Ada 115665

AFFDL-TR-79-3118
Volume III
DURABILITY METHODS DEVELOPMENT

VOLUME III
STRUCTURAL DURABILITY SURVEY:
STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENT
B. J. PENDLEY
S. P. HENSLEE
S. D. MANNING
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION
STRUCTURAL AND DESIGN DEPARTMENT
FORT WORTH DIVISION
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
SEPTEMBER 1979
TECHNICAL REPORT AFFDL-TR-79-3118, VOL. III
Final Report for Period April 1978 - June 1979
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
AIR FORCE FLIGHT DYNAMICS LABORATORY

AIR FORCE WRIGHT AERONAUTICAL LABORATORIES
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO 45433
Best Available Copy
-oo o W133o
NOTICE
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it will be available to the general public, including foreign nations.
This technical rep rt has been reviewed and is approved for publication.
Jp S L. RUDD DAVEY L. SMITH

P jct Engineer Structural Integrity Branch
Structures & Dynamics Division
FOR THE COMMANDER
RALPH L. KUSTER Jr., Colonel, USAF

Chief, Structures & Dynamics Division
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BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
I. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
AFFDL-TR-79-3118, Vol. III

4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
DURABILITY METHODS DEVELOPMENT Final Technical Report

VOLUME III - STRUCTURAL DURABILITY SURVEY: Anril 1Q7R - T,,nP 19(79
6. P'ERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENTZM-657-III
7. AUTHOR(s) 8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(-)
B. J. Pendley
S. P. Henslee F33615-77-C-3123
S. D. Manning
1,9.PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM EL.EMENT. PROJECT, TASK
General Dynamics Corp. AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Fort Worth Division, P.O. Box 748 24010118

Fort Worth, Texas 76101
1i. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE
Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (FIBE) September 1979
Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories 13. NUMBER OF PAGES
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Oh 45433 188

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office) IS. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
UNCLASSIFIED
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Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered In Block 20, it different from Report)
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side it necessary and Identify by block number)
Attack aircraft, air logistic centers, bomber aircraft, durability

analysis, fighter aircraft, material degradation, state-of-the-art
survey, structures, structural degradation, trainer aircraft,
initial quality, frequency of occurrance.
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and Identify by block number)
A structural state-of-the-art assessment was conducted to evaluate the
durability of previous and existing aircraft structures. The assessment
includes data obtained from literature, previous and current programs, and
visits to all Air Force Air Logistics Centers. Results for each major Air
Force aircraft type are summarized showing trends in structural and
material degradation. The most frequently occurring in-service structural
problems, in order of occurrence, were found to be cracking, corrosion and
fnqCtc4npr-rP1lvt-ts p-hlPm..
DD 1 JA73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETF UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)
FOREWORD
This program is conducted by General Dynamics, Fort

Worth Division with George Washington University (Dr. J. N.
Yang) and Modern Analysis Inc. (Dr. M. Shinozuka) as
associate investigators. This program is being conducted
in three phases with a total duration of 50 months.
This report was prepared under Air Force Contract
F33615-77-C-3123, "Durability Methods Development". The
program is sponsored by the Air Force Flight Dynamics
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, with
James L. Rudd as the Air Force Project Engineer. Dr. B.G.W.
Yee of the General Dynamics' Materials Research Laboratory is
the Program Manager and Dr. S. D. Manning is the Principal
Investigator. This is Phase I of a three phase program.
This report (Volume III) is one of the five volumes

that documents the Phase I work. The other Phase I reports
are:
Volume I - Phase I Summary

Volume II - Durability Analysis: State-of-the-
Art Assessment
Volume IV - Initial Quality Representation
Volume V - Durability Analysis Methodology
Development
This report is published only for the exchange

and stimulation of ideas. As such, the views expressed
herein are not necessarily those of the United States
Air Force or Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
I INTRODUCTION 1
II STRUCTURAL STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENT 3
2.1 Structural S.O.A. Assessment Approach 3
2.1.1 Structural S.O.A. Assessment

Objectives 3
2.1.2 Forms for Documentation of Struc-
tural and/or Material Degradation 3
2.2 Data Search and Acquisition 6
2.2.1 Air Logistic Center Visits 7

2.2.2 Full Scale Test Programs 7
2.2.3 Component/Element Test Programs 7
2.2.4 Other 7
2.2.5 Aircraft Types Surveyed 8
III DATA RESULTS 13
3.1 Fighter Aircraft 13
3.1.1 F-100 Series 13

3.1.2 F-104 Series 14
3.1.3 F-105 Series 15
3.1.4 F/RF-101 Aircraft 17
3.1.5 F-106 Series 17
3.1.6 F-4 Series 18
3.1.7 F-l1l Series 24
3.1.8 F-15 Series 51
3.1.9 F-16 Series 57
3.2 Trainer Aircraft 64
3.2.1 T-37 Series 64

3.2.2 T-38 Aircraft 65
3.2.3 T-39 Series 67
3.3 Bomber Aircraft 79
3.3.1 B-52 Series 79
V
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
SECTION PAGE
3.3.2 FB-111A Fighter/Bomber 91

3.3.3 F-I11C Fighter/Bomber 93
3.4 Cargo/Transport Aircraft 103
3.4.1 C-130 Series 103

3.4.2 C-141A Aircraft 110
3.4.3 KC-135 Aircraft 116
3.4.4 C-5A Aircraft 136
3.5 Attack Aircraft 147
3.5.1 A-10 Aircraft 147

3.5.2 A-7D Aircraft 155
IV OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 157
APPENDIX A: Durability Methods Development

Structural Assessment Results 171
APPENDIX B: T-38 Teardown Inspection Results 175
REFERENCES 187
vi
LIST OF. ILLUSTRATIONS
NUMBER PAGE
1 Structural State-of-the-Art Assessment Program

Plan 4
2 Durability Survey Outline 5
3 Durability Survey Sources 9
4 Air Logistic Centers Visited 10
5 Aircraft Types Surveyed 11
6 F-4 Significant Test Failures 21
7 F-4 Significant Service Failures 22
8 F-4 Significant Service Failures (Stress Corrosion) 23
9 F-1l1A (A-4) Fuselage Test Program Summary 36
10 F-l11A (FW #1) Wing Carry-Through Box Component

Test Results 37
11 F-l11A (FW #2) Wing Carry-Through Box Component

Test Results 38
12 F-l1A (A-4) Vertical Tail Component Test Results 39
13 F-111A (A-4) L/H Wing Test Program Results 40
14 ECP 10212 Wing Test Results 41
15 F-16 Structural Arrangement and Materials 58
16 F-16 Durability Airframe Test Results For 1st 8000-

Hour Life 59
17 F-16 Durability Test Results at 8000 Hours Including

8000-Hour Update 60
18 Modifications to Test Article - 8000 Hours 61
vii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
NUMBER PAGE
19 F-16 Durability Airframe Test Results for 2nd 8000-Hour

Life 62
20 F-16 Durability Test Results During 2nd 8000-Hour Life

(Schematic) 63
21 T-39A Analytical Condition Inspection (3 Aircraft Surveyed) 69
22 ACI Failure Areas T-39A S/N 60-3490 PACAF/TAN SON NHUT 70
23 ACI Failure Areas T-39A S/N 60-3508 HQC/ANDREWS AFB 71
24 Histogram of Wing Crack Sizes (Source: T-39D S.L.E.P.

Wing Teardown Report NA-77-595-I) 73
25 Histogram of Fuselage Crack Sizes (Source: NA-265-40

Fuselage Teardown Report NA77-595-2) 74
26 Histoaram of Vertical Stabilizer Crack Sizes (Source:
NA-265-40 Fuselaqe Teardown Report NA77-595-2) 75
27 T-39A Left Wing Crack Distribution - Service & Test 77
28 T-39A Right Wing Crack Distribution - Service & Test 78
29 B-52 ECP 1581 89
30 FB-111 Airframe Test Program Summary 92
31 C-130 Fuselage Fatigue Sensitive Areas 105
32 C-130 Center Wing Fatigue Sensitive Areas 106
viii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (CONTINUED)
NUMBER PAGE
33 C-130 Outer Wing Fatigue Sensitive Areas 107
34 Corrosion Development Around Fasteners i1
35 Crack in Stiffener At Joggle 112
36 C-141A Pylon Attachment Fitting Corrosion 114
37 KC-135 Wing Lower Surface Fatigue Summary 118
38 C/KC-135, ECP 405 Modification 126
39 C/KC-135, ECP 405 Configuration Comparison 127
40 C/KC-135 Problem Areas 128
41 C/KC-135 Fleet Wing Fatigue Crack Locations 131
42 C/KC-135 Fleet Wing Fatigue Cracks vs Calendar

Year 132
43 C-5A Wing Upper Surface Control Points 138
44 C-5A Wing Lower Surface Control Points 139
45 C-5A Aircraft Structural Control Points (Excluding

Wing) 140
46 C-5A ACI Summary For CY 1976 (Major Incidents) 142
47 C-5A ACI Summary For CY 1976 (Minor Incidents) 143
48 C-5A ACI Summary For FY 1977 144
49 C-5A ACI Summary For FY 1977 (Major Incidents) 145
50 C-5A ACI Summary For FY 1977 (Minor Incidents) 146
ix
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (CONTINUED)
NUMBER PAGE
51 T-39A Analytical Condition Inspection (3 Air-

craft Surveyed) 159
52 F-4C/D/E and RF-4C Analytical Condition Inspection

(44 Aircraft Surveyed) 160
53 F/FB-IIlA Airframe Analytical Condition Inspection 161
54 F-111C Analytical Condition Inspection (4 Air-

craft Surveyed) 162
55 C-5A Analytical Condition Inspection Cumulative
Occurrences for CY 76 and CY 77 163
56 F-15A Analytical Condition Inspection 164
57 Average Cumulative Distribution by Percentage of

Incidents from ACI for T-39A, F-4C/D/E, RF-4C,
F-Ill, F-IIIC, and C-5A Systems 165
x
LIST OF TABLES
NUMBER PAGE
1 F/FB-lll Airframe Structural Corrosion Summary

(CY 1975) 42
2 CY 76 ACI - F-Ill Airframe-Preliminary Review 43
3 Corrosion Summary - Airframe Structure - CY 76 - 48

F-I1 ACI
4 Honeycomb Structure Damage Summary - CY 76 -

F-Ill ACI 50
5 Defects Found During the ACI of F-15A, 73-0085 56
6 T-39A Analytical Condition Inspection Results 68
7 F-IIIC Analytical Condition Inspection (A-8-135

Wings) 94
8 F-IIIC ACI Summary (Aircraft No. A8-127) 95
9 F-I1C ACI Summary (Aircraft No. A8-130) 98
10 F-IIIC ACI Summary (Aircraft No. A8-132) 99
11 F-1I1C ACI Summary (Aircraft No. A8-133) 100
12 F-1I1C ACI Summary (4 Aircraft) 102
13 C-130 Fatigue Test Summary 104
14 C-130 Service Failures 108
15 Total Wing Lower Surface Cracks; 1972 Cyclic Test

Teardown 119
16 KC-135 Significant Fleet Cracks 121
17 KC-135 Comparison of Teardown Crack Sizes To

Fleet Crack Sizes 125
xi
LIST OF TABLES (Continued)
NUMBER PAGE
18 KC-135 Known Structural Problem Areas 129
19 Summary of Fatigue Damage Found in Wing

Sections 134
20 Summary of Fatigue Damage Found in Fuselage

and Empennage Sections 135
21 C-5A Summary of Fleet Service Cracking 141
22 Percent Occurrences for ACI Recorded Incidents 168
B-1 Summary of Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection,

Wing Assembly S/N 63-8202 178
B-2 Summary of Wing Skin Hole Inspection, Wing

Assembly S/N 83-8202 178

B-4 Summary of Flourescent Penetrant Inspection,

Wing Assembly S/N 62-3618 183

B-6 Summary of Fractographic Inspection 186
xii
S U M MA R Y
The objective of the Durability Methods Development

program is to develop and verify a durability analysis
methodology for satisfying the Air Force's durability design
requirements for metallic airframes. A structural state-of-
the-art (S.O.A.) assessment was initially performed to deter-
mine the most frequently occurring forms of structural dura-
bility degradation for in-service Air Force aircraft. This
assessment was essential to assure the durability Analysis
Methodology developed would apply to the most prevalent form
of structural durability degradation observed for in-service
aircraft. This Volume (III) documents the results of a com-
prehensive structural degradation survey of Air Force air-
craft.
The structural S.O.A. assessment was performed in three

stages: data acquisition, data analysis and documentation.
The following Air Force Air Logistic Centers (ALC) were
visited to gather in-service information at the maintenance
depot level:
o San Antonio ALC Kelly AFB, Texas

o Oklahoma City ALC Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
o Warner - Robins ALC Robins AFB, Georgia
o Sacramento ALC McClellan AFB, California
o Ogden ALC Hill AFB, Utah
Data gathered at these ALC's included written reports,

i.e., Aircraft Structural Integrity Plans (ASIP), Analytical
Condition inspection (ACI), fatigue test teardown results,
etc., and direct contactswith ALC personnel. Valuable infor-
mation was also obtained from various aircraft company reports
and General Dynamics, Fort Worth Division data.
The following aircraft systems were included in the

structural survey:
o Fighter Aircraft
F-100
F-104
F-105
F/RF-100
F-106
F-4C/D/E
F-Ill
F-15
F-16
xiii
o Trainer Aircraft
T-37B/C
T-38
T-39
o Bomber Aircraft
B-52
FB-l1l
F-111C
o Cargo/Transport
C-130
C-141A
KC-135
C-5A
o Attack Aircraft
A-7
A-10
Results of these surveys are reported herein in various forms.
The most frequently occurring in-service structural

problems, in order of occurrence, were found to be cracking,
corrosion and fastener-related problems. A uniform format
is needed for documenting durability-related problems at the
Air Logistics Centers. Data should be compiled in useful
formats for storage and retrieval and should be periodically
updated.
xiv
SECTION I
I N T R O DU C T I 0 N
The durability State-of-the-art assessment task is the initial

effort in the Durability Methods Development Program for which the
overall objective is to establish the durability procedures and
design techniques necessary to minimize fatigue cracking and/or
other structural material degradation in advanced metallic aircraft
structures.
The durability state-of-the-art assessment (S.O.A.) task de-

fined by this program is a two-fold task, namely, to conduct:
1. Structural State-of-the-Art Assessment
2. Analytical State-of-the-Art Assessment
This report presents the results of the structural state-of-

the-art assessment. The analytical effort is presented in
Reference 1
I
SECTION II
S T R U CT U R A L S T A T E -0 F - T H E - A R T
ASSES SMENT
2.1 STRUCTURAL S.O.A. ASSESSMENT APPROACH
The overall S.O.A. assessment approach was to conduct an

extensive assessment of the durability of previous and existing
aircraft structures. This assessment includes information obtained
from literature surveys, previous and current programs, contractor
and subcontractor sources,and personal visits to the five Air Force
Air Logistic Centers.
The overall program plan for the structural S.O.A. assessment

is shown in Figure 1.
2.1.1 Structural S.O.A. Assessment Objectives
The primary objective of the structural assessments as detailed

in Appendix A, "Durability Methods DeveloDment Structural Assess-
ment Results", was to determine the following:
1. Types of aircraft structure considered
2. Forms of structural and/or material degradation
3. Aircraft location
4. Cracking failure description
5. Probable flaw type/cause other than fatigue or

corrosion
2.1.2 Forms for Documentation of Structural and/or Material

Degradation
During the early planning of the structural assessment task,

an idealized form was developed that would encompass the various
forms of structural and/or material degradation experienced on
aircraft structures (see Figure 2). The primary purpose of
the form was to provide an in-depth insight into the different
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forms of durability which occur on aircraft structure, their fre-
quency of occurrence and severity. The form also provided for an
assessment of the initial quality, original design practices
applied, types of manufacturing flaws/defects present or induced,
cause and criticality of such flaws, etc. This form,when completed,
could in itself reveal the types of damage which occur in aircraft
structures, the relationships between these types of damage and.
the initial quality of the structures, and the parameters which
contribute to the initial quality of the structures.
During the Air Logistic Center visits,it became apparent very
early that any attempt to obtain all the in-depth information de-
sired by the assessment form was fruitless. Rationale for this
conclusion was obvious; namely,
1. No systematic form of record keeping for such data

exists.
2. No prior requirement for documenting these types of data.
3. Concern more for repair, fix, mod rather than cause-

effect relationship
4. Budget-manpower restraints.
Although the structural S.O.A. assessment detail form was

abandoned for the ALC visits, a significant durability data base
was obtained for the various aircraft types from the Air Logistic
Centers. These data are summarized and presented in Section III
2.2 DATA SEARCH AND ACQUISITION
The data search and acquisition for the structural assess-

ment task was almost unlimited as shown in Figure 4. Perhaps
the most significant source for data was the visits to
all five Air Force Air Logistic Centers. Data obtained from
these centers provided a significant data base for the structural
S.O.A. assessment task. These data along with those from other
sources are presented in Section IV of this report.
Another data source used in this task was the literature

survey. Data obtained via this method include symposium papers,
periodicals, reports, etc. Still another very significant data
source was the abundance of in-house data generated from both pre-
vious and current component/element test and full scale test pro-
grams such as those listed in Figure 3 . Other data sources in-
clude results from teardown inspections,analytical condition
inspections, and miscellaneous CRAD and IRAD programs.
6
2.2.1 Air Logistic Center Visits
Probably the most significant input to the structural S.O.A.

assessment task was the first-hand information gathered from the
Air Force Air Logistics Centers. During this task visits were
conducted to each of the five ALCs with a repeat visit to San
Antonio. A list of the centers visited, dates, and the aircraft
for which durability data were obtained is shown in Figure 4.
Data gathered from the ALCs for the Task I Structural S.O.A.
assessment are discussed and presented in Section III.
2.2.2 Full Scale Test Programs
Durability full scale test program results were obtained

during Task I for practically every airframe type surveyed. These
include fighters, bombers, trainers and cargo/transports. These
data are discussed and presented in Section iII.
2.2.3 Component Element Test Programs
Durability test results from various component/element tests

were also included in the -structural S.O.A. assessment task. Among
the programs discussed and presented in Section III are the follow-
ing:
"o F-l11A (FW #1) Wing Carry-Thru Box Component

"o F-1lIA (FW #2) Wing Carry-Thru Box Component
"o F-1lIA (A-4) Vertical Tail Component
"o F-l11A (A-4) L/H Wing Test Component
"o ECP 10212 - F-1lIA Wing Test Component
"o AMAVS - Advanced Metallic Air Vehicle Structures Test
"o ECP 613 -F-4B Wing Test Component
"o Fastener Hole Quality
"o Other
2.2.4 Other
Another source from which durability data was obtained for

Task I was inspection programs. These data include results from
Analytical Condition Inspections (ACI), Special Inspections,Periodic
Depot Maintenance (PDM) Inspections, and Teardown Inspections.
CRAD and IRAD programs are among the "Other" data surveyed
during Task I. These data are also discussed and presented in
Section III.
7
2.2.5 Aircraft Types Surveyed
An attempt was made to survey as many Air Force type aircraft

as possible for the Task I assessment and yet stay within the pro-
gram schedule and budget. The source of durability data that could
be gathered for all types of aircraft operating under the many usage
and environment criteria is almost unlimited and certainly beyond
the scope of this task. However, the survey conducted did include
a very good representation of the Air Force fleet which includes
fighters, bombers, trainers, cargo/transports,reconnaissance and
attack aircraft. A summary of the aircraft surveyed for which
data are presented in Section III is shown in Figure 5.
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S E C T I 0 N III
DATA RESULTS
3.1 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
3.1.1 F-100 Series
The F-100A is a single-place, low-wing air superiority

fighter with level flight capability in excess of Mach 1.3.
The F-100C represents an air superiority fighter incorporating

special provisions for fighter-bomber capabilities.
The F-100D aircraft, essentially similar to the C model, is

equipped with autopilot and radar.
The F-10OF has a two-place tandem cockpit which gives it trainer

as well as fighter and fighter/bomber capability.
Durability problems experienced with this aircraft are:
"o WING CENTER SECTION LOWER SKIN
- Fatigue cracks in 5/16" dia. hole at mid-chord
- Numerous fatigue cracks at fastener holes revealed

by fleet inspection.
"o WING OUTER PANEL LOWER SKIN
- Fatigue cracking in fastener holes during test.
- Two service crashes in same area.
- Added doubler as interim fix for fleet mod.
- T-Bird fillet radius cracks @ WS 33.8
"o WING OUTER PANEL TO WING CENTER SECTION JOINT FATIGUE
- Fatigue in outboard row of bolt holes.
13
o WING ROOT RIB
- Stress corrosion caused by press-fit bushings
- Stress corrosion in wing spar cap sealant grooves.
o INDUCED FATIGUE IN PRIMARY STRUCTURAL MEMBERS CAUSED

BY FASTENER INSTALLATION
- Deutsch Fastener Installation
- Rozan Insert Installation
3.1.2 F-104 Series
There are five basic models of the F-104 aircraft from which
nineteen different configurations are derived.
The F-104A is a single-place, supersonic type fighter aircraft

with a principal mission of interception and destruction of enemy
aircraft.
The F-104B is a two place, supersonic fighter aircraft. Its

principal mission is interception and destruction of enemy air-
craft and to serve as a proficiency and transitional trainer.
The F-104C is a single-place supersonic-type interceptor for

aircraft. Its principal mission is the interception and destruc-
tion of enemy airborne weapons during day or night.
The F-104D is a two-place, supersonic-type aircraft. Its

principal missions are interception and destruction of hostile
aircraft under "air superiority fighter conditions" and to serve
as a proficiency and transitional trainer.
The F/RF-104G is a single place, supersonic-type aircraft.

Its missions are all-weather delivery of tactical weapons, all-
weather interception and destruction of enemy aircraft and photo
reconnaissance.
The more significant durability problems encountered with

this aircraft are:
o LOWER WING ATTACH FITTINGS NOS. 1 & 5
- Fatigue cracking in aft fastener hole -

7079-T6 and 7075-T6 materials
14
"o LOWER WING SKIN @ WS 80.7 AILERON SERVO ACCESS
OPENING
- Fatigue cracking in access opening -

7075-T6 and T-651 materials
"o LOWER WING SKIN @ WS 47
Minute fatigue cracking in bore of fastener

holes.
3.1.3 F-105 Series
There were five different models of the F-105 produced of

which three remain in active inventory, namely, F-105B/D/F
aircraft.
The F-105B is a single-seat, supersonic all weather fighter-

bomber with nuclear capability.
The F-105D is basically the same as the F-105B with updated

avionics.
The F-105F is the same as the F-105D except it has a second

cockpit in tandem with dual controls for trainer capability.
Durability problems experienced with this aircraft are:
o FRONT SPAR
- Stress corrosion cracking in 200-250 A/C caused by

shim problem in flange to web radius of 7075-T6
material.
o REAR SPAR
- Stress corrosion cracking in forward web of

7075-T6 forging
o MLG PORK CHOP FITTING
- Fatigue cracking in large radius. Steel fitting

replaced aluminum fitting for production.
15
"o HORIZONTAL STABILIZER
- Stress corrosion cracking in 7079-T6 crossbeam
forging.
"o WING INBOARD PYLON FITTING
- Corrosion fatigue in 80% of fleet
" FUSELAGE STATION 390 FRAME
- Fatigue cracking accelerated by corrosion in

7075-T6 material
"o FUSELAGE STATION 442 FRAME
- Cracking in undercut lugs of 4330V steel forging.
"o UPPER FUSELAGE SKIN SPLICES, SPOT WELDS AND FUEL CELL
ACCESS OPENINGS
- Manufacturing defects in countersunk fastener holes

at fuel cell access opening caused fatigue cracking.
"o POOR MANUFACTURING PROCEDURES, POOR INSTALLATION AND

ROUGH FIELD HANDLING
- Manufacturing -- no radius in base of C bore
- Rough field handling -- tools banged against structure

with disregard for dents, scratches, notches, etc.
- Poor installation -- high torque required in torquing

3/4" bolt in wing/fuselage attach fitting. No regard
for handling of tools in relation to structure.
o TRAILING EDGE FLAP SUPPORT
- Fatigue initiated from corrosion pit caused by metal

contact between dissimilar materials, 7075-T6 forging
and steel roller track.
o WING LUG POCKETS AND WHEEL WELL
- Stress corrosion in 15 fleet aircraft.
16
3.1.4 F/RF-101 Aircraft
These aircraft are charged with the primary role of air

defense and tactical reconnaissance for both coastal and inland
environment.
Primary durability problems experienced with the early air-

craft prior to fixes were:
o LOWER WING SKIN CRACKING
- Fatigue cracking in fastener holes
o MAIN SPAR CARRY THRU STRUCTURE
- Diagonal cracking
Analytical condition inspections were performed in CY 1976

and CY 1977 on ten of these aircraft. The results are as follows:
o F/RF-101 SUMMARY OF ACI RESULTS
DEFECTS CY 1976 CY 1977
Minor 12 60
Major 1 4
Critical 0 0
Minor defects consisted primarily of loose/missing fasteners,

mild corrosion in wing fuel'cell cavities, deteriorated paint
and sealant, cracked flair in fuel line, etc.
Major defects consisted of advanced corrosion and delaminated

fuel cell.
3.1.5 F-106 Series
The F-106A is a single-place, supersonic all-weather inter-

ceptor recently modified to include Air Combat Tactics.
The F-106B is a two-seated version of the F-106A.
Potential durability problems associated with these aircraft

based on the full scale fatigue test to 36,000 hours (scatter factor
= 4) are as follows:
17
o LOWER WING SKIN @ ELEVON ACTUATOR CUTOUTS
- Fatigue cracking in inboard and outboard corner

radii.
"o WING SPAR
- Cracking in lower lug bolt hole of Spar 2
"o FUSELAGE UPPER LONGERON
- Fatigue cracking on inboard leg at the cockpit aft

pressure bulkhead
"o FUSELAGE BELT FRAMES
- Cracking of belt frames due to excessive stiffness

in wing drag angle.
No major structural failures have been reported from analytical

condition inspections.
3.1.6 F-4 Series
The F-4C/D and E aircraft are supersonic, all-weather,

tactical fighter aircraft with special weapons capability.
The F-4D is equipped with additional fire control and expanded

weapons capability.
The F-4E has engines designed for increased acceleration

capability. The leading edge at the stabilator is slotted for
increased control at lower landing speeds, and a wing modifica-
tion provides leading edge slats to enhance air-to-air combat
capability.
The RF-4C is a tactical reconnaissance aircraft capable of

high-low, day-night selected reconnaissance missions.
Durability problems experienced on these aircraft are quite

representative of the fighter aircraft series. Among these
problems are the following:
18
"o WING SKINS
- Fatigue is the primary damage source
- Main structural skin failures originating at

fastener holes
"o TORQUE BOX DAMAGE
- Gouging causedby maintenance
"o TORQUE BOX SKIN
- Fatigue cracking in 1.86 inch pylon access hole
- Torque box skin fastener holes have been trouble

free due to installation of taper lok fasteners
and cold working of holes.
"o CENTERLINE RIB
- Multiple cracking in lower flange at fastener holes

caused by stress corrosion
- Some fatigue in bolt holes and radii
"o MAIN SPAR
- General cracking
"o FRONT SPAR
- Usually trouble free
"o OUTER WING
- Skin cracking caused by fatigue in fastener holes
- One airplane lost due to catastrophic failure
- Hole elongation in skin due to compression of skin

caused by buffet loads not accounted for in analysis.
19
"o FUSELAGE - STABILATOR ACTUATOR HORN
- Stress corrosion in forging flashing line
- Navy lost an aircraft from this problem
- Material change from 7075-T6 to 7075-T773
"o TURTLE BACK DOORS
- Hole elongations from wear and door deflections
"o FUEL CELL CAVITY
- 100% fatigue cracking in 14-inch curve span
"o FLOOR AREA
- Fatigue cracking in thin metal floors caused by

unconservative analysis of slosh loads and fuel
pressure
"o FUSELAGE LONGERONS
- Generally good except cracking found on longeron flange

caused by maintenance using flange for a step.
o GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
- Most cracking showed up downstream of predictions;

however, some fastener hole cracking in sealant
grooves appeared much sooner.
- One fatigue area (most aft lug on inboard wing

forward rib) surfaced in service that did not show
in test. Cause of failure was a very sharp radius.
- Cockpit blanket insulation provides a trap for

moisture condensate on inner skin resulting in
corrosion of inner skin.
Significant test and service failures are summarized in Figures

6 and 7, respectively. Service failures attributed to stress
corrosion are shown in Figure 8.
20
L-~
.~ 0~
P~,LL
< 0 0- -LJ
L.DL j LIr4D V)
L
~ Cd
~4--
LLi
CCD
LLL 0
LUL
LAJ A .
21
L-,
00
-JL
0~Ol
(1W)I
,MILL
=D,
L(1,
LUUf
rX4
U--
22J
CL,
LL-J
o cfd
-r-4
-c4-0
i)W
<00
23
3.1.7 F-Ill Series
(Ref. 2 : F/FB-illlAircraft Structural Integrity Program
The F-1lIA is a two-place side-by-side Mach 2 plus, fighter

type aircraft powered by two TF 30-P-3 engines and is configured
with a variable sweep wing (for short take-off/landing capability).
The F-111E aircraft are the same as the F-1lIA except for
the inlet geometry which is of the Triple Plow II configuration.
The F-111D aircraft are equipped with Mark II avionics and

are powered by TF 30-P-100 engines and TP II inlet geometry.
The F-111F aircraft have the TF 30-P-I00 engines, TP II

geometry, an improved wing carry-thru box, Mark II avionics and
increased strength main landing gear as changes from the F-1lIA
configuration.
Due to the significant contribution the F-I1 made to the

field of structural integrity by being the fore-runner in the
development and application of fracture mechanics technology to
aircraft structures, it is felt that a background of this infor-
mation is appropriate. The following data has been extracted
from the Ref. F-Ill ASIP Master Plan Document.
F-Ill ASIP Master Plan Document
2.0 SUMMARY
The design, development and certification of the F-111

structure has followed the principles defined in ASD
TR 66-57 "Air Force Aircraft Structural Integrity
Program: Airplane Requirements". The basic require-
ments in terms of aircraft type, mission, required
service life, and other performance parameters which
establish the structural design criteria for both
static strength and fatigue life were specified in the
original request for proposals in 1961.
2.1 Importance ASIP Development
2.1.1 The demanding performance of modern aircraft in the

areas of speed, altitude, and range places a premium
on minimum weight structural design. In the case of
the F-ill, the constraints to provide minimum struc-
tural weight design within a minimum structural
24
F-Ill ASIP Master Plan Document (Cont'd)
envelope, and provide for variable wing sweep were

met by the monolithic wing pivot and wing carry-
thru box structures fabricated as D6ac steel weld-
ments. Also, to further the minimum weight design
concept, the steel was subjected to a higher heat
treatment to obtain high strength capability.
In December 1969, F-1l1A Nr. 94 (S/N 67-049)crashed

as a result of a wing failure in the wing pivot fitt-
ing. The failure was caused by an undetected flaw in
the wing pivot fitting forging at the time of fabri-
cation.
Initial in-process inspection and non-destructive

test capability did not provide for the sensitivity
of high strength materials to small flaws and defects
which were acceptable for past alumimum/steel designs
and fabrication practices. This problem of pre-exis-
tent flaws was separate and distinct from the classic
strength and fatigue problems identified by the struc-
tural integrity programs defined by ASD TR 66-57 and
its predecessors. For this reason, the F-ill ASIP
and the Air Force ASIP added fracture mechanics pro-
cedures for design, structural analysis, manufactur-
ing methods, process controls, and inspections.
2.1.2 Fatigue test failures in the F-1l1A carry-thru box

structure in August 1969, February 1969, and June
1969 revealed the need to design fixes and construct
new test specimens. The resulting tests also incorpo-
rated a rational and realistic test spectrum derived
from projected operational usage in order to facilitate
interpretation of test results in terms of programmed
aircraft fleet life. Due to changes in test spectra,
the F-ill contract requirements for a 4000 hour ser-
vice life (16,000 test hours) was interpreted to be
met by fatigue testing to a damage level which re-
sults in a safeservice life of 6,000 hours for the
tactical fleet (24,000 test hours). The FB-111A
was tested to demonstrate a safe service life of
10,000 hours (40,000 test hours) based on a typical
bomber spectrum. An improved safe life wing carry-
thru box was designed with significantly lower work-
ing stress levels and with specific design changes to
account for the critical areas defined by previous
25
F-ill ASIP Master Plan Document (Cont'd)
tests. This improved WCTB is being incorporated in

the F-111F and has been retrofitted into the F-lIGC.
Tests have shown that high heat treat steel is ex-
tremely sensitive to surface finish especially in
areas of stress concentrations. For this reason,
field operations must pay careful attention to pro-
tection of the surface finish of the primary steel
structure from mechanical damage and corrosion.
2.1.3 The Phase 1 "Recovery Program" was established in

February 1970 following the crash of F-l11A 67-049 to
restore fleet aircraft operation to 80% of design
capability. The sensitivity of high strength materi-
als to small flaws (e.g., the wing pivot fitting on
aircraft 67-049)and to surface finish in areas of
stress concentrations (i.e., fatigue test results
1968-69) were the primary factors in determining
the short term actions required for the program.
Included in the program was the proof test loading of

each aircraft to design limit load conditions (+7.33g
and -2.4g) at a wing sweep of 560 and a temperature
of -40 0 F. Cold test chambers were constructed at both
the contractors facility (Fort Worth, Texas) and at
Sacramento ALC. The proof test program was completed
in February 1972 on 340 F-IIIA/D/E and FB-111A fleet
aircraft. Cold chamber proof testing was also included
in acceptance testing of the remaining production
aircraft, and was a part of the F-111C modification
program.
Since the cold proof test was to demonstrate that fleet air-
craft were free of significant structural discrepancies
in the high strength steels, the two failures encountered
prevented the affected aircraft from crashing (with
probable fatalities) upon return to the fleet. F-1l1A
Nr. 43 (S/N 66-025) and F-111E Nr. 75 (S/N 68-065)
failed in the wing carry-thru box (WCTB) and horizontal
tail pivot fittingrespectively. Both failures had
causes associated with the sensitivity of the material
to fabrication and processing.
A second phase of the program (categorically a depot

level maintenance task) was called "Phase II Struc-
tural Inspection Program (II SIP) and included
26
incorporation of structural modifications required

to provide full (1007.) strength and service life de-
sign capability in the fleet aircraft. Updated NDI
techniques were used during modification and inspec-
tion, and during the second cold proof test ( a II
SIP requirement). The cold proof chamber at Sacramento
ALC was modified for the second test to incorporate
a 260 wing sweep, positive design load test condition
at -40o in addition to the original 560 wing sweep
tests at -40 0 F.
The static test and fatigue test programs were success-

ful in the context that minimal weight increases and
few changes for structural strength have resulted from
normal development testing. The significant aspects
of the fatigue test program were noted in Paragraph
2.1.2 above.
Both the static and fatigue test articles were initially

configured as full-scale total airframes. In November
1968, the structural integrity test program was realigned
to reduce completion time of the structural certi-
fication effort. This decision was, in part, motivated
by the catastrophic failure of the wing carry-thru box
(August 1968) in the fatigue test article, and the re-
sulting loss of the fatigue test article for continu-
ation of testing. Both test articles were reconfigured
into major component full-scale articles consisting of
fuselage/empennage, wing, and horizontal tail. Future
failures in any component would not delay the total
programs.
Phase 1, Design Information
The basic structural design information for the F/FB-III

MDS is delineated in the documents presented in Section
7.0, Part 7.1.
ASIP Requirements Document and Applicable Military

Specifications
The requirements for the F-ill ASIP were defined in

ASD-TN-61-141, dated September 1961, which was incor-
porated into the F-Ill contractual specifications as
27
an applicable document. ASD-TR-66-57 (the updated

version of TN-61-141) was used as the basis for
accomplishment of the F-ill ASIP. The applicable
baseline military specifications were the MIL-A-8860
(ASG) series specifications, dated 18 May 1960, and
MIL-S-5711 (USAF), dated 14 December 1954. The MIL
SPECS were amplified and modified for the F/FB-III
MDS by appropriate contractual documents (e.g.,
structural design criteria reports).
Basic Strength Requirements
Table 3.1.1 is a compilation of these requirements in

terms of load factors and the associated design gross
weights.
Basic Fatigue Requirements
These requirements are shown in Table 3.1.2 in terms

of flight hours and landings. The design mission
profiles and mix for the F-IIIA/D/E/F and FB-111A
are shown in Section 6.0, Appendix C-I.
Basic Flutter, Vibration, and Acoustic Requirements
These requirements were defined in SPEC MIL-A-8870

(ASG) dated 18 May 1960.
Guaranteed Weight Empty
None of the F/FB-III MDS was designed to a guaranteed

weight empty. However, all contractor responsible weight
increases were required to be included for purposes of
determining strength compliance.
Changes to Initial Requirements
The fatigue spectrum was modified from the MIL-A-886

(ASG), dated 18 May 1960, fighter spectrum to a composite
spectrum per the concept contained in MIL-A-8866A (USAF),
dated 31 March 1971.
3.3.1.2.1 F-1lIA Airframe Fatigue Tests. The F-1lIA air-

frame fatigue test program was initially scheduled to
start April 1965 with the sixth F-ill airframe as the
test article. Design changes, weight reduction pro
grams, design loads revisions, and a significant
28
redesign of the F-111B Navy model caused program re-

alignment to assure test of structures representative
of fleet aircraft. Also, the late acquisition of the
TAC planned usage and the resulting delay in preparation
of the fatigue criteria, loads, and spectra contributed
to the realignment. Testing started August 1968 with
the sixty-seventh airframe as the test article. Pro-
gram realignment occurred again in 1969 creating par-
allel test capability of hardware which would minimize
down-time impact due to failures and reduce test span
time to improve over-all program schedule. The 1969
realignment decision was also influenced by a 1968
wing carry through box failure and the resulting
delays necessary for a repair development program plus
test article restoration. The fatigue test program
was completed July 1974 (Reference Figures C-111.1
and C-111.2, Appendix C-ill, Section 6.0).
The test article was a full-scale total airframe (A-4),

initially representative of both the F-1lIA and F-1I1B
with a high percentage of structural components common
to both models. However, a major redesign of the F-111B
caused reconfiguration of the test article into an air-
frame representative of the F-IlIA only. After the
1968 failure of the wing carry through box (WCTB), four
WCTB full-scale component fatigue test articles (FW-I-l,
1-2, 1-3, and 1-4) were fabricated to assist design and
certification of modifications. During the 1969 program
realignment, the full-scale total airframe test article
(A-4) was reconfigured into major test components (i.e.,
wing, horizontal tail, and fuselage/vertical tail). In
addition to the total airframe, the pivoting pylon and
a total wing with pylons were tested separately.
Initially, the testing objective was to apply 16,000

equivalent flight hours of spectrum loadings derived
in accordance with MIL-A-8866 requirements and original
design usage (1962/63). This would provide a 4,000
hour safe service life of unrestricted 7.33 g usage. A
catastrophic failure of the wing carry through box
(A-4 test article) immediately after test start in 1968
and the ensuing development effort for a corrective
modification also produced a reassessment of the
usage spectrum. The reassessment concluded that the
original test spectrum did not accurately simulate ex-
pected TAC F-Ill usage (relative to available F-100/
F-105 Southeast Asia experience).
29
The test spectrum was revised using TAC crew training

syllabus missions and MIL-A-8866, Revision A Mission
analysis concepts in association with the F-100/F-105
experience. The spectrum was identified as the Mission
Analysis Composite (MAC) spectrum. Because it was not
as severe as the original MIL-A-8866 maneuver spectrum
"A", application of 24,000 equivalent flight hours of
the MAC spectrum loadings were required to demonstrate
contract fatigue design requirements compliance. The
testing would provide 6,000 hours safe service life of
unrestricted 7.33 g usage. This testing objective was
achieved on all test articles.
After completion of testing for contract compliance,

the fatigue test program was extended by Sacramento
ALC funds. Test continuation was done to determine
the ultimate fatigue life and identify additional
fatigue critical areas. An additional 16,000 equiva-
lent flight hours were applied to the test articles
followed by constant amplitude cycling to failure.
The 16,000 additional test hours were satisfactorily
completed which increased the safe service life to
10,000 hours of unrestricted 7.33 g usage. Table
C-111-3, Appendix C-Ill, Section 6.0. presents the
full-scale airframe fatigue test results.
Although a 10,000 hour safe service life was established

by the testing, this life for fleet aircraft was con-
tingent upon incorporation of modifications resulting
from test failures. The modifications were incorporated
into in-production aircraft where possible, but for exist-
ing aircraft, a retrofit program for modification was
established. The fatigue test results determined the
appropriate flight hours for retrofit modification of the
individual aircraft.
The two most significant fatigue test failures involved

the wing carry through box (WCTB) and the wing pivot
fitting (WPF). The WCTB failure occurred August 1968
immediately after the start of testing on the A-4 full-scale
test article. The WPF failure occurred April 1970
after completing 12,000 test hours on the A-4 wing major
test component.
As these failures along with others were encountered,

the resultant modifications were incorporated into the
test articles to be qualified by later testing. The
modifications which evolved from the fatigue test
30
program are listed in Table C-ill-i, Appendix C-ill,

Section 6.0.
The fatigue test of the wing/pylon component test article

was conducted to evaluate wing hardpoints, fixed pylon
structure, and wing structure subjected to extensive ex-
ternal store carriage (anticipated usage in a limited
war with conventional weapons). The test article was
composed of a left hand outer wing box with pivoting
pylon support structure and two fixed pylons attached.
Testing began March 1971 and was completed July 1974.
A total of 40,000 equivalent flight hours of spectrum
loadings was applied to the test article followed by
constant amplitude cycling to failure. A safe service
life of 10,000 hours commensurate with other testing
results was verified.
The pivoting pylon component test was performed to eval-

uate the pylon structure subjected to extensive external
store carriage, and was conducted in association with
the wing/pylon component test program. Testing started
June 1971 and was completed November 1971 with 40,000
equivalent flight hours of spectrum loadings applied
to the test article. A safe service life of 10,000
hours was satisfactorily established.
3.3.1.5 Fracture Control Program. A fracture control

program for the F-Ill aircraft was not part of the
original design approach. The need for fracture mechanics
technology surfaced in December 1969 with the loss of an
aircraft because of an inflight wing failure due to a
flaw in a high-strength steel part of the wing.
At the time the F-1ll was conceived and designed, speci-

fication design requirements, analyses, and testing for
aircraft structure were considered sufficient to provide
a safe vehicle. Test articles (and their test programs)
were considered representative of fleet aircraft for
detecting damage and flaws relative to variation in
quality and fleet usage/environment. Coupled with the
testing were the quality control programs with non-
destructive inspections deemed effective in eliminating
non-typical manufacturing flaws.
All of the accepted and proven methods for design and

quality control failed to detect the flaw in the wing
structure. Furthermore, the F-ill was designed with
considerable usage of high strength steel similar to
31
the flawed part. The need to reaffirm the structural

integrity of the F-ill fleet resulted in a fracture
control program. The F-ill fracture program also
identified the need for similarprograms on all Air
Force Weapon Systems (both existing and in development).
The F-Ill Fracture Mechanics Program (being a fore-

runner in the application of the technology to aircraft
structure) requires the development of basic fracture
mechanics data to allow the program to proceed. Test
programs were undertaken along with associated analyses.
All of this effort was summarily documented in the three
volumes of report FZM-12-13467, "Fracture Mechanics"
(Reference Section 7.0, Item 7.3.1.5). The facets of
spectrum/environmental testing, operational usage
analysis, and risk assessment for fleet assurance were
all addressed in this report.
While the fracture mechanics program was evolving after

the December 1969 accident, the Air Force and F-Ill SPO
established a "Recovery Program" to restore confidence
in the F-Ill structure by inspecting all fleet aircraft.
The Recovery Program consisted of disassembly and in-
spection, ECP/TCTO modifications, and a proof test
program, all of which were performed in concert with
the fractures mechanics program.
Inspection required a major disassembly to gain access

to the critical steel parts being identified by fracture
mechanics technology. The inspection examined the parts
with regards to quality of fabrication, presence of any
cracks, and proper dimensions. Particular attention was
given fastener holes (both taper-lok and straight shank).
A castastrophic fatigue failure (on the full scale fatigue
test article) in August 1968 was determined to have oc-
curred at or adjacent to a taper-lok bolt hole. Although
located in a high stress concentration area, the bolt hole
had been improperly fabricated.
During the program to develop a fix for the catastrophic

fatigue failure, other test failures were incurred in or
near bolt holes and were attributed to the quality of
fabrication. These events occurred in 1968 and 1969
prior to the December 1969 accident and significantly,
involved high strength steel.
32
The Recovery Program included the incorporation of out-

standing ECP/TCTO structural modifications because of the
accessibility in the disassembled structure. The modi-
fications were those identified earlier in the F-1ll
development as required to provide full strength and
service life.
The proof test program consisted of a test of the total

airframe as an extension of the fracture mechanics pro-
gram. The test served to screen the structure and
particularly critical steel forgings for deficiencies and
gross defects, provide a basis for determining safe in-
spection intervals, and also provide assurance against
stress corrosion cracking at interference - fit fastener
installations in critical steel parts.
Proof testing occurred after the aircraft had been dis-

assembled, inspected ( and refurbished as required),
modified viz outstanding ECP/TCTOs, reinspected, and
reassembled. The proof test consisted basically of
applying a critical design limit load with the airframe
at -40 degrees F. The proof test limit loads at 7.33 g's
and -2.4 g's were applied at a wing sweep position of
LE - 56 degrees. The testing was done in a facility
which housed the entire airplane (properly restrained)
and was capable of providing a temperature environment
of -40 degrees F. Facilities were established at General
Dynamics/Fort Worth and at Sacramento ALC, California.
All fleet aircraft completed the proof test program as

of 1 August 1970. Two major failures occurred. A left-
hand horizontal tail pivot shaft failed at 88 percent of
proof test loading, and a lower plate of the wing carry-
through structure at 57.5 percent of proof testing loading.
The pivot shaft failed because of improper heat treat of
a local area of the part. The lower plate failed at an
interference bolt hole which had received improper pre-
paration during fabrication.
The proof test concept was continued as a requirement for

all newly produced F-ill aircraft. Furthermore, upon
establishment of II SIP (second Structural Inspection
Program) at Sacramento ALC, all aircraft inspected were
required to be proof-tested for a second time (Reference
Section 3.6).
33
3.3.1.6 Stress Corrosion. Stress corrosion cracking

(SCC) provided an additional consideration to the
fracture mechanics, recovery, and fatigue test programs.
Three incidents of SCC during late 1970/early 1971 re-
sulted in a significant program to define their cause(s)
and to preclude future occurrences. The stress corrosion
cracking program was strongly interfaced with the frac-
ture mechanics program since both programs had a primary
interest in the presence of (or the potential for) flaws
in the structure.
The incidents of stress corrosion cracking involved two

wing pivot fitting (WPF) splice areas (F-IIIE numbers
16 and 68) and one wing carry-through box (WCTB) (F-Il1A
number 43) in which cracks were discovered in Taper-Lok
bolt holes. The cracks in the WPF splices were discover-
ed (1970) by a routine X-ray inspection during the Re-
covery Program. The crack in the WCTB resulted in a
failure (1971) at 58.5% of positive test condition loads
during cold proof test of F-IlIA number 43. The failure
during proof test provided the impetus for the SCC pro-
gram.
The five Taper-Lok holes (one each in the WPF splices

and three, in a cluster, in the WCTB) exhibited a total
spectrum of failure mechanisms, e.g., fit-up stresses,
Taper-Lok stresses, surface contamination (i.e., en-
trapped coolant/cutting fluids, surface sealant voids,
cleaning fluid), and a flaw (s) due to fabrication.
(Each hole had a combination of more than one of the
mechanisms.) As a result of this evidence of stress
corrosion, a series of tests were performed for the
purposes of (1) determining the critical flaw size curve
at minus 40'F for cracked Taper-Lok holes in D6AC steel
plate, (2) determining stress corrosion cracking char-
acteristics of such holes at room temperature prior to
cold proof test, and (3) demonstrating that the 115 day
aging period of F-Ill airplanes prior to proof test was
adequate to insure no stress corrosion cracking after
proof test. The results of these tests were presented
in report FZM-12-13465, "Investigation of Stress Corros-
ion Cracking and General Corrosion of D6AC Steel at Taper-
Lok Fasteners" (Reference Section 7.0, Item 6.3.1.6).
34
Another factor relative to stress corrosion cracking

(and also applicable to the fracture mechanics of
Section 3.3.1.5) was general corrosion. Sensitivity
of the high strength steel parts to general corrosion
(inherent in fleet operational environments) required
adherence to maintaining good protection of the parts.
Any deterioration of the protection enhanced the chance
of a flaw site developing the subsequent appearance of
a crack.
Proper fabrication procedures (whether during the initial

manufacture or during field repair and/or modifications)
were required to prevent built-in flaw sites which opera-
tional environments could aggravate into a crack.
Both surface protection and fabrication aspects (relative

to high strength steel parts) have been accented in Tech
Order requirements, specifically, T.O. 1F-111-23, Organi-
zational Maintenance - Corrosion Control and T.O. 1F-ill-
3, Structural Repair Instructions for each F-Ill MDS.
Extensive fatigue testing was conducted on the F-Ill air-

frame. This testing included full scale airframe as well as numer-
ous components. Results of these tests are presented in Figures 9
through 14.
Analytical Condition Inspections have been conducted on

a scheduled basis for the F-Ill aircraft. Results of these
inspections for Calendar Years 1975 and 1976 are presented in
Table 1 through 4.
In addition to those ACI findings the following F-Ill fighter

failures have been reported.
o Horizontal Tail Pivot Shaft Proof Test - Failure caused

by under heat treat of D6ac steel pivot shaft.
o Horizontal Tail Pivot Shaft - Failure caused by hammer

peening around an access hole in the D6ac shaft.
o Failure in the 478 Bulkhead at the speedbrake attachment.
35
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o Failure on a lug of the 496 frame where the nacelle tie
link attaches. This failure caused by excessive torque
inducing a pre-stress in the lug.
o Truss flange cracking on backbone of aircraft - 7079-T6

material.
o Cracking in upper flange on glove bulkhead - 7079-T6

material.
o 12B4811 longeron cracking - 7079-T6 material
o 531 Bulkhead flange cracking - 7079-T6 material
o 1831 Lower steel longeron splice failure due to improper

installation.
3.1.8 F-15 Series
iThe F-15A aircraft is'one-place fighter aircraft and the

F-15B is a two-place version.
The F-15A/B airplane is a twin-eNgine, high-wing, supersonic,

long-range, all-weather air superiority fighter.
The following list of durability related problems were ex-

perienced in the development and early fleet service of the ,F-15
aircraft. These problems have been corrected for production
effectivity:
1. Inlet Duct Skin Panel Cracks

2. Wing Station 206.Upper Skin Cracks
3. Rudder/Actuator Attach Bolt Problems
4. Rudder Leading Edge Spar/Boron Laminating Failures
5. Composite Speed Brake Failure
6. Vertical Stabilizer Cracks
7. Horizontal Stabilizer Cracks
8 Door IIOL Cracks
9. Main Landing Gear Strut Door Lin.kage Support Cracks
10. Inlet Duct Wrinkles
11. Wing Skin Wrinkles
Details of the above durability problems are discussed on

the following pages.
51
o FATIGUE TEST FAILURE
At 4,000 hours of fatigue testing, a crack was

detected in the upper wing skin in the inboard area re-
sulting from integral stiffener run-out discontinuities.
The machined inner surface was redesigned to provide

increased land thicknesses overlapping the ends of the
integral stiffness at the rib attach area in order to
reduce the original stress concentrations due to skin
span-wise bending. Testing of redesign was successfully
accomplished on a small component.
The following current operational problems have been

identified:
"o INLET DUCT SKIN PANEL CRACKS
These cracks were caused by poor design practice of not

providing support in large flat rectangular cross-sections
for an acoustic environment. Acoustic levels were also
higher than originally had been estimated.
Corrections were made by increasing chem-milled land

widths and added cross lands. In some cases standard
structural repair techniques were used. Due to magnitude
of the problem, a complete analysis and redesign of the
subject area was undertaken.
"o WING STATION 206 UPPER SKIN CRACKS
Skin cracks were discovered emanating from fastener

holes in the upper skin at WS 206 rib on five high time
(93-200 hours) aircraft. Cause was an unsupported strip
of skin flexing between fasteners with attendant fatigue
loading. An external skin patch repair was made on the
most severely cracked skins and the skin thickness was
increased along with local rib redesign for a production
fix.
"o RUDDER/ACTUATOR ATTACH BOLT PROBLEMS
Four 1/4 inch bolts which attach each rudder to its

actuator drive fitting failed resulting in two separate
incidents of rudder failure.
52
Cause was flush head fasteners yielding due to high
loading thus elongating holes and resulting failure.
Solution was to incorporate 5/16 inch protruding

bolts in a cold-worked and reamed hole.
o RUDDER LEADING EDGE SPAR/BORON LAMINATE FAILURES
Two occurrences of right rudder outboard boron laminate

peel-off.
Insufficient clearances between the lower edges of the
rudder leading edge spar, flanges (fiber glass) and fin
structure caused this problem. Rudder lateral deflections
in service were larger than the clearances provided. As
a result, the fin structure contacted the rudder spar flange
structure. This caused local failure of the fiber glass
flange and exposed the boron laminate skin to the airstream,
causing boron plies to be torn away.
Production fix and retrofit was accomplished by trimming

back the leading edge of each spar flange in the bottom 12
inches to provide triple the original clearance, wrapping
a thin metal sheet around the leading edge of each spar
flange and covering the leading edge of the boron/epoxy
skin, and installing a fitting the full width of the spar
channel cross-section to which both flanges and wrap strips
are attached to increase the rigidity of the leading span
edge.
o COMPOSITE SPEED BRAKE FAILURES
These structural failures of the composite speed brake

occurred on supersonic actuation.
Probable cause was poor adhesion between the lower speed

brake skin and aluminum honeycomb core.
Solution was to incorporate a double thickness adhesive

between the core and upper and lower skins.
53
o VERTICAL STABILIZER CRACKS
Cracking problems have been experienced in three areas

of the vertical stabilizer.
"o Chem-milled pocket in vertical stabilizer lower

leading edge closure fairing. Production fix
was accomplished by increasing gauges of fairing
from 0.032 to 0.045.
"o Fillet radii of fairings around light and antenna on

right vertical stabilizer. Cracking caused by high
vibration environment. Redesign of the upper box
assembly to withstand vibration levels has been
accomplished.
"o Tip pod support radii cracking where support attaches

to tip pod. A production fix incorporating addi-
tional straps has been accomplished.
"o HORIZONTAL STABILIZER CRACKS
Cracks were experienced in the inboard lower forward

fairings on the horizontal stabilators of five F-15A air-
craft undergoing severe service usage.
These cracks formed along the aft rivet line of the

lower triangular aluminum chem-milled panel. Probable
cause was panel buffet. Production fix was accomplished
by increasing chem-milled bay thickness from .040 to .045
inches and adding additional .071 inch lands.
"o DOOR IIOL CRACKS
Cracks have been experienced on the heat exchanger

access panel on the aircraft undergoing severe service
usage. The cracking of the thin titanium panel resulted
from panel flutter. Production fix was to install a
stiffener in the chem-milled bay of the panel and add an
additional land in the aft bay.
54
"o MAIN LANDING GEAR STRUT DOOR LINKAGE SUPPORT CRACKS
Cracking has been experienced on an aluminum T-shaped

bracket which serves as the door linkage support. This
bracket cracked after extended use, leading to further
cracking of the adjacent inlet duct floor and MILG trunnion
beam. A production and retrofit fix was accomplished by
change of material from aluminum to titanium and adding
an additional support angle.
"o INLET DUCT WRINKLES
Inlet duct wrinkles have been discovered on several

aircraft that had flown high Mach numbers. Cause of these
wrinkles was thermal expansion of the inlet duct at high
Mach numbers. Critical areas of the inlet ducts have been
beefed up for production.
"o WING SKIN WRINKLES
Wrinkles have been experienced in the F-15A/B wing

inner torque box upper skin. Cause of these wrinkles was
probably from steady state pull up over "g" loads and/or
rolling pull-out over "-g" loads. The condition is being
monitored and operational units have been briefed on
service life implications for such usage.
"o F-15A ANALYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION (ACI) RESULTS
A list of the defects found during the ACI of F-15A,

73-0085 is presented below, Table 3-5. The accumulated
flight hours on this airplane at the time the ACI was con-ý
ducted was not available.
55
TABLE 5
DEFECTS FOUND DURING THE ACI OF F-15A, 73-0085
1. Crack approximately 5/8 inch into fastener hole in left

wing at W.S. 206.402.
2. Manifold fuel gravity transfer valve installed upside down

in fuel tank 3A.
3. Wave washers not installed on any fuel line inside fuel

tank 3A and "B" nuts only finger tight at bulkhead fittings.
4. Right engine flame holder cracked in three places.
5. Left engine flame holder cracked in five places.
6. Doubler cracked right side of cockpit under canopy track.
7. Patch on panel 137L.
8. Hinge pin wire frozen in right and ]eft aileron hinge.
9. Hinge pin wire frozen in right and left flap hinge.
10. Five holes double drilled in panel 64L.
11. Three holes double drilled in panel 132R.
12. Three holes double drilled in panel 132L.
13. Eighteen fasteners missing from engine access door 95L.
14. Four fasteners missing on engine access door 113R.
15. Five fasteners missing from engine access door 95R.
16. Nine fasteners missing from engine access door 117L.
17. Fifteen fasteners missing from engine access door 115L.
18. Right inlet first ramp top access door chafing screw heads
in panels 19R and 20R.
19. Left inlet first ramp top access door chafing screw heads
in panels 19R and 20L.
20. Paint chipped and peeling throughout aircraft.
56
3.1.9 F-16 Series
The F-16A is a single-engine, single-seat, multirole tactical

fighter with full air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities.
The F-16B is a two-place fighter/trainer version of the basic

F-16A aircraft. It has full combat as well as training capabilities.
The service life criteria for the F-16 are based on the re-
quirements of MIL-A-008866A, MIL-A-83444 and MIL-STD-1530. The
requirements of MIL-A-83444 are applicable to the airframe only.
The F-16 design usage is established as 8000 flight hours,

5754 sorties, and 6555 landings (801 of which are touch and go
landings), with a 15-year service life.
The materials and processes specified for the F-16 air combat
fighter were selected to provide compatibility of design, manufacturing,
and assembly at minimum cost while maintaining design integrity
and reliability. Special attention was given to overcoming material
problems encountered in the past. New and improved materials/pro-
cesses which avoid durability problems such as stress corrosion
and brittle fracture, coupled with a design philosophy which
recognizes such problem areas, have resulted in a design that will
provide longer life with improved performance at lower maintenance
cost. Figure 15 presents the F-16 structural arrangement and
material selections.
A full scale durability test program was conducted for the F-16
airframe. The airframe was tested to two service lives (8000 hours
each) followed by a teardown inspection. Results of the two 8000
hour tests are shown in Figures 16 through 20. Teardown
inspection results are shown in Appendix B.
57
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3.2 TRAINER AIRCRAFT
3.2.1 T-37 Series
The USAF T-37B is a low wing, two place, side-by-side arrange-

ment jet aircraft.
The mission of this airplane is to serve as a primary trainer

for elementary contact and instrument maneuvers to qualify the
students for continued extensive pilot training.
The T-37C conforms with the mission and configuration of the

T-37B except for added fuel tanks and armament.
Among the more significant durability problems encountered

on the T-37 airplane was:
"o WING FRONT SPAR
- Aircraft accident caused by fatigue failure of wing

front spar
"o WING
- Catastrophic wing failure caused by fatigue
"o ELEVATOR
- Inflight failure caused by fatigue
"o CANOPY RAIL
- Fatigue test failure of the canopy rail attachment

fitting generated a modification for this area.
Details on the above durability problems have been documented;

however, the reports were not readily available for this report.
The reference 4 document identifies those fatigue reports
documenting the above problems.
64
3.2.2 T-38 Aircraft
The T-38 is a two-place, twin-turbojet supersonic

trainer. This airplane is the mainstay of the Air Training
Command Undergraduate Pilot Training. These fleets are used in
various roles, such as the Lead-in-Fighter Training, the Thunder-
birds, the NASA and USN test pilot training and as chase aircraft.
Durability problems common to the T-38 trainer aircraft are

listed below.
"o WING
- Fatigue test failure of lower wing skin originated

in fuel drain hole. Subsequent redesign relocated
the drain hole.
- Fatigue test failure of 66% wing spar also necessitated

redesign.
"o GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
- Poor factory workmanship

- Poor field workmanship
- Replacement wing - poor quality control
- Short edge distance on spar caps
- Stress corrosion in 7075-T6 and 7079 materials
- Canopy rail strikes
- Wing-fuselage mating mismatch
- Frame cracking around access panel due to frame stiffness
- Secondary structural failures of intake ducts
- Bonding,, debonding and chem milling problems
- Nutplate rotation
"o TEARDOWN INSPECTION OF TWO HIGH TIME AIRCRAFT
- Fatigue cracking in aileron pulley bracket.
- Stress corrosion in aluminum die forgings of root rib,

66% spar, 44% spar and 21% center section spar
65
"o ANALYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION (ACI) RESULTS
Analytical condition inspections were performed on

81 aircraft. Six significant structural problems were
uncovered.
1. Wing spar and rib stress corrosion cracks.
2. Wing lower skin corrosion.
3. Fuel cell floor cracks.
4. Honeycomb failures in the trailing edge of the

flap, wing tip, wing leading edge and horizontal
stabilizer.
5. Worn and loose wing attach bolts.
6. Stress corrosion cracks at the F.S. 287.223

bulkhead at the intersection with the inter-
mediate longeron.
"o SPECIAL INSPECTIONS
Problem areas for which special inspections have

been conducted are:
1. Stress corrosion cracks in the 66T wing spars.
2. Landing gear uplock rib fatigue cracks.
3. Stress corrosion cracks in the wing rib.
4. Canopy panel attachment problems.
5. Surface condition in the fuselage intersection

cut-out in the wing lower skin.
"o WING DAMAGE TOLERANCE ANALYSIS
The wing damage tolerance analysis identified the

following problem areas:
- Fatigue critical fastener and drain holes.
- Wing root radius at the 44% spar on the

lower wing skin.
66
o T-38 TEARDOWN INSPECTION RESULTS
Due to the susceptibility of the T-38 lower wing skin

to fatigue cracking and the advance age of the fleet, a
teardown inspection was conducted on three high time
Air Training Command (ATC) wings.
The significant findings from this inspection are

presented in Appendix B to this report. These results were
extracted directly from the Reference 5 final report.
3.2.3 T-39 Series
The T-39 Sabreliner is a low wing, twin-jet monoplane with an

axial-flow pod-mounted engine on each side of the aft fuselage.
There are two versions of the Sabreliner - the commercial Sabreliner,
and the military version, designated T-39 aircraft.
T-39 aircraft are used by the Air Force for training and
transportation of passengers and cargo.
Durability problems that have been associated with the T-39

aircraft are:
o CURRENT PROBLEMS
1. Corrosion is the most significant problem - frames

and longerons.
2. In flight service failure of the main entrance upper

door stop.
3. In service stress corrosion failures of fuselage

stiffeners at FS 333.6.
4. In service cracking of fuselage frames from FS 465

to 505 cause by vibrations of electrical bundles and
vent lines attached to the frames.
67
o ANALYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION
An in-depth ACI was performed on three T-39A aircraft

at Sacramento ALC. This ACI showed that because of inade-
quate field level maintenance, the three aircraft were in
poor condition. Some of the structural failures found in
the ACI could cause loss of the aircraft.
The three aircraft selected for the ACI were

representative of the T-39 fleet from both environmental
usage -and accumulated airframe hours. The airframe hours
range from a minimum of 8470 to a high time of 9830 hours.
A composite summary of these findings is presented

in Table 6.
TABLE 6 T-39A ANALYTICAL CONDITION INSPECTION

RESULTS
DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE CUMULATIVE OCCURRENCES
"o Cracking 142

"o Stress Corrosion Cracking 16
"o Corrosion 25
"o Fastener 31
- missing/loose
"o Dents/Nicks/Scratches 36
"o Honeycomb 4
- Damage & Delamination
"o Enlarged or Worn Fastener 4
Holes
"o Wear (Excessive) 29
- Chafing
- Maintenance Induced
"o Maintenance Related 37
- Improper Maintenance
- Improper Mods
- Bending etc.
Figure 21 ranks the results in percentage by number of

occurrences for the composite findings.
Figures 22 and 23 show the problem areas for two

different aircraft.
68
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71
"o T-39 WING FATIGUE TEST TEARDOWN INSPECTION
A teardown inspection was conducted on a T-39D wing

that had accumulated 4250 service hours. Subsequently,
a flight-by-flight spectrum was applied and at 32,000
test hours a failure initiated at a bolt hole on the
forward edge of the lower skin. Reinforcing doublers were
added and the test was continued to 75,000 test plus
service hours.
Subsequent to the completion of the test, the wing

was torn down and non-destructively inspected for cracks
in fastener holes. All holes in the upper and lower wing
skins, splice plates, repair doublers and spar flanges
were inspected using the automatic eddy current scanning
system.
Figure 24 presents a histogram of the crack sizes

recorded from the above L/R wing teardown inspection as
documented in Reference 3, NA-77-599-I.
"o T-39 FUSELAGE AND VERTICAL TAIL TEST TEARDOWN INSPECTION
A teardown inspection was conducted on an NA-265-40

Sabreliner fuselage that had been subjected to a block
type spectrum of fuselage bending loads for an equivalent
90,000 flight hours including a total of 43,000 pressuriza-
tion cycles. The teardown was concentrated in the pressurized
cabin area but also included the vertical stabilizer rear
beam and engine pylon attach fittings. Also included in
the teardown were the major longerons, wing attach frames
and fittings, and the windshield support beam. Details
of this teardown are given in Reference 3, NA-77-599-I.
A histogram of the fuselage crack sizes is shown

in Figure 25 for the frames, skins and longerons.
Figure 26 presents the vertical stabilizer crack size
distribution.
72
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75
o T-39 SERVICE CRACKING HISTORY
A formal T-39A force inspection program was undertaken

as part of the T-39A Remanufacturing Program during 1971-
1973. Twenty-two specific locations were inspected on 130
aircraft when they reached the 10,000 flight hour level.
A gross quantity of 166 cracks in the wing structure

and 1368 cracks in the fuselage were found on the 130
aircraft. No single location was found to have a high
incidence of cracking, the crack total being well distributed
over the entire area inspected.
A comparison of the wing service failures found

during this inspection is made with the cracks identified
during test and the subsequent teardown inspection. This
comparison is shown in Figures 27 and 28
The service cracking history logs from the Remanu-

facturing inspection program were of limited value from
a qualitative standpoint since the specifics of crack
lengths were not recorded.
76
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3.3 BOMBER AIRCRAFT
The bomber aircraft discussed in this report are the B-52,

FB-111A and F-llIC.
3.3.1 B-52 Series
The B-52A and B aircraft design was initiated in 1951 and the
B-52C-F were designed in the 1953-1954 time period. The B-52 is
a 450,000 pound (B-52C-F) - 488,000 pound (B-52G-H) design gross
weight heavy bomber class aircraft.
The original design was based on a high altitude mission

requirement. In 1959 the B-52 mission was changed not only to
include the low level mission but also to initiate the airborne
alert mission. In 1962 the contour low level flying concept was
initiated. All of those changes have had a marked effect upon
design usage.
The B-52 was originally designed in accordance with the

applicable requirements of the R-1803 series specifications. These
specifications did not define design standards relative to service
life expectancy, fatigue endurance, fatigue loads, fatigue testing
much less damage-tolerant/fail safe design. However, fatigue
requirements via aircraft design specifications have been im-
plemented into improved modification programs incorporated on the
B-52 fleet.
A review with ALC personnel on the durability problems

associated with the B-52 service aircraft revealed the following:
1. L.E. Upper and Lower Chord - 7075-T6 spline cracks

caused by impack wrench being used to remove steel
fasteners in gap cover.
2. Rear Spar Web - 7075-T6 - Tooling hole in spar web

caused shear failure.
3. Structural door failures - cracks generated from

sloppy holes.
79
4. Trailing edge panels, flaps, leading edge panels
cracked from excessive noise.
5. ECP 1581 Mod on first 30 airplanes was very bad due

to poor jig design, inadequate training of people,and
not enough attention given to design detail.
6. Fuel cell mod problems associated with mislocated rib,

installation misfits and inexperienced new hires.
7. Extensive cracking occurred in the sculptured skins.-
8. Service cracks experienced in upper longeron due to

rework. Material changed from 7075-T6 to 7075-T73.
9. Cracking in leading edge ribs of horizontal stabilizer.
10. Corrosion is primary problem in horizontal stabilizer.
11. De-icing of runway is the single contributory cause

of lower surface corrosion.
12. Mechanical problems with opening and closing the

bomb-bay doors.
13. Body side skins replaced with like design and material
one gage thicker. No problems with skins except aging.
14. Landing gear trunnion cracking caused by poor design.

Undercut stress riser in small radius.
15. Few problems in MLG Bulkheads caused by radius cracking

in T-sections due to clamping action and improperly
shimmed installation.
16. Forging parting plane cracks precipitated by corrosion.
17. Problems in pressurized compartment center mostly around

seals such as windows, doors, etc.
80
18. Catastrophic failure on one airplane due to stress riser
in fastener hole of rabbet cut.
19. Body station (BS) 1655 bulkhead (original welded steel

design) was replaced with a one piece forged steel crown
with significantly strengthened lower members. This
modification was the result of four B-52C-F accidents
caused by failure of the BS 1655 bulkhead.
20. The center wing upper front spar chord on the B-52G/H
aircraft had extensive machining which exposed end grain
of the material thus affording extensive susceptibility
to stress corrosion cracking. Cracks were noted on
10 aircraft during mod program.
B-52 Cyclic Fatigue Test Program
The need for a complete fatigue evaluation program for the

B-52 airplane was made apparent by the B-47 airplane fatigue
failures in 1958 and the similarity of the design criteria and
usage requirements of the two airplanes (Reference B-52 ASIP)(Ref. 6),
The primary objectives of the B-52 fatigue evaluation program

were:
1. To define fatigue areas

2. To determine adequacy of proposed repairs.
3. To establish required inspection procedures.
The results of four major B-52 series airframe test programs

are discussed in the following paragraphs. Program results include:
1. B-52A-F Body, Wing, Fin and Stabilizer

2. B-52G Wing
3. B-52G/H Wing and Body (ECP 1050)
4. B-52G/H Body and Empennage (ECP 1128/ECP 1185)
81
B-52 A-F Cyclic Test
"o Fwd body test - 10,000 hours
- No failures
"o Fwd body cyclic pressure test - 25,000 hours
- 3 pressure web failures

- 7 pressure floor to body frame tie angles.
"o Fwd body cyclic pressure test - B-52D service A/C

88,500 Equiv. Hours
- Side skin cracks and pulled through rivets
- Pilot and co-pilot escape hatch latch arm cracks
"o Fin test - 10,000 Equiv. Flt. Hours
- Fin skin cracking

- Fin terminal pin cracking
- 1655 welded steel bulkhead
- Aft body lower skin cracking
"o Wing test - 10,000 Equiv. Flt. Hours
o 52 major and 55 minor failures
- Main wing skin @ rear spar

- Upper and lower wing access doors
- Wing upper surface skin splices
- Wing lower surface closure panels
"o Wing Test Follow-on #1 - 5000 Equiv. Flt. Hours
o 22 Major and 36 minor failures
- Wing closure panels

- Fuel sump drains
- Inspar wing skin trailing edge.
82
"o Wing Test Follow-on #2 - 5000 Equiv. Fit Hours
- Upper and lower wing skin panels

- Lower wing stiffeners
- Rear spar
- Wing splice
- Wing lower surface cutout doublers
"o Wing test follow-on #3 - 5000 Equiv. Flt. Hours
- Upper and lower wing skin panels

- Wing lower stiffeners
- Upper and lower wing splice areas
- Rear spar web
"o Wing Test Follow-on #4 - 5000 Equiv. Fit. Hours
o 113 major and 3 minor failures
- Lower wing skin panel

- Wing lower stiffeners
- Rear spar web
- Body crown skin
"o Wing Test Follow-on #5 - 5000 (35,000 to total) Equiv. Fit. Hours
o 55 major and 1 minor failure
- Lower wing skin panels

- Upper wing skin panels
- Upper wing splice plates
- Rear spar web
- Rear spar chord
- Boomerang fitting
- Lower wing stiffeners
- Wing rib web
- Body side skin
- Upper longeron and bulkhead chord
83
o Stabilizer Test - 10,000 Equiv. Fit. Hours
- No significant failures
o Stabilizer Test Follow-on - 15,000 Equiv. Fit. Hours
- No significant failures
84
B-52G Wing Cyclic Test
10,992 - Equivalent Flight Hours
o Ten critical areas identified
- Lower wing skin panel - 59 failures originated in rabbet

cut in fastener holes or areas of discontinuity.
- Lower wing skin panel - area of drag strut fitting and

fairing clip fastener holes
- Lower wing skin panel boost pump fitting areas - 31

failures
- Lower wing skin panel fuel drain hole L/R
- Upper aft wing skin panel rabbet cut
- Lower wing panel stiffener sealant injection holes.

Twenty-eight failures
- Upper aft wing skin panel - 2 failures
- Missile lower fittings - 3 failures
- Lower surface access door area - 8 failures
- Lower wing skin panel stiffeners at wing rib intersection

attachment holes.
85
B-52G/H (ECP 1050) Wing and Body Cyclic Test
Fit x Fit Spectrum - 4 Life Times, 48,560 Equiv. Fit. Hours
o 1304 Combat crew training missions

o 1480 Extended high altitude missions
o A total of 2132 test specimen defects varying in magnitude and

origin were discovered during test. Significant failures include:
- Center wing rib web cracks

- Lower wing stiffener inspan cracks
- Body fatigue cracking in channel beam tie to fuel
deck and BS 805 Bulkhead
- Numerous body cracks in upper skin fastener holes common
to longeron
- Separate cracks in upper longerons
- Body shear skin panel cracks
- Drag angle fatigue cracks
- Crown skin cracking in fastener holes
- Trailing edge wing structure cracks
o Follow on Testing - 4.0 to 4.65 Lifetimes, 4.65 to 5.30

Lifetimes and 5.30 to 6.0 Lifetimes
- Cracks in upper chord of front spar

- Major crack in L/H upper longeron fitting and smaller
crack in R/H fitting
- Rear spar web cracks L/R
- Rear spar lower chords
- Front spar span wise cracking
- BS 538 Bulkhead forbing forward skin attach flange crack
- Corner tie fittings common to front spar and inspar
ribs crack (6)
- Lower wing skin stiffeners (18 cracks)
- Rear spar lower chord crack
- Boomerang fitting fatigue crack
- L/R Drag angle fatigue cracks
- Lower trailing edge shelf panel seal beam structure
cracks (19 incidents)
- Extensive galling occurred between pin and bushings
@ L/H aft terminal pin location.
86
B-52G/H (ECP 1128/ECP 1185)
Body and Empennage Cyclic Test
"o Flt x Fit Spectrum - 4 Lifetimes
o 1720 Combat Crew Training Missions

o 420 Combat Crew Supplemental Missions
o 196 Airborne Alert Indoctrination Missions
o 96 Airborne Alert Indoctrination Supplemental Missions
o 16 Combat Crew Training Proof Missions
"o A total of 688 discrepancies of various types, magnitudes and

origins were discovered during test. These include the following:
- Fatigue cracks in R/H wing primary structure near inboard

and outboard nacelle area.
- Fatigue crack in flap trap rib
- Numerous cracks (385) in the inboard trailing edge assemblies.

Cracks originated in hat sections and trailing edge upper
skin surface
- Cracks in L/R drag angles
- Fatigue skin cracks around wheel well caused by severe

canning
- Twenty-two (22) cracks discovered on the horizontal

stabilizer. Most cracking occurred on lower stabilizer
spider fitting.
FOLLOW-ON TESTING (4.0 - 7.6 LIFETIMES)
o 292 Airborne Alert Indoctrination Missions

o 2140 Combat Crew Training Standard Missions
o 16 Combat Crew Training Missions
o 6400 Constant Amplitude cycles
87
o A total of 270 discrepancies were discovered during the follow-
on testing. Among the more significant failures are the
following:
- Several major fatigue cracks occurred in the inspar

structure; namely, rear and front spar web cracks and
upper chord front spar
- Upper wing panel cracked in fuel filler hole
- Drag angle and boomerang fitting cracks
- Numerous cracks in the inboard section of the trailing

edge assemblies
- Body damage in tank deck beam angles
- Additional wheel well skin and body skin cracking
- Twenty-eight fastener failures in bomb bay door hinge

area
Numerous ECPs have been incorporated into the B-52 fleet to

improve the strength and fatigue resistance of the body, wing and
empennage based on cyclic test results, fleet experience and SAC
planned usage. An example of these ECP type changes is illustrated
in Figure 29. They include such modifications as:
"o New wing skins - 2024-T351

"o New upper surface inspar panels with increased thickness
and 7075-T6 material
"o Eliminate discontinuities
"o Lower stress levels in joints and splices
"o Use of taper shank fasteners for high strength
attachment
"o Deletion of fuel drain holes
"o Use of taper shank fasteners to attach brackets
and clamps to wing skins, spars and stiffeners
"o Apply new protective coatings to internal structure
of wing fuel tanks
"o Replace existing fasteners with oversize fasteners
in certain areas
88
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3.3.2 FB-lllA Fighter/Bomber
The FB-ll1A is a Class 2 bomber version of the F-1liA with

SRAM capability. It is equipped with TF30-P-7 engines, TP II
inlet, increased weight capability landing gear, and longer wing
span (3.5 foot increase per wing).
The FB-111A test goal was for 10,000 hours of safe service
life which was accomplished by the application of 40,000 equivalent
flight hours of spectrum loadings derived from bomber usage and
FB-111A mission profiles.
During the cyclic test program there were 45 recorded

test incidents. A breakdown of these results is shown in Figure
30.
Two significant service failures experienced on the FB-111A

aircraft have been:
1. Speed brake column/truss on the door. The fatigue

failure originated in the lugs of both the column
and truss. These same areas experienced test failures.
2. Upper plate on the wing carry-thru box. Crack found

during cold proof test. The fatigue failure originated
in a sealant groove hole. Examination revealed a bit
had been broken off in the hole and had subsequently
been eloxed out.
Additional durability problems experienced on the FB-111A

are described in the Analytical Condition Inspection (ACI) results
shown in Table 4 on page 50.
91
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3.303 F-111C Fighter/Bomber
The F-l11C is a version of the F-1lIA designated for the

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF). It has the FB-111A long wings,
increased weight capability landing gear and the F-Ill improved
carry-thru-box structure.
Service data obtained from the Royal Australian Air Force

on the F-111C aircraft were in the form of Analytical Condition
Inspection data. These data include ACI findings on a set of
wings (F-lllC A8-135) the results of which are shown in Table
7 and the findings from four aircraft the results of which
are shown in Tables 8 through 11 and summarized in Table 12.
It is observed that the defects generally fall into three

main categories; namely cracking, corrosion,and maintenance/manu-
facturing defects.
Cracking has been found in some brackets and flanges but they
have not been structurally significant. Wing pivot fitting bushings
have been found to be cracked on most aircraft. This is an identical
problem experienced by the USAF. This problem does not have a
detrimental affect on aircraft operation. It is only considered
a maintenance problem.
The main areas affected by corrosion have been the Wing

Pivot Fitting and Horizontal Stabilizer bearing housing. In some
cases the corrosion has been fairly widespread but not deep enough
to have any structural implications.
Manufacturing defects found have been due mainly to poor

machining resulting in grindouts, incorrect spot facing, gouges,
and machine tool marks. The most significant areas were found in
the WPF fuel flow doors which were corrected by smoothing out
depressions and radiusing sharp corners.
93
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< 94
TABLE 8 F-1IIC ACI SUMMARY (AIRCRAFT NO. A8-127)
Item Condition Defeat Report
Beam 12K3213 Sealant Reversion on LH Side of Beam Around

Screen Anchor Nuts.
Fairings 12B8223-5 Removal of ECt Antenna Covers Revealed 3AD/13/75

and 12B8223-6 Cracks in Fairings.
Upper Translating Corroded. 3AD/74/74 RH

Cowl Rail Attachment 3AD/75/74 LH
Brackets
Bracket Attachment Cracked. 3AD/54/74

12B7725-1
Bulkhead 12B2104 Production Repair Discovered - Crack

Stop Drilled and Scab Patched - Repair
Functional but Workmanship Sub-Standard.
Bulkhead 12B2615 Crack Discovered - Prey Stop Drilled. 3AD/72/74
ACI SEGMENT 5 A8-127
Strake 12B13406 Delamanations in Leading Edge.
FWD Engine Access Door Hinge Attachment Bolts Sheared. 3AD/70174
Saddle Tank Structure Six (6) Rivets in RH Saddle Tank have

Incomplete Tails.
Longeron 12B10812 Left and Right Longerons have Superficial

Damage Between FS632-670--Caused by
Drilling Holes for Anchor Nuts in Heat
Shield Supports.
Lower Longeron Splice Alum Metal Spray Coating Over D6AC Steel 3AD/73/74
12B10503 Structure Missing.
Panel 3325 Large Dent, on Inside Surface. 3AD/80/74
Splice Plate 12B10618 Fasteners Missing Washers, One Bolt has 3AD/57/74
Gap of .038 Between Nut and Frame. 3AD/58/74
Radome Latches Minor Sealant Reversion.
Radome Latch Assy Loose Rivets in Assy Cover.
95
TABLE 8 F-111C ACI SUMMARY (AIRCRAFT NO. A8-127)
(Cont'd)
Item Condition tw No
Wing Pivot Fitting Surface Corrosion 3AD/59/74
Wing Pivot Fitting Surface Corrosion 3AD/60/74
Plate WDF Faulty Machining 3AD/63/74
Plate WD)F Faulty Machining 3AD/64/74
WDF Centre Spar Flange Depression (Grindout) 3AD/97/74
Wing Pivot Fitting Pin-Head Blow Hole 3A0/119/74
Slat Assy No 4 Void Area 3AD/66/74
Slat Assy No I Loose Rivets Attacbe Ice Scraper 3AD/67/74
WDF Bush Cracked and Corroded 3AD/24/75
Wing Assy Sealant Reversion 3AD/71/74
Housing Slat Track Broken Flange .3AD/139/75
Fuselage Rear
Panel Lower 12BI0102-3 Large Depression 3AD/89/74
Seal Press 12B10383-10 Sealant Reversion - Cracked 3AD/98/74
Fuselage Centre
WCTB Support Brackets Ser Nos Etched it Brackot 3AD/114/74

12B12351-13/-14
WCTB Shear Panel Scratches and Gouges in Vuel 3AD/141/74

Fuel Inter Conn Attach Holes
RAM Air Scoop Cracked 3AD/206/75
Panel Water Tank Cracked Flange 3AD/92/74
Skin Water Tank Cracked and Corroded 3AD/93/74
Skin Water Tank (New) Pivot Holes Misaligned 3AD/94/74
Skin Water Tank (New) Poor Application Sealant 3AD15/74
Bolt AIC 260E-9-34 Corroded by Water Ingestion 3AD/121/74
Trans Cowl Beam Assy Prey Repair O/S Holes 3AD/I0/75
96
TABLE 8 F-111C ACI SUNMARY (AIRCRAFT NO.
A8-127) (Cont'd)
Item Condition D/R No
Air Inlet Area
Top Hat Stiffeners Cracked 3AD/68/74
Skin Support Prim Inlet 0/S Holes Tran Cowl Track 3AD/117/74
Stiffener 12PI1650-60 Mismatch Prey Repair 3AD/122/74
Empennage
Bulkhead (STA 786.5) Fin Attach Bolt Hole Off Centre 3AD/115/75
and Bushed - Prev Repair
Horiz Stabilizer LH Corrosion in Brg Hsg 3ADflh/75
Hydraulics
Suppott Bracket Piping Cracked 3AD/53/74
Air Conditioning
Duct Air 12Y838-809 Cracked 3AD/39/75
Canopies
RH Windshield Sealant Reversion 3AD/82/74
97
TABLE 9 F-111C ACI SUMARY (AIRCRAFT NO.
A8-130)
MaI np lanes
Pivot Pin Bushes Cracked 3AD/75/75
Wing Pivot Fitting 1I1 Corrosion 3AD/103/75
Wing Pivot Fitting RH Corr on Lower Plate Adj Boron 3AD1125/75

Doubler
Lever Assy Pivot Pylon Corrosion 3AD/83/75
Wing Assy Lower Skin Taperloc Protrusion 3AD/135/75
Plate ADF LH and RH Machining Mark - Spot Facings 3AD/165/73
Wing Pivot Fitting RH Corrosion and Discoloration 3AD/171175
Wing Assy RH Taperloc Protrusion 3AD/168/75
Fuselage Rear
Door Fwd Eng Access LH Water Ingress 3AD/185/75
Splice Plate Cracked 3AD/177/75
Splice Plate Deep Spot Face 3AD/182/75
Fuselage Centre
Overwing Fairing Cracked Self Locking Nut 3AD/113/75
Skin Water Tank Cracked 3AD/138/75
Empennage
Horizontal Stab Corrosion in Brg Hsg 3AD/96/75
Vertical Stab Bowing in Leading Edge 3AD/86/75
Horizontal Stab Pivot Shaft Bushings Scored 3AD/152/75
Vertical Stab Sealant Reversion 3AD/178/75
98
TABLE 10 F-111C ACI SUMMARY (AIRCRAFT NO.
A8-132)
MaiULP anes
WCTB Pivot Brgs Corroded 3AD/207/75
LH Wing Upper Skin Delamination 3AD/4/76
Fuselage Rear
Splice Plate Cracked 3AD/5/76
Fuselage Centre
RAM Air Scoop Cracked 3AD/206/75
Skin Water Tank Cracked 3AD1208/75
Empennage
99
TABLE 11 F-111C ACI SUMMARY (AIRCRAFT NO. A8-133)
Item Condition DIR No
Mainglanes
Pivot Pin Bushes Cracked 3AD/120/74
Pivot Pin Retainer Hole Two Depressions (Grindouts) 3AD/34/75
Centre Spar Flange Machining Marks 3AD/43/75
Centre Spar Flange Grindouts and Shim Fitment 3AD/57/75
Pivot Pin Bushing Corrosion 3AD/85/75
Plate WDF LH Machine Marks - Spot Facings 3AD/163/75
Plate WDF RH Machine Marks - Spot Facings 3AD/164/75
Fuselage Centre
RAM Air Scoop LU Loose Attachment 3AD/76/75
Splice Plate 12B7933 Rough Machining 3AD/146/75
Skin Assy - Water Tank Cracked in Lower Flange 3AD/137/75
Air Inlet Area
Engine Inlet Duct Corrosion around Rivet Heads 3AD/173/75
Empennage
Horizontal Stab Mismatch - New Tip 3AD/58/75
Horizontal Stab LH Corrosion in Brg Housings 3AD/77/75
Horizontal Stab RH Corrosion in Brg Housings 3AD/78/75
Horizontal Pivot Shaft Bushing Scored 3AD/15/75
Undercarriage
M. Retract Act Bracket Previous Rework of Gouge 3AD/41/75
M1G Lateral Beam Chafing 3AD/56/75
MLC Support Beam Assy Bushing Wear 3AD/114/75
MmG Support Beam Assy Bushing Wear 3AD/115/75
MLC Lower Shock Pin Bushes Corroded 3AD/116/75
100
TABLE 11 F-111C ACI SUMIARY (AIRCRAFT NO. A8-133)
(Cont'd)
Item Condition Defect Report
Shear Panel 12B3803 Deep Score on Panel-Boundary Layer 3AD/35/75

Air Scoop Cracked.
Panel 12B3681 Medium Surface Corrosion, Small Dent,

No Delamination.
Panel 12B3682 Slight Scratch Marks.
Nacelle Formers 12B2907 - Light Corrosion, Area Chafed by 3AD/40/75

12B2907, 12B2908 Cracked and Loose Ram Air Scoop.
12B2909 12B2908 - Light Surface Corrosion.
12B2909 - Light Surface Corrosion.
Longeron 12B1311 Corrosion on Aft gfnd of Longeron (LH)

and Fastener*.
Fuel Decks 12B4151, Minor Dents, *a DelEb* ions.

12B4117
Longeron 12B1904 Grinder Damage AvVpd *e Top of
Bolt Holes.
Panel 3111 Dents on Panel, No Delaminations.
Frame 12B13187 Corrosion.

FS799.00
Upper Longeron Corrosion. 3AD/107/75

Aft Centre Body
12B13118 Also Found on A8-133, A8-132 3AD/158/75-I69/75
Horiz Stab Pivot Corrosion in Internal Bore of Pistol 3AD/III/75

Bulkhead Fitting (Also Found on A8-133) 3AD/112/75
Vertical Stab Leading Edge Bowed 3AD/86/75
101
TA3LE 12 F-111C ACI SUMMARY (4 AIRCRAFT)
AIRCRAFT DESIGNATION FLIGHT HOURS @ ACI
A8-127 233
A8-130 392
A8-132 621
A8-133 426
DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE CUMULATIVE OCCURRENCES
"o CRACKING 23
"o CORROSION 27
"o FASTENER RELATED 8

- missing/loose
"o DENTS/NICKS/SCRATCHES 7
"o DELAMINATION 2
"o WEAR 4
"o MAINTENANCE/MANUFACTURING 23
- repairs, machine marks, grindouts
shim, mismatch, etc.
o OTHER 9
- sealant reversion
102
3.4 CARGO/TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
3.4.1 C-130 Series
The C-130 airplane is a turboprop transport designed and

built for the U.S. Air Force.
There are several basic models of the C-130 which include the
C-130A, C-130B, C-130E and C-130H models. Several variations of
each of the basic models have been built and are used in a variety
of different missions.
The C-130 aircraft serve the Material Airlift Command (MAC)

and the Tactical Air Command (TAC).
The C-130 fatigue test program identified fatigue induced

areas in which corrective action was accomplished prior to fleet
degradation. Distribution of major test failures among the C-130
aircraft is shown in Table 13.
103
TABLE 13
C-130 FATIGUE TEST SUMMARY
MAJOR TEST LIFETIMES

SPECIMEN FAILURES @ FAILURE
C-130A Fuselage 2 1.3
C-130B Empennage 3 8.4
C-130B Wing 3 2.0
C-130E Wing
- Center 18 2.3
- Outer 9 3.0
C-130B/E Wing
- Center 4 4.4
- Outer 9 4.4
Fatigue sensitive areas of the C-130 aircraft are identified

in Figures 31 , 32 and 33 for the fuselage, center
and outer wing.
Some of the C-130 service failures identified to date are

shown in Table 14.
104
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108
Other durability problems identified with the C-130 aircraft
are listed below.
"o C-130A - Old Center Wing
- Fatigue cracking originating in a cutout of an upper

surface spar cap loaded by Taxi and Assault Landing
- Fatigue cracking originating in a nutplate rivet hole

of the CW station 60 front spar (7075-T6)
"o C-130A - New Center Wing
- Clean design with material change from 7075-T6 to

7075-T73 and rectangular cutouts changed to elliptical.
"o C-130 Outer Wing
- Current most critical component
- Lower rear box beam spar cap has short edge distance.
Failures originate in fastener hole.
- Corrosion in lower wing skin in fuel area.
- Corrosion cracking also in dry area due to fumes and

moisture condensation
"o MLG Fuselage Area
- Failures in flange cutout of stretch bow beam (7075-T6)
"o Fuselage Area
- Cracking in Pork Chop Fitting (7075-T6 forging). Crack

originated in a radius loaded by higher than predicted
fuselage deflection. Material changed to steel for "H"
model.
109
3.4.2 C-141A Aircraft
The following discussion has been extracted from the

Reference 7 paper. This paper received the Best Paper Award
at the 9th Annual SAMPE Technical Conference held in Atlanta,
Ga, October 1-977.
The C-141 is a high performance, long range heavy logistics

transport. The aircraft was designed to the MIL-A-8860 specifica-
tions during the 1963 time frame utilizing the technology of the
late 1950s and early 1960s. About 85 percent of the aircraft
utilization is logistics and the other 15 percent is training.
The primary structure of the C-141A is a combination of high

strength aluminum and steel alloys; namely 7075-T6, 7079-T6 and
4340 steel.
Fatigue cracking on the C-141A structure has not been a major

problem. This is principally the result of the low to moderate
operating stress levels for most of the C-141A structure.
Another favorable experience is the absence of corrosion in

the wing fuel tanks. This can be attributed to the corrosion
preventative protection initially given during manufacture. This
protection consisted of applying to the 7075-T6 surface a MIL-A-
8625, Type II sulfuric acid anodize and MIL-C-27725 polyurethane
topcoat. Faying surfaces were sealed with MIL-A-8802, and fasteners
were installed wet with the same material.
Fuel leakage has only been a small problem and has occurred
where straight shank fasteners have been used and around fasteners
which were installed in larger than allowable holes. Fuel leaks
around Tapor-Lok fasteners has not been a problem.
Although corrosion has not been a problem in fuel tank areas,

it has been a major C-141A problem on much of the 7075-T6
structure where adequate corrosion protection was not applied.
110
o Upper Surface Wing Panels
The integrally stiffened wing panels of the C-141A aircraft

were manufactured from 7075-T6511 extrusion. Steel Taper-Lok
fasteners are used to attach the panels to one another and to
various internal structure. The original finish system consisted
of a MIL-C-8514 wash primer, followed by one coat of MIL-P-7962
primer and two coats of MIL-L-19537 acrylic lacquer. In time,
this system cracked around the heads of the countersunk steel
Taper-Lok fasteners permitting water entrapment and subsequent
corrosion as depicted in Figure. 34.
WATER TRAP WHERE SEALANT IS MISSING
EXFOLIATION SEALANT FILLS HOLE TO HERE.

VOID IS OFTEN DEEPER.
I .t-I.- FASTENER
PANEL
FIGURE 34 Corrosion Development Around Fasteners
Solution to this problem was the application of two coats of

MIL-S-81733, Type III polysulfide primer followed by two coats of
MIL-C-83286 polyurethane.
o Fuselage Main Frames
In the C-141A there are two main frames which transfer loads
between wing and fuselage. Both are made from 7075-T6 forgings.
During manufacture, these forgings were machined extensively,
thereby exposing end grain which again resulted in stress corrosion
cracking. Cracks have also originated from fastener holes, in
the frame webs and along the various radii of the frame flanges.
Solution to this problem is still being evaluated.
111
o Center Wing Panels
These panels have integral stiffeners machined from 7075-T6511

extrusions. The extrusions were hot joggled on each end at the
chordwise splice between the center and inner wing. Stress corro-
sion cracks occur in the vertical leg of the integral stiffener,
usually at the joggle as shown in Figure 35.
h4
Aj
FIGURE 35 Crack in Stiffner at Joggle.
Metallurgical examinations of several crack stiffeners revealed

that corrosions pits were forming in the time period between
machining and anodizing thus significantly contributing to the
subsequent corrosion cracking. This observation pointed to the
fact that corrosion cannot be ignored during any part of material
processing.
112
o 7079-T6 Aluminum Alloy
This material was also used extensively in the C-141A aircraft.

Most of the fuselage skin panels are 7079-T6, the internal structure
of the vertical and horizontal tail being 7079-T6 plate and forgings
and the aluminum components of the landing gear being 7079-T6
forgings. Like the 7075-T6 material, corrosion cracking has also been
a significant problem with the 7079-T6 material. A substitute
material of 7049-T73 has been the apparent solution to the corro-
sion cracking problem with the landing gears.
The fuselage skins experienced the same corrosion cracking

problem as discussed earlier with the upper surface wing panels.
This problem has been significantly reduced with the use of MIL-S-
81733, Type III polysulfide primer followed by two coats of MIL-
C-83286 polyurethane.
o 4340 Steel
As initially delivered, most of the high strength steel in the

C-141A was 260-280 KSI. Problems with this material have been due
to stress corrosion and have occurred in landing gear components
and wing and pylon mounted fittings. In the case of landing gear
components, new cylinders made from 300M steel 260-280 KSI are
being retrofited on the C-141A fleet.
o Pylon to Wing Attach System
The pylon attach fittings are quite susceptible to water

intrusion. Although sealing this area is a requirement, accomplish-
ment of this task is almost impossible due to the limited accessi-
bility. Consequently, the environment is ideal for corrosion
which is very common on these fittings. In cases where sealant is
properly applied, corrosion does not exist; therefore, the problem
becomes not one of sealant but use of a highly vulnerable material
used in a limited access area bound to trap corrosive fluids.
The significance of this problem cannot be over emphasized. The
life cycle maintenance cost for the C-141A pylon attachment system
is estimated to be in excess of 100 million 1976 dollars.
113
An example of this type corrosion on the C-141A is shown in
Figure 36.
FIGURE 36 C-141A Pylon Attachment Fitting Corrosion.
The C-141A structural design makes extensive use of adhesively

bonded components in secondary airframe structure and in several
areas of primary structure in the fuselage pressure vessel. Bonded
secondary structure is utilized in control surfaces, aerodynamic
flow surfaces, and in general structural applications.
The original C-141A parts were assembled using the adhesive,

surface preparation, and corrosive inhibitive technology of the
late 50's and early 60's when structural bonding was in its develop-
ment stages. Although the original polyamide epoxy film used
displayed good mechanical properties during initial short term en-
vironmental tests, environmental susceptibility over the long term
has proved to be a major problem. The primary factor has been
moisture penetration into the bondline at the face sheet and ad-
hesive film interface, resulting in adhesive failure because of
desorption of the adhesive by water. The subsequent results were
panel delamination and corrosion of the metallic structure which
seriously degraded the structural integrity of the part.
114
During initial production,corrosion resistant honeycomb core
and corrosive inhibitive bonding primers were not available..' Panel
edges, cutouts, and fastener holes were not sealed on installation,
thus exposing the bondline to the environment. Panel fayin'g and
surface sealing of joints were accomplished in later production
and during repair; however, maintenance costs for bonded honeycomb
structure on the C-141A is astounding.
A recent major procurement, to supply replacement~parts and

spares for the original honeycomb components that have reached the
end of their service life, cost approximately nine million dollars.
At depot repair level where selected C-141A honeycomb parts are
completely refurbished, 1977 expenditures approached 4.5 million
dollars. This does not include field level daily support costs.
o Conclusions - C-141A Experience
Corrosion is currently the major C-141A material/process

problem. It is prevalent in all forms including stress corrosion
cracking, wherever 7075-T6 and 7079-T6 aluminum and 4340 steel are
exposed to a corrosive environment. Second only to corrosion on
the C-141A is the honeycomb problem.
These problems primarily stem from the materials and processes

that were state-of-the-art during manufacture of the C-141A.
Recent experience and current technology can significantly reduce
these C-141 type problems on a new design.
115
3.4.3 KC-135 Aircraft
The KC-135 aircraft was an outgrowth of the Boeing developed

jet transport prototype designated 367-80. It was designed to
refuel the higher speed B-52. Production began in 1954 and five
configurations of the basic aircraft were delivered before pro-
duction was terminated in 1965. A total of 26 different designa-
tions of the -135 aircraft now exist.
Service life requirements were not specified during the

initial design. Ten thousand hours were accepted as a desired
life and design considerations indicated the airplane would be
good to at least this level. Safe service lives have subsequently
been established.
The following is a chronological history of significant events

relating to durability of the KC-135 aircraft,(Reference 8).,
1962 through 1974 timeframe:
1. A 1962 large scale wing cyclic test based on fleet exper-

ience and subsequent analysis established a safe life
for the -135 force of 13,000 equivalent tanker hours. The
results of this test are listed below:
1962 Wing Cyclic Test Results
o Test article failed catastrophically at
- 10,800 spectra simulating 5.1 hour tanker

missions
- 55,080 simulated flight hours
o 327 Fatigue cracks were discovered in the test

article.
o Established flight hours to 0.25 damage as
- 55.080/4 = 13,770
- Adjusted to 13,000 KC-135A flight hours

including SEA usage
o Four fatigue packages developed for fleet
116
By 1965 a safe life providing essentially a crack-free usage
to 13,000 equivalent tanker hours was established based on test
damage scatter factor of four and installation of four fatigue
mod packages.
In 1968 a requirement for a full scale test was established

to identify actions required to extend the life beyond 13,000
tanker flight hours. This test,known as the 1972 test,was more
sophisticated and more representative of actual fleet usage. Due
to unrepresentative high loads applied in the 1962 test which
caused crack growth retardation, the 1972 test exhibited earlier
and much more wide-spread cracking than the 1962 test. Review of
the test and -135 fleet led to two conclusions:
1. Fatigue modifications would have to be expanded

to assure safe life operation beyond 13,000 hours.
2. The wing lower surface would require replacement

for life extension beyond 13,000 hours.
A summary of the 1972 test results are listed below.
1972 Cyclic Test Results
"o Wing failed catastrophically (LWS 250) at
- 10,300 spectra (during the once per 100 spectra loading)

- 55,505 simulated flight hours
"o A total of 8,276 fatigue crack locations were found in the

wing lower surface.
"o The number and significance of fatigue cracks found indicate

a damage of 1.0 was reached prior to 40,000 flight hours of
testing. Flight hours to 0.25 damage are less than 10,000 tanker
flight hours.
Figure 37 gives a summary and general location of the wing

lower surface fatigue failures found during the test and subsequent
teardown inspection. The total number of cracks observed S 0.01"
and > 0.01" are summarized in Table 15 by structural detail.
117
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Since 1966, an upwards trend in the occurence of in-service
fatigue cracks has been observed with approximately 30 instances
of arrested unstable cracks, the longest of which was 43 inches.
A summary of the significant fleet cracks are shown in Table 16.
To substantiate the fleet findings, lower surface parts from

six aircraft which had reached 13,000 hours and had undergone
lower skin replacement, were extensively inspected. Numerous
cracks were discovered, mostly in the .05 to .10 inch range.
A comparison of the fleet crack sizes with the teardown inspection
results for the six 13,000 hours aircraft is shown in Table 17.
Results of a teardown inspection for KC-135A, SN 57-1422 (shaded
area)are also shown in Table 17. This aircraft had 11,500 hours
at the time of inspection and is shown here to more accurately
reflect the KC-135 fleet condition based on the 1975 decision to
reskin the lower surface at 11,500 hours.
Based on the 1972 test results, fleet findings and an ex-

tensive evaluation conducted by a "blue ribbon" committee, it
was concluded in 1973 that reskin at 11,500 hours would be required
as insurance against fail safety degradation. Later findings in
1977 have again revised the lower wing reskin target at 8500 hours.
The reskin is being accomplished under ECP 405 modification.

Figures 38 ana 39 depict the various design changes and
improvements associated with the ECP. A material change from the
low damage tolerant 7178-T6 lower wing skin to the high damage
tolerant 2024-T351 skin was a significant improvement in the ECP
405 mod. Elimination of splices and cutouts also added to the
improvement.
Service experience is continually monitored and updated on

the 707 and C/KC-135 fleet to identify durability problem areas
that affect structural integrity. The known fleet problem areas
relating to fatigue, stress corrosion, corrosion and miscellaneous
items that have been identified from 707 and C/KC-135 fleet ex-
periences are shown on Figure 40 and listed in Table 18.
Figure 41 presents a cumulative plot of wing fatigue crack
locations versus calendar year and Figure 43 shows the cumulative
number of cracks at these locations versus calendar year.
120
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The KC-135 Cyclic Test Article teardown inspection results
for the wing are detailed in Reference (9). A summary extracted
from that document is presented below and in Tables 19 and 20.
1. From Table 19, it can be seen that of 457 wing

parts inspected, 203 or 44 percent exhibited some
form of cracking at a total of 639 locations.
Twenty-nine percent of the locations had some crack
dimension in a hole bore or countersink surface.
The balance/majority of the wing structure cracks
occurred on skin and substructure surfaces adjacent
to fastener holes.
2. From Table 20 , it can be seen that of 772 fuse-

lage and empennage parts tested, 75 or approximately
10 percent exhibited some form of cracking at a
total of 255 locations. Eighty-eight percent of
the locations had some crack dimension in a hole
bore or countersink surface. The balance/minority
(12%) of the body/empennage cracks occurred on skin
and substructure surfaces adjacent to fastener holes.
3. Four crack locations were noted in the empennage

section. No cracks were found in any of the steel
parts inspected at AFML with the flourescent mag-
netic particle method.
4. The wing section exhibiting the greatest percentage

of cracked parts was W34, just outboard of Wing
Station 558, at the rear of the wing. However, W21
exhibited, by far, the greatest number of crack
indications (WS360) totaling 186.
5. The body/empennage section exhibiting the greatest

percentage of cracked parts was B48, located at Body
Station 820 slightly aft of the wing. Section B41,
however, had 63% more crack indications than B48,
with a total of 31. This section is located near
the base of the wing on the side of the fuselage
above the wing.
6. A final determination of the degree of significance

of these data will await the results of combining the
data of all the participants so as to obtain a com-
plete picture of the condition of the aircraft. The
AFML data, however, indicate that by far, the majority
of the flaws found had not propagated beyond approxi-
mately 100 to 200 mils in length.
133
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7. The use of no less than 20X magnification for
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purposes, but there was no other possible alterna-
tive.
3.4.4 C-5A Aircraft
The C-5A aircraft (Ref. 10) is a high-altitude, long-range,

high-subsonic-speed, heavy-logistic transport air vehicle capable
of worldwide, all weather operation.
The service life design goal for the C-5A was 30,000
flight hours, 12,000 landings, and a total of 5950 pressure cycles
all representing 15 mission profiles.
As of 1974, there were five major fatigue test articles designed

to assess the fatigue service life of the C-5A. The original goal
for these specimens was to test to four lifetimes which would equate
to 120,000 cyclic test hours. The five major tests were as follows:
1. Full-scale Fuselage and Wing Assembly. Cyclic testing

on the wing of this test article was terminated at
24,000 cyclic test hours due to general fatigue cracking.
2. Full-scale Aft Fuselage-Empennage (FS 1964). This test

article completed 60,000 cyclic test hours.
3. Main Landing Gear - The test article also included the

fuselage support structure. This test article completed
four lifetimes (48,000 landings) of testing.
4. Nose Landing Gear - The test article also included fuse-

lage support structure. Only portions of the test article
completed four lifetimes (48,000 landings) due to major
failures caused by fatigue and stress corrosion.
5. Expedited Wing - This test article was programmed to pro-

vide an accelerated test of the wing structure. Cyclic
testing was terminated after 60,000 cyclic test hours due
to a general cracking condition.
136
Based on these test program results,approximately 50
control points have been selected to identify the critical
areas where cracking either occurred in test or might be ex-
pected to occur in service. These areas are shown in Figures
43 , 44 and 45. Figure 43,, for the wing surface, de-
fine the type structure where cracking has or is expected to
occur.
Extensive cracking in the C-5A wing and projection that

the existing wing would not meet the required service life
resulted in an "H" model redesign wing. The new wing is being
designed to meet the current durability and damage tolerance
requirements. Significant material changes as well as design
improvements have been made to provide a much improved dur-
ability and damage tolerant wing. Material comparisons between
the old and new design wings are as follows:
Material Selection
Type Structure Old Design New Design
"o Panels 7075-T651 Extr. 7175-T7351 Extr.

"o Beam Caps 7075-T651 Extr. 7175-T7351 Extr.
"o Webs 7075-T6 7475-T651
"o Rib Caps 7075-T6 Extr. 7075-T73
"o Forgings 7075-T6 7075-T73
7175-T73
An extensive individual aircraft service life monitoring

program (IASLMP) is being used to monitor the service life of the
C-5A aircraft. Table 21 presents a summary of fleet service
cracks as related to IASLMP data.
Analytical condition inspections (ACI) have also been used

to monitor the durability of the C-5A structure. These data
for Calendar Years 1976 and 1977 are included in Figures 46
through 50.
137
LOCKHEED* GEORGIA COMPANY a rckTN LG IUS6]2/M-5'-20'
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3.5 ATTACK AIRCRAFT
3.5.1 A-10 Aircraft

The A-10 aircraft (Ref. SA160R9401, Ref. 11) is a subsonic
single place airplane with a primary mission of providing sustained
close air support.
The design service life for the A-10 was 6000 hours with a
scatter factor of 2.0.
The damage tolerance criteriawere established prior to the

MIL-A-83444 specification and consisted of two parts.
1. Get home residual strength capability following

battle damage from specified threats.
2. Safe life in the presence of manufacturing defects

or service induced flaws.
During the two lifetimes of fatigue testing a number of

premature failures occurred. A discussion of these results is
presented below.
oAt .819 lifetimes, the following discrepancies were noted:
- Fuselage frame 405 cracking
- Hole cracking in lower closure member
- Pulled through door fasteners at Frame 405
- Bend radius and rivet hole cracking in angles

at Frame 405
- Numerous fastener failures attaching skin in area

of Frame 405
- Cracked panels on side of inner fuel tank floor

at Station 405
147
A thorough investigation revealed that the following factors
were the major cause of this failure.
1. The applied wing load at Frame 405 is sensitive to

speed, and produces increasingly greater tension at
the failure section as speed is increased with load factor
kept constant. Increasing load factor reduces tensile
load, so that maximum tensile stresses in the fatigue
specimen are experienced at the inner flange at WL 89
at a speed of 340 knots at negative load factors.
2. The test spectrum randomized the fatigue loading con-

ditions so that there are a large number of speed cycle
changes. The only speed cycle changes considered in the
original spectrum were ground-air-ground cycles, which
are a small percentage of the speed cycles in the test
spectrum. The large number of speed cycle changes
caused the most fatigue damage.
3. There is some out-of-plan bending induced in the inner

flange of the frame below the lower auxiliary longeron.
This bending induced additional stresses of several
thousand psi at the failure site, with the attendant
decrease in fatigue life.
o At 1.02 lifetimes cracking was discovered on the fuselage skin

panel forward of Sta 468. Subsequent inspection revealed nu-
merous cracks in the radius of the panel beads. Cracks were
also discovered at rivet holes attaching to the upper longerons
and upper auxiliary longerons..... .
Strain surveys and subsequent investigation revealed the

following facts and conclusions.
1. Skin Panels
a. The cracking in the exterior skin panel assembly

originated in the 7075-T6 beaded skin at the
countersunk holes. This beaded pan skin is the
inner sheet of the bonded assembly consisting of
.040 inch 2024-T3 clad skin and the .050 inch
7075-T6 beaded pan.
148
b. The cracking was induced by high local bearing
stresses in the approximately .020 inch thick
cylindrical portion of the hole which resulted from
countersinking .070 inch into a total metal thick-
ness of .090 inch.
c. Contributing factors were: (1) a concentration
of stresses around the fastener holes adjacent to
the ends of the beads due to the redistribution of
stresses around the beads, and (2) the stress
cycles caused by speed changes.
d. The cracking was confined to this shear panel (LH

and RH). The panel is unique in that it carries
the highest shears and has deep countersinks.
e. The cracks had not reached a stage of rapid growth.
2. Upper Auxiliary Longeron
a. The cracking of the beads in the upper auxiliary

longeron web and the exterior skin panel are unre-
lated except for the common speed and load factor
spectrum.
b. The cracking of the beads was caused by bending stresses

aggravated by a sharp radius in the underside of the
bead.
c. The beads in the right hand side auxiliary longeron

web had, in general, a less severe radius than those
on the left hand side which accounted for the more
general cracking found on the left hand side.
d. The stresses in the upper auxiliary longeron beaded

web forward of frame 405 and aft of frame 468 are
substantially lower than the panel where the cracking
occurred. Assuming that the same stress concentration
exists in these beads, analyses show them to have
adequate life.
149
"o Between 1.16 and 1.20 lifetimesHi-Lok fasteners failed outboard
of WS 110 splice. Further inspection revealed a crack in the
mid-spar web originating in an open tooling hole.
"o Numerous front spar fastener failures were also found.
Subsequent test and investigations led to the following con-

clusions:
1. The failure of the mid-spar web was due to the absence

of a plug rivet in the tooling hole.
2. The failures of the fasteners through the lower surface

and front spar were due to oversize holes in the presence
of load reversals.
o At 1.47 lifetimes, during a 25 percent inspection, the following

discrepancies were noted:
- A crack on the upper longeron plate, left hand side

at the second screw hole forward of FS 468.
- Several cracks on the door strap sill at FS 481.
- Four small cracks at random fasteners at the door splice

strap at FS 505.
- One small crack on the door sill member at FS 444.
An investigation into the cause of these failures has led

to the following conclusions:
1. The crack in the upper longeron plate, P/N 160D213001-49

was due to a badly scored hole. The scoring of the hole
surface has been attributed to springing of the structure
when the fatigue aircraft was reworked to remove the
fuselage side skins between Stations 405 and 468. It
appears that the damage was done while trying to force
the parts to fit on reassembly. This condition is
unique to the fatigue aircraft, in that none of the
other aircraft have had the side skins removed.
150
2. In the initial investigation, it was found that the hole
in question had less edge distance than the drawing
requirement, .32 inch instead of .44 inch. A check of
the stress concentration factors shows an increase of
approximately 3 percent, and this is not considered
significant. The fatigue analysis shows a life well in
excess of 4 lifetimes, even with the smaller edge distance.
The RH longeron in the area, where the holes have not been
damaged, shows no signs of incipient fatigue cracks. The
fuselages in the production line have been inspected, and
all the holes in the longeron in this area have proper
edge distance, and proper hole quality.
3. The failure of the frame 481 strap, P/N 160D212007-73,

was due to loads introduced by the fuselage fuel tank
access doors, acting as part of the primary fuselage
bending structure. These doors were not intended to carry
primary fuselage bending loads, but evidently the fit of
the fasteners was close enough so that significant loads
were carried. A strain survey in the fatigue aircraft
confirmed this fact. The condition has been corrected in
the fatigue aircraft by opening the holes for the fasteners
by approximately 1/32 inch, from .192 inch to .221 inch for
the No. 10 screws and from .252 inch to .281 inch for 1/4
screws. The strain survey was repeated with the larger
holes, and showed that the door loads had been cut approx-
imately in half, with negligible increase in the upper
longeron stresses.
0 Between 1.43 lifetimes and 1.82 lifetimes there were a few
miscellaneous fastener failures primarily in the wing. These
were considered isolated occurrences largely associated with
improper fit holes.
o At 1.82 lifetimes a crack was discovered in the lower wing

skin, left hand side, at approximately WS 118. The crack,
which was six inches long, ran from the aft edge of the main
skin, through a rivet hole, and forward through a cold-worked
drain hole. Just prior to this failure (1.4 percent earlier)
two fasteners in this area had cracked heads and were replaced,
but no skin crack was observed. An investigation of this
failure has established the following:
151
1. A metallurgical examination of the fracture surface has
shown that the crack initiated at the aft side of the
rivet hole, grew aft to the skin edge, and then forward
through the drain hole.
2. There was no crack in the right hand wing skin, although

an eddy current probe showed the existence of an anomaly
in the bonded doubler at the rivet hole just inboard of
the previously mentioned crack initiation point. Dye
penetrant did not confirm the existence of a crack.
This indication was on the forward side of the hole,
whereas the maximum stress level is on the aft side of
the hole.
3. Analysis has shown that there is a stress concentration

induced by the rivet hole and by a change in wing skin
width created by a tab designed to pick up the splice
fitting at WS 110. The super position of both these effects
increases the stress level at the aft side of the hole
beyond the desired design level.
During a thorough inspection of the aircraft at two lifetimes,

it was discovered that cracking had occurred in a number of areas.
The following is a list of those areas:
o A small crack initiation site was found at the most

inboard attachment in the upper line of attachments
through the right hand fin mid-spar to horizontal
stabilizer attachment fitting.
"o Local skin cracks in the fuselage trough door at FS 483

right hand side.
"o Cracks emanating from plate nut holes around the front
spar web access cutout between WS 90 and WS 110 on the
right and left hand wings.
"o Cracks emanating from plate nut holes around the mid-spar
web access cutout between WS 90 and WS 110 on the left
hand wing.
152
"o Cracking in the flap track on the outboard end of the
outboard flap.
"o Cracks emanating from fastener holes around the mid-spar

web access cutouts between WS 23 and WS 44 and between
WS 44 and WS 66 on the right hand wing.
An A-10 Structures Review Team (SRT) was convened to review

the results of the two lifetimes of full scale fatigue testing,
inspection and analyses. The SRT team concluded that the durability
and damage tolerance has been adequately demonstrated for the re-
quired 6,000 hours of design service usage.
The SRT team also noted that an 8,000 hour life requirement
was being used for the Air Force's other new fighter aircraft and
recommended that the A-10 SPO determine the need for extending the
present 6,000 hour life to 8,000 hours for the full scale fatigue
test.
The results of the test extension are discussed in Reference (11)

SA 160R9401.
Service Probiem•
The following A-10 service problems have been reported:
"o Cracking of most forward nacelle ring frame (Prototype #1)
"o Loosening of door fasteners near the gun muzzle

(Prototype #1)
"o Loss of a leading edge slat in flight (Prototype #1)
"o Failure of a rudder lower attachment fitting (Prototype

#1 and #2)
"o Cracking of antenna shield on gun access door no. F-3

(DT&E #1)
"o Buckling of wing/fuselage fillet, door no. F-26

(DT&E #1 and Static)
153
"o Fuselage R/H Avionics door opened in flight, door
no. F-10 (DT&E #3)
"o Pilot access ladder door opened in flight (DT&E #3)
"o Cracks were discovered in the fuselage fence (DT&E #2

and #5)
"o Cracks were discovered in the wing/fuselage fillet,

door numbers F-28 and F-89 (DT&E #2)
"o Aileron vibration problems were discovered on ships 261

and DT&E #4
"o Numerous incidences of cracks in the fuselage fence
"o Failure of boarding ladder stops during ladder deployment

(DT&E #2)
"o Retention failure of the nacelle shroud door (Ships

#24, #12, #38)
"o Access panel fasteners pulling through
"o Duct panel fasteners pulling through
"o Buckling and cracking of bottom fuselage skin on a

number of ships
"o Cracking of leading edge skin under slat (Ships #8, #9)
"o Rotation of the upper torque arm pin (Ships #7, #71)
"o Cracked ribs supporting wing to fuselage fairing

(Ships #8, #12)
"o Malfunction of the single point refueling door latch

(DT&E 1-6)
154
3.5.2 A-7D Aircraft
A review of the A-7D aircraft with OC-ALC personnel produced

the following information pertaining to the durability of these
aircraft.
o Primary structure is good with major critical points

being located on the wing.
o Most A-7 structural problems have dealt with material

design problems.
- Material sections reduced to save weight resulted

in overkill
o Panels and doors are not interchangeable.
- Too much hand-fit
o Wheels are a major structural problem
- 2024 forging - weak spoke design
o Cracks occurring in .020 inch chem-milled skin
o Corrosion problem in fin/tail section
o Canopy rigging and latching problem
o Maintenance and .rigging costs are very high dollar items

on the A-7D aircraft
o Aircraft is not being used to its design capability

because of engine problems; consequently the aircraft
should last longer than its designed life (4000 hours).
155
o Other A-7 Data
The following datawere extracted from two reports published

on the A-7 test program. These reports are
1. Fractographic Examination of A-7D ASIP Initial Quality

Specimens - LTV Report No. 75-53452-078 (Reference 12).
2. An Equivalent Initial Flaw Analysis of the A-7A Wing

Fatigue Test (Reference 13).
Tests were performed to evaluate the manufacturing

quality of the A-7 aircraft. Test specimens were cut from
a production A-7A aircraft lower wing skin which had been
used as a gun fire target. This aircraft had approximately
700 hours so the probability of cracking was extremely low.
The specimens were cyclic tested to failure using a block test

spectrum with each block consisting of 5000 cycles of 0-20 ksi
followed by 0-30 ksi for 100 cycles. Fractographic analysis of
each failure was then accomplished.
From the fractographic analysis,the following results and

conclusions were made.
1. The straight shank holes usually began cracking in the

bore of the hole near the surface whereas the counter-
sunk holes most often began cracking at the inside
radius of the small diameter portion of the hole.
2. Metallurgical investigation of the crack origins re-

vealed two types of initial flaws were occurring;
namely, pits in the holes and mechanical induced flaws
from machining.
3. A survey of the cracks indicated six out of forty-four

(13.6%) began from mechanical flaws while the remaining
thirty-eight (86.4%) began from anodized pits. The
material was 7075 aluminum.
4. The mechanical flaws were induced during drilling

of the holes.
5. The pitting was induced by processing prior to

anodizing or by the anodize process itself.
156
SECTION IV
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Structural durability data presented in Section III are

evaluated and discussed in this section. Observations and
overall conclusions are presented. Essential Conclusions
of the structural durability survey are:
1. The most frequent structural durability problems

occurring in the in-service Air Force aircraft
surveyed, in order of occurrence, are: cracking,
corrosion and fastener-related problems.
2. Repair/maintenance cost data were not available

for assessing durability-related problems for
the aircraft surveyed.
3. A uniform format is needed for documenting dura-

bility-related problems at the Air Logistic Centers.
Data should be compiled in useful formats for stor-
age and retrieval and should be periodically updated.
Further details of the data evaluations are presented and

results are discussed in this section.
A Structural Assessment Form (Appendix A) was devised for

documenting in-service data. This form was later discarded
due to the type, form and quantity of information available
at the Air Logistic Centers visited. The Structural Assess-
ment Form was time consuming to fill out, Although this form
was discarded, it would be useful for documenting in-service
inspections or teardowns. Several information sources were
used for the Structural Assessment: Analytical Condition In-
spection (ACI) reports, Aircraft Structural Integrity Plan
(ASIP), direct contacts with ACI personnel, and contractor
reports. Since the ACI reports contained the most quantita-
tive information, these reports were used extensively.
There are numerous ACI reports for various aircraft sys-

tems. However, the ACI results for each aircraft were not
reported in the same format for direct comparisons. For
example, one ACI may list corrosion and stress-corrosion
occurrences individually and another ACI may only cite occur-
rences of "corrosion." Another example is based on the C-5A
transport. ACI reports for CY 76 and CY 77 compile occur-
rences and general location of fatigue cracks but fail to
157
connect any of those cracks with fastener holes. Structural
assessment data for different aircraft were cataloged as
follows so that results could be combined for purposes of
assessing general trends:
A. Cracking: Holes, plates, radii, fittings, etc.

B. Corrosion: Stress and/or any other
C. Fastener Related: lose, missing, failed, etc.
D. Dents/Nicks/Scratches
E. Honeycomb Delamination/Damage
F. Fastener Hole Related: out-of-round, etc.
G. Wear: Chaffing, Fretting, etc.
H. Maintenance: Improper or faulty practices
I. Misc: Specific system particularities
These categories are somewhat ambiguous but do allow general

comparisons of the various aircraft systems.
A summary of pertinent ACI results is shown in Figures 51

through 57, for the T-39A trainer, F-4/C/D/E, RF-4C fighter, F/FB-
l11A fighter-bomber, F-111C bomber, C-5A transport, and F-15A
fighter, respectively. These aircraft systems have been in
the Air Force's inventory for varying lengths of time. The
approximate times at which the various systems went into ser-
vice are as follows:
T-39A Early 60's

F/RF-4 Early 60's
F/FB-IIIA Mid 60's
F-111C Early 70's
C-5A Late 60's to Early 70's
F-15A Early 75
The T-39A trainer, Figure 51 , provided some very interest-

ing results. This particular ACI was very comprehensive, per-
haps due to the age of this system. Obviously cracking was
the predominate occurrence, but of special interest was the
number of maintenance-related incidents. The incidents, which
are not mentioned in all ACIs, are the results of carless in-
duced maintenance. Those incidents include abuse of "no-step"
areas or dropping of tools on sensitive areas. Also included
are incidents of improperly performed maintenance, such as
double or misdrilled holes, and other damage associated with
the drilling of holes. It should be noted that although the amount
of cracking shown may seem excessive, when considered relative
to the time in service this number may approach mean values.
158
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The ACI summary for the F-4C/D/E and RF-4C is shown in
Figure 52. This ACI was conducted during CY77 and represents
a survey of 44 aircraft. These aircraft have seen lengths of
service time that vary from one to fourteen years. The mean
service lives are listed below:
F-4C 12.8 Yr
F-4D 10.7 Yr
F-4E 6.9 Yr
RF-4C 10.0 Yr
This group of aircraft is representative of a mid-60's system

implementation.
As shown in Figure 52 there are several incidents worthy

of note. Occurrences of cracking, corrosion, fastener related
incidents, fastener-hole-related incidents, and wear are rela-
tively normal. On the other hand the amount of honeycomb damage
is abnormally high. There are no reported occurrences of
maintenance-related type incidents, i.e., dents/nicks/ scratches,
maintenance, or miscellaneous incidents.
Figures 53 and 54 are ACI summaries for F/FB-IIIA and

F-111C aircraft, respectively, Although these aircraft, which are quite
similar, have seen different service times, they show similar
trends. The predominant examples are in cracking, corrosion,
and in fastener-related incidents. The F/FB-IIIA ACI reports no
maintenance-related problems, whereas F-111C shows 22% of problems
maintenance related.
Analytical Condition Inspection results for the C-5A trans-

ports are shown in Figure 55. Of interest here are the number
of fastener-related and honeycomb-related problems. The high
occurrence of honeycomb delaminations is to be expected since
aircraft of this type use, on a percentage basis, more structural
honeycomb.
The F-15A ACI results, shown in Figure 56 do not reflect

any trends, to be established later, seen in the aforementioned
systems. This particular aircraft, the youngest fully deployed
system in the Air Force inventory, is representative of state-
of-the-art design and materials technology. The combination of
age and technology yields the low or non-existant percentages in
all categories other than fastener related. This particular ACI
has a limited data base and therefore is not included in the
following trends.
166
The results shown in Figures 51 through 56 are combined
into one composite figure, as shown in Figure 57. The average
frequency of occurrence for a given incident during any inspec-
tion are noted. The numerical ranking of incidents is as
follows:
1. Cracking
2. Corrosion
3. Maintenance
4. Fastener Related
5. Dents/Nicks/Scratches..
6. Wear
7. Miscellaneous
8. Honeycomb Delaminates/Damage
9. Fastener Hole Related
The above rankings are considered to be "generallyl''l

applicable to all aircraft systems in the Air
Force inventory. Granted each system undergoes usage variations
and has its own particular idiosyncrasies that surface in ACI
type reports. But these trends are believed to be consistent.
The above ranking may change once service data are obtained from
some of the newer aircraft e.g., F-15, F-16, F-18 etc.
Several interesting correlations can be made to demonstrate the
consistency of the ACI findings. Table 22 shows the percent of
occurrence for the T-39A, F/FB-IIIA, F-IIlC, C-5A, and F-4 aircraft.
In Table 22, consistent trends are noted for the combined percent
occurrences of cracking (A) and corrosion (B) for the various air-
craft surveyed. For example, the % occurrences for A + B ranges
from 43% to 57%. In the same manner the combination of fastener
related incidents, dents/nicks/scratches, and fastener-hole re-
lated incidents yield less consistent values. If the miscellaneous
category is included, a nearly constant value is obtained. Other
combinations yielding uniform values are the combination of "main-
tenance"-related categories, i.e., dents/nicks/scratches and fas-
tener-hole related and maintenance-related incidents.
In most of these combinations there is no interrelationship.
The point of these examples is to show that for all aircraft sys-
tems of some minimum age a relatively constant percentage
of each maintenance exercise will address the repair of certain
incidents. The conclusions that can be drawn from these data
are:
1. For this assessment, the Analytical Condition

Inspection was the best source of data for
evaluating structural durability.
167
TABLE 22 Percent Occurrences For ACI Recorded Incidents
ACI % OCCURRENCES
INCIDENT T-39A F-4 F/FB-LLLA F-111C C-5A AVE
A. Cracking 44 28 17 22 34 29
B. Corrosion 13 23 28 26 9 19.8
C. Fastener Related 10 11 5 8 17 10
D. Dents/Nicks 11 0 16 7 3 7.4
Scratches
E. Honeycomb Damage 1.2 30 12 2 7 10.4
F. Fastener Hole 1.2 3 3 0 4 2.2

Related
G. Wear 9 4 14 4 11 8.4
H. Maintenance 11 0 0 22 13 9.2
I. Miscellaneous 0 0 3 9 2 2.8
A+ B 57 51 45 48 43 48.8
C+ D+ F 22.2 14 24 15 24 19.8
C + D + F +I 22.2 14 27 24 26 22.6
D+ H+ F 23.2 3 19 29 20 18.8
168
2. In general, similar types of structural prob-
lems occur for different aircraft,
3. As the rate of corrosion occurrence decreases

with improved materials technology, other
material-related problems occur, yielding a
relatively constant percentage of "structural
occurrences.;I
4. The F-15A fighter exhibits anomalous behavior

relative to other aircraft systems, possibly
establishing a trend of increased structural
durability.
5. Improved methods are needed for tracking struc-

tural incidents at the maintenance depot level
to allow a more accurate evaluation of struc-
tural performance.
6. A voluminous data bank for durability was

collected during the survey for most of the
aircraft in the U.S. Air Force active in-
ventory. Detailed assessment of these data
is beyond the task, funds, and schedule for
this report. These data are on file at the
contractor's facility.
169
APPENDIX A
DURABILITY METHODS DEVELOPMENT
STRUCTURAL ASSESSMENT RESULTS
FLEET INFORYATION: Fill in blanks and/or check (• ) applicability.
A/C DESIGNATION:
Fighter ( ); Trainer ( ); Bomber ( ); Cargo/Transport ( );
Other ( )
SYSTEM MGT: SMALC ( ); OOALC ( ); SAALC ( ); W•-LC ( ); OCALC ( )
DATE TRANSFERRED TO AFLC:
PRIMARY BASE:
PRIJLAkRY MISSION TYPE:
HOW IS A!RCAF- BEING USED? e.g. MORE/LESS SEVJERE --A_ DESIGN USAGE"
RE7-MARKS:
FORM OF STRUCTURAL AND/OR MATERIAL DEGRADATION
MODE:
( ) STATIC ( ) GALLING
( ) FATIGU•E CACKNG C ) OTHER
( ) CORROSION.N FATIGUE R--fARKS
( ) FRETT:NG
( ) WEAR
STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION DOCUMENTATION
METALLURGICAL OR FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT NO. AND TLE
DISCREPA.NCY DA SHEET, LOG ENTRY, ETC; TO FULLY DOCCI-

.ENT FINDINGS
?.ART NO. A._ TITLE
171
AIRCRAFT LOCATION: ( ) WING ( ) CONTROL SURF
( ) FUSELAGE ( ) SPEED BRAKE
( ) VERT. TAIL ( ) OTHER
( )HORIZ. TAIL LOC. DETAIL
e.g. station,
B.L., W.L., outer skin, inner skin, etc.
LOCATION OF ORIGIN: ( ) FASTENER HOLE

() RADII
( ) NOTC-
( ) COUNTERSINK/
C' BORE
( ) OTHE7R
R&4.ARKS
CRACKING DESCRIPTION:
(a) origin, (b) initial flaw size, (c) crack length, (d) other.
MATERIAL:
Form, temper, heat treat, etc.
DESIGN: ( ) ORIGINAL: ( ) MODIFICATION
DISCOVERED. How. When: ( ) ROLTINE INSP.

( ) ASE INSP.
( ) OT'•ER
RE14AIKS
PREVIOUS CRACKING /DEGRADATION {XPERIENCE:
( ) INITIAL
()REPEATDn
( ) FREQUENCY
REMARKS
172
PROBABLE CAUSE
DES IGN RELATED (
( ) SHARP RADII ( ) COUNTERSINK/C'BCRE

( ) NOTCHES ( ) SHORT EDGE DIS.,ANCE
( ) SEALANT GROCVES ( ) OTHER
( ) FASTENER RELATED (TENSION REMARKS
BOLTED JOINTS)
) IS THIS INFC. DOCUMENTED :N AFOREMENTIONED REPOR: (i.e., MET-

ALLURGICAL, FAILURE ANALYSIS, ETC.)
MATERIAL RELATED " )
( ) PLATE, ( ) FORGING, ( ) CASTING, ( ) EXTRUSION

( ) IMPROPER SELECTION
( ) DEFECTS
FLAWS: ( ) METALLURGICAL. ) MANUFACTURING, DTHER
DENTS: ( ) 700L MARKS, HANDLING, ( ) OTHER
SCRATCHES:: , ) AXIAL, CIRCUMFERIENTIAL
( ) •IPROPER HEAT TREATMENT
( ) CHEMISTRY
( ) OTHER
REEMARRKS
SURFACE TREAT.ENT ( )
( ) CHROMIC ANODIZED ( ) OTHER

( ) SULFURIC ANCDIZED REMARKS
( ) CHEM. FILM__
( ) FINISH: RMS
( ) SHOT PEE=WE_
HOLES (
( ) WEAR AS IN PANEL REMOVAL

( ) DRILL DAMAGE
( ) ELLIPTICAL
( ) COUNTERSINK
( ) DOUBLE DR:LLED
REMARKS
173
MANUFACTURING RELATED ( )
( ) MACHINING ( ) IMPROPER TOOLING

( ) FORMING ( ) OTHER
( ) ETCHING REMARKS
( ) DIMENSIONAL ACCURACY
BONDING RELATED ( )
( ) MATERIALS
( ) ADHESIVES
( ) PROCEDURES
( ) OTHER
REMARKS
ASSMBLY/INSTALLATION RELATED (
( ) PRE-LOAD
( ) MISMATCH/MATING
( ) MOD/REPAIR
( ) OTHER
REMARKS
ENVIRONMENT RELATED (
( ) SUSTAINED STRESSES
( ) CORROSIVE ENVIRONENT
( ) GALVANIC CELL
( ) PITS, SCRATCHES
( ) OTHER
REMARKS
MAINTENANCE RELATED (
( ) IMPROPER HANDLING
( ) USAGE FREQUENCY
( ) INADEQUATE INSPECTION
( ) IMPROPER RIGGING
( ) SERVICE INDUCED
( ) OTHER
REMARKS
ARE COST DATA AVAILABLE FOR REPAIR AND/OR MOD OF THIS DISCREPANCY/
FAILURE? YES NO
COST DATA
LIST OF ANALYTICAL CONDITION
INSPECTION (ACI) REPORTS
174
APPENDIX B
T-38 TEARDOWN INSPECTION RESULTS
A. BACKGROUND
The CY 76 T-38 ACI was a teardown inspection of ten Tactical Air Command
wings that were retired at service life. The findings of the ACI indicated
the presence of generalized fatigue cracking in critical area fastener/drain

holes. The fatigue condition of high time Air Training Command (ATC) wings
is unknown, and present NDI techniques are considered incapable of detecting
the extremely small crack sizes expected. Due to the susceptibility of the
lower wing skin to fatigue cracking and the advancing age of the fleet, it
is essential to determine the condition of high time ATC wings to implement
long range logistics support of the ATC fleet.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this program is :o provide special teardown inspection
data on the condition of three (3) high time ATC wing assemblies, emphasizing
fatigue cracking in the fastener/drain holes, corrosion effects, and
mechanical condition of the skin regarding the presence of rework areas and
mechanical damage which may create scress raisers in the assembly.
C. SCOPE
The scope of the program was to perform a special teardo-wn isnpection on
three (3) high time ATC wing assemblies. The designated area inspected was
the lower wing skin spanwise between the landing gear ribs and fcra/aft from
the 39% spar to the 44% spar, and all speed brake attach and drain holes.
The internal zomponents of the wing assembly in this area were also inspected.
The levels of inspection utilized in this program included visual, fluorescent
penetrant, fractographic, and SEM inspection of selected specimen flaws.
The inspected high time wing assenbly serial numbers and associated flight tirme
hours are listed below:
"* Wing No. Ii - SN 63-8202, 6257.6 hours

"* Wing No. 12 - S/N 65-10440, 5445 hours
"• Wing No. 13 - S/N 62-3618, 8277 hours
175
D. TEARDOWN INSPECTION FINDINGS
1. WinZ Assembly No. 11, S/N 63-8202
a. Visual Inspection. Initial visual inspection of this wing
assembly revealed the presence of an epoxied scab patch at the 44% spar which
covered hole numbers 11-H-1345 through 11-1-1363. The scab patch was not
painted nor was the wing skin surface in the vicinity of the patch. Once the
fasteners were removed from this area closer inspection revealed:
0 the presence of a shim between the scab patch and the skin
covering hole numbers 11-H-1353 and 11-H-1354. This shim was
installed to cover the rework area over these holes having a
radius of 1.1 inches,ground to a depth of .045 inch.
• seventeen (17) of the niaeteen (19) countersinks in the scab
patch were poorly drilled as evidenced by the gouges and thin
flaking material at the countersink/epoxy interface.
* the scab patch countersinks were not drilled for oversized jo-
bolts as evidenced by the large bearing area of epoxy in the
countersinks (refer to Figure 3 for an illustration of a typical
scab patch fastener hole)
Thirty-two (32) fastener holes were reported to have gouged or scored hole/
countersink surfaces and out-of-round shape. In addition to these flaws, the
fastener holes listed below contained the flaws noted, for which photographs
are presented in Appendix A.
"o11-G-1118: Intergranular corrosionw-zrrosion penetration at

countersink
"*11-H-1353: Misdrill or gcuge in hole
"*11-1-1356:
11-1-1357:) Intergranular corrosion between the two fastener holes -
corrosion penetration at score in countersink of hole no. 11-H-1356
176
"* 1!-J-1948: Large delamination crack
"*1l-K-2314: Metal smears in hole surface
"*11-M-1391: Possible stress corrosion penetration in countersink

surface
"*1!-R-1437:
lI-R-1438:j Intergranular corrosion between the two fastener holes -
corrosion penetration suspected at score in countersink of hole no.
!1-R-1437
"*11-S-1245: Intergranular corrosion-corrosion penetration at

ccuntersink
Note that the intergranuiar corrosion flaws in hole nos. 1i-T-1356, 1357 and
11-R-1437, 1'33 are in approximately sym.,etrical locations alcng the 44% spar.
b, Fluorescent Penetrant inspection. Table B-I summarizes the
fluorescent .-&netrant inspection flaws detected in the intecnal components
of wing assc-nmiy No. 11. All of these reported flaws were within the acceptable
limits specified by TO IT-38A-3, Structural Repair.
C. Microscooic/Fractographic Irspection. Table B-2 summarizes
the significant microscopic/fractographic inspection results.

Of the twenty ,20) specimens selected for SEM analysis, seventeen (17) contained
scored countersink/hole surfaces which may have acted as srress raisers in the
propagaticn Df the fatigue or delamination cracks (refer c_- A:pendix A for the
data tables and SEM photographs).
177
0
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178'
2. Wing Assembly No. 12, S/N 65-10-140
a. Visual Inspection. Forty-three fastener holes were reported
to have gouged or scored hole/countersink surfaces and out-of-round shape. In
addition, the flaws noted below were detected on the lower wing skin:
* Wing Skin rtadius at 44% Soar, WS36, Wing Cut Section I:

Additional radius machined in landing gear door lands.
Additional fastener hole. Landing gear door fretting to a
depth of .027 inch. Tang fretting.
* 12-P-1418: Fretting damage observed on the faying surface

between the skin and root rib lower flange.
o Wing Skin Radius at 44' Szar, WS26, Wing Cut S'z:ion P:

.. ultiple rework radii.
b. Fluorescent Penetrant Insoection. No flaws were detected
on the lower wing skin or internal components of wing assembly No. 12 using
fluorescent penetrant.
c. Microscopic/Fractographic :nspection. Table B-3 summarizes
the significant findings of the microscopic/fractographic inspection. Of
the 12 specimens selected for SEM analysis, all contained scored countersink/
hole surfaces which may have acted as stress raisers in the propagation of the
fatigue or delamination cracks.
179
0
4 w*-4 en
E-4 W X
0
ca,
414
E-4
0
-44
1-44
z-4 w_ __
CJ co
o 0o
-44
r-4 A
f ci
18
3. Wing Assembly No. 13, S/N 62-3618
a. Visual Inspection. Thirty-five fastener holes were
reported to have gouged or scored hole/countersink surfaces and out-of-round
shape. In addition, the flaws noted below were detected on the lower wing skin
"* 13-J-1371: Grind marks on skin surface around countersink.

Possible corrosion in countersink.
"* 13-K-2004: Metal smear in fastener hole.
"* 13-K-2006: Metal smear in fastener hole.
"o 13-M-2014: Intergranular corrosion at faying surface of hole.
* 13-P-2090: Intergranular corrosion at faying surface of hole.
* 39% Spar, Wing Cut Section J: Corrosion and fretting indicated

the presence of foreign material between wing skin and lower
spar cap.
* 44% Spar, Wing Cut Section J: Corrosion and fretting indicated

the presence of foreign material between root rib and lower
spar cap.
* Wing Skin Radius at 44% Spar, WS 26, Wing Cut Section J:

Corrosion and fretting indicated the presence of foreign
material between the wing skin and lower flange of the root
rib.
* Root Rib, Wing Cut Section J: Corrosion and fretting indicated

:he presence of foreign material between the wing skin and the
lower flange of the root rib.
0 Wing Skin Radius at 44% Spar, WS36, Wing Cut Sec:ion J: Landing
gear door fretting. Tang fretting.
0 Wing Skin Radius at 44% Spar, WS 36, Wing Cut Section Q: Landing
gear door fretting. Tang fretting.
* Wing Skin Radius at 44% Spar, WS 64.8, Wing Cut Section S:

Rework Radius.
181
b. Fluorescent Penetrant Inspection. TableB-4 summarizes the
fluorescent penetrant inspection flaws detected in the internal components of
wing assembly No. 13. These flaws were within the acceptable limits specified
by TO 1T-38A-3, Structural Repair.
c. Microscopic/Fractographic Inspection. Table B-5 summarizes
the significant findings of the microscopic/fractographic inspection. Of the
21 specimens selected for SEM analysis, all contained scored countersink/hole
surfaces which may have acted as stress raisers in the propagation of fatigue
or delamination cracks.
182
0
-H AjO 0 C14
Co 0c"a- 600wr4 r
p 44 0
4J 0 41u
).4 00 -A
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0 C:~ 0 "41- 0
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18
E. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1. VISUAL INSPECTION
Of the 1223 holes inspected on the high time ATC.wing assemblies, 110
holes were reported to have damaged countersink/hole surfaces and out-of-
round shape. This condition was further supported by SEM photographs of
selected hole specimens.
A significant finding of the visual inspection was the detection of obvious
intergranular corrosion in fastener holes on wing assembly No. 11. In two
instances (hole Nos. 11-1-1356-57 and hole Nos. 11-R-1437-38) the intergranular
corrosion propagated between the fastener holes via corrosion entry at scores in
the countersinks. These flaws were in approximately symmetrical locations at
the 44% spar plane on the wing assembly, which indicates the susceptibility of
this area to stress and intergranular corrosion flaws if not detected in periodic
inspections. A third significant intergranular corrosion flaw (hole No. 11-S-
1245) propagated from a score in the countersink to the wing skin surface where
the skin material began to bubble and flake.
An additional significant finding of the visual inspection on wing assembly
No. 13 was the indication of foreign material between the wing skin faying sur-
face and the internal components. This indication was evidenced by the presence
of fretted areas which contained corrosion effects. This condition if persis-
tent could create stress raisers which could lead to stress corrosion cracking
in the internal components.
184
2. FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION
The fluorescent penetrant inspection did not reveal any significant findings
since all detected cracks were within the acceptable limits. A recurring flaw,
reported in the previous ACI, was detected in the 44% spar where it attaches
to the root rib on wing assembly No, 13.
3. MICROSCOPICIFRACTOGRAPHIC INSPECTION
Table B-6 summarizes significant crack data recorded from the microscopic/
fractographic inspection. A significant finding of the SEV analysis is that 50
of. the 53 specimens analyzed contained scores or gouges, and that fatigue
cracks, where noted, appeared to propagate from these gouges.
185
o-%
414
o~j
00cc
0C:
030
o a T
-4 w
0.. C
04 C
"" 00
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186
LIST OF REFERENCES
1. Manning, S. D.,
Flanders, M. A., Garver, W. R., and Kim, Y. H.,
Durability Analysis: State-of-the-Art Assessment, AFFDL-TR-79-
3118, Vol. II, Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, September
1979.
2. F/FB-lIIA Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Master Plan,

Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH,
28 February 1978.
3. Durability and Damage Tolerance Assessment, Phase II, Final

Report T-39 Aircraft, NA-77-599, Rockwell International, 1977.
4. Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Master Plan for T-37 B/C

Aircraft, Apr. 1970, Revised, June 1977, San Antonio Air Logistics
Center, Kelley AFB, TX, 78241.
5. Kerr, C. J. and Ursell,

C. R., Teardown Inspection of High Time
Air Training Command T-38 Wings, USAF Contract No. F41608-76-C
A576, March 1978.
6. Structural Integrity Program Master Plan B-52, ALL T/M/S,

January 1978.
7. Griffin, L. D. and Latterman, D., Service Experience - Materials

and Processes, 9th Annual SAMPE Conference, Atlanta, GA,
October 1977.
8. Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Master Plan for KC-135

(All Mods), 10 June 1977.
9. KC-135 Cyclic Test Article Teardown Inspection, AFML/MX-77-76,

Air Force Materials Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio,
November 1977.
10. Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Master Plan For C-5A

System 410A, July 1973, Revised December 1974.
11. Aircraft Structural Integrity Program Plan, Fairchild Republic

Company, 15 June 1978.
12. Fractographic Examination of A-7D ASIP Initial Quality Speci-

mens, LTV Corp., June 1975.
187
13. An Equivalent Initial Flaw Analysis of the A-7D Wing Fatigue
Test, LTV, Corp., May 1975.
188

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AFFDL-TR-79-3118

DURABILITY METHODS DEVELOPMENT

TECHNICAL REPORT AFFDL-TR-79-3118, VOL. III

Final Report for Period April 1978 - June 1979

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

AIR FORCE FLIGHT DYNAMICS LABORATORY

Best Available Copy

Jp S L. RUDD DAVEY L. SMITH

FOR THE COMMANDER

RALPH L. KUSTER Jr., Colonel, USAF

Copies of this report should not be returned unless return is required by

AFFDL-TR-79-3118, Vol. III

DURABILITY METHODS DEVELOPMENT Final Technical Report

Fort Worth Division, P.O. Box 748 24010118

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Oh 45433 188

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Attack aircraft, air logistic centers, bomber aircraft, durability

DD 1 JA73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETF UNCLASSIFIED

This program is conducted by General Dynamics, Fort

This report (Volume III) is one of the five volumes

Volume I - Phase I Summary

This report is published only for the exchange

II STRUCTURAL STATE-OF-THE-ART ASSESSMENT 3

2.1 Structural S.O.A. Assessment Approach 3

2.1.1 Structural S.O.A. Assessment

2.2 Data Search and Acquisition 6

2.2.1 Air Logistic Center Visits 7

3.1 Fighter Aircraft 13

3.1.1 F-100 Series 13

3.2 Trainer Aircraft 64

3.2.1 T-37 Series 64

3.3 Bomber Aircraft 79

3.3.1 B-52 Series 79

3.3.2 FB-111A Fighter/Bomber 91

3.4 Cargo/Transport Aircraft 103

3.4.1 C-130 Series 103

3.5 Attack Aircraft 147

3.5.1 A-10 Aircraft 147

IV OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 157

APPENDIX A: Durability Methods Development

APPENDIX B: T-38 Teardown Inspection Results 175

1 Structural State-of-the-Art Assessment Program

2 Durability Survey Outline 5

3 Durability Survey Sources 9

4 Air Logistic Centers Visited 10

5 Aircraft Types Surveyed 11

6 F-4 Significant Test Failures 21

7 F-4 Significant Service Failures 22

8 F-4 Significant Service Failures (Stress Corrosion) 23

9 F-1l1A (A-4) Fuselage Test Program Summary 36

10 F-l11A (FW #1) Wing Carry-Through Box Component

11 F-l11A (FW #2) Wing Carry-Through Box Component

12 F-l1A (A-4) Vertical Tail Component Test Results 39

13 F-111A (A-4) L/H Wing Test Program Results 40

14 ECP 10212 Wing Test Results 41

15 F-16 Structural Arrangement and Materials 58

16 F-16 Durability Airframe Test Results For 1st 8000-

17 F-16 Durability Test Results at 8000 Hours Including