
contract. It explained that the consideration thereof had become so difficult
due to the global and regional economic crisis that had
plagued the economy. Likewise, Comglasco admitted that it had removed its
stocks and merchandise, but it did not refuse to pay the rentals because the
lease contract was already deemed terminated. Further, it averred that
though it received the demand letters, it did not amount to a refusal to pay
the
rent because the lease contract had been pre-terminated in the first place.
Iloilo Jar filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings arguing that
Comglasco admitted all the material allegations in the complaint. It insisted
that Comglasco's answer failed to tender an issue because its affirmative
defense was unavailing.

Issue:
Whether a judgement on the pleadings is appropriate in this case

Held:
No; Section 1, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules of Court governs motions for
judgment on the pleadings where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
On the other hand, under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party may move
for summary judgment if there are no genuine issues raised.

Judgment on the pleadings as differentiated from summary judgment is that

in the former, it is appropriate if the answer failed to tender an issue and, in
the latter, it may be resorted to if there are no genuine issues raised. Simply
stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary
judgment is
the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails
to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the
complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party's
pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with
them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand,
when the Answer specifically denies the material averments of the complaint
or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words raises an issue, a summary
judgment is proper
provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an
issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a
genuine issue for trial."

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In the case at bench, Comglasco interposed an affirmative defense in its
answer. While it admitted that it had removed its stocks from the leased
premises and had received the demand letter for rental payments, it argued
that the lease contract had been pre-terminated because the consideration
thereof had become so difficult to comply in light of the economic crisis then
existing. Thus, judgment on the pleadings was improper considering that
Comglasco's Answer raised an affirmative defense. Although resort to
judgment on the pleadings might have been improper, there was still no
need to
remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The judgment rendered
by the RTC in this case was a summary judgment, not a judgment on the
pleadings, because Comglasco's answer raised an affirmative defense.
Nevertheless, no genuine issue was raised because there is no issue of fact
which needs presentation of evidence, and the affirmative defense
Comglasco invoked is
inapplicable in the case at bench (Article 1267 applies only to obligations to
do; not to obligations to give like Comglasco' s obligation of paying rent). A
full-blown trial would needlessly prolong the proceedings where a summary
judgment would suffice. It is undisputed that Comglasco removed its
merchandise from the leased premises and stopped paying rentals
thereafter. Thus, there remains no question of fact which must be resolved in
trial.

Sunbanun v Go
GR no 163280; February 2, 2010
Judgement on the Pleadings

Facts:
Petitioner Doris Sunbanun owns a residential house. She leased the entire
ground floor of such house to respondent Aurora Go for one year. Under their
lease contract, the lessee was allowed “to use the premises as a dwelling or
as lodging house.” To earn extra income, respondent Go accepted lodgers,
mostly her relatives, from whom she received a monthly income of Php
15,000.

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Go paid the monthly rental until such time when petitioner Sunbanun drove
away respondent’s lodgers and terminated the lease. Sunbanun then
padlocked the rooms vacated by respondent’s lodgers. Hence, Respondent
filed an action for damages against Sunbanun for her alleged loss of income
from her lodgers totalling Php 45,000. Petitioner argued that respondent
violated the lease contract when she subleased the rented premises. During
the pre-trial, petitioner Sunbanun moved for the case to be submitted for
judgment on the pleadings considering that the only disagreement between
the parties was the correct interpretation of the lease contract. Respondent
Go did not object to petitioner’s motion.

Issue:
Whether petitioner, instead of the respondent, may move for a judgement on
the pleadings during the pre-trial

Held:
Yes although it is unusual; the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted
matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadings is a
judgment on the facts as pleaded and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying
annexes.

This case is unusual because it was petitioner, and not the claimant
respondent, who moved for a judgment on the pleadings during the pre-trial.
Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof
as to the truth of her own allegations and without giving respondent the
opportunity to introduce evidence, is deemed to have admitted the material
and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her motion for
judgment based on the pleadings of the parties. In this case, it is undisputed
that petitioner ejected respondent's lodgers three months before the
expiration of the lease contract. Clearly, petitioner's act of ejecting
respondent's lodgers resulted in respondent losing income from her lodgers.
Hence, it was proper for the trial court and the appellate court to order
petitioner to pay respondent actual damages.

Garcia v Llamas
GR no 154127; December 8, 2003
Distinguish from judgement by default, summary judgement

Facts:
Petitioner and Eduardo De Jesus borrowed P400,000.00 from respondent.
Both executed a promissory note wherein they bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay the loan with a 5% interest per month. The loan has long
been overdue, and, despite repeated demands, both have failed and refused
to pay it. Hence, a complaint was filed against both. Resisting the complaint,

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Garcia averred that he assumed no liability because he signed merely as an
accommodation party for De Jesus; and that he is relieved from any liability
arising from the note inasmuch as the loan had been paid by De Jesus by
means of a check; and that, in any event, the issuance of the check and
respondent’s acceptance thereof novated or superseded the note.
Respondent answered that there was no novation to speak of because the
check bounced. During the pre-trial conference, petitioners and their lawyers
did not appear, nor did they file any pre-trial brief. Hence, respondent filed a
motion to declare petitioner in default and to allow him to present evidence
ex parte. Meanwhile, Garcia filed a manifestation submitting his defense to a
judgement on the pleadings. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to
submit the case for judgement on the pleadings, withdrawing in the process
his previous motion.

Issue:
Whether the judgement against him – whether a judgement on the pleadings
or a summary judgement – was proper

Held:
No; Under Section 3 of Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a summary judgment
may be rendered after a summary hearing if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file show that (1) except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact;
and (2) the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

A summary judgment is a procedural device designed for the prompt

disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal, not a genuine,
issue regarding any material fact. Consequently, facts are asserted in the
complaint regarding which there is yet no admission, disavowal,
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are set forth in the
answer, but the issues are fictitious as shown by the pleadings, depositions,
or admissions. A summary judgment may be applied for by either a claimant
or a defending party.

On the other hand, under Section 1 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, a

judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to render an issue
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading.
The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the
pleadings. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant,
who is the party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.

Apropos thereto, it must be stressed that the trial court's judgment against
petitioner was correctly treated by the appellate court as a summary
judgment, rather than as a judgment on the pleadings. His Answer
apparently raised several issues — that he signed the promissory note

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allegedly as a mere accommodation party, and that the obligation was
extinguished by either payment or novation. From the records, it also
appears that petitioner himself moved to submit the case for judgment on
the basis of the pleadings and documents. In a written Manifestation, he
stated that "judgment on the pleadings may now be rendered without further
evidence, considering the allegations and admissions of the parties." In view
of the foregoing, the CA correctly considered as a summary judgment that
which the trial court had issued against petitioner.

Spouses Pascual v First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol Inc)

GR no 202597; February 8, 2017
Summary Judgement

Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the CA in order to
nullify and set aside the decision rendered in a special proceeding case by
the RTC ordering the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens. After the
responsive pleadings to the petition were filed, the CA scheduled the
preliminary conference, ordered the parties to file pre-trial brief. But instead
of filing the pre-trial brief as ordered by the CA, the spouses filed a motion
for summary judgement and a motion to hold pre-trial in abeyance. At the
scheduled preliminary conference, the spouses & their counsel did not
appear. The CA rendered judgement dismissing the petition for annulment

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citing Sec 4-6 of Rule 18 wherein the parties and their counsel should appear
at the pre-trial. And that failure of the plaintiff to appear is a cause for
dismissal of the action with prejudice. Further, failure to file a pre-trial brief
has the same effect as that of failure to appear at the pre-trial. Only at the
pre-trial that the ROC allows the court to render judgement on the pleadings
& summary judgement.

Issue:
Whether it is only during pre-trial that a court may render judgement on the
pleadings or summary judgement

Held:
NO; the filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to the
pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory
relief to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof
in his favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2
of Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion
for summary judgment (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or
admissions) upon all or any part thereof "at any time." As such, the
petitioners properly filed their motion for summary judgment prior to the pre-
trial (assuming that they thereby complied with the requirement of
supporting affidavits, depositions, or admissions).

The summary judgment is a procedural technique that is proper under

Section 3, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court only if there is no genuine issue as to
the existence of a material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. It is a method intended to expedite or promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on record. The term
genuine issue is defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived,
set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The party moving for the summary judgment has the
burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact.
Upon the plaintiff rests the burden to prove the cause of action, and to show
that the defense is interposed solely for the purpose of delay. After the
plaintiff's burden has been discharged, the defendant has the burden to
show facts sufficient to entitle him to defend.

A motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule

35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot
motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In

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the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled
to counter the motion.

The spouses could have urged the Court to resolve their pending motion for
summary judgement DURING the pre-trial. Petitioner cannot insist that CA
should have first resolved their motion before holding the pre-trial. Pre-trial is
mandatory and petitioners the motion cannot be the reason to justify the
petitioner’s non-appearance or filing of pre-trial brief.

Asian Construction v PCIB

GR no 153827; April 25, 2006
Summary Judgement

Facts:
Respondent PCIBank filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for
preliminary attachment against petitioner AsiaCon. The first cause of action
was that petitioner had not paid its credit account with PCIB. The second
cause of action was that PCIB suffered damages and prayed that petitioner
pay exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and the cost of suit, and that
petitioner is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt and in the performance
thereof or both. By way of defense, petitioner pleads in its answer the
alleged severe financial crisis which hit the PH in July 1997 which affected
and put it out of business. PCIB filed a verified motion for summary

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judgement therein contending that petitioner’s defenses are a sham and that
the financial crisis alleged in the answer is not a fortuitous event that would
excuse debtors from their loan obligations.

Issue:
Whether there is a genuine issue as to the material fact which rules out the
propriety of the summary judgement

Held:
No; Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to
the amount of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an
early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no
genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-
blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when
the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as
a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for
summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact.

A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of

evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is
no real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment
is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the
issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute
a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine
issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the
place of trial.

In this case, petitioner wants this Court to believe that the abrupt change in
the political climate of the country after the EDSA Revolution and its poor
financial condition "rendered the performance of the lease contract
impractical and inimical to the corporate survival of the petitioner." The
petitioner even failed to append any "Affidavit" to its "Opposition" showing
how much it had received from its construction contracts and how and to
whom the said collections had been appended. Hence, there existing no
genuine issue as to any material fact,

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the summary judgment rendered was valid.

Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines Inc v Isabela Leaf Tobacco Co Inc

GR no 237840; June 10, 2019
Summary Judgement

Facts:
Respondent received a Notice of Pre-Termination which stated that petitioner
was pre-terminating the Agreement due to "changes in doing business for
which your current warehouse could not accommodate." Later, respondent
informed petitioner that its ground for pre-termination was not among those
stipulated under the Agreement and demanded that the latter comply with
its contractual obligations. But petitioner responded that the Agreement
gave it the right to pre-terminate the contract by reason of "sudden change
in business trends, operational restraints, and under similar causes."
Respondent filed a Complaint for breach of contract and damages. After pre-
trial, respondent filed a Motion, alleging that "the only issue left for

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determination is whether or not petitioner may validly pre-terminate the
lease agreement which the RTC granted. But the CA sustained that a
judgement on the pleadings under Rule 34 of the ROC was improper as
petitioner’s answer raised an affirmative issue.

Issue:
Whether the RTC’s order is based on judgement on the pleadings or
summary judgement

Held:
Summary Judgement; what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a
summary judgment is the presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint.
When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that is, if it does not deny the
material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of
the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or
omitting to deal with them at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate.
On the other hand, when the Answer specifically denies the material
averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words
raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised
is not genuine. "A 'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

It is clear that summary or accelerated judgment is proper only when, based

on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after hearing, it is
shown that save as to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue
regarding any material fact in the action and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, where the pleadings tender an
issue, that is, an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for a presentation
of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham or contrived,
summary judgment is not proper.

In this case, stipulation shows that petitioner's need for additional space for
the conduct of its operations certainly falls within the ambit of "operational
restraints" and/or "changes in business trends" and would be a valid ground
for the pre-termination of the lease if petitioner can prove that: 1) it was
prevented from profitably pursuing its warehouse operations and 2) it gave
the respondent-lessor written notice thereof at least 30 days prior to
termination. Said conditions are undoubtedly issues of fact that require the
presentation of evidence. Hence, summary judgement is not proper in this
case.

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Aljem’s Credit Investors Corp v Spouses Bautista
GR no 215175; April 25, 2022
Summary Judgement & Remedies against grant and denial

Facts:
This case is an offshoot of an action for accion publiciana, rescission of
contract to sell, with damages and attorney's fees, filed by petitioner against
the spouses Bautista. Petitioner alleged that a parcel of land owned by the
spouses Bautista was mortgaged to it as security for a loan." The Bautistas
failed to pay the loan; thus, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage. As the
spouses Baustista did not redeem the property within the reglementary
period, title to the property was
consolidated in petitioner's name. When petitioner was about to take
possession of the property, Catalina, the wife, offered to repurchase the
property.' Petitioner accepted the offer, so they entered into a Contract to
Sell in which they failed to comply resulting to its cancellation. Thus,
petitioner sent demand letters to Catalina to vacate the property. But since
all demands were to no avail, resulting to petitioner's filing of the complaint.

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The spouses Bautista alleged that the mortgage contract is void as it did not
bear the conformity of Porferio Bautista, the husband. Petitioner then filed a
motion for summary judgement which was denied by the RTC since it found
a need for trial to assess the facts.

Issue:
Whether Summary Judgement is proper

Held:
No; a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the
existence of a genuine issue of fact, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived, or false claim. A factual issue raised by a party is considered as
sham when, by its nature, it is evident that it cannot be proven, or it is such
that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor
adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens in denials made by
defendants merely for the sake of having an issue, and thereby gaining
delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not under oath
anyway.

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged
under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they
submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Additionally, in
order for summary judgment to be granted in lieu of a full-blown trial, the
party moving for summary judgment must establish unequivocally the
absence of genuine issues of fact or that the issue posed is so patently
insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.

In this case, it is clear that there are still genuine issues of fact that need to
be resolved in the trial. Hence, this Court holds that the denial of petitioner's
Motion for Summary Judgment is proper. Petitioner's recourse now is to
participate in the trial proper.

Also worth mentioning is that the Court's pronouncement here is in line with
the provisions of the 2019 Amended Rules of Civil Procedure on motions for
summary judgment, which provides that any action of the trial court on a
motion for summary judgment shall not be subject of an appeal or petition
for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.

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Philippine Business Bank v Chua
GR no 178899; November 15, 2010
Partial Summary Judgement

Facts:
Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Soriano issued a secretary’s certificate
which stated that John Dennis Chua was authorized during a CST board
meeting to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name
of CST with PBB. The certificate also authorized John Chua to use CST’s
properties as security
for these loans. Felipe Chua signed as a co-maker. Tan sued PBB, Chua and
Chua to annul the mortgage and loans. In its answer, PBB filed a cross-claim
against Felipe Chua, demanding payment of the PNs he signed as co-maker
with John Chua. Felipe Chua answered the cross claim admitting that he
signed the PNs as co-maker. PBB later filed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment claiming that since Chua already admitted execution of the PNs,
there was
no genuine issue on any material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. RTC
issued a partial summary judgment finding Chua liable as signatory to the
PNs

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and ordered him to pay. The RTC denied Chua’s appeal because he could not
do so under Rule 41and he should have filed a Rule 65 certiorari. However,
the period for filing a certiorari already lapsed so the partial summary
judgment has become final and executory.

Issue:
Whether the partial summary judgement is a final order

Held:
No; a partial summary judgment is not a final or appealable judgment. It is
merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case shall be deemed
established for the trial of the case. When the pleadings on file show that
there
are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain
immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are
not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the
law to the material facts. Partial summary judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary.

The court shall make an order specifying the facts that appear without
substantial controversy. The facts so specified shall be deemed established,
and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly. Unlike
a final judgment or order, which is appealable, an interlocutory order (such
as partial summary judgment) may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part
of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in the case.

Bacabac v Spouses Tiu

GR no 228126; June 30, 2021
Judgement by Default

Facts:
Respondents were compelled to file a complaint for Quieting of Title with the
RTC. Summons were duly served to petitioners, but despite this, they failed
to file an answer within the reglementary period. Hence, petitioners were
declared in default. In the same Order, the RTC appointed the Branch Clerk
of Court, Atty. Gobenciong as Commissioner to hear and receive the
respondents' evidence.
Later, petitioners' counsel of record entered his appearance but did not take
any action on the case. It took several months before petitioners moved to
set aside the RTC's Order declaring them in default which the RTC denied.
According to the CA, the RTC’s order declaring petitioners in default had long
attained finality as evidenced by an Entry of Judgement. Thus, they cannot

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ask the CA to amend the same. Nonetheless, petitioners may still appeal
from the default judgement but on limited grounds.

Issue:
Whether a party declared in default retains the right to appeal albeit on
restricted grounds

Held:
Yes; a defending party declared in default loses standing in the trial court
and the right to adduce evidence and present defense. However, such party
retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default, albeit limited to the
following: (1) the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of
the complaint; (2) the decision is contrary to law; and (3) the amount of
judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. After all, a
defendant declared in default is thereby precluded from asking for the
reversal of the assailed judgment based on evidence he or she submitted on
appeal. Otherwise, it would allow the defaulting party to present evidence,
which was a right already lost in the trial court.

In the present case, it was inaccurate for the CA to state in its assailed
decision that "the arguments proffered by the appellants do not fall under
any of the three allowable grounds that may be raised in appeals from a
judgment by default because in the petition, the ground sought by
petitioners is that the respondents failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint.
Although petitioners would not be in a position to object, only legal evidence
should be considered against them. If the same should prove insufficient to
justify a judgment for respondents as plaintiff, the complaint must be
dismissed. And if a favorable judgment is justifiable, it cannot exceed in
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.
National Power Corp v Baysic
GR no 213893; September 25, 2019
Judgement by Default

Facts:
Private respondents Baysic and Santiago filed with the RTC a Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for Accounting pertaining to their alleged gratuity pay
and financial assistance as retired employees of the NPC which had accrued
to them before the enactment of the Electric Power Industry Reform Act. In
their Answer, petitioners averred that their obligation to provide financial
assistance and other benefits only applied to NPC personnel who were
employed with government service as of the enactment of the EPIRA law.
Private respondents moved to strike out petitioners' Answer for having been
improperly verified. The trial court directed petitioners' Answer to be
expunged from the records for being a mere scrap of paper and declared
petitioners in default. Petitioners subsequently moved to lift the Order of

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Default and to Admit Attached Answer which the trial court denied by its
Order.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners may assail the order declaring petitioners in default
to be reversed and a new one be rendered

Held:
Yes; in cases of default judgments, the remedy of the party declared in
default is appeal. But when that party charges the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in declaring this party
in default and eventually rendering judgment against it, the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of.

1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and
before judgment, file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and that he has a
meritorious defense (FAME)
2. If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant
discovered the default, but before the same has become final and
executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule
37
3. If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become
final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2, Rule
38
4. He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary
to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him

Moreover, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by

default is also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in
default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave
abuse of discretion attended such declaration.

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Spouses Garcia v Spouses Soriano
GR no 219431; August 24, 2020
Judgement on Compromise

Facts:
Spouses Soriano filed an action for Consolidation of Ownership of Real
Property against Spouses Garcia before the RTC. The RTC referred the case
for mediation proceedings and later, the parties reached an amicable
settlement embodied in a compromise agreement; on the basis of which, the
RTC issued an Order approving the aforesaid compromise agreement.
Subsequently, petitioners failed to pay respondents within the one-year
period under the subject judgment based on compromise agreement. The
RTC then extended the period within which petitioners may pay respondents
on the basis of respondents’ permission of the petitioners’ request for
extension. When petitioners alleged that they informed respondents that
they are ready and able to pay, the latter refused to accept the payment and
alleged that the subject judgment based on compromise agreement

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constituted res judicata between the parties and can no longer be disturbed
by the subsequent RTC order.

Issue:
Whether the parties validly entered into a new or modified compromise
agreement which superseded the judgement based on compromise
agreement

Held:
No; a final judgment based on compromise agreement has the same force
and effect of a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction, and is, thus, subject to the same prevailing principles on
compromise agreements after final judgment. The rule of long standing is
that rights may be waived or modified through a compromise agreement
even after a final judgment has already settled the rights of the contracting
parties. As provided by the law on contracts, a valid compromise must have
the following elements: (1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2)
an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the
cause of the obligation that is established.

In the case at bar, there was nothing to prevent the parties from entering
into a new or modified compromise agreement even after the subject
judgment based on compromise agreement attained finality. However,
petitioners failed to show that respondents consented or agreed to this new
or modified compromise agreement, which purported to supersede the
subject judgment based on compromise agreement. Hence, no new or
modified compromise agreement was validly entered into by the proper
party litigants which would have superseded the subject judgment based on
compromise agreement.
National Electrification Administration v Maguindanao Electric Cooperative
Inc
GR no 192595 & 192676-77; April 11, 2018
Judgement on Compromise

Facts:
Respondent MAGELCO is a duly organized cooperative with a franchise to
distribute electric light, and power to the municipalities in the province of
Maguindanao while COTELCO is also a duly organized cooperative with a
franchise to distribute electric light, and power to the province of Cotabato.
COTELCO filed before NEA an application for the amendment of its franchise
to include the PPALMA Area which MAGELCO opposed. After conducting
hearings, NEA granted COTELCO’s application and ordered the transfer of
MAGELCO’s assets in the PPALMA area to COTELCO upon payment of just
compensation. MAGELCO Main and MAGELCO-PALMA entered into a MOA
which they used as a compromise agreement for the implementation of the
separate and independent operation of MAGELCO Main and MAGELCO-PALMA

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which the RTC approved. The NEA issued a letter-directive approving the
MOA. The CA held that NEA had jurisdiction to rule on COTELCO’s application
and affirmed the grant of COTELCO’s application. The RTC granted
MAGELCO-PALMA’s ex-parte motion for execution.

Issue:
Whether the judgement had already become final and executory thus
operating as a res judicata

Held:
No; A compromise agreement, once judicially approved, becomes
immediately final and executory. A judgment on compromise agreement is a
judgment on the merits and operates as res judicata. However, its effects
must be understood within the confines of the laws on contracts and the
rules pertaining to res judicata in judicial decisions. A compromise
agreement is essentially a contract and even if judicially approved, is
unenforceable against a non-party. Further, res judicata also limits the effect
of a judgment to the parties to a case and their privies. The effect of res
judicata extends only to a litigation on the same thing by the party or the
successor in interest under the same title and in the same action. In this
instance, the prior judgment is res judicata only as to the issues directly
adjudged and to matters that were actually and necessarily included in such
issues.

Thus, a judgment on compromise agreement, while it is final and

immediately executory, binds only the parties who signed the contract.
Moreover, precisely because a judgment on compromise agreement has the
force of res judicata, its binding effect must be seen within the parameters
within which res judicata finds application.
In this case, the judgment on compromise agreement is a settlement of the
dispute between MAGELCO Main and MAGELCO-PALMA. It cannot affect the
rights of persons who were never parties to it. Hence, it cannot be enforced
against COTELCO whose rights were eventually recognized by the CA. The
compromise agreement was a settlement of the dispute within MAGELCO as
a cooperative. It cannot be deemed to have settled the claim of COTELCO
who was not a party to it, and whose rights arose from a different source.

While a final and executory agreement is immutable and ought to be

enforced, no execution will issue under the following exceptions: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable. We rule that the last exception, the
presence of a supervening event, prevents the execution of the judgment on
compromise agreement.

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Here, there are two supervening events in this case preventing the execution
of the judgment on compromise agreement:
The first is the Decision in the First CA Case which granted COTELCO's
application for the amendment of its franchise and consequently modified
that of MAGELCO to exclude the PPALMA Area. Second, MAGELCO Main's
revocation of the MOA and the transition plan meant that MAGELCO-PALMA
will no longer be a separate unit. In legal contemplation, therefore,
MAGELCO-PALMA has ceased to exist. There is thus nothing in the
compromise agreement that can still be enforced considering that one party
thereto has been validly dissolved. These developments have created a
substantial change in the rights and relations of the parties so as to make
the execution of the judgment on compromise agreement impossible.

St. Francis Plaza Corp v Solco

GR no 248519, 248520 & 248757-59; March 17, 2021
Judgement on Compromise

Facts:
Emilio alleged that his shares of stock in SFPC were transferred to Francis
without
his knowledge and consent. He sent two separate demand letters to the
Francis
Group asking for a full accounting report and explanation on the status of his
shareholdings but SPFC denied it, asserting that he was no longer a
shareholder. The parties, excluding SFPC, executed a Compromise
Agreement which was granted by the RTC. The parties smoothly
implemented the first set of their reciprocal obligations under the
Compromise Agreement. Emilio moved for the execution of the Judgment on
a Compromise Agreement claiming that the Francis Group showed a clear
intent to renege on the Compromise Agreement by filing several motions in
the criminal cases which he filed against them. The Francis Group averred

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that it was Emilio who breached the Compromise Agreement. The Francis
Group manifested that its further compliance with the other terms of the
Compromise Agreement was no longer fair and equitable in light of Emilio's
failure to comply with his prerequisite prestation under the Compromise
Agreement. The RTC refused to annul the Compromise Agreement and
ordered the execution of the Judgement holding that the compromise, as
judicially approved, had the effect and authority of res judicata.

Issue:
Whether the Compromise Agreement should be annulled

Held:
Yes; Article 2041 of the CC states that if one of the parties fails or refuses, to
abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded, and insist upon his original demand. A
judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of
res judicata. It is final, binding on the parties, and enforceable through a writ
of execution. Article 2041 of the Civil Code, however, allows the aggrieved
party to rescind the compromise agreement and insist upon his original
demand upon failure and refusal of the other party to abide by the
compromise agreement.

Thus, despite the finality of a judicially approved compromise agreement,

where one of the parties to the agreement fails or refuses to comply with his
part of the bargain, as in this case, the law recognizes the right of the
aggrieved party to either: (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution;
or (2) regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand, upon the
other party's failure or refusal to abide by the compromise.

Undoubtedly, Emilio's obligation under the Compromise Agreement, which

he never performed, has lost its importance. Given that his obligation can no
longer be performed, it would be absurd to compel the Francis Group to
deliver its correlative obligation. The DOJ findings and the subsequent
dismissal of the criminal cases were supervening events that rendered the
execution of the Compromise Agreement as unjust and inequitable. Besides,
the Francis Group is released from its reciprocal obligation the moment
Emilio's prior prestation (execution of the Affidavits of Desistance) were
rendered legally impossible by the dismissal of the criminal cases.

Article 1266 of the CC states that the debtor in obligations to do shall also be
released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible
without the fault of the obligor. Hence, the CA's insistence that the Francis
Group can enforce the Compromise Agreement with the assistance of the
RTC by way of a Writ of Execution does not find any practical application to
the facts established in the case. In this case, Francis Group validly regarded
the unimplemented portions of the Compromise Agreement as rescinded in

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view of Emilio's material breach and noncompliance with his part of the
bargain.

Garrido v Tortogo
GR no 156358; August 17, 2011
Interlocutory Order

Facts:
Domingo, deceased, who was substituted by his surviving spouse, petitioner,
commenced in the MTCC an action for ejectment against several defendants
including the respondents. The case reached the SC where judgement was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and an entry of judgment was issued. The
MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion. The
respondents filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and its aliases, and
a motion to stay the execution of earlier decisions. They anchor their
motions on the supposedly supervening finding that the lot covered by the
writ of execution was foreshore land belonging to the State as supported by
administrative issuances from the DENR. The MTCC, on a later date, denied
respondent’s motion to quash. But the respondents filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order in the RTC. The RTC granted the

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respondents’ prayer for a temporary restraining order. Thus, petitioner went
directly to the Supreme Court through petition for review on certiorari
seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
issued by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the RTC lawfully issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction

Held:
No; the order of the RTC is an interlocutory order that was not subject of
appeal. The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is
well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the
latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to
be decided upon.

An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory, or final is: does the
order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect
to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final. The order in this case, which granted the application for
the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the
subject of an appeal.

The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid

multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the
hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the
appeals. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only
after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an
interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is
certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

In this case, the issuance of the TRO and Wirt of Preliminary Injunction is
patently without basis and violated the requirements of the rules and
jurisprudence.
Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final judgment
must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents.
They could not anymore be permitted to interminably forestall the execution
of the judgment through their interposition of new petitions or pleadings.

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Planters Development Bank v Sps Lopez
GR no 186332; October 23, 2013
Supplemental and Amended Judgement

Facts:
Spouses Lopez applied for and obtained a real estate loan from Planters
Bank. To secure the payment of the loan, the spouses Lopez mortgaged a
parcel of land covered by a TCT. Later, the parties signed several
amendments to the loan agreement which increased the interest rate. The
contract also provided that releases on the loan shall be subject to Planters
Bank's availability of funds.
Furthermore, the term of the loan was shortened to one year. Later, Planters
Bank unilaterally increased the interest rate and the spouses Lopez failed to
avail the full amount of the loan because Planters Bank refused to release
the remaining. The spouses Lopez filed against Planters Bank a complaint for
rescission of the loan agreements and for damages with the RTC. The RTC
ruled in favor of Planter's Bank and held that spouses Lopez had no right to
rescind the loan agreements. It led to an appeal in which CA reversed RTC's

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ruling. The CA initially ruled in reducing the interest, but it was amended
pursuant to a comment filed by the Planter's Bank which the CA treated to
be as a motion for reconsideration resulting in the rescission of the loan
agreement, including all its accessory contracts.

Issue:
Whether the CA’s amended decision is final and executory

Held:
No; there is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental
judgment. In an amended judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study
of the original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment
only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and
clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes or takes the
place of the original decision. On the other hand, a supplemental decision
does not
take the place of the original; it only serves to add to the original decision.

In the present case, the CA promulgated an amended decision because it

re-examined its factual and legal findings in its original decision. Thus,
Planters
Bank may file a motion for reconsideration. The amended decision is an
entirely new decision which replaced the CA's former decision. In sum, the
amended decision is not yet final and executory because Planters Bank filed
a motion for reconsideration on time; its filing is allowed by the Rules of
Court.

Baterina v Musngi
GR no 239203-09; July 28, 2021
Judgement Nunc pro tunc

Facts:
7 Information were filed with the SB and raffled to the Second Division.
Accused Relampagos and other accused filed with the SB a Joint Omnibus
Motion. The SB issued a Resolution denying the Omnibus Motion for lack of
merit: (“the Omnibus Motion filed by accused Baterina is denied for lack of
merit”). Consequently, the SB issued a Resolution nunc pro tunc in order to
clarify the Resolution and a correction to the dispositive portion of the
Sandiganbayan Resolution (“the Joint Omnibus Motion filed by accused
Relampagos, Nunez, Paule, and Bare is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.”
Later, petitioner filed the Request on the grounds of bias, partiality, and
prejudice on the part of respondents or the members of the SB, Second

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Division. According to petitioner, respondents already prejudged the case
against him because the Sandiganbayan
Resolution wrongfully included his name in the dispositive portion even if
he was not one of the parties who filed the Joint Omnibus Motion being
resolved. The Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution denying
petitioner's Request for lack of merit. On Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner prayed before the Sandiganbayan that his Request be
reconsidered and that the members be refrained from further hearing the
case insofar as he is concerned. The SB issued the second assailed
Resolution denying the motion after finding no compelling reason to grant it.
Petitioner alleged that respondents acted with bias when the dispositive
portion of the earlier Resolution included his name.

Issue:
Whether there was GADALEJ in denying petitioner’s request

Held:
No; the respondents acted well within the scope of their jurisdiction and
authority when they denied petitioner's Request for Inhibition.

In the case at bar, the Resolution erroneously contained a dispositive portion

implicating the name of petitioner. However, the subsequent issuance of
Resolution in the nature of nunc pro tunc, cured the error in the dispositive
portion. The dispositive portion of the earlier Resolution which pertained to
petitioner was a mere act of inadvertence on the part of respondents and
does not in any way qualify as proof of respondents' bias or partiality against
petitioner.

“Nunc pro tunc" means "now for then." A judgment nunc pro tunc is made to
enter into the record an act previously done by the court, which had been
omitted either through inadvertence or mistake. It neither operates to
correct judicial errors nor to "supply omitted action by the court." Its sole
purpose is to make a present record of a "judicial action which has been
actually taken”.

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Philippine Veterans Bank v Bank of Commerce
GR no 217938 & 217945; September 15, 2021
Immutability of Final Judgements; Exceptions

Facts:
CAP filed a petition for rehabilitation before the RTC where Marcelo was
appointed as Rehabilitation Receiver, while petitioner PVB became CAP's new
trustee bank. The Rehabilitation Court issued an Order directing BOC to remit
to PVB the accrued interest due on the previously redeemed shares owned
by CAP. BOC was then ordered to remit now to the trustee bank, PVB the
value of the preferred shares. BOC shall pay the legal rate of interest of 12%
per annum for every day of delay. BOC filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration which was denied by the rehabilitation court. BOC filed a
petition with the CA that the Rehabilitation Court committed an error in
issuing the order to transfer amounts to CAP. BOC alleged that this is a
violation of the BSP directive and the general banking law. CA then granted
the appeal. PVB and CAP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

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Issue:
Whether the CA and erred in reversing the rehabilitation court order

Held:
Yes; it is a settled principle that once a judgment lapses into finality, it
becomes
immutable and unalterable. It can neither be modified nor disturbed in any
manner even if the purpose of the modification is to correct perceived errors
of fact or law. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become
final at some definite point in time.

The principle of immutability of final judgments prohibits any alteration,

modification, or correction of final and executory judgments as what remains
to
be done is the purely ministerial enforcement or execution or the judgment.
There are, however, recognized exceptions: these are: (1) correction of
clerical errors: (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no
prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances
transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

Supervening events include matters which the parties were unaware of prior
to or during the trial because they were not yet in existence at that time. The
supervening event must create a substantial change in the rights or relations
of the parties which would render the execution of a final judgment unjust,
impossible, or inequitable making it imperative to stay immediate execution
in the interest of justice.

Padillo v CA
GR no 119707; November 29, 2001
Bar by Prior Judgement

Facts:
Veronica Padillo initiated a petition for declaratory relief and damages,
against Averia and Casilang for unlawfully refusing to vacate the subject lot
Padillo
Purchased from de Vera. Prior to this case, however, there was another case
which was also instituted by Padillo to compel the Register of Deeds to
register the Deed of Sale on the subject lot between de Vera and Padillo. The
RTC ordered the Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and pursuant
to the SC’s decision, a new trial was conducted which declared petitioner
Padillo as sole and exclusive owner of the property in question and ordered
the Register of Deeds to register the questioned deed of sale in favor of
petitioner Padillo. It was appealed with the CA which sustained the decision

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of the trial court. Respondent Averia appealed to the SC via a petition for
review on certiorari which was denied. The trial court suspended further
proceeding. Respondent Averia assailed the decision before the CA, which
rendered a decision therein ordering the suspension of the proceedings in
the Civil Case for declaration relief to await the final termination of M.C. No.
374-42, then pending appeal with the Court of Appeals. No appeal was filed
therefrom, hence, the decision of the appellate court became final.

Issue:
Whether there is res judicata

Held:
No; bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the
judgment was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is
invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action. Where all present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first
constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the
claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity
with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose.

Under these ordinary circumstances, it is correct that M.C. No. 374-82 barred
petitioner's claim for damages in Civil Case No. 9114 since all four (4)
essential requisites in order for res judicata as a "bar by prior judgment" to
attach are present in the case: 1. The former judgment must be final; 2. It
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the
parties; 3. It must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4. There must
be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter, and identity of cause of action.

However, the law of the case on the matter of the pendency of M.C. No. 974-
82 to bar Civil Case No. 9114 had been settled wherein Civil Case No. 9114
was erroneously suspended, not terminated. As no appeal was taken on the
said decision, it became final and became the law of the case between the
parties.

LAW OF THE CASE V RES JUDICATA

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to
be the facts of the case before the court.

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As a general rule, a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be
the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the remedy of
the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing.

Law of the Case v Res Judicata

Law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata, and
applies only to that one case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or
privies in one case by what has been done in another case.

The doctrine of law of the case is akin to that of former adjudication but is
more limited in its application. It relates entirely to questions of law and is
confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case. The
doctrine of res judicata differs therefrom in that it is applicable to the
conclusive determination of issues of fact, although it may include questions
of law, and although it may apply to collateral proceedings in the same
action or general proceeding, it is
generally concerned with the effect of an adjudication in a wholly
independent proceeding.

People v Escobar
GR no 214300; July 26, 2017
Bar by Prior Judgement

Facts:
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of a daughter
of a Filipino Chinese businessman. Cubillas, the group’s driver, confessed,
became a state witness, and executed an extrajudicial confession where he
implicated Escobar as an adviser for the alleged group leader. He filed a
petition for bail, which was denied by the RTC and CA for lack of merit.
Pending the proceedings on Escobar’s case, his co-accused was arrested and
filed for bail but was denied by the RTC which was subsequently reversed by
the same court, granting his co-accused’s bail application. This compelled
Escobar to file a second petition for bail, but the RTC denied on the ground of
res judicata reasoning that in deference to the decision of the CA which has
already attained finality, Escobar’s second petition for bail must be denied.

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The CA however, overturned the RTC order and granted the second bail
application. According to the CA, Escobar’s second bail petition was not
barred by res judicata which applies only if the former judgment is a final
order or judgment and not an interlocutory order. That an order denying a
petition for bail is interlocutory in nature.

Issue:
Whether the second bail petitioner was barred by res judicata

Held:
No; res judicata refers to "a matter adjudged." This doctrine bars the re-
litigation of the same claim between the parties. It likewise bars the re-
litigation of the same issue on a different claim between the same parties.

A final judgment "leaves nothing else to be done" because the period to

appeal has expired or the highest tribunal has already ruled on the case. In
contrast, an order is considered interlocutory if, between the beginning and
the termination of a case, the court decides on a point or matter that is not
yet a final judgment on the entire controversy. Res judicata applies only
when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed
of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.

Being an interlocutory order, the CA Decision denying Escobar's First Bail

Petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping case itself has
not attained finality. Since res judicata has not attached to the CA Decision,
the RTC should have taken cognizance of Escobar's Second Bail Petition and
weighed the strength of the evidence of guilt against him.

Padua v Heirs of de Guzman

GR no 221521; February 3, 2021
Conclusiveness of Judgement

Facts:
The heirs of Spouses De Guzman asserted ownership of the property,
including the lots sold to petitioners by Antonio. Consequently, the
subdivision homeowners filed 26 actions for Quieting of Title against the
heirs of Spouses De Guzman. The heirs of Spouses De Guzman filed a motion
to dismiss the aforementioned actions alleging, among others, they are
barred by res judicata. They averred that Doña Caridad and De Guzman
Subdivision Home
Lot Owners, Inc., including herein petitioners, have already filed an action
against the Estate of Spouses De Guzman before the HLURB for Specific
Performance praying to compel Spouses De Guzman to issue titles in favor of
the homeowners. Eventually, the HLURB found that Antonio acted without
authority and misrepresented himself as the registered owner-seller of the
lots. Thus, the sales to the homeowners, including petitioners herein, were

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declared null and void. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, filed by
the heirs of Spouses De Guzman, maintaining that res judicata does not
apply because the HLURB has no jurisdiction to nullify the deeds of sale nor
over issues involving title, possession, or any interest in real property. RTC
rendered an Order finding that res judicata had set in. The CA affirmed the
RTC that res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies in the instant
case as the issues being raised before the RTC for quieting of title and
reconveyance have been resolved with finality by the HLURB in the specific
performance case.

Issue:
Whether res judicata by conclusiveness of judgement is applicable

Held:
Yes; res judicata by conclusiveness of judgement applies in the instant case.
Res judicata is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from
re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment. It means that "a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters
determined in the former suit.”

There is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment when all the following

elements are present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between
the first and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes of
action.
Therefore, the parties and issues in the 2 cases must be the same for res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment to apply. The above-mentioned
elements are all present in the instant case. Since the issue of said validity
had been resolved in the case for Specific Performance before the HLURB, it
cannot again be litigated in the instant case without virtually impeaching the
correctness of the decision of the former case. Hence, Res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgement applies in the instant case.

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Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) v Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services Inc
GR no 214864; March 22, 2017
Law of the Case

Facts:
The dispute arose from PPA’s of NIAASI’s holdover capacity. The RTC
dissolved the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and directed NIASSI to
surrender the management and control of Nasipit Port's cargo-handling
operations to PPA.
NIASSI filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA granted NIAASI’s
petition. In the process of resolving NIASSI's CA petition, it became necessary
for the CA to determine whether NIASSI had any legal right to continue its
operations at Nasipit Port. In this connection, the CA found that a perfected
contract between NIASSI and PPA in respect of the cargo handling operations
in fact existed, albeit unwritten. The RTC directed the parties to submit their
simultaneous memoranda on the issue of whether the Amended Petition had
been rendered moot and academic. On the basis of such memoranda, Judge
Abul issued a Resolution dismissing the Amended Petition for being moot and

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academic. However, on NIASSI's Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC issued
a Resolution reversing the RTC Resolution or granting the Motion for
Reconsideration which was affirmed by the CA. The RTC directed the PPA to
enforce the 10-year period beginning form the finality of the judgement.

Issue:
Whether the CA’s findings constitute the law of the case between the parties
and are thus binding therein

Held:
Yes; the Court's decision became final and executory after the lapse of 15
days from notice thereof to the parties. From such time, the Court's decision
became immutable and unalterable. The Court notes that the CA case and
the instant Petition both stem from the Amended Petition and seek the same
relief - the execution of a written contract in accordance with the Notice of
Award. Moreover, both cases involve the same facts, parties, and arguments.
For these
reasons, the Court believes that the doctrine of the law of the case is
applicable. The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure
from a rule previously made by an appellate court in a subsequent
proceeding essentially involving the same case.

In this case, the CA determined the existence of a perfected contract

between PPA and NIASSI in order to ascertain whether the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction in favor of NIASSI was proper. Thus, the sole issue
for the RTC's determination had been resolved.

Dinglasan Jr v CA
GR no 145420; September 19, 2006
Motion for new trial or reconsideration

Facts:
An Information charging Dinglasan with violation of BP 22 was filed before
the RTC where he was found guilty. Dinglasan filed a MR which was denied
for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC
finding Dinglasan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating BP 22.
Aggrieved, he filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the SC but was
denied. He filed a MR but this was denied. The order denying the Petition for
Review has become final and executory as evidenced by Entry of Judgment.
The prosecution then moved for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 1 year
later, the petitioner filed the present Petition for New Trial based on newly
discovered evidence which seeks to introduce in this case is so material and
of such weight that if admitted, would probably change the judgement. The
alleged new evidence were the affidavits the Executive Vice-President and
Treasurer of Elmyra, and the wife of Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his
lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company, testifying

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that Dinglasan issued a second check within the 5-day period required by BP
22 after the first check bounced. The check was intended to cover a portion
of the indebtedness. Offered as evidence are
the check and the transmittal letter allegedly sent to Antrom and received by
its representative.

Issue:
Whether the instant petition for new trial should be granted

Held:
No; a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the judgment of the
appellate court convicting the accused becomes final and executory. The
court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
a. That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused have been committed during the trial
b. That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the
trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment

The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. These
standards, also known as the "Berry Rule”.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of
showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. The threshold question in
resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the preferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence
which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of
whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one,
i.e., when was the evidence discovered; and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered.

Applying the foregoing test, Dinglasan claimed that the alleged evidence
sought to be presented in this case was recently discovered; however, it
appears that the appellate court already considered that transmittal letter in
rendering its Decision.

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Marikina Valley Development Corp v Flojo
GR no 110801; December 8, 1995
Motion for new trial or reconsideration

Facts:
Sytangco instituted a complaint for reconveyance of a piece of land against
petitioner and Liamzon. After subsequent proceedings, petitioners received a
copy of the order which denied the MR for lack of merit. Private respondent
heirs moved for execution of the decision and insisted that petitioners failed
to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period. The trial court
dismissed the notice for having been filed beyond the reglementary period
and reasoned that petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was pro forma and
hence did not stop the running of the reglementary period. Petitioners went
to the CA on certiorari and injunction and denied that their motion for
reconsideration was merely pro forma and claimed that they had filed their
notice of appeal seasonably. The CA dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Whether petitioners’ MR was sufficient in form and substance

Held:
Yes, it is not merely pro forma; A motion for reconsideration must be based
on a) the judgment awarded with “excessive damages;” b) there was

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“insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision;” c) the decision was
against the law. If it is based on grounds b or c, it must point out specifically
the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings and conclusions.

A motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance that is,
when it satisfies the requirements of Rule 37 interrupts the running of period
to
perfect an appeal. A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with
those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated as pro forma
intended
merely to delay the proceedings and as such, the motion will not stay or
suspend the reglementary period.

Petitioners argued that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the down
payment of the property; that the trial court did not address the
reimbursement
issue in the decision since no constructive trust arose between Sytangco and
Liamzon; and that no evidence had been shown to prove that Marikina Valley
had been created for purposes of fraud, which the trial court also did not
touch on.

Carreon v Aguillon
GR no 240108; June 29, 2020
Motion for new trial or reconsideration

Facts:Tthe RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Aguillon and ordered the

defendants to pay as actual damages. The RTC's Decision attained finality,
and consequently, a writ of execution was issued. The Sheriff levied on the
property belonging to the defendants, which was purportedly their family
home and was sold to respondent Lopez. Lopez filed a petition for
cancellation of the TCT registered in the name of the defendants and for the
issuance of a new one in her name. When Carreon learned that they were
about to be ousted from their family home, it was only then that he
discovered all the proceedings that transpired without their knowledge and
participation. Thus, upon the advice of his counsel, he secured the pertinent
records including the subsequent issuances of the RTC which had already
become final and executory. Left with no legal recourse, Carreon, by himself,
filed the Annulment Petition before the CA on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud premised on the improper/invalid service of
summons. The CA dismissed the Annulment Petition on procedural grounds.
Aggrieved, Carreon filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation.

Issue:

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Whether the CA correctly treated Carreon’s MR as a second motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading, therefore, judgement attained finality

Held:
No; the Rules are explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not
be allowed. In this case, the CA characterized Carreon's MR as a second
motion for reconsideration. Hence, it noted without action the same for being
a prohibited pleading and, resultantly, issued an Entry of Judgment.
However, Carreon's MR can hardly be considered as a second motion for
reconsideration as contemplated by the Rules. In fact, the aforesaid motion
should have actually been treated as a first motion for reconsideration
because it assailed the CA's reconsidered ruling. Clearly, the CA's Resolution
is a new ruling based on legal grounds that are totally different from its
original resolution; hence, when Carreon filed the Motion for Reconsideration,
he was technically filing a first motion for reconsideration resolution wherein
the CA, for the first time, traversed the merits of his Annulment Petition.

As such, the prohibition on the filing of a second motion for reconsideration

found in Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules did not come into play. Evidently,
what the Rules seek to proscribe is a second motion for reconsideration,
which essentially repeats or reiterates the same arguments already passed
upon
by the tribunal, when it resolved the first motion for reconsideration filed by
the same party. If the issues had already been passed upon and there is no
substantial argument raised, then the finality and immutability of a judgment
should not be obviated.

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Valdez v Sundiang
GR no 248786; October 14, 2020
Motion for new trial or reconsideration

Facts:
Petitioners failed to comply with the 3-day notice rule which states that,
except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
Petitioners filed their MR and set the hearing thereof 1 day short of the 3-day
notice rule which is a fatal defect rendering the motion pro forma, a useless
piece of paper that is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop
the running of the reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.

Issue:
Whether the MR should be granted

Held:
No; the trial court's Decision had already lapsed into finality and may no
longer be assailed by appeal or certiorari. Once a judgment attains finality, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be
an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the
highest court of the land.

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The petitioners should have appealed the trial court's Decision upon the
denial of their motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioners opted to file a
second motion for reconsideration in violation of the rule that no party shall
be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order.
More, settled is the rule that certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of
remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is
that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.

Custodio v CA
GR no 116100; February 9, 1996
Appeals in general

Facts:
The grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Mabasa against
Custodio
before the RTC. Later, a decision was rendered by the trial court ordering
defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access —
ingress
and egress, to the public street and ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants
Custodios and Santoses indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein
private respondents, went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered
its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification and
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioners now comes to the
SC raising the issue as to whether the grant of right of way to private
respondents is proper.

Issue:
Whether the grant of right of way to private respondents is proper

Held:
Yes; petitioners are already barred from raising the same because
petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting
private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be

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satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of
the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of
way has already been
laid to rest. For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the CA,
petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in
the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become
final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by
this Court.

Whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself
appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other
than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can
only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellant's
claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign
errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the
appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds,
but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the
appellee's favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs

Republic v Capital Resources Corp

GR no 217210; November 7, 2016
Issues to be raised on appeal in civil cases

Facts:
Petitioner Republic, through the OSG is seeking the reversion of a parcel of
land
situated registered in the name of respondents Capital Resources
Corporation (CRC) and Romeo Roxas. The reversion of a portion of the
Subject Property
declared as foreshore lands has already been ordered by the RTC, and
affirmed by the CA. The instant Petition is directed merely towards the
remainder of the Subject Property. Meanwhile, Respondents pointedly argue
that the issues raised in the Petition were not alleged in the Complaint and
therefore can no longer be considered on appeal. They averred that
petitioner Republic raised the said issues for the first time only in its Motion
for Partial Reconsideration and without amending the Complaint.

Issue:
Whether the Court may consider the issued raised by petitioner

Held:

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No; issues not timely raised in the proceedings before the lower court are
barred by estoppel. As a rule, new issues can no longer be considered by the
appellate court because a party is not permitted to change his theory on
appeal; to allow him to do so would be offensive to the rules of fair play,
justice, and due process.

In this case, petitioner Republic does not dispute the fact that it failed to
raise the contested issues in its Complaint and pre-trial brief. While the
Complaint prayed for the reversion of the entire Subject Property, the
allegations contained therein pertained only to Blocks 35 and 36. Hence,
considering that the body of the Complaint merely supported the reversion
of Blocks 35 and 36, it is of no moment that there was a general prayer for
the reversion of the entire Subject Property. Any relief granted beyond the
allegations of the Complaint would be baseless and would amount to grave
abuse of discretion.

The fact that the case proceeded to trial, with the petitioners actively
participating without raising the necessary objection, all the more requires
that they be bound by the stipulations they made at the pre-trial. Petitioners
were well aware that they raised the defense of prescription and laches since
they included it in their answer. However, for reasons of their own, they did
not include this defense in the pre-trial.

Borromeo v Mina
GR no 193747; June 5, 2013
Issues to be raised on appeal in civil cases

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
seeking that: a) his landholding over the subject property be exempted from
the coverage of the government’s OLT program under PD No. 27; and b)
respondent’s emancipation patent over the subject property be consequently
revoked and cancelled. The DAR Secretary upheld the findings that the
subject landholding was improperly placed under the coverage of the
government's OLT program on account of the erroneous identification of the
landowner. The CA reversed and set aside the DAR Secretary's ruling.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner went to the
SC averring that there was actually an oral sale entered into by him and
Garcia. In his Comment, respondent counters that petitioner cannot change
his theory regarding the date of sale between him and Garcia nor even raise
the same factual issue on appeal before the Court.

Issue:
Whether petitioner can change his theory on appeal

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Held:
No; settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon which
the case is tried and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal, not because of the strict
application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. Basic
considerations of due process dictate those theories, issues, and arguments
not brought to the attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be
considered by a reviewing court, except when their factual bases would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases
of such novel theory, issue or argument is (a) subject of judicial notice; or (b)
had already been judicially admitted.

In this case, records show that petitioner changed his theory on appeal with
respect to the actual basis of his ownership rights over the subject property
and
the status of respondent as tenant of the subject property, which he never
questioned during the earlier stages of the proceedings before the DAR but
presently disputes before the Court. Clearly, the factual bases of the
foregoing theories require the presentation of proof as neither of them had
been judicially admitted by respondent nor subject of judicial notice.
Therefore, the Court cannot entertain petitioner's novel arguments raised in
the instant petition.

Neypes v CA
GR no 141524; September 14, 2005
Period of Appeal; Fresh Period Rule

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or
reconveyance and/or reversion before the RTC against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines, and the private
respondents. The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground
that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was dismissed. Later, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal which was denied one the ground that it was filed eight days late.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this too was denied.
Petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA via a
petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65. Petitioners claimed that
they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this
was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary

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period for appeal. The CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day
period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day
they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable
under the Rules.

Issue:
Whether petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time

Held:
Yes; the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from the notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30
days from the notice of judgment or final order. The period to appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed.

In this case, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the original appeal
period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but
instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration.

The court allows a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the RTC counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Hence, this "fresh period rule"
shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the MTC to RTC; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the RTC to CA; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies to the CA; Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
SC. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days
becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. The Court thus hold that petitioners seasonably
filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from
July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for
reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41,
Section 3 of the Rules which
states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which

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refers to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

Heirs of Albano v Spouses Ravanes

GR no 183645; July 20, 2016
Period of Appeal; Fresh Period Rule

Facts:
Respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter is getting
married and would need the property to build her house. However,
petitioners refused to vacate the property. The MeTC found for the
respondent-spouses. It held that the lease between respondent-spouses and
petitioners is one in which no period of lease has actually been fixed. On
appeal, the RTC agreed with petitioner. Respondent-spouses appealed to the
CA. The CA set aside the Decision of the RTC and reinstated the Decision of
the MeTC. On September 4, 2007, petitioners received notice of the CA
Decision. On September 19, 2007, they filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Stay the Execution of Judgment, which the CA denied in its February 20,
2008 Resolution. The petitioners received a copy of this Resolution on
February 22, 2008. Thereafter, on March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the February 20, 2008 Resolution of the CA. The CA
also denied this motion in its July 7, 2008 Resolution, a copy of which was
received by the petitioners on July 14, 2008. Subsequently, petitioners filed

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before us a Motion for Additional Period to File Petition for Review, which was
granted. They prayed that they be given additional 30 days within which to
file their petition or from July 29, 2008 to August 28, 2008. Petitioners filed
the petition for review on August 28, 2008.

Issue:
Whether the CA decision is already final and executory

Held:
Yes; petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, albeit
in the guise of a "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment."
In fact, the relief prayed for by petitioners in this manifestation and motion
is the same relief obtained once a motion for reconsideration is filed on time.
Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that generally, a motion for
reconsideration filed on time stays the execution of the judgment sought to
be reconsidered. It is baffling why petitioners captioned their motion as a
"Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Execution of Judgment" when the
effect
sought is one and the same – to stay the execution of judgment.

Hence, since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is a

motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners' receipt of the
resolution denying it triggers the running of the 15-day period within which
to file an appeal. Petitioners received a copy of the February 20, 2008
Resolution
on February 22, 2008. Thus, counting 15 days from receipt, petitioners had
only until March 8, 2008 to file a petition for review. On March 7, 2008,
however, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the February 20,
2008 Resolution instead. This motion for reconsideration partakes of the
nature of a second motion for reconsideration. It has been ruled that a
motion for reconsideration, even if it was not designated as a second motion
for reconsideration, is a disguised second motion for reconsideration if it is
merely a reiteration of the movant’s earlier arguments. The filing of a second
motion for reconsideration is prohibited. Being a prohibited pleading, a
second motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does
not toll the running of the period to appeal.

An appeal is not a matter of right but is one of sound judicial discretion. It

may only be availed of in the manner provided by the law and the rules. A
party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper
remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the
decision, as to him, becomes final and binding. Considering that petitioners
reckoned the period to appeal on the date of notice of the denial of the
second motion for reconsideration on July 7, 2008, instead of the date of
notice of the denial of the

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first motion for reconsideration on February 22, 2008, the present petition
filed only on August 28, 2008 is evidently filed out of time. The petition,
being 173 clays late, renders the CA Decision final and executory.

Puerto del Sol Palawan Inc v Gabaen

GR no 212607; March 27, 2019
Period of Appeal; Fresh Period Rule

Facts:
Abis filed a Complaint for Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion with Prayer for
TRO and Permanent Injunction with Damages. Finding the petition for TRO
sufficient in form and substance, a TRO was issued by the NCIP RHO IV.
Petitioner PDSPI filed an Answer, denying the allegations of Abis. PDSPI
maintained that the Puerto del Sol Resort is not in conflict and does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. A decision in favor of Abis was rendered
holding that the land wherein the Puerto del Sol Resort is situated in the
ancestral lands
of the Cuyunen Tribe. PDSPI filed a Memorandum on Appeal with
the NCIP RHO IV. The NCIP RHO IV denied due course the Memorandum on
Appeal of PDSPI for being filed beyond the reglementary period. According to
the NCIP RHO IV, since PDSPI filed its Motion for Reconsideration a day
before the end of the reglementary period to file an appeal of the NCIP RHO

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IVs Decision, PDSPI had only one (1) day remaining to file an appeal upon
receipt of the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether petitioner was given a 15-day fresh period

Held:
Yes; under the Fresh Period Rule, parties who availed themselves of the
remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file an appeal
within 15 days from the denial of that motion.

No similar provision in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure which states that
in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an
adverse decision of the RHO, the said party has only the remaining balance
of the period within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the
RHO's decision denying the motion for reconsideration. Oppositely, Section
46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure clearly adopts the Fresh
Period Rule, stating that, in a situation wherein a motion for reconsideration
was filed, a judgment
rendered by the RHO shall become final only when no appeal is made within
15 days from receipt of the order denying such motion for reconsideration.

Ang v CA
GR no 238203; September 3, 2020
Perfection of Appeal

Facts:
Warren Gutierrez, as owner, filed an action for unlawful detainer against
Spouses Ang before the MeTC. The MeTC ruled in favor of Warren and
ordered Spouses Ang to vacate the lot. Spouses Ang appealed to the RTC
which affirmed the MeTC's findings. Ligaya Ang elevated the case to the CA
through a motion for extension of time to file a Petition for Review under
Rule 42. However, the CA denied the motion for non-payment of docket fees.
Ligaya sought reconsideration arguing that her counsel's messenger was
unable to purchase postal money orders on the last day for filing the motion
for extension of time. Thus, the messenger decided to enclose the docket
fees of P4,730.00 in the
envelope containing the motion. The messenger allegedly panicked and
thought that he would not be able to file the motion on time if he would
transfer to another post office. As supporting evidence, she submitted the

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messenger's affidavit. Ligaya also invoked liberal application of the rules and
insinuated that the money might have been stolen.

Issue:
Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it denied Ligaya’s
motion for extension of time

Held:
No; the grant of any extension for the filing of a Petition for Review under
Rule 42 is discretionary and subject to the condition that the full amount of
the docket and lawful fees are paid before the expiration of the reglementary
period. Indeed, the full payment of docket fees within the prescribed period
is mandatory and necessary to perfect the appeal. Corollarily, the non-
payment of docket fees is a ground to dismiss the appeal. There is no
specific provision in the Rules of Court prescribing the manner by which
docket or appeal fees should be paid. However, as a matter of convention,
litigants invariably opt to use the postal money order system to pay such
fees not only for its expediency but also for the official nature of transactions
coursed through this system.

In this case, Ligaya failed to establish that the appellate docket fees were
duly paid. Foremost, the messenger's affidavit is insufficient to establish
payment. The
affidavit merely stated the reason why the messenger opted to enclose the
docket fees together with the motion for extension. Moreover, Ligaya's
manifestation to pay again the docket fees is inconsistent with her claim of
payment. Lastly, Ligaya has not shown any compelling reason to warrant a
liberal application of the rules.

Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v CA

GR no 165155; April 12, 2010
Perfection of Appeal

Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-
payment of rentals before the DARAB. The Regional Adjudicator issued a
decision in favor of respondents. Aggrieved by the adverse Decision,
petitioners filed two separate notices of appeal; one was filed on February
28, 2003 by the first group, while the other was filed on March 5, 2003 by
the second group. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. They
presented three grounds: first, the two notices did not state the grounds
relied upon for the appeal; second, the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period; third, the March 5, 2003 Notice of
Appeal contained the forged signatures of the deceased defendants Avelino
and Pedro. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that their Notices of Appeal
to the DARAB be given due course on the ground that they have

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substantially complied with the rules as set forth in the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure. They posit that their appeal on "questions of fact and law" should
suffice, even if they omitted the phrase "which if not corrected would cause
grave irreparable damage and injury to them". They argue that the stringent
application of the rules denied them substantial justice.

Issue:
Whether the notices of appeal are valid

Held:
Yes; the Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all that is required
under the DARAB Rules. The defects found in the two notices of appeal are
not of such nature that would cause a denial of the right to appeal. Placed in
their proper factual context, the defects are not only excusable but also
inconsequential.
There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or processes, their sole
purpose being to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should be
construed liberally.

While the notices omitted to state that "the decision would cause grave and
irreparable damage and injury to the appellant," the Court finds such
language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. Surely by appealing the Decision
of the Regional Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting that
they will be damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal application
of the rules when its purpose has already been served is oppressive
superfluity. Another important consideration is the fact that petitioners were
obviously not
assisted by counsel in the filing of the Notices of Appeal.
Bernardo v Soriano
GR no 200104; June 19, 2019
Perfection of Appeal

Facts:
Bernardo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus, praying that Lawas, Head Social
Worker of the DSWD, be ordered to produce the person of her minor
granddaughter, Stephanie Soriano before the RTC. Soriano, the surviving
parent of Stephanie, intervened in the case seeking to be granted the
custody of the child. The RTC favored Soriano’s right for the custody and
parental authority, but it ruled that for the best interest of the minor, it
should stay with Bernardo while studying. The RTC denied Bernardo’s MR.
This prompted her to file for Notice on Appeal which was denied by the RTC
on the ground that the Order denying the MR has not yet attained finality.
The CA ruled that Soriano seasonably filed her Partial MR and since it is not
an appealable judgment, the Notice of Appeal filed by Bernardo was deemed
premature.

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Issue:
Whether the CA was correct in denying the notice of appeal filed by Bernardo

Held:
NO; according to Section 1, Rule 41, an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a
particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
Further, according to Section 2(a) of the same Rule, the appeal to the Court
of Appeals in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. With respect to the period for filing the
notice of appeal, the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. When a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed by the
party, which was subsequently denied by the court, there is a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. A
party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the
filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

In this case, Bernardo had the right to appeal under Rule 41 of the RTC's
Decision by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC's
Order denying Bernardo's timely-filed Motion for Reconsideration.

Development Bank of the Philippines v Carpio

GR no 195459; February 1, 2017
Residual Jurisdiction

Facts:
Abad, et al., represented by their attorney-in-fact, Te, filed a complaint for
delivery of certificates of title, damages, and attorney's fees against
petitioner DBP and GFSME before the RTC. In their Complaint, Abad, et al.
prayed for the issuance of a writ of seizure, pending hearing of the case, for
delivery of their certificates of title they claimed to be unlawfully detained by
DBP and GFSME. The writ was granted by the RTC. Later, the RTC granted
DBP's omnibus motion and dismissed the case for improper venue and
issued an order directing Abad, et al. to return the certificates of title. Abad,
et al. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court praying for
the nullification and reversal of
the Order of the RTC. The Court dismissed the petition. DBP filed its Motion
for Writ of Execution before the RTC. Later, the RTC issued the corresponding

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Writ of Execution. The Sheriffs Return of Service, however, indicated that
Abad, et al. failed to deliver the certificates of title.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in its blind adherence to and strict application of
Rule 57 of the ROC

Held:
No; if the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party against
whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages sustained during
the
pendency of the appeal by filing an application with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the
judgment of the appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court
may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court. Nothing
precludes DBP from instituting an action for collection of sum of money
against respondents. Besides, if the parcels of land covered by the
certificates of title, which DBP sought to recover from respondents, were
mortgaged to the former, then DBP, as mortgage-creditor, has the option of
either filing a personal
action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose
on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative, and each
remedy is complete by itself. If the mortgagee opts to foreclose the real
estate mortgage, he waives the action for the collection of the debt, and vice
versa.

AL Ang Network Inc v Emma Mondejar

GR no 200804; January 22, 2014
Appeals in Summary Procedure

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under Small Claims before the
MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount which represented her
unpaid water bills. Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply
water to and collect payment therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl
Subdivision and contended that respondent still had an unpaid balance
despite petitioner’s repeated demands. Respondent contended that she paid
such for the monthly flat rate of P75.00 for her water consumption. They had
an agreement that it would only be adjusted upon prior notice to the
homeowners and petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and
excessive adjustments far above the average daily water consumption for a

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household of only 3 persons. The MTCC ruled that respondent should be
considered fully paid. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the RTC which was dismissed.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of
the ROC

Held:
Yes; petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the
propriety of the MTCC decision in the subject small claims case. Section 23 of
the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that “after the hearing,
the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on the facts
established by the evidence. The decision shall immediately be entered by
the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof
forthwith served on the parties. The decision shall be final and
unappealable.” The extraordinary writ of certiorari is always available where
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.

A petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to

correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. It is incumbent to
establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC decision.

Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the MTC, MCTC, MTCC, and MeTC certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions
should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This
petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before
the RTC which has jurisdiction over the same.

Encarnacion v Amigo
GR no 169793; September 15, 2006
Rule 40

Facts:
Petitioner, through his lawyer sent a letter demanding that the respondent
vacate the subject property, but respondent refused. Petitioner filed a
complaint for ejectment, damages with injunction and prayer for restraining
order with the MTC. In his Answer, respondent alleged that he has been in
actual possession and occupation of a portion of the subject land the
issuance of Free Patent and titles in the name of petitioner was tainted with
irregularities. The MTCCs rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On
appeal, the RTC
rendered a judgement dismissing the case on the ground that the Municipal
Court had no jurisdiction over the case and hence, it acquired no appellate
jurisdiction thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review under

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Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals which promulgated
the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding that the proper action in this case is accion
publiciana

Held:
No; if the owner of the land knew that another person was occupying his
property way back in 1977 but the said owner only filed the complaint for
ejectment in 1995, the proper action would be one for accion publiciana and
not one under the summary procedure on ejectment. Hence, if petitioners
are indeed the owners of the subject lot and were unlawfully deprived of
their right of possession, they should present their claim before the RTC in
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the MeTC in
a summary proceeding for unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For even if one
is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in physical or material possession of the same for
more than one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment.

Hence, sixteen years after, when petitioner filed his ejectment case, the
respondent should have filed an accion publiciana which is under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. However, the RTC should have not dismissed the
case.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. The RTC on appeal may
no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the
RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits but shall decide the case on
the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to
the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.

Canlas v Tubil
GR no 184285; September 25, 2009
Rule 40

Facts:
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by respondent against petitioners
Canlas before the MTC. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the
MTC is without jurisdiction over the subject matter. The MTC denied the
motion because the grounds relied upon were evidentiary in nature which
needed to be litigated and rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer because respondent failed to show that the possession of
the petitioners was by mere tolerance. Respondent appealed to the RTC
which rendered its Decision affirming in toto the judgment of the MTC.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Respondent
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which reversed the RTC’s

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Decision, ordering the said regional trial court branch to decide the merits
based on the entire record of the proceedings in the MTC.

Issue:
Which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, MTC or the RTC

Held:
MTC; the rule that determines the nature of the action as well as the court
which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. In
ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as
to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without
resort to parol evidence. In the instant case, the respondent's allegations in
the complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer, essential to
confer jurisdiction on the MTC over the subject matter. As long as the
allegations demonstrate a cause of action for an unlawful detainer, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the
facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged,
in which instance the court – after acquiring jurisdiction – may resolve to
dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.

In this case, the MTC acquired jurisdiction over case. Thus, it properly
exercised
its discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer for failure of
the respondent to prove tolerance by sufficient evidence. Consequently, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court which ordains the RTC not to dismiss the cases
appealed to it from the metropolitan or municipal trial court which tried the
same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the said case on the merits,
finds no application here.

Philippine Bank of Communications v CA

GR no 218901; February 15, 2017
Appeal of judgement of RTC rendered in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction

Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint for collection of a sum of money in the
amount of ₱8M filed by PB COM against private respondents before the RTC.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint alleging that
their obligation had already been paid in full and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket
fees. The RTC issued an Order directing PBCOM to pay additional docket
fees. PBCOM paid the additional docket fees but filed its Compliance with the
RTC later. In the interim, the RTC issued an Order dismissing PBCOM's
Complaint, to which PBCOM filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, this

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too was denied. Undaunted, PBCOM timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC
issued an Order, denying due course to PBCOM's Notice of Appeal on the
ground that said appeal is not the proper remedy. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, PBCOM filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the
CA. However, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, emphasizing that the
filing of a motion for
reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari to
prosper.

Issue:
Whether the CA acted with GADALEJ when it denied PB Com’s petition for
certiorari and mandamus on the ground that a prior MR is required

Held:
Yes; although PBCOM availed of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing the
case before the Court, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed
with the appeal. The Court recognized the broader interest of justice and
gave due course to the appeal even if it was a wrong mode of appeal and
was even filed beyond the reglementary period provided by the rules.

The rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure.
Considering that what is at stake in the present case is PBCOM's statutory
right to appeal and the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of its cause, the Court resolves to set aside PBCOM' s
procedural mistake and give due course to its petition. The first exception
applies in this case.

Rule 45: decisions, final orders, or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be
appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other
hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on
the specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including
that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy,
his petition may be dismissed outright.

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Heirs of Garcia I v Municipality of Iba, Zambales
GR no 162217; July 22, 2015
Dismissal of Appeal by CA

Facts:
The late. Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of agricultural land who
brought an ejectment suit in the MTC against the Municipality of Iba,
Province of Zambales. The MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Hence, the
Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course
to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for
certiorari in the RTC to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case
granted the petition for certiorari. The petitioners, who meanwhile
substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the reconsideration of the
judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC denied their motion
for reconsideration. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition

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for review which "dismissed" the petitioners' petition for review for not being
the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been
issued by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners was ultimately denied by the CA.

Issue:
Whether the petitioners adhered with the proper mode of appeal

Held:
No; the petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the
period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within
the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of
the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The filing of the notice of
appeal within the period allowed sets in motion the remedy of ordinary
appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party
upon his timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the
appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other
parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.

An appeal filed under Rule 42 is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon

the timely filing of the petition for review before the CA, while the RTC shall
lose jurisdiction upon perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a
matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a
matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right
to seek the review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial
court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the discretionary
appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in
the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the
superior court in its discretion. Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is
burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by
verifying the correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the
transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from the perfection of the
appeal. This requirement of transmittal of the records does not arise under
Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed necessary. As borne out
in the foregoing, the petitioners' resort to the petition for review under Rule
42 was wrong. Hence, the CA did not err in denying due course to the
petition for review.

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Dangdang – David v Alba
GR no 204621; October 6, 2021
Distinguish question of fact from question of law

Facts:
Spouses Alba filed against petitioner an action for recovery of ownership and
cancellation of title before the RTC. On the other hand, Alma filed a
complaint
for unlawful detainer against Arnie Alba, daughter of Sps. Alba, before the
MTCC. MTCC initially submitted the case for decision but later held the case
in abeyance until the Resolution of the case before the RTC. Alma then filed
a petition for certiorari which dismissed the petition for lack of merit,
explaining that it is within the MTCC’s authority to suspend the proceedings
based on strong case of equity. The RTC held that the defense of Forgery in
the unlawful detainer case must be determined in the action for recovery of
ownership and
cancellation of title. Alma’s MR was also denied. Hence, this direct recourse
through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

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Issue:
Whether Alma availed of the proper remedy

Held:
Yes; a direct recourse to the SC through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
can be taken from the Decisions, Final Orders or Resolutions of the RTC. The
appeal must involve only questions of law, not of fact. In this case, the
inquiry into whether the RTC correctly affirmed the MTCC's indefinite
suspension of the unlawful detainer case is legal and not factual issue.
Hence, direct recourse to the Court is allowed.

It is settled that Unlawful Detainer cases are summary in nature and only
resolve
the issue of physical or material possession, which is independent of any
claim of ownership. However, in case the defendant raises the issue of
ownership in
his or her pleadings, the first level courts can decide the issue of ownership
provisionally for the sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
Moreover, the mere filing of another action raising ownership of the property
as an issue cannot abate or suspend an Unlawful Detainer case. The
abatement of
action for an unlawful detainer is heavily discouraged because it is contrary
to the summary nature of ejectment proceedings.

Republic v De Borja
GR no 187448; January 9, 2017
Distinguish question of fact from question of law

Facts:
The case started in a complaint filed before the SB by petitioner thru PCGG
for
the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual
respondents therein, during the administration of the late President Marcos.
Respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence. The SB held that the
plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that defendant De
Borja is liable for damages as averred in the complaint. The SB rendered a
Decision dismissing Civil Case No. 0003 with respect to the remaining
respondents therein. Hence, this petition.

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Issue:
Whether the SB erred in granting respondent De Borja’s demurrer to
evidence

Held:
No; a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the
effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The
question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence
in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of

"preponderance of evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's
presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence
to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the defendant's
evidence. Hence,
what is crucial is the determination as to whether the plaintiff's evidence
entitles it to the relief sought.

In this case, the insinuations of petitioner can best be described as

speculative,
conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano
reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a
dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel
owners. The Court concurs in the SB's observations. As admitted by Verano
himself, he did not and could not have known what was inside the envelopes
when they were purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same vein,
Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes,
despite numerous opportunities to do so. Hence, the Court finds that the
evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations of the
Complaint before the SB.

Ross Rica Sales v Ong

GR no 132192; August 16, 2005
Procedure in the CA

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents before the
MTC. The MTC resolved the ejectment case with the decision ordering
respondents to
vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over possession
thereof to petitioners. The RTC affirmed the MTC's decision in its entirety.
RESPONDENT
FILED A NOTICE OF APPEAL However, on the following day, they filed a
motion for reconsideration. RTC granted petitioners' motion for immediate

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execution pending appeal. The RTC refused to subscribe respondents'
position. because respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA
overturned the decisions of the MTC and the RTC ruling instead that the MTC
had no jurisdiction
over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer as there was no contract
between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one
for unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set
aside.

Issue:
Whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the
time the petition for review to the CA was filed

Held:
No; since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by
the
RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the CA and not a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, this had been remedied by the
timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day.

Section 3, Rule 50 allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter

of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. The filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective
Notice of Appeal. The period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for
Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File
the
Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting 15 days from
receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the 10-day
request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition
for Review
on time.

Lank Bank of the Philippines v CA

GR no 221636; July 11, 2016
Procedure in the CA

Facts:
The DAR subjected the land of private respondents to the coverage of the
CARP. Petitioner LBP valued the property which private respondents rejected;
petitioner still deposited the amount in their favor. Private respondents then

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filed before the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case for
determination of just compensation. The SAC ordered petitioner to re-value
the property, which it did, coming up with a new valuation which the SAC
upheld.
Private respondents filed a notice of appeal under Rule 41 before the SAC,
which gave the notice due course. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that private respondents availed a wrong mode of appeal which was
denied by the CA granting leniency to the rules of procedure.

Issue:
Whether the CA committed GAD

Held:
Yes; while it is true that a liberal application of the rules of procedure in a
number of cases is valid, this can be invoked only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances, the CA and private respondents did not
proffer a reasonable cause to justify non-compliance with the rules besides
the exhortation of circumspect leniency in order to give private respondents
a day in court. Private respondents failed to specifically cite any justification
as to how and why a normal application of procedural rules would frustrate
their quest for justice. Indeed, private respondents have not been forthright
in explaining why they chose the wrong mode of appeal. The bare invocation
of the interest of substantial justice line is not some magic wand that will
automatically compel us to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are
not to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantial rights. Utter disregard
of the rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.

Anderson v Ho
GR no 172590; January 7, 2013
Procedure in the CA

Facts:
Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Ho before the
MeTC. The MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of

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action. On appeal, the RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
Anderson moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Extension of Time of 15 days within which to
file a petition allegedly due to the revisions required in the initial draft and
on account of heavy pressure of work. This was granted by the CA.
Subsequently, petitioner sought another extension of 15 days this time
claiming that the petition had already been finalized and sent to Anderson in
Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as well as sign the certification and verification
portion thereof. However, as of the last day of the extended period, the
petition has not yet
been sent back, hence, the additional extension being sought. In the interest
of justice, the CA once again granted the said motion for extension. Later,
they were finally able to file the Petition for Review but the certification
against forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him on Anderson's
behalf without any
accompanying authority to do so. Hence, the CA issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition for review. The MR was likewise denied.

Issue:
Whether there exists a justifiable reason to relax the rule on certification
against forum shopping

Held:
No; the requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign
the certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is
a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an
assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other
pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. However, if
a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign
on her behalf.

In this case, the CA correctly dismissed Anderson's Petition for Review on the
ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping attached thereto was
signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to do so.

Intramuros Administration v Offshore Construction Development Co

GR no 196795; March 7, 2018
Procedure in the CA

Facts:

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Petitioner leased certain real properties of the national government, which it
administered to Offshore Construction. Consequently, Offshore Construction
filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against Intramuros and the DOT. During the lease period,
Offshore failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite several demand
letters. Intramuros tolerated the continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
would pay its arrears.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the MeTC. Offshore filed a
Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros’ complaint be dismissed on the
grounds of violation of the rule on non-forum shopping for failure of
Intramuros to inform the Court of the 2 pending cases with the RTC. The
MeTC found that Intramuros committed forum shopping and that it had no
jurisdiction over the
case. Hence, it granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the
RTC affirmed the order in toto. Intramuros filed a petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue:
Whether direct recourse to the SC is proper

Held:
Yes; under Rule 42, Section 1, the remedy from an adverse decision
rendered by the RTC exercising its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified
petition for review with the CA. A petition for review under Rule 42 may
include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. This
Court has recognized that the power to hear cases on appeal in which only
questions of law are raised is not vested exclusively in this Court.

Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable and there

are several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the
exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when
the initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a
summary procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.
Moreover, this Court's rules of procedure permit the direct resort to this
Court from a decision of the Regional Trial Court upon questions of law, such
as those which petitioner raises in this case.

Erice v Sison
AM RtJ-15-2407- November 22, 2017
Rule 43

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Facts:
Petitioner Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City filed a complaint against
then Mayor Echiverri and other city officials before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman issued an order of preventive suspension
against Echiverri. The CA affirmed this order of suspension. Petitioner filed a
petition for declaratory relief and the RTC issued an ex-parte order to enjoin
the DILG and Erice from implementing the order of suspension. Erice and the
DILG questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC considering that the object of the
petition for declaratory relief were the CA decision and the order of
suspension of the Ombudsman. Respondent was then charged with gross
ignorance of the law.

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction

Held:
NO; the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the
CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no
jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases.

In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that
court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for
declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words
"other written instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing
petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to orders,
resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the
principle of res judicata. Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a
quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate
authority. The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment
under the guise of an action for declaratory relief.

Here, Echiverri's Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the
RTC "make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the
parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation
of the [order of] preventive suspension," effectively putting into question the
CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of Suspension — a matter clearly beyond the
ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with the deference to the basic
precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion than
that Judge Sison acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Gatchalian v Office of the Ombudsman
GR no 229288; August 1, 2018
Rule 43

Facts:

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The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of the following:
(a) one count of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, (b) one count of
malversation of public funds, and (c) one count of violation of Section
X126.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653.
The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, filed
separate motions for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution. However, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying the motions for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint
Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction over Gatchalian’s petition

Held;
No; the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised
only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
law. Hence, there must be a law expressly granting such privilege. The
Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party
from orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. The aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the CA.
Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to
indict accused persons.
However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the
Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA.

St. Martin Funeral Home v NLRC

GR no 130866; September 16, 1998
Rule 43

Facts:

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Private respondent filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment. Based on the position papers of the parties, the
LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-
employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office
had no jurisdiction over the case. The NLRC rendered a resolution setting
aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the LA for
immediate appropriate proceedings. NLRC also denied private respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of
discretion on NLRC.

Issue:
Whether the petition to the SC from the decision of the NLRC was proper

Held:
NO; historically, decisions from the NLRC were appealable to the SOLE,
whose decisions are then appealable to the Office of the President. However,
the new rules do not anymore provide provisions regarding appellate review
for decisions rendered by the NLRC. However in this case, the Supreme Court
took it upon themselves to review such decisions from the NLRC by virtue of
their role under the check and balance system and the perceived intention of
the legislative body who enacted the new rules.

“It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts
of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of
review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the
administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights
of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust
adjudications.”

The petitioners rightfully filed a motion for reconsideration, but the appeal or
certiorari should have been filed initially to the Court of Appeals – as
consistent with the principle of hierarchy of courts. As such, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.

Alcaraz v Gonzales
GR no 164715; September 20, 2006
Rule 43

Facts:

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A road rage led to the event that Alcaraz raised his pistol towards Gonzalez
and fired twice. Thereafter, he drove away but was intercepted by the PNCC
guards at the Skyway toll gate. The guards confiscated from Alcaraz the .38
pistol with 7 live bullets and 3 empty shells. The Investigating Prosecutor
resolved to maintain his finding of probable cause of attempted homicide
against Alcaraz and to retain the Information. Alcaraz filed a MR, and when it
was denied, filed a petition for review with the City Prosecutor’s Office. The
Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution granting the petition and ordering
the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. Gonzalez filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the Undersecretary of Justice denied. Gonzalez then
filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA. He claimed that the
Secretary acted beyond his authority in finding no probable cause and for
ordering the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information. The CA rendered
judgment granting the petition and reversing the assailed resolutions of the
Secretary and denied motion for reconsideration filed by Alcaraz; hence, this
current petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the ROC was the proper
remedy

Held:
No; petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy. It bears
stressing that in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary
investigation, the executive branch of government has full discretionary
authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound
discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the SOJ.

The Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises
the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and
who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor.
Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may
do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, solely on the ground that
the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying, or
reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. The remedy
of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary
course of law.
Global Medical Center of Laguna Inc v Ross Systems International Inc
GR no 230112 and 230119; May 11, 2021
Rule 43

Facts:

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GMCLI engaged the services of RSII for the construction of its hospital in
accordance with a Construction Contract. The assailed Decision of the CA
affirmed with modification the arbitral award of the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC), which mainly adjudged: (1) GMCLI was
without authority to withhold and remit the 2% CWT on the cumulative
amount of 15 progress billings of RSII; (2) RSII was not entitled to the release
of the amount equivalent to the 2% CWT withheld; and (3) RSII was still
entitled to the
representing the balance due after deducting the 2% CWT on Progress Billing
and the payment already made to RSII. The CA likewise denied the motion
for
reconsideration of RSII through its Resolution. The case at bar presents the
Court a timely opportunity to review and demarcate the laws and rules
relevant to the relationship between the courts and the CIAC.

Issue:
Whether parties may appeal to the CA a CIAC arbitral award

Held:
Yes; the SC en banc clarified that for the avoidance of doubt, the Court now
holds that judicial review of CIAC arbitral awards takes either of two remedial
routes, depending on the issue being raised. First, if the issue raised is a
pure question of law, the petition should be filed directly and exclusively with
the Court, notwithstanding Rule 43. Second, in cases where the petition
takes issue on the integrity of the arbitral tribunal and its decision or the
unconstitutionality or invalidity of its actions in the arbitral process, then the
parties can and should appeal the CIAC the process then the parties can and
should appeal the CIAC award before the CA under Rule 65, on grounds of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction, where a
factual review may then be had by the CA.

The decision enumerates the following guidelines with respect to the

application of the ruling on modes of judicial review vis-à-vis CIAC arbitral
awards:
1. For appeals from instant amendment.
2. For future appeals from CIAC arbitral awards that will be filed after the
promulgation of this Decision:
i. if the issue to be raised by the parties is a pure question of law, the
appeal
should be filed directly and exclusively with the SC through a petition for
review under Rule 45. If the parties will appeal factual issues, the appeal
may be filed with the CA, but only on the limited grounds that pertain to
either a challenge on the integrity of the CIAC arbitral tribunal or an
allegation that the arbitral tribunal violated the Constitution or positive
law in the conduct of the arbitral process, through the special civil action

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 of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction.

The CA may conduct a factual review only upon sufficient and demonstrable
showing that the integrity of the CIAC arbitral tribunal had indeed been
compromised, or that it committed unconstitutional or illegal acts in the
conduct of the arbitration.
3. Under no circumstances other than the limited grounds provided above
may parties appeal to the CA a CIAC arbitral award

Mackay v Angeles
GR no 144230; September 30, 2003
Rule 45 v Rule 65

Facts:

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This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
It seeks to annul the Decision of the CA denying petitioner Mackay’s petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order, as well as its Resolution denying petitioner’s MR. The appellate court
affirmed the assailed Orders of the public respondent, Hon. Angeles, Acting
Presiding Judge of the RTC. In that special proceeding, petitioner was
appointed as regular administrator of the intestate estate of deceased
Mackay. However, delay prompted private respondent to file an urgent
motion for the removal of petitioner as regular administrator. An Order was
issued by Judge Angeles relieving petitioner as administrator of the estate
and appointing private respondent as his substitute. The court denied
petitioner’s MR for utter lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order which was denied along with its MR.

Issue:
Whether the allegation of the petitioner of grave abuse of discretion is within
the scope of appeals by certiorari

Held:
NO; it is well-settled that in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45, only errors
of law
may be raised. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive. Certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule
45 should be distinguished from certiorari as an original action under Rule
65. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition is based on questions of law which
the appellant desires the appellate court to resolve. In certiorari as an
original action, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the
lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. An allegation of grave abuse of discretion like the one made by
the petitioner here, being beyond the scope of appeals by certiorari,
deserves scant consideration.

The trial court does not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
immediate assumption into office of one who has been appointed as
administrator before the perfection of an appeal from the order appointing
him Where sufficient reasons exist to order execution pending appeal.
Section 2, Rule 39 allows discretionary execution where special reasons or
circumstances exist.

City of Manila v Grecia-Cuerdo

GR no 175723; February 4, 2014
Rule 65 treated as under Rule 45

Facts:

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Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance
of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
assessments made by petitioner under protest. Private respondents filed
with the RTC the complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of
Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with
Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction”. The RTC granted
private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a MR but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA.
In its Resolution, the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding
that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund,
which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the CTA. pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282, it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Issue:
Whether the petition for certiorari must be filed to CTA and not to CA

Held:
Yes; while it is clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there
is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA
9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases
filed before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari

involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly
conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere
existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional
provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that
of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing
an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. The authority to
issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction
over
appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer, also such power as is deemed necessary, if not
indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.

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A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power
necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the
subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the
appeal. It carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make
the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental
matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For
this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of
any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.

Asian Terminals Inc v Simon Enterprises Inc

GR no 177116; February 27, 2013
Rule 65 treated as under Rule 45

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Facts:
Respondent Simon Enterprise has entered into contract with Contiquincy
bunge Export Company as its consignee of the shipped Soybean Meal. Later,
Simon has filed an action for damages against the unknown owner of the
vessels M/V Sea Dream and M/V Tern, its local agent Inter-Asia Marine
Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATI alleging that it suffered the losses through
the fault or negligence of the said defendants. The RTC has ruled that the
defendants be solidarily liable for the damages incurred by Simon.
Unsatisfied with the RTC ruling, the petitioners appealed to CA. The CA ruled
that the RTC ruling be assailed with some modifications. ATI filed a motion
for reconsideration at CA but was denied.
It then filed a petition for certiorari with the sole issue of whether the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court holding
petitioner ATI solidarily liable with its co-defendants for the shortage incurred
in the shipment of the goods to respondent.

Issue:
Whether the issue raised by ATI can be entertained by SC under Rule 45

Held:
Yes; matters raised by petitioner ATI involve questions of fact which are
generally not reviewable in petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that the petition shall raise
only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law
exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for
an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of
the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the
situation.

The rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained
by this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad
and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded
on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6)
there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence

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of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.

Madarang v Spouses Morales

GR no 199283; June 9, 2014

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Rule 38

Facts:
Spouses Jesus Morales and Carolina Morales filed with the RTC a complaint
for judicial foreclosure of a house and lot. RTC ordered defendants to pay the
Spouses Morales. Defendants filed their motion for reconsideration of the
RTC’s decision. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, its
amendment, and the request for a handwriting expert. Defendants filed a
notice of appeal. In its order, the trial court denied due course the notice of
appeal for having been filed out of time. In its order, the RTC denied the
petition for relief from judgment. Petitioners filed the petition for certiorari
with the CA. CA denied the petition for certiorari, finding that petitioners did
not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
relief from judgment, a prerequisite for filing a petition for certiorari.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration that the CA denied in its
resolution. Petitioners filed the petition for review on certiorari with this
court.

Issue:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari

Held:
Yes; Under Section 1, Rule 38, a petition for relief from judgment may be
filed on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A
petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only
in exceptional cases. It is not available if other remedies exist, such as a
motion for new trial or appeal. To set aside a judgment through a petition for
relief, the negligence must be so gross "that ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against." There is also no showing that the
negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence and
prudence. As such, petitioners are bound by their counsel’s negligence since
petitioners filed their notice of appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court
correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been filed out of time.

Moreover, the CA correctly denied the petition for certiorari for petitioners’
failure to file a MR of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.
In its resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ petition for certiorari for failure to
file a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from
judgment. Section 1, Rule 65 requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to a party
before a petition for certiorari is filed. In this case, a motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is
the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Purcon v MRM Philippines
GR no 182718; September 26, 2008

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Rule 38

Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement
before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint for utter lack of merit. Petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal
with the NLRC Third Division. The motion for reconsideration was dismissed
for lack of merit. The NLRC resolution became final and executory and was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
case due to formal infirmities. The CA resolution became final and executory.
Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. The SC denied the petition. Petitioner then filed a petition for relief from
judgement.

Issue:
Whether petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgement under
Rule 38 from a resolution denying his petition for review

Issue:
No; petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the SC.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final
order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a
party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must
be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original
cases cognizable by the Supreme Court.

A petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule 56 cases
originally cognizable by this Court. A petition for relief from judgment is not
an available remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The
Court explained that the petition for relief must be filed within 60 days after
petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may
be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court which rendered
the decision.

Second the phrase "any court," refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and

Regional Trial Courts. Third the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court
are governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court.

Valencia v CA
GR no 119118; February 19, 2001

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Rule 38

Facts:
Rufino Valencia entered into a lease agreement with the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Malolos involving a fishpond, registered in the latter’s name.
Private respondents filed a complaint against RCBM with the RTC for
declaration of nullity. Judge Masadao rendered judgment upholding the
validity of RCBM’s title. Petitioner filed a petition for relief from the portion of
the judgment dismissing his counterclaim. The case was re-raffled to Judge
Gascon. Judge Gascon denied the motion for execution and deferred action
on the petition for relief. The trial court also said that a grant of the petition
for relief during the pendency of the appeal would pre-empt the appellate
court’s ruling in case private respondents would appeal. Petitioner then filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The CA promulgated its
decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus. According to
the appellate court, it is clear from Section 2 Rule 39 that it is discretionary
for the trial court to grant or deny a motion for execution. Thus, it cannot be
compelled to allow execution, after finding that there was no cogent and
good reason for it. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the
CA for being pro forma. The CA concluded that his complaint for annulment
of a portion of the RTC judgment was a form of forum-shopping.

Issue:
Whether the trial court’s duty in Rule 38 is purely ministerial

Held:
No; a petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and
executory judgment. In this case, the trial court's judgment subject of the
petition for relief has not yet attained finality because of the timely appeal
by private respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot require the judge to
follow the procedure laid down in Rule 38. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court provides that parties can avail of the action for annulment of judgment
when a petition for relief is no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. In the present case, the latter remedy was still available.

There is forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse opinion in one

forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari)
in another and that the actions that were filed involve the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issues in the cases before the
two.

The petition for relief in the trial court and the petition for annulment of
judgment in the Court of Appeals emanate from the same transaction, which
is the lease contract between petitioner and the RCBM. They also involve the
same facts and circumstances. Both were for the setting aside or annulment

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of that portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing petitioner's
counterclaim on the ground of fraud. The two petitions also involve the same
subject matter or issue of whether petitioner has meritorious counterclaim
which, for alleged lack of notice for the pre-trial conference, he failed to
prove. Clearly, there is forum-shopping, and the Court of Appeals did not err
when it declared so.

Lastly, Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides that upon motion,
the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before the
expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order.

Gomez v Montalban
GR no 174414; March 14, 2008
Rule 38

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Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and
payment of attorney's fees against respondent. Summons was served, but
despite her receipt thereof, respondent failed to file her Answer.
Consequently, she was declared in default and upon motion, petitioner was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. The RTC rendered a Decision on in his
favor. Respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that there
was no effective service of summons upon her since there was no personal
service of the same.
Respondent attributes her failure to file an answer to fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence. Eventually, the RTC granted respondent's
Petition for Relief from Judgment and set aside its Decision on the ground of
lack of
Jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether respondent’s relief from judgement is proper during the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration and appeal

Held:
No; a petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and
executory judgment. Since respondent allegedly received a copy of the
Decision dated 4 May 2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for
Relief from Judgment on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained finality.
The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal had not yet
lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38 was premature and inappropriate.

As used in Section 1, Rule 38, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law,
which relates to the case. The word "mistake," which grants relief from
judgment, does not apply, and was never intended to apply to a judicial error
which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be
corrected by means of an appeal. This does not exist in the case at bar,
because respondent has in no wise been prevented from interposing an
appeal. "Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is,
the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or
presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment
without fair submission of the controversy. This is not present in the case at
hand as respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was
given the opportunity to present her case. Negligence to be excusable must
be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against. Under Section 1, the "negligence" must be excusable and
generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it
is binding on the client.

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Even assuming that the RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent on account
of
the non-service upon her of the summons and complaint, the remedy of the
respondent was to file a motion for the reconsideration on decision by
default or a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt of notice
thereof. This is also without prejudice to respondent's right to file a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
order of default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held
including the decision, the writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment
issued by the RTC, on the ground that it acted without jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, however, respondent opted to file a Petition for Relief from

the Judgment of the RTC, which, as the Court earlier determined, was the
wrong remedy. In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence that would have prevented petitioner from filing either
a motion for reconsideration or a Petition for Review on Certiorari, her resort
to a Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.

Santos v Santos
GR no 214593; July 17, 2019
Rule 38

Facts:

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Heated arguments and suspicions of infidelity marred the marriage so much
that Dana and Leodegario filed a joint petition for the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership, which was granted. Later, the RTC declared the
marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Dana filed a Notice
of Appeal but she withdrew it and instead filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the RTC alleging that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented
her from presenting her case at the trial. The trial court denied Dana's
petition, ruling that there was no sufficient allegation of fraud or mistake in
the petition. Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with the CA where
they entered into a compromise agreement and agreed to transfer the titles
to their conjugal real properties in the name of their common children. Dana
moved for the archival of the case. Thereafter, Dana filed a Manifestation
alleging that Leodegario was not complying with the compromise agreement.
The CA denied Dana's Motion to Reopen. Undaunted, Dana filed a MR and/or
to Submit Petition for Decision (with Plea to Preserve Marital Union),
asserting that the compromise agreement was never intended to settle the
issue of the validity and subsistence of her marriage to Leodegario which
was denied.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in refusing to reopen Dana’s petition

Held:
Yes; the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure changed the nature of an order of
denial of a petition for relief from judgment, making it unappealable and,
hence, assailable only via a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, the
appellate court, in deciding such petitions against denials of petitions for
relief, remains tasked with making a factual determination, i.e., whether or
not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition.

While a Rule 38 Petition does not stay the execution of the judgment, the
grant thereof reopens the case for a new trial; and thus, if merit be found in
Dana's certiorari petition assailing the trial court's denial of her petition for
relief, the case will be reopened for new trial.

Republic v De Castro
GR no 189724; February 7, 2011
Rule 47

Facts:

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The Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the OSG, filed a
Complaint for "Cancellation of TCT and Reversion" against Manipon and
respondents. Respondents failed to file their answer to the complaint despite
receipt of summons, hence, they were declared in default. Their "Motion To
Lift Order Of Default And To Admit Hereto Attached Answer," which alleged
that their failure to answer was due to "oversight and excusable neglect,"
was denied for lack of merit. Following the ex parte presentation of evidence
by petitioner, the trial court rendered a Decision nullifying Manipon’s Free
Patent and respondents’ TCT. No MR of the trial court’s decision, or appeal
therefrom was filed by respondents, hence, the decision became final and
executory. Thereafter, respondents filed a petition for annulment of
judgment of the trial court’s decision before the CA on grounds that it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manipon as he had been dead when
petitioner’s complaint was filed.
The appellate court nullified the trial court’s order granting petitioner’s
motion for execution. Its motion for partial reconsideration of the appellate
court’s decision having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether an action for annulment of judgements or final orders/resolutions
was proper

Held:
NO; the remedy of annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a
RTC in civil actions can only be availed of where "the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner."

In this case, upon notice of the writ of execution on, respondents – if indeed
they were completely unaware of the trial court’s decision – had available
remedies to question it. They could have promptly filed a motion to quash
the writ of execution or, in the alternative, a petition for relief from judgment
under Rule 38.

That they had ample opportunity to do so is gathered from the fact that the
writ of execution of the decision was not immediately implemented by the
sheriff. Hence, having failed to avail of any of the aforesaid remedies without
any justification, respondents are barred from resorting to the action for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47; otherwise, they would benefit from
their own inaction or negligence

As a rule, before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e.,
annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine
qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from,
or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate

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remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the
action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit
from his own inaction or negligence.

Spouses Flores v Spouses Estrellado

GR no 251669; December 7, 2021
Rule 47

Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of Atty. Tabalingcos to protect their rights.
The latter filed a complaint to nullify the loan documents and foreclosure
proceedings with the RTC. Unknown to them, the Court had already
disbarred Tabalingcos. They, too, were unaware that Tabalingcos withdrew

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as their counsel. As far as they were concerned, Tabalingcos was their true
lawyer. For Tabalingcos continued to act as their counsel and receive fees
from them. They were never made aware of his disbarment. Trial ensued and
the lawyer acted incompetently. Hence, in petitioner filed a petition for
annulment of judgement with the CA. The CA denied the petition and the
reconsideration. Petitioners pray for the reversal of the CA on the ground
that they were deprived of their right to counsel and denied due process of
law.

Issue:
Whether denial of due process is a ground for annulment of judgement

Held:
Yes; a petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity which courts
view with an attitude of reluctance as it is an exception to the time honored
doctrine of immutability of final judgments. Thus, to prevent parties
aggrieved by final judgments, orders, or resolutions from abusing this
exceptional remedy, the Court installed safeguards limiting its application
under Rule 47. Under the rules, the grounds for annulment are limited to
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. However, recognized a third ground —
denial of due process.

A violation of a person's right to be heard by counsel is tantamount to a

violation of said person's right to due process. Proceedings wherein one or
both parties were not duly represented by counsel may be susceptible to
annulment of judgment under Rule 47. But just because a party is assisted
by counsel in a given case does not automatically mean that his or her right
to counsel and due process are observed. For where counsel commits a
mistake so gross, palpable, and inexcusable as to result in violation of his or
her client's substantive rights, such mistake may also constitute due process
violation.

Here, petitioners were denied due process of law since they were
represented by counsel who were either disbarred or suspended from the
practice. Thus, in reality, petitioners had no counsel at all.

Spouses Alvarez v CA (Former12th Divsion)

GR no 192472; June 3, 2019
Rule 47

Facts:
Spouses Alvarez filed a complaint for Annulment of Judgment before the
Court of Appeals to set aside the decision of the RTC in a case entitled
Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. They averred in their petition that

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they were never served summons in the RTC case. They only came to know
that there was already an entry of judgment on the case when they verified
the status of their Motion to Set Aside Judgment by Way of Special
Appearance though the motion itself has yet to be resolved. The CA,
however dismissed the case on the ground of failure of the petitioners to act
immediately to have the case dismissed and that they did not resort to
ordinary remedies of appeal, new trial, petition from relief from judgment
and any other remedies. Their motion for reconsideration denied, they
sought recourse with the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the petition for annulment of judgement should be given due course

Held:
Yes; annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case
where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. It is a recourse
that presupposes the filing of a separate and original action for the purpose
of annulling or avoiding a decision in another case. It is not a continuation or
progression of the same case, as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already
final and executory, but rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is
equitable in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases.

Under Section 2, Rule 47, the annulment may be based only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid
ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief. Jurisprudence, however, recognizes lack of due
process as an additional ground to annul a judgment. (EXTRINSIC FRAUD,
LACK OF JURISDICTION, AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS). Here, the allegations
in the petition clearly set forth the ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction
over the persons of petitioners. It was alleged that petitioner Nora Alvarez
was never personally served with summons and petitioner Edgar Alvarez,
who is one of the heirs of the spouses Alvarez was not impleaded as party-
defendant in the case. Hence, there is a prima facie case of annulment of
judgement.

Ancheta v Cambay
GR no 204272; January 18, 2021
Rule 47

Facts:
Cambay filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage against
petitioners before the RTC. Ancheta narrated that while summons was
served on and received by Vivian, no summons ever reached her and/or

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Dionila. The RTC rendered a decision by default which later on became final
and executory.
Subsequently, the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff
implemented the Decision. Cambay subsequently consolidated her
ownership over the property which resulted in the issuance of a TCT in her
favor by the Register of Deeds. Ancheta filed with the RTC a Petition for
Relief from Judgment arguing, among others, that he came to know of the
case only sometime later because no summons was personally served on her
and/or Dionila. The RTC dismissed Ancheta's Petition for Relief of Judgment.
She later on filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under
Rule 47 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the persons of Ancheta and
Dionila which was dismissed.
In her Motion for Reconsideration Ancheta emphasized that her petition was
grounded on lack of jurisdiction, not extrinsic fraud but still the appellate
court denied her MR.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred when it dismissed Ancheta’s petition for annulment of
judgement

Held:
Yes; rule 47 provides for the remedy of annulment of judgment with the
appellate court of the judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the RTCs in
civil actions for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner. Significantly, Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules limits the
ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction.

When a petition for annulment of judgment is grounded on lack of

jurisdiction, the petitioner need not allege that the ordinary remedy of new
trial or reconsideration of the judgment sought to be annulled are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is because a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction is fundamentally void. Thus, considering that the ground
relied upon in the petition for annulment is lack of jurisdiction over the
persons of Ancheta and Dionila, it was not necessary nor was it essential on
the part of the CA to establish first, before it could have ruled on the merits
of the petition for annulment, whether the remedy of petition for relief was
earlier availed of by Ancheta.
Llamas v CA
GR no 149588; September 29, 2009
Rule 47

Facts:
Petition is captioned as “Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with
Preliminary Injunction”. Petitioners were charged before the RTC with the

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crime of “Other Forms of Swindling”. The RTC convicted them of the crime
charged. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. This prompted the petitioner to
appeal the decision to the SC. However, the SC denied the same for failure to
state the material dates. Consequently, the judgment of conviction became
final and executory. A warrant of arrest was issued against Carmelita and
Francisco Llamas, but the latter was nowhere to be found. Almost a year
thereafter, petitioner Francisco Llamas moved for the lifting of the warrant of
arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged. However, since no action was taken by the RTC on
Francisco’s motion, petitioners instituted an action for the annulment of the
judgment issued by the court.

Issue:
Whether the remedy of annulment of judgement is proper

Held:
No; the remedy of annulment of judgement cannot be avail of in criminal
cases as enunciated in Sec 1 of Rule 47 that this Rule shall govern the
annulment by the CA of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of RTCs for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

Moreover, Section 18, Rule 124 provides that the provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to
criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule. There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to
extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. When there is no law or rule
providing for this remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed. In this case,
petitioners are invoking the remedy under Rule 47 to assail a decision in a
criminal case. Following the aforementioned provisions, SC cannot allow such
recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules.

Pacasum Sr v Zamoranos
GR no 193719; March 21, 2017
Collateral attack of judgements

Facts:
Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for disgraceful and immoral
conduct against Zamoranos on the ground that she had contracted a

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bigamous marriage. The CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum
failed to assail the existence, much less validity, of the Decree of Divorce.
Pacasum moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CSC. On
appeal, the CA initially granted the petition. On reconsideration, however,
the CA corrected itself and admitted error in applying the admissions. The CA
held that "a collateral attack against the Decree of Divorce, much less one
embedded merely as an incident to an administrative complaint lodged
before a mere quasi-judicial tribunal such as the CSC, cannot be
countenanced. Pacasum then filed this petition for review on certiorari
arguing that the Shari'a court had no jurisdiction to dissolve
Zamoranos' first marriage. Consequently, her marriage to Pacasum was
bigamous.

Issue:
Whether the decree of divorce can be subject of a collateral attack

Held:
No; in case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect
to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of
a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order
is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the
condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will
or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of
the death of the testator or intestate. Hence, suits that affect the personal
status of a person are in the nature of proceedings in rem. Divorce suits fall
under this category, and divorce decrees are considered judgments in rem.

As a rule, a judgment could not be collaterally impeached or called in

question if rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction but must be properly
attacked in a direct action. A collateral attack is defined as an attack, made
as an incident in another action, whose purpose is to obtain a different relief.
This is proper only when the judgment, on its face, is null and void, as where
it is patent that the court which rendered said judgment has no jurisdiction.
The collateral unassailability of the divorce is a necessary consequence of its
finality.

Heirs of Casiño Sr v Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)

GR no 204052-53; March 11, 2020
Rule 39 – Execution pending appeal

Facts:
After Sps. Casiño failed to settle their loan, DBP caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. In the auction sale, DBP made the winning bid

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and was issued by the Sheriff. Upon the failure to redeem the properties
within the
redemption period, DBP caused the consolidation of the title of the
properties in
its name. Aurio filed a complaint for quieting of title with the RTC alleging
that he is the true, lawful, and absolute owner of the property. The RTC
rendered a judgment which declared that the property being claimed by
Aurio is different from that being claimed by DBP. DBP and Green River
separately filed their own MRs, while Aurio, who died pending proceedings
was now represented by his heirs, filed a motion for execution of judgment
pending appeal. RTC denied the motions for reconsideration and granted the
motion for execution pending appeal. DBP filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 asserting that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued its order granting the motion for execution pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in holding that public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal

Held:
No; the trial court’s discretion in allowing execution pending appeal must be
strictly construed and explained that the grant must be grounded on the
existence of good reason. In this case, the RTC granted the motion primarily
based on the advanced age of Aurio’s spouse who was supposed to be
65 years old at the time. While there is indeed jurisprudence where this court
has
affirmed the granting of discretionary motion for execution pending appeal
on
the reason of advanced age, such does not apply in the instant case. Even
assuming that Aurio’s spouse was indeed of advanced age, such will not be
considered as a good reason by itself, since it must be supported by special
reasons which were not provided in this case. Hence, the RTC committed
grave
abuse of discretion when it allowed execution pending appeal not based on
good reasons and merely by reason of Aurio’s spouse’s alleged old age.
Verily,
the apparent old age would not override the doctrine that a court cannot and
should not disturb the orders or judgments of a co-equal court, especially
since the said decision is already final and executory.

Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corp v Universal Motors Corp

GR no 189358; October 8, 2014
Rule 39 – Execution pending appeal

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Facts:
A Complaint for Breach of Contract was filed by Nissan Specialist Sales
Corporation against herein respondents with the RTC. The TRO prayed for
was eventually issued and later, the TRO was converted to a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA to assail the issuance of the aforesaid injunctive
writ. The CA rendered a
Decision holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ absent a clear legal right thereto on the part of NSSC and Orimaco.
Consequently, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC was
ordered dissolved. The RTC rendered Decision dismissing the complaint for
breach of contract. Upon respondents’ motion, the RTC granted Execution
Pending Appeal. It ruled that there exist good reasons to justify the
immediate execution of the Decision: that NSSC is in imminent danger of
insolvency being admittedly in a state of rehabilitation. The RTC thereupon
issued the corresponding writ. In a Decision, the CA affirmed in part the
assailed order by allowing the execution pending appeal but limiting the
amount of CGAC’s liability.

Issue:
Whether there exist good reasons to justify execution pending appeal
against CGAC which is a mere surety

Held:
Yes; the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the
general rule that only a final judgment may be executed; hence, under
Section 2, Rule 39, the existence of "good reasons" for the immediate
execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is what
confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending
appeal. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying
immediate execution, lest judgment becomes illusory, that is, the prevailing
party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are
altogether nullified. The "good reason" yardstick imports a superior
circumstance demanding urgency that will outweigh injury or damage to the
adverse party and one such "good
reason" that has been held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent
danger of insolvency of the defeated party.

In this case, that NSSC is under a state of rehabilitation and had ceased
business operations, and that NSSC President and General Manager had
permanently left the country with his family, constitute such superior
circumstances that demand urgency in the execution of the Decision
because respondents now run the risk of its non-satisfaction by the time the
appeal is decided with finality.
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) v Corpuz

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AM no P-00-1418; September 24, 2003
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer, execution and stay of execution, Sec
19, Rule 70

Facts:
Lu filed an administrative complaint against Judge Siapno which the court
found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was fined. The Court directed
the OCA to institute the appropriate administrative case against Corpuz who
was not impleaded. Investigating Judge Costales believed that as second in
command in the office, Corpuz should have guided or assisted her presiding
judge. He opined that Corpuz should have read the rules and procedure
regarding the issuance of a writ of execution and could not simply reason out
that she was doing a ministerial duty. Granting that Corpuz was only a
commerce graduate, he believed that Corpuz should have taken her position
seriously by reading the basic laws to guide her work. The OCA agrees with
the findings and recommendation and opined that the acts of signing and
issuing a writ of execution without a motion for execution or a hearing prior
to the issuance of the writ indicate irresponsibility and incompetence.

Issue:
Whether the conclusions and recommendations of the OCA and Investigating
Judge Costales are tenable

Held:
Yes; Lu’s counsel received the MTC decision on 13 September 1995 and filed
a notice of appeal on the same day. Corpuz issued the writ of execution on
11 September 1995. Sheriff Lopez implemented the writ on the same day. In
short, Corpuz issued the writ, and Sheriff Lopez implemented the same, at
least two days before Lus counsel received the MTC decision. Clearly, this is
an improper procedure because the clerk of court issued the writ of
execution before
the losing party received the decision.

The losing party must first receive notice of the judgment before the court or
its personnel can execute the judgment. The reason is that if such judgment
is immediately executed without prior notice to the losing party, then such a
party has no remedy if the evidence or law does not support the judgment.
Moreover, even if the MTC decision itself ordered that a writ of execution be
issued, this does not mean that notice of the motion for execution to the
adverse party is unnecessary. The court cannot direct the issuance of a writ
of execution motu proprio. All moneys so paid to the appellate court shall be
deposited in the provincial or city treasury, and shall be held there until the
final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the
interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a
motion to withdraw, or
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise.

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Section 8, Rule 70 (NOW SECTION 19 OF RULE 70) explicitly provides that
although execution is immediately executory, judgment may be stayed by
perfecting an appeal, filing a supersedeas bond approved by the court and
periodically paying the rents during the pendency of the appeal.

Villareal Jr v Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System

GR no 232202; February 28, 2018
Period and manner of execution – by motion or independent action

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Facts:
The MeTC of Quezon City dismissed the Civil Case for Unlawful Detainer for
being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action. On appeal by
respondent MWSS, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the MeTC's
judgment.
The RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of Judgment/Order, stating that the
RTC Decision has become final and executory. Within a period of two years,
MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the MeTC which
was granted more than 10 years from its filing. Daniel Villareal, Jr. (on behalf
of Orlando), filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the RTC
challenging the Writ of Execution. He argued that the five-year period under
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules was violated since the execution was done
more than 10 years from the finality of the RTC decision. MWSS countered
that the five-year period
under the Rules within which to enforce a judgment by mere motion run only
against the judgment obligee and not the court that will resolve/decide it.

Issue:
Whether the writ of execution issued by the MeTC is null and void for
violating the 5-year period under Rule 39, Sec 6

Held:
Yes; execution may be either through motion or an independent action. The
two modes of execution under the Rules are available, depending on the
timing when the prevailing party invoked his right to enforce the court's
judgment.
Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was
sought within 5 years from the date of its entry. This is a matter of right. On
the
other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year
prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed. The said
judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court. The action must be filed before it
is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is 10 years
from the finality of the judgment.

For execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must

ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive
period, as follows: (a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of
execution; and (b) the court's actual issuance of the writ. After the lapse of
the 5-year
period, any writ issued by the court is already null and void, since the court
no
longer has jurisdiction over the issuance of the writ.

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Records show that the MeTC issued an order granting the said motion only
on
July 28, 2014. More than a year after the grant, or on October 26, 2015, the
MeTC issued the Writ of Execution. Reckoned from the entry of judgment on
December 15, 2002, more than 12 years have elapsed after the actual writ
of execution was finally issued by the MeTC. This is clearly beyond the 5-year
prescriptive period within which the court may issue the writ of execution. By
then, the MeTC was already stripped of its jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of
execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.

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Perez v Manotok Realty Inc
GR no 216157; October 14, 2019
Period and manner of execution – by motion or independent action

Facts:
Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO. The parties entered into a
compromise agreement, which the MeTC later approved. Petitioner violated
the terms and conditions thereof. Thus, respondent moved for the execution
of the MeTC decision which was appealed by the petitioner. After the finality
of the dismissal in the SC, respondent filed a Motion to Enforce Writ of
Execution. MeTC granted respondent’s motion and ordered the sheriff to
enforce the writ. In a subsequent amended order, MeTC corrected the title of
the case changing it. Of this amended Order, petitioner moved for
reconsideration which was granted on the ground that the writ could no
longer be enforced, the subject of which being the July 15, 1999 decision
which was filed only on April 28, 2010, and such was beyond the 10-year
period under Rule 39, Sec 6. The reconsideration was denied. The CA also
denied the petition.

Issue:
Whether the judgement in favor of respondent can be executed by a mere
motion even after the lapse of 5 years

Held:
Yes; Sec 6, Rule 39 states that a judgment may be executed on a motion
within 5 years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final
and executory. After that, a judgment may be enforced by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations. However, there are instances where this
court allowed execution by the motion even after the lapse of five years
upon meritorious grounds.

Under the circumstances of the case at bar where the delays were caused by
the petitioner for her advantage, as well as outside of respondent’s control,
this court holds that the five-year period allowed for the enforcement of the
judgment by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted or
suspended. This court reiterates the principle that the purpose of the law in
prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments is to prevent parties
from sleeping on their rights. This court finds in this case that respondent, far
from sleeping on its rights, was diligent in seeking the execution of the
judgment in its favor. Hence, the 5-year period allowed for enforcement of
the judgement by motion was deemed to have been effectively interrupted
or suspended.

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Villeza v German Management and Services Inc
GR no 182937; August 9, 2010
Period and manner of execution – by motion or independent action

Facts:
In the previous case, a forcible entry case was instituted by petitioner
against respondent, wherein a decision was rendered in favor of the
petitioner. The decision became final and executory on October 5, 1989. On
May 27, 1991, petitioner filed a motion of writ of execution with MeTC. On
the subsequent year, he filed a motion to defer resolution because he was
assigned in Iloilo. 3 years later, the said court denied petitioner’s pending
motion for issuance of writ of execution. More than 3 years, petitioner filed
an MR alleging that he was still interested in the issuance of the writ, and
MTC issued said writ. Respondent then opposed, which was granted resulting
into the cancellation of the writ of execution. On October 3, 2000, petitioner
filed a complaint for revival of judgement, respondent moved to dismiss. It
alleged that it had been more than 10 years form the time the right of action
accrued that is from Oct 5, 1989. The RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. On
appeal to CA, petitioner argued that the 10-year prescriptive period was
tolled by the suspension granted him by the MeTC of Antipolo pursuant to his
request to hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of execution. The CA
ruled against him.

Issue:
Whether petitioner slept on his rights

Held:
Yes; the Rules are clear that once a judgement becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by mere
motion within 5 years from the date of entry of judgement. If the prevailing
party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of 5
years, the said judgement is reduced to a right of action which must be
enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court within 10 years
from the time the judgement becomes final. After the lapse of 5 years from
the finality of judgement, petitioner should have instead filed a complaint for
its revival in accordance with Rule 39 sec 6.

On the 11t h year, he finally sought its revival but he requested the aid of
the courts too late. When petitioner Villeza filed the complaint for revival of
judgement on Oct 3 , 2000, it had already been 11 years from the finality of
the judgement he sought to revive. Clearly, the statute of limitation had set
in. The running period is interrupted if due to the acts of the losing party.
However, it was petitioner Villeza who moved to defer the execution of
judgement, the losing party never had any hand in the delay of its execution.
Neither did the parties have any agreement on that matter.
Infante v Aran Builders

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GR no 156596; August 24, 2007
Period and manner of execution – by motion or independent action

Facts:
Aran Builders went before the RTC of Muntinlupa city for action for revival of
judgement against Infante. The judgement sought to be revived was
rendered by the RTC of Makati in an action for specific performance and
damages. The Makati RTC ruled in favor of Aran Builders which ordered
Infante to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of land in Ayala Alabang
Subdivision in favor
of Aran Builders. Infante filed a motion to dismiss (for revival of judgement)
on the ground that the RTC of Muntinlupa has no jurisdiction over the person
of the parties. The motion to dismiss was denied. The RTC of Muntinlupa
rationed that it is because at the time decision was rendered by the Makati
RTC, there was no RTC yet in Muntinlupa. Since now there is an RTC in
Muntinlupa and the subject property is located therein, Muntinlupa is a
proper venue to file the complaint for revival of a judgement. Infante’s
motion to dismiss was denied

Issue:
Whether the RTC of Muntinlupa is the proper venue for the present action for
revival of judgement

Held:
Yes; Section 6, Rule 39 provides that after the lapse of 5 years from entry of
judgement and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a final and
executory judgment or order may be enforced by action. The rule however
does not specific in which court the action should be filed. Thus, the proper
venue depends on the determination of whether the present actions for
revival of judgement a real action or a personal action is. If it affects title or
possession of real property or interest therein it is a real action to be filed
with the court of the place where the real property is located, if it does not
fall under such category of real actions, then it is a personal action to be filed
with the court of the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides. The
allegations in the complaint will determine whether it is a real or personal
action. The previous
judgment has conclusively declared Aran Builder’s right to have title over the
property. The sole reason for the action is the enforcement of her rights over
the piece of realty, thus it falls under the category of a real action, and thus
should be filed with the RTC of where the realty is located. The RTC of
Muntinlupa therefore has valid jurisdiction over the subject property and the
revival of judgement.

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Vergara et al v Gedorio et al
GR no 154037; April 30, 2003
Execution of Judgement for Money

Facts:
The warrant of arrest stemmed from a motion filed by respondent Eleuteria
P. Bolaño, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the late Anselma P.
Allers, praying that petitioners be held guilty of indirect contempt for not
complying with the probate court's order. The probate court found
petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and ordered them to pay a fine and to
undergo imprisonment until they comply with the probate court's order for
them to pay rentals. Petitioners again wrote the probate court asking that
the indirect contempt "slapped" against them be withdrawn. They stated
that their failure to attend the hearing was due to financial constraints. Upon
motion of respondent Bolaño, the probate court issued a warrant of arrest.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. The appellate court ordered the temporary release of petitioners.
After due proceedings, the appellate court rendered its decision denying the
petition for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether petitioner can be punished for contempt

Held:
No; Section 9 of Rule 39 refers to the execution of judgments for money,
while Section 10 of the same Rule refers to execution of judgments for
specific acts. The order directing the payment of rentals falls within the
purview of Section 9.

Until and unless all the means provided for under Section 9, Rule 39 have
been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a means of
coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts. Thus,
petitioners could not be held guilty of contempt of court for their continued
refusal to comply with the probate court's order to pay rentals nor could for
disobeying the writ of execution issued by the probate court, which directs
therein the Sheriff. It was the sheriff's duty to enforce the writ. Under Section
9 (b), Rule 39, in cases when the execution calls for payment of money and
the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the
officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind
and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not
otherwise exempt from execution giving the latter the option to immediately
choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to
satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option,
the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the

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real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer for the
judgment.
Miranda v Spouses Mallari
GR no 218343; November 28, 2018
Levy, Garnishment – Manner of Levy and Garnishment

Facts:
Pursuant to a Writ of Execution issued by the RTC of Balanga, a Notice of
Levy was issued covering the parcel of land registered in the names of
therein judgment debtors, Spouses Reyes. The Spouses Mallari were the
highest bidder and later, caused the annotation in the TCT. After causing the
Certificate of Sale in their favor, they discovered that the same was in the
possession of Miranda who claimed to be the owner thereof, having bought
the property from the Spouses Reyes. The Spouses Mallari filed the suit for
recovery of possession against Miranda. The RTC rendered the assailed
Decision granting the Spouses Mallari's complaint. It pronounced that
Miranda is estopped from claiming ownership over the subject property in
view of his failure to annotate his interest thereto in the TCT. The CA ruled
that the right of Spouses Mallari, having been annotated through the Notice
of Levy prevails over that of Miranda.

Issue:
Whether the rights of Spouses Mallari through the notice of levy prevail over
that of Miranda, who is in possession of the property

Held:
No; the Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses Reyes, the then registered
owners of the subject property, and possession was already transferred to
Miranda, through constructive delivery when the Deed of Absolute Sale, a
public instrument, was executed and through real delivery when actual
possession was turned over to Miranda. Pursuant to the modes of acquiring
ownership, Miranda acquired ownership of the subject property when he took
actual physical, or at least constructive, possession thereof. The non-
registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Nueva Ecija did not affect the sale's validity and effectivity.

Since ownership of the subject property had been transferred to Miranda, it

ceased to be owned by Spouses Reyes as early as then. Not being owned by
Spouses Reyes, the subject property could not therefore be made
answerable for any judgment rendered against them. Section 9 (b), Rule 39,
presupposes that the property to be levied belongs to and is owned by the
judgment debtor.
Also, according to Section 12, Rule 39, the effect of levy on execution as to
third persons is to create a lien in favor of the judgment obligee over the
right, title, and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the time
of the levy, subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. If the judgment

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obligor no longer has any right, title or interest in the property levied upon,
then there can be no lien that may be created in favor of the judgment
obligee by reason of the levy.

It is well-settled that a judgment debtor can only transfer property in which

he has interest to the purchaser at a public execution sale and the principle
of caveat emptor applies even to such sale. Consequently, the purchaser
acquires absolutely nothing if at the execution sale the judgment debtor no
longer has any right to or interest in the property purportedly belonging to
him. A judgment creditor or purchaser at an execution sale acquires only
whatever rights that the judgment obligor may have over the property at the
time of levy. Thus, if the judgment obligor has no right, title, or interest over
the levied property — as in this case — there is nothing for him to transfer.
Applied to this, the levy made on the subject property could not have
created any lien in favor of Spouses Mallari because their judgment debtors,
Spouses Reyes, had no more right, title or interest thereto or therein at the
time of the levy.

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Bigtas v Sterling Bank of Asia
GR no 230804; March 24, 2021
Terceria

Facts:
Respondent SBA filed with the RTC a Complaint for Sum of Money and Costs
of Suit with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment
against Spouses Bigtas. The RTC granted SBA's application for issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. Subsequently, a Notice of Levy on
Attachment was registered and annotated on Spouses Bigtas' TCT. Cherry
filed a Third-Party Claim alleging that a Deed of Conditional Sale had been
executed by Spouses Bigtas in her favor despite the TCT not bearing any
annotation pertaining such.
The RTC issued a Decision in favor of SBA. Upon Motion for Execution filed by
SBA, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Cherry filed a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sheriff's Sale with Supplemental Third-Party Claim insisting that
Spouses Bigtas no longer have any rights, title, interest, shares, claims or
participation in the subject property. Cherry added that the subject property
serves as her family home which makes it exempt from execution but still
the RTC denied. The RTC also denied Cherry's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in upholding the validity of the WOE and the
subsequent notice of levy on the subject property

Held:
No; Under Section 16, Rule 39, the third-party claimant may assert his or her
claim of ownership and/or possession over the property in question through
two distinct remedies. First, the third-party claimant may resort to the
remedy of terceria by making "an affidavit of his or her title thereto or right
to the possession thereof" and serving such affidavit upon the sheriff making
the levy, and a copy thereof to the judgment obligee. Alternatively, the third-
party claimant may file a separate action to vindicate his or her right of
ownership and/or possession over the property so levied. Should the third-
party claimant's opposition against the levy be defeated, he or she may seek
further redress by either: (i) filing an action for damages against the sheriff
within 120 days from posting of the judgment obligee's bond; or (ii) filing a
separate action to vindicate his or her right of ownership and/or possession
(assuming that no such separate action is already pending). In view of these
specific remedies, neither an appeal nor a petition for certiorari serves as a
proper remedy from the denial of a third-party claim. The remedy of
petitioner would be to file a separate and independent action to determine
the ownership of the attached property or to file a complaint for damages
chargeable against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of the
provincial sheriff.

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Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp (PSALM) v Maunlad
Homes Inc
GR no 215933; February 8, 2017
Terceria

Facts:
Maunlad Homes filed an unlawful detainer case with damages against NPC.
After trial, MTCC ordered NPC to vacate the subject premises and surrender
physical possession thereof to respondent. Respondent filed motion for
Execution which was opposed by NPC. RTC denied motion for reconsideration
of NPC and granted the respondent’s motion for execution. Respondent then
filed an urgent motion for issuance of a Break Open Order since the sheriff
who tried to implement the writ of execution, by serving the notice of levy,
was prevented by the security guards assigned therein. Petitioner filed an
Affidavit of third-party claim with the sheriff pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court, and alleging that it is the owner of the levied properties
pursuant to the EPIRA Law which the RTC denied. PSALM filed a petition for
certiorari but CA dismissed it. The CA averred that Section 16, Rule 39
provides a more expeditious and encompassing recourse in case a property
belonging to a third person is placed under the coverage of the writ of
execution and, thereafter, sold at public auction.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari
assailing the denial of the latter’s third-party claim for being a wrong remedy

Held:
No; if the property levied by virtue of a writ of execution is claimed by a third
person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 provides for
the remedy of such third party claimant in which the third-party claimant
may execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the property
levied, and serve the same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof
to the judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria. In such separate
action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff
enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale, which is a speedy
and adequate remedy to immediately relieve petitioner from the adverse
effects of the lower court's judgment. Thus, Section 16 of Rule 39 provides a
more expeditious and encompassing recourse from the denial of its third-
party claim.

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AQA Global Construction Inc v Planters Development Bank
GR no 211649 & 211742; August 12, 2015
Rules on redemption

Facts:
KTC defaulted in the payment of its loan constraining Plantersbank to extra-
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties and, in the process, emerged
as the highest bidder. KTC failed to redeem the subject properties, which led
to the cancellation of TCT and the issuance of TCT in the name of
Plantersbank. Thereafter, Plantersbank applied for a writ of possession,
which was granted by the RTC. AQA filed a Manifestation and Motion before
the RTC, seeking leave of court to intervene in the case and to be excluded
from the implementation of the writ of possession, claiming that its
possession stemmed from a 10-year contract of lease with petitioner Je-an,
which had bought the subject property from Little Giant, the registered
owner of the subject properties. The RTC issued an Order excluding AQA and
Je-An from the implementation of the writ of possession, ruling that they are
third parties which did not derive title from KTC. The CA ruled that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in staying the implementation of the writ of
possession. AQA and Je-An separately moved for
reconsideration which were however, denied in a Resolution.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
staying the implementation of the writ of possession against AQA and Je-An

Held:
No; the general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased who is entitled to the possession of the said property. Upon ex
parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of
possession in his favor. The exception, however, is provided under Section
33, Rule 39 where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is occupied by a
party other than a judgment debtor and the procedure is for the court to
order a hearing to determine the nature of said adverse possession. For the
exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed by a
third party, but also held by him adversely to the judgment obligor — such as
that of a co-owner, agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who possess the
property in their own right and not merely the successor or transferee of the
right of possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor.

In this case, petitioners' claim of right of possession over the subject

properties is not analogous to any of the foregoing as to render such
possession adverse to the judgment obligor, KTC, under legal contemplation.

Barrete v Amila

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AM no MTJ-92-733; February 23, 1994
Execution of judgement for a specific act

Facts:
The instant complaint originated from the decision rendered by respondent
Judge in favor of plaintiff Juanita Bungabong, which ordered Barrete to
vacate the house owned by plaintiff. A writ of execution was subsequently
issued by respondent Judge. The Sheriff went back to the premises and
although he did not find complainant there, it was clear that she had not
vacated because her furniture and other belongings were still in the house.
The Sheriff then put a padlock on the door of the house occupied by
complainant. Plaintiff Bungabong filed a motion to declare Barrete in
Contempt of Court. She then filed an adminstrative complaint. Judge Bautista
recommended that Judge Amila be exonerated from the charges made by
complainant upon a finding that he had not been motivated by malice nor
any evil purpose in ordering the arrest of complainant.

Issue:
Whether Judge Amila erred in ordering incarceration of petitioner on the
ground of contempt

Held:
Yes; records show that at the time complainant was arrested, no delivery of
possession of the subject premises had been made to the plaintiff; the writ of
execution had not yet been implemented. The mere refusal or unwillingness
on the part of complainant to vacate said property did not constitute
contempt.
The writ of possession was directed not to complainant, but to the Sheriff,
who was to deliver the properties to plaintiff Bungabong. As the writ did not
command the complainant to do anything, complainant could not be held
guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court. Moreover, complainant could not be
punished for contempt under paragraph (b) of Section 3, Rule 71, for
disobedience of or resistance to the judgment of the trial court because said
judgment was not a special judgment enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39.

When the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be

executed in accordance with Section 8 (d) of Rule 9, and any contempt
proceeding arising therefrom must be based on the second part of Section 3
(b) of Rule 71 and not on "the disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or injunction granted by a
court or judge" in relation to Section 9 of Rule 39.

Sia v Arcenas
GR no 209672-74; January 14, 2015

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Execution of special judgement

Facts:
Due to the real property tax delinquencies of PRI over the subject lots, the
City Treasurer auctioned the subject lots, with petitioner as the highest
bidder. Consequently, a Certificate of Sale was issued in petitioner's favor
however, petitioner was not able to take possession thereof in view of the
refusal of the City Treasurer to issue a Final Bill of Sale. Mayor Alba issued
Executive Order No. 08-97, nullifying the auction sale. Hence, petitioner was
constrained to file a Petition for the annulment of EO 08-97, mandamus, and
damages against the City Treasurer, Mayor Alba, and others seeking that a
Final Bill of Sale over the subject lots be issued to him. The RTC ruled in
petitioner's favor, and accordingly ordered the City Treasurer to issue the
Final Bill of Sale. PRI appealed to the CA, which affirmed the RTC’s ruling in
toto. Petitioner moved for execution and was granted. This notwithstanding,
the City Treasurer refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale, positing that
petitioner still had to settle the delinquent real property taxes. The RTC
denied respondents’ motion to quash. On appeal to the CA, it set aside the
RTC’s writ of possession and writ of demotion in accordance with Rule 39,
Sec 11. Petitioner filed a MR which was denied.

Issue:
Whether the CA correctly declared the writs of possession and demolition
null and void

Held:
Yes; the rule is that the service and execution of a special judgment, such as
a
favorable judgment in mandamus – as in this case – should be deemed to be
limited to directing compliance with the judgment, and in case of
disobedience, to have the disobedient person required by law to obey such
judgment punished with contempt. In this case, it is undisputed that the City
Treasurer obstinately refused to issue the Final Bill of Sale in petitioner’s
favor,
despite the finality of the judgment as well as the issuance and service of the
Writ of Execution commanding him to do so. In view of such refusal, the RTC
should have cited the City Treasurer in contempt in order to enforce
obedience to the said judgment. However, instead of simply doing so, it
granted petitioner’s numerous motions, resulting in, among others, the
issuance of a writ of possession.

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Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay
GR no 171947-48; February 15, 2011
Effects of judgements or final orders

Facts:
The Court rendered a decision ordering petitioner to clean up, rehabilitate,
and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities which was affirmed by
the CA.
The RTC decision reads: judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and
preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class
B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative
Order No. 34) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation. The government agencies did not file any motion for
reconsideration and the Decision became final. The case is now in the
execution phase of the final and executory decision. The Manila Bay Advisory
Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive
reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said
decision and to monitor the execution phase.

Issue:
Whether there was an encroachment by the court on the powers of the
executive branch with the recommendations and resolutions it made for the
implementation of the judgement

Held:
No; the issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise
of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of
the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court.
None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement
the decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the
Court over executive functions. While additional activities are required of the
agencies like submission of plans of action, data, or status reports, these
directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision
under Rule 39.

Section 47 of Rule 39 is clear that the final judgment includes not only what
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters
"actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Certainly,
any
activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily
encompassed by said judgment. With the final and executory judgment in
MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until
petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the

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Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the
judgment.
Valmonte v CA
GR no 108538; January 22, 1996
Rule 57 – Grounds for issuance of writ of attachment

Facts:
Respondent Dimalanta, the sister of petitioner Lourdes, filed a complaint for
partition of real property and accounting of rentals against petitioners.
Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo, who at the time,
was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo accepted the summons, insofar
as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife,
Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on
her behalf. Accordingly, the process server left without leaving a copy of the
summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes. Petitioner Alfredo thereafter filed his
Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes, however, did not file her
Answer. For this reason, private respondent moved to declare her in default.
Petitioner Alfredo
entered a special appearance on behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondent's motion. The trial court denied private respondent's motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes in default. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition and declared Lourdes in default. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:
Whether petitioner Lourdes was validly served with summons

Held:
No; private respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting under
Rule 69 is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is
essentially for
the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific property and
not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes was not
done by means of any of the first two modes, and hence, the third mode that
was sought was not valid. This mode of service, like the first two, must be
made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the

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foreign country where the defendant resides. Also, petitioner Lourdes did not
appoint her husband as her attorney-in-fact. No power of attorney to receive
summons for her can be inferred therefrom.

Davao Light & Power Co Inc v CA

GR no 93262; November 29, 1991
Application; requisites for issuance of writ of attachment & discharge of
attachment

Facts:
Davao Light filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against private respondents Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico
Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the application. Defendants
Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack
of jurisdiction to issue the same because at the time the order of attachment
was promulgated and the attachment writ issued, the Trial Court had not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.
The Trial Court denied the motion to discharge. CA nullified and set aside the
writ of preliminary attachment issued by the RTC.

Issue:
Whether a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a
defendant before acquisition of jurisdiction over the latter’s person by
service of summons or his voluntary submission to the Court

Held:
Yes; a writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant
before acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter’s person by service of summons
or his voluntary submission to the Court’s authority. Rule 57 speaks of the
grant of the remedy “at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter.” The phrase, “at the commencement of the action,” obviously
refers to the date of the filing of the complaint and the reference plainly is to
a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons
issues. Hence, after an action is properly commenced—by the filing of the
complaint and the payment of all requisite docket and other fees—the
plaintiff may apply for and obtain a writ of preliminary attachment upon
fulfillment of the pertinent requisites laid down by law, and that he may do
so at any time, either before or after service of summons on the defendant.

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Torres v Satsatin
GR no 166759; November 25, 2009
Application; requisites for issuance of writ of attachment

Facts:
Nicanor Satsatin asked petitioners’ mother, Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to
sell their lands. After consultation with her daughters, daughter-in-law, and
grandchildren, Agripina agreed to sell the properties. Petitioners, thus,
authorized Nicanor, through a SPA to negotiate for the sale of the properties.
Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar who allegedly agreed to
purchase the three parcels of land, together with the property owned by a
certain Rustica Aledia, However, notwithstanding the receipt of the entire
payment for the
subject property, Nicanor only remitted a partial amount. Consequently,
petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for sum of money and damages,
against Nicanor. Petitioners filed a Motion for Deputation of Sheriff informing
the court that they have already filed an attachment bond. They also prayed
that a sheriff be deputized to serve the writ of attachment that would be
issued by the court which was granted. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of
Attachment directing the sheriff to attach the estate, real or personal, of the
respondents.

Issue:
Whether the writ was properly implemented

Held:
No; A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy
issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon
the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment
that
might be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the
defendant.

In the case at bar, there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the
bond posted by petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its
approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that
all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be
rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court
showing that the company concerned is qualified to transact business which
is valid only for 30 days from the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent
that the Certification issued by the OCA at the time the bond was issued

ZJI
would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty Corporation
may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig.
Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have
been accepted by the RTC since the certification secured by the bonding
company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that
it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities.

A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Rule 57 on preliminary
attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy "at the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment." This phrase refers to the
date of the filing of the complaint.

The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:

first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of
attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ
is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the
implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no
power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order
issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the trial court validly issued the
writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, which was implemented on
November 19, 2002, it is to be noted that the summons, together with a
copy of the complaint, was served only on November 21, 2002. At the time
the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can
validly do so
since the motion for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment." However, at the time the
writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the respondent since no summons was yet served upon them.

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Excellent Quality Apparel Inc v Visayan Surety & Insurance Corp
GR no 212025; July 1, 2015
Claim for damages

Facts:
Petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel then represented by Ying, Vice-President
for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden, Treasurer, entered into a contract with
Multi-Rich, a single proprietorship, represented by Chua, its President and
General Manager for the construction of a garment factory within the CPEZA.
The duration of the project was for a maximum period of 5 months. Win
Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against
petitioner and Ying before the RTC. It also prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment, claiming that Ying was about to abscond, and that petitioner
had an impending closure.
Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond from respondent Visayan
Surety and Insurance Corporation. In the Order, the RTC issued a writ of
preliminary attachment in favor of Win Multi-Rich. To prevent the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary attachment on its equipment and
machinery, petitioner issued a check payable to the Clerk of Court of the
RTC.

Issue:
Whether petitioner can claim against the surety

Held:
NO; there was an application for damages, but Visayan Surety cannot be
held liable because it was not duly notified of the application for damages
resulting from the improper, irregular or excessive attachment. In this case,
the attachment bond was issued by Visayan Surety in order for Win Multi-
Rich to secure the issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any application
for damages arising from the improper, irregular, or excessive attachment
shall be governed by Section 20, Rule 57.

The usual procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to
the other party and his sureties. The other method would be to incorporate
the application in the answer with compulsory counterclaim. In the present
petition, the Court holds that petitioner sufficiently incorporated an
application for damages against the wrongful attachment in its answer with
compulsory counterclaim filed before the RTC. However, petitioner’s answer
with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application for damages,
was not served on Visayan Surety. Visayan Surety was only notified of the
application when the motion for execution had become final and executory.
Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under Section 20, Rule

ZJI
57 because Visayan Surety was not given due notice on the application for
damages before the finality of judgment. The subsequent motion for
execution, which sought to implicate Visayan Surety, cannot alter the
immutable judgment anymore.
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, the surety bond
shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment. In other
words, the damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond are
unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of
judgment must be undertaken to properly determine the amount of damages
that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper attachment. These
damages to be imposed against the attaching party and his sureties are
different from the principal case and must be included in the judgment.

On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12
therein, the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of
any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. Stated
differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are
liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be
awarded to the winning litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing left
to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case of
insufficiency, against its sureties.

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China Banking Corp v Asian Construction and Development Corp
GR no 168271; April 8, 2008
Claim for damages

Facts:
China Bank granted ACDC an Omnibus Credit Line. Alleging that ACDC failed
to comply with its obligations, China Bank filed a Complaint for recovery of
sum of money and damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment before the RTC. The RTC granted the prayer for writ
of preliminary attachment, and it was implemented levying personal
properties of ACDC. The RTC issued a Summary Judgment in favor of China
Bank but China Bank still partially appealed the summary judgment for not
awarding interest on one of its promissory notes. China Bank filed a motion
in the CA, moving to sell the attached properties even before entry of
judgment but it was denied. China Bank filed a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court insisting that the attached properties, all placed inside
ACDC’s stockyard are totally exposed to natural elements and adverse
weather conditions which have gravely deteriorated the property. China
Bank further claims that should ACDC prevail in the final judgment of the
collection suit, ACDC can proceed with the bond posted by China Bank.

Issue:
Whether the attached properties can be sold even before entry of judgement

Held:
No; Under Rule 57, Section 11, an attached property may be sold after levy
on attachment and before entry of judgment whenever it shall be made to
appear to the court in which the action is pending, upon hearing with notice
to both parties that the attached property is perishable or that the interests
of all the parties to the action will be subserved by the sale of the attached
property. An attached property is perishable "if it is shown that, by keeping
the article, it will necessarily become, or is likely to become, worthless to the
creditor, and by consequence to the debtor, then it is embraced by the
statute. It matters not, in our opinion, what the subject matter is.” However,
the determination on whether the attached vehicles are properly cared for,
and the burden to show that, by keeping the attached office furniture, office
equipment and supplies, it will necessarily become, or is likely to become,
worthless to China Bank, and by consequence to ACDC, are factual issues
requiring reception of evidence which the Court cannot do in a petition for
certiorari. Factual issues are beyond the scope of certiorari because they do
not involve any jurisdictional issue.

ACDC cannot proceed with the attachment bond posted by China Bank
because it is clear that the attachment bond answers only for the payment of

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all damages which ACDC may sustain if the court shall finally adjudge that
China Bank was not entitled to attachment. The liability attaches if "the
plaintiff is not entitled to the attachment because the requirements entitling
him to the writ are wanting," or "if the plaintiff has no right to the attachment
because the facts stated in his affidavit, or some of them are untrue."
Clearly, ACDC can only claim from the bond for all the damages which it may
sustain by reason of the attachment and not because of the sale of the
attached properties prior to final judgment.

Garcia v Honorable Clerk of Court

ZJI
GR no 248542; January 22, 2020
Rule 58

Facts:
The CA issued a decision holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain
original actions for injunction.

Issue:
Whether the CA has jurisdiction to entertain original actions for injunction

Held:
No; an original action for injunction is outside the jurisdiction of the CA.
Under B.P. 129, the appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions
for annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not they are in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. The appellate court's jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary
injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it as provided
under Section 2 of Rule 58.

If the Regional Trial Court had abused its discretion in issuing a writ of
execution, petitioner should have challenged the same through a Rule 65
petition for certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court. As petitioner
availed of the wrong remedy, the CA correctly dismissed the petition for lack
of jurisdiction.

Sola v First Jia Philippines West View Estate and Development

GR no 249926; March 2, 2020

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Rule 58

Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for injunction filed by petitioner against
respondents. After trial, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that the
Torrens title under the name of respondent First Jia is indefeasible and
carries more weight than the unregistered Deed of Sale of petitioner. On
appeal to the CA, the petition was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove
that he had any right over the property in question. Petitioner anchors his
entitlement to an injunctive relief on his claim of ownership by virtue of the
Deed of Sale between him and Jorge.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to an injunctive relief

Held:
No; the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on applications for the
injunctive writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for the
writ more often than not involve a factual determination that is not the
function of the appellate courts. Thus, the exercise of sound discretion by the
issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be interfered with except
when there is manifest abuse.

Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered

to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely
a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. The main
action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident
of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an action
for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for
injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct
from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the
merits can be heard.

In this case, petitioner failed to show that he has a better right to be

protected over respondents given the fact that respondent First Jia is a
holder of a Torrens title while petitioner only possesses a Deed of Sale.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed reversible error
that would warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Australian Professional Realty v Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas

GR no 183367; March 14, 2012
Application, requisites, what needs to be proven

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Facts:
Respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of the MOA (for the construction of a shopping complex by APRI) with
Damages before the RTC. The summons was returned unserved, as
petitioner was no longer holding office in the given address. Later, the RTC
issued an order declaring petitioners in default and allowing respondent to
present evidence ex parte. The RTC then rendered a decision in favor of
respondent. Upon learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a
Petition for Relief from Judgment which was denied by the RTC. Petitioners
later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was
also denied.

Issue:
Whether the CA correctly denied petitioner’s motion for issuance of TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction

Held:
Yes; to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests

on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of
fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the
exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be
interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion. The burden
is on petitioner to show in his application that there is meritorious ground for
the issuance of a TRO in his favor. In this case, no grave abuse of discretion
can be imputed to the CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and
whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.

Spouses Lago v Abul Jr

AM RTJ-10-2255; January 17, 2011
TRO, Ex-parte TRO

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Facts:
Respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of law for Issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants and without
hearing. Respondent judge countered the charge by submitting a certified
true copy of the Sheriff’s Return of Service stating that he actually served
the summons on the complainants with the copy of the 72-hour TRO, and a
certified machine copy of the summons which bore the signature of
complainant that he personally received the same.

Issue:
Whether respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law and
procedure

Held:
Yes; respondent judge committed blunder when he ordered the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction without the required hearing and without prior
notice to the defendants, herein complainants. The records plainly disclose
that the only hearing conducted prior to the resolution granting the
preliminary injunction was the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-
hour TRO.

Rule 58 mandates a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of

the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction separate from
the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour TRO. The preliminary
injunction prayed for by the applicant can only be heard after the trial court
has ordered the issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of 20
days, the court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to show cause at
a specified time and place why the injunction should not be granted. During
that same period, the court shall also determine the propriety of granting the
preliminary injunction and then issue the corresponding order to that effect.

Moreover, respondent judge extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already
and obviously expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no
longer be extended. Respondent judge should have known that the TRO he
issued in his capacity as an acting executive judge was valid for only 72
hours. Beyond such time, the TRO automatically expires, unless, before the
expiration of the said period, he, supposedly in his capacity as presiding
judge to whom the case was raffled, conducted the required summary
hearing in order to extend the TRO’s lifetime. Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO,
issued by an executive judge, is a separate and distinct TRO which can stand
on its own, regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not.
Evy Construction and Development Corp v Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corp
GR no 207938; October 11, 2017
TRO, Ex-parte TRO & Writ of Preliminary Injunction

Facts:

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Evy Construction registered the sale but contained the annotation of the
prior attachments by Valiant Corporation. RTC decided in favor of Valiant and
a writ of execution was issued against the property. Evy Construction filed a
third-party claim alleging that it had already filed with the sheriff an Affidavit
of Title/Ownership in accordance with Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
However, Valiant posted an indemnity Bond to answer for any damages that
Evy Construction may suffer should the execution proceed. By virtue of the
writ of execution, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale and eventually a
Certificate of Sale was issued to Valiant as the winning bidder. Evy
Construction filed for annulment of execution and certificate of sale, with
damages, and application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the
Register of Deeds from compelling it to surrender its copy of the TCT. The
RTC denied the application as well as the MR. The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC holding that Evy Construction failed to sufficiently establish its right
to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Issue:
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for injunctive relief

Held:
No. a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior
hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury." In this
instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the
preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour temporary
restraining order should be extended. A trial court may also issue ex parte a
TRO for 20 days if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.

The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rest

in the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of
facts left to the said court for its conclusive determination. The trial court, in
the exercise of its discretion, denied petitioner's application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction on the
ground that petitioner would still have sufficient relief in its prayer for
damages in its complaint.

Spouses Tumon v Radiowealth Finance Co Inc

GR no 243999; March 18, 2021
Writ of Preliminary injunction

Facts:

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Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullification of Mortgage Documents,
Promissory Note, and Damages against Radiowealth with the RTC.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an Application for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or WPI to restrain Radiowealth and any person
acting in its behalf from foreclosing and selling petitioners' real property. The
RTC issued an Order granting the TRO and scheduling the hearing on the
Application for the
Issuance of the WPI. The RTC denied the Application for the WPI as
petitioners did not deny their indebtedness to Radiowealth. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA which was
dismissed.

Issue:
Whether CA validly denied petitioner’s application for the issuance of a WPI

Held:
Yes; writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a showing that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is
to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a court to
decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire
into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage."

In addition to these requirements, the issuance of a WPI in the context of a

judicial or an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage requires
compliance with the additional rules in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended,
viz.:
1. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the
mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is
verified and supported by evidence of payment.
2. No TRO or WPI against the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan
is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve
percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the
application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while
the case is pending.
3. Where a [WPI] has been issued against a foreclosure of mortgage, the
disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved. To this end, the court
concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases
involving ten million pesos and above.
4. All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a[TRO or
WPI], such as the posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount

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 of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall
apply as well to a status quo order.

In the present case, the Court finds that the trial court judge erred in issuing
the
TRO and WPI based simply on petitioner's allegations of payment,
overpayment, and the respondent's imposition of unconscionable interest. It
must be emphasized that the petitioner did not present a single evidence of
overpayment of the obligation or even proof of payment thereof. Evidently,
the RTC's Order enjoining the foreclosure proceedings is a patent
circumvention of the guidelines outlined in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0.

City of Iloilo v Honrado

GR no 160399; December 9, 2015
Grounds for objection to/dissolution of TRO/WPI

Facts:

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JPV filed a civil case to prevent the petitioner from acting on the pending
application for the operation of another PETC. Through its answer, the
petitioner contested the injunctive relief being sought by JPV, insisting that
such relief, if issued, would result into a monopoly on the part of JPV in the
operation of a PETC; that the writ of injunction would prevent the exercise by
the City Mayor of his discretionary power to issue or not to issue business
permits; and that JPV did not establish the existence of its right in esse to be
protected by the writ of injunction. Grahar Emission Testing Center, another
PETC operator with a pending application for a business/mayor's permit to
operate its own PETC, sought leave of court to intervene. Although it allowed
the intervention of Grahar, the RTC nonetheless issued an order granting the
application of JPV for the writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioner moved
for the reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was issued erroneously by the RTC

Held:
Yes; a preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,
an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its essential
role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability
of the court to render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a
change of circumstances that will hamper or prevent the granting of the
proper relief after the trial on the merits. Another essential role is preventive
of the threats to cause irreparable harm or injury to a party before the
litigation could be resolved.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court set the guidelines for when the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is justified, namely: (a) when the
applicant is
entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists
in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained
of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually; or (b) when the commission, continuance or
nonperformance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or (c) when a party, court, agency or a person is
doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment
ineffectual.

In this case, the granting of JPV's application already amounted to the virtual
acceptance of JPV's alleged entitlement to preventing the petitioner from

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considering and passing upon the applications of other parties like Grahar to
operate their own PETC. The granting amounted to the prejudgment of the
merits of the case, something the RTC could not validly do. It apparently
forgot that the function of the writ of preliminary injunction was not to
determine the merits of the case, or to decide controverted facts, because
an interlocutory injunction was but a preliminary and preparatory order that
still looked to a
future final hearing, and, although contemplating what the result of that
hearing would be, it should not settle what the result should be.

Spouses Laus v Optimum Security Services Inc

GR no 208343; February 3, 2016
Grounds for objection to/dissolution of TRO/WPI

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Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with application for a TRO and WPI
against respondent. Opposing petitioners' application for TRO and WPI,
respondent countered that petitioners are not entitled to the TRO and WPI
because they do not own the subject properties. They maintained that
Margarita dela Rosa et al are the real owners thereof, who authorized Mr.
Arceo to enter into the Security Service Contract with respondent to secure
the subject properties. The RTC granted the application for WPI but the CA
reversed the RTC ruling and thereby, lifted the WPI and ordered the dismissal
of petitioners' complaint.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in lifting the WPI issued by the RTC

Held:
Yes; to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the
violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction
may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be
protected during the pendency of the principal action. When the
complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear
legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.
Corollarily, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out
of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the
other party where such right is being disputed. After all, a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable,
and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.

While it is a general rule that a trial court's discretion in issuing injunctive

writs should not be interfered with, the Court finds the CA's lifting of the WPI
issued by the RTC in this case to be proper, considering that the foregoing
parameters were not observed, thus, tainting the trial court's issuance with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Although petitioners appear to be the registered owners of the subject
properties, they nonetheless failed to establish that they were in actual
physical possession of the same at the time the incidents transpired. In fact,
a cursory perusal of the complaint readily shows that petitioners never
alleged that they were in prior possession of the subject properties. Besides
the WPI issued by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that
respondent already vacated the subject properties since the Security Service
Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired.

Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp v Lim

GR no 172948; October 5, 2016
Grounds for objection to/dissolution of TRO/WPI

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Facts:
Petitioner PASAR is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines and is engaged in copper smelting and refining. On the
other hand, respondents were former senior officers and presently
shareholders of PASAR holding 500 shares each. An Amended Petition for
Injunction and Damages with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order was filed by PASAR seeking to restrain
petitioners from demanding inspection of its confidential and inexistent
records. The RTC issued an order granting PASAR’s prayer for a WPI holding
that the right to inspect book should not be denied to stockholders, however,
the same may be restricted. Respondents filed a motion for dissolution of the
WPI on the ground that the petition is insufficient which was denied.
Aggrieved, they filed before the CA a petition for certiorari questioning the
propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction which was denied.

Issue:
Whether the injunction is proper to prevent respondents the right to inspect
corporate records

Held:
No; the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief are: (a) the invasion of the
right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
plaintiff is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. As such, a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and
its actual or threatened violation. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ,
the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown.
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Corporation Code provides that a stockholder has the right to inspect the
records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any
meeting at reasonable hours on business days. The stockholder may demand
in writing for a copy of excerpts from these records or minutes, at his or her
expense as provided under Section 74 of the Corporation Code. In this case,
petitioner invokes its right to raise the limitations provided under Section 74
of the Corporation Code. However, the proper remedy available for the
enforcement of the right of inspection is undoubtedly the writ of mandamus
to be filed by the stockholders and not a petition for injunction filed by the
corporation.
Strategic Alliance Development Corp v Star Infrastructure Development Corp
GR no 187872; April 11, 2011
Grounds for objection to/dissolution of TRO/WPI

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Facts:
Respondent argues that STRADEC has no clear and unmistakable right as
would entitle it to a writ of preliminary injunction which, at any rate, cannot
be directed against acts which had already been accomplished or
consummated; and, that the preliminary injunction issued in the premises
amounted a prejudgment of the case. In compliance with the decision sought
be reconsidered, STRADEC seeks the admission and approval of the
preliminary injunction bond issued by the Empire Insurance Company. On the
ground, however, that grave and irreparable damage will be brought by the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in these premises, CTCII's
motion for reconsideration of the grant of said writ is accompanied by an
offer to post a counterbond. In its comment to CTCII's Initial Motion for
Reconsideration of the Grant of the Application for WPI, STRADEC
additionally underscores the fact, among other matters, that as its duly
elected Corporate President, Quiambao has been duly authorized to file its
amended petition a quo and to obtain the requisite surety bond for the writ
of preliminary injunction sought in connection with its petition for review on
certiorari from the CA’s decision.

Issue:
Whether STRADEC is entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction

Held:
Yes; a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of
the following essential requisites: (1) that the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. Concurrence of the foregoing requisites is evident
from the fact that STRADEC has been deprived of its rights to its
shareholdings and to participate in SIDC's corporate affairs as a consequence
of the impugned loan and pledge as well as the transfer of the shares to
respondent Wong and CTCII.

Although the general rule is to the effect that a writ of preliminary injunction
cannot be issued against acts already accomplished, it has been held,
however, that consummated acts which are continuing in nature may still be
enjoined by the courts.

Dynamic Builders & Construction Co (Phil) Inc v Presbitero Jr

GR no 174202; April 7, 2015
When TRO/WPI is prohibited/not allowed

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Facts:
The Municipality of Valladolid, Negros Occidental, through its Bids and
Awards Committee, published an invitation to bid for the construction of a
rubble concrete seawall along the municipality's shoreline. The Committee
affirmed the award of contract to HLJ Construction for the Construction
Shoreline Protection Project. The Committee informed Dynamic Builders of
the post-evaluation examination results showing Dynamic Builders' failure in
its Financial Contracting Capability. Dynamic Builders lodged a formal protest
with the head of the procuring entity, Mayor Presbitero to set aside the
Committee decision. Mayor Presbitero dismissed. Dynamic Builders filed the
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC assailing Mayor Presbitero's Decision
and a prayer for prohibition with application for TRO and/or WPI with the SC.

Issue:
Whether petitioner resorted to an improper remedy when it filed a petition
for prohibition with the SC

Held:
Yes; this violates the rule against forum shopping which requires the plaintiff
or principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not commenced
any action involving the same issues in any court. The Rules of Court
provides for original concurrent jurisdiction by the Regional Trial Court, the
Court of Appeals, and this court in entertaining petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus. However, parties must adhere to the principle of
hierarchy of courts.

Republic Act No. 8975 definitively enjoins all courts, except the Supreme
Court, from issuing any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity to restrain, prohibit or compel
the bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government,
precisely the situation that obtains in this case with respect to the Agno
River Project. The only exception would be if the matter is of extreme
urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless the temporary
restraining order is issued, grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise.

The RTC can issue injunctive relief against government infrastructure

projects, even those undertaken by local governments, considering that the
prohibition in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8957 only mentions national
government projects.

Antig v Antipuesto
GR no 192396; January 17, 2018
When TRO/WPI is prohibited/not allowed

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Facts:
AMS Farming Corporation offered their respective lots for agrarian reform,
and availed of the VOS scheme under the CARP. However, petitioners
disagreed with the LBP valuation as it allegedly did not include the value of
the standing crops and the improvements. Later, Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards over the lots were issued in favor of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries, including herein
Respondents. Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction with an
application for the issuance of a TRO which was granted. On appeal to the
CA, the CA granted the petition for certiorari and reversed the TRO.

Issue:
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to issue the injunction

Held:
No; Section 55 of RA 6657 states that no court in the Philippines shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
against the PARC of any of its duly authorized or designated agencies in any
case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or in connection with
the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act
and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform.

Section 68 states that no injunction, restraining order, prohibition, or

mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the DAR, the DA, the
DENR, and the DOJ in their implementation of the program.

When TRO/WPI is prohibited/not allowed

Facts:
Respondents Spouses Silverio filed a case against BPI to seek the declaration
of the nullity of the PNs, REMs and continuing surety agreement they had

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executed in favor of the petitioner. They further sought damages and
attorney’s fees and applied for a TRO or WPI to prevent the petitioner from
foreclosing on the mortgages against their properties. Petitioner filed its
answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as well as its opposition
to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the
foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right to do. A motion to
dismiss was filed by petitioner but was denied. RTC granted the application
for Preliminary Injunction. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC
decision.

Issue:
Whether the RTC erred in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction

Held:
Yes; injunction only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and
irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. The
respondents failed to prove that they would suffer an irreparable injury. Fear
of potential loss of possession and ownership or facing a criminal prosecution
did not constitute the requisite irreparable injury that could have warranted
the issuance of the writ of injunction.

As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction –
whether preliminary or final – in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal
prosecution. But there are extreme cases in which exceptions to the general
rule have been recognized, including:
a. When the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused
b. When it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
c. When there is a prejudicial question that is subjudice
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
e. When the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance, or regulation
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent
g. When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense
h. When it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution
i. When the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied
However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that came under any of
the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the RTC of the writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal
complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was
unwarranted.

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Tantano v Espina-Caboverde
GR no 203585; July 29, 2013
Receivership

Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint of annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly
transferring lots from their parents Maximo and Dominalda. During the
pendency of the case the parties executed a Partial Settlement Agreement

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where they fixed the sharing of the uncontroverted properties among
themselves. Under the PSA, Dominalda’s daughter, Josephine, shall be
appointed as Administrator. The PSA provided that Dominalda shall be
entitled to receive a share of 1/2 of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties. The PSA also provided that Josephine shall have
special authority, among others, to provide for the medicine of her mother.
Petitioners harp on the fact that the court a quo failed to require Dominalda
to post a bond prior to the issuance of the order appointing a receiver, in
violation of Section 2, Rule 59. Respondents insist that where there is
sufficient cause to appoint a receiver, there is no need for an applicant’s
bond because under Sec. 2 of Rule 59, the very purpose of the bond is to
answer for all damages that may be sustained by a party by reason of the
appointment of a receiver in case the applicant shall have procured such
appointment without sufficient cause.

Issue:
Whether the posting of a bond is required in receivership

Held:
Yes; Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing
a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the
party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall"
denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as
in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of
an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the
requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec.
2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time
after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such
damages.

Enriquez v The Mercantile Insurance Co Inc

GR no 210950; August 15, 2018
Replevin – Rule 60

Facts:
Enriquez filed a Complaint for Replevin against Asuten before the RTC for the
recovery of her Toyota Hi-Ace van. Asuten allegedly refused to return her
van, claiming that it was given by Enriquez's son as a consequence of a

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gambling deal. Enriquez applied for a replevin bond from Mercantile
Insurance. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the Complaint without
prejudice due to Enriquez's continued failure to present evidence. The RTC
found that Enriquez surrendered the van to BPI but did not comply when
ordered to return it to the sheriff. Thus, the RTC declared the bond forfeited.
Later, Mercantile Insurance wrote to Enriquez requesting the remittance of
the amount paid on the replevin bond and later on filed a collection suit
against Enriquez with the RTC which ruled in its favor. The CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether Enriquez should be held liable to Mercantile Insurance

Held:
Yes; this case is a rare instance where the writ of seizure is dissolved due to
the dismissal without prejudice, but the bond stands because the case has
yet to be finally terminated by the RTC.

The peculiar circumstances in this case arose when Enriquez failed to return
the van to Asuten, despite the dismissal of her action. This is an instance not
covered by the Rules of Court or jurisprudence. In its discretion, the RTC
proceeded to rule on the forfeiture of the bond. As a result, Mercantile
Insurance paid Asuten twice the value of the van withheld by Enriquez.
Mercantile Insurance, thus, seeks to recover this amount from Enriquez,
despite the van only being worth half the amount of the bond.

Forfeiture of the replevin bond requires first, a judgment on the merits in the
defendant's favor, and second, an application by the defendant for damages.
Neither circumstance appears in this case. When Enriquez failed to produce
the van, equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only an amount equal to
the value of the van. The RTC would have erred in ordering the forfeiture of
the entire bond in Asuten's favor, considering that there was no trial on the
merits or an application by Asuten for damages. This judgment could have
been reversed had Enriquez appealed the Regional Trial Court's May 24,
2004 Order in Civil Case No. 10846. Unfortunately, she did not. Mercantile
Insurance was, thus, constrained to follow the RTC’s directive to pay Asuten
the full amount of the bond.
BA Finance Corp v CA
GR no 102998; July 5, 1996
Replevin – Rule 60

Facts:
Spouses Manahan executed a PN binding themselves to pay Carmasters, Inc.
To secure payment, the Manahan spouses executed a deed of chattel
mortgage over a motor vehicle. Carmasters later assigned the promissory
note and

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the chattel mortgage to BA Finance Corporation with the conformity of the
Manahans. When the latter failed to pay the due installments, BA Finance
sent demand letters, which remained unheeded. Thus, BA Finance filed a
complaint for replevin with damages. Upon motion and filing of a bond, the
lower court issued a writ of replevin. A few months later, the court dismissed
the replevin case on the ground that the Manahan spouses were never
served with summons and ordered that the Ford Cortina be returned to
Reyes. BA Finance filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted.
Later, BA Finance filed a motion to declare Reyes in default, which was
granted due to failure of Reyes to file answer within the reglementary period
which led to the dismissal of the case.
On appeal, BA finance asserted that a suit for replevin aimed at the
foreclosure of the chattel is an action quasi in rem which does not
necessitate the presence of the principal obligors as long as the court does
not render any personal judgment against them. CA denied the appeal as
well as the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Whether a mortgagee can maintain an action for replevin against any
possessor of the object of a chattel mortgage even if the latter were not a
party to the mortgage

Held:
Yes; replevin is both a form of principal remedy and of a provisional relief. It
may refer either to the action itself, i.e., to regain the possession of personal
chattels being wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the thing during
the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite. The action is primarily
possessory in nature and generally determines nothing more than the right
of possession.

Rule 60 allows an application for the immediate possession of the property

but
the plaintiff must show that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title
thereto, for seeking such interim possession. In case the right of possession
on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such possession or that of
his principal, is put to great doubt, it could become essential to have other
persons involved and accordingly impleaded for a complete determination
and resolution of the controversy. Where the right of the plaintiff to the
possession of the specific property is so conceded or evident, the action
need only be maintained against him who so possesses the property.

When the mortgagee seeks a replevin in order to effect the eventual

foreclosure of the mortgage, it is not only the existence of, but also the
mortgagor's default on, the chattel mortgage that, among other things, can
properly uphold the right to replevy the property. The burden to establish a

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valid justification for that action lies with the plaintiff. An adverse possessor,
who is not the mortgagor, cannot just be deprived of his possession, let
alone be bound by the terms of the chattel mortgage contract, simply
because the mortgagee brings up an action for replevin.

Servicewide Specialists Inc v CA

GR no 110048; November 19, 1999
Replevin – Rule 60

Facts:
Leticia Laus purchased on credit a Colt Galant from Fortune Motors. She
executed a promissory note. As a security for the promissory note, a chattel
mortgage was constituted over the said motor vehicle, with a deed of
assignment incorporated therein such that the rights were assigned in favor
of Filinvest Credit Corporation. in turn assigned the credit in favor of

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Petitioner Servicewide. Despite said formal demand, Leticia Laus failed to
pay all the monthly installments due which prompted Servicewide to institute
a complaint for replevin, impleading Hilda Tee and John Dee in whose
custody the vehicle was believed to be at the time of the filing of the suit.
Alberto Villafranca filed a third-party claim contending that he is the absolute
owner of the subject motor vehicle and moved for the dismissal of the
complaint. The lower court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence.

Issue:
Whether a case for replevin may be pursued against Villafranca without
impleading the absconding debtor-mortgagor, Laus

Held:
No; Rule 60 requires that an applicant for replevin must show that he “is the
owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof.” Where the right of the plaintiff to the possession of the
specified property is so conceded or evident, the action need only be
maintained against him who so possesses the property. However, in case the
right of possession on the part of the plaintiff, or his authority to claim such
possession or that of his principal, is put to great doubt, it could become
essential to have other persons involved and impleaded for a complete
determination and resolution of the controversy.

In a suit for replevin, a clear right of possession must be established. The

conditions essential for foreclosure of chattel mortgage would be to show,
firstly, the existence of the chattel mortgage and, secondly, the default of
the mortgagor. Since the mortgagee’s right of possession is conditioned
upon the actual fact of default which itself may be controverted, the
inclusion of other parties, like the debtor or the mortgagor himself, may be
required in order to allow a full and conclusive determination of the case.
Laus, being an indispensable party, should have been impleaded in the
complaint for replevin and damages.

Rivera v Vargas
GR no 165895; June 5, 2009
Objections to/dissolution/discharge of writ

Facts:
Respondent Vargas filed a complaint against petitioner and several John
Does before the RTC for the recovery of a 150 T/H rock crushing plant.
Vargas claims of ownership of the said equipment, having purchased and
imported directly
from Hyun Dae Trqading Co. The equipment was allegedly entrusted to
petitioner’s husband, Jan Rivera who died sometime in 2002, as caretaker of

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respondent’s construction aggregates business. According to Vargas,
petitioner failed to return the said equipment after her husband’s death
despite his repeated demands. The complaint was accompanied by a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of replevin which was issued. Rivera filed a motion
for the accpetance of petitioner’s redelivery bond. RTC issued an order
disapproving petitioner’s redelivery bond application for failure to comply
with the requirements under Section 5 and 6 of Rule 60 of the ROC.
Petitioner appealed to the CA but was denied for lack of merit.

Issue:
Whether the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5-day mandatory period
is erroneous considering the writ was improperly served

Held:
Yes; the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of
the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party together with
the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are
simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is
being seized in accordance with the court's order upon application by the
other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper
remedy
consequent thereto.

If the writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely
handed to a person who is neither an agent of the adverse party nor a
person authorized to receive court processes on his behalf, the service
thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory
and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of
replevin was served without the required documents. Under these
circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the property shall pass, the act
of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in
contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-
day period shall commence to run.
Advent Capital and Finance Corp v Young
GR no 183018; August 3, 2011
Objections to/dissolution/discharge of writ

Facts:
The present controversy stemmed from a replevin suit instituted by
petitioner Advent Capital against respondent Young to recover the
possession of a 1996 Mercedes Benz E230 which is registered in Advent’s
name. Prior to the replevin case, Advent filed for corporate rehabilitation
with the RTC which a stay order.
The rehabilitation court approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by

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Advent which included the subject car which remained in Young’s possession
at the time. Young’s obstinate refusal to return the subject car, after
repeated demands, prompted Advent to file the replevin case. After Advent’s
posting of the replevin bond, which was double the value of the subject car
at the time, through Stronghold, the trial court issued a Writ of Seizure
directing the Sheriff to seize the subject car from Young. Upon receipt of the
Writ of Seizure, Young turned over the car to Advent and filed an Answer
alleging that as a former employee of Advent, he had the option to purchase
the subject car at book value pursuant to the company car plan and to offset
the value of the car with the proceeds of his retirement pay and stock option
plan. The CA ruled in favor of Young.

Issue:
Whether the CA erred in directing the return of the seized car to Young

Held:
Yes; the return of the seized car to Young is correct because it is the
necessary consequence of the dismissal of the replevin case for failure to
prosecute without prejudice. Upon the dismissal of the replevin case for
failure to prosecute, the writ of seizure, which is merely ancillary in nature,
became functus officio and should have been lifted. There was no
adjudication on the merits, which means that there was no determination of
the issue who has the
better right to possess the subject car. Advent cannot therefore retain
possession of the subject car considering that it was not adjudged as the
prevailing party entitled to the remedy of replevin.

Section 10, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court governs claims for damages on
account of improper or irregular seizure in replevin cases. It provides that in
replevin cases, as in receivership and injunction cases, the damages to be
awarded upon the bond "shall be claimed, ascertained, and granted" in
accordance with Section 20 of Rule 57. The provision essentially allows the
application to be filed at any time before the judgment becomes executory.
It should be filed in the same case that is the main action, and with the court
having jurisdiction over the case at the time of the application.
In this case, there was no application for damages against Stronghold
resulting from the issuance of the writ of seizure before the finality of the
dismissal of the complaint for failure to prosecute. Young filed his omnibus
motion claiming damages against Stronghold after the dismissal order issued
by the trial court had attained finality. While Young filed a motion for partial
reconsideration, it only concerned the dismissal of his counterclaim, without
any claim for damages against the replevin bond.

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Somosa-Ramos v Vamenta Jr
GR no L-34132; July 29, 1972
Support – Rule 61

Facts:
Lucy filed a case for legal separation against Clemente on the ground of
concubinage and an attempt by him against her life. She likewise sought the
issuance of a WPI for the return to her of what she claimed to be her
paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the administration and
management of Clemente. Clemente opposed the motion based on Article
103 of the Civil Code which provides: "An action for legal separation shall in
no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition” (now Art 58, Family Code). He manifested that if the motion were

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heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even
more dim. Judge Vamenta granted the motion of Clemente and suspended
the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether Art 103 bars the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction over properties

Held:
No; after the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be
entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective
property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage
said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and
duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of
the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." (now Art. 61,
Family Code)

There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of

management of their respective property need not be left unresolved even
during such 6-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the
management of the property of the conjugal partnership. There is
justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court.
There is all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage and an
attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management
of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was
not specifically denied by him.

San Juan v Valenzuela

GR no L-59906; October 23, 1982
Support – Rule 61

Facts:
After the CFI had declared null and void the marriage between respondent
Mejia and petitioner San Juan on the ground of a prior and subsisting
marriage of the latter, respondent Mejia instituted an action seeking support
for herself and her two minor children. Pending resolution of the principal
action, respondent judge, upon application of private respondent, granted
support pendente lite. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
brought this petition for certiorari. However, during pendency of said
petition, petitioner filed

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with the trial court a manifestation proposing a scheme of payment for the
amount of support which had accrued, and seeking to reduce the amount of
support pendente lite on the ground that the sum previously fixed by
respondent judge is now beyond his means to pay. The Court approved
petitioner's proposal but failed to act on petitioner's request for reduction of
the
monthly support because respondent judge left for abroad.

Issue:
Whether the order fixing the amount of support is final

Held:
No; the petitioner’s unwillingness to pay the amount of the support pendente
lite in the manner indicated in his manifestation, and the approval thereof by
the respondent judge have rendered the petition moot and academic; and
the amount of support pendente lite is not final in character but the factual
issue as to the ability of the obligor to pay the support previously fixed
should be resolved by the lower court on the basis of evidence to be
presented at the proper hearing.

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