Word Count For Arguments Section: 4,994

101A
THE 2023-2024 MONROE E. PRICE

INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION
Una and OneAI

(Applicants)
v.
Cero
(Respondent)
MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANTS
Word Count for Arguments Section: 4,994

I. TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... 2
II. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 5
III. LIST OF SOURCES, AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... 7
IV. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS..................................................................... 33
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................... 44
VI. QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................ 45
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................................. 46
VIII. ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................................. 52
ISSUE A – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING UNA
UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A
ONE-MONTH BAN ON HER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, VIOLATED HER RIGHT
TO THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE
ICCPR ................................................................................................................................. 52
i) The interference was not prescribed by law ........................................................ 54
a) The law envisaging the interference was not reasonably foreseeable for Una .. 55
b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion ..................... 58
ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim ............................................... 59
iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society .............................. 60
a) The interference did not correspond to a pressing social need as the Post did not
glorify terrorism ........................................................................................................... 61
b) The interference was not suitable to pursue its alleged legitimate aims ............ 63
c) The interference was not the least intrusive instrument ..................................... 64
d) The interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect ................. 65
da) Una’s expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as political speech ..... 66
db) Una has fulfilled the role of public watchdog .................................................... 68
dc) Una’s expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as a human rights
defender .................................................................................................................... 70
dd) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate ................................................... 71
de) The interference caused a chilling effect............................................................ 73
ISSUE B – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING ONEAI
UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A
ONE-MONTH BAN ON ITS SERVICE, ‘RMSM’, VIOLATED ITS RIGHT TO THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING THE FREEDOM TO IMPART
INFORMATION AND IDEAS, RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR 76
i) The interference was not prescribed by law ........................................................ 78
a) The law envisaging the interference was not reasonably foreseeable for OneAI
78
b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion ..................... 79
ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim ............................................... 80
iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society .............................. 81
cause clear and imminent danger or clear harm ........................................................... 81
b) The interference was not suitable to pursue its alleged legitimate aims ............ 82
c) The interference was not the least intrusive instrument ..................................... 83

d) The interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect ................. 84
da) OneAI has developed RMSM with due diligence .............................................. 85
db) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate ................................................... 86
dc) The interference caused a chilling effect............................................................ 87
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .............................................................................................. 89

II. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
ACHR American Convention on Human Rights
ACmHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AfCHPR African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
AI Artifical Intelligence
CC Constitutional Court of Cero
Clarifications The 2023/2024 Price Media Law Moot Court Clarification Answers
Compromis The 2023/2024 Price Media Law Moot Court Competition Case
Constitution The Constitution of Cero
The Chamber of the Universal Court of Human Rights known as

Court
The Universal Freedom of Expression Court
CTA Counter-Terrorism Act of Cero
DRC Digital Regulatory Commission
DSA Digital Safety Act of Cero
ELA Enos Liberation Army
ERW Enos Rights Watch
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
FoE Freedom of Expression

HC High Court of Cero
IACmHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OAS Organisation of American States
the alleged the detoniation at a Cerovian weapons manufacturing facility on the
attack morning of 18 March 2023
the Post Una’s 11.00 AM Facebook post on 17 March 2023
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series

III. LIST OF SOURCES, AUTHORITIES
DECLARATIONS, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (adopted 27 June 52, 76
1981, entered into force 21 October 1986)
American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 52, 76
1969, entered into force 18 July 1978)
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ 76
C364/01
European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, 52, 62, 76
entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 1932
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 52, 58, 64, 68, 72, 73,
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 76, 80, 86
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) 52, 72, 76
UNGA Res 217A (III)
CASES FROM THE UNHRC
Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. Dobou v 52, 76

Togo CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990, 424/1990 (UNHRC, 12
July 1996)
Hak-Chul Shin v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 81
(UNHRC, 16 March 2004)
Keun-Tae Kim v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 58
(UNHRC, 4 January 1994)
Kivenmaa v Finland CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990 (UNHRC, 7 March 71
1990)
Leonardus Johannes Maria de Groot v the Netherlands 55
CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994 (UNHRC, 14 July 1994)
Malcolm Ross v Canada CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (UNHRC, 18 54
October 2000)
Mohamed Rabbae, A.B.S and N.A. v the Netherlands 66
CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 (UNHRC, 14 July 2016)
Nurbek Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 68, 69
(UNHRC, 28 March 2011)
Robert Faurisson v France CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (UNHRC, 8 54
November 1996)
Sohn v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/54/D/518/1992 (UNHRC, 19 July 54
1995)
Stephen Benhadj v Algeria CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (UNHRC, 20 52, 76
July 2007)
Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/57/D/628/1995 52
(UNHRC, 20 October 1998)
Velichkin v Belarus CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001 (UNHRC, 20 October 54
2005)
Vladimir Viktorovich Shchetko v Belarus CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 52, 76
(UNHRC, 11 July 2006)
Womah Mukong v Cameroon CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (UNHRC, 10 54
August 1994)
Yashar Agazade and Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan 54, 81
CCPR/C/118/D/2205/2012 (UNHRC, 27 October 2016)
Zeljko Bodrožić v Serbia and Montenegro CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 67
(UNHRC, 3 November 2003)
CASES FROM THE ECtHR
A and B v Norway App nos 24130/11, 29758/11 (ECtHR, 15

63
September 2016)
Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) 52, 55, 58, 65, 77, 78,
79, 83, 84, 87
Akdeniz v Turkey App no 20877/10 (ECtHR, 11 March 2014) 84
Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR, 25 January

55, 57, 78
2012)
Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom App no

60, 67
48876/08 (ECtHR, 22 April 2013)
Arslan v Turkey App no 23462/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 64
Atamanchuk v Russia App no 4493/11 (ECtHR, 12 October 2020) 64
Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990) 68, 72, 76, 77
Axel Springer AG v Germany App no 39954/08 (ECtHR, 7 February

69
2012)
Baka v Hungary App no 20261/12 (ECtHR, 23 June 2016) 67, 71, 74, 84
Barthold v Germany App no 8734/79 (ECtHR, 25 March 1985) 61
Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v Turkey App nos 23536/94, 24408/94

71, 84
(ECtHR, 8 July 1999)
Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29 March 2016) 52, 69, 74, 76
Belpietro v Italy App no 43612/10 (ECtHR, 24 September 2013) 74
Bingöl v Turkey App no 36141/04 (ECtHR, 22 September 2010) 64
Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway App no 21980/93 (ECtHR, 20

66, 68, 69
May 1999)
Błaja News Sp. z o. o. v Poland App no 59545/10 (ECtHR, 26

87
February 2014)
Bouton v France App no 22636/19 (ECtHR, 13 January 2023) 61, 64
Bozhkov v Bulgaria App no 3316/04 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011) 87
Bulgakov v Russia App no 20159/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) 83
Campos Dâmaso v Portugal App no 17107/05 (ECtHR, 24 July

69
2008)
Casado Coca v Spain App no 15450/89 (ECtHR, 24 February 1994) 77
Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992) 64
Cengiz and Others v Turkey App nos 48226/10, 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1

52, 69, 84
December 2015)
Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v Italy App no 38433/09

56, 67
(ECtHR, 7 June 2012)
Çetin and Others v Turkey App nos 40153/98, 40160/98 (ECtHR, 13
77
February 2003)
Ceylan v Turkey App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 54, 64, 66, 67, 71, 84
Chauvy and Others v France App no 64915/01 (ECtHR, 29

54, 78
September 2004)
Cojocaru v Romania App no 32104/06 (ECtHR, 10 February 2015) 68
Colombani and Others v France App no 51279/99 (ECtHR, 9

68
September 2002)
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey App no 19392/92

67
(ECtHR, 30 January 1998)
Comunicação Social, S.A. and Others v Portugal App no 39324/07

87
(ECtHR, 7 March 2011)
Cumhuríyet Vakfi and Others v Turkey App no 28255/07 (ECtHR, 8

59, 60, 65
January 2014)
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17

64, 68, 71, 74, 84
December 2004)
Dammann v Switzerland App no 77551/01 (ECtHR, 25 July 2006) 65, 71, 74, 84
Delfi AS v Estonia App no 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) 73

Demirel and Ateş v Turkey App nos 10037/03, 14813/03 (ECtHR, 12
61
July 2007)
Dicle v Turkey (No 3) App no 53915/11 (ECtHR, 8 May 2022) 61
Dilipak v Turkey App no 29680/05 (ECtHR, 2 May 2016) 68
Dmitriyevskiy v Russia App no 42168/06 (ECtHR, 29 January 2018) 67
Dupuis and Others v France App no 1914/02 (ECtHR, 12 November

68, 69
2007)
E.S. v Austria App no 38450/12 (ECtHR, 18 March 2019) 67
Editions Plon v France App no 58148/00 (ECtHR, 18 August 2004) 65
Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine App no

55
33014/05 (ECtHR, 5 August 2011)
Ekin Association v France App no 39288/98 (ECtHR, 17 October

65, 83
2001)
Elçi and Others v Turkey App nos 23145/93, 25091/94 (ECtHR, 24

74
March 2004)
Engels v Russia App no 61919/16 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) 83

Erdoğdu and Ince v Turkey App nos 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECtHR, 8
61, 67
July 1999)
Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17 (ECtHR, 22 September

61, 66, 81
2021)
Falzon v Malta App no 45791/13 (ECtHR, 20 June 2018) 69
Fatih Taş v Turkey App no 36635/08 (5 May 2011) 64
Fatullayev v Azerbaijan App no 40984/07 (ECtHR, 4 October 2010) 64, 74
Feridun Yazar and Others v Turkey App no 42713/98 (ECtHR, 23

64
December 2004)
Freitas Rangel v Portugal App no 78873/13 (ECtHR, 11 April 2022) 67, 87
Fressoz and Roire v France App no 29183/95 (ECtHR, 21 January

61, 66
1999)
Gerger v Turkey App no 24919/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 64, 67
Goodwin v the United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 27 March

54, 78
1996)
Gözel and Özer v Turkey App nos 43453/04, 31098/05 (ECtHR, 6

68
October 2010)
Grande Stevens v Italy App no 18640/10 (ECtHR, 7 July 2014) 86
Grinberg v Russia App no 23472/03 (ECtHR, 21 October 2005) 68
Guerra and Others v Italy App no 116/1996/735/932 (ECtHR, 19

87
February 1998)
Guja v Moldova App no 14277/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) 74
Gül and Others v Turkey App no 4870/02 (ECtHR, 8 September

60, 62, 80, 81
2010)
Gündüz v Turkey App no 35071/97 (ECtHR, 14 June 2004) 67
Hachette Filipacchi Associes v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 12

52, 68, 76
November 2007)
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 52, 54, 60, 61, 64, 65,
December 1976) 66, 76
Hertel v Switzerland App no 25181/94 (ECtHR, 25 August 1998) 60
Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6

84
October 2005)
Huvig v France App no 11105/84 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) 58, 78
Incal v Turkey App no 22678/93 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998) 64

Janowski v Poland App no 25716/94 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999) 66
Jersild v Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994) 66
Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) 55, 78
Karácsony and Others v Hungary App nos 42461/13, 44357/13

56, 74, 78
(ECtHR, 17 May 2016)
Karataş v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 66, 68, 71, 84
Khadija Ismayilova v Azerbaijan App nos 65286/13, 57270/14

74
(ECtHR, 10 April 2019)
Kılıç and Eren v Turkey App no 43807/07 (ECtHR, 29 February

60, 62, 80, 81
2012)
Krasulya v Russia App no 12365/03 (ECtHR, 22 May 2007) 74
Kruslin v France App no 11801/85 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) 55, 78
Lacroix v France App no 41519/12 (ECtHR, 7 December 2017) 64
Larissis and Others v Greece App no 23372/94 (ECtHR, 24 February

55
1998)
Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81 (ECtHR, 26 March 1987) 55, 58

Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France App nos 21279/02,
55, 56
36448/02 (ECtHR, 22 October 2007)
Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) 61, 65, 81
Lombardi Vallauri v Italy App no 39128/05 (ECtHR, 20 January

59
2010)
Lopes Gomes da Silva v Portugal App no 37698/97 (ECtHR, 28

74
December 2000)
Maestri v Italy App no 39748/98 (ECtHR, 17 February 2004) 58, 78, 79
Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8

66, 68, 69
November 2016)
Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v Hungary App no 201/17 (ECtHR, 20

54, 55, 78, 79
January 2020)
Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v

74
Hungary App no 22947/13 (ECtHR, 2 May 2016)
Mahmudov and Agazade v Azerbaijan App 35877/04 (ECtHR, 18

74
March 2009)
Malone v the United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August

54, 55, 58, 79
1984)
Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden App no 12963/87
58, 79
(ECtHR, 25 February 1992)
Mariapori v Finland App no 37751/07 (ECtHR, 6 October 2010) 74
Medipress-Sociedade Jornalística, Lda v Portugal App no 55442/12

84
(ECtHR, 30 November 2016)
Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v Bosnia and

52, 76
Herzegovina App no 17224/11 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017)
Melike v Turkey App no 35786/19 (ECtHR, 15 June 2021) 52
Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 March 2013) 85
Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR, 6 April 2009) 58, 79
Monnat v Switzerland App no 73604/01 (ECtHR, 21 September

52, 76
2006)
Mosley v the United Kingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR, 15

74
September 2011)
Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR,

52, 60, 76
13 July 2012)
Müller and Others v Switzerland App no 10737/84 (ECtHR, 24 May

55
1988)
Murat Vural v Turkey App no 9540/07 (ECtHR, 21 January 2015) 54
Murphy v Ireland App no 44179/98 (ECtHR, 3 December 2003) 67
Nedim Şener v Turkey App no 38270/11 (ECtHR, 8 October 2014) 68
News Verlags GmbH & Co. KG v Austria App no 31457/96 (ECtHR,

66, 69
11 April 2000)
Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway App no 23118/93 (ECtHR, 25

66
November 1999)
NIT S.R.L. v Moldova App no 28470/12 (ECtHR, 5 April 2022) 74
Oberschlick v Austria App no 11662/85 (ECtHR, 23 May 1991) 65
Oberschlick v Austria (No 2) App no 20834/92 (ECtHR, 1 July 1997) 65
Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom App no 13585/88

65, 83, 87
Okçuoğlu v Turkey App no 24246/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 64
Olsson v Sweden (No 1) App no 10465/83 (ECtHR, 24 March 1988) 55
OOO Flavus and Others v Russia App nos 12468/15, 19074/16,

83
23489/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020)
Orban and Others v France App no 20985/05 (ECtHR, 15 April
66, 67
2009)
Otegi Mondragon v Spain App no 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 September

64
2011)
Öztürk v Turkey App no 22479/93 (ECtHR, 28 September 1999) 67
Pais Pires de Lima v Portugal App no 70465/12 (ECtHR, 12 May

87
2019)
Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain App nos 28955/06, 28957/06,

66
28959/06, 28964/06 (ECtHR, 12 September 2011)
Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v Turkey App nos
67
3840/10, 3870/10, 3878/10 (ECtHR, 6 June 2016)
Pedersen and Baadsgaard v Denmark App no 49017/99 (ECtHR, 17

69
December 2004)
Pentikäinen v Finland App no 11882/10 (ECtHR, 20 October 2015) 74
Perinçek v Switzerland App no 27510/08 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015) 54, 61
Perna v Italy App no 48898/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003) 52, 66, 76
Pinto Pinheiro Marques v Portugal App no 26671/09 (ECtHR, 22

71, 84, 87
April 2015)
Reichman v France App no 50147/11 (ECtHR, 12 October 2016) 64
Rekvényi v Hungary App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999) 66
Rizos and Daskas v Greece App no 65545/01 (ECtHR, 27 May 2004) 61, 81
Rouillan v France App no 28000/19 (ECtHR, 23 September 2022) 61, 64, 71
RTBF v Belgium App no 50084/06 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) 55, 65
Saaristo and Others v Finland App no 184/06 (ECtHR, 12 January

64
2011)
Şahin Alpay v Turkey App no 16538/17 (ECtHR, 20 June 2018) 67, 68, 70
Salumäki v Finland App no 23605/09 (ECtHR, 29 July 2014) 68
Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) 52, 54, 55, 56, 66, 69,
71, 87
Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR,

55, 58, 78
14 September 2010)
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland App no

69
931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017)
Saure v Germany App no 8819/16 (ECtHR, 08 February 2023) 59

Savva Terentyev v Russia App no 10692/09 (ECtHR, 4 February
66
2019)
Selahattin Demirtaş v Turkey (No 2) App no 14305/17 (ECtHR, 22

78
December 2020)
Silver and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 5947/72, 6205/73,
7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75, 7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 54, 78
1983)
Skałka v Poland App no 43425/98 (ECtHR, 27 August 2003) 71, 84
Standard Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v Austria (No 3) App no 39378/15

66
(ECtHR, 7 March 2022)
Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom App no 68416/01 (ECtHR,15

52, 76
May 2005)
Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 10 December 2007) 52, 76
Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey App nos 23927/94, 24277/94 (ECtHR,

64, 67, 68
8 July 1999)
Sürek v Turkey (No 1) App no 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) 64, 66, 67, 68
Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98 (ECtHR, 4 April 2001) 54, 71, 78, 84
Taner Kılıç v Turkey (No 2) App no 208/18 (ECtHR, 10 October
55, 70
2022)
Tête v France App no 59636/16 (ECtHR, 26 July 2020) 64
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 54, 55, 61, 65, 68, 78,
(ECtHR, 26 April 1979) 79
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 13166/87

65, 69, 83
Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland App no 13778/88 (ECtHR, 25 June

67, 68
1992)
Times Newspapers Ltd v the United Kingdom (Nos 1, 2) App nos

52, 68, 84
3002/03, 23676/03 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009)
Tolstoy Miloslausky v the United Kingdom App no 18139/91

55
(ECtHR, 13 July 1995)
Tønsbergs Blad AS and Haukom v Norway App no 510/04 (ECtHR,

61
1 March 2007)
Uj v Hungary App no 23954/10 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011) 66
Vladimir Kharitonov v Russia App no 10795/14 (ECtHR, 16

52, 83
November 2020)
Vogt v Germany App no 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995) 55
Wille v Lichtenstein App no 28396/95 (ECtHR, 28 October 1999) 74
Wingrove v the United Kingdom App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25

55, 67
November 1996)
Yalçınkaya and Others v Turkey App nos 25764/09, 25773/09,
25786/09, 25793/09, 25804/09, 25811/09, 25815/09, 25928/09,
25936/09, 25944/09, 26233/09, 26242/09, 26245/09, 26249/09, 61
26252/09, 26254/09, 26719/09, 26726/09, 27222/09 (ECtHR, 9 May
2016)
Yleisradio Oy and Others v Finland App no 30881/09 (ECtHR, 12

74
June 2009)
Zana v Turkey App no 18954/91 (ECtHR, 25 November 1997) 61
CASES FROM THE IACtHR
Álvarez Ramos v Venezuela Series C No 380 (IACtHR, 30 August 66
2019)
Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru Series C No 52 (IACtHR, 30 56
May 1999)
Claude-Reyes et al v Chile Series C No 151 (IACtHR, 19 September 54, 68, 76, 79
2006)
Fontevecchia and D’Amico v Argentina Series C No 238 (IACtHR, 64
29 November 2011)
Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004) 54, 56, 66, 74, 76
Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru Series C No 74 (IACtHR, 6 February 2001) 67
Kimel v Argentina Series C No 177 (IACtHR, 2 May 2008) 56
Lagos del Campo v Peru Series C No 340 (IACtHR, 31 August 2017) 66
Palamara-Iribarne v Chile Series C No 135 (IACtHR, 22 November 56, 65
2005)
Perozo et al v Venezuela Series C No 195 (IACtHR, 28 January 2009) 76
Ricardo Canese v Paraguay Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 57, 60, 62, 67, 74, 76,
2004) 80, 81
Ríos et al v Venezuela Series C No 194 (IACtHR, 28 January 2009) 76
Usón Ramírez v Venezuela Series C No 207 (IACtHR, 20 November 55, 56
2009)
CASES FROM THE IACmHR
Francisco Martorell v Chile Case no 11.230 (IACmHR, 3 May 1996) 54
Rodolfo Robles Espinoza v Peru Case no 11.317 (IACmHR, 23 68, 70, 71
February 1999)
Tomás Eduardo Cirio v Uruguay Case 11.500 (IACmHR, 27 October 55
2006)
CASES FROM THE AfCHPR
Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 52, 54, 76, 78
(AfCHPR, 1 December 2022)
Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda App no 003/2014 (AfCHPR, 52, 66
7 December 2018)
Sébastien Germain Marie Aïkoue Ajavon v Republic of Benin App no 52, 54, 76
062/2019 (AfCHPR, 4 December 2020)

CASES FROM THE ACmHPR
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt 54
Comm no 323/06 (ACmHPR, 12 October 2013)
INTERIGHTS v Mauritania Comm no 242/2001 (ACmHPR, 4 June 54
2004)
Kenneth Good v the Republic of Botswana Comm no 313/05 54, 67
(ACmHPR, 26 May 2010)
Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan Comm no 288/99 68, 71
(ACmHPR, 29 May 2003)
Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria Comm nos 105/93, 52, 65, 76
128/94, 130/94, 152/96 (ACmHPR, 31 October 1998)
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Institute for Human Rights 54
and Development in Africa v Zimbabwe Comm no 294/04
(ACmHPR, 3 April 2009)
CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v eBay International AG and 85
Others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v Bellotti 435 US 765 (1978) 76
New York Times Co v United States 403 US 713-14 (1971) 65
Organization for a Better Austin v Keefe 402 US 415, 419 (1971) 83
UN DOCUMENTS
UN Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on 54, 55, 78
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Siracusa
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the
ICCPR’ (1984) UN Doc E/CN 4/1984/4
UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of 69
Impunity (adopted 12 April 2012)
UNGA ‘Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, 71
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’
A/RES/53/144 (adopted 8 March 1999)
UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 67,
and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 71, 73, 76, 78, 81, 84
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 54
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (10
August 2011) UN Doc A/66/290
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 54
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (17
April 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/40
UNHRC ‘Resolution 33/21’ A/HRC/RES/33/21 (30 September 82
2016)
UNHRC ‘Resolution 44/12’ A/HRC/RES/44/12 (16 July 2020) 82
BOOKS AND BOOK CHAPTERS
Jan Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right (Cambridge 67
University Press 2015)
Manfred Nowak, U.N.Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2nd 59
edn, N.P. Engel 2005)
Marc J Bossuyt, Guide To The “Travaux Préparatoires” of the 59
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers 1987)

ARTICLES
Agnes Callamard, ‘Expert meeting on the links between articles 19 59
and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of expression and advocacy of
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence’ (OHCHR Experts Papers, Geneva, 2-3 October 2008)
Flanagin A, Bibbins-Domingo K, Berkwits M, Christiansen SL, 77
‘Nonhuman “Authors” and Implications for the Integrity of Scientific
Publication and Medical Knowledge’ (2023) 329(8) JAMA 637-639
Korteling JE (Hans), van de Boer-Visschedijk GC, Blankendaal 85
RAM, Boonekamp RC, Eikelboom AR, ‘Human- versus Artificial
Intelligence’ (2021) 4 Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
<https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2021.622364/full
> accessed 17 December 2023
MISCELLANEOUS
ACmHPR, ‘Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and 54, 60, 68, 71
Access to Information in Africa’ (2019)
European Commission for Democracy Through Law of the Council 57, 78
of Europe, ‘Opinion on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist

Activity of the Russian Federation’ (Council of Europe, 20 June
2012)
IACmHR, ‘Annual Report 2009; Annual Report of the Office of the 76
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression’ (30 December 2009)
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51
IACmHR, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (2013) 54, 77
OEA/SER L/II CIDH/RELE/IN F11/13
IACmHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of 54
Expression’ (2009) OEA/SER L/V/II Doc 51
IACtHR ‘Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by 56, 76
Law for the Practice of Journalism’ (13 November 1985) Advisory
Opinion OC. 5/85 Series A No 5
International Commission of Jurists, ‘Response to the European 73
Commission Consultation on Inciting, Aiding or Abetting Terrorist
Offences’ (2007)
Jiayang Wu, Wensheng Gan, Zefeng Chen, Shicheng Wan, Hong 77
Lin, 'AI-Generated Content (AIGC): A Survey' (26 March 2023)
<https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.06632> accessed 16 December 2023
Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and Anti-Terrorism 56
and Anti-Extremism Legislation (The UN Special Rapporteur on

Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Expression and Access to Information, 10 December 2008)
Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to 56
Conflict Situations (The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of
the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and
Access to Information, 4 May 2015)
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the 60, 81
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American
Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression
(2009) CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to 69
member States on the protection of journalism and safety of
journalists and other media actors (adopted 13 April 2016)

IV. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Cero
1. Cero is a country with a population of approximately 50 million people, which has
recorded its highest-ever economic growth in 2022 and became the first ‘high income’
nation in its region. Cero’s successful technology and arms manufacturing industries
are widely credited for this rapid economic growth.1
2. Cero’s Constitution recognises the right to freedom of expression (Article 9) and sets
out when a restriction is permissible: if it is provided by law and necessary for: respect
the rights or reputations of others; protection of public order or public health; or
protecting national, regional, or international peace and security.
3. The Constitution also sets out duties and responsibilities for everyone – meaning both
legal and natural persons (Article 20) – towards their family and society, the state, and
the international community (Article 19). The Constitution also provides remedies for
the infringement of constitutional rights (Article 21) and compliance with international
law (Article 22).2
4. In 2018, Cero enacted the Digital Safety Act to, among other objectives, regulate the
use of social media and the offering of social media services within Cero. Digital Safety
Act defines an offence for encouraging others on any digital device or social media
platform to commit, prepare, or instigate acts of terrorism and specifies its liability
system and penalties that can be imposed (Section 28).3 The Digital Safety Act also
1
Compromis 1.
2
Compromis 2-4.
3
Compromis 5.
establishes the Digital Regulatory Commission, which is empowered to monitor and
receive complaints on the possible violations of Digital Safety Act and is authorised
to prepare a report, and then forward it to the law enforcement authorities for
appropriate legal action (Section 77).4 Digital Safety Act determines ‘terrorism’ and
‘glorification’ too (Section 100).5
OneAI
5. Cero is home to OneAI, a technology company that has developed some of the most
sophisticated AI programs in the world. On 1 January 2022, OneAI launched a beta-
version of a new opensource AI tool called RMSM (‘run-my-social-media’), which is
designed to automatically generate content on behalf of its user and can be plugged into
social media.6
6. The RMSM tool requires training through several steps. First, it requires the user to
answer 40 questions related to the user’s habits, preferences, economic, social and
political views, and cultural background. Then, for a three-month period, the tool
monitors and analyses the user’s social media activity. Finally, it makes post-
suggestions to the user. At the beta stage, the content is posted only if the user approves
the content. However, the RMSM tool does not prevent a user from posting directly;
when such posts are made, it continues to learn from the user’s behaviour. 7 Approved
suggested contents appear on social media with a ‘suggested’ label, but the user can
4
Compromis 6.
5
Compromis 7.
6
Compromis 8.
7
Compromis 9.
deselect this option.8 A ‘settings’ button on the RMSM application permits a user to
control the frequency themes and topics on which the user would like RMSM to make
and schedule ‘suggestions’. A user can deselect this option, choosing not to label
‘suggested’ content as such. In late 2021, after two years of negotiating, OneAI entered
into agreements with all the major tech companies to permit this beta version of RMSM
to be used on their platforms as a plug-in. OneAI demonstrated that 99.3% of its AI-
generated content complied with the relevant community standards of the platform on
which the content was posted and claimed that this percentage would improve to 100%
when it launched its market version. RMSM beta-version was launched on 1 January
2022 and became popular on 1 December 2022, OneAI announced the launch of the
market version on 1 January 2023, with a USD 9.99 / month payment, 80% of 1M beta
users subscribed to paid service.9
7. In the market version, the RMSM tool is able to autogenerate content and post it without
prior approval from the user; OneAI claimed that this content is 100% compliant with
the community standards of the social media platform. Users could access the RMSM
settings to control the frequency of ‘autogenerated’ content, list preferences for themes
and topics on which the user would like RMSM to produce ‘autogenerated’ content, and
schedule such content. Autogenerated content also has a label, but it can be opted out.
In summary, each user has three options: to select ‘suggested’ posts, or ‘autogenerated’
posts option, or to post directly.10
8
Compromis 10.
9
Compromis 11-12.
10
Compromis 13-14.
Una
8. Una is a Cerovian model and social media influencer, Cero’s Most Influential Person in
2022, with 13 million Instagram (6 million is from Cero) and 4 million Facebook (2
million is from Cero) followers, who became popular from producing short videos on
fashion, culture, and tourist destinations in Cero. She has several endorsement contracts
with luxury brands. Una regularly posts on political issues such as women’s rights, and
LGBTQIA+, and she is a vocal critic of arms trade. She makes close to USD 200,000 /
month through her online engagements.11
9. Una began using the RMSM beta version from its release – at that time, 40% of her
content was suggested by RMSM, Una opted out of the labelling. Then, on 1 January
2023, she subscribed to the market version, and on 15 January, she decided to select the
‘autogenerate’ option. She added themes such as ‘fashion’, ‘luxury’, ‘Women’s rights’,
‘LGBTQIA+’, ‘Anti-war’ and ‘Anti-guns’ to her preferences. She also opted out
labelling, so her followers could not differentiate between her own posts and the
autogenerated contents.12
10. Over the next few months, Una closely monitored the ‘autogenerated’ posts on her
social media feeds and was satisfied that they captured her preferences. She scheduled
one ‘autogenerated’ post on Instagram at 9.00 AM every day and one ‘autogenerated’
post on Facebook at 11.00 AM every day. The ‘autogenerated’ posts ensured that Una’s
Instagram feed was regularly featuring the hotel and its facilities.13
11
Compromis 15.
12
Compromis 16-17.
13
Comrpomis 18.
Enos
11. Enos is a low-income country with a population of approximately 20 million and shares
a border with Cero. Since 2012 Enos has experienced a brutal armed conflict between
the Enosian military and an armed rebel group (Enosian Liberation Army, ELA). The
Enosian government has described ELA as a ‘terrorist organisation’; on the contrary,
the rebels claim that they are ‘fighting for democracy’ and enjoy notable support –
according to a nationwide survey carried out in 2020 by Enos Polls 40% – among the
Enosian population.14
12. Additionally, the current government in Cero maintains good relations with the Enosian
government. In 2020, due to the Regional Defence Pact signed by the two counties,
Cero remained Enos’s largest supplier of defence technology and military equipment,
despite Cerovian habitants sympathising with ELA’s cause and ceasefire. In light of
these, Cero has not designated ELA as a terrorist organisation under its Counter-
Terrorism Act.15
13. In early March 2023, the fighting intensified, and on 10 March, the rebels retreated to
the coastal Enosian town of Naut. Then they got surrounded by the Enosian military,
which began to use heavy artillery fire to force the rebels to surrender – most of these
weaponry were obtained from Cero.16 By mid-March, around 25,000 Enosian civilians
from Naut were trapped alongside the rebels. Reports, photographs and videos showing
dead and injured civilians circulated on social media. Supporters of ELA used this
handle to call on the international community to intervene and stop ‘war crimes’
14
Compromis 19.
15
Compromis 20.
16
Compromis 21.
perpetrated by the Enosian military. Conversely, the Enosian government maintained
that the military was adopting a ‘zero civilian casualty’ policy and that any collateral
damage to civilian targets was purely due to ELA’s policy of intermingling with
civilians and using civilians as ‘human shields’.17
14. In parallel with all this, social media users in Cero called on the Cerovian government
to intervene and negotiate a ceasefire to end the ‘humanitarian crisis’. Some users also
criticised the Cerovian government for selling weapons to the Enosian government and
called them to cease all military ties with Enos.18
15. On the morning of 14 March, Una posted a video of herself f on Instagram calling for a
ceasefire in Naut. Una used several hashtags. The post went viral, and some of those
who shared the post used the additional hashtag #✊Ela – this ‘✊’ emoji is often
associated with solidarity. Then, on 16 March, while the situation in Naut worsened,
Enos Rights Watch, a reputed non-governmental organisation based in Enos, claimed
that ‘unofficial estimates’ of the civilian death toll was around three thousand. The
report prompted another wave of social media posts in Cero, and some users began to
use the term ‘genocide’ to describe the crisis.19 Later that day, Una posted a picture of
herself on both Instagram and Facebook with the caption: ‘The genocide must stop!’
with several hashtags including #✊Ela. The post went viral and was shared by
17
Compromis 22.
18
Compromis 23.
19
Compromis 24-25.
thousands of followers using the same hashtags. None of Una’s content relating to Naut
was removed by Instagram or Facebook.20
16. At 9.00 AM on 17 March 2023, the RMSM feature on Una’s Instagram handle
autogenerated and published a post with a picture of her and the caption: ‘Stop the
genocide! #❤️Naut #StopArmingEnos #✊Ela’. Una reviewed this published post at
around 9.35 AM and retained it on her feed.21
The Controversial Post
17. Then, at 11.00 AM on 17 March, the RMSM feature on Una’s Facebook page
autogenerated and published the following post: ‘The genocide must stop! I stand in
solidarity with ELA. #❤️Naut #StopArmingEnos #✊Ela’. While the Post was liked
and shared by many users, it also encountered some negative comments, as some users
commented that Una was supporting ‘terrorists’. Una was not active on Facebook
between 10.45 AM and 12.15 PM because she travelled and had poor mobile phone
service reception. Then, at around 12.15 PM, Una reviewed the Post and deleted it due
to backlash. After that, Una did not post any further content on social media related to
the Enosian crisis.22
18. The next morning, Cero National Network reported that ‘unidentified saboteurs’ had
detonated a small bomb at a Cerovian weapons manufacturing facility close to the
border with Enos, causing an explosion at around 2.00 AM.23 Cerovian Ministry of
20
Compromis 26.
21
Compromis 27.
22
Compromis 28.
23
Compromis 29.
Defence claimed that initial investigations pointed to ‘ELA sympathisers’ as the likely
perpetrators of the attack, on the contrary ELA denied responsibility for the attack. The
statement was carried on several independent news channels in Cero and was circulated
on social media.24
19. By the end of May, the Enosian military overran ELA in Naut. Enosian government
claimed that ‘very few civilians were lost in the tactical operation’; however, according
to the statement of Enos Rights Watch, nearly five thousand civilians and four thousand
rebels had died during the operation. In mid-June, the United Nations Human Rights
Council adopted a resolution calling for an independent fact-finding mission led by the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to ‘inquire into civilian and
combatant deaths and the possible occurrence of war crimes during military operations
in Naut, Enos’. A vast majority of Council members voted in favour of the resolution,
Enos and Cero – both members of the Council – voted against the resolution.25
Domestic legal proceedings
20. On the 18th and 19th March, the Digital Regulatory Commission received dozens of
complaints that Una has glorified terrorism, and some of them claimed that Una’s Post
was connected to the terrorist attack too. On the 20th, March Digital Safety Act
submitted a report to the Cerovian Criminal Investigation Department recommending
Una’s prosecution under section 28 of the Digital Safety Act.26
24
Compromis 29.
25
Compromis 30.
26
Compromis 31.
21. On the 21st of March, Una was summoned for inquiry, where she explained that she
had not intentionally posted the phrase: ‘I stand in solidarity with ELA’, which had
offended some users. Una claimed that her Post did not glorify terrorism in the first
place, it was not, in any event, generated by her, and she cannot be held liable for it. She
argued that the AI tool had overstepped the mark and that legal action should have been
taken against OneAI. Later that day, Una issued a short statement of sorry, the post was
autogenerated, and that she would take necessary legal actions against OneAI; however,
she has not done that since.27 No further information or statements were published until
then due to that the findings of a military commission of inquiry had been ‘classified on
the grounds of national security’.28
22. The next day, the Cerovian Criminal Investigation Department summoned OneAI; the
company maintained that the ‘#✊Ela’ meant ‘solidarity with ELA’ and that the
autogenerated Post was entirely in line with Una’s previous content. In addition, it was
fully compliant with Facebook’s policy on ‘Dangerous Organisations and Individuals’
and was not flagged for any violation, including praising or glorifying terrorism.29
23. On the 25th, the Cerovian Criminal Investigation Department decided to institute legal
action against both Una and OneAI in a joint prosecution under Section 28 of the Digital
Safety Act. Thereafter, both Una and OneAI immediately filed petitions to the
Constitutional Court of Cero, complaining that their freedom of expression was
violated. Moreover, Una claimed that prosecution was arbitrary, unfair and
unreasonable and was motivated by the government’s geopolitical and economic
27
Compromis 32-33.
28
Compromis 40.
29
Compromis 34.
interests. OneAI claimed that it has the right to impart information and ideas via AI tools
and that the prosecution violated this right. However, the Constitutional Court of Cero
decided to hear both petitions after the trials.30
24. On 13 April, both of them were found guilty of ‘recklessly publishing content that
indirectly encouraged acts of terrorism by glorifying an entity that committed acts of
terrorism’; they have jointly produced and, therefore, jointly responsible for the content.
Una was sentenced to pay a fine of USD 1,500, with a suspended prison sentence of 1
year; OneAI was sentenced to pay a fine of USD 50,000. On top of all this, the High
Court of Cero prohibited Una from using any social media platform and OneAI from
offering the RMSM tool for one month.31
25. Both applicants appealed against the decision; both appeals were dismissed on 25
April.32 On 1 May, the Constitutional Court of Cero reached the final verdict: in a split
decision – 3-2 – dismissed both petitions on the basis that restrictions imposed on the
basis that the restrictions imposed on the petitioners’ freedom of expression were
‘permissible under the law’, and it also noted that the applicants had relevant
constitutional duties too.33
26. Una’s conviction sparked considerable debate on social media in Cero. Many users
came forward in support of Una, whereas many others called for her boycott and for her
to be ‘cancelled’. By 25 May, Una had lost 90% of her endorsement contracts and 6
30
Compromis 35.
31
Compromis 36.
32
Compromis 37.
33
Compromis 38.
million Instagram and 2 million Facebook followers, her monthly income decreased to
USD 10,000 / month. The number of subscribers of RMSM dwindled to 200,000.34
Universal Court of Human Rights
27. The Universal Court of Human Rights exercises exclusive jurisdiction to receive and
consider applications from persons alleging the violation of rights recognised in the
ICCPR.35 Cero ratified the ICCPR without reservations in 2000.36
28. Una and OneAI have exhausted all domestic remedies. They filed applications before
the Universal Court of Human Rights alleging violations of Article 19 of the ICCPR.37
34
Compromis 39.
35
Compromis 41.
36
Compromis 4.
37
Compromis 42.
V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Una and OneAI (Applicants) have applied to the Universal Freedom of Expression Court, the
special Chamber of the Universal Court of Human Rights, hearing issues relating to the
violation of rights recognised in the Article 19 of the ICCPR.
Una and OneAI filed a petition before Cero’s Constitutional Court complaining that the State
of Cero had violated their rights under Cero’s Constitution. The Court heard their pending
petitions together and decided to dismiss both petitions.
Una and OneAI exhausted their domestic appeals.
This Honourable Court has jurisdiction as the final arbiter over all regional courts where parties
have exhausted all domestic remedies.
The Applicants request this Honourable Court to issue a judgment in accordance with relevant
international law, including the ICCPR, the UDHR, Conventions, jurisprudence developed by
relevant courts, and principles of international law.

VI. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The questions presented, as certified by this Honourable Court, are as follows:
1. Whether the State of Cero, by convicting and sentencing Una under the Digital Safety
Act, and specifically by imposing a one-month ban on her use of social media, violated
her right to the freedom of expression recognised by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
2. Whether the State of Cero, by convicting and sentencing OneAI under the Digital Safety
Act, and specifically by imposing a one-month ban on its service, ‘RMSM’, violated its
right to the freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart information and
ideas, recognised by Article 19 of the ICCPR.

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING UNA UNDER THE
DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A ONE-MONTH BAN
ON HER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, VIOLATED HER RIGHT TO THE FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR
As a popular Cerovian social media influencer, Una exercised her freedom of expression on the
Internet, participating in discussions concerning political issues. Cero’s interference on Una’s
freedom of expression is incompatible with the ICCPR, as it was not prescribed by law, not in
pursuance of a legitimate aim, and was neither necessary nor proportionate.
First, the interference was not prescribed by law as it was not reasonably foreseeable for Una
and did not provide adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion. As DSA employs overly
broad and vague terms in defining the elements of the alleged terrorism-related offence, it was
not reasonably foreseeable for Una to be held liable under it. Furthermore, despite the same
definition of terrorism within DSA and CTA, its application lacks consistency within Cero
regarding the classification of ELA. Moreover, the sanctions were uncertain either for Una as
DSA failed to provide an upper limit for the duration and precise conditions for determining
the scope of a potential ban on use. Cero failed to establish adequate legal protection against
arbitrary interferences allowing authorities to conduct the proceedings in accordance with
Cero’s geopolitical and economic interests. DSA failed to indicate with sufficient clarity the
scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise granted for courts applying it. Adequate
procedural safeguards were neither provided allowing the imposition of criminal sanctions in a
summary trial in less than two months without the comprehensive examination of the facts, as
the findings regarding the alleged attack had been classified.

Second, the interference did not pursue any legitimate aim exhaustively provided by the ICCPR
but rather served Cero’s geopolitical and economic interests. Cero failed to demonstrate based
on real causes that Una’s Post created a clear and imminent danger, therefore public order and
national security interests cannot be invoked. The existence of a clear harm to the rights of
others was not demonstrated either as Cero failed to prove any links between Una’s expression
and the alleged attack, which did not result in any casualties. Nevertheless, Cero's Constitution
does not align with the ICCPR, because it provides broader basis for restrictions, namely in the
interest of regional and international peace and security.
Third, Cero’s interference was not necessary in a democratic society, as it did not correspond
to a pressing social need, was not suitable to pursue its legitimate aim, was not the least intrusive
instrument and was not proportionate to the sacrificed right.
Firstly, Cero failed to justify a pressing social need based on relevant and sufficient reasons.
Una’s Post did not glorify terrorism, instead she spoke out against the bloodshed and expressed
her compassion for the victims following her previous posts drawing attention to an ongoing
humanitarian crisis. Hence, it cannot be considered as incitement to any violent act.
Secondly, the imposed fine amounting to less than 1% of Una’s monthly income did not
correspond to her financial situation, thus it per se could not be suitable to deter her from posting
further. By imposing an appropriate financial penalty, the suspended prison and the ban could
have been avoided.
Thirdly, Cero failed to adopt the criminal conviction with the greatest care. The imposition of
a suspended prison sentence for the criticism of the state in a public debate is not compatible
with the ICCPR. Moreover, the imposed general and unconditional ban on use constitutes an
impermissible prior restraint on her freedom of expression. Alternatively, less intrusive

instruments were available to achieve Cero’s alleged legitimate aims, thus failing the criteria of
necessity.
Fourthly, looking at the case as a whole and considering all relevant circumstances of Una’s
restricted speech, the interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect. Una’s
expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as political speech of a non-professional
journalist informing the public about an ongoing armed conflict. Taking into consideration the
elevated level of protection of Una’s expression and her conduct following the alleged
infringement, the nature and severity of the imposed sanctions, especially the one-month ban,
are not reasonable and proportionate, as they destroyed Una’s reputation, career, financial
situation and social image. Moreover, as Una is a human rights defender speaking out against
possible war crimes and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, her prosecution is not compatible with
the ICCPR either. The imposed sanctions also deterred the society from speaking out on
important public matters causing a chilling effect.
THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING ONEAI UNDER THE
DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A ONE-MONTH BAN
ON ITS SERVICE, ‘RMSM’, VIOLATED ITS RIGHT TO THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, INCLUDING THE FREEDOM TO IMPART INFORMATION AND
IDEAS, RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR
OneAI exercises its right to freedom of expression, including the right to impart information
and ideas through its internet-based information disseminating service, RMSM. Cero’s
interference on OneAI’s freedom of expression is incompatible with the ICCPR, as it was not
prescribed by law, not in pursuance of a legitimate aim, and was neither necessary nor
proportionate.
First, the interference was not prescribed by law as it was not reasonably foreseeable for OneAI
and did not provide adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion. DSA’s imprecise,
overbroad and vague wording impeded OneAI from reasonably foreseeing its criminal liability
regarding a terrorism-related offence. Cero’s failure to provide an upper limit for the duration
and precise conditions for determining the scope of a potential ban under the DSA made the
degree of the sanction not foreseeable for OneAI either. Moreover, adequate protection against
arbitrary interferences was not provided, allowing authorities to conduct the proceedings
arbitrarily in accordance with Cero’s geopolitical and economic interests. DSA failed to
indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise granted
for courts applying it. Notably, the inconsistent application of the term of terrorism in DSA and
CTA regarding ELA caused arbitrary interference for OneAI. Furthermore, adequate
procedural safeguards were neither provided, allowing the imposition of criminal sanctions in
a summary trial in less than two months without the comprehensive examination of the facts,
as the findings regarding the alleged attack had been classified.
Second, the interference did not pursue any legitimate aim exhaustively provided by the ICCPR
but rather served Cero’s geopolitical and economic interests. Cero failed to demonstrate based
on real causes that the Post created a clear and imminent danger, therefore public order and
national security interests cannot be invoked. The existence of a clear harm to the rights of
others was not demonstrated either, as Cero failed to prove any links between the Post and the
alleged attack, which did not result in any casualties. Nevertheless, Cero's Constitution does
not align with the ICCPR implementing a broader basis for restrictions, namely in the interest
of regional and international peace and security.
Third, Cero’s interference was not necessary in a democratic society, as it did not correspond
to a pressing social need, was not suitable to pursue its legitimate aim, was not the least intrusive
instrument and was not proportionate to the sacrificed right.

Firstly, Cero failed to justify a pressing social need based on relevant and sufficient reasons.
The Post generated by RMSM did not glorify terrorism or encourage the commission of any
violent action. Notably, Cero has not designated ELA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation over the 11
years of the conflict. The protection of the rights of others, national security and public order is
the obligation and responsibility of the state through active measures. The sanctions imposed
by Cero are not in response to a threat posed by OneAI but rather to its failure to perform its
own obligations, thus arbitrarily interfering with OneAI's FoE.
Secondly, the implemented measures were not suitable considering that once the ban has
expired, the algorithm continues to work in the same way generating posts based on its user’s
previous posts and habits imitating their style. Alternatively, Cero could have taken suitable
steps to prevent potentially dangerous terrorism-related postings by envisaging joint
cooperation.
Thirdly, the imposed restrictions are overbroad and are not the least intrusive instrument
amongst those that might achieve their protective function. Cero intervened using one of the
most severe measures by imposing a ban on RMSM, constituting an impermissible prior
restraint. Cero failed to ensure tight control over the ban’s scope and imposed a general and
unconditional ban on an internet-based information disseminating service, which is clearly
incompatible with the ICCPR.
Fourthly, taking into account the nature and severity of the imposed sanctions on OneAI, the
interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect. OneAI developed and operated
RMSM with constant due diligence fully complying with the relevant social media platform’s
community standards. Consistently, the Post was not flagged or removed for any violation by
Facebook. Although RMSM generated a one-sentence post relating to an organisation of
uncertain classification, available to the public only for a very limited time, Cero imposed the
upper limit of the fine. Furthermore, it imposed a ban severely tarnishing OneAI’s reputation
and causing significant losses threatening OneAI’s economic foundations. The severity of the
imposed fine and the ban's financial implications resulting in the loss of 75% of the RMSM
subscribers, caused a chilling effect on OneAI’s freedom of expression carrying the risk of self-
censorship on the Internet.
Consequently, the Applicants submit that the interference was not necessary in a democratic
society. Therefore, the freedom of expression of the Applicants shall prevail.

VIII. ARGUMENTS
ISSUE A – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING UNA
UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A ONE-
MONTH BAN ON HER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, VIOLATED HER RIGHT TO THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR
1. FoE38 serves as the cornerstone of every free and democratic society,39 enshrined in the
ICCPR40 and echoed in the regional human rights conventions.41 It is essential for a
healthy and vibrant society and to foster its moral and intellectual development.42
2. The Internet has become a principal means individuals exercise their right to FoE. It
provides essential tools for participation in discussions concerning political issues.43
38
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA
Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 19; European Convention on Human Rights (adopted 4 November 1950, entered into
force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 1932 (ECHR) art 10; American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22
November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) (ACHR) art 13; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (ACHPR) art 9.
39
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; Perna v Italy App no
48898/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003) [39]; Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom App no 68416/01 (ECtHR,15 May
2005) [87]; Monnat v Switzerland App no 73604/01 (ECtHR, 21 September 2006) [55]; Hachette Filipacchi
Associes v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 12 November 2007) [40]; Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01
(ECtHR, 10 December 2007) [101]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR, 13 July
2012) [48]; Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29 March 2016) [48]; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice
Brčko and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 17224/11 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [75]; Sébastien Germain
Marie Aïkoue Ajavon v Republic of Benin App no 062/2019 (AfCHPR, 4 December 2020) [119]; Houngue Éric
Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 (AfCHPR, 1 December 2022) [106]; UNHRC, ‘General
Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34
[2]; Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. Dobou v Togo CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990,
424/1990 (UNHRC, 12 July 1996) [7(4)]; Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/57/D/628/1995 (UNHRC,
20 October 1998) [10.3]; Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria Comm nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96
(ACmHPR, 31 October 1998) [54]; Vladimir Viktorovich Shchetko v Belarus CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (UNHRC,
11 July 2006) [7.3]; Stephen Benhadj v Algeria CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (UNHRC, 20 July 2007) [8.10].
40
ICCPR art 19.
41
ECHR art 10; ACHR art 13; ACHPR art 9.
42
Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda App no 003/2014 (AfCHPR, 7 December 2018) [133].
43
Times Newspapers Ltd v the United Kingdom (Nos 1, 2) App nos 3002/03, 23676/03 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009)
[27]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [54]; Cengiz and Others v Turkey App
nos 48226/10, 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1 December 2015) [49]; Vladimir Kharitonov v Russia App no 10795/14
The particular importance of Una’s case is that it pertains to the interference with Una’s
social media Post, generated using AI,44 thereby emphasising its profound implications
for her FoE in the era of online platforms and AI.
3. Cero violated Una’s right to FoE by convicting and sentencing her, especially by
imposing a one-month ban on her use of social media, as the Post fell within the scope
of FoE. Therefore, the unlawfulness of the interference must be assessed under Article
19 of the ICCPR, in accordance with international standards. The three-part cumulative
test must be applied to establish that the interference was i) not prescribed by law, ii)
not in pursuance of a legitimate aim, iii) neither necessary nor proportionate. These
(ECtHR, 23 June 2020) [33]; Melike v Turkey App no 35786/19 (ECtHR, 15 June 2021) [49]; Sanchez v France
App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [158].
44
Compromis 28.
requirements have been endorsed by the UNHRC,45 the ECtHR,46 the IACtHR,47 the
AfCHPR48 and the ACmHPR.49
i) The interference was not prescribed by law
4. For an interference to be prescribed by law, a) an act must be accessible and reasonably
foreseeable50 and b) adequate safeguards against arbitrary interferences must be
available.51
45
UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011)
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [35]; Womah Mukong v Cameroon CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (UNHRC, 10 August 1994)
[9.7]; Sohn v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/54/D/518/1992 (UNHRC, 19 July 1995) [10.4]; Robert Faurisson v
France CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (UNHRC, 8 November 1996) [9.4]; Malcolm Ross v Canada
CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997 (UNHRC, 18 October 2000) [11.2]; Velichkin v Belarus CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001
(UNHRC, 20 October 2005) [7.3]; Yashar Agazade and Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan CCPR/C/118/D/2205/2012
(UNHRC, 27 October 2016) [7.4]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (16 May 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 [24]; UNHRC, ‘Report
of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’
(10 August 2011) UN Doc A/66/290 [15]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (17 April 2013) UN Doc A/HRC/23/40 [29].
46
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; The Sunday Times v the
United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [45]; Ceylan v Turkey App no 23556/94 (ECtHR,
8 July 1999) [24]; Murat Vural v Turkey App no 9540/07 (ECtHR, 21 January 2015) [59]; Perinçek v Switzerland
App no 27510/08 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015) [124]; Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023)
[123].
47
Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004) [120]; IACmHR, ‘Report of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression’ (2009) OEA/SER L/V/II Doc 51 [231]-[233]; IACmHR, ‘Freedom of
Expression and the Internet’ (2013) OEA/SER L/II CIDH/RELE/IN F11/13 [54]-[64]; Francisco Martorell v Chile
Case 11.230 (IACmHR, 3 May 1996) [55];
48
Sébastien Germain Marie Aïkoue Ajavon v Republic of Benin App no 062/2019 (AfCHPR, 4 December 2020)
[117]-[120]; Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 (AfCHPR, 1 December 2022)
[104]-[107].
49
INTERIGHTS v Mauritania Comm no 242/01 (ACmHPR, 4 June 2004) [78]-[79]; Zimbabwe Lawyers for
Human Rights & Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Zimbabwe Comm no 294/04 (ACmHPR,
3 April 2009) [80]; Kenneth Good v the Republic of Botswana Comm no 313/05 (ACmHPR, 26 May 2010) [187];
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and INTERIGHTS v Egypt Comm no 323/06 (ACmHPR, 12 October 2013)
[248]; ACmHPR, ‘Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (2019)
Principle 9.
50
Goodwin v the United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 27 March 1996) [31]; Tammer v Estonia App no
41205/98 (ECtHR, 4 April 2001) [37]; Chauvy and Others v France App no 64915/01 (ECtHR, 29 September
2004) [43]; Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 (AfCHPR, 1 December 2022)
[109]; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011)
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [25].
51
Silver and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75,
7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983) [90]; Malone v the United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984)
a) The law envisaging the interference was not reasonably foreseeable for Una
5. Foreseeability not only requires that the impugned measure has a legal basis in domestic
law,52 but also refers to the quality of the law in question.53 For a restriction to be
envisaged by law, a provision must be sufficiently precise54 as to the rule’s constraints,
limitations, and penalties55 to enable the individuals to anticipate the consequences a
given action may entail and thus regulate their conduct accordingly.56 DSA failed to
[67]; Claude-Reyes et al v Chile Series C No 151 (IACtHR, 19 September 2006) [89]; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya
Párt v Hungary App no 201/17 (ECtHR, 20 January 2020) [93]; UN Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation of Provisions in the ICCPR’ (1984) UN Doc E/CN 4/1984/4 [16], [18]; UNHRC, ‘General
[25].
52
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [47]; Malone v the
United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984) [66]; Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81 (ECtHR, 26
March 1987) [50]; Olsson v Sweden (No 1) App no 10465/83 (ECtHR, 24 March 1988) [61]; Tolstoy Miloslausky
v the United Kingdom App no 18139/91 (ECtHR, 13 July 1995) [37]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10
(ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [57]; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v Hungary App no 201/17 (ECtHR, 20 January 2020)
[93]; Taner Kılıç v Turkey (No 2) App no 208/18 (ECtHR, 10 October 2022) [154].
53
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [49]; Kruslin v France
App no 11801/85 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) [27]; Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008)
[140]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [81]; Ahmet
Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [57]; Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR,
15 May 2023) [124].
54
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [49]; Malone v the
United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984) [66]; Müller and Others v Switzerland App no
10737/84 (ECtHR, 24 May 1988) [29]; Tolstoy Miloslausky v the United Kingdom App no 18139/91 (ECtHR, 13
July 1995) [37]; Vogt v Germany App no 17851/91 (ECtHR, 26 September 1995) [48]; Wingrove v the United
Kingdom App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996) [40]; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France
App nos 21279/02, 36448/02 (ECtHR, 22 October 2007) [41]; Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR, 12
February 2008) [140]; Usón Ramírez v Venezuela Series C No 207 (IACtHR, 20 November 2009) [55]; Sanoma
Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [81], [83]; Editorial Board of
Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine App no 33014/05 (ECtHR, 5 August 2011) [52]; RTBF v Belgium App no
50084/06 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) [115]; Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR, 25 January
2012) [87]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [57]; UN Economic and Social
Council, UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation of Provisions in the ICCPR’ (1984) UN Doc E/CN 4/1984/4 [17]; UNHRC,
‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc
CCPR/C/GC/34 [25]; Tomás Eduardo Cirio v Uruguay Case 11.500 (IACmHR, 27 October 2006) [64].
55
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [25]; Leonardus Johannes Maria de Groot v the Netherlands CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994
(UNHRC, 14 July 1994) [4.2].
56
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [49]; Wingrove v the
United Kingdom App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996) [40]; Larissis and Others v Greece App no
23372/94 (ECtHR, 24 February 1998) [40]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR,
14 September 2010) [81]; RTBF v Belgium App no 50084/06 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) [115]; Altuğ Taner
meet these requirements of legality, which are particularly important when determining
criminal sanctions.57
6. First, it does not use strict and unequivocal terms, clearly restricting any punishable
behaviours58 It employs overly broad and vague terms59 in defining the content
encompassed within the offence, such as ‘likely to be understood by a reasonable
person’. It lacks a clear standard for defining a ‘reasonable person’ or setting a specific
likelihood threshold.60
7. Moreover, counter-terrorism measures should clearly define terrorism-related offences
to avoid unnecessary and disproportionate interference in the FoE.61 Terms such as
‘glorifying’, ‘justifying’ or ‘encouraging’ terrorism should not be used.62 DSA applying
Akçam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR, 25 January 2012) [87]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10
(ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [57].
57
Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru Series C No 52 (IACtHR, 30 May 1999) [121]; Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica
Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004) [117]; Ricardo Canese v Paraguay Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August
2004) [72]; Palamara-Iribarne v Chile Series C No 135 (IACtHR, 22 November 2005) [79]; Kimel v Argentina
Series C No 177 (IACtHR, 2 May 2008) [63]; Usón Ramírez v Venezuela Series C No 207 (IACtHR, 20 November
2009) [55]; IACtHR ‘Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism’ (13 November 1985) Advisory Opinion OC. 5/85 Series A No 5 [39]-[40].
58
Castillo Petruzzi and Others v Peru Series C No 52 (IACtHR, 30 May 1999) [121]; Kimel v Argentina Series C
No 177 (IACtHR, 2 May 2008) [63]; Usón Ramírez v Venezuela Series C No 207 (IACtHR, 20 November 2009)
[55].
59
Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France App nos 21279/02, 36448/02 (ECtHR, 22 October 2007) [41];
Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v Italy App no 38433/09 (ECtHR, 7 June 2012) [141]; Karácsony and
Others v Hungary App nos 42461/13, 44357/13 (ECtHR, 17 May 2016) [126].
60
Compromis 5.
61
Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [136]; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article
19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [34], [46].
62
Compromis 5, 7; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12
September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [46]; Joint Declaration on Defamation of Religions, and Anti-Terrorism
and Anti-Extremism Legislation (The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, 10 December 2008); Joint Declaration
on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations (The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
4 May 2015) [3].
such imprecise terms is vulnerable to broad, inconsistent and arbitrary application by
state authorities.63
8. Second, despite the same definition of terrorism within DSA and CTA,64 its application
lacks consistency within Cero. Notably, Cero did not designate ELA as a terrorist
organisation under CTA,65 thus it was not reasonably foreseeable for Una to be held
liable under DSA for glorifying terrorism.
9. Third, DSA fails to provide precise conditions for determining the scope of social media
platforms covered by the restriction, nor does it define an upper limit for the duration of
use restrictions. It therefore remains uncertain what type of sanction Una may face in
the event of a violation, as DSA lacks the specificity to determine the extent of potential
penalties.66
10. Consequently, it was not reasonably foreseeable for Una to be held liable for the alleged
offences.
63
Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR, 25 January 2012) [95]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism’ (19 December 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/28/28 [48]; European Commission for
Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe, ‘Opinion on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity
of the Russian Federation’ (Council of Europe, 20 June 2012) [70], [74].
64
Clarifications 21.
65
Compromis 20.
66
Compromis 5.
b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion
11. Cero has not fulfilled its positive obligation to establish adequate safeguards against
unfettered discretion,67 resulting in Una’s arbitrary, unfair, and unreasonable
prosecution violating her right to fair trial.68
12. On the one hand, the broad and vague terms used in the legislation allowed Cero to
conduct the legal proceedings in accordance with its geopolitical and economic
interests, namely remaining the largest military equipment supplier to Enos.69 DSA
confers unfettered discretion for the restriction on FoE on those charged with its
execution and does not provide sufficient guidance to enable them to ascertain what
sorts of expressions are restricted.70 Consequently, it resulted in sanctioning acts that
may not truly be dangerous for the alleged legitimate aims,71 thus failing to provide Una
with adequate protection against arbitrary interference72 and unfettered discretion.73
67
Huvig v France App no 11105/84 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) [34]; Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden
App no 12963/87 (ECtHR, 25 February 1992) [75]; Maestri v Italy App no 39748/98 (ECtHR, 17 February 2004)
[30]; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR, 6 April 2009) [266]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands
App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [82]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March
2013) [59].
68
Compromis 35; ICCPR art 14.
69
Compromis 20, 35.
70
Compromis 5; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12
September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [25].
71
Keun-Tae Kim v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (UNHRC, 4 January 1994) [3.3].
72
Malone v the United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984) [66]; Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81
(ECtHR, 26 March 1987) [50]-[51].
73
Huvig v France App no 11105/84 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) [34]; Margareta and Roger Andersson v Sweden
App no 12963/87 (ECtHR, 25 February 1992) [75]; Maestri v Italy App no 39748/98 (ECtHR, 17 February 2004)
[30]; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR, 6 April 2009) [266]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands
App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [82]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March
2013) [59].
13. On the other hand, Cero failed to embed adequate procedural safeguards to prevent
arbitrary encroachments on FoE.74 The criminal sanctions were imposed in a summary
trial and all proceedings, including remedies, were conducted in less than two months.75
Moreover, the courts were not able to examine the facts comprehensively, as the
findings regarding the alleged attack had been classified.76
14. Consequently, the interference was not prescribed by law.
ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim
15. The ICCPR sets out exhaustively77 the basis for any restriction on FoE. Although Cero
has ratified the ICCPR without reservations,78 Cero's Constitution does not align with
the ICCPR, as it allows intervention for regional and international peace and security.79
74
Lombardi Vallauri v Italy App no 39128/05 (ECtHR, 20 January 2010) [46]; Cumhuríyet Vakfi and Others v
Turkey App no 28255/07 (ECtHR, 8 January 2014) [68].
75
Compromis 28-38.
76
Compromis 40; Saure v Germany App no 8819/16 (ECtHR, 08 February 2023) Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Pavli, joined by Judges Ravarani and Zünd [8].
77
Marc J Bossuyt, Guide To The “Travaux Préparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 375; Manfred Nowak, U.N.Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2nd
edn, N.P. Engel 2005) 468-480; Agnes Callamard, ‘Expert meeting on the links between articles 19 and 20 of the
ICCPR: Freedom of expression and advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence’ (OHCHR Experts Papers, Geneva, 2-3 October 2008).
78
Compromis 4.
79
Compromis 2.
16. Where public order and national security interests are invoked, it must be based on real
causes, presenting certain and credible threat of a serious disturbance. 80 Cero failed to
demonstrate81 that the expression created a clear and imminent danger.82
17. Where the rights and reputations of others are allegedly harmed, the existence of a clear
harm to the rights of others must be proven.83 Cero failed to prove any links between
Una’s expression and the alleged attack with no casualties.84
18. Consequently, the interference did not pursue any legitimate aim.
iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society
19. For an interference to be necessary in a democratic society, it must a) correspond to a
pressing social need, b) be suitable to pursue its legitimate aim, c) be the least intrusive
instrument and d) proportionate to the sacrificed right.85
80
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression (2009)
CIDH/RELE/INF. 2/09 [82]; ACmHPR, ‘Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression and Access to
Information in Africa’ (2019) Principle 22.
81
Compromis 31-38.
82
Gül and Others v Turkey App no 4870/02 (ECtHR, 8 September 2010) [42]; Kılıç and Eren v Turkey App no
43807/07 (ECtHR, 29 February 2012) [29].
83
Ricardo Canese v Paraguay Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 2004) [72].
84
Compromis 29, 31-38.
85
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; Hertel v Switzerland App
no 25181/94 (ECtHR, 25 August 1998) [47]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR,
13 July 2012) [48]; Animal Defenders International v the United Kingdom App no 48876/08 (ECtHR, 22 April
2013) [100]; Cumhuríyet Vakfi and Others v Turkey App no 28255/07 (ECtHR, 8 January 2014) [68].
glorify terrorism
20. Cero shall justify a pressing social need with relevant and sufficient reasons.86 Where
the justification for interference with discourse defending terrorism is examined, the
national authorities shall make an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.87
Including the review of the interference in light of the case as a whole, 88 to analyse the
content and the context of the impugned statements in which they were made, as well
as the personality and function of the person making the statements.89
21. The interference did not correspond to a pressing social need for the following reasons.
22. First, the classification of ELA is ambiguous and inconsistent within the Cerovian
legislation.90 As HC pointed out, Cero has not designated ELA as a ‘terrorist’
organisation91 over the 11 years of the conflict.92 However, Cero convicted and
86
United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [62]; Barthold v Germany App no 8734/79
(ECtHR, 25 March 1985) [55]; Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) [40]; Tønsbergs Blad AS
and Haukom v Norway App no 510/04 (ECtHR, 1 March 2007) [81]; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and
Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [164]; Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17
(ECtHR, 22 September 2021) [37]; Bouton v France App no 22636/19 (ECtHR, 13 January 2023) [44].
87
Zana v Turkey App no 18954/91 (ECtHR, 25 November 1997) [51]; Yalçınkaya and Others v Turkey App nos
25764/09, 25773/09, 25786/09, 25793/09, 25804/09, 25811/09, 25815/09, 25928/09, 25936/09, 25944/09,
26233/09, 26242/09, 26245/09, 26249/09, 26252/09, 26254/09, 26719/09, 26726/09, 27222/09 (ECtHR, 9 May
2016) [34]; Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17 (ECtHR, 22 September 2021) [37].
88
Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) [40]; Rizos and Daskas v Greece App no 65545/01
(ECtHR, 27 May 2004) [40]; Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17 (ECtHR, 22 September 2021) [37].
89
Zana v Turkey App no 18954/91 (ECtHR, 25 November 1997) [51]; Fressoz and Roire v France App no
29183/95 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999) [45]; Erdoğdu and Ince v Turkey App nos 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECtHR, 8
July 1999) [47]; Demirel and Ateş v Turkey App nos 10037/03, 14813/03 (ECtHR, 12 July 2007) [33]; Perinçek v
Switzerland App no 27510/08 (ECtHR, 15 October 2015) [198], [204]-[207]; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and
Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [164]; Dicle v Turkey (No 3) App no 53915/11
(ECtHR, 8 May 2022) [91]; Rouillan v France App no 28000/19 (ECtHR, 23 September 2022) [66].
90
Arguments 8.
91
Compromis 36.
92
Compromis 19.
sentenced Una for an offence implying that ELA is a terrorist organisation.93 Society is
also polarised on this issue, as about 40% of the Enosians support and many Cerovians
sympathise with ELA’s cause.94 The narrow 3-2 rejection of the Applicants' petition by
the CC also underscores the divisive nature of the issue.95
23. Second, the doctrine of clear and imminent danger96 is applied in cases with serious and
threatening events endangering the right to life.97 Una posted several times about the
bloodshed in Naut, drawing attention to an ongoing humanitarian crisis.98 Similarly, the
Post begins with the phrase ‘The genocide must stop!’.99 In this context, it is obvious
that the Post did not glorify terrorism, instead Una spoke out against the bloodshed and
expressed her compassion for the victims of the conflict. Hence, it cannot be considered
as incitement to any violent act.
24. Third, there was no clear harm to the rights of others.100 The alleged attack committed
by unidentified saboteurs had only caused minor damage to one building and a weapons
cache not resulting in any casualties.101 In addition, there is no evidence either that the
perpetrators had intended to cause any harm to the rights of others.
93
Compromis 36.
94
Compromis 19-20.
95
Compromis 38.
96
43807/07 (ECtHR, 29 February 2012) [29].
97
ECHR art 2.
98
Compromis 24-28.
99
Compromis 28.
100
Arguments 17; Ricardo Canese v Paraguay Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 2004) [72].
101
Compromis 29.
25. Fourth, Cero failed to prove conditio sine qua non between Una’s Post and the alleged
attack.102 Although Cero claimed that initial investigations pointed to ‘ELA
sympathisers’ as the likely perpetrators of the alleged attack, ELA issued a statement
denying responsibility for it.103
26. Consequently, there was no pressing social need for interference.
b) The interference was not suitable to pursue its alleged legitimate aims
27. The imposed fine did not correspond to Una's financial situation,104 as it amounted to
less than 1% of her monthly income.105 Such a modest fine per se could not be suitable
to deter Una from posting further. By imposing an appropriate financial penalty, the
suspended prison and the ban, arbitrarily repressing and holding Una in fear, could have
been avoided.
28. Consequently, the restrictions imposed were not suitable to achieve the alleged aims.
102
Compromis 36.
103
Compromis 29.
104
A and B v Norway App nos 24130/11, 29758/11 (ECtHR, 15 September 2016) Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Pinto de Albuquerque [74].
105
Compromis 15, 36.
c) The interference was not the least intrusive instrument
29. Any action taken by the domestic authorities should be necessary.106 A state shall adopt
criminal convictions with the greatest care and apply them only ultima ratio.107 This
principle should be even more strictly enforced regarding media-specific offences.108
30. Una has the right to liberty and personal security.109 Cero shall display restraint in
resorting to criminal proceedings in its dominant position, particularly where other
means are available for replying to criticisms.110
31. The imposed prison sentence on Una in the context of a public debate is not compatible
with the FoE, as fundamental rights have not been seriously infringed.111 Even if
suspended, it cannot be considered the most moderate penalty.112
106
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [48]; Fontevecchia and D’Amico
v Argentina Series C No 238 (IACtHR, 29 November 2011) [54].
107
Reichman v France App no 50147/11 (ECtHR, 12 October 2016) [73]; Lacroix v France App no 41519/12
(ECtHR, 7 December 2017) [50]; Tête v France App no 59636/16 (ECtHR, 26 July 2020) [68]; Bouton v France
App no 22636/19 (ECtHR, 13 January 2023) [48].
108
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [115]; Fatullayev v
Azerbaijan App no 40984/07 (ECtHR, 4 October 2010) [103]; Saaristo and Others v Finland App no 184/06
(ECtHR, 12 January 2011) [69]; Atamanchuk v Russia App no 4493/11 (ECtHR, 12 October 2020) [67].
109
ICCPR art 9.
110
Castells v Spain App no 11798/85 (ECtHR, 23 April 1992) [46]; Incal v Turkey App no 22678/93 (ECtHR, 9
June 1998) [54]; Arslan v Turkey App no 23462/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [46]; Ceylan v Turkey App no 23556/94
(ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [34]; Gerger v Turkey App no 24919/94 (ECtHR, 8 July, 1999) [48]; Okçuoğlu v Turkey
App no 24246/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [46]; Sürek v Turkey (No 1) App no 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [61];
Fatih Taş v Turkey App no 36635/08 (5 May 2011) [29].
111
Compromis 36; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey App nos 23927/94, 24277/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [63];
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [119]; Feridun Yazar and Others
v Turkey App no 42713/98 (ECtHR, 23 December 2004) [27]; Bingöl v Turkey App no 36141/04 (ECtHR, 22
September 2010) [41]; Otegi Mondragon v Spain App no 2034/07 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) [59]; Rouillan v
France App no 28000/19 (ECtHR, 23 September 2022) [74]; Bouton v France App no 22636/19 (ECtHR, 13
January 2023) [53].
112
Bouton v France App no 22636/19 (ECtHR, 13 January 2023) [54].
32. International practice generally prohibits prior restraints113 as one of the most severe
restrictions on FoE.114 They are narrowly allowed only for a limited time to prevent
abuse of power.115 The ban imposed generally and unconditionally deprived Una from
expressing her FoE via social media for one month.116 Hence, the ban cannot be
considered a permissible prior restraint based on its general nature and Cero’s failure to
establish an upper limit for its duration.117
33. Alternatively, less intrusive instruments were available to achieve Cero’s aims, such as
applying an appropriate fine that discourages Una from future posting. Another
alternative would have been for Cero ordering her to turn on the labelling function,118
thus Una’s followers could differentiate between her own and autogenerated posts.
34. Consequently, the imposed sanctions, especially the suspended prison and the one-
month ban were not the least intrusive instruments.
d) The interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect
35. Every formality, condition, restriction or penalty imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.119 To determine the proportionality of the
113
Palamara-Iribarne v Chile Series C No 135 (IACtHR, 22 November 2005) [78]; Media Rights Agenda and
Others v Nigeria Comm nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 (ACmHPR, 31 October 1998) [57].
114
New York Times Co v United States 403 US 713-14 (1971).
115
Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [60]; The Sunday
Times v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [51]; Ekin Association v
France App no 39288/98 (ECtHR, 17 October 2001) [58]; Editions Plon v France App no 58148/00 (ECtHR, 18
August 2004) [42]; Dammann v Switzerland App no 77551/01 (ECtHR, 25 July 2006) [52]; RTBF v Belgium App
no 50084/06 (ECtHR, 15 September 2011) [114]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March
2013) [47], [64]; Cumhuríyet Vakfi and Others v Turkey App no 28255/07 (ECtHR, 8 January 2014) [61].
116
Compromis 36.
117
Arguments 9.
118
Compromis 14.
119
United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [65]; Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR,
restriction, it is the predominant practice of human rights tribunals to look at the case as
a whole and consider all relevant circumstances of the restricted speech.120
da) Una’s expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as political
speech
36. First, FoE applies not only to information or ideas favourably regarded as inoffensive
or indifferent but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.121 Many users liked and
shared Una’s Post, yet negative comments appeared and some users reported her to
DRC.122 Even if some find the Post offensive or disturbing, it still falls under the high
level of protection of FoE.123
8 July 1986) [41]; Oberschlick v Austria App no 11662/85 (ECtHR, 23 May 1991) [57]; Oberschlick v Austria
(No 2) App no 20834/92 (ECtHR, 1 July 1997) [29].
120
Jersild v Denmark App no 15890/89 (ECtHR, 23 September 1994) [31]; News Verlags GmbH & Co. KG v
Austria App no 31457/96 (ECtHR, 11 April 2000) [52]; Uj v Hungary App no 23954/10 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011)
[18].
121
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; Fressoz and Roire v France
App no 29183/95 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999) [45]; Janowski v Poland App no 25716/94 (ECtHR, 21 January 1999)
[30]; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway App no 21980/93 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999) [62]; Rekvényi v Hungary
App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999) [42]; Ceylan v Turkey App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [32];
Karataş v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [48]; Sürek v Turkey (No 1) App no 26682/95 (ECtHR,
8 July 1999) [58]; Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway App no 23118/93 (ECtHR, 25 November 1999) [43]; Perna v
Italy App no 48898/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003) [39]; Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July
2004) [126]; Orban and Others v France App no 20985/05 (ECtHR, 15 April 2009) [52]; Palomo Sánchez and
Others v Spain App nos 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06, 28964/06 (ECtHR, 12 September 2011) [53]; Magyar
Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016) [187]; Lagos del Campo v Peru Series
C No 340 (IACtHR, 31 August 2017) [117]; Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v Rwanda App no 003/2014 (AfCHPR,
7 December 2018) [143]; Savva Terentyev v Russia App no 10692/09 (ECtHR, 4 February 2019) [69]; Álvarez
Ramos v Venezuela Series C No 380 (IACtHR, 30 August 2019) [114]; Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17
(ECtHR, 22 September 2021) [37]; Mohamed Rabbae, A.B.S and N.A. v the Netherlands
CCPR/C/117/D/2124/2011 (UNHRC, 14 July 2016) [10.4].
122
Compromis 31.
123
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; Orban and Others v France
App no 20985/05 (ECtHR, 15 April 2009) [52]; Savva Terentyev v Russia App no 10692/09 (ECtHR, 4 February
2019) [72]; Standard Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v Austria (No 3) App no 39378/15 (ECtHR, 7 March 2022) [93];
Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [148].
37. Second, debating public affairs is crucial in modern democracies,124 especially on the
causes of acts that might amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity; these
discourses should be able to take place freely.125 As to the public defence of war crimes,
significance must be attached to whether the speech contributed to a debate of general
interest.126
38. Consequently, the value placed on uninhibited expressions is particularly high in the
circumstances of public debate,127 irrespective of how unpalatable that perspective may
be for the state,128 hence there is little scope for restrictions on such speeches.129 Una
expressed her perspectives on a civil war waged against a corrupt, anti-democratic
124
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey App no 19392/92 (ECtHR, 30 January 1998) [57]; Ricardo
Canese v Paraguay Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 2004) [72], [82]-[87]; Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di
Stefano v Italy App no 38433/09 (ECtHR, 7 June 2012) [129]; Animal Defenders International v the United
Kingdom App no 48876/08 (ECtHR, 22 April 2013) [112]; Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v
Turkey App nos 3840/10, 3870/10, 3878/10 (ECtHR, 6 June 2016) [74]; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and
Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [124]; Şahin Alpay v Turkey App no 16538/17
(ECtHR, 20 June 2018) [180].
125
Dmitriyevskiy v Russia App no 42168/06 (ECtHR, 29 January 2018) [106].
126
Orban and Others v France App no 20985/05 (ECtHR, 15 April 2009) [49].
127
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [13], [20], [34]; Aduayom and Others v Togo CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990,
424/1990 (UNHRC, 30 June 1994) [7.4.]; Zeljko Bodrožić v Serbia and Montenegro CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003
(UNHRC, 3 November 2003) [7.2]; Jan Oster, Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right (Cambridge University
Press 2015) 144.
128
Erdoğdu and Ince v Turkey App nos 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [52].
129
Thorgeir Thorgeirson v Iceland App no 13778/88 (ECtHR, 25 June 1992) [64]; Wingrove v the United Kingdom
App no 17419/90 (ECtHR, 25 November 1996) [58]; Ceylan v Turkey App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999)
[34]; Erdoğdu and Ince v Turkey App nos 25067/94, 25068/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [50]; Gerger v Turkey App
no 24919/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [48]; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey App nos 23927/94, 24277/94 (ECtHR, 8
July 1999) [60]; Sürek v Turkey (No 1) App no 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [61]; Öztürk v Turkey App no
22479/93 (ECtHR, 28 September 1999) [66]; Ivcher-Bronstein v Peru Series C No 74 (IACtHR, 6 February 2001)
[155]; Murphy v Ireland App no 44179/98 (ECtHR, 3 December 2003) [67]; Gündüz v Turkey App no 35071/97
(ECtHR, 14 June 2004) [43]; Baka v Hungary App no 20261/12 (ECtHR, 23 June 2016) [159]; E.S. v Austria App
no 38450/12 (ECtHR, 18 March 2019) [42]; Freitas Rangel v Portugal App no 78873/13 (ECtHR, 11 April 2022)
[50]; Kenneth Good v the Republic of Botswana Comm no 313/05 (ACmHPR, 26 May 2010) [198]; Jan Oster,
Media Freedom as a Fundamental Right (Cambridge University Press 2015) 144.
regime,130 resulting in the loss of thousands of civilians,131 which is therefore considered
a matter of public interest.
db) Una has fulfilled the role of public watchdog
39. FoE also embodies the public’s right of access132 to or to receive information,133
including even state-held information.134 This element of FoE is seriously harmed as the
Post informed the public of the humanitarian crisis in Naut,135 resulting in Una’s
criminal conviction.136
40. Where the views expressed do not constitute incitement to violence, the state cannot
restrict them not even under the protection of national security or the prevention of
disorder and crime.137
130
Compromis 19.
131
Compromis 25, 30.
132
ICCPR art 19 (2); Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990) [45].
133
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [65]; Thorgeir
Thorgeirson v Iceland App no 13778/88 (ECtHR, 25 June 1992) [63]; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway App
no 21980/93 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999) [62]; Colombani and Others v France App no 51279/99 (ECtHR, 9
September 2002) [55]; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [95];
Grinberg v Russia App no 23472/03 (ECtHR, 21 October 2005) [24]; Dupuis and Others v France App no 1914/02
(ECtHR, 12 November 2007) [35]; Hachette Filipacchi Associes v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 12
November 2007) [41]; Times Newspapers Ltd v the United Kingdom (Nos 1, 2) App nos 3002/03, 23676/03
(ECtHR, 10 March 2009) [40]; Salumäki v Finland App no 23605/09 (ECtHR, 29 July 2014) [46]; Cojocaru v
Romania App no 32104/06 (ECtHR, 10 February 2015) [22]; Rodolfo Robles Espinoza v Peru Case 11.317
(IACmHR, 23 February 1999) [148]; Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan Comm no 288/99 (ACmHPR, 29
May 2003) [52].
134
Claude-Reyes et al v Chile Series C No 151 (IACtHR, 19 September 2006) [77]; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v
Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016) [61], [147]; XYZ v Republic of Benin App no 010/2020
(AfCHPR, 27 November 2020) [113]; Nurbek Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 (UNHRC, 28
March 2011) [7.4].
135
Compromis 22-28.
136
Compromis 36.
137
Karataş v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [52], [54]; Sürek and Özdemir v Turkey App nos
23927/94, 24277/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [63]; Sürek v Turkey (No 1) App no 26682/95 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999)
[60]; Gözel and Özer v Turkey App nos 43453/04, 31098/05 (ECtHR, 6 October 2010) [56]; Nedim Şener v Turkey
App no 38270/11 (ECtHR, 8 October 2014) [116]; Dilipak v Turkey App no 29680/05 (ECtHR, 2 May 2016) [62];
41. Although there is no universal definition of journalism itself, international practice
refers to a wide range of contributions to public debate and highlights the freedoms that
are essential to the role of public watchdog.138 The heightened level of protection is also
accorded to non-professional journalists, as the function of popular social media users
may also be assimilated to public watchdogs.139
42. The Internet has fostered the emergence of citizen journalism,140 as political content
ignored by the traditional media is often disseminated via websites to many users, who
can view, share and comment upon the information. In mid-March, the Enosian military
started to shell Naut when around 25.000 Enosian civilians were inside – reports,
photographs and videos from the warzone depicting dead civilians appeared on and
circulated social media by users repeatedly speaking out against the war crimes.141
Therefore, instead of the traditional media, these social media users, as citizen
journalists, acted as public watchdogs. Similarly, Una is considered a citizen journalist
Şahin Alpay v Turkey App no 16538/17 (ECtHR, 20 June 2018) [179]; ACmHPR, ‘Declaration of Principles of
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (2019) Principle 22.
138
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [50]; Bladet
Tromsø and Stensaas v Norway App no 21980/93 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999) [59], [62]; News Verlags GmbH & Co.
KG v Austria App no 31457/96 (ECtHR, 11 April 2000) [56]; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v Denmark App no
49017/99 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [71]; Dupuis and Others v France App no 1914/02 (ECtHR, 12 November
2007) [35]; Campos Dâmaso v Portugal App no 17107/05 (ECtHR, 24 July 2008) [31]; Axel Springer AG v
Germany App no 39954/08 (ECtHR, 7 February 2012) [79]; Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29
March 2016) [51]; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016) [165];
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v Finland App no 931/13 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [126]; Nurbek
Toktakunov v Kyrgyzstan CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 (UNHRC, 28 March 2011) [6.3], [7.4].
139
Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary App no 18030/11 (ECtHR, 8 November 2016) [168]; Falzon v Malta
App no 45791/13 (ECtHR, 20 June 2018) [57]; UN Plan of Action on the Safety of Journalists and the Issue of
Impunity (adopted 12 April 2012) [1.5]; Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers to
member States on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors (adopted 13 April
2016) [4], II. Principles [10].
140
Cengiz and Others v Turkey App nos 48226/10, 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1 December 2015) [52]; Sanchez v France
App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [160].
141
Compromis 22-28.
regarding the humanitarian crisis in Naut, as she spoke out against possible war crimes
committed by the Enosian military using the weapons supplied by Cero.142
43. Moreover, Una is considered a non-professional journalist in light of the number of her
followers and the context of her posts.143 The publication of information that a country’s
leaders regard as endangering national interests should not attract criminal charges for
particularly serious offences such as assisting a terrorist organisation.144 Therefore, Una
per se could not have been criminally charged for her Post.
dc) Una’s expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as a human
rights defender
44. FoE includes the right to analyse critically and to oppose. This protection is broader
when the statements are made by a person dealing with alleged human rights
violations.145 Human rights defenders play a special role in promoting and defending
human rights; it is a part of their work to undertake awareness-raising activities on
allegations of human rights violations.146
45. Una called for a ceasefire several times to end the genocide committed by the Enosian
military147 and disseminated information about possible human rights violations in
Enos. ERW confirmed that 5,000 civilians and 4,000 rebels were killed in the attacks in
Naut, and a UN investigation into possible war crimes was launched in mid-June.148
142
Compromis 20-22, 24-28, 30.
143
144
Şahin Alpay v Turkey App no 16538/17 (ECtHR, 20 June 2018) [181].
145
Rodolfo Robles Espinoza v Peru Case 11.317 (IACmHR, 23 February 1999) [148].
146
Taner Kılıç v Turkey (No 2) App no 208/18 (ECtHR, 10 October 2022) [145].
147
Arguments 43.
148
Compromis 30.
Una promoted and strived to protect human rights at international levels, which is her
declared right as an individual human rights defender.149
46. Consequently, Una actively engaged in a debate of public interest150 and participated in
socially beneficial endeavours.151 Hence, her speech is entitled to an elevated level of
protection.152
47. Moreover, as invoking national security provisions to prosecute human rights defenders
for disseminating information of public interest is not compatible with the ICCPR,153
thus the conviction of Una is not proportionate.
dd) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate
48. In evaluating proportionality, assessing the nature and severity of the imposed
penalties154 and the seriousness of their effects is essential.155
149
Kivenmaa v Finland CCPR/C/50/D/412/1990 (UNHRC, 7 March 1990) [9.3]; Rodolfo Robles Espinoza v Peru
Case 11.317 (IACmHR, 23 February 1999) [148]; Law Offices of Ghazi Suleiman v Sudan Comm no 288/99
(ACmHPR, 29 May 2003) [52]; UNGA ‘Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’
A/RES/53/144 (adopted 8 March 1999) art 6.
150
Arguments 36-38.
151
Arguments 39-45.
152
Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [148]; ACmHPR, ‘Declaration of Principles of
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa’ (2019) Principle 6.
153

154
Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v Turkey App nos 23536/94, 24408/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [66]; Ceylan v Turkey
App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [37]; Karataş v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [53];
Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98 (ECtHR, 4 April 2001) [69]; Skałka v Poland App no 43425/98 (ECtHR, 27
August 2003) [41]-[43]; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [111];
Dammann v Switzerland App no 77551/01 (ECtHR, 25 July 2006) [57]; Pinto Pinheiro Marques v Portugal App
no 26671/09 (ECtHR, 22 April 2015) [46]; Baka v Hungary App no 20261/12 (ECtHR, 23 June 2016) [160].
155
Rouillan v France App no 28000/19 (ECtHR, 23 September 2022) [74]-[77].
49. The severity of the imposed sanctions is not reasonable as, upon reviewing the Post,
Una immediately deleted it, limiting its availability to approx. a mere hour156
minimising the likelihood of it going viral. Notably, the Post was Una’s first publication
reported to the DRC157 and she demonstrated full cooperation with the authorities
throughout the entire process.158 Moreover, Una voluntarily refrained from posting
further regarding the Enosian crisis,159 and issued an apology statement.160
50. Furthermore, the justification for interference with discourse defending national
authorities shall also include an acceptable assessment of the personality and function
of the person making the statements.161 The gravity of this situation is heightened, as it
not only involves the silencing of an influencer but also stifling a public watchdog who
has brought attention to significant human rights violations.162 Consequently, the
public’s right to access information163 is also harmed, and the proportionality of the
interference is even more concerning.
51. This ban was not a simple prohibition from social media, but it also rendered her unable
to practise her profession. Therefore, not only was her FoE harmed, but also her right to
property and her standard of living.164
156
Compromis 28.
157
Clarifications 32.
158
Compromis 31-38.
159
Compromis 28.
160
Compromis 33.
161
Arguments 20.
162
Arguments 39-47.
163
ICCPR 19(2); Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990) [45].
164
UDHR arts 17 (1)-(2), 25.
52. Additionally, being convicted in a criminal trial165 destroyed her reputation,166 career,
financial situation, and social image. Many users called for her boycott and for her to
be cancelled.167 In only one month, she lost 90% of her endorsement contracts and
almost half of her followers.168 Furthermore, her monthly income had also fallen to
under USD 10,000 from USD 200,000, constituting a significant 95% decrease.169
53. Consequently, considering the severity and the nature of the imposed sanctions, the
interference was not proportionate.
de) The interference caused a chilling effect
54. Ambiguous and thus unforeseeable laws170 have a chilling effect on FoE171 and
constructive public debate.172 Moreover, the excessive criminalisation of mere criticism,
which is manifested in the offence of ‘glorification of terrorism’,173 results in detracting
from the development of a tolerant, pluralist, and democratic society.174
165
Compromis 36.
166
ICCPR art 17 (1).
167
Compromis 39.
168
Compromis 15, 39.
169
Compromis 15, 39.
170
Arguments 5-10.
171
Delfi AS v Estonia App no 64569/09 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajó and
Tsotsoria [20].
172
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [46]; International Commission of Jurists, ‘Response to the European Commission
Consultation on Inciting, Aiding or Abetting Terrorist Offences’ (2007) 1.
173
Arguments 7.
174
UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression’ (16 May 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 [26], [28].
55. Criminal sanctions paired with uncertainty about what expressions are illegal also
produce a chilling effect on society, where citizens avoid controversial topics for fear
of arrest.175
56. Una’s suspended imprisonment176 has a chilling effect, as for one year she faces the
threat of imprisonment, and that condition reduces her courage to impart information
and ideas on matters of public interest.177
57. Additionally, by convicting Una, Cero has set an example of what happens when
someone publishes opinions that oppose government policy, causing a chilling effect
among society, as all users will fear a violation of their fundamental rights in the
future.178 Such severe sanctions not only have a deterrent effect on Una but on other
journalists, influencers, and also her followers from speaking out on debates of
important public matters.179
175
Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004) [61], [66]; Ricardo Canese v Paraguay
Series C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 2004) [58], [60]; Mosley v the United Kingdom App no 48009/08 (ECtHR,
15 September 2011) [129]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (16 May 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 [26], [28].
176
Compromis 36.
177
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [113]–[115]; Krasulya v
Russia App no 12365/03 (ECtHR, 22 May 2007) [44]; Mahmudov and Agazade v Azerbaijan App 35877/04
(ECtHR, 18 March 2009) [51]; Yleisradio Oy and Others v Finland App no 30881/09 (ECtHR, 12 June 2009);
Fatullayev v Azerbaijan App no 40984/07 (ECtHR, 4 October 2010) [102]; Mariapori v Finland App no 37751/07
(ECtHR, 6 October 2010) [68].
178
Wille v Lichtenstein App no 28396/95 (ECtHR, 28 October 1999) [50]; Elçi and Others v Turkey App nos
23145/93, 25091/94 (ECtHR, 24 March 2004) [714]; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR,
17 December 2004) [114]; Guja v Moldova App no 14277/04 (ECtHR, 12 February 2008) [95]; Belpietro v Italy
App no 43612/10 (ECtHR, 24 September 2013) [61]; Pentikäinen v Finland App no 11882/10 (ECtHR, 20 October
2015) [65], [71], [113]; Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29 March 2016) Dissenting Opinion of
Judge López Guerra [15]; Karácsony and Others v Hungary App nos 42461/13, 44357/13 (ECtHR, 17 May 2016)
[85]; Baka v Hungary App no 20261/12 (ECtHR, 23 June 2016) [130], [160]; NIT S.R.L. v Moldova App no
28470/12 (ECtHR, 5 April 2022) [228].
179
Lopes Gomes da Silva v Portugal App no 37698/97 (ECtHR, 28 December 2000) [36]; Dammann v Switzerland
App no 77551/01 (ECtHR, 25 July 2006) [57]; Fatullayev v Azerbaijan App no 40984/07 (ECtHR, 4 October
2010) [102]; Belpietro v Italy App no 43612/10 (ECtHR, 24 September 2013) [61]; Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók
Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary App no 22947/13 (ECtHR, 2 May 2016) [86]; Khadija Ismayilova v
Azerbaijan App nos 65286/13, 57270/14 (ECtHR, 10 April 2019) [161].
58. Consequently, Applicants submit that the interference was not necessary in a democratic
society.
ISSUE B – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING ONEAI
UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A ONE-
MONTH BAN ON ITS SERVICE, ‘RMSM’, VIOLATED ITS RIGHT TO THE
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING THE FREEDOM TO IMPART
INFORMATION AND IDEAS, RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR
59. Since FoE is the cornerstone of any democratic society,180 it alone makes possible the
continuing intellectual controversy, the contest of opinions that forms the lifeblood of
free and democratic constitutional order.181 FoE includes the right to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds.182
60. The inherent worth of speech does not depend upon the identity of its source. 183 FoE
should be granted to everyone regardless of the nature of the aim pursued or the role
180
Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) [49]; Perna v Italy App no
48898/99 (ECtHR, 6 May 2003) [39]; Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom App no 68416/01 (ECtHR,15 May
2005) [87]; Monnat v Switzerland App no 73604/01 (ECtHR, 21 September 2006) [55]; Hachette Filipacchi
Associes v France App no 71111/01 (ECtHR, 12 November 2007) [40]; Stoll v Switzerland App no 69698/01
(ECtHR, 10 December 2007) [101]; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v Switzerland App no 16354/06 (ECtHR, 13 July
2012) [48]; Bédat v Switzerland App no 56925/08 (ECtHR, 29 March 2016) [48]; Medžlis Islamske Zajednice
Brčko and Others v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 17224/11 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) [75]; Sébastien Germain
Marie Aïkoue Ajavon v Republic of Benin App no 062/2019 (AfCHPR, 4 December 2020) [119]; Houngue Éric
Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 (AfCHPR, 1 December 2022) [106]; UNHRC, ‘General
[2]; Adimayo M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. Dobou v Togo CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990,
424/1990 (UNHRC, 12 July 1996) [7(4)]; Tae-Hoon Park v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/57/D/628/1995 (UNHRC,
20 October 1998) [10.3]; Media Rights Agenda and Others v Nigeria Comm nos 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96
(ACmHPR, 31 October 1998) [54]; Vladimir Viktorovich Shchetko v Belarus CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001 (UNHRC,
11 July 2006) [7.3]; Stephen Benhadj v Algeria CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003 (UNHRC, 20 July 2007) [8.10].
181
Herrera-Ulloa v Costa Rica Series C No 107 (IACtHR, 2 July 2004) [112]; Ricardo Canese v Paraguay Series
C No 111 (IACtHR, 31 August 2004) [82]; Claude-Reyes et al v Chile Series C No 151 (IACtHR, 19 September
2006) [85]; Perozo et al v Venezuela Series C No 195 (IACtHR, 28 January 2009) [116]; Ríos et al v Venezuela
Series C No 194 (IACtHR, 28 January 2009) [105]; IACtHR ‘Compulsory Membership in an Association
Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism’ (13 November 1985) Advisory Opinion OC. 5/85 Series A No.
5 [5]; IACmHR, ‘Annual Report 2009; Annual Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression’ (30 December 2009) OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 51 [8].
182
ICCPR art 19; UDHR art 19; ECHR art 10; ACHR art 13; ACHPR art 9; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union [2000] OJ C364/01 art 11; Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990)
[45].
183
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v Bellotti 435 US 765 (1978).
played by natural or legal persons in its exercise.184 Consistently, Cero recognises the
FoE of legal persons.185 OneAI exercises its FoE, encompassing the right to impart
information and ideas through RMSM.186
61. As technology evolves, AI-powered content is becoming an integral part of the public
debate on the Internet.187 FoE applies not only to the content of information but also to
the means of dissemination, since any restriction imposed on the latter necessarily
interferes with the right to receive and impart information.188 RMSM constitutes a
means of exercising FoE for its users, as it facilitates the dissemination of information
by generating social media posts.189
62. Applying the three-part test,190 the interference was (i) not prescribed by law, (ii) not in
pursuance of a legitimate aim, (iii) neither necessary nor proportionate to achieve such
aim.
184
Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990) [47]; Casado Coca v Spain App no
15450/89 (ECtHR, 24 February 1994) [35]; Çetin and Others v Turkey App nos 40153/98, 40160/98 (ECtHR, 13
February 2003) [57]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [50].
185
Compromis 2, 4.
186
Compromis 2, 8.
187
Compromis 12; Flanagin A, Bibbins-Domingo K, Berkwits M, Christiansen SL, 'Nonhuman “Authors” and
Implications for the Integrity of Scientific Publication and Medical Knowledge' (2023) 329(8) JAMA 637-639;
Jiayang Wu, Wensheng Gan, Zefeng Chen, Shicheng Wan, Hong Lin, 'AI-Generated Content (AIGC): A Survey'
(26 March 2023) <https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.06632> accessed 16 December 2023.
188
Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECtHR, 22 May 1990) [47]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no
3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [50]; IACmHR, ‘Freedom of Expression and the Internet’ (2013) OEA/SER
L/II CIDH/RELE/IN F11/13 [5], [101].
189
Compromis 8.
190
Arguments 3.
i) The interference was not prescribed by law
63. The interference was not prescribed by law because a) it was not reasonably
foreseeable191 and b) adequate safeguards were not available against arbitrary
interferences.192
a) The law envisaging the interference was not reasonably foreseeable for OneAI
64. Foreseeability beyond the procedural requirements refers to the quality of the provisions
providing the intervention.193 Accordingly, a norm cannot be regarded as ‘law’ unless
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizens to regulate their conduct.194
65. First, DSA’s wording is imprecise, overbroad and vague,195 thus impeding OneAI from
being able to reasonably foresee its criminal liability.196
191
Goodwin v the United Kingdom App no 17488/90 (ECtHR, 27 March 1996) [31]; Tammer v Estonia App no
41205/98 (ECtHR, 4 April 2001) [37]; Chauvy and Others v France App no 64915/01 (ECtHR, 29 September
2004) [43]; Houngue Éric Noudehouenou v Republic of Benin App no 028/2020 (AfCHPR, 1 December 2022)
[109]; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34, Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011)
192
Silver and Others v the United Kingdom App nos 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7107/75, 7113/75,
7136/75 (ECtHR, 25 March 1983) [90]; Huvig v France App no 11105/84 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) [34]; Maestri
v Italy App no 39748/98 (ECtHR, 17 February 2004) [30]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the Netherlands App no
38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [82]; UN Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation
of Provisions in the ICCPR’ (1984) UN Doc E/CN 4/1984/4 [16], [18]; UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 34,
Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [25].
193
Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [57]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v the
Netherlands App no 38224/03 (ECtHR, 14 September 2010) [81]; Kafkaris v Cyprus App no 21906/04 (ECtHR,
12 February 2008) [116]; Kruslin v France App no 11801/85 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) [27].
The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [49]; Karácsony and
194
Others v Hungary App nos 42461/13, 44357/13 (ECtHR, 17 May 2016) [124]; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v
Hungary App no 201/17 (ECtHR, 20 January 2020) [94]; Selahattin Demirtaş v Turkey (No 2) App no 14305/17
(ECtHR, 22 December 2020) [250].
195
Arguments 6-7.
196
Altuğ Taner Akçam v Turkey App no 27520/07 (ECtHR, 25 January 2012) [95]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism’ (19 December 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/28/28 [48]; European Commission for
Democracy Through Law of the Council of Europe, ‘Opinion on the Federal Law on Combating Extremist Activity
of the Russian Federation’ (Council of Europe, 20 June 2012) [70], [74].
66. Second, DSA neither defines any limit on the scope and duration of a ban nor the
conditions for determining them,197 thereby making the degree of a potential ban on
RMSM unforeseeable for OneAI.
67. Third, the definition of terrorism and thus the classification of ELA is also ambiguous
within Cero's legal system,198 thus making the authorities’ interpretation of DSA
uncertain for OneAI.
68. Consequently, it was not reasonably foreseeable for OneAI to be held liable for the
alleged offences.
b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion
69. Cero failed to establish adequate legal protection against arbitrary interferences with the
FoE of the Applicants,199 thus allowing authorities to conduct the proceedings arbitrarily
in accordance with Cero’s political interests.200
70. On the one hand, DSA neither provides adequate guidance for distinguishing which
expressions can be restricted legitimately201 nor defines the scope of the court’s
discretion and manner of its exercise regarding the determination of the sanctions.202
197
Arguments 9.
198
Arguments 8.
199
Malone v the United Kingdom App no 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 August 1984) [67]; Margareta and Roger Andersson
v Sweden App no 12963/87 (ECtHR, 25 February 1992) [75]; Claude-Reyes et al v Chile Series C No 151
(IACtHR, 19 September 2006) [89]; Moiseyev v Russia App no 62936/00 (ECtHR, 6 April 2009) [266]; Ahmet
Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [59]; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v Hungary App
no 201/17 (ECtHR, 20 January 2020) [93].
200
Arguments 12.
201
Arguments 12.
202
Compromis 5; The Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (No 1) App no 6538/74 (ECtHR, 26 April 1979) [49];
Maestri v Italy App no 39748/98 (ECtHR, 17 February 2004) [30]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10
(ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [59].
Notably, the inconsistent application of the term terrorism in DSA and CTA regarding
ELA caused arbitrary interference for OneAI.203
71. On the other hand, the conducted legal proceedings raise serious concerns, as the
classification of the findings regarding the alleged attack prevented the courts from
examining the alleged ground for interference invoked by Cero.204
72. Сonsequently, the interference was not prescribed by law.
ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim
73. As stated above,205 any restriction on FoE may only serve the aims stated in the
ICCPR.206
74. Cero seeking to restrict FoE must demonstrate that the expression created a clear and
imminent danger207 or clear harm.208 As outlined above,209 Cero failed to prove that the
Post threatened national security, public order or the rights of others.
75. Therefore, the intervention served Cero’s political aims and did not pursue a legitimate
aim.
203
Arguments 8.
204
Arguments 13.
205
Arguments 15.
206
ICCPR art 19(3).
207
43807/07 (ECtHR, 29 February 2012) [29].
208
209
Arguments 16-17.
iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society
76. Applying the necessity test,210 the interference a) did not correspond to a pressing social
need, b) was not suitable to pursue its aims, c) was not necessary, and d) was not
proportionate and caused a chilling effect.
a) The interference did not correspond to a pressing social need as the Post did not cause
clear and imminent danger or clear harm
77. FoE can be restricted in case of a clear and imminent danger211 or clear harm212 based
on real causes.213 Cero failed to demonstrate in a specific and individualised fashion the
precise nature of the threat and a direct and immediate connection between the threat
and the expression.214 As stated above, in light of all the relevant facts, the Post
generated by RMSM did not glorify terrorism or encourage the commission of any
violent action. 215 Moreover, no evidence supports any link between the Post and the
alleged attack.216
210
Arguments 19.
211
43807/07 (ECtHR, 29 February 2012) [29].
212
213
Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Inter-American Legal Framework Regarding the Right to Freedom of Expression, 2009, CIDH/RELE/INF.
2/09 [82].
214
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 [35]; Hak-Chul Shin v Republic of Korea CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000 (UNHRC, 16 March
2004) [7.3]; Yashar Agazade and Rasul Jafarov v Azerbaijan CCPR/C/118/D/2205/2012 (UNHRC, 27 October
2016) [7.4].
215
Arguments 20, 23; Lingens v Austria App no 9815/82 (ECtHR, 8 July 1986) [40]; Rizos and Daskas v Greece
App no 65545/01 (ECtHR, 27 May 2004) [40]; Erkizia Almandoz v Spain App no 5869/17 (ECtHR, 22 September
2021) [37].
216
Arguments 17.
78. Furthermore, the protection of the rights of others, national security and public order is
the obligation and responsibility of the state through active measures.217 It may not shift
this duty to individuals, thereby arbitrarily interfering with their FoE. The sanctions
imposed by Cero are not in response to a threat posed by OneAI but rather to its failure
to perform its own obligations.218 Therefore, it constitutes an unlawful interference with
OneAI's FoE.
b) The interference was not suitable to pursue its alleged legitimate aims
79. Cero aimed to discourage the publication and spread of posts inciting violent acts.
However, the implemented measures were not suitable, considering that the prohibition
of the use of RMSM for a prescribed period did not prevent the spread of potentially
dangerous content itself, as once the ban has expired, the algorithm continues to work
in the same way.219
80. RMSM is designed to generate posts based on its user’s previous posts and habits
imitating their style.220 Consistently, the Post translated the prevalent hashtag
‘# ELA’ used previously by Una221 into a textual social media post.222 In this way,
the Post aligned with the user's established pattern, as the emoji is often associated with
solidarity.223
217
UNHRC ‘Resolution 44/12’ A/HRC/RES/44/12 (16 July 2020) 1.
218
Compromis 36; UNHRC ‘Resolution 33/21’ A/HRC/RES/33/21 (30 September 2016) [11].
219
Compromis 5, 36.
220
Compromis 8-9; Clarifications 3, 6.
221
222
Compromis 28; Clarifications 7.
223
Compromis 24.
81. Alternatively to the ban, Cero could have taken suitable steps to prevent potentially
dangerous terrorism-related postings by envisaging joint cooperation regarding the
further development of RMSM.
82. Hence, the imposed sanctions were not suitable to achieve Cero’s alleged aims.
c) The interference was not the least intrusive instrument
83. Cero intervened using one of the most severe measures, as it imposed a ban on OneAI's
service,224 constituting a prior restraint by hindering OneAI from exercising its FoE,
including its right to impart information and ideas for a future period.225 The dangers
inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny.226
84. Cero failed to ensure tight control over the ban’s scope, 227 and strictly target illegal
contents,228 resulting in the imposition of a general and unconditional restriction not
limited to any social media platforms, users or topics.229 Such a wholesale blocking
measure excessively interferes with lawful contents as a collateral effect, thus arbitrary
interfering with OneAI’s FoE.230 Notably, generic bans relating to the operation of
224
Compromis 36-38.
225
Arguments 32.
226
Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [60]; The Sunday
Times v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 13166/87 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [51]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey
App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [47]; Organization for a Better Austin v Keefe 402 US 415, 419 (1971).
Ekin Association v France App no 39288/98 (ECtHR, 17 October 2001) [58]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no
227
3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [64].
228
Bulgakov v Russia App no 20159/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [34], [38]; OOO Flavus and Others v Russia
App nos 12468/15, 19074/16, 23489/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [38], [41]; Vladimir Kharitonov v Russia
App no 10795/14 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [40], [46].
229
Compromis 36.
230
Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [63], [66]; Bulgakov v Russia App no
20159/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [34], [38]; Engels v Russia App no 61919/16 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020)
[30]; OOO Flavus and Others v Russia App nos 12468/15, 19074/16, 23489/15 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [38],
[41]; Vladimir Kharitonov v Russia App no 10795/14 (ECtHR, 16 November 2020) [40], [46].
internet-based information dissemination systems are clearly incompatible with the
ICCPR.231
85. RMSM’s ability of generating personalised content, enabling seamless and effective
sharing on social media,232 qualifies it an internet-based information disseminating
system. Cero’s interference with such a system also deprived RMSM users of this means
of exercising their FoE, which is crucial for active engagement in pivotal discussions
on critical societal matters.233
86. Cero’s alleged legitimate aims could have been reached by much less intrusive
instruments, such as imposing an appropriate fine or a content-specific ban.
87. Consequently, as the imposed restrictions are overbroad and are not the least intrusive
instrument amongst those that might achieve their protective function,234 the
interference was not necessary.
d) The interference was not proportionate and caused a chilling effect
88. The principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the
sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned.235 The nature
and severity of the sanctions imposed are further important factors to consider.236
231
232
Compromis 8-10, 13.
233
Times Newspapers Ltd v the United Kingdom (Nos 1, 2) App nos 3002/03, 23676/03 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009)
[27]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no 3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [48]-[50], [54]; Akdeniz v Turkey App
no 20877/10 (ECtHR, 11 March 2014) [24]; Cengiz and Others v Turkey App nos 48226/10, 14027/11 (ECtHR, 1
December 2015) [49].
234
235
Hirst v the United Kingdom (No 2) App no 74025/01 (ECtHR, 6 October 2005) [71].
Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v Turkey App nos 23536/94, 24408/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [66]; Ceylan v Turkey
236
App no 23556/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [37]; Karataş v Turkey App no 23168/94 (ECtHR, 8 July 1999) [53];
da) OneAI has developed RMSM with due diligence
89. Cero should consider that the operation of an AI tool is inherently different from human
thinking,237 thus regulating and judging the same raises serious concerns. Notably, the
main obligation of OneAI during its developments is constant due diligence.238
90. OneAI has developed one of the most sophisticated AI programs in the world.239 The
due diligence regarding the development of RMSM is shown by the successful pilot
testing prior to launching its market version240 and the considerable number of users
who subscribed to the paid market version after the beta testing.241
91. Furthermore, the tool's proper functioning was ensured by requiring users to train it
through several steps over months before live use.242 In addition, RMSM continued to
learn from users' behaviour in order to evolve.243
92. Notably, the content generated by RMSM fully complies with the community standards
of the social media platform on which the content is posted contributing to a safer user
Tammer v Estonia App no 41205/98 (ECtHR, 4 April 2001) [69]; Skałka v Poland App no 43425/98 (ECtHR, 27
August 2003) [41]-[43]; Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v Romania App no 33348/96 (ECtHR, 17 December 2004) [111];
Dammann v Switzerland App no 77551/01 (ECtHR, 25 July 2006) [57]; Pinto Pinheiro Marques v Portugal App
no 26671/09 (ECtHR, 22 April 2015) [46]; Baka v Hungary App no 20261/12 (ECtHR, 23 June 2016) [160];
Medipress-Sociedade Jornalística, Lda v Portugal App no 55442/12 (ECtHR, 30 November 2016) [45].
237
Korteling JE (Hans), van de Boer-Visschedijk GC, Blankendaal RAM, Boonekamp RC, Eikelboom AR,
‘Human- versus Artificial Intelligence’ (2021) 4 Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
<https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frai.2021.622364/full> accessed 17 December 2023.
Michaud v France App no 12323/11 (ECtHR, 6 March 2013) [34]; Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v
238
eBay International AG and Others [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:474 [122].
239
Compromis 8.
240
Compromis 11.
241
Compromis 12.
242
Compromis 9.
243
Compromis 9, 14; Clarifications 3, 12.
experience.244 Consistently, the Post was not flagged for any violation, including
praising or glorifying ‘terrorism’,245 and has not been removed or blocked by
Facebook.246
db) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate
93. The DSA did not specify the circumstances to be considered in determining the
sanctions,247 resulting in the imposition of disproportionate and unreasonable sanctions
on OneAI.248 The criminal conviction and the imposed sanctions, especially the ban on
RMSM, severely tarnished OneAI’s reputation249 and caused significant financial
losses.250
94. On the one hand, Cero imposed the upper limit of the fine that can be applied.251 This
indicates that the most serious form of the offence had been committed. However, in
OneAI’s case, it was a one-sentence post relating to an organisation of uncertain
classification,252 available to the public only for a very limited, seventy-five minute
period.253
244
Compromis 11, 13; Clarifications 9.
245
Compromis 34.
246
Compromis 28.
247
Arguments 9.
248
Compromis 36.
249
ICCPR art 17; Grande Stevens v Italy App no 18640/10 (ECtHR, 7 July 2014) [122].
250
Compromis 39.
251
Compromis 5, 36.
252
Arguments 8.
253
Compromis 28.
95. On the other hand, the generic one-month ban imposed on RMSM has caused significant
financial losses for OneAI. The conviction led to a wave of unsubscribes as it created
uncertainty among users who were unable to use RMSM due to the ban. OneAI lost
three-quarters of its subscribers by the end of the ban, representing a loss of more than
USD 70,000,000 in annual revenue.254 Such a financial downturn could threaten
OneAI’s economic foundations, fundamentally affecting its operations and future
developments.255
96. Therefore, the imposed sanctions, especially the ban, were severely disproportionate.
dc) The interference caused a chilling effect
97. As stated by the ECtHR in the 2023’s Sanchez v France case ‘Interferences with the
exercise of FoE through the Internet are likely to have a chilling effect, which carries a
risk of self-censorship’.256 The severity of the imposed fine and the ban's financial
implications caused a chilling effect on OneAI’s FoE.257 Furthermore, it violated the
right of the public to receive information by reducing postings with the assistance of
RMSM.258
254
Compromis 39.
255
Błaja News Sp. z o. o. v Poland App no 59545/10 (ECtHR, 26 February 2014) [71].
256
Sanchez v France App no 45581/15 (ECtHR, 15 May 2023) [184].
257
Arguments 57; Comunicação Social, S.A. and Others v Portugal App no 39324/07 (ECtHR, 7 March 2011)
[55]; Bozhkov v Bulgaria App no 3316/04 (ECtHR, 19 July 2011) [55]; Pinto Pinheiro Marques v Portugal App
no 26671/09 (ECtHR, 22 April 2015) [46]; Pais Pires de Lima v Portugal App no 70465/12 (ECtHR, 12 May
2019) [66]-[67]; Freitas Rangel v Portugal App no 78873/13 (ECtHR, 11 April 2022) [61].
258
Observer and Guardian v the United Kingdom App no 13585/88 (ECtHR, 26 November 1991) [59]; Guerra
and Others v Italy App no 116/1996/735/932 (ECtHR, 19 February 1998) [53]; Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey App no
3111/10 (ECtHR, 18 March 2013) [50].
98. Furthermore, 600,000 users have unsubscribed from RMSM by the end of the ban.259
Before the interference, OneAI had approx. 800,000 subscribers, including celebrities
and social media influencers.260 As a result, the participation of unsubscribing users in
public debate declines. The chilling effect is particularly severe regarding high reach-
users such as social media influencers.
99. Furthermore, the interference also discourages technological progress and innovation
regarding services that facilitate the exercise of FoE. Indeed, sanctions have a deterrent
effect on such technological companies.
100. Consequently, Applicants submit that the interference was not necessary in a
democratic society. Therefore, the FoE of the Applicants shall prevail.
259
Compromis 39.
260
Compromis 12.
IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
In the light of arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Applicants respectfully request this
Honourable Court to adjudge and declare that:
1. The State of Cero, by convicting and sentencing Una under the Digital Safety
Act, and specifically by imposing a one-month ban on her use of social media,
violated her right to the freedom of expression recognised by Article 19 of the
ICCPR.
2. The State of Cero, by convicting and sentencing OneAI under the Digital Safety
Act, and specifically by imposing a one-month ban on its service, RMSM,
violated its right to the freedom of expression, including the freedom to impart
information and ideas, recognised by Article 19 of the ICCPR.
On behalf of Una and OneAI
101A
Counsels for Applicants

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101A

THE 2023-2024 MONROE E. PRICE

Una and OneAI

MEMORIAL FOR APPLICANTS

Word Count for Arguments Section: 4,994

I. TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... 2

II. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................ 5

III. LIST OF SOURCES, AUTHORITIES ......................................................................... 7

IV. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS..................................................................... 33

V. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................... 44

VI. QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................................................................ 45

VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .................................................................................. 46

VIII. ARGUMENTS .............................................................................................................. 52

ISSUE A – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING UNA

UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A

ONE-MONTH BAN ON HER USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA, VIOLATED HER RIGHT

TO THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE

i) The interference was not prescribed by law ........................................................ 54

b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion ..................... 58

ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim ............................................... 59

iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society .............................. 60

glorify terrorism ........................................................................................................... 61

db) Una has fulfilled the role of public watchdog .................................................... 68

dc) Una’s expression enjoys an elevated level of protection as a human rights

dd) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate ................................................... 71

de) The interference caused a chilling effect............................................................ 73

ISSUE B – THE STATE OF CERO, BY CONVICTING AND SENTENCING ONEAI

UNDER THE DIGITAL SAFETY ACT, AND SPECIFICALLY BY IMPOSING A

ONE-MONTH BAN ON ITS SERVICE, ‘RMSM’, VIOLATED ITS RIGHT TO THE

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, INCLUDING THE FREEDOM TO IMPART

INFORMATION AND IDEAS, RECOGNISED BY ARTICLE 19 OF THE ICCPR 76

i) The interference was not prescribed by law ........................................................ 78

b) There were no adequate safeguards against unfettered discretion ..................... 79

ii) The interference did not pursue a legitimate aim ............................................... 80

iii) The interference was not necessary in a democratic society .............................. 81

cause clear and imminent danger or clear harm ........................................................... 81

c) The interference was not the least intrusive instrument ..................................... 83

da) OneAI has developed RMSM with due diligence .............................................. 85

db) The imposed sanctions were disproportionate ................................................... 86

dc) The interference caused a chilling effect............................................................ 87

IX. PRAYER FOR RELIEF .............................................................................................. 89

ACHPR African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

ACHR American Convention on Human Rights

ACmHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights

AfCHPR African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights

CC Constitutional Court of Cero

Constitution The Constitution of Cero

The Chamber of the Universal Court of Human Rights known as

CTA Counter-Terrorism Act of Cero

DRC Digital Regulatory Commission

DSA Digital Safety Act of Cero

ELA Enos Liberation Army

ERW Enos Rights Watch

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

FoE Freedom of Expression

IACmHR Inter-American Commission on Human Rights

IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights