Methodology For HPP1 Process Technology (Report1)

The HPP1 (Hydrogen production plant ) is based on JM LCH (Low Carbon Hydrogen)
technology, consisting Gas Heated Reformer (GHR) and Autothermal Reformer (ATR)
units. The plant is designed to produce 100 kNm3 /hr of hydrogen at a purity of 99.9%
from natural gas or a mixture of natural gas and refinery off gas. The purpose of this
document is to present JM technology process selection criteria over other proven
technology & demonstrate principal of inherent safety have been applied to the design.
Process Technology selection criteria
1. Advantage in CO2 Capture:

Hydrogen production comprising SMR (Steam Methane Reforming) technology coupled
with CCS(Carbon Capture system) has a CO2-containing stream which is at low partial
pressure. Achieving acceptable levels of capture is thus expensive and energy intensive.
By contrast, the JM LCH HPP technology, comprising a GHR coupled with an oxygen
blown ATR, has a single process stream with a high partial pressure of CO2. This makes
it more cost-effective and efficient to deliver a high CO 2 capture rate (of around 97%).
The combination of a GHR and ATR offers increased gas process efficiency compared to
SMR, and the production of hydrogen at pressure results in reduced compression costs.
2. Better Efficiency:
The GHR/ATR coupled with CCS technology is inherently more efficient than the
counterfactual (SMR/ CCS), as the heat required for the reforming reactions is not
provided by external heat, as is the case in an SMR. Thermal efficiency of GHR/ATR
technology is higher as compared to that of SMR and hence the Feed requirement is
less for same Hydrogen production. This helps in reduction of Hydrocarbons handling /
processing.
3. Mitigation of Impact of Runaway Reaction:
Olefin Hydrogenation is an exothermic reaction which can take place over the
hydrodesulphurization catalyst bed. Olefins, mainly ethylene and propylene, are present
in the FCC (fluidized catalytic cracking )Off gas feed. During operation with ROG
(Refinery off gas ) feeds, purified feed gas is recycled back to the purification section
inlet in order to dilute the feed and limit the resulting temperature rise. If this recycle flow
were to be lost, the plant is equipped with trips to prevent temperatures exceeding
design temperatures. This Safety feature results in Safe Operation of Plant.
The water-gas shift reaction that occurs in the ITS(Isothermal Shift Reactor ) is also
exothermic. The impact of exothermicity is reduced by circulating BFW externally on the
ITS to limit the temperature rise and hence avoiding exceeding the design temperature.
4. The release of toxic carbon monoxide gas is avoided by providing the relevant
equipment (Vessels) with liquid seal levels.
5. The risk of carbon formation within the LCH technology is eliminated by the selection of
a low inlet temperature of the purification stage of the plant. This process reduced cost
catalyst .
6. Liquid Effluent release to Environment is avoided by recycling of the process effluent to
Membrane Biological Reactor (MBR) and reutilizing the Treated Effluent Stream.
7. The HPP condensate, together with rainwater harvested via the open drains system, will
be treated in the MBR then mixed with clarified water and subsequently filtered in the
Dual Media Filtration Plant. The only waste water stream from the HPP will be the brine
from the Water Demineralization Plant which is routed to existing Effluent Systems in
Stanlow Refinery. Generated Sludge from Water Treatment System is also routed to
existing Effluent Systems in Stanlow Refinery and also removed through external
Tankers. This system avoids any contamination of environment.
Inherent safety in Design
1. The HPP FEED design includes for a fire water protection system (firewater system, has
been designed within the HPP1). The design of the systems has been based on
corresponding National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) standards. The firewater demand
calculations are based on potential hazardous scenarios involving fire; the scenario with
the largest fire demand is selected as the design case. The firewater storage tank size is
defined by the highest demand
2. The following critical trips are considered for safety of plant :TRIP FEED FIRED
HEATER, CLOSE NATURAL GAS FEED SUPPLY AT BATTERY LIMIT, CLOSE
REFINERY OFF GAS FEED SUPPLY AT BATTERY LIMIT, CLOSE HYDROGEN
RECYCLE FLOW TO FRONT END, CLOSE SATURATOR (V-103) FEED FLOW
CONTROL VALVE, CLOSE SATURATOR (V-103) OVERHEADS FLOW TO GHR,
CLOSE OXYGEN FLOW TO ATR, CLOSE ISOTHERMAL SHIFT CONVERTER (V-106)
INLET LINE, CLOSE ISOTHERMAL SHIFT CONVERTER (V-106) OUTLET LINE,
CLOSE MP STEAM FROM ITS STEAM DRUM (V-111) TO PROCESS, TRIP STEAM
BOILER (B-101), CLOSE FUEL FLOW TO STEAM BOILER (B-101) BURNERS, TRIP
H2 COMPRESSOR (C-102A/B), TRIP CO2 COMPRESSOR (C-103), TRIP PSA
SEPARATION UNIT (U-101).
The following ESD consider for plant emergency in design.
EAA-XV-0005/6-CLOSE NATURAL GAS FEED SUPPLY AT BATTERY LIMIT
EAA-XV-0007/8-CLOSE REFINERY OFF GAS FEED SUPPLY AT BATTERY LIMIT
AAD-XV-0005/6-CLOSE HYDROGEN RECYCLE FLOW TO FRONT END
EFA-XV-0001/2-CLOSE FUEL FLOW TO FEED FIRED HEATER (F-101)
AAC-XV-0001 -CLOSE REDUCTION HYDROGEN TO CO2 COMPRESSOR C-103
EAA-XV-0004-OPEN PURIFED FEED FLOW TO FLARE
EBA-XV-0008-OPEN SATURATOR (V-103) OVERHEADS VENT TO FLARE
EBA-XV-0004 -CLOSE SATURATOR (V-103) OVERHEADS FLOW TO GHR
EBA-XV-0005-OPEN SATURATOR (V-103) OVERHEADS VENT TO FLARE
EBA-XV-0007-CLOSE SATURATOR (V-103) BLOWDOWN
AAE-XV-0004-OPEN HP NITROGEN TO PROCESS VENT TO ATM
AAE-XV-0003-CLOSE HP NITROGEN TO SATURATOR (V-103)
EDA-XV-0005-CLOSE PROCESS CONDENSATE FLOW TO SATURATOR (V-103)
AAG-XV-0001-CLOSE OXYGEN FLOW TO ATR (V-105)
ECA-XV-0001-OPEN TO VENT OXYGEN TO SAFE LOCATION
ECA-XV-0002/4-CLOSE OXYGEN FLOW TO ATR (V-105)
ECA-XV-0003/4-OPEN TO VENT OXYGEN TO SAFE LOCATION
AAE-XV-0002-OPEN HP NITROGEN TO OXYGEN VENT TO ATM
AAE-XV-0001-CLOSE HP NITROGEN TO OXYGEN PURGE
ECA-HV-0003-CLOSE ISOTHERMAL SHIFT CONVERTER (V-106)
ECA-XV-0005-OPEN ISOTHERMAL SHIFT CONVERTER (V-106) INLET LINE TO
FLARE
EDA-XV-0003-CLOSE MP STEAM FROM ITS STEAM DRUM (V-111) TO PROCESS
EDA-XV-0002-OPEN SYNGAS TO FLARE
EHA-XV-0001/4-CLOSE PROCESS CONDENSATE TO CONDENSATE COOLER (E-
113)
AAD-XV-0009/10-CLOSE FUEL FLOW TO STEAM BOILER (B-101) BURNERS
AAD-XV-0007-CLOSE SYNGAS TO PSA SEPARATION UNIT (U-101)
AAD-XV-0008-CLOSE TAILGAS FROM PSA SEPRATION UNIT
AAD-XV-0014-OPEN NATURAL GAS TO FLARE HEADER
EDA-XV-0005- CLOSE NITROGEN CIRUCLATION TO CO2 COMPRESSOR (C-103)
These trips avoid any loss of containment and prevents injury to Personnel and damage
to assets.
3. The following critical equipment PSV (pressure safety valve )are considered for
plant safety in design
EAA-PSV-0001 V-101 HYDRODESULPHURISATION VESSEL PSV
EAA-PSV-0002/3 V-102A/B DESULPHURISATION VESSEL PSV
EAA-PSV-0004 ULTRAPURIFICATION VESSEL PSV
EBA-PSV-0001 V103 SATURATOR PSV
EDA-PSV-0002/3 ITS STEAM DRUM PSV
EDA-PSV-0004 FIRST KNOCKOUT POT PSV
EDA-PSE-0004A E114 DEMIN WATER HEATER PSE
BAB-PSV-0001 DEMIN WATER PUMP PSV
EDA-PSV-0005 SECOND KNOCKOUT POT PSV
EHA-PSV-0001 CONDENSATE DRUM PSV
EGA-PSV-001/2 MP STEAM DRUM PSV
AAD-PSV-0001/2 C—102A/B H2 COMPRESSOR PSV
AAH-PSV-0001 CO2 COMPRESSORC-103 PSV
EGA-PSV-0003 DEARTOR V-113 PSV
ECA-PSV-0003 PREREFORMER V-114 PSV
EEA-PSV-0005 PURIFICATION RGC PSV
These ESD (Emergency Shutdown Device ) avoid any loss of containment and prevents
injury to Personnel and damage to assets.

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The HPP1 (Hydrogen production plant ) is based on JM LCH (Low Carbon Hydrogen)

Process Technology selection criteria

1. Advantage in CO2 Capture:

Inherent safety in Design

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