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Necessity in International Law
 Necessity
in International Law
xwx
Jens David Ohlin
and
Larry May

1
 1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Ohlin, Jens David, author. | May, Larry, author.
Title: Necessity in international law / Jens David Ohlin and Larry May.
Description: First edition. | New York : Oxford University Press, 2016. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2016010312 | ISBN 9780190622930 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: War (International law) | Necessity (International law) |
Military necessity.
Classification: LCC KZ6385 .O35 2016 | DDC 341.6—dc23 LC record available at
http://lccn.loc.gov/2016010312

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—LM
 CON T E N T S

Acknowledgments xi

Introduction 1
I. Three Kinds of Necessity: Exception, License, and Constraint 2
II. A Roadmap 6
III. Normative Prescriptions 9

PART A: Necessity & Jus ad Bellum

1. Necessity and the Principle of Last Resort in the Just War
Tradition 15
I. Defining Aggression in the Just War Tradition 16
II. Gentili and the Justification of Offensive War 19
III. Grotius on Fear of Attack 23
IV. The Grotian Principles of Last Resort and Ad Bellum
Necessity 26
V. Last Resort as the Ultimate Restraint 30
VI. Equally Efficacious Means 34
VII. Conclusion 36
2. Necessity and the Use of Force in International Law 39
I. Necessity under Customary and Treaty Law 40
II. Necessity in Investor-​State Arbitration 43
III. Necessity in Jus ad Bellum Violations 45
IV. Necessity as a Component of Self-​Defense 55
V. Conclusion 63

PART B: Necessity & Jus in Bello

3. Necessity and Discrimination in Just War Theory 67
I. Necessity and Discrimination in Early Modern
Just War Theory 69
II. Necessity and Humane Treatment 74
III. Luck and Necessity 77

( vii )
 ( viii )  C O N T E N T S

IV. Military Necessity as a Form of Practical Necessity 83

V. Relating Jus in Bello Proportionality and Necessity 87
4. The Foundations of Necessity in IHL 91
I. The ICRC and Necessity 92
II. Lieber’s Conception of Necessity 95
III. Military Necessity at the Nuremberg Tribunals 106
IV. What’s Right and What’s Wrong with Lieber’s Necessity 109
V. Conclusion 119
5. Necessity in Human Rights Law and IHL 121
I. Human Rights Necessity 123
II. Combining Human Rights Necessity with IHL Necessity 126
III. Conclusion 138
6. Necessity in Criminal Law 141
I. Necessity in Domestic Criminal Law 143
II. No Constraints on the Necessity Defense 147
III. Ad Hoc Constraints 154
IV. Principled Constraints 159
V. Conclusion 162
7. Striking a Balance between Humanity and Necessity 167
I. Humanity 168
II. Humanitarianism and Human Dignity 170
III. Humane Treatment 175
IV. Dignity and Vulnerability 177
V. Humanitarian Rights 180
VI. Concluding Thoughts on the Principles of Humanity
and Necessity 182

PART C: Applying Necessity to Contemporary Conflicts

8. Combatants and Civilians in Asymmetric Wars 189
I. Pirates and Insurgents at War 190
II. Grotius on Nonstate Actors in War 193
III. Jus ad Bellum Issues 195
IV. Jus in Bello Issues 198
V. Civil Wars and Civilians 202
9. Disabling versus Killing in War 207
I. Specific Prohibitions versus General Duties 210
II. The Hors de Combat Argument 213
III. Least Harmful Means Test at the Geneva Negotiations 218
IV. Should Jus in Bello Require Disabling before Killing? 225
V. Necessity and Killing Fleeing Soldiers 230
 C ontents   ( ix )

10. The Duty to Capture 235

I. Is Capture Required by Jus in Bello Necessity? 240
II. Are Different Rules for Civilians and Combatants
Morally Legitimate? 244
III. Capture as a Requirement of Constitutional Necessity 248
IV. The Moral Arguments for a Duty to Capture 255
11. Force Protection 259
I. Understanding Force Protection 260
II. Jus ad Bellum Necessity and Force Protection 262
III. Jus in Bello Necessity and Force Protection 264
IV. The Hannibal Procedure 266
V. Reasonable Force Protection 270
Conclusion 273

Index 277
 AC K N O W L E D GM E N T S

Part of this book originally appeared in a different form in Larry May,

Necessity and the Lives of Soldiers, which won the Frank Chapman Sharp
prize of the American Philosophical Association for the best unpublished
work on the philosophy of war and peace for 2012–​2014.
Portions of the book manuscript were also drawn from Jens David Ohlin,
The Duty to Capture, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1268 (2013).

( xi )
 Introduction

N ecessity is quite possibly the most powerful concept in the law. It has
the almost mystical power to transform what would otherwise be illegal
or immoral into a justified or excused act, all because the action was “neces-
sary.” Herein lays its utter dangerousness. Whether the inquiry is individual
self-​defense in domestic criminal law, national self-​defense under interna-
tional law, or killing during armed conflict, the concept of necessity is often
the key element that drives the outcome of the analysis. If the action is nec-
essary, then it is often permitted; if the action is not necessary, it is often for-
bidden. But what does “necessary” really mean in these debates? And does
it mean the same thing in each context, or does its meaning and function
depend on the nature of the inquiry at hand? Is necessity a universal moral
and legal concept, or is its meaning fundamentally context-​dependent?
The following book is a taxonomical and normative study of the prin-
ciple of necessity across multiple domains in international law. We aim to
study necessity in each of its flavors across international law and Just War
theory in order to answer these pressing questions. In law and morality
one of the most challenging questions posed concerning the justifiability
of war or armed conflict is that of necessity. War can only be initiated if it is
necessary, and tactics can only be employed if they are necessary. These re-
quirements are uncontroversial. What remains controversial is how prop-
erly to characterize the “necessity” condition for a just or legal war, and
how to apply the concept in concrete cases. The idea that one should only
use lethal force when it is necessary is one of the most important concepts
in the humanitarian restrictions of action during war or armed conflict.
Consequently, our book offers an analysis of the principle of necessity that

(1)
 ( 2 )  Introduction

is at once abstract and concrete; we start with general principles and ar-
ticulate how necessity works in jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but then apply
these general lessons to specific controversies regarding the appropriate
rules for the conduct of hostilities in contemporary armed conflicts, in-
cluding those conducted against nonstate actors and terrorists.
Because the concept of necessity is paramount in Just War theory,
public international law, and international humanitarian law (IHL), we
believe that a proper investigation into its appropriate usage must—​out
of interpretive necessity—​involve both legal and philosophical elements.
Prior contributions in both law and philosophy have studied the concept
of necessity, but it is rare for the scholarly literature to consider both at
the same time. Historical Just War philosophers, and the more contem-
porary philosophers known as Revisionist Just War theorists, make use of
the concept of necessity in their philosophical arguments regarding both
the resort to and the conduct of war. International lawyers working in the
fields of international humanitarian law, human rights, the use of force,
and even investor-​state arbitration deploy the concept of necessity to make
their arguments. We consider all of these domains relevant for our cross-​
disciplinary investigation into the nature of necessity.
Our ultimate goal is to understand how the concept of necessity is used
today and how it ought to be properly used when brought to bear on ques-
tions of killing in war. This requires mastery of necessity’s philosophical
and legal manifestations and the rich interplay between them. Indeed, the
two domains can never be separate, since the modern era of international
regulations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is, in a sense, a legalistic out-
growth of a prior philosophical exercise: the constraint on national conduct
during warfare. Historically, that project was popularized by the nineteenth
century natural law theorists, who brought to bear moral and normative
thought on questions of legal regulation. Although those domains (law and
philosophy) have suffered a profound normative estrangement since then,
it is important to remember their historical and conceptual linkage. As
such, the only way to understand necessity’s role in contemporary discus-
sions regarding resort to force and conduct during hostilities is carefully to
trace its emergence from prior philosophical and legal material.

I. THREE KINDS OF NECESSITY: EXCEPTION,

LICENSE, AND CONSTRAINT

Let us begin by pointing out that the concept of necessity has several distinct
uses depending on the context. In this sense necessity is a cluster concept.
 I nt r o d u ction   ( 3 )

First, necessity can be an exception to an otherwise binding obligation in

the sense that if it is necessary for one to act, say so as to avoid one’s own
death, one is entitled to use means, such as stealing food from someone else,
that would normally not be permissible. Second, necessity can mean that
one has a license to act in certain ways once one can show that the action is
part of a role, and to satisfy this role it is necessary for one to act in this way.
Third, necessity can be a constraint that blocks a form of activity due to the
lack of necessity that activity be engaged in.
Sometimes the three kinds of necessity overlap with one another. For
example, consider Lincoln’s invocation of necessity to justify his issu-
ance of the Emancipation Proclamation, which ended slavery by execu-
tive fiat.1 Lincoln’s decision was controversial because it was unclear if the
President had the unilateral authority under the Constitution to issue the
Proclamation. However, Lincoln argued that the action was necessary as
part of the war effort and in that sense fell under his constitutional author-
ity.2 This invocation of necessity contains elements of both necessity-​as-​
license and necessity-​as-​exception. Lincoln claimed that military necessity
provided him with a license to act. But viewed in another way, Lincoln’s
argument also sounded in exception, because he was arguing that the
usual constraints on unilateral executive action did not apply under the
circumstances.
Another example of the same overlapping phenomenon might be
the internment of Japanese-​Americans during World War II. President
Roosevelt justified the action by appealing to the concept of military neces-
sity, and the Supreme Court upheld the President’s order, and the actions
of his subordinates implementing that plan, on that basis.3 The concept
of necessity was used as a license, but it was also used as an exception to
basic principles of constitutional law. Even though the Constitution pro-
tects unlawful searches and seizures and the right to due process, some-
thing about the concept of necessity negated those protections. In 1983,
the federal government apologized for the injustice of the internment and
concluded that the action was not justified by military necessity.4 This in

1. The Emancipation Proclamation, January 1, 1863.

2. See John Fabian Witt, Lincoln’s Code 219 (2012) (“As a war measure based on
military necessity, the Emancipation Proclamation condensed a millennium of moral
and legal reasoning into its short text.”).
3. See Executive Order 9066 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. See Personal Justice Denied, Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, Part 2: Recommendations 5 (1983) (“In sum, Executive Order
9066 was not justified by military necessity, and the decisions that followed from
it—​exclusion, detention, the ending of detention and the ending of exclusion—​were
 ( 4 )  Introduction

itself shows the dangers that lurk in the notion of necessity as an excep-
tion to generally applicable rules. If the internment had been factually
required by military necessity, then the government’s 1983 statement
implicitly suggests that necessity would have abrogated the usual consti-
tutional protections. This only reaffirms the great danger of the concept
of necessity to sweep aside existing normative constraints when circum-
stances make it “necessary.”
Furthermore, once one understands necessity at a much deeper level of
abstraction, it is clear that all forms of necessity have the same structure.
However, at the more specific level of moral or legal arguments, necessity
works in different ways depending on the context. Unfortunately, these
contexts are sometimes blurred or confused, and the omnipresent lan-
guage of necessity is often a barrier to clear thinking on these issues. One
single word—​“necessity”—​hides a litany of deep and sometimes contested
intuitions about the appropriateness of killing.
So practically, in terms of the way that international law works, it mat-
ters quite a lot which form the concept of necessity takes in the argument.
It is therefore imperative to systematically map and catalog the various
uses of the term “necessity” in the law and ethics of killing, with the hope
of identifying the truly distinct role that the concept of necessity plays in
these debates. Then, and only then, can we move to the normative exercise
of determining when necessity—​in one of its senses—​justifies killing an-
other human being in either the moral or legal sense of that phrase.
In IHL, the three different (and occasionally overlapping) notions of ne-
cessity take special form when discussions turn more specifically to what
lawyers once called “military necessity,” though that term has fallen out of
fashion and in many ways is more confusing than illuminating. The first is
necessity as an exception to generally applicable rules (military necessity
in the High Command formulation, or necessity in criminal law), which is
the most dangerous application of the concept. Francis Lieber is sometimes
interpreted in this way although we think this is a simplistic and probably
a mistaken reading of him. The danger of military necessity qua exception
has long been recognized. For example, Westlake warned that “[t]‌he plea
of necessity, even when justified, has a dangerous tendency to corrupt and

not founded upon military considerations. The broad historical causes that shaped
these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.
Widespread ignorance about Americans of Japanese descent contributed to a policy
conceived in haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A grave
personal injustice was done to the American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese
ancestry who, without individual review or any probative evidence against them, were
excluded, removed and detained by the United States during World War II.”).
 I nt r o d u ction   ( 5 )

degrade those who urge it; and when it has sapped the foundations of one
fence, no other fence into the construction of which it has been introduced
can be greatly relied on.”5 Consequently, the law can and should find ways
to restrain it. In that regard, we will argue in Chapter 6 that there are vari-
ous ways that both international and domestic criminal law seeks to cabin
or constrain the application of this “exception” version of necessity, pre-
cisely because it is so dangerous in allowing lethal violence.6 The second
is necessity as a license (“military necessity” in Lieber’s sense, though he
is not always consistent). The third is necessity as a constraint, in the way
that human rights lawyers use the term—​as in “the government is not al-
lowed to engage in this action because it was not truly necessary.”
Human rights necessity represents necessity at its most constrain-
ing. Here is the basic structure of the concept: government x is prohib-
ited from infringing interest y unless it is necessary to achieve legitimate
aim z. This is far different from necessity in international criminal law,
whose basic structure is: individual x is excused from a generally applicable
criminal norm y if required by a state of necessity. This is the opposite of
constraining—​it produces a state of exception that allows the individual to
ignore the law. Finally, as we will show, the notion of military necessity as
a license in international humanitarian law requires only a connection, but
not a terribly tight one, between the killing of the enemy combatant and
the war aim, though perhaps there are moral reasons to tighten this rela-
tively loose notion of necessity. The important point, however, is that these
versions of necessity all function differently.
At a very deep level of abstraction, the three flavors of necessity (con-
straint, exception, and license) might share the same conceptual structure.
One could describe it in the following way: action x is appropriate if and only
if it is necessary to achieve y. With this abstract formula, one could describe
necessity in almost any domain, including human rights, IHL, and criminal
law. However, although this deep level of abstraction reveals a structural
unity in the concept of necessity across philosophical and legal domains, its
stripping of all other contexts obscures the different ways that the concept
functions. In criminal law, the prohibitions are already fixed and determi-
nate, so that necessity functions as a way of exempting an agent from the

5. See John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 275

(1894).
6. For an example of the danger of using necessity as an exemption from generally
applicable rules, consider the use of necessity in arguments attempting to justify tor-
ture. For a good discussion of the legal system’s attempt to grapple and constrain these
arguments, see generally David Luban, Torture, Power, and Law (2014).
 ( 6 )  Introduction

demands of the law. In contrast, necessity in human rights law functions as

a way of determining the content of the rules themselves (by determining
the appropriate scope of governmental conduct when its actions infringe a
personal interest). Finally, necessity in IHL acts as license, not in an ad hoc
or exceptional way, but rather as a justification for an entire class of behav-
ior (killing enemy combatants as a function of belligerency).
Although necessity in each of these domains involves, in some weak
sense, a limiting constraint on action, in a more relevant sense necessity
functions differently because in each domain the background conditions
for action are entirely different. In criminal law (whether domestic or in-
ternational), the assumption is that all members of the public follow its
general prohibitions. In human rights law, the default assumption is that
individual rights will almost always conflict and the law needs a decision
procedure to determine which infringements are permissive and which
are not. In IHL, the assumption is that killing enemy soldiers is part of
the basic architecture of armed conflict. Against these diverse legal and
moral frameworks, the same concept of necessity operates to different
effect in each domain. Tracing the conceptual unity and diversity of these
approaches is critical to avoiding misunderstanding.

II. A ROADMAP

Having offered a brief introduction into the complex web of ideas embed-
ded in the term “necessity,” as well as a glimpse into some of our normative
intuitions, we now offer a roadmap for the book’s argument. Part A asks,
and answers, the question of what is necessity in jus ad bellum by exploring
its philosophical and legal origins. Chapter 1 begins with a historical analy-
sis of how necessity figured in the jus ad bellum arguments of Gentili and
Grotius, and in particular examines how the concept of necessity is used
in Just War theory as a principle of last resort—​a criterion that must be
satisfied before the recourse to force can be justified. Chapter 2 engages in
the companion exercise of evaluating this structural argument in the legal
sphere, that is, showing how necessity works as a central element of jus
ad bellum legal arguments. In particular, Chapter 2 notes that the concept
of necessity works slightly differently depending on whether it is asserted
as an independent excuse in international relations or whether it is one
component of a self-​defense analysis. In the former case it is invoked as
an exception to general rules of conduct, while in the latter necessity func-
tions as a constraint on the application of a general justification. Although
both examples share structural similarities, the former is more dangerous,
 I nt r o d u ction   ( 7 )

and for that reason international lawyers have generally placed external
constraints on the application of the necessity doctrine.
In Part B, we turn our attention to necessity in jus in bello. Chapter 3 ex-
amines the interplay between the concept of necessity and the principle of
distinction in Just War theory, in part to understand the temptation that
often arises to use necessity as an excuse for departures from the demands
of distinction (i.e., the normative requirement to limit one’s attacks to
military objectives), or the demands of proportionality (i.e., the normative
requirement that civilian collateral damage must not be disproportionate
to the military advantage secured by destroying the military target).
We also trace the evolution of necessity from a concept in natural law to
its exposition in the Lieber Code, which in many ways is built around the
concept of necessity. That being said, necessity is often misunderstood in
natural law discussions, just as it is often misunderstood in discussions of
Lieber. Because Lieber used the term so many times, often in seemingly
contradictory ways, one can find evidence for almost any interpretation
of military necessity in Lieber’s writing. However, we argue that Lieber
mostly understood necessity as a license (as opposed to an exception).
In Chapter 4, we offer a normative and philosophical reconstruction of
Lieber’s view of necessity as a broad license, while at the same time reject-
ing any suggestion that necessity can and should be used as an exception to
generally applicable prohibitions in jus in bello.
Chapter 5 contrasts necessity in IHL with necessity as the concept is
used in human rights discourse. The task here is to explain what is dis-
tinctive about necessity in IHL and to explain why conceptions of neces-
sity that reign in other areas of international law cannot be automatically
grafted onto the laws of war without reflection and deliberation. Indeed,
any attempt to transplant a more restrictive version of necessity will result
in a substantial alteration of the legal architecture of jus in bello. Although
this is not necessarily a bad thing, it can only be accomplished if one offers
a separate normative defense for that alteration. It cannot be presumed.
Chapter 6 examines the use of necessity as an excuse in international crim-
inal law and notes that in this context necessity functions as a general ex-
ception to pre-​established rules; in this area necessity is potentially at its
most dangerous. Consequently, we examine the various constraints—​both
ad hoc constraints and principled constraints—​that international criminal
law deploys to restrict the application of the necessity defense so as to mit-
igate its over-​permissiveness.
Finally, Part B concludes with Chapter 7, which discusses how necessity
in jus in bello (now properly distinguished from human rights necessity)
can and should be balanced against the principle of humanity. In many
 ( 8 )  Introduction

ways, the principle of humanity covers much of the same ground as human
rights principles, except in this case the principle is already internal to jus in
bello. So in this investigation, we hope to explain how some human rights
principles—​under the guise of the principle of humanity—​have a proper
role to play in checking the inherent permissiveness of jus in bello neces-
sity. To accomplish this task, we examine how the principle of humanity
and necessity work in both legal and philosophical arguments about just
conduct during warfare.
The final section of the book, Part C, is an exercise in applied theory.
The task is now to understand the concept of necessity and how it ought
to apply in contemporary military conflicts that, in important ways, differ
from the military contests fought during the time of the natural law theo-
rists. Chapter 8 examines the dividing line between combatants and civil-
ians during contemporary asymmetric conflicts against nonstate actors,
the preeminent type of military conflict in this age of global terrorism.
Although the dividing line between combatant and civilian is well explored
in both the legal and philosophical literatures, we examine the subject ex-
plicitly through the lens of necessity. We conclude that the fundamental
element of status (civilian versus combatant), which is the foundation for
status-​based targeting and status-​based detention, is starting to break
down in contemporary asymmetric conflicts. This implies a subtle shift
toward conduct and behavior as morally and legally relevant conditions
that can and should supersede more elementary considerations of status.
Although this transformation has some normative appeal, the current law
of war framework is built around status-​based determinations. We are
starting to articulate a new way of fighting wars but we do not yet have the
legal architecture with which to properly regulate it.
Chapter 9 asks whether the principle of necessity should require dis-
abling rather than killing in warfare. We conclude that whatever the merits
of this ethical conundrum, the current state of the law does not codify this
obligation. However, we express substantial unease with the current state
of the law, and its permissive use of overwhelming and often brutal force
against soldiers.
Furthermore, Chapter 10 asks a similar set of questions regarding neces-
sity and the duty to capture, that is, whether necessity requires an attack-
ing force to attempt capture prior to initiating a lethal strike. Again, we
find no such duty codified in existing legal obligations, at least not where
jus in bello is concerned. However, we do believe that restrictions on the
use of overwhelming force might be found in a reinvigorated jus ad bellum
obligation on the part of attacking forces to cease an attack when the ne-
cessity giving rise to the armed conflict has evaporated because the enemy
 I nt r o d u ction   ( 9 )

nation has been so decimated that it is incapable of constituting a national

threat anymore. Finally, we also ask whether it would be morally advisable
to amend the codified rules of jus in bello to require non-​lethal attacks in
very limited and carefully circumscribed contexts.
Chapter 11 addresses force protection and the degree to which necessity
permits attacking forces to prioritize the lives of their own soldiers over the
lives of enemy civilians. This is a difficult problem of application; although
everyone agrees that the lives of enemy civilians must be safeguarded, the
question is how much must be risked in order to safeguard them. We con-
clude this chapter by articulating a standard of reasonable force protection
that is neither too restrictive nor too permissive.

III. NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS

With having identified and clarified the multiple strands of necessity, our
book turns to normative assessments regarding the appropriate role for
the concept of necessity in regulating the use of force. In the end, we find
the concept of necessity to be a central tool for constraining potentially
devastating violence during armed conflict, but at the same time we are
sensitive that there are dangers associated with using necessity as a broad
brushstroke to reflexively condemn all that happens on the battlefield. Just
as it is clear that necessity has a morally dangerous element (the attempt to
justify exceptions from legitimate principles of morality), so too necessity
has a mirror image: a siren-​song temptation to radically remake warfare
into a glorified police action. This impulse ought to be resisted. Reality, like
so many things, is in the middle.
For centuries necessity has been understood in the rules and laws of war
in terms of “military necessity.” For many theorists and practitioners, the
concept of military necessity has little to do with the common-​sense un-
derstanding of necessity. Rather, military necessity in the initiation of war
means only that lethal violence is needed to prevent the loss of something
important, and military necessity in the conduct of war means simply that
there is some goal that a commander is pursuing, and that goal has some
clear connection to the winning of a particular battle and the overall win-
ning of the war. Military necessity so conceived does not appear to be es-
pecially humane, since it does not seem to limit lethal violence much at all.
Immanuel Kant characterized one of the versions of the categorical im-
perative as the “formula of the end in itself” or “the principle of humanity.”
In Kant’s view, there is a practical imperative for all people, namely: “Act in
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the
 ( 10 )  Introduction

person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a
means.”7 This principle is deeply connected to Kant’s notion of the dignity
of a human person. To respect the dignity in each person, we must treat
each person as an end in itself, not simply as a means to our own ends.
In situations of war or armed conflict, it is hard to understand how the
various participants, especially the soldiers shooting at enemy soldiers,
could still treat the enemy soldiers as ends in themselves. Indeed, the idea
of military necessity in its traditional formulation saw the soldier’s role to
be one of killing as many enemy soldiers as possible, as long as this was
important for winning the war. This military goal was related to the fur-
ther goal of bringing the war to an end as soon as is possible so as to have
the least number of casualties in the long run. But there is no denying that
the traditional principle of military necessity was aimed at using enemy
soldiers as a means to ending the war as quickly as possible, and did not see
enemy soldiers as ends in themselves.
It is also part of the more modern understandings of necessity that this
principle is to be balanced against what international lawyers call the prin-
ciple of humanity. Yet, the question to consider is whether these principles
can indeed be balanced if the principle of military necessity contains such
a strong presumption in favor of the right of soldiers to kill as many enemy
soldiers as possible. How though can soldiers be treated humanely if they
can be killed at will? Indeed, this seems to be especially difficult unless the
principle of humanity calls for protection of combatants and not merely
noncombatants.
To combat the leniency of the traditional understanding of military ne-
cessity, some authors have recently argued for a more expansive princi-
ple, namely, the least harmful means principle.8 This principle would sweep
across all decisions by commanders during war and would require that
commanders only order that use of force that is the least harmful of all
options. We will propose a more moderate thesis that merely calls for less
than lethal force when it is not necessary to use lethal force. Our proposal
will not affect non-​lethal use of force and is hence not nearly as restrictive
as the least harmful means principle. Also, our proposal sounds in moral
theory and is not a description of the state of the law today.
In any event, the question is how to reconcile the principle of humanity,
which since Kant’s time has meant that all people are to be treated with

7. See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 36 (James

W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1981) (1785).
8. See Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. Legal Analysis 69
(2010).
 I nt r o d u ction   ( 11 )

dignity and respect, with the principle of necessity. It is our view that this
reconciliation can only occur when the restrictions that come from the ne-
cessity principle are extended to all who are affected by war, soldiers and
civilians alike. The principles of humanity and of necessity should not be
irreconcilable, and we will develop in more detail later a way to reconcile
these important principles in the morality and legality of war, while at the
same time recognizing the realities of modern warfare and the inherent
risk that all soldiers are ultimately subject to.
 PA R T A
xwx
Necessity & Jus ad Bellum
 CHAPTER 1
w
Necessity and the Principle of Last
Resort in the Just War Tradition

T homas Aquinas, writing at the height of the Middle Ages, talks of it

being unlawful if a man initiates violence, even in self-​defense, and
“uses more than necessary violence.”1 Here necessity and last resort are
linked conceptually. But even if jus ad bellum necessity, or last resort, can
be satisfied, Aquinas tells us, it is never justified to kill an innocent person.
As early as the seventeenth century, theorists such as Alberico Gentili chal-
lenged this idea, by saying that “a legitimate cause of fear” even without any
real danger, is sufficient to justify the initiation of the use of lethal force.2
In this chapter we will look at these important historical debates concern-
ing necessity and last resort, especially in connection with a principle not
much discussed in the literature: the first strike or priority principle.
In the legal and moral debates about the justifiability of initiating war,
two powerful ideas are dominant: The State that uses violence and strikes
first is normally thought to initiate an aggressive war, and the State that
uses violence as a last resort to stop the assault is normally thought to initi-
ate a defensive war. These temporal signs are only prima facie indicators of
justifiability of initiating war, but they are omnipresent in the literature of
at least the last 500 years, if not for the past four millennia.

1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Pt. II-​II, Qu. LXIV, art. 6, at 1464 (Fathers
of the Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros. 1948).
2. Alberico Gentili, De Jure Belli (On the Law of War) Bk. I, ch. 14, at 62–​63
(trans. John C. Rolfe, Clarendon Press 1933) (1598).

( 15 )
 ( 16 )  Necessity & Jus ad Bellum

The intuition behind the first strike or priority principle is based on the
analogy between war and the two-​person altercation. To identify, in a pre-
liminary way, the aggressor in a barroom brawl, one typically asks: “Who
threw the first punch?” Similarly, when investigations are launched into
police shootings, one also asks: “Did the police shoot first or were they at-
tacked first?” And if the barroom brawler or the police officer did eventually
strike, one would next ask: “Was there any other reasonable alternative to
stop the assault?” If there was a reasonable alternative, then the shootings
were not a last resort, and hence not defensive.
One of the most difficult questions posed by these simple intuitive ap-
proaches to the justifiability of initiating war concerns the State that strikes
first but also had no reasonable alternatives to prevent an assault. This case
is often labeled “anticipatory self-​defense” or “preemptive strike.” We will
also explain why the idea of last resort may not do the work that it was once
thought to do, at least in the case of anticipatory self-​defense.
In this chapter we wish to reassess the doctrine of anticipatory self-​defense,
and the larger question of the justifiability of preemptive and preventive war,
from the Just War perspective. In the second and third sections, we will re-
hearse an important debate between Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius of
400 years ago on our topics. Then we will spend the remaining sections look-
ing first at “first strikes” and then at “last resorts” to see what, if anything, is
to be said for these as markers of aggressive or defensive war. In those sec-
tions, we will address directly the justifiability of preemptive war with refer-
ence to the principle of necessity in jus ad bellum debates in Just War theory.

I. DEFINING AGGRESSION IN THE

JUST WAR TRADITION

Traditional Just War theory argues that some wars can be justified, even
required, out of respect for the protection of innocent life. Self-​defense and
defense of others are the key bases for the justification of war. This posi-
tion was historically articulated in opposition to strict pacifism, although
it ended up calling only for a kind of limitation on certain versions of pac-
ifism. If pacifism is itself grounded in respect for life, especially innocent
life, then it appears that some wars may be justified, from the standpoint
of certain versions of pacifism, if those wars will prevent massive loss of
innocent life without risking a corresponding loss of life that occurs as a
result of the waging of the war itself.3 Indeed, the early Church Fathers saw

3. See generally Larry May, Contingent Pacifism (2015).

 N ecessit y & P r incip l e of L a st Resor t in t h e J u st Wa r T r a dition   ( 17 )

themselves as sympathetic to pacifism and yet also thought that some wars
could be justified on just the grounds we have been discussing, namely,
concern or respect for the lives of fellow humans. Of course, we may want
to question whether the early Church Fathers really were pacifists, but the
point is only that war can sometimes be justified on the same grounds on
which certain forms of pacifism are themselves grounded.
Strict pacifists will not support any war since war involves the inten-
tional taking of human life. But few people would follow these strict paci-
fists in saying that one should not use violent force to defend an innocent
person’s or one’s own life from mortal attack. As an analogy think of the
abortion debates. Strict adherents to a pro-​life position will argue that all
abortions are unjustified. But they do not gain many adherents to their
position when the focus is on those cases of abortion that are necessary to
save the life of the pregnant woman. And the reason regarding abortion is
similar to the case of war. It seems odd to think that abortion or war should
be condemned in all cases on grounds of protecting life and yet not recog-
nize the conflicting intuitions that many people have about the cases in
which abortion or war is necessary to protect innocent life as well. Except in
the most extreme view of it, the principle of respect for life does not seem
clearly to require that all wars or all abortions be prohibited.
To say that war is justified is to say that the moral or legal reasons in sup-
port of waging war in a given context outweigh the moral or legal reasons
against waging war in that context. To say that waging war might be justi-
fied is to say that even though the balance of reasons weigh against waging
war, special considerations might warrant that waging war in this case not
be blamed or punished. Think of the example of murder. One can say that
a person is guilty of murder even though he or she had some reason to
engage in this act. But one can also say that a person has performed a kill-
ing and yet his act can be justified as in the case of killing in self-​defense,
or excused as in the case of insanity. One can kill someone and yet still be
excused from punishment.
One strong strain of the Just War tradition has taken off from the above
position, namely that some wars can be allowed or at least excused even if
one is generally sympathetic to pacifism. This is the position of Augustine
and of Thomas More, as well as some of the followers of Thomas Aquinas,
who specifically discuss abortion as well as war in just these terms, namely
that some wars may be justified out of respect for life. The extreme pacifist
early Church Fathers began to lose adherents throughout the late Roman
era, and it seems likely that the Just War doctrine came into being as a way
to save much of the sentiment behind the pacifist position, especially the
strong support for life, by admitting that some, but only very few, wars
 ( 18 )  Necessity & Jus ad Bellum

could be justified or excused. Contrary to what is often thought today, we

read the Just War tradition as continuing a tradition of generally condemn-
ing war. And in this respect, Just War theory and contemporary interna-
tional legal theory are quite similar to each other, in the sense that both
gesture toward a jus contra bellum but do not entirely embrace it without
reservation. Indeed, there are very similar debates today in legal circles
about how to regard recourse to force, and whether and when war can be
justified or at least excused if it seems necessary to use even lethal force to
restore or maintain the peace.4
Thomas More, in his book Utopia, explained when State use of force is
justified as follows: “Utopians go to war only for good reasons: [1]‌to pro-
tect their own land, [2] to drive invading armies from the territories of
their friends, or [3] to liberate an oppressed people in the name of human-
ity, from tyranny and servitude.”5 Aggression then, is State use of force that
is not an instance of self-​defense, defense of others, or taken contrary to
tyranny. Augustine has a similar view, writing at the beginning of the Just
War tradition; for him, self-​defense and defense of others were the only
proper just causes.6 Following in the tradition of over a thousand years,
from Augustine to More, there is a fair amount of agreement. Aggression is
the unjustified use of force, and the main forms of unjustified use of force
are those that are not taken in self-​defense or defense of others, but in-
stead, for instance, merely to increase one’s territory.
Two centuries after Thomas More, Emer de Vattel, an eighteenth century
theorist, articulates the general idea of self-​defense and the correspond-
ing idea of aggression in his book, The Laws of Nature or the Principles of
Natural Law:

A Nation has the right to resist the injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and
to use force and every just means of resistance against an aggressor. It may
even anticipate the other’s design, being careful, however, not to act upon
vague and doubtful suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself
the aggressor.7

4. See Thomas Franck, Recourse to Force (2002), especially ch. 2.

5. Thomas More, Utopia 89–​90 (George M. Logan & Robert M. Adams eds.,
Cambridge University Press 1989) (1516).
6. See Augustine, The City of God, Book 19, reprinted in The Morality of War
19 (Larry May, Eric Rovie & Steve Viner eds., 2006).
7. Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle (The
Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law) 130 (Charles G. Fenwick
trans., Carnegie Institution 1916) (1758).
 N ecessit y & P r incip l e of L a st Resor t in t h e J u st Wa r T r a dition   ( 19 )

Here are the classic elements of aggression: one State unjustifiably in-
flicts, or threatens to inflict, injury on another State by the use of force.
Preemption is here countenanced, but only under strict constraints, since
preemptive assault can turn into aggression itself.

II. GENTILI AND THE JUSTIFICATION

OF OFFENSIVE WAR

We first examine the writings of a figure in the history of international

legal thought, Alberici Gentili, who best epitomizes the long tradition of
understanding necessity, before then turning to the challenges to that view
in later times starting with the writings of Grotius. And we will eventu-
ally offer a few additional challenges as this first chapter proceeds. But our
main focus is simply to provide an account of several of the most promi-
nent historical ways of understanding necessity.
In 1594, Gentili, who was Regius Professor of Civil Law at the University
of Oxford, provided a good place for us to begin concerning how to regard
the necessity requirement for initiating defensive war:

We call defense now necessary, now expedient, now honorable; yet in every case
we should regard it as necessary. “He who defends himself is said to act through
compulsion.” So says Baldus, who refuses to distinguish whether one is defend-
ing oneself, one’s possessions, or one’s subjects; or whether what is defended is
near or at a distance… . Thus in speaking of necessity we are not speaking with
absolute accuracy, but we mean that which is not uncommon in human rela-
tions, and which is ordinarily called necessary; it may however not be true and
absolute necessity.8

Gentili here forthrightly admits that what has been called necessity is
not really about necessity properly understood when we are considering
defensive war.
Indeed, Gentili goes on to argue that absolute necessity has nothing
to do with justice: “For to kill in self-​defense is just, even though the one
who kills may flee without danger and so save himself.”9 And he gives an
example that is bizarre from the standpoint of anything that would com-
monly be called necessity today. Gentili says that “the cause of Romulus

8. Alberici Gentili, De Jure Belli Libri Tres (On the Law of War in Three
Books) 58 (John C. Rolfe trans., Oxford University Press 1924) (1594).
9. Id. at 58–​59.
 ( 20 )  Necessity & Jus ad Bellum

will rightly be called just, when he defended himself with arms against the
invasion of the Sabines, although he had himself given cause for anger and
war by carrying off the Sabine women.”10 Here, as in all cases of self-​defense
for Gentili, necessity is satisfied whenever a State is defending itself from
an invading army. And he concludes this discussion by saying “extreme
necessity forms an exception to every war.” This is the dangerous sense
of necessity as an exception to other normative standards we discussed
earlier. Even in cases of nonextreme necessity, as where Romulus could
have avoided the invasion by giving back the Sabine women his army had
kidnapped, Gentili says that he still had the “right to defend himself from
enemies who were presently going to attack him.”11
Concerning offensive war, Gentili also employs a weakened notion of ne-
cessity: “Necessity, we understand in the sense that we cannot maintain
our existence without making war.” As an example Gentili again turns to
the Roman case of Romulus carrying off the Sabine women because the
Romans could not maintain their new city without wives imported from
outside Rome.12 Later in De Jure Belli Libri Tres, Gentili advances what has
been the historical position often taken on necessity among legal theo-
rists: “A just and unavoidable necessity makes anything lawful.”13 But even
Gentili says that we may still only provide grounds for tolerance of certain
conduct, not that necessity makes initiating or conducting war fully just.14
And this caveat, as we will see, is not well recognized in the history of the
treatment of necessity.
As we will see, another obvious way to understand necessity is that there
is no other way to achieve what one has a right to achieve. This view, often
associated with Grotius, was propounded just a few short years after Gentili
wrote his treatise. The “no other way” understanding of necessity stands in
sharp relief against the position of Gentili that any defensive action should
be seen as satisfying necessity.
Gentili’s views can best be seen as embodying a kind of common sense
approach that clearly resonated with his students and readers. He was not
the theoretician or historian that Grotius was, but his views have held
up surprisingly well over the centuries and have a distinctly contempo-
rary ring. As will become clear in subsequent chapters, Gentili anticipated

10. Id. at 59.

11. Id. at 60.
12. Id. at 79.
13. Id. at 351.
14. Id. at 352.
 N ecessit y & P r incip l e of L a st Resor t in t h e J u st Wa r T r a dition   ( 21 )

the underlying ideas about necessity of the Lieber Code. In the jus ad
bellum domain Gentili is also close to the status quo position today in
international law.
In Gentili’s view, even “an offensive war may be waged justly … there is
always a defensive aspect, if they are just.”15 Gentili supports this claim by
the following argument:

we have discoursed at length of the law pertaining to every kind of defense… .

As a matter of fact, offensive warfare has the same motives, arising from neces-
sity, expediency, or honor. Necessity, however, we understand in the sense that
we cannot maintain our existence without making war… . A second variety of
this necessary warfare will be found in the case of those who, because they have
been driven from their own country or are compelled to leave it through some
emergency and to seek another home, from necessity make war upon others… .
the destruction of their cities has driven them into the lands of others16

As we will see, Gentili goes on to argue that many forms of offensive war,
not just that waged by exiles trying to support their own livelihood, can be
justified. If offensive wars can be waged for necessity, then there is a sense
in which offensive wars can be waged as a last resort and can be justified.
Concerning the case of exiles who must fight a war to preserve them-
selves from destruction, Gentili says:

Or do we think it right for men to have no pity for their kind, and allow nothing
but death for these exiles, who have been driven from their fatherland? Yet care
must be taken lest those wanderers grow discontented with the humble means
which of course they can acquire for themselves without war.17

Underlying Gentili’s general position here is the idea that people should
not be forced to do what is opposed to their sense of honor and dignity. In a
very curious passage, Gentili says: “Suppose that some one desires to issue
a scurrilous book against you, and that there are no available magistrates
to whom you may appeal. I maintain that it is your right to protect yourself
from insult by force of arms.”18 Apparently, Gentili thinks that generally
you should not have to flee rather than use violent force to defend what is
valuable to you.

15. Gentili, De Jure Belli, supra note 2, at 30.

16. Id. at 79.
17. Id. at 80.
18. Id. at 84.
 ( 22 )  Necessity & Jus ad Bellum

By taking the position that he does, Gentili disputes the age-​old idea
that those who strike first are prima facie in the wrong, even as he supports
the idea that last resort is of key—​although not of completely overriding—​
importance for determining when offensive war might be justified. Gentili
maintains that “to kill in self-​defense is just, even though the one who kills
may flee without danger to himself”19 for “every method of securing safety
is honorable”20 and that it is almost always dishonorable to be forced to flee
rather than to stay and defend one’s rights.21 Indeed, Gentili defends the
idea that wars can be fought in anticipation of “dangers already meditated
and prepared” but not yet launched.22
Regarding this latter doctrine, Gentili is justly famous for providing two key
analogies to explain why first strike as anticipatory defense is justifiable. First,
he argues that “we ought not to wait for violence to be offered us, if it is safer
to meet it half way … one may at once strike at the root of the growing plant
and check the attempts of the adversary who is meditating evil.”23 And em-
ploying another metaphor he says: “That is an excellent saying of Philo’s, that
we kill a snake as soon as we see one, even though it has not injured us and
will perhaps not harm us. For thus we protect ourselves before it attacks us.”24
These two powerful images, of stopping the growing plant before it is
a major problem for us to weed out, and killing a snake that has not yet
shown any signs of harming us but might eventually do so, play into deep-​
seated intuitions of many people. Indeed, Gentili says: “No one ought to
expose himself to danger. No one ought to wait to be struck unless he is a
fool.”25 It is not clear whether these last remarks are meant to be based in
prudence or morality.
For Gentili it is reasonable that precautions of various types be taken,
“even though there is no great and clear cause for fear, and even if there
really is no danger, but only a legitimate cause for fear.”26 Gentili adds fur-
ther support by saying that it is also reasonable that “while your enemy is
weak, slay him.”27 And he then concludes this discussion by saying that “a
defense is just which anticipates dangers that are already meditated and
prepared, and also those which are not meditated, but are probable and

19. Id. at 58–​59.

20. Id. at 59.
21. Id. at 83.
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id. at 61.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id. at 62–​63.
27. Id. at 65.
 Another Random Document on
Scribd Without Any Related Topics
fog történni, de nem tudta, hogy mi. Szeretett volna berohanni a
papjához, de nem mert. Simándy annyira fölötte állt, hogy nem
tudta magát arra határozni, hogy csak úgy kéretlenül berohanjon.
Az ablak nyitva volt, s fénysugár áradt ki belőle az éjbe. Az öreg
vadász, bár szégyelte, de odasompolygott és benézett. Simándy az
asztalnál ült és írt. Néha sokáig merően nézett a gyertya lángjába. S
arczán oly fájdalom látszott, hogy az öreg elfordult és könnyei
kicsordultak.
Aztán leült egy bokor alá, lassan megtömte pipáját, rágyujtott, s
miközben a füstöt szétfujta, tekintetét folyton a kivilágított ablakra
szegezte.
Egyszerre csak egy fehér alak jelent meg az ablak alatt.
Florica volt, a ki öreg cselédjükbe kapaszkodva állt ott. A lány
előbb benézett az ablakon, aztán az ajtóra került. Kinyitotta. Pali
nem fordult hátra.
– Pali! – szólalt meg halk, nyöszörgő hangon.
Simándy fölugrott, odarohant, átölelte s csókjaival borította el.
– Itt vagy. Hát eljöttél? Többé nem mégy vissza, enyém vagy
örökre, – suttogta elfuló hangon.
– Tied vagyok, de vissza kell mennem… csak megmondom, hogy
ne félj…
– Nem, édes, ne beszélj! Gyerünk, fussunk, meneküljünk innen…
– Nem lehet, nem lehet, de szeretlek, csak téged szeretlek és te
csak engem szeretsz, meg kell tudnod mindent… megmondok
mindent, hogy nyugodt légy, ne félts, ne öld meg magadat… Neked
mindent meg kell mondanom, úgy-e? Előtted nem lehet titkom. Úgy-
e szeretsz, nagyon szeretsz? Látod, én nem hagyhatom el szüleimet;
de ha te elhagysz, meghalok…
Megtört hangon, sebesen, zihálva beszélt.
 – Ide figyelj, Palim.
S Pali nyakába kapaszkodva, lehuzta magához a fejét…
*
Az éj csendes volt, a hold szelíd, sápadt fénynyel vont be
mindent.
Néha valahol egy szomszéd bokorban halkan nyöszörgött valami
alvó madár. Nagy zajnak tetszett már, mikor egy kavics megmozdult
a vízesés oldalán és legurult a mélységbe.
A medveölő fölugrott az árnyékban és bódultan nézett körül.
Valami nemes vadat sebeztek halálra… Hol? Az a szilaj, alaktalan,
névtelen jajszó a paplakból tört feléje… És a következő pillanatban
egy hörgő, tántorgó alak rohant el a vadász mellett.
A papja volt. Én Istenem, mi történt itt?
Karjában tartotta a lányt, csókolta a száját, érezte szívének
ütéseit, vére lüktetését, testének remegését, hajának illatát.
Miért nem is halt meg ebben a pillanatban?
Mert a következő pillanatban már nem halhatott meg.
Florica megmondta, hogy a két látogató egyike a bukaresti liga
ügynöke, a ki pénzt hozott az apjának.
Florica megmondta, hogy az apja tagja a titkos nemzeti
komiténak, s a havasi románok összeesküvésének szálai az ő
kezében futnak össze.
Ez a két úr nem Floricáért jött, hanem az újabb parancsokat és
terveket hozta az irredenta ágensének.
És Simándy szíve egyszerre megkeményedett. Két karjába erő
szállt, s a lányban, ki nélkül nem tudott már élni, kiért kész volt
meghalni, most csak egy gonosz démont látott – és eltaszította
magától.

Karjában tartotta a lányt…

Az égen teljes pompájában úszott a hold, ragyogtak a csillagok…

világos, fényes, tavaszi éj volt. Simándy körülnézett. S a hegytető a
régi váromladékkal, a templom a buzogánynyal, az égboltozat a
hadak útjával, mind-mind kötelességekről beszélt…
 Mögötte valami hirtelen támadt kóbor szélroham megzúgatta a
sötét erdőt… Ott, ott állnak a funtinelli véres árnyalakok, a kik idáig
jöttek s várják, hogy ő a kötelességét teljesítse.
Lerohant a templomához. A nagy vaspántos kapu állította meg.
Fölemelte két összeszorított öklét és megdöngette a kaput,
könyörögvén:
– Hatalmas Isten, adj erőt a te szolgádnak, hogy útjából el ne
tántorodjék.
Az üres templom visszhangja komor dübörgéssel felelt neki
vissza.
Igen, ti várvédő ősök, ti funtinelli árnyak, ti hitvédő papok, s ti
fönt az égen, Csaba királyfi fehér vitézei: nem hulltatok el hiába, a
késő utód szívében ég tovább a ti lángotok. Ő is védi hazája földjét
az árulás ellen; azét a szent földét, mely megtermette bölcsője fáját
és megtermi koporsójának fáját is.
S ekkor végigsimította a fejét és gondolkozott.
Igen, igen, a dolog tisztán áll: föl kell jelentenie Todorescut.
És elindult az úton, mely kigyózva eltünt az erdőben. Az erdő
szélén egy ember állt keresztbefont karokkal. – A medveölő volt.
– Tiszteletes úr, én nem kérdem, hová megy, de elviszem a
kocsimon.
Simándy odalépett hozzá.
– Kedves Mózes bátyám, engedjen engem haladni az utamon…
ne segítsen senki… ne kövessen senki… Vonuljon haza, pihenjen le…
– Édes jó tiszteletes uram, öreg ember vagyok, fiam lehetne,
fogadjon szót, tegye meg a kérésemet, vén ember vagyok, ne
fájdítsa a szívemet…
Simándy átölelte az öreget. Aztán röviden csak annyit mondott:
 – Jó. Fogjon be. Majd itt megvárom.
Tíz percz mulva sebes ügetéssel távoztak Papp Mózes kocsiján
Garabóról. Nem beszélgettek. Mikor a sűrűbe értek, a holdfény nem
esett már az útra, s mély sötétségben, lépést haladtak tovább. Az
erdő zúgott körülöttük és felettük. Papp Mózes hátrafordult:
– Tiszteletes úr, mondanék valamit…
– Csak beszéljen!
– Jönnek-e a funtinelli halottak?
– Nem jönnek. Sirjukban pihennek csöndesen. Az Isten áldja meg
az emléküket!
– Amen!
 XXII.

Husvéti ünnepek lévén, a főispán úr ő méltósága is eljött ez

alkalommal Budapestről, a méltóságos asszonynyal együtt a megye
székvárosába. A megyeháza előtt kivont karddal sétált a sárga
sujtásos, kék ruhás, piros tarsolyos huszár, ezzel is jelezve, hogy a
legnagyobb úrnak, a főispán úrnak méltóztatott megérkezni. Az
utczai gyerekek, a hegyi oláhok egész nap tisztes távolságban
ácsorogva bámészkodtak a tekintélyes, nagybajuszú huszárra, őt is
valami nagy úrnak tartva, a ki széles fringiájával bármely pillanatban
halált osztogathat. A főispánnak, Zágoni Albert grófnak, külön
lakosztálya volt a megyeházán, mely azonban az év legnagyobb
részén át üresen állt. Ilyenkor azonban ablakai minden este fényesen
ki voltak világítva s ott együtt teázott a megyei társaság és
sütkérezett a hatalom fényében, a mi a szürke, élettelen vidéki város
lakóinak, mint a köznapi mederből való kizökkenés, rendkívül jól
esett. Zágoni grófné igen szeretetreméltó háziasszony volt, a ki
német létére az alatt a tíz év alatt, mióta megszünt osztrák
baronessz lenni és magyar grófné lett, elég tisztességesen megtanult
magyarul. A Zágoniak olyan erdélyi család vala, melyet a
kormánynak kutyakötelessége volt respektálni, s mindig volt köztük
egy főispán, egy képviselő – sőt Zágoni Albertet a lapok
belügyminiszternek is emlegették, mert újabban a nemzetiségi
ellentétek nagyon kiélesedtek, s szakember kellett e fontos
poziczióra, a ki alapjában ismeri ezt a nagyfontosságú kérdést.
Zágoni Albertet különben nagyon művelt embernek is mondták, a ki
berlini studens korában pályadíjat nyert egy filozófiai dolgozatával.
Simándy a székvárosba érkezvén és megtudván, hogy a főispán
itt van, elhatározta, hogy ő neki mondja el titkát, mely lelkét teljesen
szétmarczangolta. Megállt a megyeháza előtt, s maga is bámult a
huszárra, mint a többi. Látta az urakat sürögni-forogni, jönni-menni,
s elgondolta, hogy szét fog itt rebbenni minden, ha ő elmondja, a
mit tud. Aztán kigördült a kapun egy nyitott hintó, rajta két kis
helyes fiucska, matrózruhába öltözködve, s németül kiabálva a
bonnera. Ezek a főispán gyerekei voltak. A hajdu tisztelgett nekik a
kardjával, a nép pedig levette a kalapját, s a bonne úgy köszöngetett
vissza, mint egy fejedelemnő. Végre Puskást látta megjelenni. Utána
szaladt és megfogta.
– Nini, Pali, te vagy?
– Én. Te, eszközöld ki, hogy a főispánnal beszéljek.
– Micsoda dologban?
– Nem mondhatom meg, de nagyon fontos.
– Az eklézsiádnak akarsz valamit?
– Nem mondhatom meg, de becsületszavamra állítom, hogy
nagyon fontos.
– Jó, de nagyon nehéz lesz. A méltóságos úr egész nap el van
foglalva, folyton járnak a nyakára.
– Ilyen dologban, tudom, senkise jön.
 – Hát a kedvedért megpróbálom, légy itt valahol kéznél.
– A dolog nagyon sürgős, nem lehetne azonnal?
– Hja, barátom, az nem úgy megy. Itt a főispán az atyaisten, hát
azt hiszed, hogy csak úgy be lehet hozzá nyitni, mint egy boltba?
Várj meg itt, majd aztán feljösz a szobámba.
– Dolgod van?
– Igen, a méltóságos asszonynak rendelek estére tortát, a német
kisasszonynak pedig bukétát. Nagyon csinos lány, s úgy látszik, én is
tetszem neki.
Pali megfogta Puskást.
– Hallod-e, nekem okvetetlenül beszélnem kell a gazdáddal. Nem
hivatalt, nem állami segítséget kérek tőle, nem is a frajla kezét
akarom megkérni tőle. Rendkívül fontos dolgot akarok tudtára adni.
Azonnal. Érted?
Puskás boszus arczczal hallgatta.
– Másnak nem mondhatod el?
– Nem. Még a sapkámnak se.
– Hát akkor várj itt meg, a míg visszajövök. Majd meglátjuk.
S kirántván a karját Pali kezéből, elszaladt.
Simándy ott maradt az utczán, s bámulta a huszárt a néppel.
Türelmetlensége a legmagasabb fokra hágott. Ő a madár szárnyaival
szeretett volna ide repülni, hogy az állam, a nagy, erős, hatalmas
magyar állam közegeit, a kik a haza érdekei fölött hivatottan
őrködnek, megragadja, fölzaklassa, fülükbe kiáltsa a vészt és itt kell
ácsorognia a buta hegyi móczok közt az utcza sarában.
Az őrt álló huszár nagyot kiáltott, mire a többi megyei hajdu
kirohant a kapu alól és kezdte szétpofozni a népet. Simándy is
félrehuzódott. A nagyszebeni román érsek jött be négylovas fogatán
gyönyörű mezei birtokáról, visszaadni a főispán látogatását. A lovak
sallangos szerszámai csak úgy csillogtak az ezüst czifraságoktól. A
kocsis a havasi oláhok tiszta fehér viseletében volt, piros tüszővel.
Mellette egy délczeg huszár ült, kék magyarban, fehér zsinórzattal.
Az érsek impozáns alak volt fekete selyem talárjában, piros
czingulusában, be nem gombolt hattyuprémes bundájában. Hófehér
szakálla mellére, hófehér haja vállára omlott. Mellén hatalmas
aranykereszt ragyogott. A mellette ülő erős, jóltáplált kanonok
hasonlóan selyembe volt öltözködve. Utánuk jött külön hintóban két
udvari pap. A metropolita kiszállt a hintóból, s a sárba térdelt népre
áldást osztogatott… Simándy pedig gyűrött, piszkos ruhájában ott
állt, s letörölte a sárt, melyet a metropolita kocsija arczába
fröccsentett. Ott állt, s kétség nyilalt át szivén, hogy ő-e az
államalkotó, államföntartó magyar faj papja? Vagy tán idegen földön
van, valami elhagyott, koldus oláhországi székelycsángó falu
papjaként, a ki az állami méltóságok fölvonulását nézi?
Összezavarodtak lelkében a gondolatok. Csudálatos, érthetetlen világ
ez. Eszébe jutottak a pellagrás sárga emberek, a mint ezeket a
fényes, erőtől duzzadó papokat látta. És végignézett a maga
kopottságán, mikor a selyemtalárok suhogását halotta. Ki az úr
ebben az országban? Ki az elnyomott ebben az országban? Miért
estek el a funtinelli katonák?… Lába megroskadt, a falnak
támaszkodott.
Nemsokára rohanva jött Puskás, virággal a kezében, fölvitte
Simándyt a szobájába, eléje tett egy skatulya czigarettát és
otthagyta.
Simándy az ablakból látta, hogy a főispán a kocsijáig kisérte a
metropolitát. Azután ott állt még jó darabig az ablaknál s bámult ki
az utczára. Egyszerre sietve megjelent Puskás.
– Most van a méltóságos urnak pár percz ideje. A kedvedért
megtettem, hogy beszéltem vele az érdekedben. Gyere!
Hirtelen visszafordult, s végignézett Simándyn.
 – Te, nincs másik ruhád?
– Nincs.
– Ez egy kicsit gyűrött. No, mindegy, most már vár ő méltósága.
Vonszolta magával egypár szobán keresztül, végre az egyikben
megállt.
– Itt várj. Méltóságos urnak szólítsd, s rövid légy, mert a gróf egy
kicsit ideges.
Pali megállt a helyén és körülnézett. Csupa szőnyeg minden. A
falon fegyverek, angol rézmetszetek. Az egyik sarokban egy puha,
süppedő, nagy, széles török diván, rajta egy csomó vánkos.
Iróasztal, s előtt bőrkarosszék. A diván mellett alacsony asztal, rajta
könyvek. Paul Bourget, Richepin, d’Annunzio, egy pesti, egy bécsi
német lap, s a Figaro. Az ajtó nyikorgott, egy nyulánk, elegáns,
sápadt férfi lépett be.
– Én Simándy Pál, garabói reformatus lelkész vagyok.
– Mi tetszik?
– Főbenjáró dolgot óhajtók méltóságodnak tudtára adni.
A főispán rágyujtott egy vastag czigarettára, s közben úgy a
czigarettával a szájában odamordult:
– Mi az?
– Méltóságos úr, Todorescu, a garabói oláh pap, hazaáruló. A
bukaresti liga fizetett ágense, most is van ott nála egy oláhországi
ember. A titkos nemzeti komité tagja…
A méltóságos úr idegesen rántott egyet a vállán, s közbeszólt:
– A havasi oláh konspiráció vezére. Hóra és Kloska, Janku…
Ugyan fiatalember, pap létére hogy hihet el ilyen agyrémeket? Hiszen
azért, hogy maga előre menjen, nem kell ilyen meséket kitalálnia.
 Simándy megdöbbenve nézett az előkelő úrra.
– Nem mese az, méltóságos uram…
– Badarság. Todorescu a legmegbizhatóbb emberünk. Mindig
beszállítja hiven, egy szálig a voksait… Az installácziómon ő mondta
a vidéki papság nevében a beszédet, olyan hazafiasat, hogy már szó
van arról, hogy kitüntetésre terjeszszék föl…
– Méltóságod… tehát… azt hiszi… nem… hajlandó…
Ugy hebegett, mint egy gutaütött.
– Örökké a református papokkal van bajom. Micsoda
nyughatatlan vérű, megférhetetlen emberek maguk. Több bajom van
magukkal, mint az oláhokkal… Egyéb se kéne még, mint hogy az én
megyémben konspirácziót fedezzünk föl. Azt ajánlom magának, hogy
menjen haza, és huzza meg magát. Az örökös politizálás öli meg
magukat. Na Kinder, was gibt’s denn?
Ez már a két fiunak szólt, a kik pokoli lármával berontottak, s
apjukra csimpaszkodtak.
Simándy pedig szó nélkül kitántorgott. Súlyos ütést kapott. Egy
világ omlott össze benne. Hite a hazában, hite az államban.
Odakint megállt, s bután rábámult a huszárra. Milyen fényes a
kardja, milyen czifra a ruhája! Milyen büszke legény! Büszke, mert
ostoba, mert nem tudja, hogy nincs mire büszkének lenni. Miért visel
ez a tökfilkó kardot? Mit őriz? Van itt mit őrizni? Kiveszett már innen
minden, a mire vigyázni érdemes volna.
Vagy talán az állam más, mint a haza? És ez a huszár az államot
képviseli? Az állam lehet czifra, büszke, a haza pedig rongyos, koldus
és megalázott? Kétféle fogalom ez?…
Ott állt hajadonfőtt és süvegét csavargatta a kezében. Azután
megindult, sokáig barangolt, de megfázott és melegre vágyott…
Bement egy kocsmába, evett, ivott, és a meleg kuczkóban jól érezte
magát. Tisztán állati érzései voltak, a nemesebb részek elzsibbadtak
benne, a lelke elkábult. Az étel egészen jól esett neki. Még
boszankodott azon, hogy a leves annyira sós és nevetett a
pinczérnek azon a bárgyú megjegyzésén, hogy a szakácsné
bizonyosan szerelmes. A bort is nagy gonddal és erős mennyiségben
szürcsölte. Még többet is szeretett volna inni, de hirtelen eszébe
jutott, hogy hátha nincs nála elég pénz. Milyen különös volna, ha
adósságba a kocsmáros ott fogná a téli kabátját. És itt eszébe jutott
az oláh metropolita. A négy lovával, a czifra huszárjával, a selyem
ruhájával, az arany keresztjével… Ez a kép vonult el előtte, miközben
a borjupörkölt zsiros levébe nagy kenyérdarabokat mártogatott.
Most a kocsmárosné jött be két kis fehérbe öltözött lányával.
Kezet csókoltak az apjuknak és távoztak.
– Hová mennek a kis lányai? – kérdé Simándy.
– A katolikus templomba. Föltámadásra.
Az igaz. Azért nem hallott hát tegnap egész nap és ma még
harangszót. Föltámadás. És holnap husvét… Erre is megivott egy
pohár bort… Nem támadt benne e szókra visszhang. A kocsmáros
kinyitotta az összes ablakokat…
És most egyszerre megkondultak a város összes harangjai,
hirdetvén a Krisztus föltámadását… A levegő tele lett ezzel a
zürzavaros és mégis oly harmónikus zenével, ott zúgott Simándy
fülében is és alvó lelkét fölébresztette. Kiesett kezéből villa, pohár,
kezei önkénytelenül összekulcsolódtak, s hallgatta a harangok hivó
szavát.
Igen, ha minden elpusztult is, – él az Isten.
Ha mindenben csalódott is, az Istenben nem csalódott. S
homályosan derengett benne, hogy van egy pontja a földnek, hol
neki kötelessége az Isten dicsőségét hirdetni. És érezte, hogy ő most
nincs ott, megszökött onnan, az ő harangjai némák, mozdulatlanok,
nem röpítik föl az égbe a hívők imádságát.
 Haza kell mennie.
Fölkelt, de lábai mintha vasból lettek volna. Fizetett s eltávozott.
Nem nézett se jobbra, se balra, nekivágott a mezőknek.
Mikor már a város, a harangzúgás messze mögötte volt, eszébe
jutott Papp Mózes. Mi dolga is van neki Papp Mózessel? Igen, a
kocsival várja. Majd hazajön.
Sebes léptekkel haladt a hegyek felé.
Elhagyott volt erdő és mező. Minden ember behuzódott a faluba,
városba ünnepelni. Odakint csak a pacsirta dicsérte az Istent, ég felé
szállván. A magányos vándor futott, pihenés nélkül futott, nem
nézve se jobbra, se balra. Szemét lesütötte, de nem látta a földet,
néha hátranézett, vagy lopva körül, s szivét összeszorította a nagy
magányosság, a néptelen síkság csöndje, mely fölött a tavasz
könnyű lehellete uszott.
Késő este volt, mikor megérkezett Garabóra. Ruháját
megtépdesték az erdei ágak; arczát is fölkarczolták a galyak. Ott állt
rongyosan, véresen, izzadságtól összecsapzott hajjal és testéhez
tapadó ruhával.
A konyhában Sári néni olvasott egy nagy öreg bibliából, s
keresztet vetett mágára, mikor a gazdáját meglátta. Simándy intett
neki, hogy hallgasson, maradjon csöndesen. Aztán eldobta a süvegét
és a tűz mellé ült. Az öreg asszony a helyén maradt. Nem mert
mozdulni s rémülettel nézett a papjára. Végre, mikor Simándy
szemei egy perczre lecsukódtak, halkan fölkelt, előkeresett egy fehér
kendőt, s szeliden letörölgette ura arczáról a vért és verejtéket.
Simándy melléből kínos sóhaj fakadt föl.
– Hagyjon, hagyjon! – szólt rekedten.
– Instálom, nem tetszik lefeküdni?
Simándy intett, hogy nem.
 – Tetszik tudni, mi történt?
Simándy nem felelt.
– Az oláh papné, a lánya, meg a két úr elutaztak. Bukarestbe
utaztak. Nem is jönnek többet vissza.
Az oláh papné lánya? Ki az? Simándy nem felelt. Az öreg asszony
elkotródott. Sokáig ült mozdulatlanul, aztán egyszerre fölugrott, s
lement a templomához. Ott végigfeküdt a régi, szétomlott kőfalra, a
repkény és fiatal bokrok közé, s lebámult a falura.
A hold magasan állt, minden ház ablaka világos volt. A hívek
bőjtölve virrasztottak és várták az éjféli föltámadást.
Éjfél felé a házakból megindultak az emberek az oláh templom
felé. Férfiak, asszonyok, tiszta fehérbe öltözködve. A lányok kezében
bokréta. Az oláh templom ablakai is fölragyogtak… Simándy látta, a
mint a kurátor egész háza népével az oláh templom felé vonul.
Azután látta Sára nénit, a mint a ház előtt félve körülnéz, s aztán
Gyorgyéval ő is az oláh templom felé elsompolyog.
Éjfélkor az oláh templomban erős, vontatott kardal zendült föl,
mely hirdette Krisztus föltámadását. Mozsarak kezdtek durrogni,
pisztolyok ropogni. A templomban levő nép énekéhez a templom
körül állók nyers, szaggatott, vontatott, durva éneke csatlakozott. A
hegyi lakók, a favágók, a pakulárok egészséges, erős tüdejéből vad
üvöltésként szakadtak föl az áhitat hangjai.
És akkor az aranyos ruháju pap levette az oltárról a gyertyát,
meggyujtotta vele a falu első gazdájának viaszgyertyáját és vontatott
hangon mondá:
– Christos a inviat! (Krisztus föltámadott.)
– Adeverat c’a inviat! (Valóban föltámadott.)
Ezt felelte vissza az első gazda, aztán meggyujtván a maga
lángjáról a szomszédja gyertyáját, adta tovább a szót.
 – Christos a inviat!
– Adeverat c’a inviat.
És így ment tovább a tűz és az ige, emberről emberre. A
legkoldusabb pakulár is ott szorongott a maga kis gyertyájával s
várta, hogy a láng ő hozzá is eljusson. Már a templomból kijutott a
templomudvarra, ment tovább szakadatlanul, fölhallatszott a Christos
a inviat. Végre az egész templom környéke ragyogó fényesség volt,
élesen látszott minden, a közeli házak, a fehérvirágos fák, a lányok,
a legények, az aggastyánok… odabent a barna fatemplomban pedig
megkezdődött a mise, az egész nép letérdelt, s vagy csöndes
mormogással imádkozott, vagy nyers, érdes hangon énekelt. Közben
zászlókkal, kettős keresztekkel, égő gyertyákkal megkerülték a
templomot, s a föltámadás ünnepi himnuszának hangjai betöltötték
a völgyet, s a komoran alátekintő bérczek tetejéig verődtek.
… S a másik pap ott feküdt fönn a sötét templom mellett, az
összedőlt romokon, s bámult alá a győzelmi ünnepre, a hold fehér, a
tűz vörös fényénél mozgó, fantasztikus csoportokra… megdermedve
bámult, majdnem a szivverése is elállt… És gondolata végigszállt
egész életén… messze országokban kalandozva, a mult ködéből
fölmerült néhány elmosódott arcz… azután visszaszállt ide, a
virágillattól terhes völgybe, hol oly jó volna boldogan élni… s hol oly
jó lesz meghalni.
A nép elcsöndesedett, a mise szertartásai folytak tovább. A
gyertyák elhamvadtak, a hold elvonult, egy pillanatra vak sötétség
borult a völgyre. A hegyek tetején az ég fehéredni kezdett.
Simándy ziháló mellel feküdt a falon. Egy az Isten, egy az Isten!
De ah, ember annyi van, s annyiféleképpen imádja az egy igaz
Istent. És tán annak a buta pakulárnak van igaza, a ki azzal imádja
az Istenét, hogy rozsdás pisztolyát a levegőbe süti.
Pirkadt. A völgy világosodott. Az ég rózsaszínű lett.
 A pap fényes, aranyos ruhájában kijött a templom elé, fölemelte
kelet felé két karját s belekiáltott a virradatba:
– Ex oriente lux! Keletről jön a világosság. Légy áldott, mi Urunk,
Istenünk, ki megteremtéd a napot, mely megmelegíti földünket.
– Légy áldott, légy áldott! – zúgott az egész nép, térdenállva.
– Légy áldott, mi Urunk, Istenünk, mert termékenynek teremtéd
a mi földünket, melynek szunnyadó erői a nap melegétől
megmozdulnak.
– Légy áldott, légy áldott!
S ekkor a hallgatag templom összedőlt kőkerítésén egy tépett
alak jelent meg. Kiterjesztette karjait és belekiáltott a hasadó
hajnalba:
– Légy áldott, hatalmas Isten, ki megteremtéd a világosságot! A
sötétség a tietek volt, hagyjátok nekem a világosságot! Jertek,
imádjuk az Urat!
Ezzel a torony alá rohant, s egyszerre megszólalt a Bod Péter
hatalmas szavú öreg harangja, s vele a kisebbik harang.
Végigkongott a völgyön, s hosszú, mély zengése mintha zokogás
volna… A pap húzta, szakadatlanul húzta… Homlokát elborította a
verejték… És nem jött senki. A magyarok ott térdeltek a fatemplom
körül és az oláh pap aranyos ruháját csókolgatták. Az öreg harang
zokogott, a kisebbik harang sikoltozott… És nem jött senki… A pap
erei kidagadtak, orrán megindult a vér, tenyerén a húst véresre
tépték a kötelek… És nem jött senki… És egyszerre egyet roppant
valami… a kötelek elszakadtak… a harangok ércznyelve egyet-kettőt
kondított még, egy darabig rezgett még a hang, aztán vége…
A harangok elnémultak. A pap ott állt egy darab rothadt, véres
kötéllel a kezében. Meghalt az Isten!
A pap egyet lépett, aztán elesett, összedőlt, leomlott, s hatalmas
koponyáját egy éles kőbe ütötte.
 Az oláhok mentek hazafelé, arra a magyar templom mellett.
Egyszerre csak néhányan megálltak.
– Te, Petru, nézd-e, a magyar pap ott fekszik a temploma előtt.
– Nagyon be talált pálinkázni a szent husvét tiszteletére.
Sára néni sietve tört át a tömegen s nehézkes koczogással ment
föl a templomajtóhoz. A parasztok látták, hogy ráborul a gazdája
testére és keservesen zokog.
– Te, Petru, ez alighanem meghalt.
Mind levették a süvegüket és bátortalanul közeledtek. De
egyszerre félresompolyogtak az utból. Úr jött gyors léptekkel: a vén
Zalathnay.
Látták, hogy letérdel a pap mellé, fölemeli a fejét és megnézi.
Aztán fehér kendővel letörli arczát, s homlokát megcsókolja. Aztán
leereszti lassan a földre és görnyedten utána hajol. Imádkozik. Vagy
tán sír… Aztán fölkel, körülnéz.
 A pap egyet lépett, aztán elesett…

– Oláhok, vigyétek a holttestet a házába.

És lehajtott fővel ment Bod Péter ősi templomának utolsó papja
után.
 Lábjegyzetek.
1) Ez a latin beszélgetés magyarúl így szól:
– Nem tudok németül.
– Hát latinul?
– Tudok.
– Hol lakol?
– Erdélyben.
– Mely föld légyen az? Talán egy magyar vármegye?
– Erdély Magyarországnak integrális része, mely több
vármegyéből áll.
– Tehát magyar vagy?
– Az. De a siculusok nemes törzséből való.
– Ha siculus vagy, akkor a te hazád Sziczilia.
– Isten ments!
2) Dicsőfi József: Templomi gondolatok.
 TARTALOM.

RÁKOSI VIKTOR. Irta Mikszáth Kálmán V

ELNÉMULT HARANGOK
Első rész. Az utrechti diákok 3
Második rész. A havasok közt 112
 KÉPJEGYZÉK.

1. Rákosi Viktor arczképe II

2. A fiúk az ablakhoz léptek 6
3. Bótai Barna 17
4. Estély Baljonéknál 50
5. Derry 80
6. Jön a bárka… 90
7. Simándy Pál 104
8. Florica otthon 175
9. A lovak lassan baktattak előre 185
10. Magyar-Garabó 226
11. Ott állott a téren… 249
12. Florica a román bálban 250
13. Simándy hazatért 258
14. Karjában tartotta a leányt… 286
15. A pap egyet lépett, aztán elesett… 299
 Javítások.
Az eredeti szöveg helyesírásán nem változtattunk.
A nyomdai hibákat javítottuk. Ezek listája:

9 azczán arczán
13 én jelöltetek én jelöltelek
22 Cak attól Csak attól
22 Ö róla Ő róla
36 magyarak fülébe magyarok fülébe
40 megtisztított a megtisztította a
51 Mert – Mert
74 mutatónjj mutatóujj
79 papapirszeletet papirszeletet
91 kiáltásásait kiáltásait
94 engen engem
94 fekele hajó fekete hajó
116 nekezebb nehezebb
119 papválaszlást papválasztást
124 híveinkct híveinket
130 benünket bennünket
139 vérszomjan vérszomjasan
143 megadhoz magadhoz
183 Össszetépik Összetépik
185 embert.« embert.»
191 tetől-talpig tetőtől-talpig
208 zt az azt az
224 egészégemre egészségemre
226 azt megteszi azt megeszi
227 Uljön le Üljön le
234 aczczal arczczal
241 elhatározt elhatározta
246 paramorgót papramorgót
281 lobogásánal lobogásánál
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ELNÉMULT
HARANGOK: REGÉNY ***

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