Bacolod City Water District V Labayen
Bacolod City Water District V Labayen
Bacolod City Water District V Labayen
FACTS:
Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner, a water district GOCC, when it published in the
Visayan Daily Star a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999 to 2001.
Respondent City opposed, alleging that it would violate due process as they were to be imposed without
the public hearing required under Letter Instructions No. 700 and P.D. No. 1479. Hence, it prayed that
before the hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injunction be
issued.
The trial court heard respondent’s application for TRO and issued an order commanding petitioner to
stop, desist and refrain from implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000. Thereafter,
petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of Appeals.
Court of Appeals however dismissed the petition for review on certiorari. But in its decision, it stated
that the Order of the trial court is in fact a preliminary injunction as the period of the restrained was not
limited. There is semi-permanence which cannot issue from a mere TRO.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it insisted that the order issued by the trial
court was a Preliminary Injunction when the records clearly and indubitably show that it was a
Temporary Restraining Order.
RULING:
Yes, the Court held that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary
injunction.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing
a certain act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main
action.
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether
prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment
embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and should not be confused with, the provisional
remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits
can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action without the
court issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date
of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction
is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken
by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the
temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining order
granted automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court
merely ordered "the respondent its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop,
desist and refrain from implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on
March 1, 2000" without stating the period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining
order to a preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix a
period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-
permanence which can only be characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period
provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission
to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to move that
hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of
this omission by respondent trial court.