Pilar Vda. de Manalo v. Court of Appeals G.R. No.

129242; January 16, 2001

Ruling: * Petitioners claim that petition is an ordinary civil action because the petition contains averments which are indicative of its adversarial nature.

Facts: Troado Manalo died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his 11 children. Troadio left several real properties located in Manila and Tarlac including Manalo's Machine Shop in Quezon City. Respondents (8 of the surviving children) filed a petition in RTC of Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate and for the appointment of Romeo(son) as the administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing and directed the publication thereof. It also directed the service of the said order upon the heirs. On the date of the hearing, the trial court issued an order "declaring the whole world in default, except the government." However, such order was set aside upon motion of petitioners. Several pleadings were subsequently filed by the petitioners: 1. set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time to file opposition; 2. to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; 3. to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; 4. for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge. TC denied the motions. MR was also denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition for No. The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, shall be controlling. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition also contains an enumeration of the names of the legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the orders of the TC which denied the motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate.

Angela Rodriguez v. Hon. Juan de Borja L-21993; June 21, 1966

issue corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by Rule 76 (section 3). The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition

Facts: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered the purported will to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan. Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for leave to allow them to examine the alleged will. However, such petition was withdrawn. The aforementioned petitioners then filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate in the CFI of Rizal. Pangilinan and Jacalan also filed a petition for the probate of the will in the CFI of Bulacan on the same date. The petitioners (Angela and Maria) contend that since the intestate proceeding was filed at 8 am on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed at 11 am, the CFI of Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Pangilinan takes the stand that the CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction upon delivery by them of the will to the clerk on March 4, 1963. The CFI of Bulacan denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few hours did not entitle one proceeding over the other; and that the movants were aware of the existence of the will since they filed a petition to examine the same. MR was also denied. Thus, the petitioners filed a pet. for a writ of certiorari and prohibition.

for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is incontestable. 2. The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73. There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only

Issues: 1. WON the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the estate proceedings. 2. Venue

subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be

Ruling: 1. Yes. The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon being deposited the court could, motu propio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and

instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

Cresencia Hernandez v. Zacarias Andal March 29, 1947; G.R. No. L-273

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

Facts: Plaintiff Cresencia, intervenors Maria & Aquilina; and Pedro and Basilia(not parties herein) are brothers and sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land. An oral partition of the land was allegedly made by the siblings. The intervenors sold 1800 square meters of the parcel to Zacarias Andal in consideration of P860. After the sale, the plaintiff attempted to repurchase the land sold to Andal. According to her complaint, dated February 3, 1944, she offered the purchaser P150 as price of repurchase. Such amount was the supposed price paid for Aquilina and Maria s shares. But Andal, it is alleged, refused to part with the property in favor of Cresencia. On April 8, the plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint wherein the she alleged that when the cause was called for trial, she announced in open court that she was willing to repurchase the lot from Andal and reimburse Andal for his expenses. Meanwhile, respondent Andal resold the land fictitiously to the vendors for the amount of 970 pesos. In their answer, the intervenors alleged that a partition was made after which everyone took exclusive, separate and independent possession of his/her portion in the partition. They charged the plaintiff with bad faith for allegedly delaying the sale in favor of Andal. The court handed down its decision declaring that the resale of the land in favor of Maria and Aquilina was illegal and in bad faith. The court ruled that under Rules 74 and 123 of the Rules of Court as well as Article 1248 of the Civil Code, parole evidence of partition was inadmissible. Issue: Whether or not oral evidence for proving a contract of partition is admissible. Ruling: Yes. -ORAL PARTITION ENFORCED IN EQUITY WHEN PERFORMED.

As a general proposition, transactions, so far as they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means of providing evidence to prove the transactions. Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example, "is for evidential purposes only." (Domalagan vs. Bolifer, 33 Phil., 471.) The Civil Code, too, requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a public instrument, not in order to validate the act or contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the party bound may be compelled to execute the document. (Hawaiian Philippine Co. vs. Hernandez, 45 Phil., 746.) -SECTION 1 OF RULE 74, NOT CONSTITUTIVE BUT MERELY EVIDENTIAL OF PARTITION. Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no express or clear declaration that the public instrument therein required is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And this Court had no apparent reason, in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties de-pendent on the execution of a public instrument and its registration. The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. Note that the last sentence of the section speaks of debts and creditors. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.

Ricardo Marquez et al v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 125715; December 29, 1998 Ruling: No. Under Article 887 of the present Civil Code, Felicidad's compulsory heirs are Facts: Rafael Marquez Sr. and Felicidad begot twelve children, namely: Natividad, Aurea, Herminigildo; Filomena; Exequel; Salvador; Gaudencio; Rafael Jr.; Belen; Alfredo; Ricardo; and Antonio. In 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del Monte Rizal, wherein they constructed their conjugal home. In 1952, Felicidad died intestate. Thirty years later, Marquez Sr. executed an Affidavit of Adjudiction of the lot in his favor. On December 29, 1983, Marquez Sr. executed a "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" over the said lot as well as the house constructed thereon to petitioner Rafael Jr. and respondents Alfredo and Belen. From 1983 to 1991, respondents were in actual possession of the land. However, when the petitioners learned about the certificate of title in the name of the donees, they immediately demanded their respective share over the land in question. Private respondents ignored petitioners demands. Rafael Jr., joined by the petitioners filed a complaint for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and The Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" were fraudulent because the private respondents took advantage of the advanced age of their father when the said documents were executed. Private respondents argued that petitioners' action was already barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's findings. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration also proved unavailing. her legitimate children and her spouse. When Marquez Sr. decided to adjudicate the entire property by executing an "Affidavit of Adjudication", a constructive trust under Art. 1456 was established. In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years. Thus, considering that the action was filed nine years after a Torrens title was issued to Marquez Sr. over the property, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred the action. Moreover, Marquez Sr., as trustee of his wife's share, cannot validly donate this portion to the respondents in accordance with Art. 736 of the Civil Code, which states: Art. 736. Guardian and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners' action has already prescribed.

Procedure. The said sections prescribed the proceedings to be had before an Eusebio Godoy v. Guillermo Orellano et al. G.R. No. L-16584; November 17, 1921 administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is Facts: On January 13, 1919, a document was executed by appellant Felisa Pangilinan, in the amount of P1,000, for an option to buy a dredge for the sum of P10,000. The dredge was the common property of the vendor and the brothers Demetrio, Jose, Guillermo, Alfredo, and Paz, all surnamed Orellano; The condition was that Godoy was to pay the whole price within twenty days; and that said option was in accordance with the power of attorney executed by Pangilinan's co-owners who reserved the right to ratify the option contract. The co-owners did not ratify the option contract. When the appellee was ready to pay the price, the appellant failed to deliver the dredge. The appellee then brought a suit in the Court of First Instance against the vendor as well as the co-owners, praying that they be ordered to deliver the dredge. The defendants set up as a special defense that the dredge in question was the property of the intestate estate of Julio Orellano, with pending administration proceedings in the Court of Instance of Manila. It was under the administration of Felisa Pangilinan and that the petitioner knew that the dredge was under judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority. The court rendered judgment, ordering the defendants to pay Godoy the sum of P2,000 with legal interest. had with the provisions of these sections, the sale of the aforesaid dredge by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it is null and void. Under the law, the court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect, and this is the more so, since two of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the aforesaid power of attorney.

Issue: Whether or not the administratrix has the authority to sell, or contract to sell, any property belonging to the estate of the deceased.

Ruling: No. In the sale of a property belonging to an intestate estate, it is necessary to comply with the provisions of sections 717, 718, 722 of the Code of Civil

Teopista Castro, et al. v. Antonio Martinez Gallegos, et al. G.R. No. L-3880; March 9, 1908

Whether or not the court erred in granting the petition to transfer ownership of the property to the plaintiffs.

Facts: Marcelina Cuico y Rodis was the owner of a house built of wood and nipa on Calle Cadiz, city of Cebu, valued at 200 pesos. She executed a nuncupative will before a notary under which she died and wherein she disposed of the house in which she lived. In one of the will's clauses, she bequeathed 10 pesos to each once of her nephews, the children of her brother Valentin, named Godofredo, Mateo, Quitin, Romana, Salud, and Constancia. Mateo, Quintin, and Constancia, and a certain Ignacio and Teopista Castro challenged the will, after Mateo and Quintin received their legacies. Under the will, Antonio Martinez Gallegos and Evaristo Rodis were appointed as executors. In compliance with clause 4 of the same, they sold the house and lot for the price of 500 pesos to Pedro Ferragut. Afterwards, Ferragut sold the same to Tomas Osmena; he later on sold it to Martinez Gallegos. The latter finally sold it to Ramon Velez y Santos for the price of 2, 500 pesos. The plaintiffs in their complaint that they we declared as the owners of the property of the deceased; that it be placed in their property; and in case that the same could not be found, for the sum of 4,000 pesos as indemnity. It is alleged in their complaint: (1) That Marcelina Cuico was not of sound mind, nor in control of her mental faculties, nor was she capable of disposing of her property at the time and place of its execution; (2) that the signature of Jose A. Casals which appears as the signature of the will is not in law sufficient as the legal signature of said Marcelina Cuico, nor by anyone in her name, or at her request. The court declared that the will was not only null and illegal but was also fraudulent. Naturally, it results that all the transfers made by Martinez Gallegos were and are null and illegal, and that the title thereto has always remained with the heirs of the deceased.

Ruling: Yes. It is a legal doctrine established in several decisions of the supreme court of justice of Spain, that "wills executed with the formalities of law are presumed valid." It is also a legal doctrine established among others, that "the normal condition of the faculties of the testator is presumed under the law." And finally it is a legal doctrine, mentioned among other decisions, "that is not proper to declare the nullity of a will if it be based on incapacity attributed to the testator when the notary who authorizes the instrument certifies that according to his judgment the testator, at the time of executing the will, was of sound mind." Consequently, neither directly nor indirectly, could the nullity of the will of Marcelina Cuico y Rodis have been declared either as a fact or as a conclusion of law . Nothing can be done upon the ground of nullity of an act without first obtaining, or at least petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity; and the plaintiffs have limited themselves to asking that they be declared the owners of the property of the late Marcelina Cuico, without first obtaining, or petitioning at the same time for a declaration of nullity of the will whereby Marcelina transmitted said property to others. In the event that will in question was really null, the proper thing to do would be open the intestate succession of Marcelina Cuico by means of the procedure established by law; in which action the declaration of heirs of Marcelina Cuico could be obtained with the right to demand the nullity of the acts or contracts by virtue of which the property of the intestate estate has been transferred to third persons.

Issue:

Estate of the deceased Basilia Tantoco, Vicente Fernandez v. Domingo Tantoco G.R. No. 25489; September 8, 1926

even contrary to the testimony of some of the subscribing witnesses, or all of them. With respect to the will now in question a prima facie case for the establishment of the document was made out when it appeared that the instrument itself was

Facts: On September 9, 1925, Basilia Tantoco, aged 62 years, executed an instrument purporting to be her will. She was a patient in the San Juan de Dios Hospital at the time. She died a few days after the will was executed. An application for the probate of the will was filed by father Vicente Fernandez, parish priest of Malolos. The three brothers and a nephew of the deceased opposed the probate. The proponent introduced the three attesting witnesses to the instrument. The instrument shows every external requisite of proper execution, but the trial judge refused to allow the probate, for the reason that the three witnesses are not in harmony whether all three of said witnesses were present together at the time and place when they affixed their signatures. In 1910, Vecente Platon, an attorney of Malolos wrote a will for the deceased for the disposition of a building and lot in favor of the parish priest for certain religious uses. When her final illness came upon her, the testatrix executed the September 9 will.

properly drawn and attested and that all of the signatures thereto are authentic. These facts raise a presumption of regularity; and upon those facts alone the will should, be admitted to probate in the absence of proof showing that some fatal irregularity occurred. And such irregularity must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence before probate can be denied.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred for not allowing the probate of the will.

Ruling: Yes. In case of opposition to the probate of the will the proponent is legally bound to introduce all of the subscribing witnesses, if available. They are therefore forced witnesses so far as the proponent is concerned, and he is not bound by their testimony to the same extent that a litigant is bound by the testimony of witnesses introduced in ordinary course. It follows that the proponent of a will may avail himself of other proof to establish the instrument,