Airbus a380 Fctm (2011)
Airbus a380 Fctm (2011)
Airbus a380 Fctm (2011)
The content of this document is the property of Airbus. It is supplied in confidence and commercial
security on its contents must be maintained. It must not be used for any purpose other than that for
which it is supplied, nor may information contained in it be disclosed to unauthorized persons. It must
not be reproduced in whole or in part without permission in writing from the owners of the copyright.
© AIRBUS 2005. All rights reserved.
AIRBUS S.A.S
CUSTOMER SERVICES DIRECTORATE
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX
FRANCE
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
This is the FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL at issue date 16 AUG 11 for the A380 and
replacing last issue dated 08 JAN 11
No comment
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
Localization Insert
Remove
Subsection Title Rev. Date
No filing instructions
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
GI GENERAL INFORMATION
OP OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
NO NORMAL OPERATIONS
AO ABNORMAL OPERATIONS
SI SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
(1)
M Localization Subsection Title Rev. Date
GI GENERAL INFORMATION 10 AUG 11
OP-10 General 03 AUG 10
OP-20-20-1 Laws 03 AUG 10
OP-20-20-2 Protections 03 AUG 10
OP-20-20-3 System Characteristics 03 AUG 10
OP-30-30-1 AP/FD 10 AUG 11
OP-30-30-2 Autothrust 03 AUG 10
OP-30-30-3 AP, FD, A/THR Mode Changes and Reversions 03 AUG 10
OP-40-40-1 General 03 AUG 10
OP-40-40-2 Normal Operations 02 JUN 11
OP-40-40-3 Abnormal Operations 02 JUN 11
NO-10 General 08 JAN 11
NO-20 Flight Preparation 03 AUG 10
NO-40 Preliminary Cockpit Preparation 03 AUG 10
NO-50 Exterior Walkaround 03 AUG 10
NO-60 Cockpit Preparation 02 JUN 11
NO-70 Before Pushback or Start 03 AUG 10
NO-80 Engine Start 02 JUN 11
NO-90 After Start 08 JAN 11
NO-100 Taxi 02 JUN 11
NO-110 Before Takeoff 03 AUG 10
NO-120 Takeoff 03 AUG 10
NO-140 Climb 08 JAN 11
NO-150 Cruise 03 AUG 10
NO-160 Descent Preparation 03 AUG 10
NO-170 Descent 08 JAN 11
NO-175 Holding 03 AUG 10
NO-180 Approach 03 AUG 10
NO-185 ILS Approach 03 AUG 10
NO-190 Non-Precision Approach 03 AUG 10
NO-195 Precision Approach 02 JUN 11
NO-200 Visual Approach 03 AUG 10
NO-210 Go-Around 03 AUG 10
NO-220 Landing 02 JUN 11
NO-230 After Landing 08 JAN 11
NO-240 Parking 03 AUG 10
NO-260 Standard Callouts 03 AUG 10
AO-10 General 10 AUG 11
AO-15 Cockpit/Cabin Communication 03 AUG 10
AO-20 Operating Techniques 02 JUN 11
AO-22 Auto flight 03 AUG 10
(1)
M Localization Subsection Title Rev. Date
AO-24 Electrical 03 AUG 10
AO-26 Fire Protection 03 AUG 10
AO-27 Flight Controls 03 AUG 10
AO-29 Hydraulic 03 AUG 10
AO-34 Navigation 03 AUG 10
AO-70 Power Plant 10 AUG 11
AO-80 Miscellaneous 10 AUG 11
AO-90 Abnormal and Emergency Callouts 03 AUG 10
SI-10-10-1 Cold Weather Operations and Icing Conditions 03 AUG 10
SI-10-10-2 Windshear 03 AUG 10
SI-10-10-3 Turbulence 03 AUG 10
SI-20 Flight References 03 AUG 10
SI-30 Navigation Accuracy 03 AUG 10
SI-60 TCAS 02 JUN 11
SI-70 Use of Vertical Display 03 AUG 10
SI-80 Use of Weather Radar 03 AUG 10
SI-90 Use of HUD 03 AUG 10
SI-100 Use of Onboard Information System (OIS) 02 JUN 11
(1) Evolution code : N=New, R=Revised, E=Effectivity, M=Moved
(1)
M Localization DU Title DU identification DU date
AO-10 Quick Reference Handbook 00023135.0001001 01 MAR 10
Criteria: T78678
Applicable to: ALL
Impacted DU: 00011429 Quick Reference Handbook
(1) Evolution code : N=New, R=Revised, E=Effectivity
This table gives, for each delivered aircraft, the cross reference between:
- The Manufacturing Serial Number (MSN).
- The Fleet Serial Number (FSN) of the aircraft as known by AIRBUS S.A.S.
- The registration number of the aircraft as known by AIRBUS S.A.S.
- The aircraft model.
(1)
M MSN FSN Registration Number Model
0035 HL7611 380-861
0039 HL7612 380-861
0059 380-861
0068 380-861
0075 380-861
(1) Evolution code : N=New, R=Revised
(1)
M MODIFICATION Linked SB Incorp. Date Title
T62521 03 AUG 10 INDICATING/RECORDING-HUD- INSTALL A SINGLE
LH HUD
Applicable to: ALL
T76484 03 AUG 10 INDICATING/RECORDING SYSTEMS
GENERAL-FLIGHT WARNING SYSTEM ( FWS)- Define
and Install FWS Software : Standard L41
Applicable to: ALL
T76701 03 AUG 10 FLIGHT CONTROLS - ELECTRICAL BACKUP - Swap
BCM wiring from inboard elevators to outboard elevators.
Applicable to: ALL
T76662 03 AUG 10 HYDRAULIC POWER - GENERAL - INSTALL HSMU
STD 5 WITH MODIFIED PUSH-BACK AND SIMULATED
FLIGHT FUNCTIONS
Applicable to: ALL
T71614 03 AUG 10 INFORMATION SYSTEMS - FLIGHT CREW
APPLICATION - INSTALL ELECTRONIC FLIGHT
FOLDER AND FLIGHT FOLLOW-UP (EFF/FFU)
SOFTWARE V2.2 IN THE 3 LAPTOPS
Applicable to: ALL
T73386 03 AUG 10 AUTO FLIGHT-AUTOPILOT/FLIGHT DIRECTOR
(AP/FD)-CERTIFY AUTO PILOT TCAS MODE
Applicable to: ALL
T73377 03 AUG 10 ELECTRICAL POWER - DCGS - INTRODUCE NEW
DCGS ARCHITECTURE.
Applicable to: ALL
T76645 03 AUG 10 INFORMATION SYSTEMS-PORTABLE ONBOARD
INFORMATION TERMINAL-INSTALL CONFIG DATA
(LAOD INTEGRATOR) IN THE 3 LAPTOPS FOR ILG 3.4
AND QFA01
Applicable to: ALL
T77518 03 AUG 10 INDICATING/RECORDING SYSTEMS
GENERAL-FLIGHT WARNING SYSTEM ( FWS)- Define
and Install FWS Software : Standard L50
Applicable to: ALL
T78678 03 AUG 10 INDICATING/RECORDING SYSTEMS - FLIGHT
WARNING SYSTEM (FWS)-DEFINE AND INSTALL
NEW ATQC V5 L50.
Applicable to: ALL
(1) Evolution code : N=New, R=Revised, E=Effectivity
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE
The purpose of the Main FCTM Changes is to provide general information about this FCTM
revision and to highlight the main changes.
Note: In addition, each Documentary Unit (DU) provides highlights with the reason(s) for
change and uses revision bars to indicate the revised sections.
TIMEFRAME
The Main FCTM Changes are defined on a monthly basis, regardless of the revision cycle that
is applicable to each Operator.
The subjects in the Main FCTM Changes are categorized by month, but include revision
information from the preceding 6 months only.
SEPTEMBER 2010
MODIFICATION OF THE OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE CASE OF TRAFFIC
ADVISORY (TA) ALERT
In 2004, the visual acquisition of the intruder was removed from the Resolution Advisory alert
procedure, for all Airbus aircraft. This is in accordance with a set of recommendations on the
use of TCAS II, issued by the aviation industry following in-service events.
In particular, Eurocontrol issued the following limitations relative to visual acquisition of the
traffic:
‐ The visual assessment of the traffic can be misleading. At high altitude, it is difficult to assess
the range and heading of traffic as well as its relative height. At low altitude, the heavy aircraft
attitude at low speed makes it difficult to assess whether it is climbing or descending
‐ Visual acquisition does not provide any information about the intent of other traffic
‐ The traffic in visual contact may not be the threat that triggers the Resolution Advisory. A
visual maneuver relative to the wrong visual traffic may degrade the situation against the real
threat.
Airbus considers that the above limitations apply as well in the case of a Traffic Advisory alert,
as in the case of a Resolution Advisory alert.
As a consequence, the Supplementary Information / TCAS / Operational Recommendations
section is amended, in order to remove the recommendation to try to see the reported traffic, in
the case a Traffic Advisory is generated.
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
AUGUST 2010
No FCTM revision in August.
JUNE 2010
The stall recovery procedure in the FCOM is updated, as explained in Flight Operations Telex
999.0044/10 issued May 12, 2010.
A new FCTM chapter in FCTM/Abnormal Operations/Operating Techniques provides the flight
crew with more information and background on the new stall recovery procedure.
FCTM PURPOSE
Applicable to: ALL
The Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) complements the Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM).
The FCTM is designed to provide the flight crews with information on how to operate the aircraft. The
flight crew should read the FCTM in conjunction with the FCOM.
If the data contained in the FCTM differs from the data in the FCOM, the FCOM remains the
reference.
The Airline Training Policy may be different. In this case, the Airline Training Policy remains the
reference.
Airbus encourages all manual holders and users to submit any FCTM question and suggestion to:
E.MAIL: fltops.A380std@airbus.com
AIRBUS S.A.S.
FLIGHT OPERATIONS SUPPORT AND SERVICES
1 ROND-POINT MAURICE BELLONTE
31707 BLAGNAC CEDEX, FRANCE
Fax: +33 5 61 93 29 68
ABBREVIATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
A
Abbreviation Term
A Ampere
A.FLOOR Alpha Floor
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
B
Abbreviation Term
B/C Back Course
BARO Barometric
BAT Battery (Electrical)
BCM Backup Control Module
BCS Brake Control System
BEA Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses
BFO Beat Frequency Oscillator
BITE Built-in Test Equipment
BKUP Backup
BLG Body Landing Gear
BLW Below
BPS Backup Power Supply
BRG Bearing
BRK Brake
BRT Bright, Brightness
BSCS Brake and steering Control System
BSU Beam Steering Unit
BTAC Belly Taxi Aid Camera
BTC Bus Tie Contactor
BTL Bottle
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
C
Abbreviation Term
C/B Circuit Breaker
C/L Check List
CAB Cabin
CAN Controller Area Network
CAPT Captain
CAS Calibrated Air Speed
CAT Category, Clear Air Turbulence
CAUT Caution
CCD Cursor Control Device
CCOM Cabin Crew Operating Manual
CCRC Cabin Crew Rest Compartment
CDAM Centralized Data Acquisition Module
CDL Configuration Deviation List
CDLCU Cockpit Door Lock Control Unit
CDLS Cockpit Door Locking System
CDS Control and Display System
CDSS Cockpit Door Surveillance System
CF Cost of Fuel
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
CFP Computerized Flight Plan
CG Center of Gravity
CHR Chronometer
CHRO Chronometer
CI Cost Index
CIDS Cabin Intercommunication Data System
CKPT Cockpit
CL Coefficient of Lift, Climb Detent on Thrust Levers
CLB Climb
CLR Clear
CLS Cargo Loading System
CM1 Crewmember (Left Seat)
CM2 Crewmember (Right Seat)
CMS Constant Mach Segment, Cabin Management System, Central Maintenance System
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
D
Abbreviation Term
DA Decision Altitude
DC Direct Current
DDD Decompression Deceleration Device
DDRMI Digital Distance and Radio Magnetic Indication
DECEL Decelerate, Deceleration Point
DEP Departure
DEPS Door Emergency Power Supply
DES Descend, Descent
DEST Destination
DET Detection, Detector
DEV Deviation
DFDR Digital Flight Data Recorder
DH Decision Height
DIR Direction, Direct, Director
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
E
Abbreviation Term
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency
EBCU Emergency Brake Control Unit
EBHA Electrical Backup Hydraulic Actuator
EBPTU Emergency Brake Pedal Transmitter Unit
EC Engine Control
ECAM Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring
ECAS Emergency Crew Alerting System
ECB Electronic Control Box
ECON Economy, Economic
ECP ECAM Control Panel
ECU Electronic Control Unit
EDP Engine Driven Pump
EEC Engine Electronic Controller
EFB Electronic Flight Bag
EFF Electronic Flight Folder
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
EFOB Estimated Fuel on Board
EGT Exhaust Gas Temperature
EHA Electro-Hydrostatic Actuator
EIPM Engine Interface Power Management
ELEC Electric, Electrical, Electricity
ELEV Elevation, Elevator
ELEVN Elevation
ELMU Electrical Load Management Unit
ELT Emergency Locator Transmitter
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
F
Abbreviation Term
F Minimum Flap Retract Speed
F/C Flight Crew
F/CTL Flight Control
F/O First Officer
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FADEC Full Authority Digital Engine Control
FAF Final Approach Fix
FANS Future Air Navigation System
FAP Final Approach Point, Flight Attendant Panel, Forward Attendant Panel
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations
FCDC Flight Control Data Concentrator
FCGU Flight Control and Guidance Unit
FCOM Flight Crew Operating Manual
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
G
Abbreviation Term
G/S Glide Slope
G/S* Glide Slope Capture Mode
GA Go-Around
GA TRK Go-Around Track Mode
GCU Ground Control Unit
GD Green Dot
GDOT Green Dot
GEN Generator
GES Ground Earth Station
GGPCU Generator and Ground Power Control Unit
GLS GNSS Landing System
GND Ground
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
GPS Global Positioning System
GPIRS GPS IRS
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
GRVTY Gravity
GS Ground Speed
GSE Ground Support Equipment
GW Gross Weight
GWCG Gross Weight Center of Gravity
H
Abbreviation Term
HA Holding Pattern to an Altitude Termination
HCF Heading Control Function
HCU Head-Up Combiner Unit
HDG Heading
HF High Frequency
HH Hour (entry format)
HI High
HM Holding Pattern with a Manual Termination
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
I
Abbreviation Term
IAS Indicated Airspeed
IATA International Air Transport Association
IBLC Inter-Bus Line Contactor
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IDENT Identification, Identifier, Identify
IFE In-Flight Entertainment
IFPA In-Flight Performance Application
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IGN Ignition
IGV Inlet Guide Vane
ILS Instrument landing System (LOC and G/S)
IMA Integrated Modular Avionics
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IN-BND In-Bound
INFO Information
INIT Initial(ization)
INOP Inoperative
INR Inner
INT Interphone
IOM Input/Output Module
IP Intermediate Pressure
IPCU Ice Protection Control Unit
IR Inertial Reference
IRS Inertial Reference System
IRU Inertial Reference Unit
ISA International Standard Atmosphere
ISIS Integrated Standby Instrument System
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
K
Abbreviation Term
KBD Keyboard
KCCU Keyboard and Cursor Control Unit
KOZ Keep Out Zone
L
Abbreviation Term
L Left
L/G Landing Gear
LAF Load Alleviation Function
LAND Landing
LAT Latitude, Lateral
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LDA LOC type Directional Aid
LDC Local Door Controller
LDG Landing
LDPA Landing Performance Application
LED Light Emitting Diode
LEHGS Local Electro-Hydraulic Generation System
LGCIS Landing Gear Control Indication System
LGERS Landing Gear Extension and Retraction System
LH Left Hand
LIM Limit, Limitation, Limiting, Limiter
LL Latitude/Longitude
LL XING Latitude/Longitude Crossing
LO Low
LOC Localizer, Localizer Track Mode
LOC B/C Localizer Back Course Track Mode
LOC B/C* Localizer Back Course Capture Mode
LOC* Localizer Capture Mode
LONG Longitude
LP Low Pressure
LRC Long Range Cruise
LS Landing System, Low Speed, Loudspeaker
LSELV Locking Selector Valve
LSK Line Selection Key
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
M
Abbreviation Term
MABH Minimum Approach Breakoff Height
MAG Magnetic
MAN Manual
MAP Missed Approach Point
MAX Maximum
MC Master Caution
MCD Magnetic Chip Detector
MCDU Multipurpose Control & Display Unit
MCL Maximum Climb Thrust
MCPU Motor Control and Protection Unit
MCR Maximum Cruise Thrust
MCT Maximum Continuous Thrust
MDA Minimum Decision Altitude
MDH Minimum Descent Height
MECH Mechanic, Mechanical, Mechanism
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MET Meteorological
METAR Meteorological Airport Report
METOTS Modified Engine Takeoff Thrust Setting
MFD Multi Function Display
MFP MultiFunction Probe
MGA Maximum Go-around Thrust
MHA Minimum Holding Altitude
MIN Minimum
MIP Maintenance Information Printer
MIXIRS Mixed IRS
MKR Marker (radio) Beacon
MLG Main Landing Gear
MLS Microwave Landing System
MLW Maximum Landing Weight
MM Middle Marker, Minutes (entry format)
MMEL Master Minimum Equipment List
MMO Maximum Operating Mach
MMR Multi-Mode Receiver
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
N
Abbreviation Term
N1 Engine Fan Speed, Low Pressure Rotor Speed
N2 Engine Intermediate Pressure Rotor Speed
N3 Engine High Pressure Rotor Speed
NADP Noise Abatement Departure Procedure
NAV Navigation
NAVAID Navigation Aid
NAVAIDS Navigation Aids
NBPT No Break Power Transfer
NBPTU Normal Brake Pedal Transmitter Unit
NBSELV Normal Brake Selector Valve
NCD Non Computed Data
ND Navigation Display
NDB Non-Directional Beacon
NLG Nose Landing Gear
NORM Normal
NPA Non-Precision Approach
NPT Normal Pressure Transmitter
NSELV Normal Selector Valve
NSS Network Server System
NSV Normal Servo Valve
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
NW Nose Wheel
NWS Nose Wheel Steering
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
O
Abbreviation Term
OANS Onboard Airport Navigation System
OAT Outside Air Temperature
OEB Operations Engineering Bulletins
OEI One Engine Inoperative
OEW Operational Empty Weight
OIS Onboard Information System
OIT Onboard Information Terminal
OMS Onboard Maintenance System
OMT Onboard Maintenance Terminal
OOOI Out-Off-On-In
OP Open
OPC Operational Program Configuration
OP CLB Open Climb
OP DES Open Descent
OPMS Oleo Pressure Monitoring System
OPS Operations
OPT Optimum, Optional
OPV Overpressure Valve
OSCU Oxygen System Control Unit
OUT-BND Out-Bound
OUTR Outer
OVHT Overheat
OVRD Override
OXY Oxygen
P
Abbreviation Term
P.POS Present Position
P/N Part Number
PA Passenger Address
PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator
PARK Parking
PAX Passenger
PB Place/Bearing, Pushbutton
PB-SW Pushbutton-Switch
PBD Place/Bearing/Distance
PBE Protective Breathing Equipment
PBSELV Parking Brake Selector Valve
PD Place/Distance
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
Q
Abbreviation Term
QAR Quick Access Recorder
QFE Field Elevation Atmospheric Pressure
QFU Runway Heading
QNH Sea Level Atmospheric Pressure
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
R
Abbreviation Term
R Right
RA Radio Altimeter, Radio Altitude, Resolution Advisory
RAD Radio
RAM Random Access Memory
RAT Ram Air Turbine
RCDR Recorder
RCL Recall
RED Reduction
REF Reference
REGUL Regulation
REC Recommended
REV Revise, Revision, Reverse
RFCF Runway Field Clearance Floor
RH Right Hand
RLD Required Landing Distance
RMP Radio Management Panel
RNAV Area Navigation
RNP Required Navigation Performance
ROC Rate of Climb
ROD Rate of Descent
ROP Runway Overrun Protection
ROW Runway Overrun Warning
RPTG Reporting
RQRD Required
RST Reset
RTA Required Time of Arrival
RTD Required Time to Destination
RTE Route
RTO Rejected Takeoff
RTOW Runway Takeoff Weight
RTU Radar Transceiver Unit
RUD Rudder
RVR Runway Visual Range
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
RWY Runway, Runway Mode
RWY TRK Runway Track Mode
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
S
Abbreviation Term
S Minimum Slat Retract Speed, South
S/C Step Climb
S/D Step Descent
SAT Static Air Temperature
SATCOM Satellite Communication
SC Single Chime
SCI Secure Communication Interface
SCS Steering Control System
SD System Display
SDF Smoke Detection Function, Simplified Directional Facility
SDU Satellite Data Unit
SEC Secondary Flight Control Computer, Secondary Flight Plan
SEL Select, Selected, Selector, Selection
SELCAL Selective Calling
SFC Specific Fuel Consumption
SFCC Slat Flap Control Computer
SFD Standby Flight Display
SID Standard Instrument Departure
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information
SIRU Secure Interface Router Unit
SND Standby Navigation Display
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SP Space, Sampling
SPD Speed
SPD LIM Speed Limit
SPDB Secondary Power Distribution Box
SPEC Specification
SPECIF Specification
SPLR Spoiler
SQWK Squawk
SR Specific Range
SRS Speed Reference System
SS Sky/Shading
SSA Side Slip Angle
SSB Single Side Band
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route
STBY Standby
STD Standard
STL System Torque Limiter
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
T
Abbreviation Term
T-P Turning Point
T.O Takeoff
T/C Top of Climb
T/D Top of Descent, Touchdown
TA Traffic Advisory
TAC Taxiing Aid Camera
TACS Taxiing Aid Camera System
TACAN Ultra-high Frequency Tactical Air Navigation Aid
TAD Terrain Awareness and Display
TAF Terminal Aerodrome Forecast
TAS True Airspeed
TASOV Trim Air Shut-Off Valves
TAT Total Air Temperature
TAU Estimated Time to Intercept
TAV Trim Air Valve
TAWS Terrain Awareness and Warning System
TBC To Be Confirmed
TBD To Be Defined
TBV Transient Bleed Valve, Turbine Bypass Valve
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TCC Turbine Case Cooling
TCF Terrain Clearance Floor
TCM Thrust Control Malfunction
TCV Temperature Control Valve
TDU Temporary Documentary Unit
TEI Two Engines Inoperative
TEL Telephone
TEMP Temperature
TERR Terrain
TFLEX Flex Temperature
THR Thrust
THS Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
U
Abbreviation Term
USB Universal Serial Bus
UTC Universal Time Coordinated
V
Abbreviation Term
V/S Vertical Speed
V1 Decision Speed, Critical Engine Failure Speed
V2 Takeoff Safety Speed
VAPP Approach Speed
VASI Visual Approach Slope Indicator
VD Vertical Display
VDAR Virtual Digital ACMS Recorder
VDEV Vertical Deviation
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
W
Abbreviation Term
W/S Windshear
WADU Weather Antenna Drive Unit
WARN Warning
WBA Weight and Balance Application
WBBC Weight and Balance Backup Computer
WD Warning Display
Continued on the following page
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
X
Abbreviation Term
XING Crossing
XPDR Transponder
XTK Cross Track
Y
Abbreviation Term
Y Year
Z
Abbreviation Term
ZFCG Zero Fuel Center of Gravity
ZFW Zero Fuel Weight
ZFWCG Zero Fuel Weight Center of Gravity
A380
FLIGHT CREW TRAINING MANUAL
OP-10 General
Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A
Operational Golden Rules....................................................................................................................................... B
OP-20-20-2 Protections
OBJECTIVES OF THE PROTECTIONS.................................................................................................................A
BANK ANGLE PROTECTION................................................................................................................................. B
HIGH SPEED PROTECTION..................................................................................................................................C
LOAD FACTOR PROTECTION.............................................................................................................................. D
HIGH PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION.................................................................................................................E
High Angle-Of-Attack (AOA) Protection...................................................................................................................F
ABNORMAL ATTITUDES....................................................................................................................................... G
OP-30-30-2 Autothrust
OBJECTIVE............................................................................................................................................................. A
INTERFACE............................................................................................................................................................. B
Normal Operations...................................................................................................................................................C
OPERATIONS WITH ONE ENGINE INOPERATIVE..............................................................................................D
To Set Autothrust to Off.......................................................................................................................................... E
ALPHA FLOOR........................................................................................................................................................ F
A/THR USE - SUMMARY....................................................................................................................................... G
OP-40 ECAM
OP-40-40-1 General
PURPOSE OF THE ECAM ....................................................................................................................................A
Main Principles.........................................................................................................................................................B
INTRODUCTION
Applicable to: ALL
The Airbus cockpit is designed to achieve pilot operational needs throughout the aircraft operating
environment, while ensuring maximum commonality within the Fly by Wire family. The cockpit design
objectives are driven by three criteria:
• Reinforce the safety of flight
• Improve efficiency of flight
• Answer pilot requirements in a continuously changing environment
Airbus operational rules result from the design concept, more particularly from the following
systems:
• The Fly by wire system with its control laws and protections, commanded through the side stick,
• An integrated Auto Flight System comprising:
INTRODUCTION
Applicable to: ALL
The relationship between the Pilot Flying’s (PF’s) input on the sidestick and the aircraft’s response is
referred to as control law. This relationship determines the handling characteristics of the aircraft.
There are three sets of control laws and they are provided according to the status of the computers,
peripherals and hydraulic generation.
The three sets of control laws are:
‐ Normal law,
‐ Alternate law,
‐ Direct law.
The aim of normal law is to provide the following handling characteristics within the normal flight
envelope (regardless of aircraft speed, altitude, gross weight and CG):
‐ Aircraft must be stable and maneuverable,
‐ The same response must be consistently obtained from the aircraft,
‐ The actions on the sidestick must be balanced in pitch and in roll.
The normal law handling characteristics at the flight envelope limit are:
‐ The PF has full authority to achieve Maximum Aircraft Performance,
‐ The PF can have instinctive/immediate reaction in the event of an emergency,
‐ There is a reduced possibility of overcontrolling or overstressing the aircraft.
Normal Law is the law that is most commonly available and it handles single failures.
IN FLIGHT
When the PF performs sidestick inputs, a constant G-LOAD maneuver is ordered and the aircraft
responds with a G-LOAD / Pitch Rate. Therefore the PF’s order is consistent with the response
that is “naturally” expected from the aircraft: Pitch Rate at low speed, Flight Path Rate or G at high
speed.
Operational Recommendation
Since the aircraft is stable and auto-trimmed, the PF needs to perform minor corrections on the
sidestick if the aircraft deviates from its intended flight path.
The PF should not fight the sidestick or overcontrol it. If the PF senses an overcontrol, the
sidestick should be released.
NORMAL CONDITIONS
When the PF performs a lateral input on the sidestick, a roll rate is ordered and naturally obtained.
Therefore at a bank angle of less than 33 ° with no input on the sidestick, a zero roll rate is ordered
and the current bank angle is maintained. Consequently the aircraft is laterally stable and no
aileron trim is required.
However lateral law is a mixture of roll and yaw demand with:
‐ Automatic turn coordination,
‐ Automatic yaw damping,
‐ Initial yaw damper response to a major aircraft assymetry.
In addition, if the bank angle is less than 33 °, pitch compensation is provided.
If the bank angle is greater than 33 °, spiral stability is reintroduced and pitch compensation is no
longer available. This is because, in normal situations, there is no operational reason to fly with
such high bank angles for a long period of time.
Operational Recommendation
During a normal turn (bank angle less than 33 °), in level flight:
‐ The PF moves the sidestick laterally (the more the sidestick is moved laterally, the greater the
resulting roll rate - e.g. 15 ° per second at max deflection),
‐ Not necessary to make a pitch correction,
‐ Not necessary to use the rudder.
In the case of steep turns (bank angle greater than 33 degrees), the PF must apply:
‐ Lateral pressure on the sidestick to maintain bank,
‐ Aft pressure on the sidestick to maintain level flight.
ENGINE FAILURE
In flight, if an engine failure occurs and no input is applied on the sidestick, lateral normal law
controls the natural tendency of the aircraft to roll and yaw.
The lateral behavior of aircraft is safe.
However, the PF is best suited to adapt the lateral trimming technique when necessary. From a
performance standpoint, the most effective flying technique, in the event of an engine failure at
takeoff, is to fly a constant heading with roll surfaces retracted. This technique dictates the amount
of rudder that is required and the resulting residual sideslip.
As a result, to indicate the amount of rudder that is required to correctly fly with an engine-out at
takeoff, the measured sideslip index is shifted on the PFD by the computed residual-sideslip value.
This index appears in blue instead of in yellow and is referred to as the beta target. If the rudder
pedal is pressed to center the beta target index, the PF will fly with the residual slip as required
by the engine-out condition. Therefore, the aircraft will fly at a constant heading with ailerons and
spoilers close to neutral position.
Beta Target on PFD
Operational Recommendation
In the case of an engine failure at takeoff, the PF must:
• Smoothly adjust pitch to maintain a safe speed (as per SRS guidance)
• Center the Beta target (there is no hurry, because the aircraft is laterally safe).
• When appropriate, trim the aircraft laterally using the rudder trim
• Apply small lateral sidestick inputs, so that the aircraft flies the appropriate heading.
Normal Law provides five different protections (Refer to the Protections paragraph):
‐ High angle-of-attack protection,
‐ Load factor protection,
‐ High pitch attitude protection,
‐ Bank angle protection,
‐ High speed protection.
ALTERNATE LAW
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
In some double failure cases, the integrity and redundancy of the computers and of the peripherals
are not sufficient to achieve normal law and associated protections. System degradation is
progressive and will evolve according to the availability of remaining peripherals or computers.
In addition, depending on the type of failure, the control law may either be Alternate 1 or Alternate
2.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION
The handling characteristics within the normal flight envelope are identical in pitch with normal law.
Outside the normal flight envelope, the PF must take appropriate preventive actions to avoid losing
control and/or avoid high speed excursions. These actions are the same as those that would be
applied in any case where non protected aircraft (e.g. in case of stall warning: add thrust, reduce
pitch, check speedbrakes retracted).
DIRECT LAW
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
In most triple failure cases, direct law triggers. When this occurs:
‐ Elevator deflection is proportional to stick deflection.
Maximum deflection depends on the configuration and on the CG.
‐ Aileron and spoiler deflections are proportional to stick deflection but vary with the aircraft
configuration,
‐ Pitch trim is commanded manually,
‐ Yaw damper and minimum turn coordination are provided.
Handling characteristics are natural, of high-quality aircraft, almost independent of the configuration
and of the CG. Therefore the aircraft obviously has no protections, no automatic pitch trim but
overspeed or stall warnings.
In direct law, VMO/MMO settings are reduced to 310/.86 and ALPHA FLOOR is also inhibited.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATION
The PF must avoid performing large thrust changes or sudden speedbrake movements,
particularly if the center of gravity is aft. If the speedbrakes are out and the aircraft has been
re-trimmed, the PF must gently retract the speedbrakes to give the aircraft time to retrim and
thereby avoid a large nose-down trim change.
INDICATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
The ECAM and PFD indicate any control law degradation.
ON THE ECAM
In Alternate Law:
F/CLT ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)
MAX SPEED : 310 KT
In Direct Law:
F/CLT DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST)
MAX SPEED : 310/.86
MANEUVER WITH CARE
ON THE PFD
The PFD enhances the PF’s awarness of the status of flight controls.
Specific symbols (= in green) and specific formatting of low speed information on the speed scale
in normal law indicate which protections are available.
When protections are lost, amber crosses (X) appear instead of the green protection symbols (=).
When automatic pitch trim is no longer available, the PFD indicates this with an amber “USE MAN
PITCH TRIM” message below the FMA.
Therefore by simply looking at this main instrument (PFD), the flight crew is immediately aware of
the status of flight controls and the operational consequences.
One of the PF’s primary tasks is to maintain the aircraft within the limits of the normal flight envelope.
However some circumstances, due to extreme situations or aircraft mishandling, may provoke the
violation of these limits.
Despite system protections, the PF must not deliberatly exceed the normal flight envelope. In
addition, these protections are not designed to be structural limit protections (e.g. opposite rudder
pedal inputs). Rather, they are designed to assist the PF in emergency and stressful situations,
where only instinctive and rapid reactions will be effective.
Protections are intended to:
‐ Provide full authority to the PF to consistently achieve the best possible aircraft performance in
extreme conditions,
‐ Reduce the risks of overcontrolling or overstressing the aircraft,
‐ Provide PF with an instinctive and immediate procedure to ensure that the PF achieves the best
possible result.
Bank angle protection prevents that any major upset or PF mishandling causes the aircraft to be in a
high-bank situation (wherein aircraft recovery is complex, due to the difficulty to properly assess such
a situation and readily react). Bank angle protection provides the PF with full authority to efficiently
achieve any required roll maneuver.
The maximum achievable bank angle is plus or minus:
‐ 67 °, within the Normal Flight envelope, in clean configuration (2.5 g level flight), 60 ° with slats
out,
‐ 45 ° in nose down high pitch protection,
‐ 45 ° in high Speed protection (to prevent spiral dive).
When flying beyond maximum design speeds VD/MD (which are greater that VMO/MMO), there is
an increased potential for aircraft control difficulties and structural concerns, due to high air loads.
Therefore, the margin between VMO/MMO and VD/MD must be such that any possible overshoot of
the normal flight envelope should not cause any major difficulty.
High speed protection adds a positive nose-up G demand to a sidestick order, in order to protect the
aircraft, in the event of a dive or vertical upset. As a result, this enables a reduction in the margin
between VMO/MMO and VD/MD.
The PF, therefore, has full authority to perform a high speed/steep dive escape maneuver when
required, via a reflex action on the sidestick. In addition, the bank angle limit is reduced from 67 ° to
45 °, which minimizes the risk of a spiral dive.
Note: An OVERSPEED warning is provided.
On commercial aircraft, high load factors can be encountered during evasive maneuvers due to
potential collisions or CFIT…
Pulling “g” is efficient, if the resulting maneuver is really flown with this “g” number. If the aircraft is
not able to fly this trajectory or to perform this maneuver, pulling "g" will be detrimental.
On most commercial aircraft, the potential for an efficient 2.5g maneuver is very remote.
Furthermore, as G-LOAD information is not continuously provided in the cockpit, airline PFs are not
used to controlling this parameter. This is further evidenced by inflight experience, which reveals that:
In emergency situations, initial PF reaction on a yoke or sidestick is hesitant, then aggressive.
With load factor protection, the PF may immediately and instinctively pull the sidestick full aft: the
aircraft will initially fly a 2.5 g maneuver without losing time. Then, if the PF still needs to maintain
the sidestick full aft stick because the danger still exists, the high AOA protection will take over. Load
factor protection enhances this high AOA protection.
Load factor protection enables immediate PF reaction without any risk of overstressing the aircraft.
Flight experience has also revealed that an immediate 2.5 g reaction provides larger obstacle
clearance, than a hesitant and delayed high G Load maneuver (two-second delay).
High AOA protection enables the PF to pull the sidestick full aft in dangerous situations and thus
consistently achieve the best possible aircraft lift. This action on the sidestick is instinctive and the
high AOA protection minimizes the risk of stalls or control loss.
High AOA protection is an aerodynamic protection:
‐ The PF will notice if the normal flight envelope is exceeded for any reason, because the auto pitch
trim will stop, the aircraft will sink to maintain its current AOA (αPROT, strong static stability) and a
significant change in aircraft behavior will occur.
‐ If the PF then pulls the sidestick full aft, a maximum AOA (approximately corresponding to CL
Max) is commanded. In addition, the speedbrakes will automatically retract if extended.
Airbus AOA Protection
In addition to this aerodynamic protection, there are three more energy features:
‐ If A/THR is in SPEED mode, the speed cannot drop below VLS, even if the target speed is below
VLS.
‐ A “LOW ENERGY” aural alert triggers when the aircraft energy level drops below a specific
threshold function of, for example, IAS, ACCEL/DECEL or FPA.
This “SPEED, SPEED, SPEED” alert draws the PF’s attention to the SPEED scale and indicates
the need to adjust thrust.
It comes immediately before the ALPHA FLOOR and is available when the aircraft is below
2 500 ft RA and is in CONF≥2.
‐ If the angle-of-attack still increases and reaches ALPHA FLOOR threshold, the A/THR triggers
TOGA thrust and engages (in engine out, TOGA thrust would be applied on the symmetrical
running engines only).
EMERGENCY SITUATION
In case of an emergency situation, such as Windshear or CFIT, the PF is assisted in order to
optimize aircraft performance via the:
‐ A/THR: adds thrust to maintain the speed above VLS,
‐ Low Energy Speed – Speed warning: enhances PF awareness,
‐ ALPHA FLOOR: Provides TOGA thrust,
‐ HIGH AOA protection: provides maximum aerodynamic lift,
‐ Automatic speedbrake retraction: minimizes drag.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
When flying at αmax, the PF can make gentle turns, if necessary.
The PF must not deliberately fly the aircraft in alpha protection except for brief periods when
maximum maneuvering speed is required.
If alpha protection is inadvertently entered, the PF must exit it as quickly as possible by easing the
sidestick forward to reduce the angle-of-attack while simultaneously adding power (if alpha floor
has not yet been activated or has been cancelled). If ALPHA FLOORS has been triggered, it must
be cancelled with the DISC pb (on either thrust lever), as soon as a safe speed is resumed.
In case of GPWS / SHEAR:
‐ Set the thrust levers to TOGA,
‐ Pull the sidestick to full aft (for shear, fly the SRS, until full aft sidestick),
‐ Initially maintain the wings level.
This immediately provides maximum lift/maximum thrust/minimum drag. Therefore, CFIT escape
maneuvers will be much more efficient.
The above-illustrated are typical trajectories flown by all protected or not protected aircraft when
the PF applies the escape procedure after an aural GPWS PULL UP alert.
The graph demonstrates the efficiency of the protection, to ensure a duck-under that is 50 %
lower, a bucket-distance that is 50 % shorter, a safety margin that more than doubles (due to a
quicker reaction time) and a significant altitude gain (∼250 ft). These characteristics are common
to all protected aircraft because the escape procedure is easy to achieve and enables the PF to
fly the aircraft at a constant AOA, close to the max AOA. It is much more difficult to fly the stick
shaker AOA on an aircraft that is not protected.
ABNORMAL ATTITUDES
Applicable to: ALL
If the aircraft is, for any reason, far outside the normal flight envelope and reaches an abnormal
attitude, the normal controls are modified and provide the PF with maximum efficiency in regaining
normal attitudes (an example of a typical reason for being far outside the normal flight envelope
would be a mid-air collision).
The so-called “abnormal attitude” law is:
‐ Pitch direct,
‐ Roll direct law with yaw alternate.
ARCHITECTURE REDUNDANCY
Applicable to: ALL
POWER REDUNDANCY
The A380 flight controls are powered by conventional hydraulic actuators and EHA/EBHA.
There are 2 hydraulic systems, supplying the hydraulic actuators and 2 sides of the electrical
system, supplying the EHA.
Such an integrated electrical/hydraulic architecture enhances the redundancy of the flight control
system.
Electrical/Hydraulic Architecture Redundancy
BACKUP CONTROL
The backup control is active in the case of the loss of all flight control computers (PRIMs and
SECs), which is very unlikely. The backup control enables the PF to safely stabilize the aircraft
while reconfiguring the systems.
The objective is not to fly the aircraft accurately, but to maintain the aircraft attitude safe and
stabilized, in order to allow the recovery of lost systems.
For this purpose, the Backup Control Module (BCM), supplied by its two own electrical generators
(each of them powered by one hydraulic circuit), enables to control:
‐ Both inner ailerons
‐ Both rudders
‐ Both outer elevators
‐ The THS.
When the Pilot Flying (PF) makes an input on the sidestick, an order (an electrical signal) is sent to
the fly-by-wire computers. If the Pilot Monitoring (PM) also acts on the stick then both signals/orders
are added.
Therefore, as on any other aircraft type, PF and PM must not act on their sidesticks at the same
time. If the PM (or Training Captain) needs to take over, the PM must press the sidestick takeover
pushbutton and announce: "I have control".
If a flight crewmember falls on a sidestick or a mechanical failure leads to a jammed stick (there is no
associated ECAM caution), the "failed" sidestick order is added to the "non failed" sidestick order.
In this case, the other not affected flight crewmember must press the sidestick takeover pushbutton
for at least 30 s in order to deactivate the "failed" sidestick.
A pilot can at any time reactivate a deactivated stick by momentarily pressing the takeover
pushbutton on either sidestick.
In the case of a “SIDE STICK FAULT” ECAM alert, the affected sidestick order (sent to the computer)
is forced to zero. This automatically deactivates the affected sidestick. This explains why there is no
procedure associated with this warning.
OBJECTIVE
Applicable to: ALL
The Auto Pilot (AP) and Flight Director (FD) assist the flight crew to fly the aircraft within the normal
flight envelope in order to:
‐ Optimize performance in the takeoff, go-around, climb or descent phases,
‐ Follow ATC clearances (lateral or vertical),
‐ Repeatedly fly and land the aircraft with very high accuracy in CAT 2 and CAT 3 conditions.
To achieve these objectives:
‐ The AP takes over routine tasks. This gives the Pilot Flying (PF) the necessary time and resources
to assess the overall operational situation,
‐ The FD provides adequate attitude or flight path orders and enables the PF to accurately fly the
aircraft manually.
The FCU and MFD/KCCU must be used, in accordance with the rules outlined below, in order to
ensure:
‐ Safe operation (correct entries made),
‐ Effective inter-pilot communication (knowing each other’s intentions),
‐ Comfortable operations (use “available hands”, as appropriate).
Tasksharing_N_comm
AP/FD MONITORING
Applicable to: ALL
The FMA indicates the status of the AP, FD and A/THR and their corresponding operating modes.
The PF must monitor the FMA and announce any FMA changes. The flight crew uses the FCU or
MFD/ KCCU to give orders to the AP/FD. The aircraft is expected to fly in accordance with these
orders.
The main concern for the flight crew should be:
‐ WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NOW ?
‐ WHAT IS THE AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO FLY NEXT ?
If the aircraft does not fly as expected:
• and, if in managed mode: Select the desired target
• or, disengage the autopilot, and fly the aircraft manually.
The flight crew can engage the Autopilot (AP) within the normal flight envelope, atleast5 s after
liftoff, and at a minimum height of 100 ft. The AP automatically disengages when the aircraft flies
significantly outside the normal flight envelope limits.
The flight crew cannot engage the AP when the aircraft is outside the flight envelope. Flight control
laws are designed to assist the flight crew to return within the flight envelope in accordance with the
selected strategy.
When manually flying the aircraft with the FDs on, the FD bars provide lateral and vertical orders in
accordance with the active modes that the flight crew selects.
Therefore:
‐ Fly with a centered FD,
‐ If not using FD orders, turn off the FD.
It is strongly recommended to turn off the FDs to ensure that the A/THR is in SPEED mode if the
A/THR is active.
OBJECTIVE
Applicable to: ALL
The A/THR computer (within the FG) interfaces directly with the engine computer, referred to as the
FADEC.
The A/THR sends to the FADEC the thrust targets that are needed to:
‐ Obtain and maintain a target speed when in SPEED mode,
‐ Obtain a specific thrust setting (e.g. CLB, IDLE) when in THRUST mode.
INTERFACE
Applicable to: ALL
When the A/THR is active, the thrust lever position determines the maximum thrust that the A/THR
can command in SPEED or THRUST mode. Therefore, with A/THR active, thrust levers act as a
thrust limiter or a thrust-rating panel.
The A/THR computer does not drive back the thrust levers. The PF sets them to a specific detent on
the thrust lever range. The A/THR system provides cues that indicate the energy of the aircraft:
‐ Speed, acceleration or deceleration, obtained by the speed trend vector,
‐ THR and THR command on the THR gauge.
All these cues are in the flight crew’s direct line of vision.
In other words, the Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) should not be used to monitor correct A/THR operation.
Neither should the thrust lever position of a conventional autothrottle, be considered a cue because,
in many hazardous situations, the thrust lever position can be misleading (e.g. engine failure, thrust
lever jammed).
NORMAL OPERATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
NORMAL OPERATIONS
The A/THR can only be active when the thrust levers are between IDLE and the CLB detent.
When the thrust levers are beyond the CLB detent, thrust is controlled manually to the thrust lever
position and the A/THR is armed (A/THR appears in blue on the FMA). This means that the A/THR
is ready to be re-activated when the flight crew sets the thrust levers back to the CLB detent (or
below).
AT TAKEOFF
The thrust levers are set either full forward to TOGA or to the FLX detent. Thrust is manually
controlled to the TLA and A/THR is armed. The FMA indicates this in blue.
AFTER TAKEOFF
When the aircraft reaches THR RED ALT, the flight crew sets the thrust levers back to the CLB
detent. This activates A/THR. MAX CLB will, therefore, be the maximum normal thrust setting that
will be commanded by the A/THR in CLB, CRZ, DES or APPR as required.
The above-noted principles also apply to an one-engine inoperative situation, except that A/THR can
only be active when the thrust levers are set between IDLE and MCT.
In case of engine failure the thrust levers will be in MCT detent for remainder of the flight. This is
because MCT is the maximum thrust that can usually be commanded by the A/THR for climb or
acceleration in all flight phases (e.g. CLB, CRZ, DES or APPR).
ALPHA FLOOR
Applicable to: ALL
When the angle-of-attack of the aircraft goes beyond the ALPHA FLOOR threshold, this means that
the aircraft has decelerated significantly (below ALPHA PROT speed): A/THR activates automatically
and orders TOGA thrust, regardless of the thrust lever position.
The example below illustrates that:
• The aircraft is in descent with the thrust levers manually set to IDLE,
• The aircraft decelerates, during manual flight with the FD off, as indicated on the FMA.
Speed Scale and FMA indications in a Typical Alpha Floor Case
When the speed decreases, so that the angle-of-attack reaches the ALPHA FLOOR threshold,
A/THR activates and orders TOGA thrust, despite the fact that the thrust levers are at IDLE.
When the aircraft accelerates again, the angle-of-attack drops below the ALPHA FLOOR threshold.
TOGA thrust is maintained or locked. This enables the flight crew to reduce thrust, as necessary.
TOGA LK appears on the FMA to indicate that TOGA thrust is locked. The desired thrust can only be
recovered by setting A/THR to off with the instinctive disconnect pushbutton.
ALPHA floor is available when the flight controls are in NORMAL LAW from liftoff to 100 ft R/A at
landing. In case of one engine out operation, the TOGA thrust would be applied on the symmetrical
running engines only.
INTRODUCTION
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew manually engages the modes. However, they may change automatically, depending
on the:
• AP, FD, and A/THR system integration
• Logical sequence of modes
• So-called "mode reversions".
There is a direct relationship between aircraft pitch control, and engine thrust control. This
relationship is designed to manage the aircraft’s energy.
• If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a vertical trajectory (e.g. ALT, V/S, FPA, G/S):
→ A/THR controls speed
• If the AP/FD pitch mode controls a speed (e.g. OP CLB, OP DES):
→ A/THR controls thrust (THR CLB, THR IDLE)
• If no AP/FD pitch mode is engaged (i.e. AP is off and FD is off):
→ A/THR controls speed
Therefore, any change in the AP/FD pitch mode is associated with a change in the A/THR mode.
Note: For this reason, the FMA displays the A/THR mode and the AP/FD vertical mode columns
next to each other.
In climb, when the flight crew selects a climb mode, they usually define an altitude target, and expect
the aircraft to capture and track this altitude. Therefore, when the flight crew selects a climb mode,
the next logical mode is automatically armed.
For example:
The flight crew may also manually arm a mode in advance, so that the AP/FD intercepts a defined
trajectory.
Typically, the flight crew may arm NAV, LOC-G/S, and APPNAV-FINAL.
When the capture or tracking conditions occur, the mode will change sequentially.
For example:
These logical mode changes occur, when the modes are armed. They appear in blue on the FMA.
MODE REVERSIONS
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
Mode reversions are automatic mode changes that unexpectedly occur, but are designed to
ensure coherent AP, FD, and ATHR operations, in conjunction with flight crew input (or when
entering a F-PLN discontinuity).
For example, a reversion will occur, when the flight crew:
FLIGHT CREW CHANGE OF FCU ALT TARGET → ACTIVE VERTICAL MODE NOT POSSIBLE
This reversion to the V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify the pitch
behaviour of the aircraft.
It is the flight crew’s responsibility to change it as required.
In descent:
This reversion to V/S (FPA) mode on the current V/S target does not modify the pitch behavior of
the aircraft. It is the flight crew’s responsibility to adapt pitch, if necessary.
THE PF MANUALLY FLIES THE AIRCRAFT WITH THE FD ON, AND DOES NOT FOLLOW THE
FD PITCH ORDERS
If the flight crew does not follow the FD pitch orders, an A/THR mode reversion occurs. This
reversion is effective, when the A/THR is in THRUST MODE (THR IDLE, THR CLB), and the
aircraft reaches the limits of the speed envelope (VLS, VMAX):
A/THR in SPEED mode automatically readjusts thrust to regain the target speed. The FD bars will
disappear, because they are not being followed by the PF.
TRIPLE CLICK
Applicable to: ALL
The "triple click" is an aural alert. It is an attention-getter, designed to draw the flight crew’s attention
to the FMA.
The PFD FMA highlights a mode change or reversion with a white box around the new mode, and
the pulsing of its associated FD bar.
The reversions, described in the previous paragraph, are also emphasized via the triple click aural
alert.
Note: The triple click also appears in the following, less usual, cases:
• SRS → CLB (OPCLB) reversion: If, the flight crew selects a speed on the FCU
• The V/S selection is «refused» during ALT *: The flight crew pulls the V/S knob, while in
ALT*
• The V/S target is not followed, because the selected target is too high, and leads to
VMIN/VMAX.
The Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system is a main component of Airbus’
two-crewmember cockpit, which also takes the “dark cockpit” and “forward-facing crew” philosophies
into account.
The purpose of the ECAM is to
‐ Display aircraft system information
‐ Monitor aircraft systems
‐ Indicate required flight crew actions, in most normal, abnormal and emergency situations.
The ECAM fully supports the no-paper cockpit concept, and enables to reduce the number of
memory items.
MAIN PRINCIPLES
Applicable to: ALL
FAILURE LEVELS
The ECAM has three levels of warnings and cautions. Each level is based on the associated
operational consequence(s) of the failure. Failures will appear in a specific color, according
to defined color-coding system, that advises the flight crew of the urgency of a situation in an
instinctive, unambiguous manner. In addition, Level 2 and 3 failures are accompanied by a specific
aural warning: A Continuous Repetitive Chime (CRC) indicates a Level 3 failure, and a Single
Chime (SC) indicates a Level 2 failure.
Failure Level Priority Color Coding Aural Warning Recommended Crew Action
Level 3 Safety Red CRC Immediate
Level 2 Abnormal Amber SC Awareness, then action
Level 1 Degradation Amber None Awareness, then monitoring
When there are several failures, the FWC displays them on the Engine Warning Display (E/WD) in
an order of priority, determined by the severity of the operational consequences. This ensures that
the flight crew sees the most important failures first.
FEEDBACK
The ECAM provides the flight crew with feedback, after action is taken on affected controls:
‐ The System Synoptic:
Displays the status change of affected components.
‐ The Memo:
Displays the status of a number of systems selected by the flight crew (e.g. anti ice).
‐ The Normal Checklists
When the flight crew has performed a required action, the related line of the checklist is shown
in green (except for some systems or actions, for which feedback is not available).
‐ The Procedures
When the flight crew performs a required action on the cockpit panel, the applicable line of the
checklist usually changes from blue to white color (except for some systems or actions, for
which feedback is not available).
The ECAM reacts to both failures and pilot action.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
On ground, the ECAM MEMO is reviewed for feedback on temporarily-selected items (e.g. SEAT
BELTS / IGNITION / ENG A-ICE), and to check whether IRs are aligned. If alignment is not
complete, the time remaining will be displayed. It is, therefore, not necessary to refer to the Overhead
panel.
In cruise, the main systems should periodically be reviewed during flight (ENG, BLEED, ELEC
AC/DC, HYD, FUEL, F/CTL), to ensure that they are operating normally, and to detect any potential
problem in advance.
The ECAM and PFD MEMO must be included in the instrument review. In cruise, in most of the
cases, they should be blank. They help to make the flight crew aware of any system that a flight
crewmember temporarily selected, but forgot to deselect.
An STS label, displayed at the bottom of the MEMO/limitations page of the E/WD, indicates that
there is a STATUS to be reviewed. When STATUS review is an item of a checklist, it takes into
account the STATUS content. It is displayed as green line if the STATUS is empty. It is displayed as
a blue “NOT DETECTED” item, if it has to be reviewed.
If there is an STS at engine shutdown, it will pulse at the bottom of the E/WD. If this is the case, the
STATUS page should be reviewed for help in completing the technical log.
INTRODUCTION
Airbus normal checklists are of a “non-action” type (i.e. all actions should be completed from
memory before the flight crew performs the checklist).
The normal checklist includes nine flight phases. The BEFORE START, BEFORE TAKEOFF, and
AFTER TAKEOFF checklists are divided in two sections: The “Down to the Line” section, and the
“Below the Line” section. This format is designed to help flight crews to manage the workload.
For example, the “BEFORE START ” checklist may be called out, as soon as the Load and Trim
Sheet is available and takeoff data is set, but it will be held at "down to the line". The “BEFORE
START” checklist will be continued "below the line" after obtaining the start-up clearance.
selects the appropriate checklist using the "tick" pushbutton and reads the checklist title, then the
checklist items.
DETECTED ITEMS
The completed items detected by the ECAM appear in green. The PM/FIRST OFFICER does not
read these items.
The items monitored by ECAM, which are not yet completed, appear as “challenge/response”-type
actions, in blue color. The PM/FIRST OFFICER reads the left part of the line, and the
PF/CAPTAIN must take corrective action before “responding” to the “challenge”. As for not
detected items, if corrective action is not possible, then the PF/CAPTAIN must modify the
response to reflect the real situation (with a specific answer).
Note: If some checklist items are not validated intentionally, the “C/L COMPLETED” line can
still be validated and the checklist will be considered as completed. This may be the case
after a system failure, which may prevent some checklist items from being completed. As
result on the checklist menu the checklist will appear as a grey line.
CHECKLIST RESET
In some particular cases the flight crew may want to do again a completed checklist (for example,
the takeoff checklist after a long standby, or any checklist after an error). For this purpose, he
must select the checklist, then tick the RESET line. This automatically resets all the subsequent
checklists as well
Note: 1. The first checklist of the flight must be manually reset.
2. In case of go-around, the after takeoff checklist (and following checklists) are reset.
checklists
HANDLING OF ADVISORY
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew member that first notices an advisory announces: "ADVISORY on XYZ system".
Then, the PF/CAPTAIN requests the PM/FIRST OFFICER to review the drifting parameter. If time
permits, the PM/FIRST OFFICER may refer to the FCOM on the OIS, containing recommended
actions in various advisory situations.
Before operating or selecting some controls (i.e. ENG MASTER sw, FIRE pb, IR MODE selector, ,
all guarded switches (e.g. DRIVE pb), and reset buttons), the PF and the PNF must crosscheck
these controls. This crosscheck prevents the flight crew from performing inadvertently any
irreversible actions.
The cockpit overhead panels are clearly labelled, in order to help the flight crew to correctly
identify all applicable systems and controls. When the ECAM requires the flight crew to perform an
action on the controls of the overhead panel, the flight crew is able to rapidly identify and find the
correct system panel via the white label (uppercase) that is on the side or top of each panel.
The PM should call out information in the following sequence before performing any action: "Name
of the system, then name of the selector, then the action (e.g. “AIR, CROSSBLEED, CLOSE”).
The use of this approach, and announcement of a planned action enable the PM to keep the PF
informed of the progress of the procedure.
It is important for flight crew to remember that, after the PF announces "ECAM ACTIONS" , in the
case of system failure, the FAULT light of the applicable control will come on in amber, in order to
enable the flight crew to correctly identify the applicable system control on the overhead panel.
After the selection of a control, the PM should check the SD to verify that the selected action
occurred (e.g. The closure of the crossbleed valves shouldchange the indications that appear on
the SD).
PF PM
•First pilot who notices
MASTER CAUTION/MASTER WARNING............. RESET
ANNOUNCE.....................................“TITLE OF FAILURE”
FLY THE AIRCRAFT ECAM.............................................................................CONFIRM (1)
Situation assessment consists in making a synthesis of the failure operational impacts for the remaining of the flight.
The crew will also take into consideration any impact on RVSM, RNP (FCOM/Special operations) and CATII/III
operations.
Decision should take into consideration the operational, maintenance and commercial aspects.
Information should be given to cabin crew, passengers, ATC and airline as required.
IF THE ECAM WARNING (OR CAUTION) DISAPPEARS WHILE APPLYING THE PROCEDURE:
If an ECAM warning disappears, while a procedure is being applied, the warning can be
considered no longer applicable. Application of the procedure can be stopped.
For example, during the application of an engine fire procedure, if the fire is successfully
extinguished with the first fire extinguisher bottle, the ENG FIRE warning disappears and the
procedure no longer applies. Any remaining ECAM procedures should be performed as usual.
IN APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
STATUS, deferred procedures and pertinent limitations will be reviewed during the approach
preparation.
When necessary, the flight crew will use the OIS PERF application to compute the VAPP and landing
distance.
Then, when the flight crew selects CONF 1 for approach, or sets QNH (QFE) during descent (when
APPR C/L should be requested), the SD automatically displays the STATUS (if not empty).
When performing the APPROACH C/L, the flight crew must use the STS pbto remove the STATUS
page. This is because, at that time, any action on the CLEAR pb would clear the checklist, but not
the STATUS page.
NOT-SENSED PROCEDURE
Applicable to: ALL
Some emergency and abnormal procedures are not automatically displayed on the ECAM . These
procedures also referred to as not-sensed procedures, and are manually requested by the flight
crew. The not-sensed procedures are available on the ABNORMAL PROC menu of the ECAM . The
flight crew can access and display on the EWD the ABNORMAL PROC menu by pressing the ABN
PROC pb on the ECP . The emergency procedures that require immediate access, appear on the
first part of the ABNORMAL PROC menu. The other abnormal procedures are in system submenus.
For more information, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-40-10-00001135 Sensed and Not-Sensed Procedures
.
When the flight crew displays a not-sensed ABN PROC, the procedure appears in grey. This
prevents the flight crew:
‐ To apply the procedure without activating the procedure,
‐ To display limitations or memos associated to this procedure.
To activate the procedure, the flight crew validates the ACTIVATE line of the procedure. When the
procedure is activated, the flight crew carries out the procedure as any other procedure automatically
displayed by the ECAM .
If the procedure is no longer applicable, the flight crew must deactivate the procedure (by deselecting
the ACTIVATE line), in order to remove any aircraft limitations or memos associated to this
procedure.
For instance, following the not-sensed emergency procedure FIRE SMOKE/FUMES application,
the source of smoke has been identified and stopped. Thus, the FIRE SMOKE/FUMES emergency
procedure must be deactivated to remove the limitation LAND ASAP .
The flight crew must not activate a not-sensed procedure to consult or discuss a procedure for the
following reasons:
‐ If limitations and/or memos are associated with this procedure they will appear on the PFD and/or
the EWD
‐ When some not-sensed procedures are activated (e.g. VOLCANIC ASH ENCOUNTER), a
message is sent to the ground in order to inform the maintenance crew
‐ Some not-sensed procedures have many lines, and the EWD may not display the procedure on
a single page. In such a case, if the flight crew consults the procedure, while the procedure is not
activated, the flight crew will not have access to the lines of the procedure in the overflow.
Therefore, if the flight crew needs to consult, or discuss a not-sensed procedure, the flight crew must
use the FCOM .
When the flight crew knows the not-sensed procedure to apply, the flight crew applies the following
task sharing to activate the not-sensed procedure.
PF PNF
ORDER..................................... SELECT "Tittle" ABN PROC
"Title" ABN PROC............................. SEARCH and SELECT
When the "Title" ABN PROC appears on the EWD
ORDER....................................................... ECAM ACTIONS
Resume normal task sharing (1)
(1) After the PF orders "ECAM ACTIONS", the PNF will activate the not-sensed procedure and will handle the ACTIVATE
line as any other ECAM line.
ADDITIONAL ITEMS
Applicable to: ALL
MEMORY ITEMS
There are very few memory items
• Emergency descent initiation
• First reaction, in case of an unreliable speed indication
• Loss of braking
• Windshear (reactive & predictive)
• TAWS
CONDITIONAL ITEMS
Some parts of a procedure have to be applied only under some conditions.
In most cases, the ECAM displays the condition with a tick box, and the associated lines are grey
(that means: not applicable), until the crew tick the condition. In some particular cases, when the
procedure is long, the associated action lines are hidden until the flight crew tick the condition.
When the condition is met, the flight crew tick the box and the associated action lines are
displayed in blue as they become applicable.
ECP FAILURE
In the case of an ECP failure, the CLR pb, RCL pb, STS pb, ALL pb, EMER CANC pb, tick and
up/down arrow keys will continue to operate, because they are hardwired to the FWS. Therefore,
the ALL key can be used to scroll all SD pages and display the desired one (by releasing the key,
when the desired SD page appears).
FLUCTUATING CAUTION
Any fluctuating caution can be deleted with the EMER CANC pb. When pressed, the EMER CANC
pb deletes both the aural alert, and the caution for the remainder of the flight. This is indicated on
the STATUS MORE page, by the “CANCELLED CAUTION” title. Any caution messages that have
been inhibited via the EMER CANC pb can be recalled by pressing and holding the RCL key for
more than three seconds.
The EMER CANC pb inhibits any aural warning that is associated with a red warning, but does not
affect the warning itself.
NO-10 General
General.....................................................................................................................................................................A
NO-100 Taxi
Introduction...............................................................................................................................................................A
Taxi Camera............................................................................................................................................................ B
Onboard Airport Navigation System........................................................................................................................C
Brakes...................................................................................................................................................................... D
Taxi Roll and Steering.............................................................................................................................................E
180 deg Turn........................................................................................................................................................... F
Takeoff Briefing Confirmation..................................................................................................................................G
NO-120 Takeoff
Thrust Setting...........................................................................................................................................................A
Takeoff Roll..............................................................................................................................................................B
Rotation Technique..................................................................................................................................................C
Tailstrike Avoidance.................................................................................................................................................D
Flight Guidance........................................................................................................................................................E
Thrust Reduction Altitude........................................................................................................................................ F
Acceleration Altitude................................................................................................................................................G
Takeoff at Heavy Weight.........................................................................................................................................H
Immediate Turn After Takeoff...................................................................................................................................I
Low Altitude Level Off..............................................................................................................................................J
Noise Abatment Takeoff.......................................................................................................................................... K
NO-140 Climb
AP/FD Climb Modes................................................................................................................................................ A
Small Altitude Changes........................................................................................................................................... B
Speed Considerations............................................................................................................................................. C
Vertical Performance Predictions............................................................................................................................ D
Vertical Display........................................................................................................................................................ E
Lateral Mode............................................................................................................................................................ F
NO-150 Cruise
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
FMS Use.................................................................................................................................................................. B
Cost Index................................................................................................................................................................C
Speed Considerations............................................................................................................................................. D
Altitude Considerations............................................................................................................................................ E
Step Climb................................................................................................................................................................F
Fuel Monitoring........................................................................................................................................................G
Fuel Temperature.................................................................................................................................................... H
NO-170 Descent
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Computation Principle..............................................................................................................................................B
Guidance and Monitoring........................................................................................................................................ C
Descent Constraint.................................................................................................................................................. D
Mode Reversion.......................................................................................................................................................E
NO-175 Holding
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Holding Speed And Configuration........................................................................................................................... B
In The Holding Pattern............................................................................................................................................ C
NO-180 Approach
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Initial Approach........................................................................................................................................................ B
Intermediate Approach............................................................................................................................................ C
Final Approach.........................................................................................................................................................D
NO-210 Go-Around
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Considerations About Go-Around............................................................................................................................B
AP/FD Go-Around Phase Activation....................................................................................................................... C
Go-Around Phase.................................................................................................................................................... D
Leaving The Go-Around Phase...............................................................................................................................E
Rejected Landing..................................................................................................................................................... F
NO-220 Landing
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Flare......................................................................................................................................................................... B
Call out.....................................................................................................................................................................C
Derotation.................................................................................................................................................................D
Roll Out....................................................................................................................................................................E
Braking..................................................................................................................................................................... F
Tailstrike Avoidance................................................................................................................................................ G
NO-240 Parking
Engines Cooling Period........................................................................................................................................... A
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The Normal Operations chapter outlines the techniques that the flight crew should apply during
each flight phase, in order to optimize the use of the aircraft. The flight crew should read the Normal
Operations chapter in complement of the FCOM which provides the normal procedures and their
associated tasksharing, callouts, and checklists.
All of the following flying techniques are applicable to normal conditions.
The Adverse Weather part of the Supplementary Information chapter addresses other techniques
applicable to adverse weather conditions.
MEL
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
The Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) is published by the aircraft manufacturer. It is an
approved document that enables an aircraft to be dispatched, with some equipment, systems, or
functions inoperative, for a limited period of time. Some limitations, operational procedures and/or
maintenance procedures may have to be performed.
The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is published by the operator, and approved by local
authorities. It must be at least as restrictive as the MMEL. The MMEL cannot be used to replace
the MEL.
Aircraft can be dispatched with one, or more, secondary airframe parts missing. In this case, the
flight crew must refer to the Configuration Deviation List (CDL), in the Aircraft Flight Manual.
MMEL PHILOSOPHY
To introduce an item in the MMEL, the manufacturer must demonstrate first that the consequences
of the system failure are no more than minor on the flight. The manufacturer must demonstrate
then, that the next critical failure, i.e. the failure that has the most critical effect on aircraft operation
when added to the initial failure, maintains the level of safety.
In some cases, this level of safety is maintained provided operational (o) or maintenance (m)
procedures are observed.
MEL DESCRIPTION
The MEL has three main sections:
• MEL Entries
• List of items that may be inoperative for dispatch
• Associated operational procedures
When several flights are performed with the same inoperative item, the operational procedure
should be repeated before each flight. The periodicity of the maintenance procedure is usually
indicated in the MEL.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
AIRCRAFT POWER-UP
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew should not perform this step if the aircraft is already electrically supplied.
The objective of this step is to perform the initial safety checks, before applying electrical power.
The electrical starting sequence can take up to 30 s before all displays are available.
The flight crew performs the engine and APU fire tests by using one common TEST pb. Therefore,
even if the APU is already running, the flight crew should press the TEST pb to test the ENG FIRE
system.
The flight crew should set to ON the RMP before the APU start, and select the appropriate frequency
for an emergency call, if necessary (e.g. APU fire).
OIS PREPARATION
Applicable to: ALL
Usually, during the preliminary cockpit preparation phase, the workload of the flight crew is not too
heavy. Both flight crewmembers should therefore take this opportunity to work together. Each flight
crewmember should enter the necessary data in the OIS T.O PERF application, taking into account
any applicable MEL/CDL items, and compute the preliminary takeoff performance data.
Both flight crewmembers should independently perform the preliminary takeoff performance
computation, and then crosscheck the results. This crosscheck validates the entries made by both
flight crew members. The CAPT announces the results, the F/O crosschecks with his/her own
computation. These preliminary takeoff performance results are then available for the flight crew to
enter them in the FMS during the cockpit preparation. Additionally, both OITs are ready for takeoff
performance computation, if the takeoff conditions change at the last minute.
BEFORE WALKAROUND
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew must check the systems, even if the maintenance personnel performs the
walkaround.
OXYGEN
The DOOR SD page displays the oxygen pressure. If the oxygen pressure for cockpit or cabin is
below a defined threshold, an amber half-frame highlights the value. This advises the flight crew
that the bottle should be refilled. The flight crew should refer to the minimum oxygen pressure
that is provided in the FCOM Limitations. Refer to FCOM/Cockpit Oxygen Limitation or Refer to
FCOM/Cabin Oxygen Limitation . The prolonged dispatch of the aircraft in such condition is not
recommended.
EXTERIOR WALKAROUND
Applicable to: ALL
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) outline the various elements that the flight crew must review
in detail. The objectives of the exterior walkaround are:
‐ To obtain a global assessment of the aircraft status
The flight crew checks any missing parts or panels. They should consult the Configuration
Deviation List (CDL) for dispatch, and evaluate any operational consequences.
‐ To ensure that main control surfaces are in the appropriate position compared to the surface
control levers
‐ To check that there are no leaks: E.g. engine drain mast, hydraulic lines
‐ To check the condition of the essential visible sensors, i.e. MFP, pitot and static probes
‐ To observe any abnormal condition of the landing gear:
• Cuts, wear, or cracks on wheels and tires
• Safety pins should be removed
• Brakes conditions
Check the length of the brake wear pin on the body landing gears, with parking brake set to ON.
• Length of shocks absorbers.
‐ To observe any abnormal condition of the engines:
• Fan blades, turbine exhaust, engine cowl and pylon condition
• Access door should be closed
• Thrust reverser door condition.
ADIRS INITIALIZATION
Applicable to: ALL
ALIGNEMENT
At the beginning of the pre-flight checks, the crew sets the ADIRS selectors to NAV, in order to
start alignment.
The alignment takes approximately 10 minutes, and must be completed before pushback (before
any aircraft movement).
IN TRANSIT:
ADIRS re-alignment is only necessary, if one of the ADIRS displays a residual ground speed
greater than 5 kt.
In this case, a rapid re-alignment should be performed on all 3 IRSs (by setting all the ADIRS to
OFF, then all back to ON within 5 seconds). The fast alignment takes approximately one minute.
It involves setting the ground speed to 0, and updating the IRS position to the position of the
coordinates on the INIT page .
INITIALIZATION
The ADIRS are automatically initialized at the GPS position. These GPS coordinates are displayed
on the MFD POSITION/MONITOR page, in replacement of the airport reference coordinates, after
the pilot entered the FROM-TO city pair.
When performing the BEFORE START C/L, the crew will check that the IRS IN ALIGN ECAM
MEMO has disappeared, as a confirmation that the ADIRS are in NAV mode.
FMS PROGRAMMING
Applicable to: ALL
FMS programming involves inserting lateral data, vertical data and then the final loading path. The
FMS programming is launched with the INIT function. The automatic cursor jump eases to review
each active area. If the automatic FMS programming path is left, whatever the reason, it should be
resumed.
It is to be noted that:
• Amber boxed fields must be filled
• Blue fields inform the crew that entry is permitted
• Green fields are used for FMS generated data, and cannot be changed
• Magenta characters identify limits (altitude, speed or time), that FMS will attempt to meet
• Yellow characters indicate a temporary flight plan display
• Amber characters signify that the item being displayed is important and requires immediate action
ACTIVE/WIND page:
The history wind is the vertical wind profile, that has been encountered during the previous
descent and should be entered at this stage if it is representative of the vertical wind profile for the
flight. If this field is selected, it will erase the "trip wind" previously inserted.
PERFORMANCE AND FINAL LOADING PATH
POSITION/IRS page:
GPS position is shown. It will be used automatically for ADIRS initialization.
ACTIVE/FPLN/DEPARTURE page:
tobe completed thoroughly including:
• The take-off runway
• SID
• Correct transition to the cruise waypoint
→ ACTIVE/FPLN page:
• Check altitude and speed constraints
• Insert intended step climb/descents, according to the Computerized Flight Plan (CFP).
• If time permits, the wind profile along the flight plan may be inserted using vertical revision
through wind prompt.
• The flight crew should also check the overall route distance (lower part of the ACTIVE/F-PLN
page), versus CFP distance.
POSITION/NAVAIDS page:
When required, NAVAID should be manually entered using ident.
If a NAVAID is reported on NOTAM as unreliable, it must be deselected on the TUNED FOR FMS
NAV next index. To deselect a navaid, enter the NAVAID ident on the list of deselected NAVAIDS.
The crew will pay particular attention not to mismatch with the GPS box.
ACTIVE/PERF page:
The thrust reduction altitude/acceleration altitude (THR RED / ACC) are set to default at 1500ft,
or at a value defined by airline policy. They may be changed , if required. The flight crew should
consider the applicable noise abatement procedure.
The one-engine-out acceleration altitude must:
Three secondary FPLNs are available. The secondary FPLNs should be used to consider:
• A return to departure airfield or a routing to a take-off alternate
• An alternate runway and corresponding SID for take-off
• SEC3 should be dedicated to uplink.
The SWAP/ACTIVE key allows swapping the dedicated SEC FPLN with the active FPLN (Active
F-PLN remains available).
SEC pages are quite similar to ACTIVE pages (EX: ACTIVE/PERF and SEC/PERF). As a general
rule, it is a good practice, before programming any MFD page, to read each page title to avoid any
mismatch.
TAKEOFF BRIEFING
Applicable to: ALL
The PF should perform the takeoff briefing at the gate, when the flight crew workload permits, cockpit
preparation has been completed and, before engine start.
The takeoff briefing should be relevant, concise and chronological. When a main parameter is
referred to by the PF, both flight crewmembers must crosscheck that the parameters have been set
or programmed correctly.
The PF will use the KCCU keys (INIT for FUEL& LOAD, PERF, F-PLN) to select the relevant MFD
pages.
The takeoff briefing covers the following:
1. Miscellaneous
Aircraft technical status (relevant MEL and CDL considerations, relevant OEB)
NOTAMS
Weather
RWY conditions
Use of ENG/Wings Anti Ice
Expected Taxi Clearance (if required, for instance: complex airports)
Use of Radar
Use of Packs for Takeoff
2. FUEL & LOAD PAGE
Block Fuel √ (FOB on EW/D)
Estimated TOW
Extra Fuel/time at destination
3. PERF TO PAGE
T/O RWY
T/O CONF
FLEX / TOGA √ (FLEX / TOGA on EW/D)
V1, VR, V2 √ (V1, V2 on PFD)
TRANS ALT
THR RED / ACC Altitude
4. F-PLN PAGE
Minimum Safe Altitude (paper charts versus VD)
First assigned FL √ (altitude target in blue on PFD)
Flight Plan description √ (SID on MFD FPLN page)
Only if GPS PRIMARY not Avail:
RAD NAV √ (RAD NAV on ND)
Abnormal operations
Continued on the following page
FMS UPDATING
Applicable to: ALL
When the load and trim sheet is available, the flight crew will update as required the figures in the
FUEL & LOAD page:
• Updates the ZFWCG/ZFW,
• Checks that the TOW is consistent with the load sheet,
• Checks the updated fuel figures.
And the ACTIVE/PERF TO page:
• Computes the FLEX TEMP and the take-off speeds as required
• Enters the THS position
• Uses the AUTO GND XFER as required
If takeoff conditions change before engine start, both flight crew members should update the
affected/applicable parameter(s) in the OIS PERF TAKEOFF application, recompute the takeoff
performance data, and crosscheck the results.
Experience has demonstrated that a simple visual check by one flight crew member of the entries
made by the other flight crew member does not prevent significant errors. Therefore, both flight crew
members should recompute the data independently, as follows:
• The First Officer should enter the resulting data in theMFD PERF TAKEOFF page, and
• The Captain should crosscheck theFIRST OFFICER’S entries with his own results.
Crosschecking the results also ensures that both OITS are immediately ready for any additional
computations, by any flight crew member, if necessary (e.g. in the case of a runway change, or
takeoff condition change during taxiing).
SEATING POSITION
Applicable to: ALL
To achieve a correct seating position, the aircraft is fitted with an eye-position indicator on the centre
windscreen post. The eye-position indicator has two balls on it. When the balls are superimposed on
each other, they indicate that the pilot’s eyes are in the correct position.
The flight crew should not sit too low, to avoid reducing the visual segment. During Low Visibility
Procedures (LVP), it is important that the pilot's eyes are positioned correctly, in order to maximize
the visual segment, and consequently, increase the possibility of achieving the required visual
reference for landing as early as possible.
After adjusting the seat, each pilot should adjust the outboard armrest, so that the forearm rests
comfortably on it, when holding the sidestick.
There should be no gaps between the pilot’s forearm and the armrest. The pilot’s wrist should not
be bent when holding the sidestick. This ensures that the pilot can accomplish flight maneuvers by
moving the wrist instead of lifting the forearm from the armrest.
Symptoms of incorrect armrest adjustment include over-controlling, and not being able to make
small, precise inputs.
The rudder pedals must then be adjusted to ensure the pilot can achieve both full rudder pedal
displacement, and full braking simultaneously on the same side.
The armrest and the rudder pedals have position indicators. These positions should be noted and set
accordingly for each flight.
INTRODUCTION
Applicable to: ALL
Engines usually start using the Automatic Starting function. The Full Authority Digital Engine Control
(FADEC) systems control this engine Automatic Starting function, and takes appropriate action, if
engine parameters are exceeded. This function extends significantly the duration of engine life.
The thrust levers must be confirmed at ”idle” before engine-start. If the thrust levers are not at ”idle”,
the thrust increases above idle after engine-start, and can result in a hazardous situation. However,
an ENG START FAULT ECAM alert triggers, to indicate that the flight crew must set the thrust levers
to “idle”.
The APU bleed enables to start two engines simultaneously. The engines are started in sequence:
Engines 1 and 2, then engines 3 and 4.
When the ENG START selector is set to START, the FADECs are electrically-supplied. When there
is sufficient BLEED pressure, the CAPTAIN begins the start sequence by setting the ENG MASTER
levers 1 and 2 to ON. A white attention-getting box identifies the starting engines parameters. The
flight crew should monitor the start sequence:
‐ Start valve opens
‐ N2 increases
‐ IGN A(B)
‐ Fuel flow
‐ EGT
‐ N1
‐ Oil pressure increases
‐ Start valve closes
‐ IGN indication off.
After reaching the peak EGT , or when AVAIL appears on the EWD , the CAPTAIN can start engines
3 and 4.
For more information, Refer to FCOM/Automatic engine start.
As soon as the engine-start is complete, the flight crew should check the stabilized parameters. At
ISA sea level:
If the start is not successful, the flight crew must apply the ECAM actions as usually done, and avoid
instinctively selecting the ENG MASTER switch to "OFF". This would interrupt the FADEC protective
actions (e. g. cranking after hot start).
After an aborted engine start, the flight crew must consider dry cranking the engine before performing
another engine start. ( Refer to FCOM/FCOM Limitations Engines ).
TAILPIPE FIRE
Applicable to: ALL
An engine tailpipe fire may occur at engine-start, and may be the result of either excess fuel in the
combustion chamber, or an oil leak in the low-pressure turbine. A tailpipe fire is an internal fire within
the engine. No critical areas are affected. The right way to deal with an engine tail pipe fire is to
ventilate the engine.
This procedure is not referred as memo items. The TAIL PIPE FIRE C/L is available in the ABN
PROC menu.
If the ground crew reports a tailpipe fire, the flight crew must perform the following actions:
• Shut down the engine (MASTER switch set to OFF)
• Do NOT press the ENG FIRE pushbutton
• Crank the engine, by using either the bleed opposite the engine, the APU bleed, or external
pneumatic power (Set ENG START selector to CRANK, then set the MAN START switch to ON).
Do NOT use the ENG FIRE pushbutton, this would stop power to the FADECs, and would stop
the motoring sequence. The fire extinguisher must not be used, as it will not extinguish an internal
engine fire. As a first priority, the engine must be ventilated.
If the ground crew reports a tailpipe fire, and bleed air is not readily available, a ground
fire-extinguisher can be used as last result: Chemical or dry chemical powder causes serious
corrosive damage to the engine.
After engine-start, and in order to avoid thermal shock of the engine, the engines should be operated
at idle or near idle for a minimum of 3 minutes (5 minutes recommended) prior to take-off before
setting the thrust lever to high power. The warm-up can include any taxi time at idle.
INTRODUCTION
Applicable to: ALL
TAXI CAMERA
Applicable to: ALL
The External Taxi Aid Camera System (ETACS) is designed to assist the flight crew by determining
the nose and main gear position before and during taxi. Looking out of the cockpit window remains
the primary means of determining when to initiate turns, and of verifying the aircraft’s position relative
to the ground track.
The ETACS can assist the flight crew during pushback: The flight crew is able to see and check that
the tow truck is connected, that the aircraft’s environment is clear of obstacles, and that the ground
crew personnel is in the appropriate position.
The magenta squares on the upper ETACS display, help the flight crew initiate turns with a correct
over-steer. When the turn is established, the aircraft is correctly turning if the wing root continues
over the yellow line.
During taxi, the flight crew can monitor how close the wheels are to the edges of the runway, by
referring to the bottom ETACS image.
To correctly turn and taxi, flight crew must primarily refer to external cues. The ETACS is merely a
tool that assists the flight crew, and is an MEL “GO” item.
The Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) is designed to improve flight crew situational
awareness at complex and busy airports, in order to:
• Enhance safety, by helping to prevent dangerous errors such as runway incursions, or takeoffs
from the wrong runway
• Enhance the operational efficiency.
It is important to emphasize that the OANS is not a guidance system. Therefore, the flight crew
should not use the OANS as a substitute for taxi procedures. Such taxi procedures include looking
outside the aircraft, and using airport signs and ground markings. The flight crew must confirm the
validity of all information displayed on the OANS by visually comparing this information to outside
references.
The OANS does not provide information about temporary airport taxi restrictions, and may not
include the most recent buildings, and construction sites. Therefore, the flight crew must consult
NOTAMS before beginning the taxi phase, and can update the moving airport map on the ND, by
using flags and crosses, as necessary.
During taxi, the CAPTAIN and the FIRST OFFICER can display the OANS on their ND, by selecting
"ZOOM", in either the ARC, NAV, or PLAN mode. The CAPTAIN may refer to the ND during taxi, if
necessary. However, the CAPTAIN ' s primary reference should always be the outside of the aircraft.
The FIRST OFFICER will assist the CAPTAIN during taxi, as necessary, by referring to the ND, in
order to locate taxiways and runways.
When visibility is reduced, the FIRST OFFICER should announce the aircraft ' s approach to active
runways.
The flight crew members should deselect the OANS on both NDS before line-up at the latest.
BRAKES
Applicable to: ALL
BRAKE CHECK
When cleared to taxi, the CAPTAIN should set the Parking Brake to "OFF". When the aircraft
starts to move, the CAPTAIN should check the efficiency of the normal braking system by gently
pressing the brake pedals, to ensure that the aircraft slows down. The FIRST OFFICER should
also check the triple brake indicator to ensure that brake pressure drops to zero. This indicates a
successful changeover to the normal braking system.
BRAKE TEMPERATURE
The FCOM limits brake temperature to300 °C. before takeoff is started. This limit ensures that any
hydraulic fluid that may come into contact with the brake units will not be ignited in the wheelwell
after gear retraction
BRAKING ANOMALIES
If the ACCU PRESS drops below the green band, the flight crew should be aware that the Parking
Brake can, quite suddenly, become less efficient. This explains the amber range on the hydraulic
pressure gauge of the ACCU PRESS .
If the flight crew encounters any braking problems during taxi, they should call "LOSS OF
BRAKING" and release the brakes, set the A/SKID to OFF then apply pedal braking again. The
pressure on the brakes is automatically limited and there is no use to refer to the hydraulic triple
indicator. If braking is still inoperative, the crew will use the PARK BRK. These items are not
supported by an ECAM procedure and will be considered as memo items.
GENERAL
Before taxi, check that the amber "NWS DISC" ECAM MEMO is not displayed, to ensure that
steering is fully available.
THRUST USE
Little, if any, thrust above idle may be necessary to get the aircraft moving (approximately up to
10% THR at heavy weight). Excessive thrust application on engines can result in exhaust-blast
damage e.g, on airport signs. Thrust should be used symmetrically. Once the aircraft begins to
move, reduce thrust as necessary.
It can be noticed that the use of engine anti-ice slightly increases ground idle thrust.
If the inner engines are located over unconsolidated or unprepared ground during taxi, avoid high
thrust settings on the inner engines (engine ingestion -FOD- risk increase). If additional thrust is
required, the use of the outer engines is preferred."
STEERING TECHNIQUE
Nose-wheel steering is "by-wire" with no mechanical connection between the tiller and the
nose-wheel.
The relationship between tiller deflection and nose-wheel angle is not linear and the tiller forces
are light.
Therefore, the CAPTAIN should move the tiller smoothly and maintain the tiller’s position. Any
correction should be small and smooth, and maintained for enough time to enable the pilot to
assess the outcome. Being over-active on the tiller will cause uncomfortable oscillations.
If both pilots act on the tiller or pedals, their inputs are added until the maximum value of the
steering angle (programmed within the BSCU ) is reached.
When the seating position is correct, the cut-off angle is about 19 ° , and the visual ground
geometry provides an obscured segment of about 68 feet/21 meters).
In order to monitor taxi, press the TAXI P/B on EFIS-CP ; this provides a combined video image of
the 2 cameras located under the belly of the aircraft and at the top of the fin. This combined view
of the aircraft allows the taxiing pilot to properly track the aircraft along the taxiways or runways in
straightline or in turns.
If the TAXI display is not available or not clear (e.g heavy rain showers), while taxiing on a
straightline the taxiing pilot should see the taxiway (runway) centreline arriving between PFD & ND
Asymmetric thrust from the outer engines can be used to initiate a tight turn and to keep the
aircraft moving during the turn. Asymmetric thrust from inner engines is not recommended due to
FOD risk on certain taxiways. If nosewheel lateral skidding occurs while turning, reduce taxi speed
or increase turn radius.
When exiting a tight turn, the CAPTAIN should anticipate the steer out. Additionally, the CAPTAIN
should allow the aircraft to roll forward for a short distance to minimize the stress on the main
gears.
Takeoff briefing should usually be a brief confirmation of the full takeoff briefing made at the parking
bay and should include any changes that may have occurred, e.g. change of SID, change in runway
conditions etc.
MISCELLANEOUS
Applicable to: ALL
STROBE LIGHT
When the STROBE lights are set to AUTO, they come on automatically when the aircraft is
airborne. The ON position must be used to turn on the lights on ground for crossing, backtracking
or entering a runway.
PACKS
If takeoff must be completed without air bleed from the engines (for performance reasons), but air
conditioning is desired, then APU bleed may be used with the packs set to ON. This will maintain
the engine performance level, and passenger comfort. In the event of an APU auto-shutdown
during takeoff, engine thrust is frozen until the thrust is manually-reduced. The packs revert to
engine bleed that causes an increase of EGT, in order to maintain THR.
If one pack is failed before takeoff, it is recommended that the flight crew set the failed pack to
OFF. The takeoff can be performed with the other pack ON with TOGA or FLEX thrust, the pack
being supplied by the onside bleeds. In this asymmetric bleed configuration, the N1 takeoff value
is limited to the value corresponding to the bleed ON configuration .
CLEARANCE CHANGE
If ATC clears the aircraft to maintain specific heading after take-off, turn the AFS-CP HDG selector
(on the FCU) to disarm NAV. The current aircraft heading will be displayed on the AFS-CP and
ND, and the fight crew can then set the cleared heading. Once airborne, and above 30 ft RA,
RWY TRK engages. To follow the clearance, the AFS-CP HDG knob should be pulled. Once
cleared to resume the SID, a HDG adjustment may be necessary to intercept the desired track for
NAV capture.
THRUST SETTING
Applicable to: ALL
TAKEOFF ROLL
Applicable to: ALL
The Captain must keep his hand on the thrust levers when the thrust levers are set to TOGA/FLX
notch and until V1.
The PF should use pedals to keep the aircraft straight. The nosewheel steering will be effective (until
reaching 150 kt ) but its authority decreases at a pre-determined rate as the groundspeed increases
and the rudder becomes more effective. The use the tiller is not recommended during takeoff roll,
because of its high efficiency, which might lead to aircraft overreaction.
For crosswind takeoffs, routine use of into wind aileron is not necessary. In strong crosswind
conditions, small lateral stick input may be used, if deemed necessary due to into wind wing reaction,
but avoid using large deflections, resulting in excessive spoiler deployment which increase the
aircraft tendency to turn into the wind.
In case of low visibility take-off, visual cues are primary means to track the runway centerline. The
PFD yaw bar provides an assistance in case of expected fog patches if ILS available.
ROTATION TECHNIQUE
Applicable to: ALL
Rotation is conventional. The PF must perform the rotation mainly head-up, using outside visual
reference until airborne, or at least until visual cues are lost, depending on visibility conditions. The
PF must then monitor the pitch attitude on the PFD.
The higher the inertia of the aircraft is, the more it is important to initiate the rotation with a smooth
positive backward sidestick input. Avoid aggressive and sharp inputs.
The typical all engine operating attitude after lift-off is about 12.5 ° .
If the established pitch rate is not satisfactory, the pilot must make smooth corrections on the stick.
He must avoid rapid and large corrections, which cause sharp reaction in pitch from the aircraft. If, to
increase the rotation rate, a further and late aft sidestick input is made around the time of lift-off, the
possibility of tailstrike increases significantly.
During rotation, the crew must not chase the FD pitch bar, since it does not give any pitch rate order,
and might lead to overreaction.
Once airborne only, the crew must refine the aircraft pitch attitude using the FD, which is then
representative of the SRS orders. The fly-by-wire control laws change into flight normal law, with
automatic pitch trim active.
A pitch limit indication is provided on the PFD at takeoff. It is displayed from the power application up
to 3 seconds after lift off.
TAILSTRIKE AVOIDANCE
Applicable to: ALL
INTRODUCTION
Tail strikes can cause extensive structural damage, which can jeopardize the flight and lead
to heavy maintenance action. They most often occur in such adverse conditions as crosswind,
turbulence, windshear, etc.
AIRCRAFT GEOMETRY
MAX PITCH ATTITUDE ON GROUND depending on main gear
oleo position
fully extended fully compressed
13.5 ° 11.5 °
MAIN FACTORS
EARLY ROTATION
Early rotation occurs when rotation is initiated below the scheduled VR. The potential reasons
for this are:
• The calculated VR is incorrect for the aircraft weight or flap configuration.
• The PF commands rotation below VR due to gusts, windshear or an obstacle on the runway.
Whatever the cause of the early rotation, the result will be an increased pitch attitude at lift-off,
and consequently a reduced tail clearance.
ROTATION TECHNIQUE
The recommendation given in the ROTATION TECHNIQUE paragraph should be applied.
A fast rotation rate increases the risk of tailstrike, but a slow rate increases take-off distance.
The recommended rate is between 2 and 3 degs/sec, which reflects the average rates achieved
during flight test, and is also the reference rate for performance calculations.
CONFIGURATION
When performance is limiting the takeoff weight, the flight crew uses TOGA thrust and selects
the configuration that provides the highest takeoff weight.
When the actual takeoff weight is lower than the permissible one, the flight crew uses FLEX TO
thrust. For a given aircraft weight, a variety of flap configurations are possible. Usually, the flight
crew selects the configuration that provides the maximum FLEX temperature. This is done to
prolong engine life.
The configuration that provides the maximum FLEX temperature varies with the runway length.
On long runways, CONF 1+F becomes the optimum configuration, in term of FLEX temperature.
However, the flight crew should keep in mind that the tail clearance at lift off depends on the
configuration. The highest flap configuration gives the highest tailstrike margin.
TAKEOFF TRIM SETTING
The main purpose of the pitch trim setting for take-off is to provide consistent rotation
characteristics. Takeoff pitch trim setting is automatic on ground.
The aircraft performs a safe takeoff, provided the pitch trim setting is within the green band on
the pitch trim display, on the PFD.
However, the pitch trim setting significantly affects the aircraft behaviour during rotation:
• With a forward CG and the pitch trim set to the nose-down limit the pilots will feel an aircraft
heavy to rotate" and aircraft rotation will be very slow in response to the normal take off stick
displacement.
• With an aft CG and the pitch trim set to the nose-up limit the pilots will most probably have to
counteract an early autorotation until VR is reached.
In either case the pilot may have to modify his normal control input in order to achieve the
desired rotation rate, but should be cautious not to overreact.
CROSSWIND TAKEOFF
It is said in the TAKEOFF ROLL paragraph that care should be taken to avoid using large
deflection, resulting in excessive spoiler deployment. A direct effect of the reduction in lift due to
the extension of the spoilers on one wing will be a reduction in tail clearance and an increased
risk of tailstrike.
OLEO INFLATION
The correct extension of the main landing gear shock absorber (and thus the nominal increase
in tail clearance during the rotation) relies on the correct inflation of the oleos. An under inflated
oleo will delay the start of the bogie rotation and reduce tail clearances.
FLIGHT GUIDANCE
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
The AP can be engaged 5 seconds after takeoff and above 100ft RA.
VERTICAL PROFILE
SRS engages when the thrust levers are set to the applicable detent for take-off and will remain
engaged until the acceleration altitude.
In SRS mode, the aircraft maintains a speed target equal to V2 + 10 kt (in normal engine
configuration).
The SRS guidance law also includes :
• Attitude protection to reduce aircraft nose-up effect during takeoff 14 °
• Flight path angle protection that ensures a positive climb.
LATERAL PROFILE
Under most circumstances, the crew can expect to follow the programmed SID. In this case, NAV
is armed on selecting the thrust levers to the applicable detent for take-off and engages once
above 30 ft RA.
At the thrust reduction altitude, "LVR CLB" flashes on the FMA. When hand flying, lower slightly
the nose, as applicable, to anticipate the pitch down FD order. Bring the thrust levers back to CLB
detent. The A/THR is now active (A/THR on the FMA changes from blue to white).
The FD pitch down order depends upon the amount of thrust decrease between TOGA or FLX and
CLB.
If take-off was performed packs OFF, the packs will be selected back to ON after thrust reduction
because of the potential resulting EGT increase.
ACCELERATION ALTITUDE
Applicable to: ALL
At the acceleration altitude, the FD pitch mode changes from SRS to CLB or OP CLB mode. The
target speed, displayed as a triangle, jumps:
• Either to the managed target speed (eg; speed constraint, speed limit or ECON climb speed),
• Or to the preselected climb speed (entered by the pilot on PERF CLB page before takeoff).
The short term managed speed, displayed as a magenta dot, jumps to the lowest of VFE-5 ktof the
present aircraft configuration and initial climb speed.
During takeoff phase, F and S speeds are the minimum speeds for retracting the surfaces:
• At F speed, the aircraft accelerating (positive speed trend): retract to 1.
• At S speed, the aircraft accelerating (positive speed trend): retract to 0.
GENERAL
If take-off is carried out at heavy weight, the maneuvring speed F may be close to VFE Conf 2 and
S speed is above VFE Conf1+F. In this case, two protections intervene:
• The Automatic Retraction System (ARS)
• The α Lock function
The triggering of the alpha/speed lock function is a normal situation at high weight. If the slats
alpha/speed lock function is triggered, the flight crew continues the scheduled acceleration to
enable later slats retraction.
Obstacle clearance, noise abatement, or departure procedures may require an immediate turn
after take-off. Provided FD commands are followed accurately, the flaps and slats may be retracted
using the normal procedure as FD orders provide bank angle limits with respect to speed and
configuration.
If the aircraft is required to level off below the acceleration altitude, ALT* engages and SRS
disengages. The "LVR CLB" message flashes on the FMA and the target speed goes to the initial
climb speed. In this case, the crew should expect a faster than normal acceleration, and be prepared
to retract the flaps and slats promptly.
NADP1
NADP2
CLB or OP CLB mode will be preferred to V/S mode for climb even for small altitude changes.
Indeed, in the small altitude change case, the THR CLB mode is limited in order to give 1000 fpm
making this altitude change smoother and more comfortable for the passengers.
SPEED CONSIDERATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
The FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays the MAX REC ALT and the OPT ALT information (Refer
to Cruise/Altitude Considerations). The flight crew uses this information to rapidly answer the ATC
request: “CAN YOU CLIMB TO FL XXX?”.
The CLB panel of the FMS ACTIVE/PERF page displays time and distance predictions for a given
FL for the managed speed and selected speed. This default value of this FL is the AFS CP target
altitude. The flight crew can change the default value. The flight crew uses this information to rapidly
answer the ATC request: “CAN YOU MAKE FL XXX by ZZZ waypoint?”.
VERTICAL DISPLAY
Applicable to: ALL
When switching the altimeter setting from QNH (or QFE if available) to STD, the safety altitude that
was graphically displayed (safe altitude within the VD area), switches to a numerical value.
Since this numerical value is equal to the highest safe altitude along the F-PLN on the VD range, this
may result in the aircraft being below the displayed safe altitude. This functionality increases the crew
awareness regarding the safe altitude.
The vertical flight plan profile induces a change of practice in the way to avoid cells. Indeed, as the
VD provides the predicted vertical clearance with cells, it may push the crew to over fly the cells with
low vertical margins.
If the flight crew is unable to establish whether or not the vertical clearance above the cell is sufficient
enough to overfly safely, he should avoid the cell laterally. The cells displayed on VD are vertical
cut along the green solid line. Lateral spacing of the aircraft versus the cell may be refined using the
AZIM function.
LATERAL MODE
Applicable to: ALL
If the aircraft is following the programmed SID, the AP/FD should be in NAV. If ATC vectors the
aircraft, HDG will be used until a time when clearance is given to either resume the SID or track
direct to a specific waypoint. In either case, the crew must ensure that the waypoints are properly
sequenced.
The crew should keep in mind that the use of HDG mode e.g. following ATC radar vectors, will revert
CLB to OP CLB and any altitude constraints in the MFD F-PLN page will not be observed unless they
are selected on the FCU.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
Once the cruise flight level is reached, “ALT CRZ” is displayed on the FMA. The cruise Mach number
is targeted and cruise fuel consumption is optimized.
FMS USE
Applicable to: ALL
MFD USE
Once the ALT CRZ is displayed on the FMA, The FMS sequences from the climb phase to the
cruise phase.
The POSITION MONITOR page can be accessed from the PERF page via a short cut and
provides information on the navigation accuracy and BRG/DIST.
The PNF MFD should display in ACTIVE/FPLN page
CRUISE FL
If the aircraft is cleared to a lower cruise flight level than the pre-planned cruise flight level
displayed on MFD ACTIVE/PERF page, “ALT CRZ” will not be displayed on the FMA and cruise
Mach number will not be targeted. The crew will update the MFD ACTIVE/PERF page accordingly.
When in cruise i.e. ALT CRZ on FMA, the thrust control is soft. This means that the thrust will
allow small speed variation around the cruise Mach (typically +/- 4 kt to 6 kt) while limiting thrust
readjustment . This optimizes the fuel consumption and increase passengers comfort.
WIND AND TEMPERATURE
When reaching cruise FL, the crew will ensure that the wind and temperatures are correctly
entered and the lateral and vertical F-PLN reflect the CFP. Entries should be made at waypoints
when there is a difference of either 30° in direction or 30 kt in velocity for the wind data and 5 °C
for temperature deviation. These entries should be made up to four different levels to reflect the
actual wind and temperature profile. This will ensure that the FMS fuel and time predictions are as
accurate as possible and provide an accurate OPT FL computation.
STEP CLIMB
If there is a STEP in the F-PLN, the crew will ensure that the wind is properly set at the first
waypoint beyond the step (D on the following example) at both initial FL and step FL.
If at D waypoint, the CFP provides the wind at FL 350 but not at FL 310, it is recommended to
insert the same wind at FL 310 as the one at FL 350. This is due to wind propagation rules, which
might affect the optimum FL computation.
F-PLN INFO
On the MFD ACTIVE/F-PLN page, the F-PLN INFO key gives a quick access to several useful
functions, which are not associated to a waypoint::
• ALTERNATE
• CLOSEST AIRPORTS
• EQUI-TIME POINT
• FIX INFO
• LL CROSSING
• TIME MARKER
• CPNY F-PLN REPORT
The ALTERNATE airport page permits
• To get valuable distance, bearing time and fuel information to several alternates
• To update the alternate if required
The CLOSEST AIRPORT page provides valuable distance, bearing time and fuel information to
the four closest airports from the aircraft present position (PPOS), as well as to an airport the crew
may define. The fuel and time predictions are a function of the average wind between the aircraft
and the airport.
The EQUI-TIME POINT (ETP) function should be used to assist the crew in making a decision
should an en-route diversion be required. Suitable airport pairs, REF1 and REF2, diversion FL and
wind should be entered. The ETP calculation is based on the entered average wind at diversion FL
with actual speed.
The SECF-PLN function is a useful tool and should be used practically. The ETP should be
inserted as a waypoint and the route to diversion airfield should be finalized. By programming a
potential en-route diversion, the crew would reduce their workload should a failure occur. This is
particularly true when terrain considerations apply to the intended diversion route. When an ETP is
sequenced, the crew will:
• Access to the ETP page in FPLN info
• Insert the next suitable diversion airfield
• Read new ETP and insert as waypoint
• Import the ACTIVE F-PLN in one SEC F-PLN
• Insert the new diversion as NEW DEST in the SEC F-PLN from new ETP
MISCELLANEOUS
If ATC requires for a position report, the crew will use the MFD POSITION/REPORT page.
If ATC modifies the routing, the crew will revise the F-PLN. Once achieved, the crew may perform
a new F-PLN print.
If ATC requires to report on a given radial, the crew will use a FIX INFO page, that can be
accessed from the F-PLN INFO key.
If ATC requires a report at a given time, the crew will insert a TIME MARKER pseudo waypoint.
TIME MARKER function is also available from the F-PLN INFO key.
If there is weather, the crew will use the OFFSET function, which can be accessed from a revision
on the MFD ACTIVE/F-PLN page at any waypoints. The crew will determine how many NM are
required to avoid the weather. Once cleared by ATC, the crew will insert the offset.
If ATC gives a DIR TO clearance to a waypoint far from present position, the crew will use the
ABEAM facility. This facility allows both a better crew orientation and the previously entered winds
to be still considered.
COST INDEX
Applicable to: ALL
The Cost Index (CI) is used to take into account the relationship between fuel and time related
costs in order to minimize the trip cost. The CI is calculated by the airline for each sector. From an
operational point of view, the CI affects the speeds (ECON SPEED/MACH) and cruise altitude (OPT
ALT). CI=0 corresponds to maximum range whereas the CI=999 corresponds to minimum time.
The CI is a strategic parameter, which applies to the whole flight. However, the CI can be modified
by the crew in flight for valid strategic operational reasons. For example, if the crew needs to reduce
the speed for the entire flight to comply with curfew requirements or fuel management requirements
(XTRA gets close to 0), then it would be appropriate to reduce the CI.
The SEC F-PLN can be used to check the predictions associated with new CI. If they are
satisfactory, the crew will then modify the CI in the primary F-PLN. However, the crew should be
aware that any modification of the CI would affect trip cost.
SPEED CONSIDERATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
accordingly, between green dot and MMO, to achieve this constraint. If the constraint can be met,
i.e. within +/- 2 minutes, a magenta asterix will be displayed on the MFD; if the constraint cannot
be met, an amber asterix will be displayed. Once the constrained waypoint is sequenced, the
ECON Mach is resumed.
The Constant Mach Segment (CMS) option enables to fly cruise segment at constant Mach.
This guidance is performed under managed speed control and is taken into account for cruise
predictions
This CMS option may be accessed through ACTIVE/FPLN page or ACTIVE/PERF/CRZ page. This
facility is also available in the SEC FPLN to evaluate any speed strategy change.
SELECTED
Should ATC requires a speed constraint for a limited period of time, the pilot will select the cruise
speed on the AFS-CP (on the FCU). FMS predictions are updated accordingly until reaching
either the next step climb or top of descent, where the managed speed applies again. The FMS
predictions remain therefore realistic.
The MFD ACTIVE/PERF CRZ page displays Long Range Cruise (LRC) speed and TURB speed.
At high altitude, the speed should not be reduced below GREEN DOT as this may create a
situation where it is impossible to maintain speed and/or altitude as the increased drag may
exceed the available thrust.
ALTITUDE CONSIDERATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
accurately entered. The crew should be aware that flying at a level other than the OPT FL would
adversely affect the trip cost.
For each Mach number, there will be a different OPT FL. Should an FMS failure occur, the crew
should refer to the OIS PERF application to determine the OPT FL.
STEP CLIMB
Applicable to: ALL
Since the optimum altitude increases as fuel is consumed during the flight, from a cost point of
view, it is preferable to climb to a higher cruise altitude when aircraft weight permits. This technique,
referred to as a Step Climb, is typically accomplished by initially climbing approximately 2000 ft
above the optimum altitude and then cruising at that flight level until approximately 4000 ft below
optimum.
Step climbs can either be planned at waypoints or be optimum step points calculated by the FMS.
In order to determine the optimum location of the next FL change, the crew will use the OPT STEP
facility on the ACTIVE/F-PLN/VERT REV/STEP ALTS page and insert the next FL. If predictions are
satisfactory in term of time and fuel saving, the crew will insert it in F-PLN provided it is compatible
with ATC. The inserted step climb is set as a geographic waypoint. It may be updated by pressing
the UPDATE* prompt on the STEP page
The OPT STEP computation will be accurate if vertical wind profile has been properly entered. Refer
to FMS USE of this section.
It may be advantageous to request an initial cruise altitude above optimum if altitude changes are
difficult to obtain on specific routes. This minimizes the possibility of being held at a low altitude and
high fuel consumption condition for long periods of time. The requested/cleared cruise altitude should
be compared to the REC MAX altitude. Before accepting an altitude above optimum, the crew should
determine that it will continue to be acceptable considering the projected flight conditions such as
turbulence, standing waves or temperature change.
The diagram above shows three step climb strategies with respect to OPT and REC MAX FL.
Strategy 1 provides the best trip cost, followed by 2 then 3.
FUEL MONITORING
Applicable to: ALL
The flight plan fuel burn from departure to destination is based on certain assumed conditions. These
include gross weight, cruise altitude, route of flight, temperature, cruise wind and cruise speed.
Actual fuel consumption should be compared with the flight plan fuel consumption at least once every
30 minutes.
The crew should be aware that many factors influence fuel consumption, such as actual flight level,
cruise speed and unexpected meteorological conditions. These parameters should normally be
reflected in the FMS.
The crew must keep in mind that:
• A significant deviation between planned and actual fuel figures without reason
• An excessive fuel flow leading to a potential imbalance
• An abnormal decrease in total fuel quantity (FOB+FU)
May indicate a fuel leak and the associated procedure should be applied.
FUEL TEMPERATURE
Applicable to: ALL
Fuel freeze refers to the formation of wax crystals suspended in the fuel, which can accumulate when
fuel temperature is below the freeze point (-47°C for jet A1) and can prevent proper fuel feed to the
engines.
During normal operations, fuel temperature rarely decreases to the point that it becomes limiting.
However, extended cruise operations increase the potential for fuel temperatures to reach the freeze
point. Fuel temperature will slowly reduce towards TAT.
If fuel temperature approaches the minimum allowed, consideration should be given to achieving a
higher TAT:
• Descending or diverting to a warmer air mass may be considered. Below the tropopause, a 4000
ft descent gives a 7°C increase in TAT. In severe cases, a descent to as low as 25,000 ft may be
required.
• Increasing Mach number will also increase TAT. An increase of 0.01 Mach produces
approximately 0.7°C increase in TAT.
In either case, up to one hour may be required for fuel temperature to stabilise. The crew should
consider the fuel penalty associated with either of these actions.
APPROACH PREPARATION
Applicable to: ALL
The latest destination weather should be obtained approximately 15 minutes prior to descent and the
FMS programmed for the descent and arrival. During FMS programming the PM will be head down,
so it is important that the PF does not become involved in any tasks other than flying the aircraft.
The fuel predictions will be accurate if the F-PLN is correctly entered in terms of arrival, go-around
and alternate routing.
The three first boxes of the FMS menu will be reviewed as required to update the FMS:
FPLN
Update landing runway, STAR, Approach, Go-around procedure, FPLN to alternate.
Check altitude and speed constraints.
Compare MFD FPLN versus the approach chart .
PERF
PERF APPR:
• Destination airfield weather (QNH, Temperature and wind). The entered wind should be the
average wind given by the ATC or ATIS. Do not enter gust values, for example, if the wind is
150/20-25, insert the lower speed 150/20 (With managed speed mode in approach, ground
speed mini-function will cope with the gusts). The QNH (QFE) setting will be updated at that
time by presetting the barometer reference selector.
• Minima (DH for CAT 2 or 3 approach and MDA for others approaches)
• Landing configuration (wind shear anticipated or in case of failure).
PERF GO AROUND: Check thrust reduction and acceleration altitude.
The MFD PERF page provides a quick access to MFD POSITION MONITOR for BRG/DIST
function which is a useful tool to monitor the descent. Insert VOR/DME or landing runway
threshold of destination airfield in the BRG/DIST field as required.
FUEL & LOAD
Check estimated landing weight, EFOB and extra fuel.
NAVAIDS
Manually tune the VOR/DME and/or NDB if required.
Check ILS ident, frequency and associated course of destination airfield as required. It is not
recommended manually forcing the ILS identifier as, in case of late runway change, the associated
ILS would not be automatically tuned.
SEC INDEX
To cover contingencies e.g. runway change, circling or diversion.
Once the FMS has been programmed, the PF should then cross check the information prior to the
approach briefing.
LANDING BRIEFING
Applicable to: ALL
The main objective of the approach briefing is for the PF to inform the PM of his intended course
of action for the approach. The briefing should be practical and relevant to the actual weather
conditions expected. It should be concise and conducted in a logical manner. It should be given at a
time of low workload if possible, to enable the crew to concentrate on the content. It is very important
that any misunderstandings are resolved at this time.
PF briefing Associated cross check
technical status (relevant MEL and CDL considerations, relevant OEB)
NOTAM
Weather
• Accessibility
• Runway in use
Fuel
FUEL & LOAD page
• Extra fuel
Descent F-PLN page
Paper chart and VD
• TOD (time, position)
F-PLN page
• MORA, STAR, MSA
• Altitude and speed constraints
Holding (If expected)
• Entry in holding pattern
• MHA and MAX speed
Approach F-PLN and ND
F-PLN
• Approach type
PERF APPR and FMA
• Altitude and FAF identification
F-PLN
• Descent gradient
F-PLN
• MDA/DH
• Missed approach procedure
• Alternate considerations
Continued on the following page
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
The PM will set preferably the MFD ACTIVE/PERF page, as it provides predictions down to any
inserted altitude in DES/OP DES modes, and VERT DEV in NAV MODE. He may also select the
POSITION/MONITOR page, for BRG/DIST information.
The PM will set the MFD ACTIVE/F-PLN page.
If use of radar is required, consider selecting the radar display on the PM side and TERR on PNF
side only.
COMPUTATION PRINCIPLE
Applicable to: ALL
• The ECON speed (which may have been modified by the crew on the MFD ACTIVE/PERF DES
page, before entering DESCENT phase), or
• The speed constraint or limit when applicable.
INTRODUCTION
To carry out the descent, the crew can use either the managed descent mode (DES) or the
selected descent modes (OP DES or V/S). Both descent modes can be flown either with selected
speed or managed speed.
The modes and monitoring means are actually linked.
The managed DES mode guides the aircraft along the FMS pre-computed descent profile, as long
as it flies along the lateral F.PLN: i.e. DES mode is available if NAV is engaged.
As a general rule when DES mode is used, the descent is monitored using VDEV called "yoyo" on
PFD, or its digital value on the MFD ACTIVE/PERF page, as well as the level arrow symbol on the
ND.
The selected OPDES or V/S modes are used when HDG is selected or when ALT CSTR may be
disregarded or for various tactical purposes.
As a general rule when OPDES or V/S modes are used, the descent is monitored using the
Energy Circle, (displayed if HDG or TRK modes and indicating the required distance to descend,
decelerate and land from present position) and the level arrow symbol on the ND. When the
aircraft is not far away from the lateral F.PLN (small XTKi.e. less than 5 nm) , the yoyo on PFD is
also a good indicator.
MANAGED DESCENT MODE
The managed descent profile from high altitude is approximately 2.5°.
As an estimation of the distance to touchdown is required to enable descent profile monitoring,
it is important to ensure that the MFD ACTIVE/F-PLN plan page reflects the expected approach
routing. Any gross errors noted in the descent profile are usually a result of incorrect routing
entered on the MFD or non-sequencing of F-PLN waypoints, giving a false distance to touchdown.
DESCENT INITIATION
To initiate a managed descent, the pilot will set the ATC cleared altitude on the AFS-CP and
push the ALT selector selector. DES mode engages and is annunciated on the FMA. If an early
descent were required by ATC, DES mode would give 1000 fpm rate of descent, until regaining
the computed profile.
If the descent is delayed, speed should be reduced towards green dot, and when cleared for
descent, the pilot will push for DES and push for managed speed. The speed reduction prior to
descent will enable the aircraft to recover the computed profile more quickly as it accelerates to
the managed descent speed.
DESCENT PROFILE
When DES with managed speed is engaged, the AP/FD guides the aircraft along the
pre-computed descent path determined by a number of factors such as altitude constraints,
wind and descent speed. However, as the actual conditions may differ from those planned, the
DES mode operates within a 20 kts speed range around the managed target speed to maintain
the descent path.
If the aircraft gets high on the computed descent path:
• The speed will increase towards the upper limit of the speed range, to keep the aircraft on
the path with IDLE thrust.
• If the speed reaches the upper limit, THR IDLE is maintained, but the autopilot does not
allow the speed to increase any more, thus the VDEV will slowly increase.
• A path intercept point, which assumes half speedbrake extension, will be displayed on the
ND descent track.
• If speed brakes are not extended, the intercept point will move forward. If it gets close to a
an altitude constrained waypoint, then a message "EXTEND SPD BRK" will be displayed
on the PFD.
This technique allows an altitude constraint to be matched with minimum use of speedbrakes.
When regaining the descent profile, the speedbrakes should be retracted to prevent the
A/THR applying thrust against speedbrakes. If the speedbrakes are not retracted, the
speedbrake symbol becomes amber and "RETRACT SPD BRK" is displayed in white on the
PFD.
maintain the descent path at this lower speed. The path intercept point will be displayed on
the ND, to indicate where the descent profile will be regained.
DESCENT CONSTRAINT
Applicable to: ALL
Descent constraints may be automatically included in the route as part of an arrival procedure or they
may be manually entered through the MFD ACTIVE/FPLN page. The aircraft will attempt to meet
these as long as DES mode is being used.
The crew should be aware that an ATC "DIR TO" clearance automatically removes the requirement
to comply with the speed/altitude constraints assigned to the waypoints deleted from the F-PLN.
However, if intermediate waypoints are relevant, e.g. for terrain awareness, then "DIR TO" with
ABEAMS may be an appropriate selection as constraints can be re-entered into these waypoints if
required.
Following the selection of HDG, DES mode will switch automatically to V/S, and altitude constraints
will no longer be taken into account.
MODE REVERSION
Applicable to: ALL
If a high V/S target is selected (or typically after a DES → V/S reversion), the autopilot will pitch the
aircraft down to fly the target V/S. Thus the aircraft will tend to accelerate, while ATHR commands
idle thrust to try to keep the speed. When IAS will reach a speed close to VMO or VFE, the autopilot
will pitch the aircraft up, so as to fly a V/S allowing VMO or VFE to be maintained with idle thrust.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
Whenever holding is anticipated, it is preferable to maintain cruise level and reduce speed to green
dot, with ATC clearance, to minimize the holding requirement. As a rule of thumb, a M 0.05 decrease
during one hour equates to 4 minhold. However, other operational constraints might make this option
inappropriate.
A holding pattern can be inserted at any point in the flight plan or may be included as part of the
STAR. In either case, the crew can modify the holding pattern.
If a hold is to be flown, provided NAV mode is engaged and the speed is managed, an automatic
speed reduction will occur to achieve green dot speed when entering the holding pattern. Green dot
speed corresponds to an approximation of the best lift to drag ratio and provides the lowest hourly
fuel consumption.
If green dot speed is greater than the ICAO or state maximum holding speed, the crew should select
flap 1 below 20.000 ft and fly S speed. Fuel consumption will be increased when holding in anything
other than clean configuration and green dot speed.
The holding pattern is not included in the descent path computation since the FMS does not know
how many patterns will be flown. When the holding fix is sequenced, the FMS assumes that only one
holding pattern will be flown and updates predictions accordingly. Once in the holding pattern, the
VDEV indicates the vertical deviation between current aircraft altitude and the altitude at which the
aircraft should cross the exit fix in order to be on the descent profile.
The DES mode guides the aircraft down at –1000 fpm whilst in the holding pattern until reaching the
cleared altitude or altitude constraint.
When in the holding pattern, LAST EXIT UTC/FUEL information is displayed on the MFD HOLD
page. These predictions are based upon the fuel policy requirements specified on the MFD FUEL &
LOAD page with no extra fuel, assuming the aircraft will divert. The crew should be aware that this
information is computed with defined assumptions e.g.:
• Aircraft weight being equal to landing weight at primary destination
• Flight at FL 220 if distance to ALTN is less than 200 nm , otherwise FL 310performed at maximum
range speed i.e. CI=0
• Constant wind (as entered in alternate field of the DES WIND page).
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
This section covers general information applicable to all approach types. Techniques, which apply to
specific approach types, will be covered in dedicated chapters.
All approaches are divided into three parts (initial, intermediate and final) where various drills have to
be achieved regardless of the approach type.
INITIAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
USE OF VD
Within 25 NM of the NAVAID relative to the selected arrival or approach procedure, the minimum
altitude displayed switches from MORA to MSA. MSA displayed on VD will be that of the NAVAIDs
relative to the selected procedure.
The crew should keep in mind that crossing the safe altitudes during an approach doesn’t always
represent a constraint violation, as long as the flight monitoring is supported by another means,
e.g. radar control. This is why the safe altitude is not displayed as a red line (but as a magenta
one). However, crossing the safety altitude should trigger crew alertness regarding aircraft position
and ATC clearance i.e. "I will go below if I am sure of my position and I am allowed to do it (radar
or procedure)".
NAVIGATION ACCURACY
No navigation accuracy check is required as long as GPS PRIMARY is available.
Without GPS PRIMARY, navigation accuracy check has to be carried out prior to any approach.
The navigation accuracy determines which guidance modes the crew should use and the type of
display to be shown on the ND.
THE FLYING MODE
It is recommended to select HDG/ VS for ILS approaches and TRK/FPA for Non precision
approaches. However, since the FD are selected ON, the FD bars will be the flight reference in all
cases.
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION
Activation of the approach phase will initiate a deceleration towards VAPP or the speed constraint
inserted at FAF, whichever applies.
When in NAV mode with managed speed, the approach phase activates automatically when
sequencing the deceleration pseudo-waypoint D. If an early deceleration is required, the approach
phase can be activated on the MFD PERF APPR page.
When in HDG mode, e.g. for radar vectoring, the crew will activate the approach phase manually.
When the approach phase is activated, the magenta triangle (target speed) drops to VAPP,
whereas the short term managed speed appears as a magenta dot, equal to green dot in clean
configuration, S in CONF 1, etc...
There are two approach techniques:
• The decelerated approach
• The stabilized approach
THE DECELERATED APPROACH
This technique refers to an approach where the aircraft reaches 1 000 ft AGL in the landing
configuration at VAPP. In most cases, this equates to the aircraft being in CONF 2 and at F
speed at 2 500 ft AGL
This is the preferred technique for ILS approach or FLS approach in the F-APP or F-APP+RAW
cases. The deceleration pseudo waypoint D computed by the FM assumes a decelerated
approach technique.
THE STABILIZED APPROACH
This technique refers to an approach where the aircraft reaches the FAF in the landing
configuration at VAPP.
To get a valuable deceleration pseudo waypoint and to ensure a timely deceleration, the pilot
should enter VAPP as a speed constraint at the FAF.
F-PLN SEQUENCING
When in NAV mode, the F-PLN will sequence automatically. In HDG/TRK mode, the F-PLN
waypoints will sequence automatically only if the aircraft flies close to the programmed route.
Correct F-PLN sequencing is important to ensure that
• The Vertical Display is meaningful and
• the programmed missed approach route is available in case of go-around.
• The predictions are correct
A good cue to monitor the proper F-PLN sequencing is the TO waypoint on the upper right side of
the ND.
If under radar vectors and automatic waypoint sequencing does not occur, it is recommended to
sequence the F-PLN using the DIR TO COURSE IN function .
Using DIR TO or DIR TO COURSE IN function arms the NAV mode. If NAV mode is not
appropriate, pull the HDG knob to disarm it.
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
The purpose of the intermediate approach is to bring the aircraft at the proper speed, altitude and
configuration at FAF.
DECELERATION AND CONFIGURATION CHANGE
Managed speed is recommended for the approach. Once the approach phase has been activated,
the A/THR will guide aircraft speed towards the short-term managed speed displayed as a
magenta dot. It corresponds to the target speed of the current configuration, whenever higher than
VAPP, e.g. green dot for Config 0, S speed for Config 1 etc.
The managed speed target, displayed either with the numeric value when out of the speed scale
or with a magenta triangle when within the speed scale, drops to VAPP.
The Automatic Extension System (AES) automatically limits the slats/flaps extension to “1” as long
as the speed exceeds 205 kt. When the speed drops below 205 kt, the slats/flaps extends to “1 +
F”. .
To achieve a constant deceleration and to minimize thrust variation, the crew should extend the
next configuration when reaching the short term target speed + 10 kts (IAS must be lower than
VFE next), e.g. when the speed reaches green dot + 10 kts, the crew should select Config 1.
If selected speed is to be used to comply with ATC, the requested speed should be selected on
AFS-CP(on the FCU). A speed below the manoeuvring speed of the present configuration may
be selected provided it is above VLS. When the ATC speed constraint no longer applies, the pilot
should push the AFS-CP speed selector to resume managed speed.
When flying the intermediate approach in selected speed, the crew will activate the approach
phase. This will ensure further proper speed deceleration when resuming managed speed;
otherwise the aircraft will accelerate to the previous applicable descent phase speed. For this
concern, the position of the magenta dot with regard to the selected speed is a valuable cue.
Speedbrakes can be used to increase the deceleration rate but the crew should be aware of:
• The increase in VLS with the use of speedbrakes
• The limited effect at low speeds
INTERCEPTION OF FINAL APPROACH COURSE
To ensure a smooth interception of final approach course, the aircraft ground speed will be
appropriate, depending upon interception angle and distance to runway threshold. The pilot will
refer to applicable raw data (LOC, needles), XTK information on ND and wind component for the
selection of an appropriate IAS.
If ATC provides radar vectors, the crew will use the DIR TO COURSE IN facility. This ensures
• A proper F-PLN sequencing
• A comprehensive ND display
If ATC gives a new wind for landing, the crew will update it on MFD ACTIVE/PERF APPR page.
Once cleared for the approach, the crew will press the APPR P/B to arm the approach modes
when applicable.
FINAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
SPEED CONSIDERATION
VAPP
The approach speed (VAPP) is defined by the crew to perform the safest approach. It is function
of gross weight, configuration, headwind, A/THR ON/OFF, icing and downburst.
In most cases, the FMS provides valuable VAPP on MFD ACTIVE/PERF APPR page, once
tower wind and FLAP3 or FLAP FULL landing configuration has been inserted (Vapp=Vls + max
of {5kt, 1/3 tower head wind component on landing RWY in the F-PLN}).
The crew can insert a lower VAPP on the MFD APPR page, down to VLS, if landing is
performed with A/THR OFF, with no wind, no downburst and no icing.
He can insert a higher VAPP in case of strong suspected downburst, but this increment is
limited to 15 kts.
In case of strong or gusty crosswind greater than 20 kt, VAPP should be at least VLS + 5 kt; the
5 kt increment above VLS may be increased up to 15 kt at the flight crew's discretion.
The crew will bear in mind that the wind entered in MFD ACTIVE/PERF APPR page considers
the wind direction to be in the same reference as the runway direction e. g. if airport if magnetic
referenced, the crew will insert magnetic wind.
The wind direction provided by ATIS and tower is given in the same reference as the runway
direction whereas the wind provided by VOLMET, METAR or TAF is always true referenced.
VAPP is computed at predicted landing weight while the aircraft is in CRZ or DES phase. Once
the approach phase is activated, VAPP is computed using current gross weight.
Managed speed should be used for final approach as it provides Ground Speed mini (GS mini)
protection, even when the VAPP has been manually inserted.
GROUND SPEED MINI
Purpose
The purpose of the ground speed mini function is to keep the aircraft energy level above a
minimum value, whatever the wind variations or gusts.
This allows an efficient management of the thrust in gusts or longitudinal shears. Thrust
varies in the right sense, but in a smaller range in gusty situations, which explains why it is
recommended in such situations.
It provides additional but rational safety margins in shears.
It allows pilots "to understand what is going on" in perturbed approaches by monitoring the
target speed magenta bugs: when target goes up = head wind gust.
Computation
This minimum energy level is the energy the aircraft will have at landing with the expected
tower wind; it is materialized by the ground speed of the aircraft at that time which is called
GS mini:
If, for any reason, one flight parameter deviates from stabilized conditions, the PM will make a
callout as stated below:
Exceedance and associated PM callout
Parameter Exceedance Callout
IAS VAPP +10 kt / -5 kt "SPEED"
V/S < -1 000 ft/min "SINK RATE"
Pitch attitude +7 ° / -3 ° "PITCH"
Bank angle 5° "BANK"
Localizer 1/4 dot PFD "LOCALIZER"
ILS only Excess deviation
Glide slope 1 dot PFD "GLIDE SLOPE"
Excess deviation: 1/2 dot on
Course "COURSE"
PFD (or 2.5 ° (VOR) / 5 ° (ADF))
NPA selected
Altitude at
Deviation "x FT HIGH (LOW)"
check points
Localizer 1/4 dot PFD "F-LOC"(1)
NPA FLS -
Glide slope 1 dot PFD "F-GLIDE"(1)
(1) Reaching the minima, if the required visual conditions are met to continue the approach, external visual cues prevail.
Following a PM flight parameter exceedance callout, the suitable PF response will be:
• Acknowledge the PM callout, for proper crew coordination purposes
• Take immediate corrective action to control the exceeded parameter back into the defined
stabilized conditions
• Assess whether stabilized conditions will be recovered early enough prior to landing, otherwise
initiate a go-around.
REACHING THE MINIMA
Decision to land or go-around must be made at MDA/DH at the latest. Reaching the MDA/DH, at
MINIMUM call out:
• If suitable visual reference can be maintained and the aircraft is properly established, continue
and land.
• If not, go-around
The MDA/DH should not be set as target altitude on the AFS-CP (on the FCU). If the MDA/DH
were inserted on the AFS-CP, this would cause a spurious ALT* when approaching MDA/DH,
resulting in the approach becoming destabilised at a critical stage.
AP DISCONNECTION
During the final approach with the AP engaged, the aircraft will be stabilised. Therefore, when
disconnecting the AP for a manual landing, the pilot should avoid the temptation to make large
inputs on the sidestick.
The pilot should disconnect the autopilot early enough to resume manual control of the aircraft and
to evaluate the drift before flare. During crosswind conditions, the pilot should avoid any tendency
to drift downwind.
Some common errors include:
‐ Descending below the final path, and/or
‐ reducing the drift too early .
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
This chapter deals with some characteristics of the ILS approach. Recommendations mentioned in
APPROACH GENERAL chapter apply.
For CATI ILS, the crew will insert DA/DH values into MDA (or MDH if QFE function is available) field
on MFD ACTIVE/PERF APPR page, since these values are baro referenced.
For CATII or CATIII ILS, the crew will insert DH into DH field on MFD ACTIVE/PERF APPR page,
since this value is a radio altitude referenced.
INITIAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
NAVIGATION ACCURACY
When GPS PRIMARY is available, no NAV ACCURACY monitoring is required.
When GPS PRIMARY is lost the crew will check on MFD POS MONITOR page that the required
navigation accuracy is appropriate. If NAV ACCURACY DOWNGRAD is displayed, the crew will
use raw data for navigation accuracy check. The navigation accuracy determines which AP modes
the crew should use and the type of display to be shown on the ND.
ND
NAVIGATION ACCURACY AP/FD mode
PF PM
GPS PRIMARY
NAV ACCUR HIGH
ARC or ROSE NAV with navaid raw data NAV
NAV ACCUR LOW and NAV
ACCURACY check ≤1NM
GPS PRIMARY LOST and
NAV ACCUR LOW and NAV
ACCURACY check>1NM ARC or ROSE NAV or ROSE
ROSE ILS HDG or TRK
GPS PRIMARY LOST ILS with navaid raw data
and aircraft flying within
unreliable radio navaid area
FLYING MODE
FD are the flight reference. The crew will select HDG V/S on the AFS-CP (on the FCU).
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION
For a standard ILS, the crew should plan a decelerated approach. However, if the G/S angle
is greater than3.5 °or if forecast tail wind at landing exceeds10 kt (if permitted by the AFM), a
stabilized approach is recommended.
MISCELLANEOUS
The LS PB is to be checked pressed in the first stage of the approach. The crew will check that:
• LOC and GS scales and deviations are displayed on PFD
• IDENT is properly displayed on the PFD.
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
FINAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
approaching the G/S, G/S* will engage. The crew will monitor the capture with raw data (pitch and
G/S deviation). The missed approach altitude will be set on the AFS-CP (on the FCU) and speed
reduced so as to be configured for landing by 1 000 ft.
In such a situation, taking into account the ground obstacles and if ATC permits, it may be
appropriate to carry out a 360 °turn before resuming the approach.
MINIMA
For CATI ILS, the crew will insert MDA values into MINIMUM BARO field on MFD PERF APPR
page.
For CATII or CATIII ILS, the crew will insert DH into MINIMUM RADIO field on MFD PERF APPR
page.
MISCELLANEOUS
Close to the ground, avoid large down corrections. Give priority to attitude and sink rate.
In case of double receiver failure, the red LOC/GS flags are displayed, ILS scales are removed,
the AP trips off and the FDS revert to HDG/VS mode.
In case of the ILS ground transmitter failure, the AP/FD with LOC/GS modes will remain ON.
This is because such a failure is commonly transient. In such a case, ILS scales and FD bars are
flashing.
PREFACE
ILS raw data refers to an ILS flying technique without FD.
INITIAL APPROACH
FLYING REFERENCE
The big green bird is the flight reference.
The crew will select TRK FPA on the AFS-CP(on the FCU).
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION
The approach technique is the stabilized approach.
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
The TRK index will be set to the ILS course and, once established on the LOC, the tail of the bird
should be coincident with the blue TRK index. This method allows accurate LOC tracking taking
into account the drift.
Should the LOC deviate, the pilot will fly the bird in the direction of the LOC index, and when
re-established on the LOC, set the tail of the bird on the TRK index again. If there is further LOC
deviation, a slight IRS drift should be suspected. The bird is computed out of IRS data. Thus, it
may be affected by IRS data drift. A typical TRK error at the end of the flight is 1 °to 2 °.
The ILS course pointer and the TRK diamond are also displayed on PFD compass.
FINAL APPROACH
When 1/2 dot below the G/S, the pilot should initiate the interception of the G/S by smoothly
flying the bird down to the glide path angle. The bird almost sitting on the -5 °pitch scale on PFD,
provides a -3 °flight path angle. Should the G/S deviate, the pilot will make small corrections in the
direction of the deviation and when re-established on the G/S, reset the bird to the G/S angle.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
This chapter deals with some characteristics of the Non Precision Approach (NPA). General
recommendations mentioned in APPROACH GENERAL chapter apply.
Most of VOR, NDB, RNAV and GPS approaches may be flown with the FMS Landing System (FLS)
function.
The LOC GS OUT, LOC ONLY, LOC BC approaches are flown laterally using a radio beam and will
be discussed in a dedicated section.
Flying a NPA without the FLS function is discussed in the PARTICULAR CASE section.
FLS PRINCIPLE
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
The FMS outputs a virtual FLS beam from the Navigation Database and sends it as well as the
FM position, to the Multi Mode Receiver (MMR). The MMR computes and displays the lateral and
vertical angular deviations from this FLS virtual beam like an ILS approach. These deviations are
materialized with double diamonds both on PFD & ND. The FLS virtual beam may be followed with
F-LOC and F-G/S AP/FD modes.
PARTICULAR CASE
Depending on the approach procedure construction, the anchor point may be different than the
runway threshold and may be located abeam this threshold. The anchor point ident is EPXX.
• During the instrument part of the approach, down to MDA, the distance and slope information on
the PFD are representative of distance and slope to runway the threshold.
• When flying the visual part of the approach i.e. below the MDA,
‐ The distance displayed on PFD will no longer be representative of distance to the threshold
(indeed, the distance may increase as the aircraft is converging towards the runway threshold)
‐ As the aircraft is leaving the F-LOC beam toward the runway threshold, the F-G/S deviation
becomes meaningless and must be disregarded.
FLYING TECHNIQUE
The double diamond symbol permits flying the FLS approach
APPROACH PREPARATION
It is essential to understand that the FLS virtual beam is generated from the FMS approach coding
and thus, must not be followed unless
• The FMS approach coding has been crosschecked against the published approach procedure
and
• The final approach leg has not been modified by the crew.
The crew will review the aircraft STATUS to check the FLS function capability.
Except for RNAV approach, NAVAID must be available for display. The crew will thus pre-select
the appropriate NAVAID on NAVAID page to anticipate any approach capability degradation.
The briefing will outline the key elements such as:
• Check of the approach coding in the FM data base
• Preparation of the NAVAID page
• Strategy in case of approach capability degradation:
• The flying technique below minima. (The RWY or EP anchor coding may be consulted when
switching LS pb temporarily)
Note: 1. If the approach capability downgrades to F-APP+RAW, and the NAVAID raw data is
not available, e.g. for RNAV approach, a go-around must be initiated unless the required
conditions to continue are met.
2. It must be noted that the distance available on the lower left part of the PFD is FMS
computed and not radio computed and must be considered as such.
3. If the approach capability downgrades to RAW ONLY, see PARTICULAR CASE
section hereafter.
INITIAL APPROACH
FLYING REFERENCE
In all cases, it is recommended to use the FD bars for NPA approach with the TRK/FPA
selection on AFS-CP.
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION
The decelerated approach technique may be used.
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
The FLS virtual beam is displayed in magenta and is 80 nmlong. It could be intercepted at
any point along the magenta line. The crew must bear in mind however, that the obstacle
clearance outside the published approach is his responsibility.
When cleared for final approach course interception, the pilot will press APPR p/b on AFS-CP.
Verify F-G/S and F-LOC become armed on the FMA.
FINAL APPROACH
When the aircraft reaches the FAF, the flight crew monitors the engagement of F-G/S.
As for ILS, the final descent point will be validated by an appropriate means for the approach e.g.
DME for VOR/DME approach, FMS WPT sequencing for RNAV or GPS approach.
REACHING THE MINIMA
The applicable minima are those associated with the NPA. Reaching MDA, “MINIMUM” is either
monitored or called by the PNF. The current altitude value becomes amber.
If the required visual conditions are not met by MDA, a missed approach must be initiated.
• FLS approach capability (displayed on FMA but addresses to the vertical mode only).
• The LOC deviation is displayed as single diamond (radio data).
• The F-G/S deviation is displayed as a double diamond (FM computed data).
• The LOC IDENT, frequency and DME distance
FINAL APPROACH
If the approach capability reverts to RAW ONLY, the F-G/S vertical deviations remain but must
be disregarded. The crew will select a Flight Path Angle to deselect F-G/S mode.
REACHING THE MINIMA
The applicable minima are those associated with the NPA. Reaching MDA, “MINIMUM” is either
monitored or called by the PNF. The current altitude value becomes amber.
• If the required visual conditions are not met by MDA, a missed approach must be initiated.
• If the required visual conditions are met, the PF must disengage the AP (if not previously
done) and continue visually. As a reminder, an amber “DISCONNECT AP FOR LDG”
message appears on the FMA at minima minus 50 ft AP is still engaged.
• Below the minimas, visual references shall prevail. However, FD guidance and LS deviations
remain meaningful and may be used as pilot aid.
When the F-G/S mode engages, the FMS trajectory (green) moves toward the FLS beam
trajectory (magenta).
Refer FCTM 04.010 ADVERSE WEATHER section for altitude correction in cold weather
operations.
PARTICULAR CASES
PREFACE
This section deals with the NPA when the FLS tool is not available. This can be due to:
• The NPA construction e.g. where the offset between final approach course and runway
exceeds 50°.
• A multiple failure condition e.g. MMR 1+2 failure
• RAW ONLY degradation e.g. in the FMS LOW accuracy case.
In these cases, the FLS function must not be used. The lateral guidance may be either NAV or
TRK and the vertical guidance will be FPA.
Hereafter are listed some particularities of these approaches.
INITIAL APPROACH
FLYING REFERENCE
In all cases, it is recommended to use the FD bars for NPA approach.
The TRK/FPA selection is recommended with the bird as cross-reference to the FD bars.
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATION
The stabilized approach technique is recommended
INTERMEDIATE APPROACH
When cleared for final approach course interception, the pilot will:
• For GPS PRIMARY or NAV ACCY check positive (error<1 nm):
Keep NAV mode and validate the final interception course with raw data. Under radar vectoring,
the crew should use the DIR TO COURSE IN facility.
Or
• For the others cases:
Select appropriate TRK on AFS-CP, in order to establish final course tracking with reference to
NAVAIDS raw data.
FINAL APPROACH
FPA should be preset on the AFS-CP no later than1 nm prior to the FAF. A smooth interception of
the final approach path can be achieved by pulling the FPA selector 0.2 nm prior to the FAF.
The crew will refer only to NAVAID raw data and altitude versus distance throughout the final
approach for the RAW ONLY case.
REACHING THE MINIMA
• If the required visual conditions are not met by MDA, a missed approach must be initiated.
• If the required visual conditions are met, the PF must disengage the AP (if not previously
done) and order the PNF
‐ FDS off.
‐ Set runway track
CIRCLING
Applicable to: ALL
PREFACE
The circling approach is flown when the tower wind is such that the landing runway is different
from the runway fitted with an instrument approach, which is used for the descent and approach in
order to get visual of the airfield.
APPROACH PREPARATION
The approach preparation follows the same schema as described in APPROACH PREPARATION
section in Descent Preparation section. However, some characteristics need to be highlighted:
FPLN
Lateral: STAR, instrument approach procedure.
Vertical: Insert F speed as constraint at FAF since the approach will be flown flaps 3, landing
gear down and F speed (stabilized approach); Check altitude constraints.
SEC FPLN
When planning for a circling approach, the landing runway will be inserted into the SEC F-PLN.
The crew will update the SEC F-PLN as follows:
• SEC F-PLN then IMPORT ACTIVE
• Lateral revision on destination and insert landing runway
• Keep the F-PLN discontinuity
FINAL INSTRUMENT APPROACH
The crew will fly a stabilized approach at F speed, configuration 3 and landing gear down.
CIRCLING APPROACH
When reaching circling minima and with sufficient visual reference for circling:
• Push the FCU ALT P/B.
• Select TRK/FPA
• Select a TRK of 45 °away from the final approach course (or as required by the published
procedure
• When wings level, start the chrono
• Once established downwind, activate the SEC F-PLN to take credit of the "GS mini" protection
in final approach when managed speed is used. Additionally, the landing runway will be shown
on the ND and the 10 nm range should be selected to assist in positioning onto final approach
• By the end of the downwind leg, disconnect the AP, select FDs off and keep the A/THR
• When leaving the circling altitude, select the landing configuration
• Once fully configured, complete the Landing Checklist.
Once the SEC F-PLN is activated, the go-around procedure in the MFD will be that for the landing
runway rather than the one associated with the instrument approach just carried out. Therefore,
if visual references were lost during the circling approach, the go-around would have to be flown
using selected guidance, following the pre-briefed missed approach procedure.
LOW VISIBILITY CIRCLING APPROACH
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
CAT II and CAT III approaches are flown to very low DH (or without DH) with very low RVR. The
guidance of the aircraft on the ILS beam and the guidance of the aircraft speed must be consistently
of high performance and accurate so that an automatic landing and roll out can be performed in good
conditions and, the acquisition of visual cues is achieved the aircraft properly stabilized. Hence,
• The automatic landing is required in CAT III operations including roll out in CAT IIIB.
• The automatic landing is the preferred landing technique in CATII conditions
• Any failures of the automated systems shall not significantly affect the aircraft automatic landing
system performance
• The crew procedures and task sharing allow to rapidly detect any anomaly and thus lead to the
right decision
DEFINITION
Applicable to: ALL
DECISION HEIGHT
The Decision Height (DH) is the wheel height above the runway elevation by which a go around
must be initiated unless adequate visual reference has been established and the aircraft position
and the approach path have been assessed as satisfactory to continue the automatic approach
and landing in safety. The DH is based on RA.
ALERT HEIGHT
The Alert Height (AH) is the height above the runway, based on the characteristics of the
aeroplane and its fail-operational automatic landing system, above which a CAT III approach
would be discontinued and a missed approach initiated if a failure occurred in one of the redundant
part of the automatic landing system, or in the relevant ground equipment.
In others AH definition, it is generally stated that if a failure affecting the fail-operational criteria
occurs below the AH, it would be ignored and the approach continued (except if AUTOLAND
warning is triggered). The AH concept is relevant when CAT3 DUAL is displayed on FMA.
For the A380, the AH =200 ft (100 ft for KAL) .
CAT 3 SINGLE
CAT 3 SINGLE is announced when the airborne systems are fail passive which means that a
single failure will lead to the AP disconnection without any significant out of trim condition or
deviation of the flight path or attitude. Manual flight is then required. This minimum DH is 50 ft.
CAT 3 DUAL
CAT 3 DUAL is announced when the airborne systems are fail-operational. In case of a single
failure, the AP will continue to guide the aircraft on the flight path and the automatic landing
system will operate as a fail-passive system. In the event of a failure below the AH, the approach,
flare and landing can be completed by the remaining part of the automatic system. In that case, no
capability degradation is indicated. Such a redundancy allows CAT III operations with or without
DH.
CAT II OR CAT III APPROACHES
ICAO FAA JAA
CAT II DH 100 ft≤DH<200 ft 100 ft≤DH<200 ft 100 ft≤DH<200 ft
RVR RVR ≥350 m 350 m≤RVR<800 m RVR≥300 m
RVR≥1 200 ft 1 200 ft≤RVR<2 400 ft RVR≥1 000 ft
CAT IIIA DH No DH or DH<100 ft No DH or DH<100 ft DH<100 ft (1)
RVR RVR ≥200 m RVR ≥200 m RVR ≥200 m
RVR≥ 700 ft RVR≥ 700 ft RVR≥ 700 ft
CAT IIIB DH No DH or DH<50 ft No DH or DH<50 ft No DH or DH<50 ft
RVR 50 m≤RVR<200 m 50 m≤RVR<200 m 75 m≤RVR<200 m
150 ft≤RVR<700 ft 150 ft≤RVR<700 ft 250 ft≤RVR<700 ft
(1) DH≥50 ft if fail passive
FLIGHT PREPARATION
Applicable to: ALL
In addition to the normal flight preparation, the following preparation must be performed when CAT II
or CAT III approach is planned:
• Ensure that destination airport meets CAT II or CAT III requirements
• Check aircraft required equipment for CAT II or CAT III in QRH
• Check that crew qualification is current
• Consider extra fuel for possible approach delay
• Consider weather at alternate
APPROACH PREPARATION
Applicable to: ALL
LIMITATIONS
• The crew will check that tower wind remains within the limit for CAT II or CAT III approaches (
Refer to FCOM/Limitations ).
• The autoland maximum altitude must be observed.
AIRCRAFT CAPABILITY
The failures that may affect the aircraft’s CAT 2/3 capability are listed in the FCOM . Most of these
failures are monitored by the FMS and the landing capability will be displayed on the FMA once
the APPR pb is pressed, i.e. CAT 2, CAT 3 SINGLE, CAT 3 DUAL. However, there are a number
of failures which affect the aircraft’s landing capability which are not monitored by the FMS and,
consequently, not reflected on the FMA . It is very important, therefore, that the crew refer to the
FCOM to establish the actual landing capability if some equipment are listed inoperative.
AIRPORT FACILITIES
The airport authorities are responsible for establishing and maintaining the equipment required
for CAT II/III approach and landing. The airport authorities will activate the LVP procedures as the
need arises based on RVR . Prior performing a CAT II/III approach, the crew must ensure that
LVP procedures are in force.
CREW QUALIFICATION
The captain must ensure that both crew members are qualified and that their qualification is
current for the planned approach.
SEATING POSITION
The crew must realise the importance of eye position during low visibility approaches and landing.
A too low seat position may greatly reduce the visual segment. When the eye reference position is
lower than intended, the visual segment is further reduced by the cut-off angle of the glareshield or
nose.
USE OF LANDING LIGHTS
The use of landing lights at night in low visibility can be detrimental to the acquisition of visual
reference. Reflected lights from water droplets or snow may actually reduce visibility. The landing
lights would, therefore, not normally be used in CAT II/III weather conditions.
APPROACH STRATEGY
Irrespective of the actual weather conditions, the crew should plan the approach using the best
approach capability. This would normally be CAT 3 DUAL with autoland, depending upon aircraft
status. The crew should then assess the weather with respect to possible downgrade capability.
Conditions CATI CATII CATIII
WITH DH NO DH
Flying technique Hand flying or AP / FD , A/THR AP / FD / ATHR and Autoland
AP / FD , A/THR down to DH
Continued on the following page
GO AROUND STRATEGY
The crew must be ready mentally for go-around at any stage of the approach. Should a failure
occur above 1 000 ft RA , all ECAM actions (and DH amendment if required) should be completed
before reaching 1 000 ft RA , otherwise a go-around should be initiated. This ensures proper task
sharing for the remainder of the approach. Any alert generated below 1 000 ft should lead to a
go-around.
LANDING BRIEFING
Before commencing a CAT II/III approach a number of factors must be considered by the crew. In
addition to the standard approach briefing, the following points should be emphasised during an
approach briefing for a low visibility approach:
• Aircraft capability
• Airport facilities
• Crew qualification
• Weather minima
• Task sharing
• Call-outs
• Go-around strategy
APPROACH PROCEDURE
Applicable to: ALL
TASK SHARING
The workload is distributed in such a way that the PF primary tasks are supervising and decision
making and the PM primary task is monitoring the operation of the automatic system.
The PF supervises the approach (trajectory, attitude, speed) and takes appropriate decision
in case of failure and at DH. Since the approach is flown with AP/FD/A-THR, the PF must be
continuously ready to take-over:
• If any AP hard over is experienced
• If a major failure occurs.
• If any doubt arises
The PF announces "LAND", when displayed on FMA.
The PM is head down throughout the approach and landing. The PM monitors:
• The FMA and calls mode change as required (except "LAND")
• The Auto call out
• The aircraft trajectory or attitude exceedance
• Any failures
The PM should be go-around minded.
VISUAL REFERENCE
Approaching the DH, the PF starts to look for visual references, progressively increasing external
scanning. It should be stressed that the DH is the lower limit of the decision zone. The captain
should come to this zone prepared for a go-around but with no pre-established judgement.
Required conditions to continue
• With DH
In CATII operations, the conditions required at DH to continue the approach are that the visual
references should be adequate to monitor the continued approach and landing and that the
flight path should be acceptable. If both these conditions are not satisfied, it is mandatory to
initiate a go-around. A 3 lights segment and a lateral light element is the minimum visual cue for
JAR OPS.
In CATIII operations, the condition required at DH is that there should be visual references
which confirm that the aircraft is over the touch down zone. Go-around is mandatory if the
visual references do not confirm this. A 3 lights segment is required by JAR OPS for fail passive
system and 1 centerline light segment for fail operational system.
• Without DH
The decision to continue does not depend on visual references, even though a minimum RVR
is specified. The decision depends only on the operational status of the aircraft and ground
equipment. If a failure occurs prior to reaching the AH, a go-around will be initiated. A go-around
must nevertheless be performed if AUTOLAND warning is triggered below AH. However, it is
good airmanship for the PF to acquire visual cues during flare and to monitor the roll out.
Loss of visual reference
• With DH before touch down
If decision to continue has been made by DH and the visual references subsequently become
insufficient a go-around must be initiated.
A late go-around may result in ground contact. If touch down occurs after TOGA is engaged,
the AP remains engaged in that mode and A/THR remains in TOGA. The ground spoilers and
auto-brake are inhibited.
• With DH or without DH after touch down
If visual references are lost after touch down, a go-around should not be attempted. The roll-out
should be continued with AP in ROLL OUT mode down to taxi speed.
FLARE/LANDING/ROLL OUT
During the flare, decrab and roll-out, the PF will watch outside to assess that the autoland is
properly carried out, considering the available visual references.
For CATII approaches, autoland is recommended. If manual landing is preferred, the PF will
take-over at 80 ftat the latest. This ensures a smooth transition for the manual landing.
Pull to reverse IDLE at main landing gear touchdown (not before). When REV is indicated in
green on ECAM, MAX reverse may be applied. The use of auto-brake is recommended as it
ensures a symmetrical brake pressure application. However, the crew should be aware of possible
dissymmetry in case of crosswind and wet runways.
The PM will use standard call out. Additionally, he will advise ATC when aircraft is properly
controlled (speed and lateral trajectory).
As a general rule, if a failure occurs above 1 000 ft AGL, the approach may be continued, ECAM
actions completed, approach briefing update performed and a higher DH set if required.
Below 1 000 ft(and down to AH in CAT3 DUAL), the occurrence of any failure implies a go-around
and a reassessment of the system capability. Another approach may be under taken according to the
new system capability. It has been considered that below 1 000 ft, not enough time is available for
the crew to perform the necessary switching, to check system configuration and limitation and brief
for minima.
In CAT3 DUAL and below AH, as a general rule, a single failure does not necessitate a go-around. A
go-around is required if the AUTOLAND warning is triggered.
The crew may wish to practice automatic landings in CAT I or better weather conditions for training
purposes. This type of approach should be carried out only with the airline authorization. The crew
should be aware that fluctuations of the LOC and/or GS might occur due to the fact that protection
of ILS sensitive areas, which applies during LVP, will not necessarily be in force. It is essential,
therefore, that the PF is prepared to take over manually at any time during a practice approach and
rollout, should the performance of the AP become unsatisfactory.
VISUAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
The crew must keep in mind that the pattern is flown visually. However, the XTK is a good cue of the
aircraft lateral position versus the runway centreline. This is done using DIR TO CF CRS IN.
The crew will aim to get the following configuration on commencement of the downwind leg:
• Both AP and FDS will be selected off
• BIRD ON
• A/THR confirmed active in speed mode, i.e. SPEED on the FMA
• Managed speed will be used to enable the "GS mini" function
• The downwind track will be selected on the FCU to assist in downwind tracking
• The downwind track altitude will be set on FCU.
INTERMEDIATE/FINAL APPROACH
Applicable to: ALL
Assuming a 1 500 ft AAL circuit, the base turn should be commenced 45 s after passing abeam the
downwind threshold (+/- 1 second/kt of head/tailwind).
Initially the rate of descent should be 400 ft/min , increasing to 700 ft/minwhen established on the
correct descent path.
The pilot will aim to be configured for landing at VAPP by 500 ft AAL, at the latest. If not stabilised, a
go-around must be carried out.
VISUAL APPROACH
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
Failure to recognize the need for and to execute a go-around, when required, is a major cause of
approach and landing accidents. Because a go-around is an infrequent occurrence, it is important to
be “go-around minded”. The decision to go-around should not be delayed, as an early go-around is
safer than a last minute one at lower altitude.
The go-around phase is activated when the thrust levers are set to TOGA, provided the flap lever is
selected to Flap 1 or greater.
The FD bars with HDG/VS are displayed automatically, SRS and GA TRK modes engage and speed
brakes, if extended, retract automatically.
For the go-around, the appropriate flight reference is the attitude, because go-around is a dynamic
maneuver. If the "bird" is on, it is automatically removed and HDG/VS automatically selected on the
FCU (AFS-CP).
The missed approach becomes the active F-PLN and the previously flown approach is strung back
into the F-PLN.
GO-AROUND PHASE
Applicable to: ALL
The SRS mode guides the aircraft with a maximum speed of VAPP, or IAS at time of TOGA selection
(limited to maximum of VLS + 25 with all engines operative or VLS + 15 with one engine inoperative)
until the acceleration altitude where the target speed increases to the CLB speed.
The GA TRK mode guides the aircraft on the track memorised at the time of TOGA selection. The
missed approach trajectory becomes the ACTIVE F-PLN provided the waypoints have been correctly
sequenced on the approach. Pushing for NAV enables the missed approach F-PLN to be followed.
When the pilot sets TOGA thrust for go-around, it takes some time for the engines to spool up due to
the acceleration capability of the high by pass ratio engines. Therefore, the pilot must be aware that
the aircraft will initially loose some altitude. This altitude loss will be greater if initial thrust is close to
idle and/or the aircraft speed is lower than VAPP.
Attitude Loss Following a Go-Around
Above the go-around acceleration altitude, the target speed is CLB speed.
GENERAL
The purpose of leaving the go-around phase is to obtain the proper target speed and proper
predictions depending upon the strategy chosen by the crew. During the missed approach, the
crew will elect either of the following strategies :
• Fly a second approach
• Carry out a diversion
SECOND APPROACH
If a second approach is to be flown, the crew will activate the approach phase on the MFD
ACTIVE/PERF page. The FMS switches to Approach phase, the short term target speed displayed
as a magenta dot, moves according to the flaps lever setting, e.g. green dot for Flaps 0 and VAPP
is displayed as a magenta triangle.
The crew will ensure proper waypoint sequencing during the second approach in order to have the
missed approach route available, should a further go-around be required.
DIVERSION
Once the aircraft path is established and clearance has been obtained, the crew will enter the
ALTN FPLN as ACTIVE FPLN:
• If the crew has prepared the ALTN FPLN in the active F-PLN, on selecting the ENABLE ALTN
prompt on the TO WPT revision menu, the lateral mode reverts to HDG if previously in NAV.
The aircraft will be flown towards the next waypoint using HDG or NAV via a DIR TO entry.
• If the crew has prepared the ALTN FPLN in one SEC F-PLN, the MFD SEC INDEX page will be
accessed and SEC F-PLN for diversion will be swapped to active. The crew will use the DIR TO
function as required to sequence the FPLN.
• If the crew has not prepared the ALTN FPLN, climb will be initially carried out in OP CLB mode.
Once established in climb and clear of terrain, the crew will use the “DIR TO” function to the
next cleared waypoint, make a lateral revision at this waypoint to insert a NEW DEST and
finalize the ALTN FPLN. The route and a CRZ FL (on PERF page) can be updated as required.
REJECTED LANDING
Applicable to: ALL
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
When Transitioning from IMC to VMC, the crew will watch the bird versus the aircraft attitude symbol
in the center of the PFD. This provides a good assessment of the drift, thus in which direction to look
for the runway.
But, then:
• Do not turn towards the runway
• Do not duck under
FLARE
Applicable to: ALL
NORMAL CONDITIONS
When reaching 100 ft , auto-trim ceases and the pitch law is modified to become a flare law, i.e. a
smoother direct law (as described in OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY Chapter).
Indeed, the normal pitch law, which provides trajectory stability, is not the best adapted to the flare
manoeuvre.
At 50 ft, a term that increase the static stability is introduced, function of ground speed.
Consequently, as the speed reduces, the flight crew has to pull backstick to maintain a constant
path.
The flare technique is thus conventional.
Start the flare by progressively increasing and maintaining backstick. From stabilized conditions,
the flare height is about 40 ft. This height varies with different parameters, such as weight, rate of
descent, wind variations…
Avoid under flaring:
‐ Prior to the initiation of the flare, the flight crew must control the rate of descent (i.e. nominal
3 °slope and rate not increasing)
‐ Start the flare by progressively increasing and maintaining backstick as necessary
‐ Avoid significant forward stick movement when the flare is initiated (releasing back-pressure is
acceptable).
At 20 ft , the “RETARD” auto call-out reminds the flight crew to retard thrust levers. It is a reminder
rather than an order. When best adapted, the flight crew will rapidly retard all thrust levers :
Depending on the conditions, the flight crew will retard earlier or later.
However, the flight crew must ensure that all thrust levers are at IDLE detent at the latest at
touchdown, to ensure ground spoilers extension at touchdown.
CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
The flare technique described above applies.
The recommended technique is to use the rudder to align the aircraft with the runway heading
during the flare, while using lateral control to maintain the aircraft on the runway center line.
The lateral law compensates the roll induced by the rudder input, thus the routine use of into-wind
aileron is not needed.
In strong wind conditions, the aircraft may land with a residual drift of 5 °maximum.
CALL OUT
Applicable to: ALL
DEROTATION
Applicable to: ALL
When the aircraft is on the ground, pitch and roll control operates in Direct Law. Consequently, when
the aircraft touches down, the pilot flies the nose down conventionally, varying sidestick input as
required, to control the derotation rate.
After touch down, when reverse thrust is selected (on at least one engine) and one main landing gear
strut is compressed, the ground spoilers partially extend to establish ground contact. The ground
spoilers fully extend when both main landing gears are compressed.
ROLL OUT
Applicable to: ALL
NORMAL CONDITIONS
During the roll out, the rudder pedals will be used to steer the aircraft on the runway centreline.
At high speed, directional control is achieved with rudder. As the speed reduces, the Nose Wheel
Steering (NWS) becomes active. However, the NWS tiller will not be used until taxi speed is
reached.
CROSSWIND CONDITIONS
The above-mentioned technique applies. Additionally, the pilot will avoid to set stick into the wind
as it increases the weathercock effect. Indeed, it creates a differential down force on the wheels
into the wind side.
The reversers have a destabilizing effect on the airflow around the rudder and thus decrease
the efficiency of the rudder. Furthermore they create a side force, in case of a remaining crab
angle, which increases the lateral skidding tendency of the aircraft. This adverse effect is quite
noticeable on contaminated runways with crosswind. In case a lateral control problem occurs in
high crosswind landing, the pilot will consider to set reversers back to Idle.
At lower speeds, the directional control of the aircraft is more problematic, more specifically
on wet and contaminated runways. Differential braking is to be used if necessary. On wet and
contaminated runways, the same braking effect may be reached with full or half deflection of the
pedals; additionally the anti skid system releases the brake pressure on both sides very early
when the pilot presses on the pedals. Thus if differential braking is to be used, the crew will totally
release the pedal on the opposite side to the expected turn direction.
BRAKING
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
Once on the ground, the importance of the timely use of all means of stopping the aircraft cannot
be overemphasised. Three systems are involved in braking once the aircraft is on the ground:
• The ground spoilers
• The thrust reversers
• The wheel brakes
Stow the reversers before leaving the runway to avoid foreign object ingestion.
Autobrake does not relieve the pilot of the responsibility of achieving a safe stop within the
available runway length.
TAILSTRIKE AVOIDANCE
Applicable to: ALL
INTRODUCTION
Although most of tail strikes are due to deviations from normal landing techniques, some are
associated with such external conditions as turbulence and wind gradient.
DEVIATION FROM NORMAL TECHNIQUES
Deviations from normal landing techniques are the most common causes of tail strikes. The main
reasons for this are due to:
• Allowing the speed to decrease well below VAPP before flare
Flying at too low speed means high angle of attack and high pitch attitude, thus reducing ground
clearance. When reaching the flare height, the pilot will have to significantly increase the pitch
attitude to reduce the sink rate. This may cause the pitch to go beyond the critical angle.
• Prolonged hold off for a smooth touch down
As the pitch increases, the pilot needs to focus further ahead to assess the aircraft’s position
in relation to the ground. The attitude and distance relationship can lead to a pitch attitude
increase beyond the critical angle.
• Too high flare
A high flare can result in a combined decrease in airspeed and a long float. Since both lead to
an increase in pitch attitude, the result is reduced tail clearance.
• Too high sink rate, just prior reaching the flare height
In case of too high sink rate close to the ground, the pilot may attempt to avoid a firm touch
down by commanding a high pitch rate. This action will significantly increase the pitch attitude
and, as the resulting lift increase may be insufficient to significantly reduce the sink rate, the
high pitch rate may be difficult to control after touch down, particularly in case of bounce.
• Bouncing at touch down
In case of bouncing at touch down, the pilot may be tempted to increase the pitch attitude to
ensure a smooth second touch down. If the bounce results from a firm touch down, associated
with high pitch rate, it is important to control the pitch so that it does not further increase beyond
the critical angle.
APPROACH AND LANDING TECHNIQUES
A stabilized approach is essential for achieving successful landings. It is imperative that the flare
height be reached at the appropriate airspeed and flight path angle. The A/THR and bird (Velocity
Vector) are effective aids to the pilot.
VAPP should be determined with the wind corrections by using the FMS functions. As a reminder,
when the aircraft is close to the ground, the wind intensity tends to decrease and the wind direction
to turn (direction in degrees decreasing in the northern latitudes). Both effects may reduce the
head wind component close to the ground and the wind correction to VAPP is there to compensate
for this effect.
When the aircraft is close to the ground, high sink rate should be avoided, even in an attempt to
maintain a close tracking of the glideslope. Priority should be given to the attitude and sink rate. If
a normal touchdown distance is not possible, a go-around should be performed.
If the aircraft has reached the flare height at VAPP, with a stabilized flight path angle, the normal
SOP landing technique will lead to repetitive touch down attitude and airspeed.
During the flare, the pilot should not concentrate on the airspeed, but only on the attitude with
external cues.
Specific PNF call outs have been reinforced for excessive pitch attitude at landing.
Note: a "PITCH-PITCH" aural warning is activated if the pitch attitude, monitored by the flight
controls, reaches a given limit. This aural warning is only available in manual flight at
landing when the aircraft height is lower than 50 ft. In addition, a pitch limit indication is
provided on the PFD at landing under 400 ft.
After touch down, the pilot must "fly" the nosewheel smoothly, but without delay, on to the runway,
and must be ready to counteract any residual pitch up effect of the ground spoilers. However, the
main part of the spoiler pitch up effect is compensated by the flight control law itself.
BOUNCING AT TOUCH DOWN
In case of light bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and complete the landing, while keeping the
thrust at idle. Do not allow the pitch attitude to increase, particularly following a firm touch down
with a high pitch rate.
In case of high bounce, maintain the pitch attitude and initiate a go-around. Do not try to avoid a
second touch down during the go-around. Should it happen, it would be soft enough to prevent
damage to the aircraft, if pitch attitude is maintained.
Only when safely established in the go-around, retract flaps one step and the landing gear. A
landing should not be attempted immediately after high bounce, as thrust may be required to
soften the second touch down and the remaining runway length may be insufficient to stop the
aircraft.
CUMULATIVE EFFECTS
No single factor should result in a tail strike, but accumulation of several can significantly reduce
the margin.
BRAKE TEMPERATURE
Applicable to: ALL
The use of brake fans could increase oxidation of the brake surface hot spots if brakes are not
thermally equalized, leading to the rapid degradation of the brakes. For this reason, selection of
brake fans should be delayed until approximately five minutes after touchdown or just prior to
stopping at the gate (whichever occurs first).
When reaching the gate, if there is a significant difference in brake temperature between the wheels
of the same gear, this materializes a potential problem with brake e.g. if one wheel reaches the
limit temperature of 600°C while all others wheels brakes indicate less than 450°C, this indicates
that there is a potential problem of brake binding or permanent brake application on that wheel.
Conversely, if one wheel brake is at or below 60°C whereas the others are beyond 150°C, this
indicates that there is a potential loss of braking on that wheel.
If brake temperature is above 500°C with fans OFF (350°C fans ON), use of the parking brake,
unless operationally necessary, should be avoided to prevent brake damage.
The MMEL provides information regarding brake ground cooling time, both with and without brake
fans.
To avoid engine thermal stress, it is required that the engine be operated at, or near, idle for a
cooling period. For description Refer to FCOM/FCOM SOP .
Standard phraseology is essential to ensure effective crew communication. The phraseology should
be concise and exact. The following section lists the callouts that should be used as standard. They
supplement the callouts identified in the SOP. These standard Airbus callouts are also designed to
promote situational awareness, and to ensure crew understanding of systems and their use in line
operation.
CHECKLIST CALLOUTS
Applicable to: ALL
ACTIONS COMMANDED BY PF
Applicable to: ALL
The following commands do not necessarily initiate a guidance mode change, e.g. : selected to
managed, or managed to selected. The intent is to ensure clear, consistent, standard communication
between crewmembers. All actions performed on the AFS CP and FMS must be checked on the PFD
and ND: E.g. “FL 350 blue”, “FL 200 magenta”. Ensure that the correct AFS CP knob is used, then
verify indications on the PFD/ND.
SET
The “SET” command means using an AFS CP knob to set a value, but not to change a mode. SET
is accomplished by only rotating the appropriate selection knob. Example:
• ”SET GO AROUND ALTITUDE__”
• ”SET QNH __”
• “SET FL __”
• “SET HDG __”
MANAGE/PULL
The “MANAGE” command means pushing an AFS CP knob to engage, or arm, a managed mode
or target.
The “PULL” command means pulling an AFS CP knob to engage a selected mode or target.
Example :
• “PULL HDG 090” (Heading knob is pulled and turned).
• MANAGE NAV (Heading knob is pushed).
• “FL 190 PULL” (Altitude knob is turned and pulled).
• “FL 190 MANAGE” (Altitude knob is turned and pushed).
• “PULL SPEED 250 kt ” (Speed knob is pulled and turned).
• “MANAGE SPEED” (Speed knob is pushed).
Note: If the value was previously set, there is no requirement to repeat the figure. Simply
callout e.g. PULL HDG : PULL SPEED : FL PULL
The VS/FPA selector knob has no managed function. The standard callouts for the use of this
knob are as follows :
V/S Plus (or Minus) 700 PULL or
FPA Minus3 ° PULL (V/S (FPA) knob is turned and pulled)
PRESS ALT
The ALT pb enables to immediately start a level off. The standard callout for the use of the ALT pb
is "PRESS ALT".
ARM
The “ARM __” command means arming a system by pushing the specified AFS CP button.
e.g. : “ARM APPROACH”
e.g. : “ARM LOC.”
ON/OFF
The simple ON or OFF command is used for the autopilot, flight directors, autothrust and the bird
(velocity vector).
FMA
Applicable to: ALL
Unless listed otherwise (e.g. CAT II & III task sharing), all FMA changes will be called out by the PF
and checked by the PM :
• All armed modes are announced by calling out their associated color (blue, magenta) e.g. : “G/S
blue”, “LOC blue”.
• All active modes are announced without calling out the color (green, white) e.g. : “NAV”, “ALT”.
ALTITUDE
Applicable to: ALL
The PM calls out “One thousand to level” when passing 1 000 ft before the cleared altitude or FL,
and the PF calls out “checked”.
FLAPS’ CALLOUTS
FLAPS’ CONFIGURATION CALL
1 "FLAPS ONE"
1+F "FLAPS ONE"
0 "FLAPS ZERO"
The reply will be given when selecting the new flap position. e.g. :
CALLOUT REMARK
PF ″FLAPS ONE″
PM ″SPEED CHECKED″ PM checks the speed :
− Above the S or F speed and accelerating
(Takeoff)
− Below VFE next and decelerating (Approach)
″FLAPS ONE″ PM selects the flaps lever position and replies
after checking the blue number on the ECAM flaps
indicator to confirm the correct selection has been
made.
GEAR CALLOUTS
CALLOUT REMARK
PF ″GEAR UP (DOWN)″
PM ″GEAR UP (DOWN)″ The PM selects the gear lever position and replies
after checking the red lights on the landing gear
indicator to confirm gear operation.
FLIGHT PARAMETERS
Applicable to: ALL
For more information on callouts associated with a malfunction before V1 at takeoff, Refer to AO-90
Abnormal and Emergency Callouts.
DESCENT
EVENT PF PM
SEAT BELTS ---------- AS RQRD
At 20,000feet
(3 chimes then Auto or On )
(or TOD if CRZ LEVEL is below
CABIN CREW PREPARE FOR
20,000feet)
LANDING (PA by captain)
When approaching or passing TRANSITION, ALTIMETER RESET
transition level ______ inHg or hPa
___ inHg or hPa RESET
At 10,000feet ONE ZERO THOUSAND
CHECKED
APPROACH C/L
APPROACH C/L COMPLETE
APPROACH AND LANDING
EVENT PF PM
Activation of approach phase ACTIVATE APPROACH PHASE
APPROACH PHASE ACTIVATED
Continued on the following page
GO AROUND
EVENT PF PM
GO AROUND EXECUTION GO AROUND – FLAPS
Flaps retraction FLAPS—
Gear retraction POSITIVE CLIMB
GEAR UP
GEAR UP
Check list AFTER TAKEOFF/CLIMB C/L
DOWN TO THE LINE
At transition altitude BELOW THE LINE
AFTER TAKEOFF/CLIMB C/L
COMPLETE
AFTER LANDING
EVENT CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER
Check List AFTER LANDING C/L
AFTER LANDING C/L COMPLETE
PARKING
EVENT CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER
Check List PARKING C/L
PARKING C/L COMPLETE
SECURING THE AIRCRAFT
EVENT CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER
Check List SECURING THE AIRCRAFT C/L
SECURING THE AIRCRAFT C/L
COMPLETE
AO-10 General
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Quick Reference Handbook.................................................................................................................................... B
Quick Reference Handbook.................................................................................................................................... C
Landing computation............................................................................................................................................... D
AO-24 Electrical
Emergency Electrical Configuration.........................................................................................................................A
AO-29 Hydraulic
G+Y Hydraulic Failures............................................................................................................................................A
AO-34 Navigation
ADR/IR FAULT........................................................................................................................................................ A
Flying The Back Up Speed Scale...........................................................................................................................B
AO-80 Miscellaneous
Emergency Descent.................................................................................................................................................A
Crew Incapacitation................................................................................................................................................. B
Overweight Landing.................................................................................................................................................C
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
The ABNORMAL OPERATIONS chapter highlights techniques that will be used in some abnormal
and emergency operations. Some of the procedures discussed in this chapter are the result of
double or triple failures. Whilst it is very unlikely that any of these failures will be encountered, it
is useful to have a background understanding of the effect that they have on the handling and
management of the aircraft. In all cases, the ECAM should be handled as described in FCTM
OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY- ECAM 01.040 (Refer to Section ECAM).
Four emergency procedures are available on a paper QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH):
• EMER EVAC
• SMOKE/FUMES
• SMOKE/FUMES REMOVAL
• UNRELIABLE AIR SPEED INDICATION (Below FL 250 and Above FL 250).
The EMER EVAC procedure is also available on ECAM (i.e. available in the ECAM ABNORMAL
PROC menu).
All other abnormal and emergency procedures are available on the ECAM.
Three emergency procedures are available on a paper QUICK REFERENCE HANDBOOK (QRH):
• EMER EVAC
• SMOKE/FUMES
• SMOKE/FUMES REMOVAL.
The EMER EVAC procedure is also available on ECAM (i.e. available in the ECAM ABNORMAL
PROC menu).
All other abnormal and emergency procedures are available on the ECAM.
LANDING COMPUTATION
Applicable to: ALL
The use of the OIS LDG PERF application for the computation of landing performance following
in-flight failure is driven by the ECAM. Several cases are considered depending on the messages
that appear on the ECAM.
The following table summarizes how to use the OIS LDG PERF according to the ECAM displays.
Before launching landing performance computation the flight crew will update the landing weight, if a
diversion is performed.
Definition:
‐ LDG DIST means that only the landing distance is affected
‐ LDG PERF means that both approach speed and landing distance are affected.
ECAM Displays Conditions Flight Crew Actions
If LDG at destination airport:
‐ Dry runway : Computation of the LDG distance is not
necessary because LDG distance penalty
is below the regulatory margins (1.66). The
penalties apply to the actual landing distance.
However, the flight crew can compute the
landing distance with the OIS LDG PERF
application in order to assess the stop
margin.
Procedure &
Limitations: Note: When an aircraft is dispatched
LDG DIST ‐ Single failure under MEL, with an inoperative
AFFECTED ‐ No VAPP increase system that impacts landing
STATUS page: ‐ Landing distance performance, the flight crew must
LDG DIST COEF penalty below 1.50. always use the OIS LDG PERF
< 1.XX ON DRY application, even if the ECAM
RUNWAY displays LDG DIST COEFF <
1.XX ON DRY RUNAWAY. The
ECAM cannot combine MEL items
with in-flight failures.
‐ Wet or contaminated : Computation of the LDG distance with the
runway OIS LDG PERF application is required.
If diversion:
‐ Computation of the LDG distance with the OIS LDG PERF application is
required.
COCKPIT/CABIN COMMUNICATION
Applicable to: ALL
EMERGENCY COMMUNICATION
For more information on the cabin/cockpit communications:
‐ Refer to CCOM/Emergency Communications
‐ Refer to CCOM/Planned Emergency Landing
EMERGENCY CALL
From To Communication Actions Remark
The Chief Purser goes immediately to
Passenger Address (PA) system:
the cockpit to be briefed by the Captain.
Cockpit Cabin "CHIEF PURSER TO
If time permits, the Captain should allow
COCKPIT, PLEASE!"
the Chief Purser to brief the cabin crew.
In the case of an abnormal or emergency
Interphone: situation in the cabin, any cabin
Cabin Cockpit
Press PRIO then CAPT crewmember must inform the flight
crew. The flight crew must reply.
EMERGENCY ALERT
From To Communication Actions Remark
The flight crew announces shortly and briefly that
Passenger Address (PA) system: an emergency evacuation may be soon required.
Cockpit Cabin
"ATTENTION CREW! AT STATIONS!" The cabin crew must proceed to their
emergency stations and fasten their seat belts.
NOTIFICATION TO PASSENGERS
From To Communication Actions Remark
SIGNS set to ON. For psychological reason, the flight
Cockpit Cabin If duties permit, use the crew should inform the passengers
Passenger Address (PA) system of an intended emergency landing.
FINISH PREPARATION
From To Communication Actions Remark
The flight crew announces that
Passenger Address (PA) system:
Cockpit Cabin the preparation is finished a short
"FINISH PREPARATION"
time before the emergency landing.
INITIATE EVACUATION
From To Communication Actions Remark
Press the EVAC CMD pb. The Captain orders an immediate evacuation.
Cockpit Cabin Passenger Address (PA) system: The cabin crew directs passengers
"EVACUATE, EVACUATE" to all available emergency exits.
CROSS-COCKPIT COMMUNICATION
The term “cross-cockpit communication“ refers to communication between the PF and the PM.
This communication is vital for any flight crew. Each time one flight crewmember adjusts or
changes information and/or equipment on the flight deck, the other flight crewmember must be
informed, and an acknowledgement must be obtained.
STALL RECOVERY
Applicable to: ALL
Slats and flaps have a different impact on the lift coefficient obtained for a given AOA. Both slats
and flaps create an increase in the maximum lift coefficient.
Influence of Slats and Flaps on Lift Coefficient versus Angle of Attack
On the contrary, speed brake extension and ice accretion reduce the maximum lift coefficient.
Flight control laws and stall warning threshold take into account these possible degradations.
Influence of Speed Brakes and Icing on Lift Coefficient versus Angle of Attack
To summarize, loss of lift is only dependant on AOA. The AOA stall depends on:
‐ Aircraft configuration (slats, flaps, speed brakes)
‐ Mach and altitude
‐ Wing contamination.
STALL RECOGNITION
The flight crew must apply the stall recovery procedure as soon as they recognize any of the
following stall indications:
‐ The STALL aural alert
The STALL aural alert sounds when the AOA exceeds a given threshold, which depends on the
aircraft configuration and Mach number. This alert provides sufficient margin to alert the flight
crew in advance of the actual stall even with contaminated wings.
For more information on the stall aural alert, Refer to FCOM/DSC-31-40-20 FWS Audio
Indicators and Refer to FCOM/DSC-22-27-10-20 V alpha sw .
‐ Stall buffet
Buffet is recognized by airframe vibrations that are caused by the non-stationary airflow
separation from the wing surface when approaching AOA stall . When the Mach number
increases, both the AOA stall and C L MAX will decrease. The STALL aural alert is set close to the
AOA at which the buffet starts. For some Mach numbers, the buffet may appear just before the
STALL aural alert.
STALL RECOVERY
‐ The immediate key action is to reduce the AOA:
The reduction of AOA will allow the wing to regain lift. The flight crew must achieve this by
applying a nose down pitch order on the side stick. This flight crew action ensures an immediate
aircraft response and reduction of the AOA.
In the case of lack of pitch down authority, it may be necessary to reduce thrust.
Simultaneously, the flight crew must ensure that the wings are level in order to reduce the lift
necessary for the flight, and as a consequence the required AOA.
As a general rule, minimizing the loss of altitude is secondary to the reduction of the a AOA
as the first priority is to regain lift. When the AOA reduces below the AOA stall, lift and drag will
return to their normal values.
‐ The secondary action is to increase energy:
When stall indications have stopped, the flight crew should increase thrust smoothly as needed
and must ensure that the speed brakes are retracted.
Immediate maximum thrust application upon stall recognition is not appropriate. Due to the
engine spool up time, the aircraft speed increase that results from thrust increase, is slow and
does not enable to reduce the AOA instantaneously. Furthermore, for under wing mounted
engines, the thrust increase will generate a pitch up that may prevent the required reduction of
angle of attack.
When stall indications have stopped, and when the aircraft has recovered sufficient energy, the
flight crew can smoothly recover the initial flight path.
If an engine failure occurs at low speed, the resultant yaw may be significant, leading to rapid
displacement from the runway centreline. For this reason, it is essential that the Captain keeps
his hand on the thrust levers once take-off thrust has been set. Directional control is achieved by
immediately closing the thrust levers and using maximum rudder and braking. If necessary, the
nosewheel tiller should be used to avoid runway departure.
REJECTED TAKEOFF
Applicable to: ALL
Applicable to: ALL
DECISION MAKING
A rejected takeoff can possibly be a hazardous maneuver, and the time for decision making is
limited. To minimize the possibility of decisions that are not appropriate to reject a takeoff, many
alerts are inhibited between 80 kt and 400 ft. Therefore, the flight crew must consider as significant
any alert triggered during this period.
To assist the flight crew in the decision making, the takeoff is divided into low speed and high
speed phases, separated by the 100 kt speed. The speed of 100 kt is not critical. It is selected in
order to help the Captain make the decision, and to avoid inadvertent stops from high speed.
‐ Below 100 kt, the Captain considers stopping the takeoff, if any ECAM alert is triggered
‐ Above 100 kt, and when the aircraft approaches V1:
The Captain should be "Go-minded". The Captain should only reject the takeoff in the case of:
• A fire alert, or severe damage, or
• A sudden loss of engine thrust, or
• Any indication that the aircraft will not fly safely, or
• If an ECAM alert is triggered.
In the case of a tire damage between V1 minus 20 kt and V1, and unless debris from the tire
causes noticeable engine parameter fluctuations, it would be preferable to take off, to reduce
the fuel load, and to land with a full runway length available.
The Captain must decide to reject the takeoff and to stop the aircraft before it reaches V1.
‐ If a failure occurs before V1, for which the Captain does not intend to reject the takeoff, he
announces "GO"
‐ If the Captain decides to reject the takeoff, the Captain announces "STOP".
The "STOP" announcement both confirms the decision to reject the takeoff, and indicates that
the Captain has control. It is the only situation where taking over control is not associated with
the "I have control" announcement.
If the failure occurs above V1, the flight crew must continue the takeoff because it may not be
possible to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway.
Applicable to: ALL
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
If the flight crew initiates a rejected takeoff, and when the autobrake decelerates the aircraft, the
captain should not press the pedals (which may be a reflex action). If the Captain does not feel the
deceleration of the aircraft, he can apply full braking pedals.
EMERGENCY EVACUATION
Applicable to: ALL
INTRODUCTION
The typical case, which may require an emergency evacuation, is an uncontrollable on ground
engine fire. This situation, which may occur following a rejected take-off or after landing, requires
good crew coordination to cope with a high workload situation.
• In the rejected take-off case, the captain calls STOP. This confirms that the captain has
controls.
• in all other cases, the captain calls "I HAVE CONTROL" if required to state the control hand
over.
DECISION MAKING
As soon as the aircraft is stopped, the parking brake is set, the captain notifies the cabin crew and
the F/O notifies ATC. The Captain calls for ECAM ACTIONS. At this stage, the task sharing is
defined as follow:
• The first officer carries out the ECAM actions until evacuation decision point.
• The captain builds up his decision to evacuate depending on the circumstances. Considerations
should be given to:
‐ Fire remaining out of control after having discharged the fire agents
‐ Possible passenger evacuation of the aircraft on the runway.
‐ Positioning the aircraft to keep the fire away from the fuselage, taking into account the wind
direction.
‐ Communicating intentions or requests to ATC.
If fire remains out of control after having discharged the fire agents, the captain calls for the
EVACUATION. The applicable actions are displayed on the ECAM (included in the ENG FIRE ON
GROUND ECAM procedure).
EVACUATION PROCEDURE:
If an evacuation is required for an other reason than ENGINE FIRE ON GROUND, the flight crew
will find the EMER EVAC procedure in the ECAM ABN PROC menu.
This procedure is also available on the QRH.
This will be done preferably in this order for a clear understanding by cabin crew.
The captain can locate the EVAC command pushbutton by sweeping his hand up from the bottom
of the left side of the overhead panel until reaching the CAPT/CAPT&PURS switch and then
moving to the second pushbutton on the left.
The crew will keep in mind that as long as the evacuation order is not triggered, the crew may
differ or cancel the passengers’ evacuation. As soon as the evacuation order is triggered, this
decision is irreversible.
At any time during an ECAM procedure, if captain estimates that lives are at risk, he calls for the
EVACUATION
When applying the EMERGENCY EVACUATION procedure, the F/O can select the engine master
OFF and push the fire pushbutton, without any confirmation from the Captain.
AIRCRAFT HANDLING
If an engine fails after V1 the flight crew must continue the takeoff. The essential and primary
tasks are associated with the aircraft handling. The flight crew must stabilize the aircraft at the
correct pitch and airspeed, and establish the aircraft on the correct track before the beginning of
the ECAM procedure.
ON THE GROUND
Use the rudder as usual in order to maintain the aircraft on the runway centerline. When the
rudder input is more than 2/3 of the full rudder deflection, the ground laws order ailerons and
spoiler 3 deflection in order to ease the lateral control of the aircraft.
At VR, rotate the aircraft smoothly at a slower rate than with all engines that operate, with
a continuous pitch rate up to an initial pitch attitude of 10 °. The combination of high FLEX
temperatures and low speeds requires precise handling during rotation and liftoff. The 10 °pitch
target enables the aircraft to become airborne.
WHEN SAFELY AIRBORNE
The flight crew should then follow the SRS orders that may request a lower pitch attitude in
order to obtain or maintain V2.
When the aircraft reaches a positive rate of climb and when the radio altitude increases, the PM
announces “positive climb”. This advises the PF to retract the landing gear.
Note: For a specific combination of angle of attack and sideslip angle, and depending on
the conditions (e.g. AIR DATA selector position, time since liftoff), the SPD flag can
temporarily appear on one PFD, during landing gear retraction. In this case, the flight
crew should crosscheck airspeed indications. If necessary, the PF should transfer the
controls to the PNF.
Shortly after liftoff, the lateral normal law orders rudder surface deflection in order to minimize
the sideslip (there is no feedback of this command to the pedals). Therefore, the lateral behavior
of the aircraft is safe and the flight crew should take their time to react on the rudder pedals and
to center the beta target.
In the case of an engine failure at takeoff, the blue beta target appears instead of the usual
sideslip indication on the PFD. The lateral normal law does not order the entire rudder surface
deflection that is necessary to center the beta target. Therefore, the flight crew must adjust the
rudder pedals as usual to center the beta target.
When the beta target is centered, it minimizes the drag even if the aircraft flies with a small
sideslip. The calculation of the beta target is a compromise between the drag induced by the
deflection of the control surfaces and the airframe drag produced by a small sideslip. When the
beta target is centered, it causes less drag than centering a conventional ball, because rudder,
aileron, and spoiler deflection, and aircraft attitudes are all taken into account.
The flight crew should keep in mind that the flight controls react to a detected sideslip.
This means that with hands off the sidestick and no rudder input, the aircraft bank angle is
approximately 5 °maximum and then remains stabilized. Therefore, the aircraft is laterally stable
and it is not urgent to laterally trim the aircraft. The flight crew should control the heading as
usual with the bank angle, and center the beta target with the rudder. The flight crew should
accelerate if it is not possible to center the beta target by applying full rudder. Trim the rudder as
usual.
The use of the autopilot is STRONGLY recommended. After an engine failure, the flight crew
should laterally trim the aircraft with the rudder before they engage the autopilot.
When the AP is engaged, the rudder trim is managed via the AP and therefore, manual rudder
trim command that includes reset, is inhibited.
THRUST CONSIDERATIONS
Consider the use of TOGA thrust, keeping in mind the following:
‐ For a FLEX takeoff, setting the operating engine(s) to TOGA provides an additional
performance margin but is not a requirement for the reduced thrust takeoff certification.
The application of TOGA supplies a large thrust increase very rapidly but this comes with a
significant increase in yawing moment and an increased pitch rate. The selection of TOGA
restores thrust margins but it may increase the workload in aircraft handling.
‐ For a derated takeoff, the flight crew cannot apply asymmetric TOGA thrust if the speed is
below F in CONF 2 or 3, due to VMCA considerations.
‐ TOGA thrust is limited to 10 min.
PROCEDURE
For more information on the Engine Failure after V1 procedure described in the FCOM , Refer to
FCOM/PRO-ABN-NECA-10-GENGF Engine Failure after V1 - Continued Takeoff .
INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE
The PM carefully monitors the aircraft flight path. The PM cancels any Master Warning/Caution
and reads the ECAM title that appears on the top line of the EWD .
Procedures are initiated on PF 's command. No action is performed (except cancel audio alerts
via the MASTER WARNING light) until:
‐ The appropriate flight path is established
‐ The aircraft is at least 400 ft above the runway.
A height of 400 ft is recommended because it is a good compromise between the necessary
time for stabilization and the excessive delay beginning the procedure . In some emergency
cases and provided that the flight path is established, the PF may initiate the ECAM actions
before 400 ft .
When the PF stabilizes the flight path, he(she) confirms the failure. If it is necessary to delay the
ECAM procedure, the PF should order “Standby”. In all other cases, the PF should announce “
ECAM actions”.
The flight crew should control the aircraft trajectory as a priority. They should not delay the
acceleration phase for the purpose of applying the ENG FAIL ECAM procedure.
If the PF requires a PM action during the ECAM procedures, he(she) should order "STOP
ECAM" . When ready to resume the ECAM procedure, the PF should order "CONTINUE ECAM
".
The flight crew should continue the procedure until "ENG MASTER OFF" (in the case of an
engine failure without damage), or until "AGENT 1 DISCH" (in the case of an engine failure with
damage), before the acceleration phase.
Note: In the case of an engine fire, the fire drill remains the highest priority.
ACCELERATION SEGMENT
At the Engine-Out ( EO ) acceleration altitude, press the ALT pb to level off and enable the
speed to increase. If the flight crew manually flies the aircraft, the PF should remember that as
airspeed increases, the rudder input necessary to center the beta target decreases. Retract the
flaps as usual. When the flight crew sets the flaps lever to zero, the beta target reverts to the
usual sideslip indication.
FINAL TAKEOFF SEGMENT
When the speed trend reaches the green dot speed, pull the ALT knob to engage OP CLB .
Set the thrust levers to MCT when the LVR MCT message flashes on the FMA (This message
appears when the speed index reaches green dot). Resume the climb phase with MCT . If the
thrust levers are already in the FLX / MCT detent, move the thrust levers to CLB and then back
to MCT .
If the engine failure occurs after takeoff, the noise abatement procedures are no longer a
requirement. In addition, the acceleration altitude provides a compromise between the obstacle
clearance and the engine thrust limiting time. It enables the aircraft to fly with Flap 0 and at
green dot speed, that provides the best climb gradient.
When the aircraft is established on the final takeoff flight path, the flight crew should continue
the ECAM procedure until the STATUS appears. At this point, the flight crew should complete
the AFTER T/O checklist. They should consider the system resets and refer to the OEB s (if
applicable). Then, they should review the STATUS.
ONE ENGINE-OUT FLIGHT PATH
The flight crew flies the one engine-out flight path in accordance with the takeoff briefing
performed at the gate:
‐ The EOSID (with attention to the decision point location)
‐ The SID
‐ Radar vectors, etc.
Proceed as above. If the failure occurs above V2 however, maintain the SRS commanded attitude. In
any event the minimum speed must be V2.
When an engine failure is detected, the FMS produces predictions based on the engine-out
configuration and any pre-selected speeds entered in the MFD are deleted.
GENERAL
There are two strategies available for dealing with an engine failure in the cruise:
• The standard strategy
• The obstacle strategy
Unless a specific procedure has been established before dispatch (considering mountainous
areas), the standard strategy is used.
PROCEDURE
As soon as the engine failure is recognized, the PF will simultaneously:
• Set MCT on the remaining engine(s)
• Disconnect A/THR
Then, PF will:
• Select the SPEED according to the strategy
• If appropriate, select a HDG to keep clear of the airway, preferably heading towards an
alternate. Consideration should be given to aircraft position relative to any relevant critical point
• Select the appropriate engine inoperative altitude in the FCU ALT window and pull for OPEN
DES.
Then, PF will:
• Require the ECAM actions.
At high flight levels close to limiting weights, crew actions should not be delayed, as speed will
decay quickly requiring prompt crew response. The crew will avoid decelerating below green dot.
The A/THR is disconnected to avoid any engine thrust reduction when selecting speed according
to strategy or when pulling for OPEN DES to initiate the descent. With the A/THR disconnected,
the target speed is controlled by the elevator when in OPEN DES.
Carrying out the ECAM actions should not be hurried, as it is important to complete the drill
correctly. Generally, there will be sufficient time to cross check all actions.
STANDARD STRATEGY
Set speed target .M 85/300 kt.
The EO MAX FL Cruise altitude, which equates to LRC with anti-icing off, is displayed on the MFD
ACTIVE PERF page and should be set on the FCU.
If V/S becomes less than 500 ft/min, select V/S-500 ft/min and A/THR on. This is likely to occur as
level off altitude is approached.
Once established at EO MAX FL, the EO LRC speed may be flown in managed mode.
Note: • The EO LRC speed is computed with Cost Index (CI) 30.
• The EO ECON speed is computed with the all engines operative CI.
• The EO ECON speed exceeds the EO LRC speed and may be flown at a lower FL, if
fuel permits.
OBSTACLE STRATEGY
To maintain the highest possible level due to terrain, the drift down procedure must be adopted.
The speed target in this case is green dot. The procedure is similar to the standard strategy, but as
the speed target is now green dot, the rate and angle of descent will be lower.
The MFD ACTIVE PERF CRZ page in EO condition will display the DRIFT DOWN TO ceiling,
assuming green dot speed. It should be set on FCU.
When clear of obstacles, revert to standard strategy.
With one engine inoperative, the flight crew should use the autopilot in order to minimize the flight
crew workload. The flight crew can perform an automatic approach, landing and roll out.
In anticipation of the autopilot disconnection, the autopilot trims the rudder pedals to obtain
zero-sideslip after autopilot disconnection. Therefore, shortly after the autopilot disconnection and
without any flight crew input, the aircraft sideslip will be zero. In such a case, roll input is necessary to
control the aircraft trajectory in steady heading.
The flight crew may reset the rudder trim at any time after the autopilot disconnection but prior to
engine thrust reduction. The flight crew should anticipate the force on the rudder pedals necessary to
maintain the pedals deflection after the rudder trim reset.
The main actions that the flight crew should perform are quite similar in the case of two engines
inoperative on same side and on opposite side. However, the procedures differ regarding the use of
the A/THR, the go-around altitude, and the aircraft handling during the final approach.
In the case of two engines inoperative, the flight crew should:
‐ Consider fuel jettison, if time permits
‐ Prefer a long approach, or a wide visual pattern rather than a normal straight in approach
AIRCRAFT HANDLING
In the case of two engines inoperative on the same side, in accordance with the aircraft
capability (CAT 2 INOP displayed on the STATUS page), the flight crew should disconnect the
autopilot at CAT I minima at the latest. As per ECAM procedure, the landing is done with the
FLAPS lever in position 3.
In anticipation of the autopilot disconnection, the autopilot trims the rudder pedals as follows:
‐ When the FLAPS lever in position 0, or 1, or 2, the autopilot trims the rudder pedals to obtain
zero sideslip after autopilot disconnection
‐ When the FLAPS lever is in position 3, the autopilot trims the rudder pedals so that the
aircraft trajectory remains unchanged after the autopilot disconnection.
Therefore, at the autopilot disconnection, i.e. in manual flight, the aircraft behavior depends on
the current flaps setting:
‐ The flight crew disconnects the autopilot and the FLAPS lever is in position 0, or 1, or 2:
Shortly after the autopilot disconnection and without any flight crew input, the aircraft sideslip
will be zero. This may result in a lateral aircraft movement. Roll input is necessary to control
the aircraft trajectory in steady heading
‐ The flight crew disconnects the autopilot and the FLAPS lever is in position 3: There is no
lateral movement/acceleration of the aircraft. The aircraft trajectory does not change. The
PFD indicates the current sideslip of the aircraft.
Note: ‐ If the flight crew disconnects the autopilot early during the approach and the
FLAPS lever is in position 3, the flight crew can trim the aircraft in order to keep
the sideslip indication centered. In such a case, roll input is necessary to control
the aircraft trajectory in steady heading
‐ If the flight crew disconnects the autopilot late in final approach and the FLAPS
lever is in position 3, the flight crew should not try to cancel the sideslip that
is displayed on the PFD. The flight crew should maintain the aircraft trajectory
without considering the sideslip indication.
The flight crew may reset the rudder trim at any time after the autopilot disconnection but prior
to engine thrust reduction. The flight crew should anticipate the force on the rudder pedals
necessary to maintain the pedals deflection after the rudder trim reset.
L/G GRAVITY EXTENSION
The loss of green or yellow hydraulic system prevents the normal L/G extension and retraction.
The flight crew must perform a gravity extension of the L/G.
GO-AROUND ALTITUDE
In the case of a go-around and above the commit altitude (I.e. 500 ft AGL), the flight crew must
select FLAPS lever 1. The go-around performance may not be achieved with the L/G down.
AUTOTHRUST AND APPROACH SPEED
During the final approach, the flight crew should select VLS and disconnect the A/THR. When
two engines are inoperative on the same wing and if there is small speed change, the A/THR
may command large thrust variation. Therefore, to ease the aircraft handling with asymmetric
thrust, the flight crew should manually control the thrust, and minimize the thrust variations
during the final approach.
At the commit altitude (I.e.500 ft AGL), if the flight crew estimates that all the conditions to land
are met, the flight crew may engage the managed speed. On the PFD, the airspeed speed
target indicates the VAPP.
Depending on the aircraft gross weight, the VAPP may be below the VLS. Therefore, the flight
crew must manually control the thrust to be able to reduce the speed to VAPP.
TWO ENGINES INOPERATIVE ON OPPOSITE WINGS
The actions that the flight crew should perform during the approach until the landing are displayed
on ECAM. The following flow pattern gives an overview of the various actions, and when the flight
crew should perform them.
Two Engines Inoperative on Opposite Side
A one engine inoperative go-around is similar to that flown with all engines. On the application of
TOGA, rudder must be applied promptly to compensate for the increase in thrust and consequently
to keep the beta target centered. Provided the flap lever is selected to Flap 1 or greater, SRS will
engage and will be followed.
If SRS is not available, the initial target pitch attitude is 12.5 °. The lateral FD mode will be GA TRK
and this must be considered with respect to terrain clearance. ALT should be selected at the engine
inoperative acceleration altitude, with the flap retraction and further climb carried out using the same
technique as described earlier in "ENGINE FAILURE AFTER V1" section.
This section provides recommendations on thrust levers management in the case of inoperative
reverser(s). These recommendations are applicable in the case of in-flight failure (including engine
failure) and/or in the case of MEL dispatch with deactivated reverser(s).
AT LEAST ONE REVERSER OPERATIVE
If at least one reverser is operative, the general recommendation is to select the reverser thrust on
both engines during rejected takeoff (RTO) and at landing, as per normal procedures.
Note: The ENG 2(3) REV FAULT ECAM alert may be triggered after the reverser thrust is
selected. This is to remind the flight crew that one reverser is inoperative.
NO REVERSER OPERATIVE
If no reverser is operative, the flight crew should not select the reverser thrust during RTO and at
landing.
However, as per normal procedures, the PF still selects both thrust levers to IDLE detent.
BRIEFING
IMPORTANCE OF THE FLIGHT CREW BRIEFING.
Among other things, the flight crew must review the aircraft status during the flight crew briefing.
The flight crew must review any particularities at that time (i.e. operational consequences,
procedures, associated task sharing and callouts). The flight crew must particularly review:
‐ The status of the thrust reversers and if reverse thrust can be used
‐ Aircraft handling during roll-out.
The Flight Control Unit (FCU) is composed of the AFS CTL PNL and the EFIS CTL PNL which may
fail independently. In case of failure, the AFS or EFIS CTL PNL functions may be restored with the
MFD FCU BKUP. The MFD FCU BKUP page will be activated either
• Automatically in case of detected FCU failure. In that case, an amber AUTO FLT FCU FAILURE
ECAM alert will advise the crew.
• Manually in case of FCU malfunctioning detected by the crew. The FCU BACK UP is selected
through the MFD FMS FCU BACK UP page.
The FCU and BACK UP FCU are exclusive i.e. when one is active, the other is in stand by.
The use of the MFD BACK UP FCU is based on the same principles as the FCU use i.e :
• Displayed as required and used on the PF side if the AP/FD is engaged or on the PNF side when
the aircraft is hand flown.
• Each data inserted in the MFD BACK UP FCU page will be checked on the associated peripheral.
The use of the MFD BACK UP FCU page has some particularities that need to be highlighted:
• As the MFD BACK UP FCU is out of the peripheral vision of the opposite crew, the crew will pay
particular attention to call out.
• Entries are made through the KCCU scroll (not the MFD keyboard).
• The ND mode and ND range entries are scrollable
• The ZOOM function is not available
INTRODUCTION
The procedure described in this section is the emergency electrical configuration after the loss of
the four Variable Frequency Generators ( VFG s). Although it is not very probable that the flight
crew will encounter this failure, it is useful:
• To review the technical background
• To recall the general guidelines applicable in such a case.
In the case of all engines flame out, the aircraft will have the same emergency electrical
configuration. The ALL ENGs FLAME OUT procedure is described in the FCTM . For more
information, Refer to All engines flame out.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
The emergency electrical configuration is triggered by the loss of all AC busbars, that causes
the automatic engagement of the emergency generator powered by the RAT . Depending on the
aircraft speed, the emergency generator engagement takes between 2 s and 6 s .
During RAT extension:
• The batteries supply the emergency busbars only
• PRIM 1, SEC 1, and Green + Yellow hydraulics are available. The inboard ailerons, 2 out of 4
elevators, and the full rudder are available to ensure safe flight.
When the RAT is extended:
• The RAT powers the AC ESS and AC EMER busbars and the ESS TR . The ESS TR then
supplies the DC ESS bus bar. The electrical power, that the RAT develops, corresponds to
approximately 10 % of the total electrical power of the four electrical generators
• All flight controls are recovered except for the outer ailerons, half of the elevator surfaces and,
some spoilers.
PROCEDURE GUIDELINES
In the case of an emergency electrical configuration, the flight cockpit indications change
significantly because the generators are disconnected from the AC busbars. The RAT is deployed
in order to supply the emergency generator.
The AP/FD and ATHR are lost. CM1 has all available instruments to fly the aircraft.
The aircraft operates in direct law and the flight crew must manually trim the aircraft.
The AFS - CP is available and the IAS / MACH , HDG , and ALT blue targets are available on the
PFD .
The ND 1 remains and the navigation is performed via FMS 1, VOR / DME 1 and LS 1 using the
RMP in STBY NAV .
When convenient, an emergency will be notified to ATC by using VHF 1. Depending on the exact
situation, assistance may be available from ATC about the position of other aircraft, safe direction,
closest airport etc...
Significant remaining systems in ELEC EMER CONFIG
FLY PFD 1, DIRECT LAW
NAVIGATE VOR 1, ADF 1, DME 1, LS 1, FM 1, TCAS 1, WX 1
COMMUNICATE RMP 1, RMP 2 audio, VHF 1, ATC 1
When a safe flight path is established, the ECAM actions are performed. The EWD remains
available and it is possible to recover the SD on MFD 1 via either the LH RECONF pb or the
MAILBOX pb on the CAPT KCCU (for CM2 ).
A precise understanding of the STATUS page is essential to assess the full implications of the
aircraft status. The flight crew refer to the deferred procedure and limitations at this time. For more
information, Refer to Ops philosophy, ECAM .
In an emergency electrical configuration, the four CROSSFEED fuel valves automatically open
and two remaining fuel pumps (FEED TK 2 MAIN +3 STBY ) feed the four engines. An automatic
fuel transfer sequence enables FEED TK 2+3 supply from the TRIM TK, then the OUTR TK , and
then the FEED TK 1+4.
The fuel in the INR and MID tanks is not usable (boxed in amber). The fuel in the FEED, OUTR
and TRIM tanks remains usable. As the FQMS cannot identify the fuel that is not usable, the extra
fuel computed by the FMS must be decreased by the quantity of fuel that is not usable.
In addition, the fuel consumption increases due to additional drag (e.g. RAT extension), and the
limitation at FL 200 .
Therefore the flight crew must not take into account the FMS fuel predictions that are not correct.
For more information how to estimate the fuel consumption with an EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL
CONFIGURATION, Refer to FCOM/ the FUEL CONSUMPT INCRSD in the INFO part of the
ELEC EMER CONFIG ECAM procedure on the FCOM .
The engines anti- ice valves are forced opened and the engines are continuously anti-iced. The
wing de-icing is inoperative.
For night operations, the dome lights are available.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
Fire and/or smoke in the fuselage present the crew with potentially hazardous situations. Not only
will they have to deal with the emergency itself but also the passengers are likely to panic should
they become aware of the situation. It is essential therefore, that action to control the source of
combustion is not delayed.
An immediate diversion should be considered as soon as the smoke is detected. If the source is not
immediately obvious, accessible and extinguishable, it should be initiated without delay.
SMOKE/FUMES
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
The FIRE SMOKE/FUMES procedure includes:
‐ A not-sensed ECAM procedure ( Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ECAM-10-26-GSMKF FIRE
SMOKE/FUMES )
The ECAM displays the actions that the flight crew must apply immediately (i.e immediate
actions), and a reference to apply the associated paper procedure
‐ A Quick Reference Handbook ( QRH ) paper procedure ( Refer to
FCOM/PRO-ABN-NECA-26-120 FIRE SMOKE/FUMES ).
When the flight crew applies the FIRE SMOKE/FUMES procedure, some action steps may trigger
ECAM alerts. In this case, the flight crew must acknowledge these ECAM alerts, and delay the
ECAM actions until the end of the paper procedure.
DETECTION AND PROCEDURE APPLICATION
The smoke is identified either by an ECAM alert, or by a crewmember (i.e. flight crew or cabin
crew) without any ECAM alert.
SMOKE IDENTIFIED BY AN ECAM ALERT
‐ If the ECAM triggers an AVNCS SMOKE alert, the flight crew must apply the ECAM actions
After the immediate actions, the ECAM requests to apply the QRH SMOKE/FUMES paper
procedure
‐ If the ECAM triggers another SMOKE alert (e.g. LAVATORY SMOKE ), the flight crew must
apply the ECAM procedure.
If any doubt exists about the origin of the smoke, the flight crew must refer to the QRH
SMOKE/FUMES paper procedure.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS
The immediate actions are common to all cases of smoke and fumes, regardless of the source.
The objectives of the immediate actions are:
‐ Avoid any further contamination of the cockpit/cabin
‐ Communicate with the cabin crew
‐ Protect the flight crew.
SMOKE ORIGIN IDENTIFICATION AND FIGHTING
The flight crew tries to identify the smoke source by isolating systems. Some guidelines may
help to identify the origin of the smoke/fumes:
‐ If smoke initially comes out of the cockpit ventilation outlets, or if smoke is detected in the
cabin, the flight crew may suspect an air conditioning smoke
In addition, the ECAM may immediately trigger SMOKE alerts (e.g. cargo, lavatory, avionics)
The flight crew must apply the associated ECAM procedures
‐ Following an identified ENG or APU failure, smoke may come from the faulty equipment
through the bleed system and be perceptible in the cockpit or the cabin
In that case, smoke is re-circulated throughout the aircraft, until it completely disappears from
the air conditioning system.
‐ If the ECAM only triggers the AVNCS SMOKE alert, the flight crew may suspect an avionics
smoke
‐ If smoke is detected, while an equipment is failed, the flight crew may suspect that smoke is
coming from this equipment.
According to the suspected smoke source, the flight crew enters one of the following
sub-sections:
• IF AIR COND SMOKE SUSPECTED
• IF CABIN EQUIPMENT SMOKE SUSPECTED
• IF SMOKE SOURCE CANNOT BE DETERMINED AND STILL CONTINUES OR
AVNCS/ELECTRICAL SMOKE SUSPECTED.
The electrical fire is the most critical case of smoke. Therefore, the flight crew must enter
the last sub-section if the source of smoke is not identified, or if the application of the AIR
COND/CABIN EQUIPMENT SMOKE procedure was not successful.
This procedure consists in shedding one side, then the other. If unsuccessful, the last means to
isolate the smoke source is to set the electrical emergency configuration.
BOXED ITEMS
If smoke/fumes become the greatest threat, the flight crew should apply SMOKE/FUMES
REMOVAL procedure. If the situation becomes unmanageable, they should consider an
immediate landing.
The flight crew should consider application of these boxed items at any time during the
SMOKE/FUMES procedure, but always after the immediate actions.
GENERAL
The abnormal operation of the flaps, and/or slats may be due to:
• Multiple slats control unit and/or flaps control unit failures:
‐ SLAT SYS 1 and SLAT SYS 2 control the slats
‐ FLAP SYS 1 and FLAP SYS 2 control the flaps
• Multiple slats and/or flaps motor power supply failures:
‐ The green hydraulic system and the essential AC network power the slats motors
‐ The green and yellow hydraulic systems power the flaps motors.
• Locked flaps and/or slats, i.e. the wing-tip brakes have locked the slats and/or flaps
CONSEQUENCE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE FLIGHT
The abnormal operation of the flaps and/or slats has the following consequences:
• The flight control laws revert to alternate law
• The pitch attitude during the approach and flare differ from the usual pitch attitude without failure
• The flight crew should use the selected speed
• The flight crew should prefer a stabilized approach
• The approach speed and landing distance increase
• The aircraft approach capability downgrades to CAT I
• The flight crew may need to change the go-around procedure.
In the case of a go-around with the slats and/or flaps failed, the flight crew must maintain the
slats/flaps configuration. Therefore, the go-around performance may not be achieved
• When the slats and/or flaps are extended, the fuel consumption increases. The FMS predictions
do not take into account the slat and/or flap abnormal configurations. Therefore, the flight crew
must disregard the FMS fuel predictions
• When the flaps/slats are extended, the maximum cruise altitude is 20 000 ft.
Note: • On the PFD, the speed scale displays the VLS and the VFE in accordance with the
current abnormal configuration
• The overspeed warning and stall warning trigger according to the actual configuration
PROCEDURE GUIDELINES
FAILURE AT TAKEOFF
When the slats and/or flaps fail at takeoff, the flight crew should pull the SPD/MACH knob on
the AFS CP for selected speed in order to stop the acceleration. The short term managed speed
is set to VFE-5 kt.
Note: If the flight crew does not revert to selected speed mode, the flight control laws protect
the aircraft against the VFE exceedance and limit the speed to VFE-5 kt.
After the acceleration altitude, the flight crew should select the speed in order to control the
acceleration to the required speed for the retraction of the remaining surfaces.
FAILURE DURING THE APPROACH
When the slats and/or flaps fail during the configuration of the aircraft for landing, the flight crew
should:
• Pull the SPD/MACH knob on the AFS CP to stop the deceleration
Note: If the autothrust and the FMS approach phase are engaged, the managed speed
target becomes the next maneuvering characteristic speed, e.g. S speed when
selecting flap lever to 1.
If the flight crew does not stop the deceleration, the aircraft may decelerate to a
speed close to the VLS. Depending on the slats or flaps position failure, the margin
between the characteristic speeds and the VLS may be significantly reduced (e.g.
2 kt or 3 kt between the VLS and S speeds at all GW < 520 t).
• Delay the approach to complete the ECAM procedure
• Update the approach briefing, and/or decide to divert if required.
In accordance with the ECAM procedures, when the slats and/or flaps are failed, the flight
crew should use the selected speed to configure the aircraft for landing. The flight crew
should reduce the speed and should keep wings level during the change of the slats or flaps
configuration.
To prepare the aircraft for landing the flight crew must decelerate the aircraft to the approach
speed, as follows:
‐ Decelerate the aircraft toward the VFE NEXT-5 kt
Note: In the case of turbulence, to avoid VFE exceedance, the flight crew may decide to
decelerate to a lower speed but above the VLS
‐ When the aircraft reaches the selected speed, the FLAPS lever can be set one step down.
The above steps are repeated until the FLAPS lever is set to 3. When the landing configuration
is established, aircraft can be decelerated to the computed approach speed.
SITUATION ASSESSMENT
The flight crew should consider the following to select the appropriate airfield:
‐ Landing distance available v.s. landing distance required with slats and/or flaps failed
‐ The aircraft gross weight
Dual hydraulic failure is an amber failure and has little effect on the handling of the aircraft since
AP/FD and ATHR remain available. The flight controls revert to ALTN LAW due to the loss of the
outer ailerons and most spoilers.
When the landing performance penalty has been computed, it is time for decision-making. The flight
crew will note that there is no requirement to LAND ASAP or LAND ANSA. The flight crew may thus
decide to continue the flight taking into consideration the following aspects:
‐ Weather (CAT1 capability only),
‐ Operational (landing performances),
‐ Maintenance,
‐ Commercial.
The approach briefing will concentrate on safety issues:
‐ Use of the selected speeds on the AFS-CP,
‐ Approach configuration,
‐ Landing gear gravity extension,
‐ Approach speed VAPP,
‐ Stabilized approach technique,
‐ Tail strike awareness,
‐ Braking and steering considerations,
‐ Go around call out, aircraft configuration and speed.
DEFERRED PROC FOR APPROACH will be applied early in approach phase i.e. before IAF:
‐ In some abnormal slats/flaps configurations (e.g. SLATS SYS failure), the FMS does not receive
the FLAPS lever position. Thus, the managed speed is not in accordance with the FLAPS lever
position. Therefore, as a general rule, when the slats/flaps are in abnormal configuration (e.g.
following a dual hydraulic failure, or when slats/flaps are locked), the flight crew must use the
selected speed to configure the aircraft for approach and landing.
The speed reduction and configuration changes should preferably be done with wings level.
‐ The VFEs NEXT displayed on the PFD takes into account the abnormal slat/flap configuration
vs. placard speeds. Therefore, to configure the aircraft, the flight crew must consider the VFEs
displayed on the PFD.
‐ The VLS displayed on the PFD takes into account the abnormal slat/flap configuration.
‐ As the landing gear is extended by gravity, the gear doors are mechanically locked opened. The
aircraft may vacate the runway in these conditions.
‐ The stabilized approach technique will be preferred, and the aircraft should be configured for
landing at the FAF.
DEFERRED PROC FOR LANDING will be applied early in landing phase i.e. before FAF.
The AP may be used down to 500ft AGL. As the AP is not tuned for the abnormal configurations its
behavior can be less than optimum and must be monitored.
As the flaps are no longer available, the pitch attitude during the approach is increased (typically 6°
to 7°), and thus increasing the risk of tail strike at touchdown. Therefore a long flare must be avoided.
The alternate braking with anti skid is available. The hydraulic power is provided by the Local Electro
Hydraulic Generation System (LEHGS). Auto brake is available and braking performance is not
affected.
The nose wheel steering function is done with the LEHGS (ALTN NWS).
The ALTN NWS is designed to be used until the runway is cleared (to land and to vacate runway).
Therefore, the flight crew should anticipate a tug to tow the aircraft back to the gate.
Prolonged use of the ALTN NWS should be avoided because it would result in:
‐ An ALTN NWS overheat and its associated ECAM alert followed by
‐ A disconnection of the NWS itself.
ADR/IR FAULT
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL INFORMATION
Each ADIRS has two parts (ADR and IR), which may fail independently of each other. Additionally
the IR part may fail totally or may be available in ATT mode.
A single failure affects the approach capability only. A dual/triple failure may additionally affect:
• The AP/FD and ATHR availability
• The FLT CTL law
SINGLE NAV ADR FAULT OR NAV IR FAULT
Single NAV ADR FAULT or NAV IR FAULT are simple procedures, and only require action on the
switching panel as indicated by the ECAM.
The AP/FD anticipates the crew action on the switching panel and thus remains available. The
A/THR remains available.
DUAL NAV ADR FAILURES
In case of dual NAV ADR failures, AP/FD and A/THR are lost. The flight controls revert to ALTN
LAW.
The PF/PM task sharing will be redistributed as required.
TRIPLE NAV ADR FAILURE
A total loss of reliable ADR information is mainly due to obstructed pitot tubes or static sources, as
the probability of a triple ADR failure is very low.
In case of a detected triple NAV ADR failure, the crew will follow the ECAM which requires to fly
with the standby instruments (ISIS) and to switch off the ADRS to recover the Back Up Speed
Scale (BUSS) on both PFD.
The crew will pay particular attention in case of all air data disagree case, especially when close
to the ground. As soon as the situation is not understood by the crew e.g. abnormal correlation
of basic flight parameters (IAS, pitch, attitude, thrust, climb rate), the flight crew will apply the
memory items:
When a safe flight path is established and above the minimum safe altitude, the crew will carry
out the NAV ALL AIR DATA DISAGREE ABN PROC. This consists in identifying the reliable
information by comparing ADR computed data with altitude or speed information which are not
ADR computed e.g. GPS altitude. If no ADR remain available, they will be switched off and the
crew will fly the BUSS.
The crew will note that if static pressure information is reliable (e.g. altitude information), the bird is
reliable and will be used.
Note: If the ISIS is available, its use should be preferred to the BUSS.
GENERAL
Both PFDs display the Back Up Speed Scale (BUSS) when the flight crew switches off all three
ADRs following:
‐ A NAV ADR 1+2+3 FAULT alert, or
‐ A NAV ALL AIR DATA DISAGREE alert, if all air data are unreliable, or
‐ An unreliable airspeed situation, if all air data are unreliable.
The BUSS is based on Angle-Of-Attack information and enables to continue a safe flight and
landing in the case of the lost of the three ADRs.
BUSS DESIGN
The BUSS design enables to flight in the entire flight domain (i.e. from high altitude and high Mach
number to low altitude and low speed) while observing the flight domain limits.
The BUSS is tuned for the aerodynamic model with the speed brake retracted. Therefore, the flight
crew should not extend the speed brakes.
FLYING TECHNIQUE
When the BUSS is used:
‐ The AP/FD and A/THR are inoperative
‐ The flight control law is the direct law. The angle of attack protection and VMO/MMO warning
are lost but the STALL aural alert remains available.
The altitude indications are based on GPS data. Because the GPS altitude is less accurate than
barometric altitude, two amber dashes cover the two last digits. The vertical speed indicator is not
available.
For approach, the flight crew should perform a stabilized approach. The flight crew should change
the aircraft configuration with the wings levelled.
To retract/extend the flaps apply the following technique:
‐ Before retracting the next flaps configuration, the flight crew should fly the upper part of the
green area
‐ Before extending the next flaps configuration, the flight crew should fly the lower part of the
green area.
This technique limits the excursion in the amber area when changing the flaps configuration.
CAUTION When flying with BUSS, do not use the speed brakes.
INTRODUCTION
The procedure described in this section is the loss of the four engines.
This situation mainly results in an emergency electrical configuration and in the loss of the green
and yellow hydraulic systems.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
ELECTRICAL GENERATION
In the case of an all engines flameout:
‐ All the AC busbars are lost
‐ The RAT automatically extends to power the AC ESS, EMER busbars, and the DC ESS
busbar via the ESS TR.
The RAT can supply all the electrical loads that are necessary for the remainder of the flight
and for the landing.
Below FL 200, if the flight crew can start the APU, the normal electrical configuration partly
recovers, i.e. half of the electrical network is supplied. In such a case, the RAT continues to
supply the emergency network.
HYDRAULIC GENERATION
The green and yellow hydraulic systems are lost. When the RAT is extended, the
electrical-hydraulic actuators (EHA, EBHA) ensure the aircraft control (after 10 s maximum since
the last engine is detected failed).
GENERAL GUIDELINES
Following an all engines flameout and when in emergency electrical configuration, the cockpit
indications and systems change significantly:
‐ AP, FD, and A/THR are lost
‐ Aircraft operates in alternate law
‐ F/O PFD, F/O ND and ADIRS 2+3 are lost.
When the flight crew detects an all engines flameout condition, the CM1 must immediately take
over control of the aircraft, and must establish a safe flight path. CM1 is PF.
When time permits, the flight crew must transmit an emergency message to ATC using VHF1.
Depending on the exact situation, assistance may be available from ATC (e.g. position of other
aircraft, safe direction, closest airport).
The following table indicates the main systems that remain available to fly the aircraft, navigate
and communicate:
Significant remaining systems in ALL ENGs FLAME OUT
FLY CAPT PFD, ADIRS1, ISIS
NAVIGATE CAPT ND, FM1, VOR1, ADF1, DME1, LS1, TCAS1, WX1
COMMUNICATE RMP1, VHF1
After the PF establishes a safe flight path, the flight crew should perform the ECAM actions. The
EWD remains available. The PNF (F/O side) can display the SD pages on CAPT MFD by pressing
the MAIL BOX pb on CAPT KCCU keyboard.
The RECONF pb on the CAPT side remains available.
The ALL ENGs FLAME OUT ECAM procedure takes into account the cases of fuel remaining or
no fuel remaining, and provides ditching or forced landing procedures.
If fuel remains: The flight crew should start the actions at the optimum windmilling relight speed
(without starter assist). The optimum relight speed enables an immediate windmilling engine
relight without an excessive aircraft descent rate. The flight crew should perform engine relight
attempts on all engines simultaneously.
• If there is no relight within 30 s, the procedure requests to set all engine master levers to off for
30 s in order to ventilate the combustion chamber. Then, the flight crew can set again all engine
master levers to on. The flight crew should repeat the engine start attempts on all engines as
much as possible
• If below FL 200: The flight crew can start the APU. Therefore, the flight crew can take
advantage of the APU bleed air to attempt starter-assisted engine relights. However, with
starter-assisted, the flight crew can only attempt a relight on two engines simultaneously.
If the APU bleed is used, the flight crew should fly at a speed below the optimum windmilling
speed to enable the FADEC to select a starter-assisted engine relight, and can reduce speed to
the green dot speed to minimize the descent rate.
If no fuel remains: The first actions are similar to the case "fuel remains", except that there is no
action for engine relight attempts and APU start. Green dot speed is the target speed in order to
maximize the remaining time for cabin preparation and distance flown.
The flight crew should pay attention to the time to manage the ECAM procedure. An efficient
procedure application is important to fully configure the aircraft for ditching or forced landing. Some
items at the end of the procedure are time demanding (e.g. slats extension requires 4 min).
Sequence
Forced Landing
If the flight crew expects a forced landing, they must extend the landing gear, even if the
landing is planned out of a runway. The L/G enables to absorb some energy, when the
aircraft touchdowns the ground.
For the PF, during the initial and final approach, the main concern is the aircraft energy
management. Even if the aircraft is at a correct gliding distance from an airport, it could be
difficult to make a correct descent path assessment and be sure to land the aircraft on the
runway.
For approach, because there is no engine to manage the energy of the aircraft, the PF should
keep the aircraft higher than in a normal approach.
When the flight crew selects a runway, they may perform a visual approach, if possible.
In bad weather conditions and if possible, the flight crew may use the ILS to land, more
particularly the localizer signal. The glide slope signal may not be helpful, and the PF should
fly an non usual approach as the aircraft should be well above the glide slope signal in order
to efficiently manage aircraft energy.
The recommended approach speed is VLS displayed on the PFD, or 140 kt, if the VLS is
lower than minimum RAT speed.
When on ground, the flight crew can use the brake pedals. The brake accumulator provides
the hydraulic power to the brakes, but the number of brake applications is limited. The
A-SKID is not available, the brake pressure is automatically limited to 1 000 PSI. The flight
crew may consider the differential braking to maintain the runway axis.
Ditching
Just before ditching, the flight crew must set the DITCHING pb to on in order to close all
valves under the aircraft.
Then, the flight crew must touchdown with a minimum aircraft vertical speed.
The optimum pitch for flare is 8 °. The flight crew should maintain the optimum pitch flare until
the impact on the water, and should keep the wings level.
RELIGHT OF ONE ENGINE
When at least one engine relights, the ENG ALL ENGs FLAME OUT ECAM alert is no longer
applicable and the ENG 1(2)(3)(4) FAIL ECAM alerts trigger for the remaining failed engines.
In such a case, the RAT continues to supply the emergency network, and the available engine
generators supply as many busbars as possible.
If at least one engine relights, the A/THR and the AP are available.
In order to optimize the relight sequence of the failed engines, and to avoid the flight crew
to consider in sequence each ENG 1(2)(3)(4) FAIL procedure, each ENG 1(2)(3)(4) FAIL
procedure requests to immediately apply the ENG RELIGHT IN FLIGHT, if at least three
engines are failed.
The ENG RELIGHT IN FLIGHT procedure is an ECAM not-sensed procedure that the flight
crew calls via the ABN pb on the ECP.
Note: When two engines are running, the aircraft can level off at a lower altitude. For the
two inoperative engines, the ENG 1(2)(3)(4) FAIL procedure asks to consider the
ENG RELIGHT IN FLIGHT. Therefore, depending on the circumstances (e.g. altitude,
obstacle), the flight crew may decide to delay the relight of the remaining failed
engines, when time permits.
The ENG RELIGHT IN FLIGHT procedure is divided into two parts, depending on the number of
failed engines:
‐ If start attempt applies to only one engine: The procedure enables to attempt either a
windmilling start, or a starter-assisted engine relight with the bleed of the other engines
‐ If start attempt applies to multiple engines: Similarly to the previous case, the procedure
enables to attempt either a windmilling start, or a starter-assisted engine relight with the bleed
of the operating engines. In addition, the procedure takes into account engine relight using
APU bleed, if available.
Note: This part of the procedure has a similar structure to the engine relight part of the
ENG ALL ENGs FLAME OUT procedure:
‐ Above FL 200: The procedure asks for a windmilling engine relight for the failed
engines at the optimum windmilling speed
‐ Below FL 200: If APU is available, the procedure asks for a starter-assisted
engines relight with the APU bleed, and green dot speed is the target speed in
order to maximize the flight time.
If the flight crew enters this part of the procedure after the flight crew performed
some steps of the ENG ALL ENGs FLAME OUT procedure, they may have to
validate some steps already performed.
The flight crew can decide at any time to stop the ENG RELIGHT IN FLIGHT procedure, if the
situation requires (e.g. remaining time and distance to fly), and continues with other ECAM
alerts or procedures, if any.
EMERGENCY DESCENT
Applicable to: ALL
The emergency descent should only be initiated upon positive confirmation that cabin altitude and
rate of climb is excessive and uncontrollable. This procedure should be carried out by the crew from
memory. The use of AP and auto thrust is strongly recommended for an emergency descent. The
AFS-CP (FCU) selections for an emergency descent progress from right to left, i.e. ALT, HDG, SPD.
The memory items comprise two steps:
• First step: to initiate the descent
• Second step: to refine the settings
When in idle thrust, high speed and speed brake extended, the rate of descent is approximately 9000
ft/mn. To descend from FL 410to FL 100, it takes approximately 4 min and 25 nm .
The crew will bear in mind that ND MORA is the highest MORA value within a circle of 40 nm radius
around the aircraft whereas the VD safety altitude is defined inside the vertical cut along the aircraft
trajectory within the VD range (green solid line).
If structural damages are suspected, the crew will press SPEED/MACH pb to speed to prevent
the IAS from increasing thus minimizing efforts on aircraft structure. Structural damages may be
suspected in case of a loud bang or high cabin vertical speed.
The passenger oxygen MASK MAN ON pb should be pressed only when it is clear that cabin altitude
will exceed 14 000 ft i.e. the crew will consider the cabin rate increase versus the aircraft rate of
descent.
Once the two steps procedure has been carried out from memory, the PF will call for ECAM actions.
The ECAM will automatically prioritize the abnormal C/L.
The EMER DESCENT PROC is also available in the ABN procedure menu and may be activated as
required.
Following an emergency descent and once the oxygen mask are removed, the oxygen stowage
box will be closed and the PRESS TO RESET oxygen slide will be pressed to deactivate the mask
microphone and to recover the use of the hand mike/head set.
EMERGENCY_DESCENT
CREW INCAPACITATION
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
Crew incapacitation is a real safety hazard which occurs most frequently than many of the other
emergencies. Incapacitation can occur in many form varying from obvious sudden death to subtle,
partial loss of function. It may not be preceded by any warning.
RECOGNITION
The keys to early recognition of the incapacitation are
• Routine monitoring and cross checking of flight instruments
• Crew members should have a very high index of suspicion of a subtle incapacitation
• If one crew member do not feel well, the other crew must be advised
• Others symptoms e.g. incoherent speech, pale fixed facial expression or irregular breathing
could indicate the beginning of an incapacitation.
ACTION
The recovery from a detected incapacitation of the fit pilot shall follow the sequence below:
First phase
• Assume control, return the aircraft to a safe flight path, announce “I have control”, use the
take-over pb and engage the on side AP as required.
• Declare an emergency to ATC
• Take whatever steps are possible to ensure the incapacitated pilot cannot interfere with the
handling of the aircraft. This may include involving cabin crew to restrain the incapacitated pilot
• Request assistance from any medically qualified passenger
• Check if a type qualified company pilot is on board to replace the incapacitated crew member
• Land At the Nearest Suitable Airport after considering all pertinent factors
• Arrange medical assistance after landing giving many details about the condition of the affected
crewmember
Second phase
• Prepare the approach and read the checklist earlier than usual
• Request radar vectoring and prefer a long approach to reduce workload
• Perform the landing from the fit pilot usual place
OVERWEIGHT LANDING
Applicable to: ALL
Overweight landing can be performed "in exceptional conditions" (in flight turn back or diversion),
provided the flight crew follows the OVERWEIGHT LANDING procedure. The decision to jettison
remains at captain discretion after the analysis of various parameters such as runway length, aircraft
conditions, emergency situation.
Automatic landing is certified up to Maximum Landing Weight (MLW), but flight tests have been
performed successfully up to Max Takeoff Weight (MTOW). In case of emergency, and under crew
responsibility, an automatic landing may be performed up to MTOW provided that the runway is
approved for automatic landing.
It is always possible to return immediately to land, at the departure runway, whatever the aircraft
weight, provided that maximum reverse is used on at least one reverser.
The flight crew must press the ABN PROC pb on the ECP, than select MISC menu, to display the
OVERWEIGHT LANDING procedure on the ECAM. As required by the procedure, the flight crew
must compute the landing performance, using the OIS. Unless a specific landing flap setting is
required by the ECAM for abnormal operations, AUTO CONF option must be selected. This ensures
that CONF FULL is preferred for optimized landing performance and minimized energy. CONF 3 will
be used only when necessary for go-around performance.
Should an overweight landing be required, a long straight in approach, or a wide visual pattern,
should be flown in order to configure the aircraft for a stabilized approach.
The stabilized approach technique should be used, and VAPP established at the FAF. The speed will
be reduced to VLS in the final stages of the approach to minimize the aircraft energy.
For go around, if the landing configuration is different from FLAP FULL, FLAP 1 must be used.
If a go-around FLAP 1 is carried out, VLS CONF 1+F may be higher than VLS CONF 3 +5 kt . The
recommendation in such a case is to follow SRS orders which will accelerate the aircraft up to the
displayed VLS. It should be noted, however, that VLS CONF 1+F equates to 1.23 VS1G whereas
the minimum go-around speed required by regulations is 1.13 VS1G. This requirement is always
satisfied.
The crew should be aware that the transition from -3 °flight path angle to go around climb gradient
requires a lot of energy and therefore some altitude loss.
The maximum brake energy and maximum tire speed limiting weights are not limiting even in an
overweight landing configuration.
Taking into account the runway landing distance available, the use of brakes should be modulated to
avoid very hot brakes and the risk of tire deflation.
ECAM PROCEDURES
For more information on the callouts associated with ECAM procedures, Refer to
OP-40-40-3-40-3-2 Tasksharing Rules.
MEMORY ITEMS
The aim of the following callouts is to announce the appropriate procedure by calling out, in most
cases, the title of the procedure. This allows the flight crew to be aware of the situation and be
prepared to properly react (crew coordination, task sharing, and communication).
GPWS
If the flight crew considers an avoidance maneuver:
"PULL UP TOGA"
WINDSHEAR
"WINDSHEAR TOGA"
UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION
"UNRELIABLE SPEED"
TCAS
If a TRAFFIC advisory alert is triggered:
"TCAS Blue"
EMERGENCY DESCENT
"EMERGENCY DESCENT"
LOSS OF BRAKING
"LOSS OF BRAKING"
MALFUNCTION BEFORE V1 AT TAKEOFF
EVENT CAPT F/O
If GO decision GO
If RTO decision: STOP
Continued on the following page
SI-10-10-2 Windshear
General.....................................................................................................................................................................A
Operational Recommendations............................................................................................................................... B
SI-10-10-3 Turbulence
Preface..................................................................................................................................................................... A
Use of the Radar..................................................................................................................................................... B
Procedure.................................................................................................................................................................C
Considerations On Clear Air Turbulence (CAT)..................................................................................................... D
Miscellaneous...........................................................................................................................................................E
SI-60 TCAS
General.....................................................................................................................................................................A
Operational Recommendations............................................................................................................................... B
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
For more information on the cold weather procedures described in the FCOM , Refer to
FCOM/Procedures/Supplementary Procedures/Adverse Weather/Cold Weather Procedures .
Aircraft performance is certified on the basis of a clean wing. Ice accretion affects wing performance.
When the wing is clean, the airflow smoothly follows the shape of the wing. When the wing is
covered with ice, the airflow separates from the wing when the Angle-Of-Attack ( AOA ) increases.
Therefore, the maximum lift-coefficient is reduced. As a result, the aircraft may stall at a lower AOA ,
and the drag may increase.
The flight crew must keep in mind that the wing temperature of the aircraft may be significantly lower
than 0 °C , after a flight at high altitude and low temperature, even if the Outside Air Temperature (
OAT ) is higher than 0 °C . In such cases, humidity or rain cause ice accretion on the upper wing,
and light frost under the wing. Only 3 mm of frost on the under-surface of the wing is acceptable.
EXTERIOR INSPECTION
Applicable to: ALL
When ground-icing conditions are encountered, and/or when ice accretion is suspected, the Captain
should determine, on the basis of the exterior inspection, whether the aircraft requires ground
deicing/anti-icing treatment. This visual inspection must take into account all vital parts of the aircraft,
and must be performed from locations that offer a clear view of these parts.
Deicing/anti-icing fluids enable to remove ice and to prevent ice accumulation on aircraft surfaces
until the beginning of the takeoff. In addition, the fluids flow off the surfaces of the aircraft during
takeoff, in order not to degrade the takeoff performance.
Several types of fluids can be used. These fluids have different characteristics:
Type 1 Type 2, 3, 4
Low viscosity High viscosity
Limited holdover time Long holdover time
Used mainly for deicing Used for deicing and anti-icing
The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of the fluid. It depends on the type of
fluid and on the nature and the severity of the precipitation. The flight crew should refer to applicable
tables as guidelines. The should use these tables in conjunction with the pre-takeoff check.
Depending on the severity of the weather, the flight crew must apply the deicing/anti-icing procedure:
‐ In one step, via the single application of heated and diluted deicing/anti-icing fluid, or
This procedure provides a short holdover time, and should only be used in low moisture
conditions. The holdover time starts from the beginning of the application of the fluid.
‐ In two steps, by first applying the heated deicing fluid, then by applying a protective anti-icing fluid.
The ground crew must apply consecutively the two fluids. The holdover time starts from the
beginning of the application of the second fluid.
TAXI-OUT
Applicable to: ALL
On contaminated runways, the taxiing speed should be as low as possible, and any action that could
distract the flight crew during the taxi should be delayed until the aircraft is stopped.
The flight crew should consider the following factors:
‐ The antiskid is inhibited at very low speed
‐ The engine anti-ice increases the ground idle thrust
‐ Avoid large tiller inputs to minimize the risk of skidding during turns
‐ On slippery taxiways, it may be more effective to use differential braking and/or thrust, instead of
the nosewheel steering
‐ If there is slush or snow on the taxiways, the flight crew should delay the flap selection until
reaching the holding point, in order to avoid contaminating the flap/slat mechanism
‐ When reaching the holding point the flight crew should perform the "Before Takeoff Down to the
Line" checklist
‐ The flight crew must maintain the aircraft far behind the aircraft in front
‐ In icing conditions, when holding on ground for long periods of time, or if engine vibration occurs,
the flight crew should increase the thrust before takeoff to shed any ice from the fan blades. For
more information, Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-90-90 After start_ENG Anti-Ice .
TAKEOFF
Applicable to: ALL
TAKEOFF PERFORMANCE
When taking off on contaminated runways, it is not permitted to use FLEX thrust. However,
derated thrust may be used, as required, in order to optimize aircraft performance. When
available, a derated takeoff thrust results in lower minimum control speeds and therefore,
in a lower V1 . A reduction in the minimum control speeds can sometimes enhance takeoff
performance.
If anti-ice is used, the flight crew must apply the applicable performance penalty.
Slush, standing water, and/or deep snow reduce the effectiveness of aircraft takeoff performance,
because of increased rolling resistance and reduction in tire-to-ground friction. A higher flap setting
increases the runway-limited takeoff weight, but reduces the second segment limited takeoff
weight.
TAKEOFF ROLL
When on ground, in icing conditions, and if temperature is less than + 1 °C :
‐ Before the aircraft lines up on the runway for takeoff, the flight crew must ensure that the
airframe has no ice or snow
‐ In order to shed any possible ice on the fan, the flight crew should increase the thrust on two
symmetric engines at a time, just before takeoff with parking brake on or brake with pedals.
For more information on the shedding procedure, Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-90-90 After
start_ENG Anti-Ice .
CAUTION Pay particular attention to the aircraft movement during this procedure. If during
thrust increase, the aircraft starts to move, immediately retard the thrust levers
to IDLE.
If the aircraft moves, apply the thrust on only one engine at a time.
Then, before applying thrust, the Captain should ensure that the nosewheel is straight. If there
is a tendency to deviate from the runway centerline, the flight crew must immediately correct this
tendency by using the rudder pedal steering, not the tiller.
On contaminated runways, the flight crew should ensure that engine thrust is set symmetrically to
avoid difficult directional control.
The flight crew should consider the maximum crosswind in relation to the friction coefficient of the
runway. For more information on the maximum crosswind, Refer to FCOM/PER-TOF-CTA-CWD
Crosswind Refer to FCOM/Performance/Takeoff/Runway Contamination/Crosswind .
IN FLIGHT
Applicable to: ALL
CLIMB/DESCENT
Whenever icing conditions are encountered or expected, the flight crew should turn on the engine
anti-ice. Although the TAT before entering clouds may not require engine anti-ice, the flight crew
should be aware that the TAT often decreases significantly, when entering clouds.
In the climb or the cruise phase, when the SAT is less than -40 °C , the flight crew should turn off
the engine anti-ice, unless flying near CB s.
If the flight crew does not apply the recommended anti-ice procedures, engine stall,
over-temperature, or engine damage may occur.
The flight crew should turn on the wing anti-ice, if severe ice accretion is expected, or if there is
any indication of icing on the airframe.
HOLDING
If holding is performed in icing conditions, the flight crew should maintain the clean configuration
because they should avoid flying in icing conditions with the slats extended during a long period of
time.
APPROACH
If significant ice accretion develops on parts of the wing that have not been deiced, the aircraft
speed must be increased ( Refer to FCOM/Operations in Icing Conditions ).
When the temperature is less than ISA-10, the flight crew must correct the target altitudes
(provided by the ATC ), by adding the values that are indicated in the table below:
Corrections to be Added (ft)
Height (ft) ISA - 10 ISA -20 ISA 30
500 50 70 100
1000 100 140 190
2000 200 280 380
3000 290 420 570
4000 390 570 760
5000 490 710 950
LANDING
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew should avoid landing on very slippery runways. However, if it is not possible to avoid
such landings, the flight crew should consider the following factors that are linked to operations on
contaminated runways:
‐ Braking action
‐ Directional control.
BRAKING ACTION
Fluid contaminants on the runway has an adverse effect on braking performance, because it
reduces the friction between the tires and the surface of the runway. It also creates a layer of fluid
between the tires and the runway surface, and reduces the contact area.
The flight crew should perform a firm touchdown. They should apply MAX reverse as soon as the
main landing gear is on ground. Using reversers on a runway that is contaminated with dry snow
may reduce the visibility, particularly at low speeds. In such cases the flight crew should reduce
the reverse thrust to idle, if necessary.
The flight crew should set to 3 the autobrake when landing on an evenly contaminated runway.
It is possible that the DECEL indication on the PFD does not appear, as the predetermined
deceleration may not be achieved. This does not mean that the autobrake is not working.
DIRECTIONAL CONTROL
During rollout, the flight crew must center the sidestick. This prevents asymmetric wheel loading,
that results in asymmetric braking and increases the weathercock tendency of the aircraft.
The flight crew should use the ruder for directional control after touchdown, in the same way as
for a normal landing. They must avoid using the tiller above taxi speed, because it may result in
nosewheel skidding, and lead to a loss of directional control.
If necessary, the flight crew must apply differential braking by completely releasing the pedal on
the side that is opposite to the expected direction of the turn, because on a slippery runway, full or
half deflection of the pedal may lead to the same braking effect.
Landing on a contaminated runway in crosswind conditions requires careful consideration. In such
case, two factors can cause directional control difficulties:
‐ If the aircraft touches down with crab angle, and if the flight crew applies the reverse thrust,
the side-force component of reverse thrust adds to the crosswind component, and causes the
aircraft to drift to the downwind side of the runway
‐ As the braking efficiency increases, the cornering force of the main wheels decreases.
If there is a problem with the directional control, the flight crew should:
‐ Set to idle the reverse thrust, in order to reduce the reverse thrust side-force component
‐ Release the brakes in order to increase the cornering force
‐ Return to the runway centerline, select again the reverse thrust, and resume braking ( Refer to
Landing ).
The concept of equivalent runway condition is used to determine the maximum
crosswind limitation. For more information on the maximum crosswind, Refer to
FCOM/Performance/Landing/Runway Contamination/Crosswind .
TAXI-IN
Applicable to: ALL
During taxi-in, after landing, the flight crew should not retract the flaps/slats, because retraction could
cause damage, by crushing any ice that is in the slots of the surfaces. When the aircraft arrives at
the gate, and the engines are stopped, the flight crew should perform a visual inspection to check
that the slats/flaps areas are free of contamination. Then, the flight crew can retract the slats/flaps by
using the electric pumps.
At the end of the flight, in extreme cold conditions, cold soak protection is requested when a longer
stopover is expected.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
WINDSHEAR PHENOMENON
A windshear results from a cool shaft of air, that is similar to a cylinder with a width between
0.5 nm and 1.5 nm, that moves downward.
When the air hits the ground, it:
‐ Expands horizontally, causing a horizontal wind gradient
‐ Curls inward at the edges, causing vertical movement of the air mass.
Flight safety is affected, because:
‐ The horizontal wind gradient significantly affects lift, causing the aircraft to descend, or to reach
a very high Angle-of-Attack
‐ The vertical movement of the air mass severely affects the aircraft flight path.
WINDSHEAR PHENOMENON
If a windshear encounter is expected, the flight crew should delay takeoff or landing until the
conditions improve (e.g. until the thunderstorm leaves the airport).
STRATEGY FOR COPING WITH WINDSHEAR
Windshear and microburst are hazardous phenomena for aircraft at takeoff or landing. The
strategy to cope with windshear is:
‐ Increase flight crew awareness by using the Predictive Windshear Function (PWS)
‐ Inform the flight crew of air mass variations that are not expected by using Velocity Vector
(VV) and approach speed variations
‐ Warn the flight crew of significant loss of energy by using "SPEED, SPEED, SPEED" and
"WINDSHEAR" aural alerts
‐ Provide effective tools to escape the windshear by using ALPHA FLOOR protection, SRS
pitch order, high AOA protection and Ground Speed mini protection.
INCREASE FLIGHT CREW AWARENESS
When the microburst reaches the ground, it expands outward, carrying a large number of falling
rain droplets. The weather radar measures the speed variations of the droplets, and as a result,
assesses wind variations. The Predictive Windshear Function (PWS) predicts wind variations.
The PWS automatically operates below 1 500 ft AGL. The PWS triggers aural and visual alerts
in the case of a windshear detection.
INFORM THE FLIGHT CREW
The bird(Velocity Vector) associated with the approach speed variations (GS mini protection) is
an effective way of informing the flight crew of air mass variations that are not expected.
Approach speed variations and lateral bird movement reflect the horizontal wind gradient.
Vertical bird movement reflects the vertical movement of the air mass.
BIRD AND TARGET SPEED – WIND INTERPRETATION
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
TAKEOFF
PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR ("WINDSHEAR AHEAD" AURAL ALERT)
The Predictive Windshear Function detected a windshear.
If a predictive windshear aural alert is triggered on the runway before takeoff, the flight crew
must delay takeoff.
If a predictive windshear aural alert is triggered during the takeoff roll, the Captain must reject
the takeoff (the aural alert is inhibited at speeds more than 100 kt).
If a predictive windshear aural alert is triggered during initial climb, the flight crew must:
‐ Set TOGA
‐ Closely monitor the speed and the speed trend
‐ Ensure that the flight path does not include areas with suspected windshears
‐ Change the aircraft configuration, provided that the aircraft does not enter windshear.
REACTIVE WINDSHEAR ("WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" AURAL ALERT) OR
WINDSHEAR DETECTED BY FLIGHT CREW OBSERVATION
The PRIMs detected a windshear.
If the windshear occurs before V1, with significant speed and speed trend variations, the
Captain must initiate a rejected takeoff.
If the windshear occurs after V1, the flight crew must select TOGA. The flight crew must pay
attention to the following:
‐ The flight crew should not change the configuration, until the aircraft is out of the windshear,
because operating the landing gear doors causes additional drag
‐ The PF must fly SRS pitch orders rapidly and smoothly, but not aggressively, and must
consider pulling full backstick, if necessary, to minimize height loss
‐ The PNF should call out the wind variations from the ND and V/S and, when clear of the
windshear, report the encounter to the ATC
‐ During a derated takeoff and in the case of windshear encounter, the flight crew cannot apply
TOGA thrust, if the speed is less than F speed in CONF 2 or 3, due to VMCA considerations.
APPROACH
PREDICTIVE WINDSHEAR
The Predictive Windshear Function detected a windshear.
If "MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY" or the visual alert appears, the flight crew should either delay
the approach or divert to another airport. However, if the flight crew decides to continue the
approach, they should:
‐ Assess the weather severity with the radar display
‐ Consider the most appropriate runway
‐ Select FLAPS 3 for landing, in order to optimize the climb gradient capability in the case of a
go-around
‐ Use managed speed, because it provides the GS mini function
‐ Increase the VAPP displayed on the FMS PERF APP page up to a maximum of VLS + 15 kt
‐ Consider using the VV pb or ILS, for an earlier detection of vertical path deviation
‐ In the case of "GO AROUND WINDSHEAR AHEAD" triggering, the PF must set TOGA for a
go-around. The flight crew can change the aircraft configuration, provided that the windshear
is not entered. Full backstick should be applied, if required, to follow the SRS, or to minimize
the loss of height.
REACTIVE WINDSHEAR
The PRIMs detected a windshear.
In the case of a "WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR" aural alert, the PF must set
TOGA for a go-around. However, the flight crew must not change the configuration (slats/flaps
and gear) until out of the windshear, and must closely monitor the flight path and speed.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew must use weather reports and charts to determine the location and altitude of possible
CBs, storms, and Clear Air Turbulence (CAT). If turbulence is expected, the flight crew must turn on
the seatbelt signs, in order to prepare passengers and prevent injury.
PROCEDURE
Applicable to: ALL
If moderate turbulence is encountered, the flight crew should set the AP and A/THR to ON with
managed speed.
If severe turbulence is encountered, the flight crew should display the SEVERE TURBULENCE IN
CRUISE procedure, by pressing the ECP ABN pushbutton, then selecting the MISCELLANEOUS
Menu.
The ECAM procedure indicates 300 kt/M 0.85as MAX TURB SPEED, and green dot as MIN TURB
SPEED. This range protects the aircraft structure from wind gusts, and maintains the buffet margin,
especially during vertical wind gusts.
The ECAM procedure also recommends to set the AP to ON, and to disconnect the autothrust in
case of excessive thrust variations.
Use of the A/THR is, however, recommended during approach, in order to benefit from the GS mini.
If the aircraft is flown manually, the flight crew should be aware of the fact that flight control laws are
designed to cope with turbulence. Therefore, they should avoid the temptation to fight turbulence,
and should not over-control the sidestick.
The flight crew must set the harness to on, check that the seat belts signs are on and use all white
lights in thunderstorms.
Clear Air Turbulence (CAT) can be expected by referring to weather charts and pilot reports.
However, the radar cannot detect CAT, because it is "dry turbulence".
If CAT is encountered, the flight crew may consider avoiding it vertically, keeping in mind that the
buffet margin reduces as the altitude increases.
MISCELLANEOUS
Applicable to: ALL
It is not necessary to set the ENG START selector to IGN. In the case of an engine flameout, the
igniters will trigger automatically.
The handling characteristics of "fly-by-wire" aircraft are independent of the CG in normal and
alternate law. Therefore, it is not necessary to command a FWD fuel transfer, in the event of heavy
turbulence in cruise.
PREFACE
Applicable to: ALL
For visual manual flight, Airbus recommends to fly FD off In this case, two flight references may be
used on the PFD:
• The attitude
• The Velocity Vector, called the “bird”
In this case, the pilot selects the bird with the HDG/VS-TRK/FPA pb on the FCU (AFS-CP).
Note: When the FD are ON, the bird can also be displayed, however, only as an information, not
as a reference.
For visual circuits, the PF should use the “bird” as the flight reference.
→ TRK/FPA on the FCU
→ Fly the big green bird.
For dynamic maneuvers (such as takeoff or go around), the PF should use the attitude flight
reference. An action on the sidestick has an immediate effect on the aircraft attitude (while the
“bird” is directly affected by the aircraft inertia and has a delayed reaction).The flight crew can
monitor the attitude flight reference directly and accurately during these maneuvers. This is why, at
go-around initiation, HDG/VS is automatically selected (FD are automatically displayed) and the bird
is removed.
FD ON
Applicable to: ALL
When the FD is ON, the FD bars remain the reference, even if the bird is displayed.
The bird can be displayed, as a slope and track information. However the PF should not fly the bird.
This is why the symbol is smaller.
If TRK/FPA is selected on the FCU (AFS-CP), the bird is automatically displayed in green (small
green bird).
If HDG/VS is selected on the FCU (AFS-CP), the bird is not automatically displayed. However, the
flight crew can display it manually in black color, using the VV pb on the EFIS control panel (small
black bird).
INFORMATION PRESENTATION
Applicable to: ALL
Whatever the selected modes, whatever its size and its color, the bird indicates the track and flight
path angle in relation to the ground.
The track is indicated on the PFD by a green diamond on the track/heading scale, in addition to the
lateral movement of the bird in relation to the fixed aircraft symbol. On the ND, the track is indicated
by a green diamond on the compass scale. The difference in angle between track and heading
indicates the drift.
The flight path angle is indicated on the PFD by the vertical movement of the bird in relation to the
pitch scale.
With both FDS pb set to off, the blue track index appears on the PFD horizon
GENERAL
As a general rule, when using the bird as a reference (FD OFF), the pilot should first change
attitude, and then check the result with reference to the bird.
FINAL APPROACH
The bird provides the trajectory parameters, and quickly warns the pilot of downburst. In addition,
together with the GS MINI protection, it is an excellent indicator of shears or wind variations. If
nothing else, the position of the “bird” in relation to the fixed aircraft symbol provides an immediate
indication of the wind direction. Therefore, when approaching the minima, the pilot knows in which
direction to search for the runway.
The target approach speed symbol moves upward (and the bird moves downward), indicating that
there is headwind gust.
The bird drifts to the right, indicating that there is wind from the left.
RELIABILITY
Applicable to: ALL
The bird is computed from IRS data, therefore, it is affected by ADIRS errors. An error may be
indicated by a small track error, usually of up to +/- 2°. This can be easily determined during the
approach.
The bird is also computed from static pressure information. Therefore, the bird must be considered
as not reliable, if altitude information is not reliable.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The primary function of the FMS is navigation, i.e. to compute the aircraft’s position as accurately as
possible.
Three types of sources may be used to compute the FMS aircraft position:
• The GPS
• The IRS
• Radio navigation
The accuracy of the FMS navigation determines the validity of all others FMS functions and
consequently the crew’s strategy for using the AP/FD modes, in addition to the ND display.
PRINCIPLE
The FMS position computation is based on the MIX IRS position. This MIX IRS position is
continuously updated via a BIAS taking into account :
• The GPIRS position when in GPS PRIMARY
• The radio position when in GPS PRIMARY LOST
Therefore, the FMS position tends toward the GPIRS position when in GPS PRIMARY whereas it
tends toward the radio position when in GPS PRIMARY LOST.
NAVIGATION ACCURACY
The navigation accuracy is quantified by the Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU) parameter.
Depending on the navigation mode i.e. GPS PRIMARY, GPS PRIMARY LOST, IRS only, the EPU
computation is different.
GPS PRIMARY
The GPS position is characterized by two parameters:
• Integrity
• Accuracy.
Integrity is a direct function of the number of satellites in view of the aircraft. If five or more
satellites are in view, several combinations of the satellite signal may be used to process
“several positions” and to carry out reasonableness tests on the satellite signals themselves.
Accuracy functions is in direct connection with the satellite constellation in view of the aircraft.
If the satellites are low on horizon, or not in appropriate positions, accuracy will be poor. It is
provided as a “figure of merit”.
If the GPS position fulfils both the integrity and the accuracy criteria, GPS PRIMARY is
displayed on the MFD POSITION / MONITOR page and the GPS position is the best raw data
position available. The EPU is low.
GPS PRIMARY LOST
To compute the EPU, the FMS considers the immediately available radio navigation
means in the FMS position computation and applies defined tolerances for each of them.
These tolerances assume that the radio navigation means are working properly. They
ignore any possible excessive IRS drift or erroneous locations of radio navaids. The MFD
POSITION/MONITOR page displays the HIGH/LOW indications, according to the EPU. These
indications reflect the probable accuracy of the FMS navigation compared to the determined
accuracy criteria.
GPS PRIMARY
PREFLIGHT
The three IRS take the GPS position as the alignment reference point. It is not recommended to
modify the coordinates of the alignment reference point. (See FCTM 02.060)
TAKEOFF
No FMS position update.
IN FLIGHT
The FMS position tends to the GPIRS position as long as the GPS satellites are available.
IN FLIGHT
The original TO BIAS is continuously updated with the current radio aid and the FMS position
tends to the radio position.
SUMMARY
FMS POSITION
Flight phase GPS PRIMARY LOST GPS PRIMARY
Preflight MIX IRS position Tends toward GPIRS position
Takeoff Updated at runway threshold (shift) Tends toward GPIRS position
With RADIO Tends toward RADIOposition Tends toward GPIRS position
In flight
Without RADIO MIX IRS position + last updated BIAS Tends toward GPIRS position
POSITION/MONITOR PAGE
This page indicates the GPS PRIMARY capacity.
The POSITION/MONITOR page displays the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) in blue (this
can be changed). The required navigation accuracy thresholds are determined, depending on the
flight phase, or can be manually entered. The EPU is compared with the RNP to define whether
accuracy is HIGH or LOW. These indications are used when flying within RNP airspace.
POSITION/NAVAIDS PAGE
The POSITIO/NAVAIDS page displays the navaids
• Tuned for display
• Tuned for FMS NAV
The “Tuned for FMS NAV” page has deselect prompt to deselect Navaids if reported
unserviceable on NOTAMS
The “Tuned for FMS NAV” page has deselect prompt to deselect GPS that enables the flight
crew to prevent the FMS from using the GPS data to compute the position, in the case of a major
problem. GPS PRIMARY LOST is then displayed on MFD and ND. The GPS can be reselected.
POSITION/GPS PAGE
The GPS PREDICTED AVAILABILITY may be accessed on the MFD POSITION/GPS page. The
GPS PRIMARY criteria depend upon the satellite constellation status (position and number) and
this is predictable. The crew can assess the GPS PRIMARY status at destination or alternate.
POSITION/IRS PAGE
The IRS table provides information on:
• The IRS status i.e. NAV or ATT
• The residual alignment time (also available on ECAM) and HDG entry when one IRS is in ATT
mode
• The IRS drift and residual ground speed information when the flight is completed
ND/MFD
A GPS PRIMARY message is displayed when GPS PRIMARY is again available. This message is
clearable.
A GPS PRIMARY LOST message is displayed when GPS PRIMARY is lost. This message is
clearable on MFD but not on ND.
When the class of navigation accuracy is downgraded from HIGH to LOW (LOW to HIGH), a NAV
ACCUR DOWNGRADE (UPGRADE) is displayed on ND and MFD
OPERATIONAL CONSEQUENCES
The result of the crosscheck of the navigation accuracy determines the pilot’s strategy for using
the ND display, the AP/FD modes and the EGPWS.
(1) A GPS-defined Non-Precision Approach must be interrupted, if the GPS PRIMARY LOST
message is displayed
POSITION UPDATE
In the case of an obvious and major map shift, indicated by messages, such as “CHECK
A/C POSITION, FM1/FM2 POS MISMATCH”, the FMS position may be updated on the MFD
POSITION/MONITOR page. There are two possible techniques:
The recommended technique is to update the FMS position over a beacon by pressing the
CONFIRM UPDATE prompt once estimating that the aircraft overflies the beacon using the
associated needle. The potential error induced is approximately 4 to 5 nm. When the position
update is achieved, the EPU is automatically set to a higher value and the navigation accuracy is
low.
The second technique consists of updating the FMS position, when flying over a
Point/Bearing/Distance (P/B/D) with reference to beacon raw data (Needle + Distance) rather than
the beacon itself. The potential for error is far less when the distance is greater than 60 nm. The
flight crew will keep in mind the potential 180 degree error on bearing.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) provides the flight crew with traffic
information and warnings of possible conflicts with vertical avoidance instructions. The TCAS can
only detect and indicate other aircraft that are equipped with a transponder.
The ND displays traffic information, and:
‐ The bearing and range to the intruder
‐ The vertical movement of the intruder
‐ The relative altitude of the intruder.
INTRUDER DETECTION
The TCAS detects intruders that are flying within a maximum of 20 nm to 60 nm (depending on the
aircraft configuration and external weather conditions), and within a maximum altitude of 9 900 ft
above, and 9 900 ft below, the aircraft.
Based on the received information from the intruders, the TCAS may generate the following
sequence of alerts:
If the TCAS considers the intruder to be a possible collision threat:
‐ It generates a visual and aural Traffic Advisory ( TA )
‐ In that case, the AP / FD TCAS mode automatically arms: TCAS appears on the FMA to
inform the flight crew that the AP / FD TCAS mode will be available in the case a Resolution
Advisory ( RA ) is subsequently triggered.
If the TCAS considers the intruder to be a real collision threat:
‐ It generates a visual and aural Resolution Advisory ( RA )
‐ The AP / FD TCAS mode automatically engages: TCAS appears on the FMA . The flight
crew has vertical guidance to fly the RA orders, automatically with the AP / FD , or manually
with the FD s only
INTRUDER CLASSIFICATION
Type of Flight Crew Response
Intruder Display on ND Collision Aural Alert AP/FD TCAS AP/FD TCAS
BASIC TCAS
Threat without AP with AP
No threat No threat - - -
traffic, or other
Proximate Consider - - -
as no threat
and remains in
green area.
(1)
(1) In AP/FD TCAS mode, the load factor authority of the guidance law is increased.
The TCAS triggers TAs and RAs when the relative altitude between the aircraft and the intruder, at
the Closure Point of Approach (CPA) is:
‐ Less than 850 ft for the TA and 700 ft for the RA, above FL 200
‐ Less than 850 ft for the TA and 600 ft for the RA, below FL 200.
RAs are inhibited if the aircraft is below:
‐ 900 ft AGL in descent
‐ 1 100 ft AGL in climb.
TAs are inhibited if the aircraft is below:
‐ 400 ft AGL in descent
‐ 600 ft AGL in climb.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
TCAS SELECTIONS
The flight crew should select:
‐ ABV in climb
The TCAS displays intruders that are between 2 700 ft below, and 9 900 ft above the aircraft.
‐ NORM in cruise
The TCAS displays intruders that are between 2 700 ft below, and 2 700 ft above the aircraft.
‐ BLW , if the cruise altitude is within 2 000 ft of FL 430 , or in descent
The TCAS displays intruders that are between 9 900 ft below, and 2 700 ft above the aircraft.
‐ TA ONLY, in the case of:
• An engine failure
The aircraft may not be able to achieve the RA orders because of its degraded performance.
• A flight with the landing gear down
The aircraft may not be able to achieve the RA orders because of its degraded performance.
• Operations at specific airports, and during specific procedures, that an operator identifies as
having a significant possibility for RA s that are not wanted and not appropriate (e.g. closely
spaced parallel runways, converging runways).
Note: In TA ONLY mode, the AP / FD TCAS mode will not arm.
TRAFFIC ADVISORY
If a TA is triggered, the flight crew should check the immediate arming of the AP/FD TCAS mode,
and the engagement status of the AP and A/THR.
TCAS in blue on the FMA indicates that the AP/FD TCAS mode is available, and armed.
Note: If the AP/FD TCAS mode does not immediately arm, the flight crew must apply the
BASIC TCAS procedure, in the case of a subsequent RA.
If a TA is generated:
‐ The PF announces "TCAS blue"
‐ If the A/THR is off, the PF should request the PM to set it ON
‐ The PF must not initiate an evasive maneuver, only on the basis of a TA.
RESOLUTION ADVISORY
In all cases, the flight crew must always follow the TCAS RA orders, even if:
‐ The TCAS RA orders disagree with the ATC instructions
‐ It results in flying above the maximum ceiling altitude with "CLIMB, CLIMB" or "INCREASE
CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB" TCAS RA orders
‐ It results in crossing the altitude of the intruder.
CAUTION Be aware that the intruder may have a TCAS , and may maneuver in response to
a coordinated RA order. Therefore, not following an RA order could compromise
safe separation.
AP / FD TCAS PROCEDURE
AP/FD TCAS Mode Engagement
If an RA is triggered, the AP / FD TCAS mode automatically, and immediately, engages.
If the PF uses the Head-Up Display ( HUD ), the PF must refer to the PFD .
The PF announces the AP / FD TCAS mode engagement, like any other FMA changes.
If the FD s are disengaged, they automatically engage. The FD pitch bar does not flash,
and the triple click aural alert does not sound, in order to avoid to disturb the PF during the
evasive maneuver.
If the A/THR is disconnected, it automatically becomes armed or active.
If AP s and FD s are off when the RA is triggered, HDG automatically engages.
AP/FD TCAS Procedure
If an RA is triggered:
‐ If the AP is engaged, the PF should keep it ON
The AP guides the aircraft in accordance with the RA order.
‐ If the AP is not engaged:
• The PF smoothly and firmly flies the FD pitch bar
The FD orders guide the aircraft in accordance with the RA orders.
• The PF can ask the PM to engage the AP .
‐ The PM monitors the evasive maneuver. He does not try to see the reported traffic.
The flight crew checks that the guidance of AP / FD TCAS mode leads the vertical speed
out of the red area of the vertical speed scale, and in the green area if any.
CAUTION If for any reason during an RA , the aircraft vertical speed does not reach
the green area of the vertical speed scale, the PF should disconnect the
AP , and override the FD orders, in order to lead the aircraft vertical speed
out of the red area of the vertical speed scale.
If necessary, the PF must use the full speed range between Vα max and
VMAX .
‐ If any "CLIMB" aural alert sounds during the final approach, the flight crew should first
apply the AP / FD TCAS procedure. When clear of conflict, depending on the situation,
they can consider a go-around.
‐ The PM notifies the ATC
‐ When clear of conflict:
• The AP / FD TCAS mode automatically reverts to V/S , in order to capture the AFS CP
selected altitude. In some cases, the AP / FD TCAS mode may revert to an altitude
acquire mode, or an altitude hold mode: Refer to Refer to FCOM/When Clear of Conflict
/ Consequence on AP/FD Vertical Mode .
• The PM notifies the ATC
• The PF engages an appropriate vertical mode, or adjusts the vertical speed target, in
accordance with ATC clearance.
Note: The AP / FD TCAS mode is speed protected, i.e. it ensures that the aircraft speed
remains between VLS - 5 kt and VMAX . Therefore, in the case the RA is triggered
when the aircraft is close to its performance limits, the RA vertical speed target may
not be reached with the AP / FD TCAS mode.
BASIC TCAS PROCEDURE
If the PF uses the Head-Up Display ( HUD ), the PF must refer to the PFD .
‐ The PF disconnects the AP and requests the disconnection of the FD s, and smoothly and
promptly follows the green area of the vertical speed scale within 5 s .
Note: The flight crew must disconnect the FD s as soon as the AP s are disconnected, in
order to:
‐ Ensure that autothrust is in SPEED / MACH mode
‐ Avoid possible confusion between FD bar orders, and TCAS aural alerts and
vertical speed orders.
‐ The PM disconnects the FD s and monitors the evasive maneuver. He does not try to see the
reported traffic.
‐ The PF avoids excessive maneuvers, and maintains the vertical speed outside the red area
of the vertical speed scale and within the green area. If necessary, the PF must use the full
speed range between Vα max and VMAX .
‐ The PM notifies the ATC .
‐ The flight crew should never maneuver in the opposite direction of the RA , because TCAS
maneuvers are coordinated.
‐ In final approach, i.e. "CLIMB", "CLIMB NOW", "INCREASE CLIMB", the flight crew initiates a
go-around.
‐ When clear of conflict, the flight crew resumes normal navigation, in accordance with ATC
clearance, and using the AP / FD , as required.
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The main objectives of Vertical Display (VD) is to enhance flight crew awareness of the vertical
situation by:
‐ Collecting existing information in the same place, to provide a synthetic view of various parameters
with their relative position
‐ Providing a situational assessment about the current and future aircraft position in relation to:
• Safe altitudes (check that the flight path is compliant)
• Terrain (check the altitude constraints versus the terrain)
• Weather information (anticipate changes caused by weather).
VERTICAL CUT
Applicable to: ALL
In normal operations (aircraft in NAV mode and on its F-PLN, or in HDG/TRACK mode), in ARC and
ROSE-NAV modes, and provided that the flight crew did not pull the VD AZIM knob, the vertical cut
is along the ND green solid line.
There are few exceptions to this rule. These cases are indicated by the VIEW ALONG ACFT TRK
message that appears on the lower part of the VD.
Safety altitudes, terrain, and weather data are displayed along this vertical cut.
VERTICAL TRAJECTORY
Applicable to: ALL
In normal operations (aircraft in NAV mode and on its F-PLN, or in HDG/TRACK mode), in ARC and
ROSE-NAV modes:
‐ The green solid line displayed on both the Navigation Display (ND) and the Vertical Display (VD)
indicates the path that the aircraft will fly without any further action from the flight crew
‐ The green dotted line displayed on the VD is associated with the computed FMS trajectory
‐ The grey area displayed on the VD identifies the next turning point in the vertical plan (i.e. the
vertical view is not straight ahead)
‐ The blue bracket on the ND indicates the end of the VD range.
MANAGED MODE
Vertical cut: Along the green solid line of the ND, i.e. the FMS flight plan
Solid line: Vertical F-PLN until AFS CP altitude
SELECTED MODE
Vertical cut: Along the green solid line of the ND, i.e. the current track
Solid line: Selected trajectory.
GENERAL
The VD improves the vertical situational awareness of the flight crew in relation to the safety
altitudes (i.e. MORA and MSA) and the terrain.
On the VD, the terrain information is considered to be secondary to the safe altitudes. However,
this information is necessary and complementary to the safe altitudes, particularly when the flight
crew flies the aircraft below the safe altitudes, because it makes any potential hazard visible.
The display of safety altitudes enables the flight crew to anticipate hazardous situations for mid-
and long-term flight planning. The VD is not designed for short-term use (e.g. for flying/guidance).
The flight crew should be aware that the use of approved charts (i.e. Electronic or paper charts)
remains the primary source of information for safe altitudes, because VD data is not certified data.
Recommendations:
‐ Along a new path, check the MORA/MSA on the VD
‐ Before deviating, check the MORA on the ND and crosscheck with charts, to detect if the
hazard is currently on the intended path.
TERRAIN
The height of the aircraft above the terrain displayed on the VD is geometrically correct and does
not vary with the altimeter setting.
The flight crew must be aware that the vertical range of the VD depends on the lateral selected
range (the ratio is fixed). As a result, at high altitude, if the flight crew selects a shorter range, the
terrain below the aircraft may disappear.
WEATHER
Applicable to: ALL
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The flight crew can select the following modes, in order to display the data on the ND, and the VD.
AUTO
When the flight crew selects the AUTO mode (default mode), the weather is displayed along the
flight path of the aircraft.
On the ND, the weather is displayed along the vertical FMS flight plan, or, if not available, along
a flight path based on the current FPA. The WXR considers a vertical envelope, in order to
differentiate:
• The on-path weather that will be encountered by the aircraft
• The off-path weather that will not be encountered by the aircraft, and that is displayed with
reduced intensity and black parallel lines.
This vertical envelope is defined as indicated on the following schematic.
Note: ‐ Resulting from this vertical envelope, it must be highlighted that, when the aircraft flies
at high altitude (I.e. above 30 000 ft), some weather can be displayed on-path, even
if it is located well below the flight path. The flight crew can use the VD to assess the
altitude of the weather, compared to the flight path.
‐ The WXR may not be able to discriminate the on-path and the off-path weather at
ranges above 160 nm, because of the angle of the antenna beam width. Therefore, the
flight crew should not decide a diversion based on on-path weather located more than
160 nm ahead the aircraft.
On the VD, the weather is displayed along the zero width vertical cut. For more information on the
vertical cut, Refer to SI-70 Vertical Cut.
ELEVN/TILT
The flight crew can select these modes by using the SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page
of the MFD.
For weather analysis, ELVN or TILT mode enables the ND to display the weather:
• At an altitude selected by the flight crew
• At a tilt angle selected by the flight crew
Note: The flight crew must return to the AUTO mode, when they have completed the analysis.
AZIM
The flight crew can select this mode by using the SURV panel.
The AZIM mode enables to display the weather on the VD, along a selected azimuth. It should be
used to prepare a diversion.
The WXR automatically returns to AUTO after 30 s, if the flight crew does not select any azimuth
value.
GAIN
The gain control is mostly used in AUTO. The flight crew can select the manual mode by using the
SURV panel, or the SURV/CONTROLS page of the MFD.
The detection or evaluation of cells will always start in the AUTO mode. However, the gain may
be manually tuned to detect the strongest part of a cell displayed in red on the ND. If the flight
crew slowly reduces the gain value, the red areas (level 3 return) will slowly become yellow areas
(level 2 return), and the yellow areas will become green areas (level 1). The last part of the cell
that becomes yellow is the strongest area.
The gain must then be reset to AUTO when the flight crew has completed the analysis.
TURB FUNCTION
Turbulence detection (TURB) function mode is selected by default (AUTO on the MFD SURV
page).
The TURB function displays wet turbulence up to 40 nm in front of the aircraft.
It is not affected by the gain.
The TURB function should be used in order to isolate turbulence from precipitation.
PWS FUNCTION
Refer to Adverse Weather.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
WEATHER DETECTION
Takeoff: The flight crew must be aware that, when they press the WX pb on the EFIS CP, it takes
about 30 s to fill the buffer with radar data, and to have the complete display available on the ND
and on the VD.
In flight: Use the TURB function in order to isolate turbulence from precipitations.
WEATHER AVOIDANCE
Avoid cells laterally, rather than vertically.
Do not underestimate a thunderstorm, even if echo is weak (only wet parts are detected).
Avoid all red or magenta cells by at least 20 nm .
Deviate upwind instead of downwind (less probability of turbulence or hail).
Do not attempt to fly below a storm, even visual (turbulence, shear, altimetry).
Use the TURB function in order to isolate turbulence from precipitation.
There may be severe turbulence, up to 5 000 ft above a cell.
Storms with tops above 35 000 ft are hazardous.
Frequent and vivid lightning indicates a high probability of severe turbulence.
WEATHER PENETRATION
In the case of storm penetration, the flight crew must take full advantage of the weather radar. For
flight crew guidelines, in the case of turbulence, Refer to Adverse Weather.
GROUND MAPPING
The GAIN has to be adjusted harmoniously.
Use MAP to detect PROMINENT TERRAIN (mountain, city, and coastline).
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The Head-Up-Display (HUD) is an instrument in the cockpit that provides the flight crew with
trajectory-related symbols. The flight symbols are superimposed to the outside view. This enables
the flight crew to fly the aircraft, in relation to external parameters (e.g. terrain, runway surface,
clouds, etc.).
The flight crew can use the HUD during all the flight phases.
The flight crew may consider the benefits of using the HUD:
‐ At takeoff
‐ In climb, cruise, descent in order to avoid adverse weather conditions
‐ During intermediate and final approach for smooth IMC/VMC transition.
However, in the following cases the flight crew must revert to the PFD and the ND:
‐ TCAS Resolution Advisories (RA)
‐ Unusual attitude recoveries.
In such cases, a specific message appears on the HUD to inform the flight crew that it is necessary
to revert to the PFD and the ND.
In addition, it is also recommended that the flight crew uses the PFD and the ND for the following
maneuvers:
‐ Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance
‐ Windshear recovery
‐ Non-Precision Approaches with the RAW ONLY capability.
The flight crew can initiate these maneuvers head-up.
The use of the HUD has no effect on the standard task sharing rules.
Only the manner in which the flight crew visually scans cockpit information is changed.
The following recommendations apply when the PF is the CM1. The PF uses the HUD as follows:
‐ The PF can fly the aircraft using the HUD as the main reference in the following flight phases:
• Taxi
• Takeoff
• Climb/cruise/descent for avoidance of adverse weather conditions
The PF flies the aircraft in order to maintain the trajectory symbols of the HUD out of the
adverse weather.
• Intermediate and final approach for smooth IMC/VMC transition
• Landing
• Rollout.
‐ The PF visually scans the ND and the ECAM, when using the HUD to fly the aircraft.
In the case of a HUD failure, the PF must refer to the PFD and the ND.
The PNF uses the PFD and the ND as the main references to monitor the flight parameters.
However, if the PNF is the CM1, the PNF may periodically refer to the HUD, in order to take
advantage of situational awareness enhancement of the HUD during the intermediate and final
approaches, especially during the IMC/VMC transition, and during the visual approach segment.
During takeoff, the PNF monitors the takeoff thrust setting on the ECAM, before reaching 80 kt.
During the final approach, the PNF monitors the pitch, the bank, and the speed of the aircraft on the
PFD, for deviation callouts.
The aircraft will decelerate, if the flight crew maintains the current thrust.
The aircraft will accelerate, if the flight crew maintains the current thrust.
The flight symbols are superimposed to the outside view. Therefore, when the flight crew flies using
the HUD, the flight crew must be aware that HUD symbols make deviations appear larger than on the
PFD.
When the flight crew flies using the HUD, they should use the basic HUD symbols in relation to
the external parameters, if they are in view. This helps the flight crew to stabilize the aircraft on a
ground-related trajectory, and to improve the flight accuracy.
In addition to these four basic HUD symbols, the HUD automatically provides additional sets of
symbols, during the various flight phases: I.e. taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, and approach.
TAKEOFF ROLL
When the flight crew sets the thrust levers to FLX or TOGA, the aircraft reference symbol and the
yaw bar (if the ILS is available) appear on the HUD.
The yaw bar indicates the correction that the flight crew must apply to the rudder pedal, in order to
move the aircraft to the runway centerline.
The LOC deviation symbol indicates the position of the aircraft in relation to the runway centerline.
The combination of both helps the flight crew perform an accurate takeoff roll.
In the illustration below, the aircraft is on the left side of the runway centerline, and the yaw bar
provides an order to go the right side.
Yaw Bar
The flight crew must use both the LOC deviation and the yaw bar to smoothly direct the aircraft to
the runway centerline, in addition to the external parameters.
ROTATION
At takeoff, the flight crew must control the pitch and the pitch rate. On the HUD, when the aircraft
is on ground, the visible field of view above the horizon line is approximately 5 °. Therefore, it is
difficult for the flight crew to use the aircraft pitch symbol at rotation, because this pitch target (e.g.
12.5 °) is out of the flight crew’s field of view during the rotation. As a result, the HUD does not
display the aircraft pitch symbol during the takeoff roll. Instead, the HUD provides an offset pitch
symbol in the form of an inverted T. The offset pitch symbol is positioned 12.5 ° below the actual
pitch attidue of the aircraft (10 ° in the case of an engine failure), due to the fact that 12.5 °(10 °) is
close to the pitch target, at the end of the rotation.
Rotation
As a result, at VR:
‐ The PF pulls the sidestick in order to rotate the aircraft, and controls the pitch and the pitch rate
monitoring the inverted T. When the inverted T is close to the horizon line, the aircraft lifts off
‐ During the initial rotation, the PF adjusts the rotation rate, to prevent the inverted T from
reaching the tailstrike pitch limit symbol
‐ Next, the PF looks for the FPV and its associated FPD, in order to adjust the flight path, as per
SRS TO mode. The PF then stabilizes the aircraft on the initial climb segment.
Note: Both the inverted T and the tailstrike pitch limit symbol no longer appear after takeoff.
The HUD provides similar symbols for ILS and VMC approaches.
This is because for approaches, the same type of information helps the flight crew to stabilize the
aircraft on:
‐ The final approach path (i.e. the published final approach path for ILS approaches, or the selected
final approach path for VMC approaches)
‐ The lateral trajectory of the final approach, indicated either by a synthetic runway symbol, or the
real runway when in view.
The flying technique for a VMC approach is similar to the flying technique for an ILS approach. This
explains why the IMC/VMC transition is smooth, when the flight crew uses the HUD.
In order to align the aircraft with the LOC axis, the PF flies FPV to the left(right), so that the LOC axis
symbol is perpendicular to the horizon.
In order to stabilize the aircraft on the final approach path, the flight crew flies the FPV above(below),
or in line with the touchdown point, so that the final approach FPA symbols remain aligned with the
touchdown point.
When transitioning from IMC to VMC, the real runway gradually appears through the HUD. The real
runway should be superimposed by the synthetic runway symbol.
In the case of crosswind, the drift effect naturally appears on the HUD: The synthetic (real) runway
appears on the HUD in relation to the drift angle. For example, if there is crosswind that comes
from the right side, the synthetic runway appears on the left of the HUD, when the aircraft is on the
centerline.
DECLUTTER MODES
Applicable to: ALL
The symbols provided on the HUD enable the PF to fly intermediate and final approaches using only
the HUD. As a result, the HUD provides a full set of symbols (e.g. speed, altitude scales, FMA, etc)
so that the flight crew can control the aircraft during these phases.
However, when the aircraft approaches the terrain or the runway, it is important to improve the PF’s
view of the external parameters through the HUD.
For this purpose, the HUD provides a declutter mode, with two levels:
‐ Declutter mode level 1 enables the flight crew to remove the synthetic runway, the approach axis,
and the touchdown point or the FLS anchor point from the HUD
Declutter mode level 1 is recommended for the visual acquisition of the real runway, after
IMC/VMC transition.
‐ For stabilized approaches in VMC, declutter mode level 2 enables the flight crew to focus on
external parameters, whilst using only basic trajectory, speed and altitude information on the
HUD, .
Declutter 2
CROSSWIND MODE
Applicable to: ALL
The aim of the crosswind mode is to clear the lateral borders of the field of view, so that the flight
crew can fly the FPV without interfering with the speed and altitude scales. As a result, these scales
are reduced in size on the HUD.
Crosswind Mode
The HUD helps the PF to perform accurate landings, due to the fact that the stabilization of the final
descent path is more accurate, as the aircraft approaches the touchdown point.
The flight crew performs a conventional flare when using the HUD for landing: The flight crew uses
external parameters, and looks through the HUD.
The HUD does not provide flare guidance. However, the HUD displays arrows that temporarily pulse
on the FPV, as “flare reminders”.
Flare Reminder
GENERAL
Applicable to: ALL
The On board Information System (OIS) provides several applications to the flight crew, which are
used from flight preparation to flight closure.
The use of this new product introduces some changes in the pilot task organization.
This chapter reviews some general and per flight phase recommendations, to optimize the use of the
OIS.
OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Applicable to: ALL
As a general rule, when the sliding table is deployed but the OIS applications are not used, the flight
crew may use the cover to avoid inadvertent entries on the OIS keyboard.
The OIS is designed to provide the flight crew with operational information only, and must be
considered as such.
The OIS should be used wisely:
‐ When leaving the gate, the flight crew should avoid focusing on it
‐ In flight, the use of the Onbard Information Terminal ( OIT ) is restricted to the Pilot
Monitoring ( PM ). The X-OIS function can be used to share information as required ( Refer
to FCOM/DSC-46-20-30 X-OIS Function ). If required, the task sharing will be temporarily
redistributed, in order to crosscheck OIS applications results.
When the OIS applications have been opened, it is recommended not to close the applications, in
order:
‐ To be able to rapidly manage non-expected events
‐ To keep already computed data for FLT OPS side applications.
Furthermore, keeping applications open does not increase computation times.
FLT FOLDER
The FLT FOLDER application enables the flight crew to consult the Electronic Flight Folder
(EFF).
An EFF contains all the necessary data for flight preparation:
‐ Weather information
‐ NOTAMs
‐ Predicted load sheet
‐ Operational and ATC flight plans
‐ Specific airline data.
The flight crew can load the EFF via a USB key or via communication means (gatelink).
One flight crewmember uses the UTILITIES/LOAD BOX function to load the EFF on board.
Then, both flight crewmembers import the EFF, in the FLT FOLDER application.
At this stage, the flight crew will concentrate on the flight preparation itself and should not be
tempted to carry out others tasks. The EFF enables the flight crew to confirm the feasibility of
the flight. The flight crew starts to initialize the FMS, at the end of the EFF study only,
Both flight crewmembers must be in the loop. The X-OIS function may be used to enable the
flight crew to prepare the flight together. Use the CHECK function while going through the
different documents of the EFF.
E-LOGBOOK
The flight crew consults the e-Logbook before using any aircraft system.
If a failure occurs after the flight crew accepted the aircraft, the flight must be closed in the
e-Logbook before any maintenance actions.
In the case of deferred items, the flight crew must check the dispatch conditions in the MEL.
Only the MEL on the FLT OPS side must be used as reference for the flight crew.
FMS/OIS PRE-INITIALIZATION
The FMS/OIS pre-initialization will be made through the FMS INIT page to take maximum
advantage of the contextualization throughout the applications, thus minimize flight crew entries
errors.
FMS/OIS pre-initialization and FLT OPS STS page should be associated.
COCKPIT PREPARATION
NAV CHARTS
One flight crewmember prepares the takeoff airport clip. Then, the other flight crewmember may
import it, by using the IMPORT FROM OFFSIDE function, in the navigation charts application.
The flight crew should note that:
‐ The PREVIEW function is designed to assess the nature of information on the selected page.
It is not designed to read the content
‐ The flight crew should prepare the clip strictly in the order that they plan to use the charts: the
take off clip will cover from taxi to immediate turn back to departure airport in case of engine
failure
‐ Charts that are presented in both portrait and landscape view need to be set up properly in
advance
‐ If a chart is zoomed when preparing the clip, the zoom is kept. If the flight crew wishes to
focus on several parts of the chart, e.g. vertical profile of the final approach and go-around
flight path, the flight crew should use the DUPLICATE function. This function enables to copy
the same charts several times in the clip, and to have each copy focused on different parts
of the chart, so that with one single input the flight crewmember is able to navigate within the
chart
‐ The chart database crosscheck does not relieve the flight crew from checking date and
effectivity on the chart itself.
The keyboard offers many abilities to navigate within the chart application and may be used
during taxi out, but must be stored prior to takeoff. At that time, only the ACD must be used. The
ACD enables the flight crew to select the chart to display from the charts clip.
LOADSHEET
In all cases:
‐ The flight crew uses the LOADSHEET application when the ECAM GWCG and the loadsheet
TOCG are different. Refer to FCOM/PRO-NOR-SOP-70-A Before Start Clearance_LOAD
AND TRIM SHEET
‐ The final loadsheet is signed (by clicking on the SIGN button), and exported (by clicking
on the EXPORT button). The flight crew uses the EXPORT BOX, to send a copy of the
loadsheet to the ground, via wireless or via a USB key
‐ A second click on the SIGN button unsigns the document. There is no flight crew attention
getter if an unsigned document is exported.
T.O. PERF
When the final take off performance computation is launched with real figures, crosschecked
and validated, the result can be stored in the EFF .
If the take off speeds are different from the initial take off performance computation, the flight
crew must re-enter them in the FMS , and crosscheck.
IN FLIGHT
LDG PERF
For information about the use of the LDG PERF application in flight, Refer to AO-10 Landing
Computation.
When using the LDG PERF application:
‐ The PM performs the landing computation
‐ The PF checks the inputs and the result, using the X-OIS function.
The flight crew should note that:
‐ They enter first the runway, even if this window is not located on the top left of the screen
‐ They enter the ZFCG from the loadsheet as aircraft CG.
In the case of diversion, there is no requirement for landing distance margin. However, the
airline may impose its own margin, and the airline administrator can introduce it in the LDG
PERF application. The flight crew is not aware of the administrator margin. The margin
mentioned in the LDG PERF application is an extra margin, which is to be added to the
administrator margin, if any.
OPS LIBRARY
If time permits, the OPS LIBRARY (FCOM and MEL) consultation is recommended in-flight,
following a failure, in order to get some additional information for flight crew situation
assessment, before flight crew decision.
NAV CHARTS
As for take off preparation, the destination airport clip will be prepared from STAR to taxi-in and
eventually alternate airport if required.
Any landing runway change should be anticipated. The arrival briefing will be the right time to
validate the charts clip.
Below 1 000 ft AGL, the sliding table must be stowed, the flight crew uses the ACD. The ACD
enables the flight crew to select the chart to display from the charts clip.
In the case of a laptop freezes, a hard shutdown is not necessary. The flight crew switches off then
on the laptop to recover the applications ( Refer to FCOM/PRO-ABN-ECAM-10-46-50 MISC OIS
FAULT ).
The flight crew should avoid to perform a laptop hard shutdown, because:
‐ After a laptop hard shutdown, the applications on the laptop may not restart
‐ If the flight crewmember performs a hard shutdown while data loading is in progress from
the loadbox of the laptop, the data loading stops. After the laptop is restarted, if the flight
crewmember tries to perform the same data loading, the data loading may not work. In this
case, the flight crew must contact the maintenance.