Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger

Author(s): Selusi Ambrogio

Source: Frontiers of Philosophy in China , March 2018, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March 2018), pp. 55-
71
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27073786

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Front. Philos. China 2018, 13(1): 55–71
DOI 10.3868/s030-007-018-0005-0

SPECIAL THEME

Selusi Ambrogio

Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger: Reopening a Debate

on Ontology and Ethics
Abstract In this paper I investigate differences and similarities in the
definitions of human being and human essence as proposed by two of the most
influential thinkers of 20th-century world philosophy, namely Mou Zongsan and
Martin Heidegger. I first examine a number of interpretations put forth by
scholars that assess the philosophical compatibility of the thought of the two
philosophers. Each of these assessments tend to agree that they are incompatible
with each other based on what they perceive as an absolute distance between
Mou’s and Heidegger’s ways of thinking. Although these studies are pioneering
and show an in-depth understanding of Mou’s thought, none demonstrate a
correct understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy. Therefore, I will attempt to
demonstrate that, despite their differences, the ontological and ethical theses of
Mou and Heidegger have several striking points of contact. I will also put forth
the claim that Heidegger’s post-turn philosophy is more compatible with Mou’s
philosophy than Kant’s system.

Keywords Mou Zongsan, Martin Heidegger, ethics, ontology, ontological

ethics, opening

I begin this paper by examining three relevant assessments of the philosophical

compatibility between the thought of Mou Zongsan and Martin Heidegger, and I
classify them according to the scale of: (1) irrelevance, (2) strong conflict, (3)
light conflict.
The first assessment is from Serina Chan (2011) in her valuable work, The
Thought of Mou Zongsan. In it, she relegates the impact of Heidegger on the
Chinese philosopher to note number 35 on page 129, where she contests an
article by Sébastian Billioud on Mou and Heidegger that I will quote as an
instance of strong conflict. She argues that Mou did not receive any influence

Selusi Ambrogio ( )
Department of Humanities, University of Macerata, Macerata 62100, Italy
E-mail: aselusi@yahoo.it

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56 Selusi Ambrogio

from Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, and she goes on to argue that Mou’s
thought is in many ways religious while Heidegger’s is thoroughly non-religious.
She states:

I find Heidegger fascinating, but given the fundamental divergence between

him and Kant in spirit as well as in theory, I have to say that the possibility of
Kant’s works having to be interpreted in Heidegger’s way is nil. (Chan 2011,
129)

The problem with this reasoning is that it is completely lacking in textual

evidence. Her argument is based on a “Kant only” interpretation of Mou’s
thought that provides an invaluable work on the Neo-Confucian, Confucian, and
Kantian influences on him, but completely disregards Heidegger. Her reason for
this exclusion is an assumption that Heidegger is a “non-religious” thinker, a
nearly unbelievable statement. Heidegger studied theology in Freiburg and wrote
on Duns Scoto, Saint Paul, Saint Augustine, Luther, and Kant. He devoted his
life as a philosopher to the question of the sacred, and his description of aletheia
is indebted to a substantial analysis of God’s attributes.1 We can find a simple
proof of his religiosity in the famous interview “Only a God can save us.” The
fact that in his early years Heidegger broke with Catholicism does not by itself
suggest that his thought is “non-religious.” He can be considered a
“non-Catholic,” even “non-Christian,” thinker. On this basis, if Heidegger is
“non-religious,” then so is Mou. Therefore, Chan’s “irrelevance approach” based
on this incompatibility between the two authors because of Heidegger’s
irreligiosity is untenable.
Chan’s target in dismissing any relation between these philosophers is
supplied by the dense and complex article by Billioud (2006), which deals with
Mou and the Heideggerian interpretation of Kant. Billioud’s main argument is
that the ontology of Heidegger and of Mou are strongly conflictual, and this leads
to the assessment that the thought of both are in strong conflict with each other.
Billioud writes:

[… this article] posits that Mou Zongsan’s appropriation of Kant to build up

his metaphysical system encountered one real obstacle, which was
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason in the Kantbuch
(Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics) …. In fact, Heidegger and Mou both

1
For examples which demonstrate the relevance of Heidegger’s philosophy of religion, see
Vedder (2006), Macquarrie (1973) and the incisive Caputo (1993). Moreover, these are only a
few references in English, since the books devoted to Heidegger’s religious, spiritual, and
mystical thought are countless in German, French, Italian, etc.

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 57

link their conceptions of the practical subject with understandings of ontology

which are totally incompatible. If Kant’s works have to be interpreted in
Heidegger’s way, the whole philosophical system of Mou Zongsan is
threatened. (Billioud 2006, 225–26)

Chan denies that there is any threat in this because she holds that the
philosophies of the two thinkers, Mou and Heidegger, completely irrelevant to
each other, too far apart to have any positive or negative reciprocal effect on the
another. In contrast, Billioud states that Mou openly attacks Heidegger’s
ontology as vague and ineffective, and he argues that Mou requires a
“transcendent metaphysics” (chaojue xingshangxue 超绝形上學 ) in order to
anchor his ethical philosophy, while Heidegger allows only an “immanent
metaphysics” (neizai xingshangxue 内在形上學) as the correct interpretation of
Kant. According to Mou, man cannot perfect his nature in the absence of a
transcendent principle for which to strive. The power of “imagination” that
fulfills Heidegger’s main constructive argument in Kant-Buch, is seen by the
Chinese philosopher as a weak power that, although Mou does not use this term,
represents a kind of dangerous relativism wherein moral principles or values
become only phenomena. The following quote clarifies Billioud’s standpoint:

Anchoring practical reason in transcendental imagination, Heidegger pulls

ethics and its foundations into the field of his fundamental ontology, which
Mou only considers as an ontology of the phenomenal world. In so doing, it is
for MouZongsan the very essence of Chinese philosophy—the recognition of a
link between the cosmos and human subjectivity in its moral and creative
activity, the affirmation of a constitutive identity between the original mind
(benxin) and the intelligible principle (li) governing a myriad of things—which
is doomed. (Billioud 2006, 241–42)

Mou’s entire theoretical and historical system is in fact threatened if Kant is to be

interpreted as according to Heidegger’s understanding since there is not any
room for any transcendent principle that could inspire human life while it
governs nature.
Now we turn the third approach—i.e. “light conflict”—suggested by Lau Po
Hei (2015), a professor from Hong Kong and an expert on Mou, who
convincingly shows that Mou Zongsan simply inherited Heidegger’s ontological
interpretation of Kant. Widely quoting the Chinese philosopher, Lau shows that
Heidegger’s impact on him was decisive because, thanks to the German
philosopher, Mou changed his understanding of Kant, he eschewed
interpretations of that approached his thought in terms of scientific logic, instead

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58 Selusi Ambrogio

strictly approaching it as ontology. After a dense series of illustrations on this,

Lau sums up in writing:

Now finally we might understand that both of the main theories that Mou
provides in Phenomenon and Thing-in-itself—namely that man can have
intellectual intuition and that although man is finite he can become
infinite—are not purely theories originating in Mou’s thought but instead are
effects of his reading of Heidegger’s Kant-Buch.2 (Lau 2015, 169)

In support of his reading, it is notable that Esther C. Su adds to the translation of

the fourth chapter of Mou’s autobiography (Mou 2015a) his translation of the
Preface to the second edition of the Critique of the Cognitive Mind (1987), where
Mou blames himself for reading in the years 1956 and 1957—i.e. the years he
wrote the first edition of this book—Kant’s Critics only through logic, when the
correct understanding of the Königsberg philosopher is ontological (Mou 2015a,
112–15; see also the editor’s note number 25 on page 104). Additionally, the
opening explanation (shuoming 说 明 ) to the edition of Zhi de Zhixue yu
Zhongguo Zhexue 智 的 直 學 與 中 國 哲 學 (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese
Philosophy) (Mou 2003a) states in no uncertain terms that Mou was introduced
to Heidegger’s Kant-Buch (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics) and the
Introduction to Metaphysics in 1968, which compelled him to write this book
over the course of the following three years. Therefore, it is clear that these two
milestones of the Chinese philosopher’s thought directly emerged from his
reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. This fact alone demonstrates the
relevance of their philosophical relation. Without Heidegger, as Mou admits,
there could never be an ontological interpretation of Kant, only logical and
epistemological ones.
Lau rejects Billioud’s thesis concerning Mou’s disregard for Heidegger and
states that Mou not only did not refuse Heidegger’s thought, but he greatly
benefited from it (Lau 2015, 173). Lau accuses Billioud of over-emphasizing
Mou’s criticisms of Heidegger when he employs the term “usurper” (Lau
translates this with cuanqiezhe 竄窃者). We know that Heidegger himself admits
to having used “violence”3 in his reading of Kant, but neither did Mou refuse it
in his general ontological interpretation, he only refused the final ethical
consequences drawn by it. Lau asserts:

2
現在我們終於明白牟宗三在 《 现象 [ 与物自身 ]》 中所宣称的两大命题 ( 一 ﹑ 人可有智的直觉 ;
二﹑人虽有限而可无限)不是纯粹的个人洞见, 而是他阅读海德格尔《康德书》的结果.
3
“[…] 必然地使用暴力,” quoted in Lau (2015, 175). Heidegger himself admitted to imposing
strong hermeneutical interpretations on Kant’s philosophy (Heidegger 1991, 202).

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 59

Mou Zongsan thinks that in interpreting Kant’s route, Heidegger used the
correct means, but he went in the wrong direction. The most relevant point in
Kant’s philosophy is his “practical reason,” not “time” as Heidegger argues.
MouZongsan claims that the xin 心 (heart-mind) of traditional Chinese
philosophy is the highest fulfillment of the real meaning of Kant’s philosophy,
and this is why he insists on the fact that “man has intellectual intuition,”
although this thesis completely disregards the violation committed on Kant’s
text.4 (Lau 2015, 176)

Thus, Heidegger violated Kant’s ethical system by interpreting it in an

ontological way, but so did Mou. Mou even went as far as suggesting that man
has “intellectual intuition,” which Kant completely denied. Lau tries not to
offend the Chinese philosopher but, as is evident from his argumentation, where
Heidegger is a usurper (cuanqiezhe), Mou is also.
To summarize, according to Chan, the philosophical thought of Heidegger and
Mou are two lines that never cross; they are irrelevant to each other. Billioud, on
the other hand, views them as intersecting lines which meet in the ontological
interpretation of Kant, but then diverge in opposite directions; they are in strong
conflict with each other. Finally, according to Lau, their thought share a relevant
crossing point at some angle less than 90° and go in different, but not
perpendicular, directions; they are in “light conflict” with each other. The
evidence that I have examined suggests, however, that although their thought is
actually quite different, the philosophical directions and tenets of Heidegger and
Mou are quite similar, and I recognize this as a “moderate convergence.”
There are several studies that explore Heidegger’s influence from Eastern
philosophy and even on Heidegger’s hidden Asian sources. The fruitful exchange
between Japanese philosophy and the German philosopher is well known. Many
of the leading thinkers of the Kyoto School have engaged Heidegger’s thought
and have located several points of contact between the two systems. In his last
years, Heidegger openly dealt with Japanese thinkers, who were also his
university students. For instance, in “A Dialogue on Language,” the professor
Tezuka claimed: “We marvel to this day how the Europeans could lapse into
interpreting as nihilistic the nothingness of which you speak in that lecture [i.e.
‘What is metaphysics?’]. To us, emptiness is the loftiest name for what you mean
to say with the word ‘Being’” (Heidegger 1971, 19). In the context of such
statements, how could it be that Japanese contemporary philosophy, which is
devoted to the ontology of nothingness and ethics, has so many points of contact

4
“在诠释康德的路途上, 牟宗三认为海德格尔用对了方法, 却走错了方向。康德哲学最重要的应该
是其道德意识, 而不是海德格尔所说的时间。牟宗三认为中国传统的‘心’最能勾出康德哲学的真正
意思, 所以他坚持‘人可有智的直觉’, 即使违背康德文本亦在所不计。”

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60 Selusi Ambrogio

with Heidegger—even operating under the assumption that Japanese readers

could understand Heidegger’s thought better than Europeans—while Mou
Zongsan’s thought would be threatened by his philosophy? Certainly,
20th-century Japanese philosophy and Mou’s philosophy are different, but not
that different.
It seems the reason for this more or less apparent “strong conflict” between
our two philosophers lies in the fact that Mou only knew the aforementioned two
works by Heidegger. We know that the Kant-Buch and the Introduction to
Metaphysics, which were written between 1929 and 1935, were read by Mou
between 1968 and 1971, almost forty years later, and at least thirty years after
what is called Heidegger’s kehre or “turn.” Mou never read Heidegger’s magnum
opus, Being and Time (1927), the post-turn Pathmarks (1950), or On the Way to
Language (1959). On the contrary, in Heidegger’s Thought and Chinese Tiandao,
Zhang Xianglong (1996) demonstrates a close compatibility between Chinese
thought—mostly Daoism and Buddhism—and Heidegger’s philosophy. In doing
so, he widely relied on Heidegger’s post-turn books. This suggests the second
Heidegger, owing to a shift of focus (on hermeneutics, ethics, human life,
anti-nihilism, critics of technique, and so on), provides a richer opportunity for a
comparison with Mou. This point is best illustrated by showing a few points of
contact between both of their late works, since in their old ages their thoughts
became closer, both of them having in fact undergone a kehre.
Rather unfortunately, none of the three previously-examined assessments
consider an old, but still invaluable, article written by Chan Wing-cheuk (陳榮灼),
“Confucian Moral Metaphysics and Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology” (1984),
in which he compared Confucianism—mostly following Mou’s version—and
Heidegger. He identified a strong “common ontological orientation” between
them, as well as six other similarities that can be summarized as follows: (1)
Human being has a special status among all beings because of his relation with
Being; (2) humans are the place of revelation of this Being; (3) human thought is
not anthropocentric, since the revelation is of Being through men; (4) Being is an
ontological movement, therefore human being has a dynamic essence; (5) Being
cannot be studied through species or genres (in this, I would also add that both of
them distrust Science and Technique as a correct approaches to Being, since
these are good only for the study of the ontic realm); and (6) both Heidegger and
Mou:

[…] stress the thesis of the primacy of praxis. While Heidegger focuses on the
“self-to-self behavior” (Sichzusichverhalten) of Dasein, Confucianism begins
with the moral practice of the human being. In other words, for both of them
the self-understanding of the human being cannot be construed in terms of the

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 61

subject-object dichotomy; rather, as a form of existence, it involves the

pre-objective practical participation of the human being. (Chan 1984, 193–94)

This sixth point reveals both similarities and differences between Mou and
Heidegger. As Chan says: “While Confucianism lifts the moral mind to an
onto-cosmological level, Heidegger merely understands the moral consciousness
as an ontical phenomenon” (Chan 1984, 193–94). Therefore, according to Chan,
among these several similarities, the biggest difference between Mou and
Heidegger is in the role of ethics. Billioud reads Heidegger’s ethics more or less
in the same perspective, but his thesis pertaining to the incompatibility and
threatening seems exaggerated when we consider the points of contact raised by
Chan.
A detailed comparison of the many works by both philosophers is outside the
scope of this essay. Therefore, I will limit myself to a focus on three
representative books: Mou’s Nineteen Lectures on Chinese philosophy 2003b),5
Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (1998, published in Pathmarks), and the
above-mentioned On the Way to Language. The Nineteen Lectures comprise the
collected lectures Mou delivered to graduate students at National Taiwan
University in 1978. Being Mou’s penultimate work, it contains his last and most
refined thinking on the theory of “vertical teaching vertically or horizontally
expressed” and the “Summum bonum,” two pillars of his mature thought. I will
try to interpret Heidegger’s as a “vertical teaching” in order to understand if his
teaching is horizontally or vertically expressed. We will notice that the argument
turns straight to Heidegger’s ethics (or whether he has one), a topic mostly raised
in the Letter on Humanism.
In the first of the Nineteen Lectures, we find clear evidence supporting the first
four similarities listed above by Chan concerning their two theories of human
being. In effect, Mou defines the existence of human (ren 人) as “in a singular
opening” (zai yi tongkong zhong 在一通孔中): each human as a “through hole” is
the unique metaphysical condition for the manifestation of Truth, which is
denoted as dao 道, the Way, but also as God (shangdi 上帝), Heaven (tian 天), or
Principle (li 理)—all the names of the normative principle sometimes compared
by Mou, not without ambiguity, with God and with different meanings. Each
man is a finite (xianzhi 限制 or youxian 有限) being, while this transcendental
principle (i.e. dao 道, tian 天, li 理) is infinite (wuxian 无限). Mou clarifies this
idea with the statement:

5
For an edition in simplified Chinese characters published in mainland China, see Mou
(2009). Recently an English translation became available, Mou (2015b), but since I do not
always agree with this useful translation, all quotes from this book are my translations.

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62 Selusi Ambrogio

[…] when we are able to understand that this finitude is a metaphysical

necessity, it achieves a positive meaning. We might say that, in order to reveal
itself, the principle [zhenli 真理] needs finitude, since without the latter it
would not be exhibited. Therefore, finitude limits us but, at the same time,
only since we are in this finitude we can embody [tixian chulai 體現出來] the
principle. This is the reason why the [Neo-Confucian] School of the Principle
[lixuejia 理學家] attributed such a great relevance to the qi [氣], that although
immanent, entrapping and limiting us, at the same time, in order to exhibit the
principle [理], we cannot do without it. To distance ourselves from qi, would
be not to exhibit the principle. (Mou 2003b, 10)6

Each human is a specific and unique display of this unspeakable infinite principle
that requires the finite existence of human beings to find “embodiment” (tixian
chulai 體現出來). We are faced here with a clear metaphysical paradox: the
infinite dao needs the finitude of human being, and can only come to display
itself because of this “opening” that is human being. The paradox emerges as
Mou proceeds by saying that, clearly, the body limits the manifestation of dao,
but this is simply the paradox Zhuangzi named diaogui 弔詭. Chinese civilization
has ever understood the paradoxical nature of human existence as “openness,”
despite the fact that it remains an arduous concept for Westerners to understand,
or so Mou claims (Mou 2003b, 10). The hypothesis in which life provides the
place for dao’s manifestation is one of the perennial topics of Chinese thought,
next to the ancient Greek interest in the study of nature and in the definition of
theoretical reason connected to abstraction and language.
This distinction Mou traces between Chinese and Western cultural thought is
partially correct, but unfair. Mou was very much quite aware that Heidegger had
already been discussing the same topic since the 1920s, yet he imputes to
Western philosophy the “oblivion of Being” present at least since Plato, despite
the fact the German thinker had already shown the limits of Western metaphysics,
and the intrinsic nihilism of the objectivation of Being and beings, in Being and
Time (1927). Moreover, as Lau Po-hei has persuasively demonstrated, Mou’s
new ontological reading of Kant itself emerged from his reading of Heidegger,
the father of modern Western ontology. This is evident in the relation he
identified between Dasein and Sein (Being), which he spoke of in his post-turn
writings as a “sacred clearing” on the way. In On the Way to Language,
Heidegger (I) and his Japanese interlocutor (J) had the following exchange:

6
[…] 如果你了解這限制有它形而上的必然性的時候, 它也有積極的意義。也就是說, 真理必須要
通過這限制來表現, 沒有限制就沒有真理的表現。所以這個限制, 它同時限制你, 同時使你在限制
之中把真理體現出來。因此理學家很看重這個氣, 氣雖然是形而下, 它阻礙, 限制我們, 但同時你
要表現那個理也不能離開氣。離開氣, 理就沒表現。

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 63

J: The distance is the boundlessness which is shown to us in Ku, which

means the sky’s emptiness.
I: Then, man, as the message-bearer of the message of the two-fold’s
unconcealment, would also be he who walks the boundary of the boundless.
J: And on this path he seeks the boundary’s mystery…
I: …which cannot be hidden in anything other than the voice that
determines and tunes his nature. (Heidegger 1971, 41)

Since humans walk on the limits of finitude, they can also encounter the
boundaries of finitude and infinitude. The limits of their existence reveal the
unlimitedness of Being, although this Being could never become the specific
object of his rational knowing. In Being and Time, humans “meet” Being through
a threefold opening or disclosure that comprises angst, auto-projection, and a
speaking that should remain silent (Heidegger 1996, § 60, 273). The similarities
between this characterization of human being offered by Heidegger and what we
presented earlier as Mou’s theory of man as “in a singular opening” (在一通孔中)
are indisputable; however, Mou, having read only the Kant-Buch, could only
vaguely perceive this ontological closeness.
This leads our discussion to the sixth point raised by Chan, which lies partway
between similarity and difference, i.e. ethics. According to Chan, as well as
Billioud and Lau, the strongest difference between the two philosophers is due to
Heidegger’s disregard for ethics, and Mou would completely agree with them.
However, this topic is a vexataquestio wrongly posed. It is true that Heidegger
refuses ethics, but only a form of ethics that states norms and behavior while
disregarding the knowing of truth or reality. Ethics should not be based on values
that express the esteem and convenience of humans; rather, it should serve as a
code of conduct for the doing of positive or negative acts, which are treated as
objects of action and not as autonomous values. This does not mean that
Heidegger considers everything valueless, but that values as typically given in
Western society are valueless, since they disregard Being and truth, thereby
propping up an ethics that ever remains in the oblivion of Being (Heidegger 1998,
265). What he proposes is a renovated ethics:

If the name “ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word θος [i.e.
abode], should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then
that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the
human being, as one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics. (Heidegger 1998,
271)

However, this thinking of Being is in and of itself neither ontology nor ethics,
since it precedes these two disciplines. This originary thinking refers only to the

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64 Selusi Ambrogio

act of staying in the direction of Being, without making of it an object of

knowing or of resolution:

The answer is that such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to
pass [ereignetsich] before this distinction. Such thinking is, insofar as it is,
recollection of Being and nothing else. Belonging to Being, because thrown by
Being into the preservation of its truth and claimed for such preservation, it
thinks Being. (Heidegger 1998, 272)

The term used by Heidegger for the English “recollection” is “Andenken,” which
entails the recovery of the memory of Being. Despite what we could think, this
memory is not passivity but rather continuous action; to recollect here means to
preserve, guard, and shield Being. That is why the human who cares about Being
and Truth is the “shepherd of Being”: “They gain the essential poverty of the
shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the
preservation of Being’s truth” (Heidegger 1998, 260).
The shepherd listens to that which he cares about (his flock) and to what could
endanger it. Listening is the first way of language. This language is not the
language of human communication, but instead the root of language, which calls
to stay in the act of listening to Being. According to Heidegger, language and
listening are the essence of action, and the essence of action is accomplishment
(not production), reachable through preservation and care:

We are still far from pondering the essence of action decisively enough. We
view action only as causing an effect. The actuality of the effect is valued
according to its utility. But the essence of action is accomplishment. To
accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead
it forth into this fullness—producere. Therefore only what already is can really
be accomplished. But what “is” above all is Being. Thinking accomplishes the
relation of Being to the essence of the human being. (Heidegger 1998, 239)

Producere means to produce, and in its root we find the concept of “conduct”
(ducere). Thus, real action is ethical conduct displayed as the act of bringing
(ducere) humans to their essence (pro), namely Being. Humans should actively
nourish their relationship with Being, not because it is useful (as a value), but
rather because this act follows their essence—their human nature that is Being,
the Being they forget in mundane life. According to Heidegger, the ethics of man
is the same as the accomplishment of human nature.7

7
On Heidegger’s ethics, see the invaluable article by Jean-Luc Nancy (2002).

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 65

It is apparent that in this, Mou’s philosophical thought is indeed close to

Heidegger’s, particularly when we realize that the latter in fact did not neglect or
reject ethics. Heidegger speaks of human nature (Wesen) in a fashion that could
be translated into Chinese as xing 性. This nature, as it is in Neo-Confucianism, is
shared by all beings, but only human beings have the capacity of bringing it to
perfection. Heidegger refers to this with the term vollbringen, the act of bringing
the essence of human to the completeness of Being in order to accomplish this
dynamic ontological relation. Now we understand that Chan is only partially
correct when he says that “Heidegger merely understands the moral
consciousness as an ontical phenomenon” (Chan 1984, 194). Ontical morality
does not belong to the essence of human being—as ontological morality does—
but to his superficial, mundane, and volatile social life. Thus, any argument
stressing Heidegger’s lack of ethics is incorrect. While it is true that their ethics
are different, both descend from a superior principle—what Heidegger calls
Being (Sein) or Truth, and what Mou variously names as li 理, dao 道, or tian 天.
Mou, having read only the two aforementioned books, could not recognize this
affinity with Heidegger, and scholars who have studied this philosophical
relation are too influenced by the fact of Mou’s limited familiarity with
Heidegger to fully appreciate this “moderate compatibility.” When Mou speaks
of Heidegger as the philosopher of “immanent metaphysics” (neizai
xingshangxue 内在形上學 ), while Kant is the philosopher of “transcendent
metaphysics” (chaojue xingshangxue 超绝形上學) (Mou 2003b, 20, 47),8 the
misunderstanding is obvious. Billioud helps us in understanding this point in his
article, in which he clearly states that Mou interprets Heidegger’s insistence on
imagination and time as an ontology of phenomena instead of noumena. Mou
misreads in the Kant-Buch the relationship that human beings have with Being,
for which they are shepherd and not owner. Heidegger even describes the
relation between humans and Being as: “[…] remain as wanderers on the way
into the neighborhood of Being” (Heidegger 1998, 262). That is evidently neither
an objectification nor a description of phenomenal content. Billioud again notes:
“In Mou’s perspective, the emergence of our benxin refers to the practical
actualization of the supra-sensible in our lives and, therefore, cannot be a
phenomenon. This generates the radical impossibility of anchoring it in time”
(Billioud 2006, 243).
Here lies the second problem in Mou’s interpretation of Heidegger: the first
understands time as mundane time, while the latter conceptualizes the same
concept as ek-sistence, a never-ending projection that is not concerned with
phenomena but with noumena. Heidegger specifies that “human being occurs
essentially in such a way that he is the ‘there’ [das ‘Da’], that is, the clearing of

8
See also the convincing analysis in Billioud (2006, 236ff).

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66 Selusi Ambrogio

being” (Heidegger 1998, 248) or, in the original German, “Lichtung des Seins”
(Heidegger 1976, 325). Man as a good and active woodcutter prepares, inside the
forest of his life, places for the revelation of Being, the same Being that
determines his essence as human. In order to definitively clarify that Being is
never related to phenomena, I quote again from The Letter on Humanism, where
Heidegger—exhausted by his detractors—states unequivocally: “The
Introduction to Being and Time” (p. 38) says simply and clearly, even in italics,
“Being is the transcendens pure and simple” (Heidegger 1998, 256), Therefore,
Heidegger’s philosophy as “immanent metaphysics” is not an acceptable reading.
When Mou asserts that, from Plato to Heidegger, Western philosophy is only
concerned with a “being” that is self-centered and autonomous (namely,
substance), he clearly betrays Heidegger (Mou 2003, 254). He says Western
philosophy “struggle[s] for Being” (wei shiyou er fendou 為實有而奮鬥), as
opposed to the emptiness of beings or phenomena characteristic of Buddhist
philosophy, i.e. “the struggle for non-Being” (wei qudiao shiyou er fendou 為去掉
實有而奮鬥) (Mou 2003, 254). Mou understands Heidegger’s Sein as substance
or what Heidegger names “the present-at-hand”—the ontic or phenomenal—and
not as a project, a being that asks the question of Being. The critics moved by the
Chinese philosopher to Heidegger are almost identical with Heidegger’s
“struggle” against the Western “oblivion of Being.” Mou adds that Buddhism
“struggle[s] for non-Being,” Daoism refuses the question (and thus does not
“struggle” at all), while Confucianism “struggle[s] for Being.” This struggle
finds its ground in morality, and not in epistemology or science. This is
reminiscent of Heidegger’s “struggle,” in which epistemology and science are
also disregarded.
In his last lecture, Mou deals with the question of the “vertical system”
(zongguan xitong 纵贯系统), which refers to a system that aims for the ultimate
realm, not only at the cognitively real. Essentially, this is a system that respects
transcendence. Each of the three teachings (sanjiao 三教) (Buddhism, Daoism,
Confucianism) are “vertical systems.” However, he distinguishes “vertical
systems vertically expressed” (zongguan zongjiang 縱 貫 縱 講 ), which only
includes Confucianism, from “vertical systems horizontally expressed”
(zongguan hengjiang 縱 貫 橫 講 ), which includes Buddhism and Daoism.
Buddhism is horizontally expressed because it refuses the concepts of God,
creator, origin, etc. Daoism, instead, is horizontally expressed because it
envisages a creation process (as in the Laozi), but man’s attainment of wisdom or
enlightenment lies in contemplation (guanzhao 觀照). The Daoist wise or realized
man, named sheng 聖, does not create anything; he even retreats from action
(wuwei 無為). Only Confucianism has “moral creativity” (daode chuangzaoxing
9
道德創造性) (Mou 2003b, 431), since it acknowledges both the transcendence

9
Mou himself translates in English with “moral creativity.”

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 67

of principle (li 理) as well as the moral capacity of humans to create moral

noumena that descend from his nature (xing 性 ). Humans possess this
transcendent capacity because of their intellectual intuition. This source of virtue
in human nature (xing) is the same as dao. Mou surprisingly acknowledges
Christianity as a “vertical system vertically expressed” because of its belief in
God as Creator and Moral Regulator, although European thought mostly suggests
a heteronomy of will (therefore, humans do not have any moral creativity). Only
Kant proposes a “vertical system vertically expressed” that safeguards free will
and creativity, but it still needs three postulates (free will, God’s existence, and
the immortality of soul), while Confucianism has only xing and, as such, is more
perfected.
Heidegger’s thought, grounded in a transcendent Being that human beings can
meet owing to their nature as “clearing” (Lichtung) opened to the same Being,
perfectly represents a “vertical system.” To decide whether this system is
vertically or horizontally expressed is more complicated. Humans certainly are
endowed with a moral nature from their projection toward Being, but the moral
actions elucidated by Heidegger are completely different from what Mou
describes. Much in alignment with the Chinese tradition, Mou presents the wise
man who follows all social values (li 禮) such as filial piety (xiao 孝), and this
moral activity is the natural and free outcome of his nature. Heidegger portrays
his “wise man” as a shepherd and a wanderer, a clearing for Being, and who
therefore follows a mostly contemplative conduct. Does this mean that
Heidegger is like a Daoist, and thus proposes a vertical system horizontally
expressed? Not necessarily. Although he put forth a less “creative” and “active”
moral system, he provides room for a vertical expression of his system, namely
in language and in poetry, the heart of Heidegger’s late works.
In the second lecture, Mou says that when we prevent the denial of our human
nature, which is “intensional” and not merely rational, we can comprehend the
feelings produced in us through poetry and, above all, by philosophical teachings
such as the one provided by the Three Teachings (Mou 2003, 27). The feelings
that arise from interior understanding are shared by all humans, since all humans
are “openings,” and are therefore all endowed with a “moderate universality”
(xiangdangde pubianxing 相當的普遍性), where “moderate” means adequate in
the sense of a fitting intentionality. An individual’s feeling has not universality in
itself, but it becomes universal when it is shared in an “moderate” form, and
when it achieves the quality of reflection and philosophical reasoning that only a
product of “human nature” (xing) can achieve. Philosophy, particularly of the
Chinese sort, arises when reason is applied to feelings and elevates them to the
level of universality, as all men share the same nature of being an opening for
dao. As such, we can say that, in this lecture, Mou seems to have a good

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68 Selusi Ambrogio

reckoning of the power of poems and philosophical teachings to speak about

heart (xin 心) and nature (xing 性). However, in the nineteenth lecture he states:

Also writers speak of a creativity that originates from spontaneous vitality, but
this creativity derives from a particular power, therefore when this power
decreases also creativity vanishes. […] This creativity derives from a specific
function. On the contrary, the nature of moral creativity is the creativity we
might name “creativity of itself” [chuangzaoxing zishen 創造性自身], therefore
it is noumenal and does not belong to any particular or finite faculty. (Mou
2003b, 431–32)10

According to Mou, literary creation is a product of human finite nature and does
not share any capacity of infinitude. Artistic or written creativity belongs to
human faculties and is not rooted in human nature. Here we are faced with an
incoherence between the two lectures since, in the second, poems and
philosophical teaching are acknowledged as able to transmit “moderate
universality,” while in the last lecture they become product of human limited
functions—beautiful, but pulled up from the deep root of human nature.
In contrast, as is well known, Heidegger raises language, and specifically the
language of poetry, to the role of the aforementioned “clearing” or “Lichtung.”
He explains:

Language is the house of Being. In its home human beings dwell. Those who
think and those who create with words are the guardians of this home. Their
guardianship accomplishes the manifestation of Being insofar as they bring
this manifestation to language and preserve it in language through their saying.
(Heidegger 1998, 239)

Thinkers and poets are the shepherds of Being. Thinking and creating poetry are
superior moral acts, and belong to an “originary ethics” because they display the
power of language that “is the clearing-concealing advent of Being itself”
(Heidegger 1998, 249). Should his readers think of the poetic language as
evocative but ambiguous, rough and inadequate to knowing, Heidegger replies,
“The ambiguity of this poetic saying is not lax imprecision, but rather the rigor of
him who leaves what is as it is, who has entered into the ‘righteous vision’
[gerechten Anschauens] and now submits to it” (Heidegger 1971, 192). Poetic

10
文學家也講創造, 那種創造根源於自然生命, 那只是附屬於一個特定能力之下的創造; 然而一旦
能力發洩完了, 創造也沒有了。[…] 這種創造力隸屬於一個特殊的機能之下。至於呈現道德創造
的性體之為創造性, 叫做創造性自身 (creativity itself), 這創造性自身就是本體, 不隸屬於任何特
殊而有限定的機能。

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Mou Zongsan and Heidegger: Reopening a Debate on Ontology and Ethics 69

language is the meeting point between human being and Being, but it is not a
meeting between God and men, since beings already share the being of Being
and meet it in their projection towards Being itself. This projection is most
adequately expressed in poetry, which does not objectify but keeps the polysemy
of words. Being is polysemic, and human being approaches Being when it
safeguards its polysemic nature that descends from the fact that he is. Thus, he
belongs to the pluripotentiality of Being.

The poet’s work means: to say after—to say again the music of the spirit of
apartness that has been spoken to the poet. For the longest time—before it
comes to be said, that is, spoken—the poet’s work is only a listening.
Apartness first gathers the listening into its music, so that this music may ring
through the spoken saying in which it will resound. (Heidegger 1971, 188)

The language of poetry is evocative because it is preceded by the act of listening.

Therefore, when the language of poetry speaks, it evokes the visions it had while
in the clearing.
Heidegger very rarely presents norms of good moral conduct. At most he says
that, from his system, only three general recommendations descend: “rigor of
meditation, carefulness in saying, frugality with words” (Heidegger 1998, 276).
It is evident that Heidegger’s ethics is too contemplative and undefined for a
Neo-Confucian such as Mou Zongsan, even if both philosophers understand
ontology as action and ethics as a path towards noumena. Although Heidegger
shares in the contemplative with Daoism, he provides a relation with Being that
is not within nature (ziran 自然). Using Heideggerian language, we could say that
for Daoists, human being is always in the “clearing,” since Being is the same as
nature. Heidegger instead calls for an active creation of “clearings.” It is the
contemplation of the shepherd more than of the ascetic. According to this view,
the fact that Being is not the same as nature makes his system transcendental and,
in Mou’s words, vertical and even vertically expressed.
In my conclusions, I want to raise two final points; one is evocative, one is
provocative. The first is a suggestion about the relevance of listening from as
recorded of Confucius (Analects II: 4). As stated in the rich translation by David
R. Schiller:

The Master said, “I was fifteen and dedicated myself to studying. I was thirty
and firmly grounded in the rules for felicitous human relations. I was forty and
rid of moral turbulence. I was fifty and understood the constitutive decree
from celestial order [天命]. I was sixty and my ear was in accord [耳顺] with
that decree. I am now seventy and go along with whatever my heart-mind [心]

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70 Selusi Ambrogio

wants to do without worrying about overstepping the moral carpenter’s square.

(Schiller 2015, 215)

After knowing the correct place I have in society, thanks to a long social and
cultural training, I can control myself, and I can even know the role I have in
maintaining the global harmony (he 和) among all beings. Afterwards, my ears
(er shun 耳顺), i.e. my natural receptivity, become one (attuned) with my mission
as creator of harmony. Therefore, I listen to the decree of Heaven (tianming 天命)
that projects me into the world as an active moral actor. In the end, I act naturally,
following the morality that is inscribed in me. Although culturally far from
Heidegger, I suggest that this ancient biographical description of Confucius
deeply resonantes with Heidegger’s “shepherd of Being” that deserves further
attention.
My last point is a philosophical provocation to both Mou and Billioud
regarding Kant. According to the latter, Mou interprets Heidegger’s thought as a
philosophical danger to his interpretation of Chinese philosophy, a theory that I
called into question. Now I want to raise the following question: for Mou’s
philosophy, is Kant’s refusing the intellectual intuition and precluding noumena
not more threatening than Heidegger’s proposing a philosophy of finitude and an
ontology of action? I suspect Mou is completely aware of that. In fact, at the end
of his last lecture, he pronounces a very revealing sentence criticizing Kant’s
restriction of intellectual intuition only to God:

Therefore, on this point, we cannot entirely follow Kant’s Critic [of Pure
Reason], since this would entail a complete violation of the Chinese tradition
and would make this tradition completely meaningless. (所以在這點上, 我們不
能根據康德的標準往下落, 否則便違反中國的傳統, 使之成為無意義。 ) (Mou
2003b, 442)

Kant’s system, without the violation carried out by Mou Zongsan—i.e. human
intellectual intuition—transgresses Chinese thought more than Heidegger’s
philosophy.

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