TABLE OF CASES

Please note that these cases have been categorized into subtopics based on how questions
have been asked on the different areas within each chapter. However, this categorization is
only for the convenience of the reader. When preparing for exams you are required to know
about all the cases relevant to a particular chapter and not just a particular subtopic. For more
information on each case, please consult the accompanying notes. If you find any cases in these
tables about which details have not been mentioned in the notes, the information in these
tables is sufficient.

CHAPTER 4: CONSIDERATION
SUBTOPIC: Introduction to Consideration and General Rules of Consideration

CASE NAME SUMMARY/PRINCIPLE OF LAW

Dunlop v Selfridge Definition of Consideration
Roscorla v Thomas Consideration will only be considered valid for
enforcing a promise where it has been given after
the promise made by the other party. If
consideration is given before the promise,
consideration is not valid, and the promise cannot
be enforced through that consideration.

ReMcardle Principle Same as Roscorla v Thomas

Lampleigh v Braithwaite Exception to Rule that Consideration can only
enforce promise if it has been given after the
promise and not before: If consideration is
provided before the promise has been made, but
consideration has been provided on the promisor
request and carrying out the request will involve
the promisee spending money, then promisee can
enforce promise through that consideration.

ReCasey's Patents Principle Same as in Lampleigh v Braithwaite

Thomas v Thomas A promise will be enforced if the consideration is
deemed valid by law, the quantity or amount of
consideration does not matter
Chappell v Nestle Principle Same as Thomas v Thomas; chocolate
wrappers were considered as adequate
consideration.
White v Bluett Consideration must have economic/physical value.
Emotional and Sentimental Value is not sufficient
 SUBTOPIC: Performance of Existing Duty

CASE NAME SUMMARY/PRINCIPLE OF LAW

Collins v Godefroy Existing Public Duty (Existing Duties that someone
is legally obliged to perform will not amount to
consideration, and no promise can be enforced in
exchange for performing such duties)
Glassbrook v Glamorgan County Council Exception: However, where someone does
something beyond their public duty, that extra
effort will amount to consideration and any
promise made in exchange can be enforced
Ward v Byham Moral Duties may amount to consideration and a
promise made in exchange for them may be
enforced
Stilk Myrick Performance of an Existing Contractual Duty owed
to the promisor will not amount to consideration
and cannot be used to enforce any promise.
Hartley v Ponsonby Exception: Where duties performed go beyond the
existing contractual duty, that extra duty can
amount to consideration and enforce a promise
made in exchange
Williams v Roffey Brothers If an existing duty to supply goods and services
under a contract provides an additional practical
benefit to the other party, then such a duty will be
a valid consideration for any promise made in
return
Scotson v Pegg Existing contractual duty to provide a benefit to a
third party can amount to consideration and
enforce an additional promise made in exchange
by a third party
Shadwell v Shadwell Same Principle as Scotson v Pegg
Eurymedon Same Principle as Scotson v Pegg
South Caribbean Trading v Trafigura The rule of Williams v Roffey Bros has been
criticized and it has been stated in this case by
Glidewell LJ that he would not have followed the
decision if it was not made by the HOL.

Pinnels Case and Promissory Estoppel Cases See Subtopic Below

SUBTOPIC: The Rule in Pinnel’s Case and its Exceptions (Promissory Estoppel)

CASE NAME SUMMARY/PRINCIPLE OF LAW

Pinnels Case A debtor paying back a reduced sum of money
(not full) they owe to a lender will not in itself
amount to consideration. The lender can agree to
 accept the reduced sum of money and still sue the
debtor for the remaining money. However, if a
debtor does something extra in addition to just
paying back the reduced amount of money, the
lender on accepting the reduced sum of money
cannot sue the debtor.
Foakes v Beer Same Principle as Pinnel’s Case
Hughes v Metropolitan Railways Fundamentals of the Doctrine of Promissory
Estoppel were laid down in this case, the doctrine
itself was created in the latter case of Central
London Property v High Trees Ltd
Central London Properties v High Trees Ltd The doctrine of Promissory Estoppel was created
as an exception to the rule in the Pinnels Case. Any
contracting party who promises not to enforce a
contractual right will not be able to enforce that
right later if it would be inequitable to do so and
the promise has been relied upon by the other
party. In other words, if any party lends money to
another and when it is time to pay back the
money, the lending party agrees to accept a lesser
amount than which it had lent, it will not be able
to claim the remaining amount if it is inequitable
to do so.
Durham Fancy Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson There doesn't need to be a pre-existing contract
between the parties. There can be a statutory
relationship as well.
China Pacific SA There must be an obvious and unambiguous
promise not to enforce a person’s full legal rights.
This promise may be implied from conduct, but
silence, or failure to act, will not usually be
sufficient.
WJ Alan and Co v El Nasr Reliance on the promise is enough; there is no
need to show that the promisee was at a
disadvantage because of relying on the promise.
Tungsten v Tool Metal Promissory estoppel can usually only be used to
prevent rights being exercised for a period;
it cannot destroy them forever.
DC Builders v Rees The doctrine of Promissory Estoppel cannot be
applied where it is inequitable to do so
Combe v Combe Promissory Estoppel does not create new rights it
just defends/provides existing rights. It is a shield
and not a sword

NOTE: For Full Facts of each case, please consult your textbook.

CHAPTER 4: CONSIDERATION
SUBTOPIC: Introduction to Consideration and General Rules of Consideration

Introduction:

As we know by now, a contract is an agreement between parties where either party promises
to do something for the other. The topic of Consideration is concerned with providing
contracting parties rules on when and how the promises made by them to each other under a
contract may be enforced by the courts in cases where one of the parties refuses to fulfill their
promise to the other.

Definition of Consideration:

In Dunlop v Selfridge (1915) Sir Frederick Pollock defined consideration in the following terms:
“act or forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of
the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable”.

Accordingly, if any party wishes to enforce a promise made to them by the other party (who has
afterward not fulfilled their promise), such a party must show that they are providing/
giving/doing something in return for the promise made by the other party i.e., they have
provided consideration in return for the promise made to them by the other party.

Example: (This is for your understanding do not write this in the exam) Ali wants to buy Tahir’s
mobile. Ali (Promisor) Promises to pay Tahir (Promisee) Rs.5000/- if Tahir gives his mobile to
Ali. In return, Tahir (Promisor) Agrees to sell his phone to Ali and promises to give his mobile to
Ali (Promisee) if Ali gives him Rs.5000/-. Here we can see that both parties have made a
promise to each other. If either party refuses to fulfill the promise they have made to each
other, the other party (Promisee) may request the courts to make the promise-breaking party
(the promisor) fulfill their promise by enforcing them to do so. In such a case the promisee will
have to show that they had provided consideration in return for the broken promise made to
them by the Promisor: If Ali does not pay Tahir and Tahir gives his mobile to Ali, Tahir can go to
court, and ask them to Make Ali fulfill his promise of paying Rs.5000/-, as he (Tahir) has
provided consideration for Ali’s promise to pay Rs.5000/- by giving Ali his mobile.

TYPES OF CONSIDERATION (NOT NECESSARY TO WRITE THIS IN EXAM, BUT THE STUDENT
MUST KNOW WHAT THIS IS)

There are two valid types of consideration: executory consideration and executed
consideration.

Executory Consideration is where both parties to the contract will do something in the future in
exchange for the promise of the other. For example: on making a contract A promises to
deliver some goods to B and B promises to pay for them when they arrive. Usually, such
consideration will be found in Bilateral Contracts.

Executed Consideration is where one of the parties has already done all that was required of
them under the contract, i.e., they have already done something they had promised to do in
exchange for the other parties’ promises. For example: If A promises to give £20 to anyone who
finds his lost handbag, returning the bag is both acceptance of his offer (and thus the time
when the contract is formed) and executed consideration for A’s promise. Executed
consideration usually occurs in unilateral contracts.

General Rules of Consideration:

English law has developed certain rules about Consideration, which help in understanding
whether any promisee can show consideration in a court of law. These are:

1. Consideration need not benefit the promisor.

2. Consideration must not be past.
3. Consideration must be sufficient.
4. Consideration must be of economic value.
5. Consideration must move from the promisee;
6. An Existing duty will not amount to valid Consideration.
7. Part Payment of a debt is not a valid consideration for a promise to forego the balance.

We will look at all of these in more detail:

1. Consideration Need Not Benefit the Promisor

Under this rule, a party wanting to enforce another party’s promise made to it does not have to
show that whatever they have done in return for the other party’s promise necessarily
benefitted this other party. For example: where a party enters a contract with another to
provide services to a third party, the benefit will be gained by this third party and not the party
with whom the contract and promise was made.

2. Consideration must not be past.

This means when a contract is made between the parties and thus promises are made to one
another, consideration must be given in return for the promise or act of the other party. If
consideration is given or performed before the promise of the other has been made, that will
not be valid consideration and a party seeking to enforce the other party's promise through
such consideration will not be able to enforce the promise, as the court will hold that the
consideration is past. This was the case in Roscorla V Thomas [1842], where the seller had
promised to the buyer of a horse that the ‘horse was free from any vice’ after the buyer had
bought the horse. It was held that the buyer could not enforce such a promise made by the
seller as it had been made after the horse had been sold. If such a promise was made before
the horse was bought, the buyer would be able to enforce the seller’s promise and return the
horse to the seller. Another case on the same rule is Remcardle [1951], in this case, the
wording of the contract, which seemed to suggest that performance for the promise would be
done in the future was overlooked, and the court again held that where a daughter in law tried
to recover money for the housework she had carried out on her mother in law’s house earlier,
and regarding which it was later promised that she should be paid, the court held that the
daughter in law could not recover the money as the promise was made after she had provided
consideration.

An Exception to the rule that consideration must not be past comes from the case of Lampleigh
vs. Brathwait [1615], where it was decided that past consideration would be sufficient to
enforce a promise if it was provided at the other party’s request and the court felt that such a
request would result in a payment being made by the party to whom the request was made,
even though no payment was discussed before the making of such a request.

FACTS (You are not expected to write these in the exam, but you must know about these):
Brathwait was convicted of murdering a man and put in jail, he requested Lampleigh to seek a
pardon for him from the King. Lampleigh did so after making considerable expense, and upon
release, Brathwait promised him 100 GBP for his efforts. Later, Braithwaite refused to pay and
Lampleigh went to court and was successful in having Brathwait’s promise enforced. The court
held that Braitwait by making Lampleigh such a request had made an implied promise to make
payment to him, and the latter promise of 100 GBP was just the determination of the amount
that would be paid under this implied promise made earlier by Brathwaite.

The rule laid down in Lampleigh v Brathwait has been more recently followed in Recasey’s
Patents [1892] (See your textbook for full facts of cases).

3. Consideration must be sufficient but need not be adequate.

This rule means that the court in determining the question of valid consideration will not
consider the amount or value of consideration as long a minimal value can be given to it. This
approach of the courts can be seen in the cases of Thomas V Thomas (1842) and Chappell V
Nestle (1959). In Thomas, it was held that a promise by a widow to pay 1 GBP per year and
keep the house in good condition was sufficient consideration, in exchange for the deceased
husband’s promise to leave the house to her after his death. The point that 1 GBP a year was
too low to be considered an appropriate amount of consideration was rejected by the court.
Similarly in Chappell, empty wrappers of chocolate bars were sufficient consideration to make a
promise made in return binding, even though these wrappers had very little market value.
 4. CONSIDERATION MUST HAVE SOME ECONOMIC VALUE

This rule requires that consideration (whatever has been done in exchange for enforcing the
promise of the other party) must have some economic value rather than an emotional or
sentimental value. This can be demonstrated through the case of White V Bluett [1853], where
a son’s promise to bore his father with complaints was not regarded as a valid consideration in
exchange for the father’s promise to not make his son repay the money that the son had earlier
borrowed from him.

5. CONSIDERATION MUST MOVE FROM THE PROMISEE

This rule states that a person who has not provided consideration (i.e. has not done something
in exchange for the promise made by the other) will not be able to go to court and enforce a
promise of another. In Tweedle V Atkinson, it was held that the son-in-law could not enforce a
promise made by his father-in-law to give them money, as the promise was made by the father-
in-law to the son’s father. The son was not a party to these promises and therefore could not
sue his father-in-law when he failed to fulfill his promise of payment.

SUBTOPIC: 6. Performance of Existing Duty (This is point no.6 from above but also a
new subtopic)

Generally, if a person, who is already obliged to do something in exchange for a promise, does
the same, doing so will not in itself amount to consideration for a new promise. However, in
certain cases, the courts of England have discovered consideration in the performance of an
existing duty.

Existing duties can be divided into three main categories:

1. Public duties.
2. Contractual duties to the promisor; and
3. Contractual duties to a third party.

1. EXISTING PUBLIC DUTIES

If a person is carrying out duties that they must perform because the law tells them to do so
and the same forms the basis of his consideration in a potential contract, the performance of
that duty cannot amount to sufficient consideration.

This was held to be the case in Collins v Godefroy (1831), where a policeman (claimant) was
summoned to give evidence in court. It was held that the policeman’s duty to appear in court to
provide evidence could not be considered on his behalf to enforce a contract in which he was
promised to be paid money if he appeared before the court.
This position will, however, change if it can be shown that the person performing the existing
public duty has done something more than the duty imposed by law. This was the case in
Glasbrook Bros v Glamorgan County Council (1925), where, during a strike, a pit owner asked
for extra police protection and promised an extra payment in return. After the strike he refused
to pay, claiming that the police were just carrying out their public duty of preserving law and
order. The court held that the police had done something above and over what they were
required to do under their existing public duty, and this was sufficient consideration for the
owner's promise to pay.

2. EXISTING CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OWED TO THE PROMISOR

The rule that applies to existing public duties also applied where there was an existing
contractual duty. Therefore, the mere performance of an existing contractual duty could not
amount to sufficient consideration for a new contractual agreement. This rule has however
been modified and an existing contractual duty will be held as sufficient consideration for
certain types of contracts. These will be discussed but only after examples of the classical rule
are first given.

The rule that existing contractual duty could not amount to sufficient consideration comes from
Stilk v Myrick (1809), where it was held sailors who were bound by their existing duty to sail
the boat home had not given any extra consideration in return for a new promise to pay them
more money for doing the same even though the new promise was made after a few sailors (2
out of 11) deserted the ship. This situation, however, changes when the defendant does
something over existing duties. In Hartley v Ponsonby (1857) it was held that sailors who were
originally contracted to sail the boat had given extra consideration for a new promise to pay
them more money for doing the same existing contractual duty because more than half of the
sailors deserted the ship, making the voyage more dangerous and therefore requiring an extra
effort on their part to sail the boat to its destination.

These rules, however, do not apply where there is an existing contractual duty to provide goods
and services [William v Roffey Bros and Nicholls Contractors Ltd (1990)]. In Williams, the
defendants built several flats and subcontracted the carpentry to the claimant for 20000 GBP.
The claimant was understaffed and ran into financial difficulty. The defendants had a clause in
their contract for building the flats saying that they would be liable to pay money if the flats
were not ready on time. The claimant said he would not be able to complete the carpentry on
time, so the defendants offered him another 10,300 GBP to do this. The Work was completed
on time, but the defendants refused to pay the extra money. The claimant was only doing what
he had been contracted to do, and it was held that the defendants were gaining the benefit of
not having to pay the penalty for not completing the work on time. In other words, it was seen
that the contractor had gained a benefit through not having to pay the penalty. Therefore, the
law considering Williams seems to be that where a party’s existing duty to provide goods and
services confers an extra practical benefit on the other party, then it will be sufficient
consideration to make a promise given in return binding.

The implications of Williams v Roffey on the doctrine of consideration are much less clear, as in
legal terms it is still a very recent case, and the boundaries of the rule are yet to be established.
It redefines consideration, giving it a wider definition and in many ways reducing the barriers to
making modifications binding. It has been suggested that consideration in the shape of a
Williams v Roffey practical benefit is likely to be present in most agreed modifications made to
commercial contracts since in such situations the parties are unlikely to agree to any change
unless it has some benefit for them. The Williams v Roffey view of consideration also allows the
courts more discretion than previous, tighter definitions since they will be able to find a
practical benefit in situations where traditional consideration was not present because there
was no legal benefit. This approach is in direct contrast to the earlier case of Stilk v Myrick,
which strictly conforms to the notions of traditional consideration. The question then arises;
Has Williams effectively overruled Stilk? In South Caribbean Trading Ltd v Trafigura Beeheever
BV (2004) the High Court judge, Coleman J, albeit obiter, was critical of the law in Williams v
Roffey and pointed out that the approach in Williams v Roffey directly conflicts with the
established case of Stilk v Myrick. However, it seems that this may not be the case, as
Reselectmove suggests that the principle in Williams would only be applied to contracts
involving provisions of goods and services and cannot be extended to those which involve the
payment of debts.

Another aspect is the flexibility that Williams may afford judges when deciding which contracts
to enforce upon a finding of consideration. This may lead to dubious decisions where the court,
due to public policy reasons, may stretch the concept of consideration to enforce a contract. In
Ward v Byham Ms. Ward and Mr. Byham had a daughter, who after separation lived with
Byham. Some months later Ms. Ward asked to take the child to live with her, and Mr. Byham
wrote to say that she could do so, and he would pay £1 a week maintenance if she could ‘prove
that [the daughter] will be well looked after and happy’. When Byham refused to provide the
maintenance, he alleged that there was no consideration because, as the mother of an
illegitimate child, she was already under a statutory duty to maintain the little girl, so her
promise to do so was not considered. On the facts, most of the court held that there was a valid
contract because her promise to see that their daughter was happy, went beyond her statutory
duty, and could therefore be considered. Thus, the finding of consideration on the mere fact of
keeping the daughter ‘happy’, seems to be hard to justify except if one is to consider public
policy.

Williams v Roffey could also affect the rules on promissory estoppel. Similarly, if in a case like
High Trees, there was a practical benefit to the landlord in reducing the rent (such as avoiding
ending up with a bankrupt tenant and no rent at all), would that bar him from later returning to
his strict rights by giving reasonable notice? It would seem unlikely because the promissory
estoppel is meant to only suspend rights.

As stated earlier, it is hard to provide a definitive answer to all the issues concerning Williams,
because of a lack of Supreme Court judgments on the matter.

EXISTING CONTRACTUAL DUTIES OWED TO A THIRD PARTY

In some cases, two parties make a contract to provide a benefit to someone who is not a party
to the contract, known as a third party. If one of them makes a further promise to that third
party, to provide the benefit they have already contracted to provide, that further promise can
be good consideration for a promise made by the third party in return. [ Scotson v Pegg (1861)]

In this case, Scotson contracted with a party for the supply of coal who instructed him to deliver
the coal to Pegg (a third party). Pegg promised to unload the coal at a stated rate of pay. He
subsequently failed to do the agreed unloading. Scotson sued Pegg, claiming that their promise
to deliver the coal to him was a consideration for his promise to unload it. Pegg claimed this
could not be considered, since Scotson was already bound to supply the coal under the contract
with A. The court upheld Scotson’s claim: delivery of the coal was considered because it was a
benefit to Pegg and a detriment to Scotson in that it prevented them from having the option of
breaking their contract with A (in which case they would just pay damages to A) and having no
liability to Pegg.
Key Case
SUBTOPIC: 7. Part Payment of a Debt [The Rule in Pinnel’s Case (P and its exceptions
(Promissory Estoppel)]

This rule was laid down in Pinnel’s Case (1602) and it states that if a party (debtor) who has
borrowed money from another person (a creditor), offers (at the time of repaying the money)
to pay back a smaller sum of money (and not the entire amount) in exchange for the creditor’s
promise not to claim the remaining money, they said party will not able to enforce the creditors
promise and prevent the creditor from later claiming the remaining amount as his/her part-
payment of the debt will not amount to sufficient consideration.

This rule was later confirmed in Foakes v Beer (1884), where it was held that a promise by
Beer(creditor) to accept payment of a debt by Foakes (Debtor) in installments did not prevent
her from claiming interest on the debt, which Foakes had refused to pay after repaying the
original debt. The court held that Beer was fully capable of claiming interest from Foakes on the
debt and Foakes's payments of the original debt in installments did not amount to sufficient
consideration.

There are however two exceptions to the Part Payment of a debt rule laid down in the Pinnels
Case. The first was laid down in Pinnel’s Case itself; where the debtor does something extra in
addition to offering part payment of a debt, that extra could be regarded as adequate
consideration in exchange for the creditor's promise not to accept full payment. This doing
‘extra’ may include anything such as offering to pay back a smaller sum of money before the
date at which the creditor was supposed to receive their money.

The second exception is that of Promissory Estoppel. This is the defense to a claim by a creditor
for the remainder of the debt where part payment has been accepted. The doctrine of
promissory estoppel stops the claimant from going back on their promise and has been
established in equity as to do so would be unfair. The concept, it is brought, was originally seen
in Hughes v Metropolitan Railway (1877), where it was held that a creditor’s promise to accept
part payment as full settlement should be binding. The modern development of the doctrine is
found in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd (1947). In this case, the
defendants leased a block of flats from the claimants in 1937. When World War II started, it
became impossible to find tenants and the defendants could not pay the rent. As a result, the
claimants agreed to accept half the rent. By 1945, all the flats were rented, and the claimants
wanted the rent to be paid in full again. It was held that they could have the original rent only
from 1945 onwards when the flats were rented out; they could not claim for the previous
period (during the war) as they had promised to accept the rent only half and would be stopped
from going back on their promise on which the defendants had relied.

The essential elements of the doctrine are:

1. There must be an existing contractual relationship.
2. There must be a promise by the claimant to let go (waive) some of their rights under the
contract.
3. The defendant relied on the promise to forego some of the debt.
4. It must have been inequitable to enforce legal rights.
5. Estoppel only suspends the rights of the claimant, not finishes them forever.
6. Estoppel cannot be used as a sword but only as a shield.

1. Existing Contractual Relationship

For a person to seek relief under a promissory estoppel it is more than obvious that there must
be a relationship between the parties. This relation may be contractual, but in Durham Fancy
Goods Ltd v Michael Jackson it was held that a pre-existing contract between the parties is not
necessary, and there can be a statutory relationship as well.

2. Promise by the claimant to let go of some of their rights.

There must be an obvious and unambiguous promise by the claimant not to enforce their full
legal rights. In China-Pacific SA v Food Corp of India (1980), where the parties had been
involved in a complex commercial dispute, entailing a great deal of correspondence and
discussion, it was held that at no point in time during this communication, an unambiguous
promise had been made, and therefore the promissory estoppel could not apply.

3. Reliance by the Defendant on the promise made by the Claimant.

As stated in the Case of High Trees, the defendants had relied on the claimant's promise not to
charge full rent, and due to this, the claimants would be estopped from going back on their
promise not to charge full rent during the period of the War. The court held that the
defendants had shown this reliance by continuing in their activity to look for tenants after the
claimants had made the promise, rather than packing up and leaving. In WJ Alan and Co v El
Nasr, it was held that reliance on the promise is enough; there is no need to show that the
defendant was at a disadvantage because of relying on the promise.

4. Inequitable to enforce legal rights.

Since estoppel is a concept of equity, it will only apply in cases where there is unfairness. If the
perceived unfairness is that the party who makes the promise tries to back on its promise, then
the promissory estoppel will apply and stop the party from going back on its promise. If on the
other hand, a party who seeks relief by way of promissory estoppel has itself engaged in unfair
conduct, it will not be able to seek relief through promissory estoppel. This was the situation in
DC Builders v Rees (1966), where it was held that the defendant could not rely on the
promissory estoppel to stop the claimant from breaking their promise, as they had knowingly
taken unfair advantage of the claimant’s financial difficulties in forcing them to accept a lower
payment than one previously agreed for work the claimant did at the defendant’s house.

5. Estoppel only suspends the rights of the claimant, not finish them forever.
This can be better explained through Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co
Ltd (1955). In this case, the defendants paid royalties for the manufacture and sale of certain
metals in which the claimants had a patent. The defendants had also agreed to pay
compensation if the production of the metals exceeded the limits set by the claimants.
However, due to the Outbreak of World War 2, the claimants agreed to suspend their right to
receive compensation from the defendants if the production of metals exceeded the limits they
had set. Once the war was over, the claimants revoked their suspension and claimed
compensation and it was held that they would only be entitled to receive compensation for the
time after the war and not during it. The party that has suspended their rights like this can
enforce them again after giving reasonable notice of it to the other party.

6. Estoppel cannot be used as a sword but only as a shield.

The doctrine must be used as a defense and not a cause of action as was shown in Combe v
Combe (1951), where a wife who had separated from her husband had sued on a promise
made by him to pay her 2GBP a week. It was held that the wife had provided no consideration
for her husband’s promise, and could not rely on promissory estoppel, which did not give rise to
a cause of action. It was also held that as promissory estoppel is an equitable remedy, it cannot
be used to create new legal rights but only defend existing ones.