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Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India

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Defending God in
Sixteenth-Century India
The Śaiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dīks: ita
JONATHAN DUQUETTE
1
3
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Acknowledgements
This book is the outcome of seven years of postdoctoral research at the various
academic institutions in Europe and Asia where I had the chance to pursue
exciting research alongside scholars generous with their time and expertise. The
idea of working on Appaya Dīks: ita’s Śaiva oeuvre developed while I was a SSHRC
(Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council) Postdoctoral Fellow at the
University of Concordia in Montreal in 2011. Back in 2009, I had co-authored,
together with my then teacher Krishnamurti Ramasubramanian (IIT Bombay), an
article on Appaya Dīks: ita’s critique of the Nyāya doctrine of anyathākhyāti.
I was then only (barely) acquainted with Appaya’s Parimala, his sub-commentary
in the Bhāmatī school of Advaita Vedānta. Later on, I heard about the
Śivārkamanidīpikā,
: his magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta, and acquired a
copy of a printed edition during my stay in Delhi in 2012. I still remember
bringing this copy with me to a reading with Harunaga Isaacson in Hamburg a
month later, as I was just starting a postdoc on a project of a very different nature.
Harunaga noticed it and gladly encouraged me to start reading it. This is how this
project began. The text turned out to be pretty difficult for me in the early stages,
and without the patience and careful guidance of Harunaga I may not have
persisted in my study of Appaya’s work. For this, I am truly grateful to him.
In the years that followed, the aforesaid copy travelled with me to Leiden
University (Gonda Fellowship, 2013–14) where I had the chance to read
passages from the Śivārkamanidīpikā : with Peter Bisschop and Gonda
fellows like myself nearly every week; then to Kyoto University (JSPS Postdoctoral
Fellowship, 2014–15), where I focused on Appaya’s engagement with Vyāsatīrtha’s
Tarkatān: dava
: in readings with Diwakar Acharya, Somdev Vasudeva, and Yuko
Yukochi; and finally to the University of Oxford, where I spent four productive years
expanding my study of the Śivārkamanidīpikā
: to the rest of Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre.
In Oxford, I benefitted from everything a scholar could dream of: a calm office in a
dynamic research centre (the Oriental Institute), a tremendous library, a collegial
atmosphere and a supportive network of scholars and friends. My stay in Oxford was
made possible by two postdoctoral fellowships: the Newton International Fellowship
(2015–17) and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship (2017–19). I wish to express
my sincere gratitude to Christopher Minkowski, my supervisor and guide in Oxford.
Aside from providing me with constant support and advice during those years, he
encouraged me to submit my book proposal to the Oxford Oriental Monographs
series. I also wish to extend my heartful thanks to Alexis Sanderson. His scholarly
work on Śaivism was an unerring guide in this project. I also had the chance to read
vi 
the beginning of Appaya’s little-known Ratnatrayaparīks: ā with him just before his
retirement.
I wish to thank all the institutions and funding bodies that have made this book
project possible: the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, which
granted me the two-year postdoctoral grant that eventually brought me to
Hamburg, a haven for Sanskritists around the world; the J. Gonda Fund
Foundation; the Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science; the British
Academy and the Royal Society, which granted me a Newton International
Fellowship to pursue my study of Appaya’s Śivādvaita corpus at the University
of Oxford; and the European Commission, for awarding me a prestigious Marie
Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank the
Austrian Academy of Sciences for twice offering me a Visiting Fellowship (2016
and 2017), as well as the École Française d’Extrême-Orient for providing me
accommodation and other resources during my fieldwork in South India. Special
thanks go to Dominic Goodall who helped me in various ways during my stays in
Pondichery and always made himself available for thoughtful discussions on various
aspects of my research. I must also thank libraries that granted me access to their
collections, especially the Adyar Library and Research Centre, the Oriental Research
Institute in Mysore, the Saraswati Bhavan Library in Varanasi, the Government
Oriental Manuscripts Library in Chennai, and the British Library in London.
Aside from the several gifted scholars I met on the way and with whom I had
the pleasure to discuss Appaya’s work, many friends and colleagues have contrib-
uted to this volume through sharing material, ideas, and critical comments (in
alphabetical order): Whitney Cox, Hugo David, Florinda De Simini, Pierre-
Sylvain Filliozat and Vasundhara Filliozat, Elisa Freschi, Elisa Ganser, Kengo
:
Harimoto (with whom I first read the mangalaślokas of the
Śivārkamanidīpikā!),
: Andrey Klebanov, Nina Mirnig, Marion Rastelli, Marcus
Schmücker, Vishal Sharma, and Anand Venkatkrishnan. Special thanks go to
Sharathchandra Swami for the enjoyable time spent discussing matters pertaining
to Vīraśaiva religion and philosophy, as well as for facilitating my fieldwork in
Karnataka in so many ways; to his late guru, Immadi : Śivabasava Swamy, for
bringing to my attention the Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana; and to Jayatīrthācārya
:
Purānika (while revising this book, I learnt that Jayatīrthācārya unfortunately
passed away), who generously offered me copies of several works by Vijayīndra,
one of Appaya’s fiercest opponents. I also wish to take this opportunity to thank
Kristen de Joseph and Martin Noble, who helped with the editing of the book.
Above all else, it is my wife, Aslıhan Bökö, and our son, Emil-Jivan Duquette, to
whom I wish to express my deepest love and gratitude. Loyal companions on this
long journey, they offered me all the support that I truly needed to bring this book
to completion.
Cambridge
30 March 2020
Contents
List of Abbreviations ix
Introduction: The Rise of Śivādvaita Vedānta 1

1. Śrīkan: t:ha and the Brahmamīmāmsābhā: s: ya 10
1.1 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Date, Lineage, and Influences 10
1.2 References to Śrīkan: t:ha in Sanskrit Sources Prior to Appaya 16
1.3 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Theology and the Vīraśaiva Tradition 21
1.3.1 Śrīkan: t:ha and Nīlakan: t:ha 28
2. Early Śaiva Works 31

2.1 Śivatattvaviveka 33
2.2 Śivakarnām: r: ta 43
2.3 Brahmatarkastava 51
:
2.4 Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra 59
2.5 Śrīkan: t:ha in Appaya’s Early Śaiva Works 65
3. Reading Śrīkan: t:ha’s Commentary 70
3.1 Introducing Śrīkan: t:ha’s Vedānta 72
3.2 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Teachings and Pure Non-dualism 75
3.2.1 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Theory of Transformation 77
3.2.2 An Argument in the Śivādvaitanirnaya: 84
3.2.3 Coordination and Coherence: Daharavidyā in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
Commentary 89
3.2.4 The Argument Continued: Appaya on BS 1.3.16 in the
Śivārkamanidīpikā
: 92
3.2.5 Inclusivism and Hermeneutics: Advaita in Śivādvaita 95
3.2.6 Non-duality and Śiva’s Grace 100
3.3 Appaya on Śaiva Scriptures 106
4. Engaging with Śrīvais: navas
: 117
4.1 On Rāmānuja’s Reading of the Brahmasūtras 119
4.2 Subordination, Tolerance, and Orthodoxy 130
4.2.1 Ratnatrayaparīks: ā: Appaya’s Triadic Theology 130
4.2.2 Ānandalaharī: A Treatise on Cicchakti 139
4.3 Appaya on Sudarśanasūri’s Defence of Aikaśāstrya 152
4.4 Refutation of Pāñcarātra 160
4.5 Sudarśanasūri: Appaya’s Nemesis? 171
viii 
5. Reception of Appaya’s Śaiva Works 174

:
5.1 The Vais: nava Response 175
5.1.1 Dvaita Vedānta: Vijayīndra (c.1514–1595) 175
5.1.2 Śuddhādvaita Vedānta: Purus: ottama (c.1657/1668–1725) 184
5.1.3 The Śrīvais: nava
: Response 189
5.2 Two Advaitins in Banaras 198
5.3 The Śaiva Response 202
5.3.1 The Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta of Vīraśaivas 204
Conclusion: In Defence of Śiva 218
Appendix 1: List of Śaiva Works by Appaya Dīks: ita 227

Appendix 2: Opening Verses from the Brahmamīmāmsābhā: s: ya
and the Śivārkamanidīpikā
: 229
Appendix 3: Verses from the Ratnatrayaparīks:ā 234
Appendix 4: Śrīkan: tha
: and Nīlakan: tha:
: Further Details 237
Bibliography 247
Index Locorum 259
Index of Sanskrit Works 262
General Index 265
List of Abbreviations
BMB :
Brahmamīmāmsābhā :
sya
BS Brahmasūtras
ChU Chāndogya Upanis: ad
MBh Mahābhārata
MS :
Mīmāmsāsūtras
MU Mun: daka
: Upanis: ad
NCC New Catalogus Catalogorum
PāS :
Pāninisūtras
RTP :
Ratnatrayaparīksā
ŚAMD1, ŚAMD2 Śivārkamanidīpikā
: volume 1, volume 2
ŚU Śvetāśvatara Upanis: ad
Introduction
The Rise of Śivādvaita Vedānta
Once upon a time . . .
:
The illustrious Rangarājamakhin had a famous son, Appaya Dīks ita,
devoted to the moon-crested [Śiva].
Thanks to him, the fame of the illustrious king Cinnabomma,
breaker of armies, was unobstructed.
He raised up the commentary of Śrīkan: t:ha to support
the doctrine of the supreme Śiva.
These words¹ were inscribed in 1582 on the Kālakan: t:heśvara temple situated in
:
Adaiyapālam, a small village in the Tamil region and the birthplace of the
celebrated scholar at the centre of this book—Appaya Dīks ita (c.1520–1593).
Appaya was undoubtedly one of India’s most influential Sanskrit intellectuals in
the sixteenth century. A scholar of polymathic erudition, he wrote profusely in a
range of Sanskrit disciplines prominent in his day—especially poetic theory
:
(alamkāraśāstra), :
scriptural hermeneutics (mīmāmsā), and theology (vedānta)²—
and with an idiosyncratic boldness that generated both praise and blame in the
centuries to follow. While he is mostly remembered in India today for his writings
on the non-dualist school of Advaita Vedānta—most notably for his sub-
commentary on Śan kara’s famous Brahmasūtrabhās ya, the Parimala, which
continues to be part of the curriculum in some institutions of learning in
¹ The Kālakan: t:heśvara inscription includes a versified portion in grantha script and a prose
portion in both grantha script and Tamil. The passage translated here is extracted from the versified
portion, which reads: vidvadguror vihitaviśvajidadhvarasya śrīsarvatomukhamahāvratayājisūnoh: |
:
śrīrangarājamakhinah: śritacandramaulir asty appaidīks ita iti prathitas tanūjah: || yena śrīcinna
bommaks itipabalabhidah: kīrtir avyāhatāsīt yena śrīkan: t:habhās yam : paramaśivamatasthāpa
:
nāyoddadhāra | tena śrīrangarājādhvarivaratanayenāppayajvādhipenākāri praudhonnatāgra : m:
rajatagirinibham : kālakan: t:heśadhāma ||. The inscription, presumably composed by Appaya himself,
is reported in the Report on South Indian Epigraphy (no. 395). I follow here the transliteration in
Mahalinga Sastri 1929: 148. Sastri rightly suggests reading yaś ca śrīkan: t:habhās yam instead of yena
śrīkan: t:habhās yam to make sense of the active perfect uddadhāra (from ud + √dhr: ).
² Appaya, notably, did not write works on Nyāya, a discipline of epistemology and metaphysics most
prominent in his day. However, he was familiar with the technical language of Navya-Nyāya and did
engage in some of its key debates; see Duquette 2020b.
́
Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India: The Saiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dı k̄ s: ita. Jonathan Duquette,
Oxford University Press (2021). © Jonathan Duquette. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198870616.003.0001
2    - 
India—Appaya also devoted a large share of his long and prolific³ career to writing
about Śaivism, a major religious tradition centred on the god Śiva and to which
Appaya belonged by birth and remained devoted throughout his entire life. It is
this key dimension of Appaya’s career and scholarly persona, highlighted in the
Kālakan: t:heśvara inscription, that forms the central scope of this book.
Appaya wrote all his Śaiva works over the course of three decades (1549–1578),
while serving at the court of Cinnabomma—the ‘breaker of armies’ hailed in the
inscription and whose fame Appaya contributed to spreading. Cinnabomma was
an independent Śaiva ruler based in Vellore, a town in the Tamil country, located
a few hundred kilometres from Vijayanagara, the capital of the empire of the same
name. Vijayanagara was a powerful polity in South India founded in the four-
teenth century and arguably one of the greatest empires in the history of South
Asia.⁴ Appaya’s Śaiva works include a number of hymns in praise of Śiva
(often with a self-authored commentary), a ritual manual on the daily worship
of Śiva and a series of polemical treatises and works of Śaiva Vedānta theology
which, as this book will show, impacted on the intellectual and religious
landscape of early modern India in significant ways. Aside from highlighting
Appaya’s association with Cinnabomma and his construction of the temple
:
in Adaiyapālam, the Kālakan: t:heśvara inscription also hails Appaya as the
author of the Śivārkamanidīpikā,
: a monumental sub-commentary on the
:
Brahmamīmāmsābhās ya, a Śaiva commentary on the Brahmasūtras (a founda-
tional text of the Vedānta tradition) composed by Śrīkan: t:ha Śivācārya around the
fourteenth to fifteenth centuries.⁵ We are told that Appaya wrote this work thanks
to the generous support of his Śaiva patron. He himself says at the beginning of the
: that he was commanded to write this work twice: in a dream
by Śiva in His androgynous form as Ardhanārīśvara and, in waking life, in the
form of Cinnabomma, whom Appaya here implicitly identifies with Śiva.⁶ Upon
completion of the Śivārkamanidīpikā,
: continues the inscription, Appaya was
³ The same Kālakan: t:heśvara inscription mentions him as the author of no less than one hundred
works, an attribution that should probably not be taken too literally. See Bronner 2007: 1, fn. 2, on this
point.
⁴ Appaya had three patrons, the first (Cinnatimma of Trichy) and the third (Ven kat:a II) having
:
blood ties to the Aravīdus, :
the last dynasty to rule the Vijayanagara empire, known for its Vais nava
proselytism (Rao 2016); his second patron, Cinnabomma of Vellore, was Śaiva. We know from
colophons that he composed the Śivārkamanidīpikā, : his magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta, and
his Śaiva ritual manual, the Śivārcanacandrikā, under the latter’s patronage; it is most likely that he also
composed all his other Śaiva works under Cinnabomma’s patronage. This is supported by the fact that
he composed works with a Vais nava : leaning under his two other patrons, notably a commentary on
Ven kat:anātha’s Yādavābhyudaya (under Cinnatimma of Trichy) and the Varadarājastava, a hymn of

praise to Vis nu: (under Venkat:a II). I agree with Rao that ‘it is likely that this connection between
patronage and scholarly activity was not incidental’ (Rao 2016: 62).
⁵ Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary was translated into English and studied by Roma Chaudhuri (1959,
1962). On Śrīkan: t:ha’s date, see Chintamani 1927 and Chapter 1, Section 1.1 in this book. Accounts
of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology are found in Dasgupta 1991[1922]: 65–95, Sastri 1930 and Sivaraman 1989.
⁶ See v. 12 of the ŚAMD in Appendix 2; see also v. 14.
     3
literally covered with gold by his patron and an endowment was established for
500 scholars to study Appaya’s magnum opus both in Adaiyapālam : and Vellore.
The composition of the Śivārkamanidīpikā : marked a new beginning in
Appaya’s Śaiva career. Prior to this work, Appaya had only written polemical
works claiming Śiva’s supremacy over Vis nu-Nārāya
: : based on a creative exe-
na
gesis of passages taken from smr: ti literature and Upanis ads. With the
: Appaya begins a new, more extensive exegetical project in
which he articulates the view that the canonical Brahmasūtras centre on Śiva as
the conceptual and semantic equivalent of Brahman, the absolute reality eulogized
in the Upanis ads. From here on, Appaya shifts his focus from plain polemics to
establishing a new theological position (siddhānta) combining Śaiva doctrine with
the orthodox theology of non-dual Vedānta—a position he refers to as Śivādvaita
Vedānta.⁷ Although he relies on Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary as his main textual
source in this endeavour, Appaya approaches the latter with an unusual degree
of freedom, substantially reinterpreting its core teachings along the lines of
Advaita Vedānta, the school of Vedānta he cherishes the most. In this sense,
Appaya truly positions himself as the founder of a new school. Before him,
virtually no scholar had paid attention to Śrīkan: t:ha and his Śaiva commentary;
with Appaya’s commentarial work, the figure of Śrīkan: t:ha achieved wider recog-
nition among early modern scholars of Vedānta. Appaya was not only the first
scholar to present Śrīkan: t:ha’s Vedānta as a legitimate participant in intra-Vedānta
debates of his time, but also the first to actively promote and defend the positions
of Śrīkan: t:ha vis-à-vis other Vedānta schools, notably Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta, as
I shall demonstrate in this book.
His work on Śivādvaita Vedānta not only earned Appaya a formidable reputa-
tion as a scholar, but also established him as a legendary advocate of Śaiva religion
in South India. Already during his lifetime, he was held as the representative of
this school par excellence: a Sanskrit copper-plate inscription, dated to 1580 and
ascribed to Sevappa Nāyaka of Tañjāvūr, praises him as the ‘sole emperor of Śaiva
Advaita’ (śaivādvaitaikasāmrājya).⁸ For his pioneering work on Śrīkan: t:ha’s com-
mentary, Appaya continued to be praised as an emblematic figure of Śaiva religion
in later hagiographies, and even as Śiva incarnate: his grand-nephew Nīlakan: t:ha
Dīks ita (seventeenth century), a great scholar in his own right, says in the opening
of his Nīlakan: t:havijayacampū that Śiva (śrīkan: t:ha) took on the body of Appaya,
the teacher of Śrīkan: t:ha’s doctrine (śrīkan: t:havidyāguru), in this Dark Age, just as
⁷ Appaya uses the term śivādvaita to label Śrīkan: t:ha’s position (siddhānta) at the beginning of his
Śivādvaitanirnaya,
: presumably following Śrīkan: t:ha’s own usage of this term in the
Brahmamīmāmsābhās : ya. See Chapter 3, fn. 1, for my usage of this term in contradistinction to the
more general term ‘Śaiva Vedānta’.
⁸ This inscription can be found in the Annual Report of the Mysore Archaeological Department of
1917 (1917, pp. 15–17, 55–6) and reads: tretāgnaya iva spas t:am : vijayīndrayatīśvarah: | tātācāryo
:
vais navāgrya h: sarvaśāstraviśāradah: || śaivādvaitaikasāmrājyah: śrīmān appayyadīks itah: | yatsabhāyām :
matam : svam
: svam : sthāpayantah: sthitās trayah: ||. For more details on this inscription, see Rao 2016: 49.
4    - 
: will one day appear as Kalkin, His last incarnation (avatāra).⁹ But Appaya’s
Vis nu
Śivādvaita work did not attract only praise. Right from its inception, it was met
with fierce criticism from several quarters, including from Śaiva scholars who did
not agree with the non-realist implications of this new form of Śaiva non-dualism.
This criticism continued throughout the early modern period and to some extent
into the modern period.
Appaya was not the first Śaiva scholar to undertake a major exegetical project
backed by a Śaiva ruler. Two centuries earlier and in the same imperial setting—
the Vijayanagara empire—Sāyana : had authored no fewer than eighteen commen-
taries on different Vedic texts under the patronage of the early Vijayanagara
ruler Bukka I (1356–1377) and his successor Harihara II (Galewicz 2009: 34),
both from the San gama dynasty. It has been shown that Sāyana’s : commentarial
work was unprecedented in scope and that the ‘image of grandeur’ attached to his
exegetical project was closely tied to the dynastical ambitions of the first
Vijayanagara rulers (ibid.: 22). There are significant parallels between Appaya’s
:
and Sāyana’s grand projects. Aside from the fact that they both authored
multiple works that were commissioned, and possibly encouraged, by a Śaiva
ruler, both wrote commentaries that could be characterized as both canonical and
scholarly. As Galewicz explains, Sāyana : wrote commentaries on canonical Vedic
texts with the clear intention that his own commentaries themselves be considered
‘canonical’ or authoritative. Furthermore, Sāyana : did so in ways that reached
beyond the ‘traditional idea of exegesis’, making skilful use of poetic literary
devices and manipulating the discourse of philosophical polemics with an imagined
opponent to convey his own personal views (ibid.: 20–1). Likewise, Appaya’s
: styles itself the first sub-commentary written from a Śaiva
perspective on a canonical text of the Vedānta tradition, the Brahmasūtras. As we
shall see, Appaya too made use of various literary devices and textual strategies to
reinterpret Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in a way to convey his own idiosyncratic views
on hermeneutics, grammar, and theology, and make his own sub-commentary—
and, by extension, the school he sought to firmly establish—authoritative.
Like Sāyana,: Appaya also sought to make an impact on his immediate social
milieu with his commentarial project. The last decades of the Vijayanagara empire
witnessed dramatic changes in its social, political, and religious life. In the second
half of the sixteenth century, the Aravīdus,: the last dynasty of the empire (which
came to an end in 1565), abandoned the diverse patronage of Śaiva, Vais nava, :
⁹ līdhālī
: :
dhapurā : t:ambhasambhāvanāparyastaśrutisetubhi
nasūktiśakalāvas : h: katipayair nīte kalau
sāndratām | śrīkan: t:ho ’vatatāra yasya vapus ā kalkyātmanevācyutah: śrīmān appayadīks itah: sa jayati
śrīkan: t:havidyāguruh: ||—‘Victorious is the illustrious Appaya Dīks ita, the teacher of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
doctrine, in whose body Śrīkan: t:ha [i.e., Śiva] descended—just as Vis nu
: [will one day] descend in the
form of Kalkin—[at the time when this] Dark Age is made thicker by people who breached the dams of
scriptures out of their esteem for some little bits of Purānic : sayings licked and licked again’
(Nīlakan: t:havijayacampū 1.3). See Bronner 2016: 19 for more details on Nīlakan: t:ha’s praise of his
grand-uncle.
     5
Jaina, and Muslim institutions that had been practised earlier, and started to
aggressively commission Vais nava : scholars and institutions. By the time of
Cinnabomma’s death in 1578, the Aravīdu : rulers had effectively taken control
of the capital, and replaced Virūpāks a (a local form of Śiva that had been the
ensign of the first Vijayanagara rulers) with Vit:t:hala (a form of Vis nu) : as the
empire’s tutelary deity (Rao 2016: 45). This shift in state policy in an empire that
used to be predominantly Śaiva arguably changed how Śaiva and Vais nava :
scholars interacted with one another. Not only did it dramatically enhance
competition for royal patronage, influence, and prestige, but it also led to increas-
ing polemicism and intellectual rivalry, particularly among theologians espousing
different interpretations of Vedānta.¹⁰ At the time when Appaya started his career
under Cinnabomma, theologians of Vedānta included primarily: smārta brah-
mins, typically adherents of pure non-dualism (Advaita Vedānta) who had man-
aged the court temple of Virūpāks a since the empire’s founding in the fourteenth
century; Śrīvais nava
: theologians, who advocated a non-dualism of the qualified
(Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta) and whose influence on Vijayanagara royal agents had
been on the rise since the end of the San gama dynasty in the late fifteenth century
(Rao 2011: 30); and Mādhva theologians, also of Vais nava : affiliation, who
defended a realist and dualist view of reality (Dvaita Vedānta), and who achieved
wider prominence at the beginning of the sixteenth century under the leadership
of the scholar and religious leader Vyāsatīrtha. It is in this context of increasing
sectarian tensions between Śaivas and Vais navas : and of polemical debates
between Vedānta theologians that Appaya composed his Śaiva oeuvre. One key
difference between Appaya and Sāyana, : however, is that the former’s intellectual
production was not so much a ‘project of empire’ as a project on the verge of it.
Patronized by a self-declared Śaiva ruler rather than by a patron of imperial
calibre, Appaya did not get involved with the Vijayanagara court. Nonetheless,
it is likely that his militant defence of Śaiva religion was tied to the rise of Vais nava
:
religion in the imperial capital.¹¹
¹⁰ In her monograph focused on the figure of the Mādhva theologian and religious leader
Vyāsatīrtha (1460–1539), Stoker highlights important linkages between patronage practices in
Vijayanagara, religious institutions and intra-sectarian scholarly debates on Vedānta. She argues that
the ‘Vijayanagara court was selective in its patronage of primarily Hindu religious institutions’ and that
the ‘opportunistic flexibility of Vijayanagara patronage, coupled with generosity, galvanized Hindu
sectarian leaders to pursue certain kinds of intellectual projects as well as to form different intersectar-
ian alliances and rivalries’ (Stoker 2016: 2). Unlike Vyāsatīrtha, however, Appaya was not patronized by
the main rulers in place. The life and intellectual production of Vyāsatīrtha have attracted recent
scholarly attention; see Williams 2014 and McCrea 2015b. Appaya knew Vyāsatīrtha’s work and
engaged with it; on this point, see Duquette 2016b.
¹¹ The relation between Vijayanagara governance and religion is still a matter of debate. As rightly
noted by Stoker, although there was no state religion under Vijayanagara rule (that is, no religion was
imposed on its citizens), the ‘pageantry of the Vijayanagara state—displays of its power in the
abstract—depended upon religious symbols to a significant extent’ (Stoker 2016: 136). The replacement
of Virūpāks a with Vit:t:hala as the empire’s tutelary deity constitutes an example of how Vais nava :
religious iconography was used by rulers to promote the state’s authority during the last decades of the
6    - 
Likewise, Appaya was not the first Śaiva scholar to try and reconcile Śaiva
doctrine with Vedāntic ideas. Before Śrīkan: t:ha, both Bhat:t:a Bhāskarācārya (sec-
ond half of the tenth century?) and Haradatta Śivācārya (twelfth to thirteenth
centuries) had argued for the identity between Śiva and Brahman. These two Śaiva
scholars most probably inspired Śrīkan: t:ha’s own views. Appaya himself draws
attention to affinities between Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Bhat:t:a’s Śaiva theologies in the
: and several textual and conceptual parallels have been noted
between Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology and Haradatta’s understanding of the relation
between Śiva/Brahman and the world (Sastri 1930). A number of pre-modern
Vīraśaiva works written in Sanskrit also show a clear imprint of Vedānta termi-
nology and ideas, and share the same intention of establishing Śiva as the non-
dual Brahman of the Vedāntic tradition. What sets Appaya apart from these
scholars, however, is that he is the first Śaiva scholar to develop a fully fledged
Śaiva Vedānta position (siddhānta) and elevate it to the status of a school (mata)
on a firm footing with the other prominent Vedānta schools of his time. The
boldness and ingenuity with which he accomplished this scholarly feat as well as
the scope of his commentarial project are unprecedented in the history of Śaivism
in South India, and therefore fully deserve our attention. What drove the talented
Appaya to ‘support the doctrine of the supreme Śiva’? What were his message and
rationale? How was his Śivādvaita work received among Sanskrit intellectuals in
early modern India? What does this tell us about Appaya as a scholar and social
agent, and the complex world in which he lived and wrote?
This study puts the Śaiva oeuvre of Appaya and its reception in early modern
India into context for the first time.¹² In Chapter 1, I offer new insights on
empire. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that Vijayanagara rulers commissioned the construction of
:
Vais nava temples that did not include subsidiary Śaiva elements (Verghese 1995: 137). Rao has argued
that the desecration of temples during the battle of Tālikot:a in 1565, which marked the end of the
:
empire, was selective as mostly Vais nava temples were affected. The fact that Śaiva temples remained
for the most part undamaged suggests that Śaivas in Vijayanagara ‘were responsible for the desecration
:
of Vais nava temples, perhaps as a reaction to the dramatic loss of patronage under Sadāśivarāya and
Rāmarāya’ (Rao 2016: 45). In light of this evidence, it is reasonable to assume that Śaivas would have
been active ‘defending’ their religion in response to the significant religion-based changes in state policy
that were taking place in the imperial capital. While we have no direct evidence to this effect, it is
possible that religious tensions in the capital, though miles away from Appaya’s centre of activity, may
have impacted on his decision to ‘defend’ Śaiva religion contra Vais nava
: theologians of Vedānta.
¹² A few studies were published on Appaya’s scholarly work and persona at the beginning of the
twentieth century, notably by the Indian scholar S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri. The last decade has
witnessed a renewal of interest in Appaya’s thought. Worth noting is a special issue on Appaya
published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy in 2016, with contributions by Christopher Minkowski
(editor), Lawrence McCrea, Ajay Rao, Yigal Bronner, Madhav Deshpande, and myself. Further
publications have followed since then. On Appaya’s life and intellectual biography, see Mahalinga
Sastri 1929, Joshi 1966, Ramesan 1972, and more recently Bronner 2015b, 2016 and Minkowski 2016;
on his devotional hymns, see Bronner 2007 and Rao 2016, and Bronner & Shulman 2009 for a
translation of Appaya’s Ātmārpanastuti;
: on his work on poetics, see Edwin Gerow’s edition and
translation of the Vr: ttivārttika (Gerow 2001) as well as Bronner 2002 and 2004; on his work on
:
Mīmāmsā, see Pollock 2004, McCrea 2008, Bronner 2015a, and Duquette 2016b; on his work on
     7
Appaya’s main source of exegesis, Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhās : ya, and

reassess the current evidence about Śrīkan: t:ha’s lineage, influences, and date of
activity. Attention has recently been paid to the relationship between his Śaiva
Vedānta theology and the theology deployed in the work of Vīraśaiva scholars
writing in Sanskrit. Although there are significant linkages between these Śaiva
scholars, the extent to which they influenced each other’s theologies is not yet fully
understood. Among other things, my analysis will complicate the relationship
between Śrīkan: t:ha and Nīlakan: t:ha, a figure central to the Vīraśaiva Vedānta
tradition. In Chapter 2, I focus on Appaya’s ‘early’ Śaiva works. In these polemical
works, which I surmise to have been composed before the Śivārkamanidīpikā, :
Appaya emphasizes the greatness of Śiva and His superiority over Vis nu- :
Nārāyana,: based principally on the exegesis of passages taken from the Purānas, :
Upanis ads and epics. An overall understanding of Appaya’s early Śaiva works is
key to understanding his Śivādvaita Vedānta oeuvre. Aside from the fact that they
feature core theological concepts that prefigure the fully fledged theology of
Śivādvaita Vedānta, they also reveal that Appaya was engaged with Vais nava :
opponents early on. In these works, we begin to see Appaya’s aversion for those
‘heretics’ and ‘evil-minded’ scholars who denigrate Śiva’s worship. I will argue that
these scholars were principally Śrīvais nava
: adherents of Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta, the
:
dominant Vais nava school of Vedānta theology in Appaya’s time and place.
One of the core arguments developed in this book is that Appaya’s Śivādvaita
project pursued the same ambition of defending Śaivism as in the early polemical
works, yet in a more systematic manner, that is, by shifting the debate to the
interpretation of the canonical Brahmasūtras. Prior to the sixteenth century,
Vedānta theology had essentially been the bastion of Vais nava : scholars. In the
aftermath of Śan kara’s Brahmasūtrabhās ya, four major Vais nava-leaning
: com-
mentaries on the Brahmasūtras were written, namely by Rāmānuja, Madhva,
Nimbarka, and Vallabhācārya, the first two of which led to the formation of
long-standing and systematic schools of thought—namely Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta
and Dvaita Vedānta—and generated an important amount of commentarial
literature. In comparison, the production of Vedānta material by the other
prominent religious group in medieval India, the Śaivas, had been rather limited.
In Appaya’s time, the Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta school dominated the theological
landscape in South India. Scholars still read and commented on the works of
Rāmānuja, Sudarśanasūri, and Ven kat:anātha while continuing to actively write
Advaita Vedānta, see Sastri 1935/1937, Joshi 1966, Gotszorg 1993, and Duquette 2009; on his work
critically engaging Dvaita Vedānta, see Deshpande 2016, Okita 2016, and Duquette 2016b; on his work
on epics, see Bronner 2011 and Minkowski 2017; on his engagement with the Navya-Nyāya tradition,
see Duquette 2020b. Much less work has been done on Appaya’s Śaiva work. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri
pioneered research on this subject in the 1930s with a translation of the Śivādvaitanirnaya
: (Sastri 1929)
and a comprehensive study of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology (Sastri 1930). Recent studies in this area include
Duquette 2015a, Duquette 2016a, McCrea 2016, Fisher 2017a, and Duquette 2020a, 2020c. To this date,
no comprehensive study of Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre has ever been written.
8    - 
new independent works in this tradition. The flowering of Śrīvais nava: scholarship
on Vedānta in this period was increasingly stimulated as Śrīvais nava
: scholars were
gaining the support of Vijayanagara rulers. During the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, several preceptors and advisors to the king belonged to the prestigious
Śrīvais nava
: Tātācārya family. In Appaya’s time, both Kr: s nadevarāya
: (ruled
c.1509–30) and Rāmarāya (c.1542–1565) were advised by Tātācārya preceptors
(rājaguru): the first by Ven kat:a Tātācārya, and the second by Pañcamatabhañjana
Tātācārya, a scholar whom later hagiographical sources describe as an important
rival of Appaya. It is my view that Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta had gained enough
significance by Appaya’s time to inspire, for the first time, a parallel Śaiva
attempt—Śivādvaita Vedānta.
In Chapter 3, I turn to Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta works per se. While these
works, composed later in Appaya’s Śaiva career, are also polemical to some degree,
they differ from the earlier Śaiva works in that their central concern is now the
correct interpretation of the Brahmasūtras in light of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. It
is in these works that Appaya develops and promotes a fully consistent Śaiva
Vedānta position (siddhānta) in opposition to Viśis t:ādvaita Vedānta. For this
purpose, he relies on various textual and hermeneutical strategies, ranging from
including Śrīkan: t:ha’s position alongside other schools of Vedānta in an unprece-
dented doxography of Vedānta schools, to reinterpreting some of Śrīkan: t:ha’s key
doctrines in line with the doctrine of pure non-dualism advocated in the Advaita
Vedānta tradition, a position that Śrīkan: t:ha did not himself fully acknowledge.
Appaya’s lifelong endorsement of Advaita Vedānta is well known. Not only
did he write substantial works in this tradition, but he also remained a great
admirer of Śan kara (the bhagavatpāda, as he often refers to him) and of his
Brahmasūtrabhās ya throughout his entire career. We shall see that this commit-
ment not only influenced his reading of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, but also—in
stark contrast with his Śaiva co-religionists in South India—how he interpreted
Śaiva scriptures and their validity vis-à-vis the Vedas.
In Chapter 4, I pursue my analysis of Appaya’s Śivādvaita works with a special
focus on the modalities of his engagement with the Śrīvais nava : tradition of
Vedānta. I examine a number of arguments Appaya employs to criticize
Rāmānuja’s theology and his reading of the Brahmasūtras, and thereby establish
Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology as the superior system. One of the core doctrines against
which Appaya argues—developed to a large extent by Sudarśanasūri, a late-
thirteenth-century scholar who may well have been Appaya’s nemesis—is that
the two Mīmāmsās, : namely Pūrvamīmāmsā : and Vedānta, form a single unified
corpus. I also pay attention in this chapter to a little-studied work of Śivādvaita
Vedānta, the Ratnatrayaparīks ā, a short devotional hymn with self-authored
commentary in which Appaya encapsulates his original vision of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
‘esoteric’ theology. I conclude this chapter with an examination of Appaya’s
critical take on Pāñcarātra, a key source of Śrīvais nava
: theology.
     9
The book concludes (Chapter 5) with an analysis of the reception of Appaya’s

Śaiva work in early modern India. Vais nava
: theologians of Vedānta from various
schools were quick to respond to Appaya’s bold theses; we will pay attention to
critical responses by Vijayīndra (Dvaita Vedānta), Purus ottama (Śuddhādvaita
Vedānta) and Śrīvais nava
: theologians such as Mahācārya, Ran garāmānuja and
Varadācārya. If the Śaiva response was generally more favourable, some Śaiva
scholars also took a critical stance on Appaya’s work and developed their own
position on Vedānta. This is most notably the case of Vīraśaiva scholars of
Vedānta, who promulgated their own distinctive position on Vedānta in the
wake of Appaya—Śaktiviśis t:ādvaita Vedānta.
By uncovering this intellectual history, I wish to demonstrate that Appaya
Dīks ita played a key role in the history of Śaivism in South India in being the
first Śaiva scholar to ever take up the challenge posed by Śrīvais nava
: theologians of
Vedānta in the medieval period. His comprehensive work based on Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary was not meant as a mere contribution to Vedānta scholarship; it was
a grand exegetical project designed to respond in particular to the Śrīvais navas’
:
interpretation of Vedānta material. Thus this study aims to provide a more
nuanced portrait of Appaya Dīks ita, the scholar and the religious figure. It will
present him not only as the prolific and bold intellectual we already know him to
be, but also as a social agent sensitive to the polemical conflicts that set Śaivas and
:
Vais navas apart in his time and place. In doing so, I hope that this book will open
up new possibilities for our understanding of the challenges of Indian theism, and
also shed light on the religious landscape of early modern India as seen through
the lenses of the most important scholar of the sixteenth century.
1
Śrīkan tha
and the Brahmamīmāmsābhā
sya

The Brahmamīmāmsābhā (hereafter ‘BMB’) of Śrīkan tha

sya Śivācārya is the
commentary on the Brahmasūtras (hereafter ‘BS’) upon which Appaya Dīksita
based his Śivādvaita Vedānta corpus. Although this commentary on the BS
may well be the first ever written from a Śaiva perspective, its author remained
more or less unheard of until Appaya decided to take over his commentary in
order to establish a Vedānta for Śaivas: Śivādvaita Vedānta. Appaya himself
does not reveal much about Śrīkan tha’s persona, lineage, scholarly affiliations,
and influences. Modern scholarship has not shed much light on this scholar
either, if only to suggest that Śrīkan tha
was a Śaiva scholar active in South India
between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, and that he authored a single work,
the commentary in question. In this chapter, I investigate the current evidence
about Śrīkan tha’s
lineage, influences, and date of activity, and also provide further
details on the relationship between Śrīkan tha’s theology and the Vīraśaiva
tradition.
1.1 Śrīkan tha’s

Date, Lineage, and Influences
In the BMB, Śrīkan tha

does not say much about his own lineage and teachers. In
the fourth introductory verse, he refers to a certain Śveta as his guru. We are told
that Śveta authored scriptures (āgama) on various subjects and that he was a
dispenser of liberation for his illustrious disciples.¹ He mentions him only once
more in the concluding verse of the BMB as the inspiration for writing his
¹ namah śvetābhidhānāya nānāgamavidhāyine | kaivalyakalpatarave kalyānagurave namah ||—

‘Obeisance to the one named Śveta, who authored various scriptures, the teacher of the auspicious
ones, who is [for them] like a wish-fulfilling tree of liberation’ (v. 4, ŚAMD1: 5). It has been suggested
(Filliozat 2001: 50) that the compound kalyānaguru in this verse could refer to another teacher of
Śrīkan tha.
However, I have not been able to locate any source linking Śrīkan tha to a figure of this name.
Partly against this interpretation is the fact that Śrīkan tha
uses the adjective kalyāna in other places in
his commentary merely in the sense of ‘auspicious’ or ‘excellent’, as in the compound kalyānagu na:

daharākāśas tu svābhāvikātirohitatattatkalyānagu . . . —‘But the space in the cavity [of the heart] has
na
various excellent qualities that are natural and fully manifest . . . ’ (ŚAMD1: 443). Thus, kalyānaguru
could refer simply to Śveta and the fact that he was an excellent teacher. Note, however, that Appaya
allows for the possibility of interpreting this compound as a reference to another guru, namely
Śrīkan tha’s
āśramaguru, but ultimately favors the interpretation according to which the kalyānas
refer to those who bestow the fruit of prosperity (abhyudaya, i.e., enjoyment in this world and the
other) on those who desire welfare (kalyāna); here, kalyā naguru
refers to Śveta. See Appendix 2 for a
translation of Śrīkan tha’s
opening verses.
́
Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India: The Saiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dı ̄ksita.
Jonathan Duquette,
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   11
commentary.² The historicity of Śveta as a Śaiva teacher is problematic. The name

‘Śveta’ does appear in the Vāyusamhitā and Liṅ gapurāna,
but refers there to the
first of twenty-eight yogācāryas, mythical incarnations of Śiva who taught a Vedic
form of Pāśupata Śaivism (Sastri 1930: 19). Appaya accepts this interpretation in
his Śivārkamanidīpikā
(hereafter ‘ŚAMD’), though he also points out the possi-
bility that Śveta may refer to Śrīkan tha’s
vidyāguru, on whom he gives no details.³
Interestingly, Appaya claims that yogācāryas were teachers in the Mahāpāśupata
tradition.⁴ The Mahāpāśupatas have been identified with the Kālāmukhas, the
‘black-faced’ ascetics, also known as the Lākulas, one of the major subdivisions
within Atimārga Śaivism (Sanderson 1993: 34). The association between the
Kālāmukhas and Pāśupatas in early medieval times is well documented. Several
South Indian inscriptions attest the importance of Lakulīśa—the Pāśupata teacher
to whom are traditionally attributed the Pāśupatasūtras—to the Kālāmukhas.
According to Lorenzen, one Śrīkan tha, possibly of Kālāmukha lineage, was active
in the Kedāreśvara temple at Belagāve in the Shimoga Distict (modern-day
Karnataka) around the eleventh century. A Kedāreśvara grant dated to 1103
praises this Śrīkan tha
as Kedāraśakti’s chief disciple and an expert in logic.
Another grant, dated to 1113, describes the same Śrīkan tha as fully conversant
with the Paramātmāgama, a skillful orator as well as a lord among yogins
(Lorenzen 1991: 106–7). None of these inscriptions, however, mention that the
Śrīkan tha
in question composed a commentary on the BS, nor does our Śrīkan tha
refer to Kedāraśakti as his guru in the BMB.
Clark (2006: 210), on the other hand, identifies our Śrīkan tha with a
Śrīkan thanātha
mentioned in an inscription ascribed to Bhoganātha, the youngest
brother of the famous scholars Mādhava-Vidyāranya and Sāyana. The inscription,
dated to 1356, narrates the grant of a village named Bitragu n ta
by the king
Saṅ gama II to Śrīkan thanātha;
it refers to the latter as having expounded a new
Śaiva doctrine. Another inscription by Bhoganātha reported by Clark, not dated
but possibly from the same period, mentions this same Śrīkan thanātha as a great
poet and the guru of Sāyana. Clark identifies this Śrīka n
tha with the Śrīka n tha

mentioned in the Kedāreśvara inscription, but does not provide any reason for
² śvetācāryapadadvandvaśuśrūsādyotitādhvanā
| krtam
etan mayā bhāsya
m kevalam
bhaktimā-
tratah ||—‘My path illuminated by serving the two feet of Śvetācārya, I composed this single commen-
tary purely out of devotion [to him]’ (ŚAMD2: 506).
³ Appaya reads the fourth opening verse of Śrīkan tha’s
In the first way
commentary as a pun (ślesa).
of reading the verse, Śveta refers to Śrīkan tha’s
vidyāguru, in which case nānāgamavidhāyin means that
this teacher taught that Upanisads
have Śiva as their main object. In the second way of reading the
verse, Śveta denotes the incarnation of Śiva, namely the first of the twenty-eight yogācāryas, in which
case nānāgamavidhāyin means that this incarnation composed the āgamas of the Pāśupatas and others
(nānāvidhapāśupatādyāgamanirmātr). See ŚAMD1: 6.
⁴ mahāpāśupatajñānasampradāyapravartakān | amśāvatārān īśasya yogācāryān upāsmahe ||—‘I
pay homage to the Yogācāryas, partial incarnations of the Lord, who expounded the traditional
doctrine of Mahāpāśupatas’ (third opening verse of the ŚAMD, ŚAMD1: 1). See Appendix 2 for a
translation of Appaya’s opening verses in the ŚAMD.
12    - 
this, nor does he explain on which basis he identifies this Śrīkan tha
with ‘the śaiva
advaitin who lived in the early twelfth century’ (Clark 2006: 210). Indeed, neither of
these inscriptions mention the fact—which, if true, would arguably be significant—
that Śrīkan thanātha
composed a Śaiva commentary on the BS. Śrīkan tha’s
date and
identity thus remain unclear as far as the epigraphical record goes.
A close textual analysis of the BMB strongly suggests that Śrīkan tha
was active
after Rāmānuja (eleventh to twelfth century).⁵ Several of its passages are parallel to
passages from the Vedāntasāra, an abridgement of the Śrībhāsya traditionally
attributed to Rāmānuja.⁶ Chintamani (1927: 71–4) highlights a number of such
passages and concludes that Śrīkan tha was more likely to be the borrower. Sastri
also leans towards the view that Śrīkan tha followed Rāmānuja based on his
analysis of Rāmānuja’s and Śrīkan tha’s commentaries ad BS 3.3.27–30, where
Śrīkan tha’s
criticism of views on post-mortem karman strongly suggests that he
knew Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāsya and responded to it (Sastri 1930: 60–4). Śrīkan tha

himself implies a certain parallelism between his views and those of scholars who,
like Rāmānuja and his followers, hold a non-dualism of the qualified
(viśis tādvaita):
he designates his own doctrine as viśis taśivādvaita
ad BS
2.1.14—a term most likely modelled on the Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta tradition⁷—
and says, ad BS 2.1.22, that his own views are closer to those of the adherents of
this tradition than to those who hold the view of difference (bhedavādin) or pure
non-difference (atyantābhedavādin).⁸
Although several of the concepts foundational to Śrīkan tha’s theology—cic-
chakti, cidākāśa, paramākāśa, etc.—are distinctively Śaiva, his terminology often
parallels that of Rāmānuja’s Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta tradition. Śrīkan tha’s
use of
expressions such as cidacitprapañcaviśis ta,
cidacidvastuśarīraka, kāranāvasthā/

⁵ Śrīkan tha
has sometimes been depicted as a contemporary of Śaṅ kara. The Śaṅ karavijaya, the
well-known hagiography of Śaṅ kara ascribed to Mādhava, claims that a certain Nīlakan tha, author of a
Śaivabhāsya on the BS, debated with Śaṅ kara and was eventually won over; see verses 33 to 72, canto
15, for the narration of this story. All evidence suggests that this story is spurious. It has been shown
that the Śaṅ karavijaya is a late hagiography (dated between 1650 and 1800 in recent studies; see Bader
2000: 5) with a strong bias for Advaita Vedānta. In addition, the claim that Śrīkan tha was a contem-
porary of Śaṅ kara is unfounded since Śrīkan tha cites a sentence from the Bhāmatī (Vācaspati Miśra’s
commentary on Śaṅ kara’s Brahmasūtrabhāsya) in his commentary (Chintamani 1927: 69).
⁶ However, the authorship of the Vedāntasāra by Rāmānuja was contested by van Buitenen in his
edition of the Vedārthasamgraha:
‘If the text was at all composed during Rāmānuja’s life-time, it will at
most have been an authorized epitome by one of his pupils’ (van Buitenen 1956: 31–2).
⁷ The compound viśis tādvaita
as a descriptive term for Rāmānuja’s theology does not appear in
Rāmānuja’s work but in the works of later Śrīvais nava exegetes, the earliest of whom is probably
Sudarśanasūri (late thirteenth century). If Śrīkan tha indeed borrowed this term from Rāmānuja’s
tradition, it would entail that he was active after the late thirteenth century.
⁸ These three doctrines (vāda) of Vedānta differ essentially in the way they envision the relation
between Brahman, the world and the self. The viśistādvaitavādins
hold that Brahman is the non-dual
(advaita) reality of everything, and that Brahman is qualified (viśista) by the insentient worldly entities
and sentient selves, which constitute as such the ‘body’ (śarīra) of Brahman. bhedavādins hold that
these three ontological principles represent entirely distinct realities, while the atyantābhedavādins, on
the contrary, hold that there is ultimately no difference whatsoever between Brahman, world, and self.
Śrīkan tha,
as we will discuss later, leans toward the first view.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   13
kāryāvasthā and several others clearly echoes the non-dualist theology of

Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta. This applies also to his description of Brahman as cause
and effect of the world. Compare, for instance, the definition of Brahman as the
cause of the world given by Śrīkan tha ad BS 1.4.27 with the definition given in
the Vedāntadīpa⁹ on the same sūtra: in both passages, Brahman, in its causal
state (kāranāvasthā),
is said to have as its body sentient and insentient entities
that are subtle and devoid of a differentiation in terms of names, forms, etc.
(nāmarūpādivibhāgarahitasūksmacidacidvastuśarīraka
in Śrīkan tha’s
commen-
tary, avibhaktanāmarūpasūksmacidacidvastuśarīraka
in the Vedāntadīpa).
Śrīkan tha
also shares distinctive philosophical views with adherents of
Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta. Like them, he rejects the ‘difference and non-difference’
(bhedābheda) interpretation of the BS (see also Appendix 4, Section A4.2) and
holds that the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāmsās form a single śāstra—a position not
adopted by Śaṅ kara, for instance, and which Appaya himself refutes in his later
work (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3). It is worth noting that the early modern scholar
of Śuddhādvaita Vedānta, Purusottama (1657/1668–1725; see Smith 2005: 425),
believed that Śrīkan tha’s
views on the unity of both Mīmāmsās were taken from
Rāmānuja. Purusottama
even goes to the extent of describing Śrīkan tha
as a
‘stealer’ (caura) of Rāmānuja’s school for having appropriated the teachings of
Rāmānuja and lent them authority by using Śaiva rather than Vais nava scriptures.
The same view was held in more recent times by Nārāyanācārya, a commentator
on Veṅ katanātha’s
Paramatabhaṅ g a, who refers to Śrīka ntha
as a ‘stealer from
[Rāmānuja’s] Śrībhāsya’ (śrībhā syacora).¹⁰
In light of all this, it is safe to conclude
that Śrīkan tha
was heavily influenced by Rāmānuja’s tradition, and that he must
consequently have been active after the twelfth century.
⁹ The attribution of the Vedāntadīpa to Rāmānuja is also contested, but it is surely a work
belonging to the Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta tradition.
¹⁰ In his Bhāsyaprakāśa
(a commentary on Vallabhācārya’s Anubhā sya)
ad BS 1.1.1, Purusottama

paraphrases the views of Śrīkan tha
(whom he refers to simply as a ‘Śaiva’ in this context) and says that
he borrowed the teachings of Rāmānuja’s tradition on the unity of both Mīmāmsās: yat tu śaivo
rāmānujamataikadeśam ādāya ārādhanārādhyabhūtadharmabrahmapratipādakayor mīmāmsāśās-
trayoh phalaikyād aikyam [ . . . ]—‘As for the Śaiva [i.e., Śrīkan tha],
[he defended the view that] the
[two] Mīmāmsā śāstras, which teach dharma and brahman as worship and what ought to be
worshipped, form a unity based on the fact that they have the same fruit, by taking a portion of [the
teachings of] Rāmānuja’s school’ (Anubhā
sya:
89). Later, ad BS 1.1.4, Purusottama
is more explicit and
says that the Śaiva (Śrīkan tha
is again understood here), stealing at times from Rāmānuja’s and also
Madhva’s teachings, distinguishes his position from theirs by quoting from Śaiva scriptures that
contradict their views: śaivas tu rāmānujamatasyaiva cauro madhvamatasya ca kvacit kvacit
tadviruddhām śaivaśrutim udāharan bhinnam prasthānam abhimanyate (Anubhā sya:
247). The
same claim was made later by another important Śuddhādvaita theologian, namely Giridhara (fl.
1850–1900). In verse 63 of his Śuddhādvaitamārtan da, Giridhara describes the Śaiva[advaitin] as a
‘stealer’ (cora) of Rāmānuja’s tradition: śaivo ’py etena vidhvasto yatas taccora eva hi. A commentator
on this work, Rāmakr s nabha
glosses taccora as rāmānujamatacora, and adds that the Śaivādvaitin
tta,
also stole at times from Mādhvas (madhvamata) (Śuddhādvaitamārtan da: 37). See Chapter 5,
Section 5.1.2 for Purusottama’s
engagement with Appaya’s work. For Nārāyanācārya’s
reference to
Śrīkan tha
as śrībhāsyacora,
see Paramatabhaṅ ga: 87.
14    - 
Another influence on Śrīkan tha was most likely Haradatta Śivācārya, also
known as Sudarśanācārya, a prominent Śaiva scholar who may have been
active in the twelfth or thirteenth century (Kane 1930: 351, Sastri 1930: 42).
Appaya quotes one verse (v. 42) from Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā (also
known as Caturvedatātparyasamgraha or simply Tātparyasamgraha)
in the
and points out there that Śrīka ntha
‘follows’ (anuvartin)
him.¹¹ Nowhere does Śrīkan tha mention Haradatta in his commentary, and we
might therefore understand Appaya’s remark as highlighting intellectual affinities
rather than a historical relationship (such as Śrīkan tha
being an actual follower or
student of Haradatta) between the two scholars. Sastri adopts this view and notes
several doctrinal affinities—such as the Viśis tādvaita-modelled
view that Śiva/
Brahman relates to the world as an embodied person relates to his/her body, or the
view that the Mahānārāyana Upanisad praises Śiva—and the use of a shared
vocabulary between the works of both scholars (Sastri 1930: 319–20). Another
important commonality between the scholars is their preference, among the
several methods of contemplation (brahmavidyā) taught in Upanisads, for
the daharavidyā which teaches the contemplation of the deity in the cavity of the
heart. Sastri holds that these affinities suggest that Haradatta and Śrīkan tha were
near contemporaries. Moreover, since Haradatta and Rāmānuja were contempor-
aries in his view, and since Śrīkan tha
and Rāmānuja share a similar conceptual
vocabulary, he also holds that Śrīkan tha was a contemporary of Rāmānuja,
making all three scholars near contemporaries, with Śrīkan tha being the latest
(Sastri 1930: 42). However, such affinities need not be taken as direct evidence for
these scholars’ contemporaneity, as they may merely reflect the fact that Śrīkan tha
was influenced by the writings of Haradatta and Rāmānuja.
Another probable South Indian influence on Śrīkan tha was Bhatta
Bhāskarācārya (second half of the tenth century?), the well-known author of
extensive commentaries on the Taittirīya Samhitā, Taittirīya Āranyaka
and the
Rudrapraśna. In the ŚAMD (ad BS 1.4.27), Appaya himself makes a rapproche-
ment between Śrīkan tha’s
views on the identity between Śiva and Brahman and
the transformation of Śiva’s cicchakti into the world (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1),
on the one hand, and Bhatta Bhāskarācārya’s commentary on the Taittirīya
Āranyaka
on the other. Sastri also reports a number of parallel verbal descriptions
between the two works (Sastri 1930: 72).
¹¹ sudarśanācāryair api tātparyasamgrahe garudaikyabhāvanād

r stānta
evopāttah [ . . . ] iti
tadanuvartinām śrīkan thācāryā
nām
api tathaiva matam—‘The very same example of the contempla-
tion [in a state of] unity with Garuda occurs also in Sudarśanācārya’s Tātparyasamgraha.
The position
of Śrīkan thācārya,
who follows him, is also exactly the same’ (Sastri 1929: 21). Appaya refers to
Haradatta’s work as the Tātparyasamgraha,
which is an alternative title Haradatta himself gives to
his own work (see v. 2 in the Śrutisūktimālā). See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 for more details on Appaya’s
quotation of Haradatta in his Śaiva work.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   15
A less direct and yet important influence on Śrīkan tha’s thought is the
Kashmirian non-dualist Śākta Śaiva tradition. Several of the concepts and terms
used by Śrīkan tha
in his commentary are reminiscent of the conceptual vocabu-
lary used by Utpaladeva, Ksemarāja,
and others. Right at the beginning of his
commentary, in the second opening verse, Śrīkan tha
describes Śiva as the supreme
self on the surface of whose power the picture of the universe was drawn:
Victorious is Śiva, the supreme self, the sum of everything that is most important
in scriptures, who painted the multitude of pictures consisting of the entire net of
the world on the canvas that is His own power.¹²
As Sanderson has already pointed out (2014: 90, fn. 370), this depiction of Śiva is
typically Kashmirian and has parallels in Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā,
Śivadr s tyālocana
and Stavacintāmani,
as well as in Ksemarāja’s
Pratyabhi-
jñāhrdaya.
Śrīka ntha
also quotes from the Bodhapañcadaśikā (ad BS 1.2.1), the
Tantrāloka (ad BS 4.4.17) and from the Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā. From the latter,
Śrīkan tha
quotes the following verse thrice in his commentary:
For, just like a yogin, God, which consists only in consciousness, must manifest
externally all the objects residing in [Him], by the force of His own will, without
any material cause.¹³
This well-known verse is oft quoted in Kashmirian sources as well as in early

medieval South Indian sources¹⁴ as encapsulating the essence of the idealist
doctrine of Pratyabhijñā. That Śrīkan tha
refers to this verse in his commentary
may therefore not be taken as direct evidence that he was well versed in
Kashmirian non-dualist philosophy. In fact, Śrīkan tha
interprets this verse some-
what differently than Utpaladeva and his commentators. For Abhinavagupta, for
instance, this verse stresses that God, as consciousness—just like the yogin who
makes perceptible to others complex phenomena like cities and armies without
any material cause, only thanks to his will—creates phenomena through an act of
pure freedom that depends solely on His own will (icchāvaśāt), without the need
for any material support (nirupādānam). According to Śrīkan tha,
however, Śiva
does not create the world spontaneously, without any material, but in a causal
manner, out of the material available, as it were, in Himself. To be ‘without
¹² nijaśaktibhittinirmitanikhilajagajjālacitranikurumbah | sa jayati śivah parātmā nikhilāga-

masārasarvasvam || 2 || (ŚAMD1: 1).
¹³ cidātmaiva hi devo ’ntahsthitam
icchāvaśād bahih | yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam
prakāśayet ||
(v. 1.5.7, Torella 2013: 21). Śrīkan tha
quotes the verse in three places in his commentary: as an
abhiyuktasūkti in BS 1.2.9; as an āptavacana in BS 2.1.18; and as an āgama in BS 2.2.38.
¹⁴ It is quoted, for instance, in Maheśvarānanda’s self-authored commentary (Parimala) on the
Mahārthamañjarī and in Natanānanda’s
Cidvallī commentary on Punyānanda’s
Kāmakalāvilāsa.
16    - 
material cause’ for Śrīkan tha

essentially means that Śiva does not create the world
out of a material cause that is external to Himself.
Śrīkan tha’s
non-dualism certainly shares family resemblances with the non-
dualism of Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and others. It acknowledges the nature of
Śiva as pure consciousness, the identity between Śiva and His power (śakti), and
also admits that consciousness can apprehend the world through an act akin to
reflective awareness (vimarśa).¹⁵ But it radically differs from Pratyabhijñā non-
dualism in its firm defence of the Vedānta doctrine of causality and the absence of
emphasis on Śiva’s innate freedom and dynamism.¹⁶
1.2 References to Śrīkan tha

in Sanskrit Sources
Prior to Appaya
While there is little doubt that Śrīkan tha

was active after Haradatta and Rāmānuja,
his date remains uncertain. Recent scholarship, mostly following the lead of
Chintamani (1927) and Sastri (1930), has placed Śrīkan tha roughly between the
twelfth century and the fourteenth century. Chintamani argues that Śrīkan tha
lived after the thirteenth century based on Śrīkan tha’s
quotation of a statement
supposedly made by the Advaitin Akhan dānanda (c. thirteenth century), but
thinks that Śrīkan tha
was a rather late author, as he is ‘not referred to by any
writer older than Appaya Dīksita’ (Chintamani 1927: 75). Against this, Sastri
argues that Śrīkan tha
was already a known figure by the beginning of the four-
teenth century, since the Śaiva scholar of Śaiva Siddhānta, Umāpati Śivācārya
(who, according to Sastri, lived around 1400), quotes from Śrīkan tha’s commen-
tary in his Pauskarabhā
sya,
a commentary on the Pau skaratantra
(Sastri 1930:
33).¹⁷ However, it has been convincingly shown that Umāpati Śivācārya, the
author of the Pauskarabhā
sya,
is not the fourteenth-century author of the Tamil
Saiddhāntika works that Sastri has in mind, but a scholar who certainly belonged
‘to a period later than the first half of the 16th century’ (Colas-Chauhan 2007: 4),
¹⁵ See, for instance, Śrīkan tha’s

description (ad BS 3.2.16) of the wise person as one whose
consciousness perceives, i.e., self-represents (! vi + √mrś) the manifold world: vividham vastujātam
paśyantī vimrśantī
cid yasya sa vipaścit (ŚAMD2: 248).
¹⁶ See Chapter 3, Section 3.2 for more details on Śrīkan tha’s
philosophical views.
¹⁷ Umāpati quotes Śrīkan tha’s
commentary (ad BS 2.2.38) while discussing the authority of Śaiva
scriptures: ‘patyur asāmañjasyād’ ity atra bhāsye nīlakan thācāryai
h ‘vayam tu vedaśivāgamayor
bhedam na paśyāmah’ iti. yadi sarvātmanā vedasiddhāntaśaivāgamayor abhedah, kim artham tad
ubhayor nirmānam iti cen, na. astīyān anayor bhedah, vedas traivarnikādhikāra,
āgamāś
cāturvarnikādhikārā
iti. etad apy uktam śrīkan tha[bhā]
‘vedas traivarnikavi
sye saya
h. sarvavarnavi
s-
ayaś cānya’ iti (Pauskarabhā
10). Note that Umāpati refers to the author of the Śrīkan thabhā
sya: sya
as
Nīlakan thācārya
and not Śrīkan tha;
see Appendix 4, Section A4.1 for more details on this point. The
passage quoted here is also quoted, with almost the same wording, by Nirmalamani in his Prabhā on
Aghoraśiva’s Kriyākramadyotikā, a ritual manual of Śaiva Siddhānta written in the twelfth century.
Nirmalamani was a South Indian author who lived around the sixteenth or seventeenth century (Janaki
1986: 6; Sanderson 2014: 25).
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   17
and who lived quite possibly after Śivāgrayogin (second half of the sixteenth
century), as Umāpati seems to be familiar with his works (ibid.: 7). Thus
Umāpati is more likely to have been active after Appaya Dīksita, so his quotation
cannot be used to establish that Śrīkan tha was active shortly after Rāmānuja.
Sastri also points out that three other commentaries on Śrīkan tha’s BMB may
have been composed before Appaya (none of which, it should be emphasized, are
referred to by Appaya in his Śivādvaita work): Nijaguna Śivayogin’s Tārāvali,
Haradatta Śivācārya’s Śrīkan thabhā
syasamartha
and Brahmavidyādhvarīndra’s
Vedāntasarvasvaśivadarpana (Sastri 1930: 16). Sastri gives no detail about the
first commentary, which all evidence suggests he was not able to consult, or the
sources from which he gathered this information. But even if such a commentary
were to be found, it would not help us determine the date of Śrīkan tha, since
Nijaguna Śivayogin lived, like Appaya, in the sixteenth century (Kittel 1875: lxvi).
Sastri claims that some scholars before him reported to have seen manuscripts of a
commentary by Haradatta, presumably the same Haradatta that Appaya quotes in
the Śivādvaitanirnaya;
he himself never consulted it and as of yet it has not been
found. Note, however, that if the date tentatively ascribed to Haradatta by Sastri is
correct (i.e., fl. 1119; Sastri 1930: 41), and if Śrīkan tha followed Rāmānuja, then
Haradatta could hardly have composed a commentary on Śrīkan tha’s bhāsya.
As
for the third ‘commentary’ by Brahmavidyādhvarīndra, after consulting the work
myself, I can confirm that it is not a commentary on the BMB, but a work aiming
to refute Appaya Dīksita’s interpretation of Śrīkan tha’s commentary. It was
therefore composed after Appaya.¹⁸
It has been suggested more recently that Śrīkan tha could be no later than about
1400, since the Vīraśaiva commentator Śrīpati¹⁹ refers to Śrīkan tha in his own
commentary on the BS, the Śrīkarabhāsya (McCrea 2014: 82). While it is true that
Śrīpati quotes Śrīkan tha
in the Śrīkarabhā sya,
the posited date of composition of
this work is questionable. There was certainly an early Śrīpati: this prominent
Śaiva figure is praised in the work of the thirteenth-century Vīraśaiva scholar
Pālkuriki Somanātha as one of the early exponents of Śaivism in Andhra Pradesh,
together with Śivaleṅ ka Mancana Pan dita and Mallikārjuna Pan dita (Lalitamba
1976: 17). Somanātha does not say, however, that Śrīpati composed a commentary
on the BS. Moreover, the Śrīkarabhāsya quotes from the Siddhāntaśikhāmani (late
fifteenth/early sixteenth century; see fn. 33, this chapter, below), so it could not
possibly have been composed by the early Śrīpati. Even more significant is the fact
that the Śrīkarabhāsya is not mentioned in any major Vīraśaiva work from the
medieval and early modern periods—even those with a Vedānta leaning, such as
¹⁸ See Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for a brief discussion of Brahmavidyādhvarīndra’s work.

¹⁹ The editor of the Śrīkarabhāsya, C. Hayavadana Rao, argues that Śrīpati’s commentary was
composed between 1300 and 1400 based on his identification of the author of the bhāsya with the
early Śaiva figure also called Śrīpati (Rao 1936: 17).
18    - 
the Anubhavasūtra, the Śivādvaitadarpana and the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā. For

this reason, I suspect that this work was composed in modern times.²⁰ The work
itself seems spurious, for it contains large sections copied entirely from
Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāsya, for which reason its authenticity has been dismissed even
by contemporary Vīraśaivas.²¹ According to K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, the
renowned historian of South India, the Śrīkarabhāsya ‘remained unknown till
quite recently . . . ’ (Sastri 1963: 95).
It has been argued elsewhere that Śrīkan tha must have lived prior to the
fifteenth century, because the Kriyāsāra, which the author ascribes (albeit without
providing direct evidence) to c.1400–1450, ‘directly cites Śrīkan tha’
(Fisher 2017a:
3). The Kriyāsāra is a work of Vīraśaiva theology that includes a running com-
mentary on the BS, based, as the author of the Kriyāsāra claims, on a Śaiva
commentary on the BS written by a certain Nīlakan tha Śivācārya. Most scholars
have so far assumed—though sometimes with reserve (e.g., Sastri 1930: 18)—that
is none other than Śrīkan tha.
this Nīlakan tha While this might well be true, the
identification of both scholars is not so straightforward, as I discuss in detail later
in this chapter and in Appendix 4. If we assume for the time being that both names
refer to the same scholar, then the BMB would indeed have been composed prior
to the Kriyāsāra. But this would not allow us to confirm the early date of
Śrīkan tha,
for the Kriyāsāra is not as early as has so far been assumed (see, for
instance, Sanderson 2014: 84, who places the Kriyāsāra between the thirteenth
and fifteenth centuries). I have recently argued (Duquette 2020a) that the
Kriyāsāra must have been composed during the seventeenth century or early
eighteenth century, since its author reuses Appaya’s ritual manual, the
Śivārcanacandrikā, and since the Kriyāsāra is quoted with attribution in an
eighteenth-century Vīraśaiva work, the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā.
The most compelling evidence for Śrīkan tha’s
terminus post quem, in my view,
is Sastri’s claim that Śivaliṅ gabhūpa—a prince from the Kon davī
du Reddy dynasty
who, according to Sastri, was active between 1350 and 1450—quotes without
attribution from Śrīkan tha’s BMB in his commentary on Haradatta’s
Śrutisūktimālā (Sastri 1930: 71). A detailed comparison of the two passages
²⁰ Hayavadana Rao relied for his own edition on an incomplete printed edition in Telugu script
published in 1893 by the Śrī Lakshmī Vilāsa Press in Secunderabad. He refers to the existence of two
palm-leaf manuscripts of the Śrīkarabhāsya as well as one paper copy, all in Telugu script and
preserved in the Saiva Grantha Kāryālaya at Devidi (Rao 1936: 3). While this suggests that the
Śrīkarabhāsya
could not have been composed after the close of the nineteenth century, the author
provides in my view no convincing evidence that this work is as early as he claims.
²¹ Compare the Śrībhāsya and Śrīkarabhāsya ad BS 2.3.33, 2.4.1, 3.1.25, 3.3.10, 3.4.8, 4.2.12, and
4.3.1; large sections are identical and, in some cases, the entire sūtra commentary is the same. I am
grateful to Sharathchandra Swamy for directing me to a Kannada work written by his late guru Immadi
Śivabasava Swamy, respected scholar and the former head of a Vīraśaiva matha (Srikundur) in Mysore.
In this work, entitled Siddhāntaśikhāmani hārū Śrīkarabhā sya
nijada nilavu (published by Samvahana,
Behind Evening Bazar, Mysore, 2003), Immadi Śivabasava Swamy convincingly argues that the
Śrīkarabhāsya
is a Vīraśaiva commentary on the BS written in modern times.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   19
pointed out by Sastri indeed reveals strong intertextuality.²² However, it is

difficult to conclude on this basis alone that it is Śivaliṅ gabhūpa who relies on
Śrīkan tha’s
commentary and not the other way around. For the identity of
Śivaliṅ gabhūpa, Sastri relies on an excerpt from Hultzsch’s Reports on Sanskrit
Manuscripts in Southern India (Hultzsch 1896, Vol. II). The excerpt includes the
beginning of Śivaliṅ gabhūpa’s commentary on Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā, where
Śivaliṅ gabhūpa describes his own lineage in detail. However, this entire passage is
absent from the Tinnevelly edition of Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā (which includes
a commentary ascribed to Śivaliṅ gabhūpa), where the passages parallel to
Śrīkan tha’s
commentary are found. It could be that the editor of the Tinnevelly
edition omitted this passage or that his manuscript(s) did not contain it. In any
case, in the absence of clear evidence showing that the commentary found in the
Tinnevelly edition was actually written by Śivaliṅ gabhūpa, and not wrongly
ascribed to him, we cannot conclude with certainty that Śrīkan tha’s
commentary
was composed prior to 1350–1450 (assuming as well that Sastri is right on
Śivaliṅ gabhūpa’s date and on the fact that Śivaliṅ gabhūpa was indeed the
borrower!).
If we assume that Śrīkan tha
was active some time between Rāmānuja’s period
and the fourteenth or fifteenth century, it is worth noting that no major scholars of
Vedānta refer to Śrīkan tha’s
commentary or to his persona as a bhāsyakāra
prior
to Appaya. The Mādhva scholar Vyāsatīrtha (1460–1539) does not engage with
Śrīkan tha’s
Vedānta in his monumental Tātparyacandrikā, which otherwise deals
in detail with Advaita and Viśis tādvaita
interpretations of the BS. Vijayīndra
(c.1514–1595; see Sharma 1981: 395²³) is to my knowledge the first Mādhva
²² Compare the two following passages: (1) ‘rta m satyam param brahma purusa m kr snapiṅ
galam |
ūrdhvaretam virūpāksa m viśvarūpāya vai namah’ iti. rta m satyam manoviparyāsarahitam, param
brahma pūrvoktadaharākāśe śeta iti purusa m śaktimayyā śabalākāratayā kr snapiṅ galam
krśānuretastayā
cordhvaretasam trilocanatayā virūpāksam iti [ . . . ] (Śrutisūktimālā: 68); and (2) tad
eva hi ‘rta
m satyam param brahma purusa m kr s napiṅ
galam | ūrdhvaretam virūpāksa m’ ity ucyate.
tatra paramaśaktyumāśabalākāratayā kr snapiṅ galam krśānuretaskatayā
cordhvaretaskam,
trilocanatayā virūpāksa m, puri pūrvoktadaharapun darīke śeta iti purusa m,
rta m satyam man-
ovāgviparyāsarahitam param brahma iti laksa nam
(ŚAMD1: 327). Or compare: (1) padma
kośapratīkāśam iti nārāyanasyaiva hrdayam
ucyate. katham tasya karmakartrvyapadeśatva
m saṅ -
gacchate? ‘paramātmā vyavasthita’ iti parameśvara eva paramātmā tadantarvartitayā dhyeyatveno-
cyate. tato dhyātrtvena
nārāyanasya
dhyeyatvena parameśvarasya kartrtva m vyapadiśyate. ato
nārāyanād anya evopāsyah paramātmā. ‘sa brahmā sa śivah’ ityādinā brahmavis nurudrendrādipra-

pañcavibhūtiviśistatva
m parameśvarasyopadiśyate (Śrutisūktimālā: 88); and (2) padmakośapratīkāśam
iti prakrtasya
nārāya nasyaiva
h rdayam
ucyate. ‘paramātmā vyavasthita h’
iti parameśvara eva
paramātmā tadantarvartitayā dhyeyatvenocyate. tato dhyātrtvena nārāyanasya
dhyeyatvena
parameśvarasya ca karmatvam kartrtva
m ca vyapadiśyate. ato nārāyanād anya evopāsyah
paramātmā. ‘sa brahmā sa śivah’ ityādinā brahmavisnurudrendrādiprapañcavibhūtiviśi
statva
m
parameśvarasyopadiśyate (ŚAMD1: 322–3).
²³ Sharma (1981: 395) approves the traditional claim that Vijayīndra was the disciple of Vyāsatīrtha
based on Vijayīndra’s own statement, in the introduction of his Upasamhāravijaya and other works, to
the effect that Vyāsatīrtha was his guru. However, the colophon in the Upasamhāravijaya clearly
mentions Surendra [Muni or Tīrtha] as his direct guru, as does the colophon of a manuscript of
Vijayīndra’s Paratattvaprakāśikā kept at the Adyar Library (no. 816, folio 26) that I have consulted.
20    - 
scholar to show awareness of Śrīkan tha’s

commentary.²⁴ No major commentator
on Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāsya, from Vātsyavaradaguru and Sudarśanasūri to
Veṅ katanātha,
ever engages with Śrīka n
tha’s views.²⁵ The first Śrīvais nava
scholar
who refers to Śrīkan tha’s
ideas is, I surmise, Mahācārya, who was a younger
contemporary of Appaya.²⁶ Vallabhācārya (1479–1531?), the author of a
Śuddhādvaita Vedānta commentary on the BS, also shows no awareness of
Śrīkan tha.
However, one of his commentators, Purusottama (c.1657/1668–1725),
does, and significantly refers to Śrīkan tha
as a navya (‘new’) Śaiva.²⁷ Although the
term navya could simply mean that Śrīkan tha’s ideas had only recently come to the
attention of scholars (perhaps through Appaya’s work), it also suggests that
Śrīkan tha
was not a very early figure.
In light of the quasi-absence of references to Śrīkan tha’s commentary prior to
Appaya’s time, and also owing to the lack of details available about his lineage and
teachers, one might even be led to think that Śrīkan tha, the bhāsyakāra,
simply
never existed: Śrīkan tha
could be a fictitious character created by Appaya, the
author of the bhāsya
being no one but Appaya himself. This bold hypothesis was
put forward by a respected Śrīvais nava pandit active in the 1960s, named
Varadācārya, in a short Sanskrit work called Śrīkan thasamālocana,
now out of
print.²⁸ According to the author, this hypothesis would explain, among other
things, why Appaya does not show any awareness of Śrīkan tha’s commentary in
his early Śaiva work (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5) and why barely anything is known
about Śrīkan tha.
The author argues that Appaya wrote this Śaiva commentary
because no Śaiva commentary on the BS was available at the time, and because he
needed one in order to meet the challenge posed by the Śrīvais nava Viśis tādvaita

Vedānta tradition.
²⁴ Vijayīndra concludes the tenth chapter of his Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana by saying

that the position of Śrīkan tha
is refuted by the very fact that Rāmānuja’s position has been refuted
earlier in the work: evam rāmānujamatanirākaranena śrīkan thamatam
api nirastam
veditavyam
(Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana [1976]: 41). This last statement argues in favor of the obvious
similarities between Rāmānuja’s and Śrīkan tha’s
systems. See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1 for a discussion
of Vijayīndra’s reception of Appaya’s work.
²⁵ In his Tattvamuktākalāpa, an extensive philosophical treatise on topics salient to Viśis tādvaita

Vedānta, Veṅ katanātha
mentions Haradatta Śivācārya, Pāśupatas and Vedic Śaivas but never
Śrīkan tha.
Nor does he seem to be aware of the existence of a Śaiva commentary on the BS.
²⁶ For the date of Mahācārya, see Raghavan 1979: 57 and Charumathy 1999 (beginning of Chapter 2,
unpaged).
²⁷ This mention occurs in Purusottama’s
discussion of the unity of the two Mīmāmsās (aikaśāstrya)
in the Bhāsyaprakāśa,
his commentary on Vallabhācārya’s Anubhā sya:
ārādhanārādhyabhūtayor
dharmabrahmano h pratipādakatvenaikaśāstryam. ‘athāto brahmajijñāsā’ iti prthagārambhas
tv
‘athātah śesalak
sa
nam’
ityādivad avāntaraparicchedārtha iti tadekadeśī navya śaivah (Anubhā sya:

49). Compare with Śrīkan tha’s
commentary ad BS 1.1.1: dharmabrahmanor ārādhanārādhyabhūtayoh
pratipādakam ‘athāto dharmajijñāsā’ ity ārabhya ‘anāvrtti h śabdād’ ity etāvat paryantam ekam eva
śāstram. tatra ‘athātah śesalak
sa
nam’
ityādivad avāntaraparicchedārtho ’yam ‘athāto brahmajijñāsā’
ity ārambhah (ŚAMD1: 34–7).
²⁸ I was lucky to acquire a copy of this original piece through personal acquaintances in Mysore.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   21
Although, as I shall argue in this book, the prominence of Rāmānuja’s tradition

in Appaya’s time did play a large role in his Śivādvaita project, it appears unlikely
to me that he would himself have composed the BMB. Beside the time factor, there
is the obvious fact that Appaya ‘struggles’ to interpret Śrīkan tha’s
theology along
the lines of pure non-dualism (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2); were he the author of
the BMB, he would presumably have made his task easier by adapting the
commentary appropriately. Moreover, Appaya hints at the existence of circulating
manuscripts of the work in the ŚAMD.²⁹ The fact that Appaya does not mention
Śrīkan tha
in his early Śaiva work—especially in contexts where we would expect
such a mention—could simply be due to the fact that he came across the
commentary only later in his career (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). In light of the
evidence presented here, it seems more reasonable to assume that Śrīkan tha’s
commentary was composed before Appaya—somewhere in the fourteenth or
fifteenth century, if we are to believe the evidence that Śivaliṅ gabhūpa knew this
commentary—but that it remained unknown or simply ignored until the famous
Appaya decided to bring it back to light, as the Kālakan theśvara
inscription
relates, in order to strengthen Śaiva religion.
1.3 Śrīkan tha’s

Theology and the Vīraśaiva Tradition
In composing his commentary on the BS, Śrīkan tha was influenced to a large
extent by Rāmānuja’s Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta and the work of early medieval Śaivas
such as Haradatta Śivācārya and Bhatta Bhāskarācārya. We have seen that
Śrīkan tha
was also acquainted, though to a lesser extent, with the work of
prominent Pratyabhijñā philosophers such as Utpaladeva, Ksemarāja,
and others.
Another important source to consider to better contextualize Śrīkan tha’s
thought
is the Sanskrit-language literature of the Vīraśaiva tradition. The historical roots of
this tradition are generally traced back to a corpus of Kannada-language Śaiva
devotional ‘sayings’ (vacana) composed by Śaiva saints and poets in the twelfth
century. The saints and poets who authored those vacanas rejected caste hierarchy
and brahmanical claims to superiority. In the course of time, however, the
militancy of the Vīraśaiva movement gave way to the validation of brahmanical
social norms and caste identities. This change was reflected in the composition of
an increasing number of Vīraśaiva works in Sanskrit that acknowledged the
authority of the Vedas, integrated Vedānta terminology and ideas, and eventually
defended a distinctive Vedānta position (siddhānta). Fisher (2017a) has drawn
attention to this Vīraśaiva Vedānta tradition—to which she refers retrospectively
²⁹ I have located a single example: atra ‘pūrvācāryair’ iti sthāne ‘vrddhavaidyair’

iti pātha
h kvacid
dr sta
h—‘Here
instead [of the words] “by previous teachers”, the reading “by senior experts” is
sometimes seen’ (ŚAMD1: 9).
22    - 
as Śaktiviśis tādvaita
Vedānta³⁰—and argued that it drew its inspiration directly
from Śrīkan tha’s
BMB. Although, as I shall now explain, there are significant
linkages between Śrīkan tha’s
theology and the Vīraśaiva tradition, the extent to
which each influenced the other is not yet well understood.
One of the earliest Vīraśaiva works in Sanskrit to show a clear imprint of
Vedānta is the Anubhavasūtra of Māyideva (c. fifteenth century).³¹ This short yet
influential treatise expounds on the distinctive Vīraśaiva theological doctrine of
the ‘six stations’ (sa tsthala),
according to which the Vīraśaiva devotee goes
through a series of six ‘stages’ or ‘stations’ (sthala) in his liberating journey
towards union with Śiva (śivaikya, śivajīvaikya): initially in a state where he
worships Śiva in a personified form and as an entity separate from himself, the
devotee gradually moves towards achieving a non-dual (advaita) state in which he
completely identifies with Śiva. Although Śiva is by nature non-dual, He under-
goes differentiation on a phenomenal level for the sake of His own worship. Śiva’s
first phenomenal duplication is between the worshipper—the individual self,
termed aṅ gasthala—and the worshipped—Śiva, termed liṅ gasthala. Each of
these two sthalas is then subdivided into six principles—hence the term
sa
tsthala—which
are in turn operated upon by six active principles, namely
‘powers’ (śakti) and ‘devotions’ (bhakti). On the one hand, the liṅ gasthala prin-
ciples account for the world experienced by the devotee through their conjunction
with six types of ‘powers’, foremost among which is the ‘power of consciousness’
(cicchakti), a concept that recurs with a different connotation in Śrīkan tha’s
theology. On the other hand, the aṅ gasthala principles account for the devotee’s
gradual union with Śiva through their conjunction with six types of ‘devotions’. In
the Anubhavasūtra, Māyideva describes the properties of every principle and its
corresponding active principle, and explains how the union of self and Śiva
(liṅ gāṅ gasamyoga)
can be achieved by combining devotion, right knowledge,
and the practice of rituals.
³⁰ The term śaktiviśistādvaita

(or śaktiviśis taśivādvaita)
is not attested in early Vīraśaiva sources in
Sanskrit. To my knowledge, the first Vīraśaiva scholar to explicitly use the term to describe the
Vīraśaiva position (siddhānta) on Vedānta is Maritōn tadārya in his Vīraśaivānandacandrikā;
Maritōn tadārya
was active in the middle of the eighteenth century. See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 on
this point.
³¹ The Anubhavasūtra is ascribed to the first half of the fifteenth century based on the fact that
Māyideva was a contemporary of Devarāya II, who ruled in Vijayanagara between 1423 and 1446
(Anubhavasūtra: 2). Chandra Shobhi (2005: 262–3) argued that the Anubhavasūtra was composed
after the Siddhāntaśikhāmani (see below) based on his presupposition that it synthesizes the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani’s doctrine of a ‘hundred and one stations’ (ekottaraśatasthala) into a doctrine
of ‘six stations’ (sa
tsthala).
In my view, the opposite is more likely to be true: the author of the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani shows prior knowledge of the doctrine of sa tsthala
(see vs. 15.1ff.) and
Maritōn tadārya,
a commentator on the Siddhāntaśikhāmani, claims that the ‘hundred and one
stations’ are included (antargata) within the broader scheme of ‘six stations’ (see introduction to v.
5.31). Moreover, the sa tsthala
doctrine is attested early in Vīraśaiva literature: it is discussed, for
instance, by the thirteenth-century Vīraśaiva scholar Pālkuriki Somanātha (Rao 1990: 23).
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   23
The Anubhavasūtra traces its origins not to the Vedānta tradition, but to
the revealed corpus of Śaiva scriptures (śivasiddhāntatantra), particularly the
Vātulatantra, which it claims to be best among all Śaiva scriptures. In the intro-
duction, Māyideva says that the sa tsthala
doctrine forms the content of the second
and concluding part (uttarabhāga) of this tantra (see vs. 1.27–8) and that it was
taught, like the first part of the Vātulatantra, by Śiva to Devī. Māyideva’s aim, he
tells us, is to communicate in a concise manner the ‘secret meaning’ (rahasyārtha)
of this doctrine. It is to be noted that as a result of its close association with the
Vātulatantra, the Anubhavasūtra is often conflated with it in later Vīraśaiva
literature: the Siddhāntaśikhāmani, for instance, ascribes multiple passages
from it to the Vātulatantra or Vātulottaratantra. From a doctrinal standpoint,
the Anubhavasūtra also presupposes a Śaiva rather than a Vedāntic metaphysics:
it refers to the Śaiva ontology of thirty-six principles of existence (tattva) (v. 1.4),
and its scheme of six stations is based upon the idea that Śiva is inseparable
from Śakti.
Nevertheless, this work also has clear Vedāntic resonances. Although it ultim-
ately praises devotion (bhakti) over knowledge (jñāna), it acknowledges, as in
Vedānta, the latter’s importance in the pursuit of liberation. Māyideva’s descrip-
tion of Śiva as the non-dual absolute also echoes the non-dual Brahman of
the Vedāntic tradition. Right in the first verse, Māyideva describes Śiva as
the personified form (mūrti) of the sa tsthalabrahma,
the ‘six-station Brahman’,
which is non-dual and has the nature of existence, bliss, and consciousness
(sadānandacidātma, v. 1.7). He also invokes the well-known Upanisadic meta-
phor of the identity between the space in a pot and the space outside it to explain
how Brahman (Śiva) divides itself into several sthalas while retaining its non-dual
nature (v. 2.11). Māyideva also eulogizes the Upanisads (vedāntavākya) and those
acquainted with their teachings (vedāntavedin, vedāntaparāga), and also claims
that the realization of the sa tsthalabrahma
is the essence of Vedas and Vedānta
(vedavedāntasāra, v. 8.80). The concept of sa tsthalabrahma,
defined here as
the central principle of the sa tsthala scheme, will later be integrated into the
Śaktiviśis tādvaita
Vedānta doctrine of Vīraśaivas, where it is equated with the
non-dual Śiva/Brahman qualified by śakti (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1).
Overall, however, there is little in common between the doctrine laid down in
the Anubhavasūtra and Śrīkan tha’s Vedānta theology. Although it is perceptibly
influenced by Vedānta ideas and terminology, and also acknowledges the author-
ity of the Upanisads,
Māyideva’s position is distinctively Vīraśaiva in its focus on
the sa tsthala
doctrine and recognition of the Vātulatantra as its main authority. It
is true that the Anubhavasūtra is possibly the earliest Vīraśaiva work in Sanskrit to
make use of the term śivādvaita, the very same term used by Śrīkan tha to define
his brand of Vedānta (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1). But in Māyideva’s work, the
term does not have the doctrinal sense intended by Śrīkan tha in the BMB. All
instances of the compound in the Anubhavasūtra—śivādvaitavidyā (v. 1.23),
24    - 
śivādvaitapara (v. 1.25), śivādvaitarahasya (v. 1.30) and śivādvaitaparāyana

(v. 8.76)—refer to a state of complete union (advaita) with Śiva or, by extension,
to the knowledge of how to accomplish this union. It is neither the name of a school
nor a claim about the ontological nature of Śiva per se, as in Śrīkan tha’s
system.³²
The Anubhavasūtra influenced another major work of Vīraśaiva theology: the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani of Śivayogi Śivācārya.³³ Śivayogi lays down his teaching in
the form of a dialogue taking place at the beginning of the Kali Age between the
teacher Revanasiddha
and the sage Āgastya. Like the Anubhavasūtra, the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani is divided into two main parts—the first part (pūrvabhāga)
deals with the worshipper or self (aṅ gasthala), and the second part (uttarabhāga)
deals with the worshipped, Śiva (liṅ gasthala)—each of which is subdivided into
several sections. The Siddhāntaśikhāmani notably extends the sa tsthala
scheme
to include ‘one hundred and one stations’ (ekottaraśatasthala), each station
accounting for a specific aspect of Vīraśaiva doctrine and ritual: the application
of ashes (vibhūti) on the body, the wearing of a small liṅ ga on one’s body
(liṅ gadhārana),
the qualities of the guru, donations, mantras, meditation, forms
of worship, the realization of the unity with Śiva, the nature of Śiva, the greatness
of Śakti, the relationship of Śiva and Śakti to the world, etc.³⁴ Śivayogi holds that
the ekottaraśatasthala doctrine constitutes the main Vīraśaiva teaching
(vīraśaivamahātantra). Early modern Vīraśaiva scholars writing on Vedānta
Śivācārya (the author of the Kriyāsāra) and Maritōn tadārya
such as Nīlakan tha
maintain the same view.
As in the Anubhavasūtra, the main aim of the Siddhāntaśikhāmani is to explain
what the Vīraśaiva practitioner ought to know and how he is to worship Śiva, the
guru, etc. in order to reach unity with Śiva. Here too the term śivādvaita is used to
³² This interpretation of the compound is most evident in the verse that recurs at the end of every
section of the Anubhavasūtra: etad yo veda so ’vidyāgranthim vikirati prabhuh | śivasiddhāntakam
tantram śivādvaitam śivam padam ||—‘He who knows this tantra[, which belongs to the]
Śivasiddhānta [tradition], [which teaches] the auspicious state of non-duality with Śiva, tears apart
the knot of ignorance [and becomes] the Lord.’
³³ The Siddhāntaśikhāmani was presumably composed after the Anubhavasūtra, for it contains
verses that are exactly parallel to verses from the Anubhavasūtra and which the commentator
Maritōn tadārya
attributes to the Vātulottara or Vātulatantra. Sanderson (2014: 84, fn. 344) sets the
terminus post quem of the Siddhāntaśikhāmani as 1530 on the basis that it is quoted by Śrīpati in the
However, as argued earlier, the Śrīkarabhāsya
Śrīkarabhāsya. is probably spurious. The earliest work
I know of that quotes from the Siddhāntaśikhāmani is the Kaivalyasāra, a work authored by Virakta
Tōn tadārya
in the second half of the sixteenth century (Ripepi 1997). In light of this, I surmise that the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani was composed between the second half of the fifteenth century and the second
half of the sixteenth century.
³⁴ As noted earlier in this chapter (fn. 31), the ekottaraśatasthala scheme seems to conceptually
presuppose the sa tsthala
scheme. However, it is also possible that the ekottaraśatasthala scheme
coexisted with the sa tsthala scheme in the early stages. In support of this is the fact that Jakkanārya,

a contemporary of Māyideva who also worked under Devarāya II, wrote a work on the
ekottaraśatasthala doctrine, the Ekottaraśatasthalī. Incidentally, this last piece of evidence suggests
that works pertaining to the ekottaraśatasthala doctrine were already in circulation prior to the
composition of the Siddhāntaśikhāmani.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   25
denote the liberated state of unity between the worshipper and Śiva.³⁵ In his work,
Śivayogi lays down an elaborate theology in which Śiva (also referred to as the
supreme liṅ ga) is equated to the non-dual and indescribable Upanisadic
Brahman,³⁶ and in which Śakti, through Her inseparable connection to Śiva,
functions as the material cause of the universe. Like the Anubhavasūtra, the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani also bases its theology on Śaiva āgamas and Purānas and
the underlying Śaiva metaphysics of the thirty-six tattvas, and also acknowledges
the authority of Upanisads/Vedānta.
However, it goes further in its acceptance of
Vedānta, as it claims that its own teachings are in perfect conformity with the
Vedic-Upanisadic
tradition (vedasammata) and that Śaiva scriptures (śaivāgama,
siddhānta) have the same object as the Vedas.³⁷ In some places, Śivayogi shows
familiarity with the conceptual imagery of the non-dualist tradition of Advaita
Vedānta and seems to subscribe to some of its key ideas. He says, for instance, that
Śiva appears to be non-different from the world, just as a rope appears as a snake
in a false cognition, which entails the idea that the world is ultimately illusory, just
as the snake is.³⁸ For Śivayogi, the worshipper is real and distinct from Śiva, and
yet he has the capacity to achieve, through contemplating Śiva as himself (śivo
’ham)—what he otherwise calls the contemplation of supreme non-duality
(paramādvaitabhāvanā)—the blissful and complete union with Śiva.³⁹ In this
³⁵ Like Māyideva (e.g., v. 2.32), Śivayogi uses the term śivajīvaikya (or śivaikya, śivātmaikya or
liṅ gaikya, interchangeably) to describe the close union between the worshipper and Śiva. For Śivayogi’s
usage of the term śivādvaita, see for instance: evam sthire śivādvaite jīvanmukto bhavisyasi—‘When

established in this way in union with Śiva, you will become liberated while alive’ (Siddhāntaśikhāmani:
533). The term śivādvaita is also used by Śivayogi in expressions such as śivādvaitamahā-
nandaparāyana or simply śivādvaitaparāyana, which refer to those whose final aim is the union
with Śiva, or the great bliss resulting from it.
³⁶ For the identification of Śiva with Brahman, see, for instance: brahmeti vyapadeśasya visaya m
yam pracaksate
| vedāntino jaganmūlam tam namāmi param śivam ||—‘I bow down to that supreme
Śiva, the source of the world, whom Vedāntins declare to be the object of the designation “Brahman” ’
(Śiddhāntaśikhāmani: 5). For Śiva/Brahman as non-dual and indescribable, see: advitīyam anirdeśyam
param brahma sanātanam (ibid.: 21). Throughout the work, Śiva is repeatedly defined, like the
Upanisadic
Brahman, as having the nature of existence, consciousness and bliss (saccidānanda).
³⁷ vedadharmābhidhāyitvāt siddhāntākhyah śivāgamah | vedabāhyavirodhitvād vedasammata
ucyate || vedasiddhāntayor aikyam ekārthapratipādanāt |—‘The Śaiva scriptural corpus called
Siddhānta is said to be in conformity with the Vedas since it teaches religious practices [that are
taught] in the Vedas [and] since it is incompatible with heterodox [teachings, i.e., teachings “external”
to the Vedas]. Both Vedas and Siddhānta are one because they teach the same thing [i.e., Śiva as
Brahman]’ (Śiddhāntaśikhāmani: 75).
³⁸ tasmāc chivamayam sarvam jagad etac carācaram | tadabhinnatayā bhāti sarpatvam iva rajjutah
||—‘Therefore, this entire world [consisting of] moving and unmoving [entities] [and] constituted by
Śiva appears to be non-different from [Śiva], just as the snake [appears to be non-different] from the
rope’ (Śiddhāntaśikhāmani: 293). The author of the Tattvapradīpikā, a commentary on the
Śiddhāntaśikhāmani, stresses that the verse conveys that the world is pervaded by Śiva and partakes
of His very nature.
³⁹ See, for instance: nirdhūtamalasambandho niskalaṅ
kamanogatah | śivo ’ham iti bhāvena nirūdho

hi śivaikyatām ||—‘Having got rid of his relation to impurities and made his mind stainless, [devoted
to] the thought “I am Śiva,” he experiences unity with Śiva’ (Siddhāntaśikhāmani: 391, v. 14.5).
26    - 
liberated state, no difference (bheda) whatsoever is perceived by the worshipper:

notions such as ‘lord’ (pati), ‘soul’ (paśu), etc. simply cease to exist.⁴⁰
The Siddhāntaśikhāmani shares more affinities with Śrīkan tha’s
BMB than the
Anubhavasūtra does. First, as just noted, Śivayogi gives greater importance to
Vedānta than Māyideva when he explains the relation between the absolute,
world, and self, and also in claiming, like Śrīkan tha and other South Indian
Śaivas from the late medieval period, that Vedānta and Śaiva scriptures have the
same object (i.e., Brahman as Śiva) and equal authority (see Chapter 3,
Section 3.3). Secondly, like the BMB, it shows a certain familiarity with the non-
dualistic doctrines of Kashmirian Śākta Śaivas. As Sanderson has noted (2014: 84,
fn. 344), Śivayogi employs several distinctively Kashmirian terms throughout his
work. Besides, the Siddhāntaśikhāmani’s opening verse is parallel to Śrīkan tha’s

second opening verse (quoted earlier in this chapter, see Section 1.1) and presents
the same Kashmirian affinities in describing the world as being painted on the
canvas that is Śiva (or Śiva’s śakti).⁴¹ Thirdly, both works display the same central
Śaiva doctrinal features, such as the view that Śiva’s śakti is the material cause of
the world, the emphasis on worshipping Śiva inside the cavity of the heart and the
identification of śakti with the ‘supreme space’ (paramākāśa, parākāśa) and
consciousness. To designate the latter, Śrīkan tha and Śivayogi use the same
cognate terms: cicchakti, cidambara, cidākāśa, etc. These linguistic and doctrinal
affinities, however, need not entail that one work directly influenced the other,
as these terms and concepts—such as the distinctive identification of space
with consciousness and the goddess—already feature in earlier Krama-leaning
Śaiva works, such as the anonymous Mahānayaprakāśa, Maheśvarānanda’s
Mahārthamañjarī (c.1300) and Śrīvatsa’s Cidgaganacandrikā (c.1100–1300).⁴²
These sources, interestingly, are familiar to later Vīraśaiva scholars such as
⁴⁰ For the absence of difference (bheda) in the state of unity with Śiva, and the disappearance of
notions such as paśutva and patitva, see vs. 14.8–9. In his commentary on the next verse (v. 14.10), the
author of the Tattvapradīpikā explains that the notion of difference between self and Śiva
(jīveśvarabheda) is one of the manifestations of the dualistic understanding characteristic of samsāra,

the manifestations of which disappear upon liberation.
⁴¹ Compare the opening verse of the Siddhāntaśikhāmani—trailokyasampadālekhyasamullekhana-

bhittaye | saccidānandarūpāya śivāya brahmane namah || — with the first two introductory verses of
the BMB, namely: aum namo ’hampadārthāya
lokānām siddhihetave | saccidānandarūpāya śivāya
paramātmane || and nijaśaktibhittinirmitanikhilajagajjālacitranikurumbah | sa jayati śivah parātmā
nikhilāgamasārasarvasvam ||.
⁴² The equation between the goddess (śakti), space (vyoman) and consciousness occurs in the figure
of Vyomamāveśī (also called Vyomeśī or Vyomeśvarī) in the Mahānayaprakāśa; see, for instance:
nirvikalpavikalpādisamvidoghasamāśrayā
| yā citis tanmayasparśāt parānandacamatkrti h || sā
bhūtavyomavāmeśī—‘That [state] of consciousness in which the flood of cognitions, be they non-
conceptualised, conceptualised or otherwise, have their resting place, the contact with the evolutes of
which [evokes] the highest delighted wonder, is called She who Emits the Void of the Elements’
(Mahānayaprakāśa: 3, vs. 1.15–16a). This same figure is also mentioned in the Parimala (auto-
commentary) on the Mahārthamañjarī (see comm. on v. 37). The concept of ‘space of consciousness’
(cidvyoman) and that of ‘void of consciousness’ (cidambara) feature in the Cidgaganacandrikā. I am
grateful to Whitney Cox for pointing out to me in a personal communication (4 November 2013) the
aforesaid passage (together with his translation) from the Mahānayaprakāśa.
̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   27
Svaprabhānanda and Maritōn tadārya

(see Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1), and it is thus
likely that Śivayogi may also have been influenced by these or similar sources in
his exegesis. On the other hand, neither Śrīkan tha nor Appaya ever engages with
these sources.
If Śrīkan tha
does not extensively rely on Kashmirian non-dualist works or on
the South Indian works that transmit their doctrines, such as the
Mahārthamañjarī, what were the main sources of his Śaiva exegesis? Was he
possibly influenced by the philosophical writings of Vīraśaivas? The
Anubhavasūtra and the Siddhāntaśikhāmani are, to my knowledge, the two
most influential Vīraśaiva doctrinal works in Sanskrit composed in the pre-
modern period. While both show a leaning towards Vedānta, especially the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani, none of them can be said to strictly defend a Vedānta
doctrine in the way Śrīkan tha
does. It is true, as has been pointed out already
(Fisher 2017a), that Vīraśaivas composed philosophical works that uphold a Śaiva
Vedānta doctrine akin to that of Śrīkan tha, and in which the term śivādvaita
obtains a doctrinal sense as in Śrīkan tha’s
commentary. However, as I shall discuss
further in this chapter and in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1, all these works (at least the
extant Vīraśaiva Vedānta works composed in Sanskrit⁴³) were, all evidence sug-
gests, composed after Appaya, and therefore cannot be held to have influenced
Śrīkan tha’s
theology. The first Vīraśaiva work to actually engage with the BS is the
Kriyāsāra, and it was arguably composed, as I pointed out earlier, in the seven-
teenth century or in the first half of the eighteenth century.
As for the term śivādvaita, Śrīkan tha uses it at least once in his commentary
and in a sense that is more reminiscent of Rāmānuja’s tradition than of the śakti-
oriented Vedānta that was (later) upheld by Vīraśaivas. In his commentary on BS
2.1.14, Śrīkan tha
discusses whether or not Brahman is an enjoyer (bhoktr) of
pleasures and pains like the individual self. In this context, he puts forward a
doubt that could possibly be raised about his own teachings:
The doubt [here] is whether or not the viśis taśivādvaita

[doctrine] that we have
taught earlier—[according to which] nothing but Śiva, who is qualified (viśista)
by the manifestation of sentient and non-sentient [entities], is non-dual, the
cause [of the world] and the effect [i.e., the world itself]—[a doctrine] that has
been established on the basis [that all scriptural texts] are in concordance [with
it], is set aside by reasoning.⁴⁴
⁴³ Note, for instance, that the term śivādvaita appears in the Śūnyasampādane,
an anthology of
poems composed in Kannada in the fifteenth century. However, the term obtains here the same general
sense of a devotional union between Śiva and the devotee.
⁴⁴ yad uktam pūrvatra cidacitprapañcaviśistātmā
śiva evādvitīyah kārana
m
kāryam ca bhavatīti
viśis taśivādvaitam,
tasya samanvayasiddhasya yuktibādhāpattir asti na veti samśaya h (ŚAMD2:
19–20).
28    - 
In this passage, Śrīkan tha

describes his own doctrine—which he labels with the
term viśis taśivādvaita—as
a form of non-dualism in which Brahman (or Śiva), the
cause and effect of the world, is a non-dual (advitīya) entity qualified (viśis ta)
by
sentient and non-sentient entities. His description broadly follows the
Viśis tādvaita
description of Brahman, except that Śiva replaces Vis nu as the
absolute Brahman. Furthermore, while commenting on BS 2.1.14 in his ŚAMD,
Appaya does not hint at the terminology employed by Vīraśaivas: his explanation
is also reminiscent of the Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta tradition.⁴⁵ While it is possible
that Śrīkan tha
implicitly relied on or was influenced by Vīraśaiva Vedānta works
that are yet to be discovered, we currently have no clear evidence to this effect.
1.3.1 Śrīkan tha

and Nīlakan tha

I have noted earlier that the first Sanskrit Vīraśaiva work to engage with the BS
Śivācārya, an influential work on
that I know of is the Kriyāsāra by Nīlakan tha
Vīraśaiva theology and ritual that was arguably composed in the seventeenth
century (Duquette 2020a). The Kriyāsāra contains thirty-two sections or ‘instruc-
tions’ (upadeśa), the first four of which consist in a running commentary on the
BS in the form of mnemonical verses (kārikā), which the author claims to be based
on a commentary (bhāsya) Śivācārya
on the BS authored by another Nīlakan tha
(hence the author of the Kriyāsāra and the author of the commentary on the BS
upon which he relies share the same name). Modern scholars have generally
is Śrīkan tha,
assumed that this Nīlakan tha the author of the BMB known to
Appaya. While several Vīraśaiva scholars (both modern and traditional) agree
from Śrīkan tha
with this, others distinguish Nīlakan tha and claim that the former
authored a commentary on the BS that is now lost.
The evidence provided in support of the view that Nīlakan tha,
the author of the
Śaiva commentary referred to in the Kriyāsāra, is the same as Śrīkan tha, the
author of the BMB, comes down to two observations: (a) Nīlakan tha Śivācārya
and Śrīkan tha
Śivācārya both authored Śaiva commentaries on the BS that defend
a similar theology of ‘non-dualism of the qualified’ (viśis tādvaita),
according to
which the non-dual Śiva (or Brahman) is qualified (viśis ta)
by His power (śakti);⁴⁶
⁴⁵ Appaya’s commentary reads: yad uktam iti. tatra sūksmacidacidviśi h śivah kārana
s ta m

sthūlacidacidviśista
h sa eva kāryam iti viśistaśivādvaitam
ārambha
nādhikara
ne
samarthayisyamā na
m

siddham krtvā
kāryakāranāvasthayor
viśesa nabhūtasya
cidacitprapañcasya taccharīratvam
upapāditam manusyādiśarīragatabālatvayuvatvādinyāyena
taddosā nā m
samsparśa
h śive na bhavatīti
samarthanārtham (ŚAMD2: 19). Note, for instance, the typically Rāmānujian way of describing Śiva as
the cause of the world qualified by subtle sentient and non-sentient entities; and also the Rāmānujian
notions that the manifested world is the body (śarīra) of Brahman, and that this world qualifies the
states (avasthā) of cause and effect characterizing Brahman.
⁴⁶ In the first section of the Kriyāsāra, the author narrates how Śiva, in His incarnation as
Śivācārya, composed a great commentary on the BS in which he upholds a doctrine of
Nīlakan tha
non-dualism of the qualified (viśistādvaita):
[ . . . ] pārvatīpatih || nīlakan thaśivācāryanāmnā
bhāsyam

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   29
(b) a number of scholars (both modern and pre-modern) mention that the author
of Śrīkan tha’s
BMB is Nīlakan tha Śivācārya. I discuss the first observation in detail
in Appendix 4 (Section A4.2). In support of the second observation is the fact, for
instance, that Umāpati Śivācārya (second half of the sixteenth century or later)
says that the author of Śrīkan tha’s
commentary is Nīlakan thācārya
(see fn. 17, this
chapter, above). The Vīraśaiva scholar Maritōn tadārya
(middle of the eighteenth
century) also uses the names Śrīkan tha and Nīlaka n
tha interchangeably in his
Vīraśaivānandacandrikā,⁴⁷ while another Vīraśaiva scholar, Nāgaliṅ ga, explicitly
says in his Śivādvaitaparyaṅ kikā that the name Śrīkan thayogi
(by which he means
the author of the BMB) is another name (parābhidhāna) for Nīlakan tha.⁴⁸
Likewise, a modern commentator on Veṅ katanātha’s Paramatabhaṅ ga, Nārāya-
nācārya,
as the author of Śrīkan tha’s
refers to Nīlakan tha commentary.⁴⁹ Several
other such examples could be provided. To my knowledge, however, no sources
refer to Nīlakan tha
as the author of a commentary on the BS before either
Umāpati (if we assume that he lived in the second half of the sixteenth century)
or the author of the Kriyāsāra (seventeenth century). In other words, the use of the
name Nīlakan tha to denote the author of the BMB appears to be contemporary
with or post-date Appaya.
Given that the famous Appaya systematically mentions Śrīkan tha as the author
of the BMB in his Śivādvaita work, and given that ‘Nīlakan tha’ is a different
personal name than ‘Śrīkan tha’,
we may ask why the authors mentioned above
came to employ the name Nīlakan tha. This is intriguing also in view of the fact
that virtually all colophons of manuscripts of the BMB that I have consulted
acīkarat | viśistādvaitasiddhāntapratipādanam
uttamam ||—‘Under the name of Nīlakan tha Śivācārya,
the Lord of Pārvatī [i.e., Śiva] composed a great commentary teaching the doctrine of non-dualism of
the qualified’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 13, vs. 31d–32). In the following verse, he says that he will convey the
meaning intended in Nīlakan tha’s
commentary in the form of mnemonical verses (kārikā) for the
benefit of his audience: mayāpi tasya tātparyam śrotr nā
m sukhabuddhaye | kārikārūpatah sarvam
kramenaiva
nibadhyate ||—‘In order to facilitate the understanding of [my] audience [lit., in order for
them to have an easy understanding], I shall describe in order, in the form of verses, the intended
meaning of [Nīlakan tha’s
commentary] in its entirety’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 13, v. 33). See also later in the
same section—nīlakan thaśivācāryabhā
syārtham
anusandadhan | vīraśaivair abhimatam abhidhāsye
śruter matam ||—‘Bearing in mind the meaning [laid down] in the commentary of Nīlakan tha
Śivācārya, I shall explain the meaning of scriptures as intended by Vīraśaivas’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 19,
v. 100).
⁴⁷ See in particular the 22nd prakarana, where the colophon mentions Nīlakan tha while one of the
introductory verses mentions Śrīkan tha (Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 425 and 431). See Chapter 5,
Section 5.3.1 for more details on this point.
⁴⁸ tasmān nīlakan thācāryāparābhidhānaśrīka
n thayogiviracitabhā
syasiddha
m viśis tādvaitam
eva
śivādvaitaśabditam ity avadheyam—‘Therefore, it should be considered that what is referred to as
śivādvaita is precisely the non-dualism of the qualified established in the commentary written by
Śrīkan thayogi,
which is another name for Nīlakan thācārya’
(Śivādvaitaparyaṅ kikā: 19). See Chapter 5,
Section 5.3.1 for more details on this work and its reception of Appaya’s work.
⁴⁹ . . . nīlakan thācāryo
vedāntasūtrabhāsyārambhe
‘vyāsasūtram idam netram vidusā
m
brahmadarśane | pūrvācāryaih kalusita m śrīkan thena
prasādyate’ ity āha (Paramatabhaṅ ga: 87). The
verse quoted here is the fifth opening verse of Śrīkan tha’s commentary.
30    - 
mention Śrīkan tha,

not Nīlakan tha,
as the author.⁵⁰ In addition to the fact that a
number of modern Vīraśaiva scholars have argued that Nīlakan tha
is a different
scholar altogether, two other sets of evidence further complicate the matter: (1)
two quotations of a Śaiva commentary on the BS by Nīlakan tha, found in
Vīraśaiva sources, present a text that is not found in our edition of the BMB;
and (2) the text of the commentary by Nīlakan tha Śivācārya presented by the
author of the Kriyāsāra does not always concord with our edition of the
BMB. I discuss this evidence in Appendix 4.
⁵⁰ I have consulted a single manuscript of this work at the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore
(nāgarī script, no. 2824/1) that mentions Nīlakan tha
as the author, but it is a paper manuscript and
therefore fairly recent.
2
Early Śaiva Works
Appaya Dīks: ita was a prolific writer and multifaceted scholar specializing in a
wide range of śāstric disciplines. During his career under the patronage of the
Śaiva ruler Cinnabomma of Vellore, which spanned nearly three decades
(1549–1578), he composed a considerable number of Śaiva works, varying in
genre, authorial intention and subject matter. I shall divide these works into four
broad categories:
A. Polemical Works. Appaya’s Śaiva polemical works focus on demonstrating
the greatness of Śiva and His superiority over Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : Here Appaya
na.
bases his exegesis mainly on the Purānas,: Upani :
s ads and epics, and only rarely on
the BS. Some of these works, like the Śivatattvaviveka and the Brahmatarkastava,
are doctrinal treatises written in the form of devotional hymns (stotra, stava, stuti)
with a self-authored (svopajña) commentary. Others, like the Śivakarnāmr : : ta, the
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra and the Rāmāya :
natātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra, are
shorter works in which Appaya offers more specific arguments in support of Śiva’s
supremacy. Common to all these works is an attempt to counteract, in different
:
ways and degrees, Vais: nava beliefs and doctrines. Some, like the Śivatattvaviveka
and the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta, are for the most part directed against Śrīvais: navas,
: while
others, like the Madhvatantramukhamardana and the Upakramaparākrama,
attack the doctrines and hermeneutical methods of Mādhvas.¹ I discuss some of
these works in this chapter.
B. Devotional Hymns. Aside from hymns composed in praise of Vis: nu- :
Nārāyana: and the goddess, Appaya composed other devotional hymns in praise
of Śiva’s supremacy that are not explicitly directed against Vais: nava: positions.
¹ In the Madhvatantramukhamardana and its commentary, the Madhvamatavidhvamsana, : Appaya

attacks the doctrines and hermeneutical methods used by Madhva in his commentary on the BS. The
Upakramaparākrama is a short polemical treatise in which Appaya refutes views upheld by the
celebrated Mādhva scholar Vyāsatīrtha (1460–1539). It deals with the hermeneutical problem as to
whether the introduction (upakrama) of a text is more important than its conclusion (upasamhāra) :
when it comes to resolving apparent contradictions in the text. While Vyāsatīrtha, following Jayatīrtha
(c.1365–1388) before him, held that the conclusion is more important, Appaya maintains the opposite.
After Appaya, this topic continued to generate interest among Mādhva theologians and to play a
significant role in intra-sectarian debates between Śaivas and Vais: navas : in general. Vijayīndra
(c.1514–1595) composed a rejoinder to Appaya’s Upakramaparākrama, the Upasamhāravijaya; :
another commentator of Madhva, Rāghavendratīrtha (1623–1671), continued to invoke the primacy
:
of the conclusion in his Tattvamañjarī on Madhva’s Anubhā : is
s:ya, in order to demonstrate that Vis: nu
the central object of the Upanis: ads. See Bronner 2015a, McCrea 2015a, and Duquette 2016b for more
details on Appaya’s Upakramaparākrama. See Deshpande 2016 for a study of the influence of Appaya’s
anti-Dvaita works on the early modern grammarian Bhat:t:oji Dīks: ita.
Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India: The Sˊaiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dı k̄ s: ita. Jonathan Duquette,
32    - 
These works include the Ātmārpanastuti,: the Śivamahimakalikāstuti, and the

Pañcaratnastuti. Also worthy of mention here is the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā, a devo-
tional hymn in praise of Śiva, Vis: nu
: and the goddess that has a Śivādvaita Vedānta
leaning. I discuss this work in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.
C. Śaiva Ritual. Appaya seems to have written a single work on Śaiva ritual: the
Śivārcanacandrikā, a ritual manual (paddhati) describing various procedures for
the daily worship of Śiva.² Appaya’s authorship of this work is confirmed by his
grand-nephew, the scholar and poet Nīlakan: t:ha Dīks: ita (seventeenth century), in
the Saubhāgyacandrātapa.³ Since the Śivārcanacandrikā contains no references to
any of Appaya’s other works, and since the other works likewise contain no
reference to it, we have no way of dating the Śivārcanacandrikā relative to
Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre. In terms of content and sources, Appaya’s ritual manual
shows influence from other paddhatis of Śaiva Siddhānta that were composed
and/or widely circulated in South India during the medieval period. In Duquette
2020a, I show how this work is reused in the Kriyāsāra, an influential early
modern treatise on Vīraśaiva ritual and doctrine.
D. Śivādvaita Vedānta. In this category, I include all the works of Appaya that
depend, to a greater or lesser extent, on Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB, most notably the
ŚAMD, the only extant sub-commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śaiva commentary.
While Śivādvaita works are also polemical to some degree, they differ from the
polemical works mentioned above in that they focus on presenting and defending
a consistent Śaiva Vedānta theology, and engage with the interpretation of the BS
propounded by other theologians. Appaya’s Śivādvaita works were composed later
on in his Śaiva career. In support of this is the fact that, for instance, one of
Appaya’s first Śivādvaita works, the ŚAMD, was composed after the
Śivatattvaviveka and the Śivakarnāmr : : ta (it quotes from them ad BS 1.1.2).
Aside from the fact that they arguably have a different agenda and generally
adopt a more aggressive rhetoric, it is significant that the polemical works
mentioned above contain no reference whatsoever to Śrīkan: t:ha, including in
contexts where we would expect at least a passing reference to his teachings (see
Section 2.5, this chapter).
An overall understanding of Appaya’s earlier polemical works is key to under-
standing his later Śivādvaita Vedānta oeuvre. Aside from the fact that they include
arguments about Śiva’s supremacy that are reused and developed further in the
Śivādvaita works, the polemical works feature core theological concepts that
² The New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 34 (p. 103), reports that another ritual manual, titled
Śivadhyānapaddhati, was composed by an ‘Appaya Dīks: ita’. The text is available online (https://
shaivam.org/scripture/Sanskrit/1699/ssk-srimad-appayya-dikshithar-shivadhyana-paddhatih), but no
details are given on the source.
³ asmatpitāmahacaranair: apy es:a eva paks: o likhitah: śivārcanacandrikāyām [ . . . ]—‘This same view
was propounded [lit. written] by my venerable paternal grand-father too in the Śivārcanacandrikā’
(Fisher 2013: 72).
 ś  33
prefigure the fully fledged theology of Śivādvaita Vedānta. In order to lay the
groundwork for my discussion of Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta works in the follow-
ing chapters, I first provide an overview of four representative polemical works of
Appaya, namely the Śivatattvaviveka, the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta, the Brahmatarkastava
:
and the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra. I focus on these works both because of
their relative importance within Appaya’s broader Śaiva oeuvre, and because
:
their anti-Śrīvais: nava rhetoric partly overlap with that found in his later
Śivādvaita Vedānta works.
2.1 Śivatattvaviveka
The Śivatattvaviveka (‘Inquiry into the Śiva-principle’) is an extensive auto-

commentary on the Śikharinīmālā
: (‘Garland of [Verses in the] Śikharinī : [Metre]’),
a hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of sixty verses in the śikharinī
: metre.⁴ All evidence
suggests it is one of Appaya’s earliest Śaiva works, as it is mentioned in the
:
Brahmatarkastava—which itself predates the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra⁵—as well
as in the Madhvatantramukhamardana.⁶ The Śivatattvaviveka is one of Appaya’s
most important Śaiva works in terms of its sheer volume, scope of argumentation
:
(many of its arguments are reused in later works) and elaborate critique of Vais: nava
positions.
This work includes five introductory verses. The first two, also found in the
ŚAMD, praise Śiva as the dark-throated companion of Nārāyanī : and the chastiser
of the intoxicating love god Madana. In the next two verses, Appaya pays homage
to the great teachers that preceded him and to the devotees of Śiva who wish to
achieve liberation. The last verse sums up Appaya’s intention in composing his
work. In this last verse, Appaya remarks that the Śivatattvaviveka is an ‘abstruse
⁴ In his study of Appaya’s devotional hymns, Bronner remarks that the phenomenon of ‘self-
authored commentaries on stotras’ may have been ‘a new development of the late medieval period’
(Bronner 2007: 3). Appaya excelled in this genre of literature, as Bronner illustrates in his study of his
Durgācandrakalāstuti, Śrīvaradarājastava and Ātmārpanastuti. : We may add to this list Śaiva stotras
such as the Śivatattvaviveka, the Brahmatarkastava, the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā, the Pañcaratnastuti and
his two essays on epics. Appaya wrote other Śaiva stotras that have no extant self-authored commen-
tary: for instance, the Śivamahimakalikāstuti, whose only extant commentary was composed by
Tyāgarāja Śāstri (1815-1904), a descendant of Appaya.
⁵ See comm. on verse 6: suprasiddhāni vacanāni brahmatarkastavavivarane : samudāhr: tāni
dras: t:avyāni—‘The well-known statements given as examples in [my] commentary on the Brahma-
:
tarkastava should be examined’ (Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra: 340).
⁶ See v. 14: tad etad asmābhih: śivatattvavivekādis: u prapañcenopapāditam—‘I have explained this in
detail in the Śivatattvaviveka and other works’ (Brahmatarkastava: 29). See also: [i]ti upapāditam asmābhih:
śivatattvaviveke—‘I have proved this in the Śivatattvaviveka’ (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 78). The
Madhvatantramukhamardana was itself composed rather early, that is, before the ŚAMD (its auto-
commentary, the Madhvavidhvamsana, : is referred to ad BS 1.1.1 in the ŚAMD: ayam apy artho
’smābhir madhvavidhvamsana : eva . . . ; ŚAMD1: 91), though after the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha
: (see com-
mentary on v. 15 of the Madhvatantramukhamardana: yuktibhir asmābhih: siddhāntaleśasamgrahādi : s: u . . . ),
which is certainly one of Appaya’s earliest works (Gotszorg 1993: 22–3).
34    - 
commentary’ (vis: amavivr: ti) on the Śikharinīmālā,

: and that it is intended for those
who ‘follow the path of the ancients’ (vr: ddhavartmānuga), namely the teachings
:
of eminent Advaitins such as Śankara, Gaudapāda : and others. The pedagogical
dimension of Appaya’s work, particularly in his hymns and works on poetics, has
been addressed in recent scholarship.⁷ Like several other scholars of the early
modern period, Appaya wrote textbooks and manuals (among which his
Kuvalayānanda is a striking example) that were accessible and intended for
students, as opposed to difficult commentaries intended for a limited audience
of specialists. Appaya’s remark about the ‘path of the ancients’ and the
Śivatattvaviveka being ‘abstruse’ show that this work is not a textbook designed
to ease the process of learning for students, but an erudite commentary for those
:
thoroughly acquainted with the writings of Śankara and others.
In the introduction to the first verse, Appaya describes at length what he intends
to do in the Śivatattvaviveka. He writes this hymn of praise to Śiva in order to put an
end to the blabbering (pralāpa) of ‘evil-minded’ people (kumatikula) who have not
even a tiny bit of devotion to Śiva. He describes these people as being soiled with
impurities of the Kali age (kalimalamalīmasa), as having miserable sins lodged
deep in their heart (hr: dayakuharaviśrāntadurantadurita) and as having a ‘hole
as a mouth’ for they badmouth Śiva ([śiva]nindāmukharamukhabila). In verse 3,
Appaya refers to the same people as ‘infidels’ or ‘heretics’ (avaidika)—note that he
uses the same term in the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta to denote those who follow the teachings of
Pāñcarātra—and, in verse 4, stresses their unwillingness, if not inborn incapacity, to
accept the ‘Vedic truth’ that only Śiva ought to be worshipped. In his own words:
The Vedas clearly proclaim that only You, O Self, transcend the universe and
ought to be worshipped by all people, and yet, alas, rogues dispute even that.
What is this life they live, constrained by their irrepressible need to offend You?
[Only] death can expiate those who listen to their words.⁸
Appaya wonders how these miserable ‘two-legged animals’ (dvipadapaśu) (v. 5)

have become so deluded and incapable of appreciating Śiva’s greatness (vs. 6–7).
Such a lack of faith, he presumes, must result from evil actions performed in
previous lives (v. 9), or else reflect the conditions of the Kali age in which we live
(v. 10). In any case, there is no real way out for them: without Śiva’s grace
(prasāda), they cannot acquire the superior strength of intellect (medhābāhulya)
required to achieve a strong faith (śraddhā) in Śiva, and this grace can only come
after thousands of lives filled with good actions (v. 8). As a matter of fact,
⁷ See especially Bronner 2007.

⁸ tvam evātman viśvādhika iti jagatsevya iti ca spas: t:am
: brūte vedas tad api vivadante bata khalāh. :
kim es:ām: tvaddrohavyasananihatam : jīvanam idam : yaduktīh: śrotr nā
: m: maranam
: uditam: nis: kr: tir iti
:
(Śikharinīmālā: 5).
 ś  35
continues Appaya, only Nārāyana : is capable of the utmost devotion to Śiva (v. 11).
The idea that Nārāyana : worships Śiva and is incidentally subordinate to
Him surfaces time and again in Appaya’s Śaiva works: for instance, in the
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra, where Kr: s: na,
: an incarnation of Vis: nu,: is described
as a great worshipper of Śiva (see Section 2.4, this chapter); in the benedictory
verse of the Ānandalaharī, where Vis: nu : is depicted as bowing down to the feet of
Śiva (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2); or in the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā, where Nārāyana :
functions as an aspect (amśa): of Śiva’s śakti insofar as He is the material cause
(upādānakārana) : of the world (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1).
Both historical and textual evidence suggest that the ‘evil-minded’ people
Appaya has in mind in the Śivatattvaviveka are Śrīvais: navas.: Although members
of the Mādhva community were involved in the intensified Vais: nava : influence in
Vijayanagara from the late fifteenth century onward—most notably Vyāsatīrtha
(1460–1539), an influential Mādhva theologian whose work Appaya knew
and critically engaged with—the current evidence suggests that Śrīvais: navas :
were the dominant socio-religious group in Appaya’s place and time. Several of
Vijayanagara’s royal preceptors (rājaguru) belonged to the illustrious Śrīvais: nava :
Tātācārya family, such as Pañcamatabhañjana Tātācārya, a scholar in his own
right whom later hagiographical sources describe as an important rival of Appaya.
The Prapannāmr: ta, the seventeenth-century Śrīvais: nava : hagiography composed
by Anantācārya, recalls the rivalry between Appaya and Pañcamatabhañjana
Tātācārya, and describes the former as the ‘best among experts on the Śaiva
system’ (śaivaśāstravidām : śres: t:ha) and as being ‘hostile to the Lord [Vis: nu]’ :
(bhagavaddves: in). Significantly, the hagiographer notes that Appaya’s Śaiva theses
have been successfully refuted by Śrīvais: nava : scholars, who thus protected ‘the
undefeated doctrine of the illustrious Rāmānuja’.⁹
In further support of this is internal evidence found in the Śivatattvaviveka. In
verse 60, for instance, Appaya refutes the view that Nārāyana : ought to be
worshipped in every ‘science about the supreme’ (paravidyā), and ascribes this
position primarily to Rāmānuja (rāmānujādi). In verse 16, he critiques the
interpretation of BS 1.3.23 put forward in the ‘commentary of another’
(parabhās: ya); he does not mention the commentator in question, but his wording
points to the Vedāntadīpā, attributed to Rāmānuja.¹⁰ In verse 18, we are told about
the position of ‘others’ who hold that words used in the Upanis: ads to denote the
supreme reality (namely, sat, brahman and ātman) actually denote Nārāyana. :
This position is elaborated in greater detail in the Śivakarnāmr : : ta, and there the
wording suggests that the interpretation Appaya is referring to belongs to the late
⁹ See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3 for more details on this passage from the Prapannāmr: ta and this
work’s authorship. See also Rao 2016 on this same passage and on the broader historical context
underlying the religious tensions between Śaivas and Śrīvais: navas
: in Vijayanagara.
¹⁰ parabhās: yakr: tāpi īśāno bhūtabhavyasyeti paramātmavāciśabdād ity eva vyākhyātam. Compare
with Vedāntadīpā ad BS 1.3.23: īśāno bhūtabhavyasyeti paramātmavāciśabdāt.
36    - 
thirteenth-century Śrīvais: nava

: theologian Sudarśanasūri (see Section 2.2, this
chapter). Appaya also implicitly refers to Sudarśanasūri’s views—as is also made
clear in the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta—in verse 31, where he argues against reading the
mantra ‘nārāyanapara
: m: brahma’ in the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad as signifying
that Nārāyana: is the supreme Brahman. Other implicit references to Śrīvais: nava :
positions are made throughout the Śivatattvaviveka.
One topic that attracts Appaya’s attention is that of denotation: what is the referent
of names like Śiva, Śambhu, Vis: nu,
: Nārāyana : and others in scriptures? This question
had already engaged the attention of Śrīvais: nava : theologians centuries before
Appaya, starting with Rāmānuja himself. For Rāmānuja, Brahman is Nārāyana, :
and the word ‘Śiva’ also denotes Nārāyana.
: As he explains in the Vedārthasamgraha:
:
All the words denoting the supreme reality in all [the different] recensions [of the
passage] beginning with sahasraśīrs: am : devam and ending with sa brahmā sa
śivah: sendrah: so ’ks:arah: paramah: svarād: [in the Nārāyana : section of the
Taittirīya Āranyaka]—[namely]
: ak :
s ara, śiva, śambhu, parabrahman, parajyotis,
paratattva, parāyana,: paramātman, etc.—with all their respective qualities, are
applied to Nārāyana : alone. [This being the case,] by asserting that all the things
that are different from Him are dependent on Him, controlled by Him, accessory
to Him and ensouled by Him, it is communicated that Brahmā and Śiva are
likewise manifestations of Him since they are of the same order [of manifest-
ation] as Indra and the like.¹¹
Since all names used to refer to the supreme reality actually denote Nārāyana, : it
follows that Nārāyana : alone should be meditated upon and that He alone is the
central object of all scriptures. In the Śivatattvaviveka, Appaya argues just the
opposite, namely that Śiva, not Nārāyana,
: is the central deity praised in scriptures.
In verse 46, he says:
[Our opponents claim that] the supremacy of the Lord of the goddess Śrī [i.e.,
:
Nārāyana], and not that of any other deity, is proclaimed in scriptures with
words that have no other meaning [than Nārāyana].: Hence [they claim that] the
meaning [of scriptures] is ascertained precisely on the basis [of these words].
O Conqueror of Death, the lack of study of mantras, Upanis: ads [and other
scriptures] causes fools to make noise in vain in this way.¹²
: devam ity ārabhya sa brahmā sa śivas sendrah: so ’ks: arah: paramah: svarād: iti
¹¹ sahasraśīrs: am
sarvaśākhāsu paratattvapratipādanaparān aks:araśivaśambhuparabrahmaparajyotihparatattvaparā-
:
:
yanaparamātmādisarvaśabdā : tattadgunayogena
ms : : eva prayujya tadvyatiriktasya samasta-
nārāyana
sya tadādhāratām : tanniyāmyatām : tacches: atām
: tadātmakatām : ca pratipādya brahmaśivayor
apīndrādisamānākāratayā tadvibhūtitvam : ca pratipāditam (van Buitenen 1956: 133).
¹² ananyārthaih: śabdaih: śrutis: u parabhāvah: prakat:itah: śriyo devyāh: patyuh: na tu taditares: ām
:
divis:adām | atas tair evārthāvadhr: tir iti mantropanis: adādyanadhyāyo mūdhān : mukharayati
mr: tyuñjaya mudhā || 46 || (Śikharinīmālā:
: 98).
 ś  37
The opponents in question lack the proper knowledge of scriptures, as a result of

which they are bound to interpret their meaning incorrectly. Their strategy, as
Appaya explains in his commentary, is to choose a few scriptural passages that
apparently concern Nārāyana : alone, and infer on this basis that Nārāyana : is the
central object of all scriptures. Here he draws an interesting contrast between the
more comprehensive approach of Advaitins—who hold that meditation on
Brahman with attributes (saguna) : and without attributes (nirguna) : are both
means to ultimately achieve the realization of the absolute Brahman—and the
more narrow, sectarian approach of those who hold that only Brahman with
attributes can be worshipped. He has in mind Śrīvais: navas : who uphold the
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta thesis of non-dualism of the qualified. For Advaitins, the
worship of the personified Brahman in the form of a deity is merely a preliminary
step and could therefore involve any deity; hence they accept the conditional
worship of Nārāyana. : In their view, continues Appaya, it is also an incorrect
hermeneutical practice to rely on a selected number of passages about Nārāyana :
alone to deduce that Nārāyana : is the central deity to be worshipped; this could be
done for virtually any deity. This argument shows that Appaya, at this early stage
of his career, is already committed to the Advaita doctrine of pure non-dualism
(kevalādvaita, śuddhādvaita), which runs in the background of all his later
Śivādvaita works.
As noted earlier, Appaya claims at the beginning of the Śivatattvaviveka that his
only wish is to stop the ‘blabbering’ of those who condemn the worship of Śiva,
and to defend the right to worship Śiva. He is concerned by the rigid sectarianism
:
of Vais: navas, which requires them to abandon the worship of all deities for the
:
sake of worshipping Vis: nu-Nārāya : alone. In verse 61, for instance, he con-
na
demns the ‘fool who abandons You [i.e., Śiva], O Lord of the world, and seeks
another deity to worship’,¹³ a statement that presumably reflects the mounting
importance placed on Vais: nava: religion as well as the concomitant decline of
Śiva’s worship in Appaya’s time and place. However, in several places in the
Śivatattvaviveka, Appaya moves beyond the mere defence of Śiva’s worship and
:
promotes, at times aggressively, His plain superiority over Vis: nu-Nārāya : citing
na,
an abundant number of passages from the Purānas : and epics to this effect. Some
of the arguments he advances here in support of Śiva’s central role in the epics are
:
reused and developed further in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra (see Section 2.4,
:
this chapter) and in the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra. A number of
other arguments draw on the exegesis of the Upanis: ads. In verses 30 and 31, for
instance, Appaya argues that the contemplative practices described in the
Kaivalya Upanis: ad and Mahopanis: ad enjoin worshipping Śiva in the heart, a
: viśvādhika mr: gayate devam itaram

¹³ . . . vihāya tvām : vimūdha
: h: (Śikharinīmālā:
: 138).
38    - 
theme that also figures prominently in his reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology
in the ŚAMD (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3).
Significantly, Appaya barely addresses the interpretation of the BS in the
Śivatattvaviveka. The single exception is verse 40, where he claims that the BS too
are centred on Brahman qua Śiva. In his commentary, he argues that the author of
:
the BS, in BS 1.3.23, holds that the ‘thumb-sized Person’ (angus: t:hamātrah: purus:a)—
referred to as the Lord (īśāna) ‘of what was and what will be’ in the Kat:ha
Upanis:ad¹⁴—denotes the supreme self (paramātman), a view also acceptable, he
:
claims, to his [Śrīvais: nava] opponents (pares: ām api sammata). Since the name īśāna
can only refer to Śiva and not to any other deity, it follows that the author of the BS
held that Śiva is identical to the supreme self, Brahman:
And thus it is concluded that the author of the [Brahma]sūtras holds in his heart
[the view that] the Lord of Umā [i.e., Śiva], denoted by the word īśāna, is
supreme [for the following reason]: since there is no strict rule with regard to
other deities by way of the justification to use [the word īśāna for them], whether
through etymology or through figurative implication, no conventional meaning
can be postulated [for this word]. As a result, it is not possible that scriptures
directly mention the names of those [deities].¹⁵
While it is theoretically possible to use the name īśāna to denote other deities than
Śiva, there is no strict rule (anuśāsana) enforcing the use of this word to denote
these deities, whether through etymology or through figurative implication. It
follows from this absence of restriction that we have to understand the word īśāna
in its natural meaning (as opposed to a given conventional meaning), namely Śiva.
Having established this, Appaya concludes that the author of the BS meant Śiva
when using the word paramātman (which the Kat:ha Upanis:ad equates with
īśāna), and therefore that he held Śiva to be identical to the supreme self, i.e.,
Brahman. This interpretation of BS 1.3.23 recurs in other polemical works of
Appaya. This sūtra is in fact the only one discussed in these works as well. A more
extensive treatment of the BS occurs only in later Śivādvaita Vedānta works.
The Śivatattvaviveka introduces a number of key ideas that Appaya develops
further in his later Śivādvaita works, most notably the idea that Śiva is fundamen-
tally identical to nirguna: Brahman, the non-dual and formless absolute reality.
In his introduction to the first verse, Appaya justifies his attempt to pay homage to
¹⁴ See, for instance, Kat:ha Upanis: ad 4.5: ya imam : madhvadam : veda ātmānam : jīvam antikāt |
īśānam : bhūtabhavyasya na tato vijugupsate ||—‘The man who perceives close [to him] the living,
honey-eating self, the lord of what was and what will be, [that man] does not wish to conceal from it.’
¹⁵ tathā ca yasyāyam īśānaśabdo ’bhidhānam : tasyomāpateh: parabhāvah: sūtrakārasya hr: dayasthito
’vasīyate, devatāntare yogena laks: anayā
: vā prayogopapattyā tes: v anuśāsanābhāvāt rūdhik
: :lptyabhāvena
tadabhidhānaśrutitvāyogād iti bhāvah: (Śikharinīmālā:
: 92).
 ś  39
the personified form of Śiva in the work he is about to write, despite the fact that
:
He is fundamentally devoid of attributes (nirguna):
Even if it is not possible to make the attributeless Śiva-principle (śivatattva) an

object of praise—[given that it is an entity] from which the entire spectrum of
differences in terms of agent, actions, etc. has been removed, [and an entity]
beyond the reach of speech and thought, [both properties that are] communi-
cated in various scriptural and traditional passages such as [ . . . ]—nevertheless,
[Appaya], wishing to pay homage in this work (iha) [ . . . ] to [Śiva’s] embodied
: form referred to by the term ‘supreme Śiva’—[the form in which Śiva] is
(saguna)
accompanied by Umā; [a form] whose distinctions in terms of qualities
:
(guna), etc. are falsely imagined due to the indescribable māyā that resides in
[Himself ] [ . . . ]; [and] the cause of the creation, sustenance and destruction of
the entire world [ . . . ]—indicates [in this first verse] what will be specifically
established in the hymn that he now begins.¹⁶
Appaya holds in this important passage that, from a certain epistemic perspective,
Śiva must be conceived as possessing attributes (guna)—shape,
: colours, and other
specific attributes such as having three eyes and a dark throat, the fact of being
accompanied by Umā, agency with regard to the world, etc.—in order to be
worshipped appropriately.¹⁷ As he says later in the same passage, without wor-
shipping the embodied Śiva, the attempt to gain knowledge of His non-dual and
attributeless reality is bound to fail, as this comprehension can only come through
Śiva’s grace (prasāda). Yet this embodied form is not Śiva’s ultimate reality: like
the diversified phenomenal world, it is ultimately false, a product of the indes-
cribable māyā. At its most fundamental ontological level, Śiva is devoid of any
attribute that can either be conceptualized or put into words. The necessary
relation between Śiva’s grace and the knowledge of His non-dual nature is a
central trope of Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta. It is formulated, for instance, in
the introductory verses of the ŚAMD (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6).
Likewise, in verse 12, Appaya states that Śiva, although endowed with limita-
tions (upādhi) and qualities (guna): on a phenomenal level, is in reality devoid of
limitations (upādhivinirmukta). Śiva is none other than the supreme Brahman
¹⁶ iha yady api [ . . . ] ityādiśrutismr: tisamdohasampratipanna

: m: nirastasamastakartr: karmādibhe-
:
daprapañcam akhilavānmanasapathātītam : nirguna: m : śivatattvam : na stutigocarīkartum : śakyam, :
tathāpi [ . . . ] svādhis:t:hitānirvacanīyamāyākalpitagunādivibhāga
: m: [ . . . ] sakalabhuvanasr: s:t:isthitisam- :
: m
hārakārana : [ . . . ] umāsahāyam: paramaśivaśabditam: tasyaiva saguna : m: rūpam : [ . . . ] stotukāmah: [ . . . ]
prāripsitastotravyavasthāpanīyam artham : sūcayati [ . . . ] (Śikharinīmālā:
: 1–2).
¹⁷ The implied equation between the personified Śiva accompanied by His śakti and saguna :
brahman is explicitly formulated, for instance, in the ninth introductory verse of the ŚAMD: iti
bhagavatā vedavyāsena sūtrayatā param : sagunam
: api tat sāmbam : brahma nyarūpi śivābhidham—
‘This is why the blessed Vedavyāsa, when composing the [Brahma]sūtras, described that supreme
Brahman as also having attributes with the name “Śiva” [and as being] accompanied by Ambā’
(ŚAMD1: 1).
40    - 
consisting of pure existence, consciousness, and bliss (saccidānanda), the inner

self revealed once all dualities have vanished (parābhūtadvaita):
That which [the sages] have declared to be infinite, to consist in unsurpassed

existence, consciousness and bliss, to be pure once all dualities have vanished, to
manifest inwardly, to be the [reality] cognized through the several Upanis: adic
statements that convey an unbroken meaning—That You are, O Mahādeva, the
Light known as the supreme self.¹⁸
When employing the term akhan: dārtha: to describe the type of Upanis: adic
statements through which the non-dual reality of Śiva can be cognized, Appaya
uses a typically Advaitic terminology. The concept of akhan: dārtha
: is indeed of
vital importance to Advaita Vedānta, as it explains how certain linguistic utter-
ances have the capacity to make an impartite object (Brahman) known. Unlike
ordinary sentences construed in terms of a logical subject-predicate relation, these
sentences of ‘unbroken meaning’ express the simple identity of a thing with itself.
Typical examples of such statements are the Upanis: adic mahāvākyas such as tat
tvam asi (‘You are That’), which have the linguistic power to convey the identity
between the individual self and Brahman.
The next verse (v. 13) deserves special attention, given that it was subject to
:
criticism among later Vais: navas (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1). Here Appaya
claims that though Śiva fundamentally transcends all qualities (gunātīta),
: He
nevertheless appears to be endowed with qualities (saguna : iva) inasmuch as He
is ‘mixed with’ or ‘coloured by’ māyā (māyāśabalita):
Though You transcend qualities [of the phenomenal world], You are mixed with
māyā and appear to be endowed with qualities. Adorned with Ambā, a body, a dark
throat and three eyes, You are widely known by the names of Śiva, Bhava and others.
You are victorious, the controller of [all] people as well as Hari, Hara and Brahmā.¹⁹
Appaya begins his commentary on this verse by saying that the above-mentioned
qualities attributed to the supreme Śiva are imagined (kalpita) through the power
of māyā, not ultimately real; that is, these qualities do not participate to or ‘enter’
the reality of Śiva (tattvānupraveśābhava). Hence Śiva cannot be on par with the
three deities of the trimūrti (including Hari, Śiva’s own phenomenal form) since
the latter are ‘really’ endowed with qualities (guna):
: just as He is beyond gunas,: He
¹⁸ anantam : yat prāhur niratiśayasaccitsukhavapuh: parābhūtadvaitaprakaraviśadam : pratyaguditam

| akhan: dārthair
: vedyam: vacananikarair aupanis: adair mahādeva jyotis tad asi paramātmeti viditam ||
:
12 || (Śikharinīmālā: 10).
: ’pi tvam: saguna: iva māyāśabalitah: paris: kurvan sāmbam
: vapurasitakan: t:ha
: :
¹⁹ gunātīto m trinayanam
| abhikhyābhih: khyātah: śivabhavamukhābhir vijayase niyantā lokānām : sahariharapankeruhabhuvām
:
|| 13 || (Śikharinīmālā: 11).
 ś  41
is also beyond the trimūrti.²⁰ However, this does not entail that Śiva is absolutely
formless or without a body (aśarīra):
Some do not wish [to admit the existence] of another entity [i.e., another Śiva]
that functions as the cause of everything [and that] is beyond forms endowed
with qualities [i.e., beyond the trimūrti]. Others, however, think that this [other
entity], having nothing but māyā as its limiting factor, has no body [and] is
denoted only by words such as parabrahman, etc. that are used in the
Brahmasūtras. [The fact that Śiva] is accompanied by Umā is [actually] stated
[in scriptures] from both points of view . . . ²¹
According to Appaya, Śiva is beyond forms and qualities, yet paradoxically has a
body and attributes. When scriptures declare that Śiva is accompanied by Umā, it
does not entail that Śiva is identical to one of the three deities of the trimūrti,
namely Hara (or Rudra) the Destroyer. Nor does it entail that Śiva is beyond the
trimūrti and has no form or attributes. The truth for Appaya lies in between these
two extremes.
At the outset, one may ask: but what is this other Śiva beyond the trimūrti? If it
is referred to by the names Śiva, Bhava, and others, how does it differ from Rudra,
who is also at times referred to by those names? Furthermore, how do we
distinguish this transcendent Śiva from Rudra, given that both have very similar
attributes? As a matter of fact, both entities are more closely related to each other,
in terms of their names and forms, than Brahmā and Vis: nu : are related to each
other. These are questions that Appaya briefly addresses in his commentary. First,
there is a natural linguistic connection (vyutpatti) between the names Śiva, Bhava,
and others on the one hand, and Brahman (identified here to the transcendent
Śiva) on the other hand. People naturally refer to Brahman by using these names
because their understanding of Brahman has become ‘mixed’ or ‘contaminated’
(śabalita) with His having specific forms, such as the fact of having a blue throat,
etc.²² In other words, it is not a problem if the name Śiva and others are used to
denote both Rudra and the ‘other entity’ (tattvāntara) beyond the trimūrti, for
these names do not really denote the latter entity and are only used out of a certain
confusion about the real nature of Brahman. As for the second point, Appaya does
concede that there is confusion among Śaivas concerning the various forms
attributed to Śiva and Rudra:
:
²⁰ gunamūrtibhya h: param : māyopādhikam : jagatkārana : m
: brahmeti vajralepāyate—‘[The view that]
Brahman [i.e., Śiva], the cause of the world, which has māyā as its limiting factor, is beyond forms
endowed with qualities [i.e., beyond the trimūrti], is written in stone’ (Śikharinīmālā: : 13).
:
²¹ atra kecid gunamūrtibhya h: param : sakalakāranabhūta : : tattvāntaram
m : necchanti. anye tu
māyāmātropahitam aśarīram : śārīrakasūtravyavahr: taparabrahmādiśabdamātravācyam : tad iti man-
yante. tadubhayadr: s:t:yomasāhityam uktam : . . . (Śikharinīmālā:
: 11–12).
²² nīlakan: t:hatvādiviśis:t:amūrtiśabalite brahmani : tes: ām
: vyutpatteh,
: prasiddhatvād (Śikharinīmālā:
: 16).
42    - 
Some say that the supreme Śiva has three forms only: the form of the blissful
:
dancer, the form of Daks: ināmūrti and the form of Ardhanārīśvara in the dancing
posture. Others, however, [say that these forms] belong to Rudra endowed with
qualities. I am not pleased with this . . . ²³
Appaya is not pleased because the supreme Śiva is mentioned in some texts as
having the form of the blissful dancer, as sitting with Umā, etc. while sometimes it
is Rudra who is associated with these attributes. Surprisingly, Appaya does not
elaborate further on this slightly contentious point, and readily concludes this
counterargument with this verse:
Thus it is established that the Lord accompanied by Umā [and] with the moon on
His head, is the fourth [entity beyond the trimūrti], the Brahman whose form
[becomes manifest through] māyā, the cause of the world.²⁴
In the rest of his commentary on verse 13, Appaya has recourse to BS 1.2.23
(rūpopanyāsāc ca) to explain why, in his view, the supreme Śiva, despite being
fundamentally devoid of qualities, nevertheless has a form or body. On this point,
:
Appaya differs significantly from Advaitins. Śankara, in his commentary on this
sūtra, discusses the fact that Brahman, described in several scriptural passages as
invisible (adr: śya), is described in other passages as having a form (vigrahavat). For
:
Śankara, this is not a problem: the latter passages simply aim to convey that
Brahman pervades all beings (sarvātma), not that Brahman has actually a form
(vigrahavat).²⁵ Whatever form Brahman may be said to have is merely superim-
posed (āropita) on it for the sake of facilitating worship or meditation. For
Appaya, however, Brahman (or the supreme Śiva) has a form, and this form is
not superimposed for the sake of meditation. When, for instance, the Chāndogya
Upanis: ad declares that the ātman is devoid of old age, death, hunger, thirst, etc.,²⁶
it actually says that the ātman is endowed with the qualities of not having old age,
immortality, etc.; these qualities are not superimposed on the ātman to facilitate
meditation, but are actual attributes. Likewise, says Appaya, Śiva’s form is
²³ kecid āhuh: ānandatān: davavigraho

: daks: ināmūrtivigrahas
: tān: davaparomārdhavigrahaś
: ceti vigra-
:
hatrayam eva paramaśivasya. anye tu gunirudrasyeti. :
tan na rocayāmahe . . . (Śikharinīmālā: 17).
²⁴ evam : māyāvapur brahma turīyam : viśvakāranam
: | umāsahāyo bhagavān indumaulir iti sthitam ||
:
(Śikharinīmālā: 18).
²⁵ katham : punar adr: śyatvādigunakasya
: bhūtayoner vigrahavadrūpam : sambhavati?
: sarvātmatvavi-
vaks: ayedam ucyate, na tu vigrahavattvavivaks: ayā ity ados:ah—‘[An : opponent asks:] How can the
source of beings [i.e., Brahman], endowed with qualities such as invisibility, etc., [be said in some
:
scriptural passages to] have a form? [Śankara answers:] This is not a problem since this is said with the
intention [to convey that Brahman] pervades all beings, not with the intention [to convey] that it has a
form’ (Parimala: 259).
²⁶ See ChU 8.7.1: ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro vimr: tyur viśoko vijighatso ’pipāsah: satyakāmah:
:
satyasamkalpa h: [ . . . ]—‘That self which is free from sins, free from decrepitude, free from death, free
from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst, with true desires and true volitions . . . ’
 ś  43
qualified by the fact of being accompanied by Umā, etc., and this form is not
superimposed for the sake of meditation, but is an actual form.²⁷ In Appaya’s
Śaiva theology, the nature of Śiva as an embodied deity with attributes is compat-
ible with its fundamental nature as an attributeless (nirguna) : reality. This is a
distinctive feature that remains central to his later Śivādvaita works as well.
2.2 Śivakarnāmr
: : ta
Appaya wrote the Śivakarnāmr : : ta (‘Nectar to the Ears of Śiva’²⁸) after the
Śivatattvaviveka. As we shall see (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3), the Śivakarnāmr : : ta
was quickly attacked by Śrīvais: navas:
: Mahācārya, a Śrīvais: nava
: contemporary of
Appaya, devotes an entire work to it, the Śrutitātparyanirnaya.: This is not surpris-
ing for this work is clearly directed against Śrīvais: navas.
: The work opens with five
verses. The first two consist in a praise of Brahman as the personified Śiva—namely,
Sadāśiva²⁹ together with Ambā—the creator of the world, the compassionate refuge
:
and protector of living beings and the remover of the great disease that is samsāra.
The last three verses sum up the purpose of the work:
The vaidikas [hold that] Sadāśiva, who is together with Ambā in His
embodied form, is the eternal [and] supreme Brahman, and that the
phenomenal world is a fragment of His emanation.
Those who are devoted to the Pāñcarātra [teachings], unable to bear
[Śiva’s] supremacy, claim that the purport of all Vedas [is to teach] the
:
supremacy of Vis: nu.
I have described in detail in the Śivatattvaviveka how to refute this view.
I give the gist of this refutation here.³⁰
²⁷ . . . turīyā umāsahāyatvādiviśis:t:ā mūrtih, : sāpi na dhyānārtham āropiteti śakyam vaktum—‘The

fourth form [i.e, the supreme Śiva beyond the trimūrti] is qualified by the fact of being accompanied by
Umā, etc.; and it is not possible to say that this [form] is superimposed [on the attributeless Śiva] for the
:
sake of meditation’ (Śikharinīmālā: 14). Later in the same passage, Appaya concludes: tasmād . . .
dharmino : vigrahasyāpy anāropitatā niścīyate ity upagantavyaiva turīyasyāpi mūrtih—‘Therefore
: . . . it
is concluded that the form too is not superimposed on the quality-possessor, and so it must be accepted
that the fourth [i.e., the supreme Śiva] too has a form’ (ibid.).
:
²⁸ Unlike, for instance, the medieval Kr: s:nakar
: : : ta of Līlāśuka Bilvamangala, which consists of
nāmr
verses in praise of Kr: s: na,
: Appaya’s Śivakar : :
nāmr ta is not a hymn to Śiva but a prose work. However, it
makes sense to translate the title in the same way, namely as ‘Nectar to the Ears of Śiva’.
²⁹ Sadāśiva is one of the main forms of Śiva worshipped in the ritual of Śaiva Siddhānta, and is the
third principle (tattva) (after Śiva and Śakti) in the standard Śaiva list of thirty-six ontological
principles (tattva). Sadāśiva is iconographically represented with five faces and is associated with the
five functions (pañcakr: tya) of the universe over which He governs. Appaya often refers to the pair Śiva-
Ambā with the term Sāmbaśiva.
³⁰ sadāśivah: param : brahma sāmbamūrtih: sanātanah: | vibhūtileśas tasyaiva prapañca iti vaidikāh:
|| pāñcarātrasthitās tasya parabhāve dhr: tāks:amāh: | vis:no : h: paratve vedānām api tātparyam ūcire
|| tannirāsaprakāro ’tra samk : pradarśyate | śivatattvaviveke yah: prapañcenopapāditah: ||
: s: epena
(Śivakarnāmr: : ta: 243).
44    - 
Just as he does in the Śivatattvaviveka, Appaya ascribes the view that Śiva is
Brahman to vaidikas. Accordingly, later in this work, he refers to those who
disagree with this view—he further specifies that they are ‘devoted to the
Pāñcarātra [teachings]’ (pāñcarātrasthita)—as ‘infidels’ or ‘heretics’ (avaidika).
His aim in composing the Śivakarnāmr : : ta is to lay down concise arguments
against their view that the Vedas (by which he means especially the Upanis: ads)
:
are intent on praising Vis: nu-Nārāya : Since he has already refuted this view in
na.
detail in the Śivatattvaviveka, he only intends to summarize his refutation here.
He divides the work into two sections: a long pūrvapaks: a including arguments by
the pāñcarātrasthitas, and a longer siddhānta in which Appaya defends the view
that Śiva, not Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : is the supreme deity referred to in Upanis: ads.
na,
Although the identity of the pāñcarātrasthitas in question is not made explicit
here, it is clear from a closer analysis of the arguments presented in the text that
the focus is once again on Śrīvais: navas:
: the opponent (pūrvapaks: in) right at the
beginning of the text turns out to be Sudarśanasūri, with whose views Appaya had
also engaged in the Śivatattvaviveka, and who remains a major opponent in his later
Śivādvaita work as well (see, e.g., Chapter 4, Section 4.3).³¹ Also in support of this
view is the fact that the only direct reply to the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta I am aware of was put
forward by a Śrīvais: nava
: scholar, Mahācārya (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3).
The first argument advanced by the pūrvapaks: in concerns denotation, a topic
already dealt with in the Śivatattvaviveka but developed further here. Although a
seminal version of this argument is already found in Rāmānuja’s Vedānta works
(for instance in his Vedārthasamgraha), : as well as in Vātsyavaradaguru’s
:
Tattvanirnaya, the wording used by Appaya points to Sudarśanasūri’s more
extensive argument found in his sub-commentary on Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās:ya, the
Śrutaprakāśikā, specifically his sub-commentary on the introductory verse.
Rāmānuja’s introductory verse reads as follows:
May my intellect be engrossed in devotion to the supreme Brahman, the abode of

Śrī (śrīnivāsa), for whom the creation, sustenance, destruction, etc. of the entire
universe is [just] a sport, who is consecrated solely to the protection of the
various creatures bent down [before Him] and who shines brilliantly in the
Upanis: ads.³²
³¹ The authority of the Pāñcarātra scriptural corpus was not only acknowledged by Śrīvais: nava :
scholars of Vedānta but also by Mādhva scholars. Although Madhva himself does not engage with this
corpus in his commentary on the BS—he actually interprets the pāñcarātrādhikarana : (BS 2.2.39–42) as
a criticism of the Śākta system rather than the Pāñcarātra system (see Sharma 1981: 113–14)—Mādhva
scholars of Vedānta after him, notably Vyāsatīrtha, defended the authority of Pāñcarātra. In his
Tātparyacandrikā, Vyāsatīrtha begins his commentary on this adhikarana
: : by refuting the view,
prominently upheld by Śankara, that the origination of the individual self (jīva) is taught in
Pāñcarātra, and defends this system’s authority (prāmānya) : based on a number of passages from
: and epics.
Purānas
:
³² akhilabhuvanajanmasthemabhangādilīle vinatavividhabhūtavrātaraks: aikadīks: e | śrutiśirasi vidīpte
brahmani : śrīnivāse bhavatu mama parasmin śemus: ī bhaktirūpā || (Śrībhās:ya, introductory verse).
 ś  45
In his commentary on this verse, Sudarśanasūri invokes the Mīmāmsā : herme-

neutical principle according to which a generic word (sāmānyapada) can denote a
specific word (viśes:apada) under certain conditions. This rule is discussed in MS
:
6.8.30–43, a section of the Mīmāmsāsūtras concerning the obtainment of the
animal (paśu) to be sacrificed during the Jyotis: t:oma sacrifice. As Śabara explains,
the doubt here is whether any animal or a particular animal should be sacrificed.
The pūrvapaks:a (MS 6.8.30) states that there is no restriction concerning the
animal to be sacrificed, because the term ‘animal’ (paśu) appearing in the
injunction—namely, ‘One should sacrifice with the animal’ (paśunā yajeta³³)—is
generic (sāmānya) and does not involve any specification (viśes: a). The
siddhāntin’s reply (MS 6.8.31) is that, to the contrary, there are scriptural grounds
for limiting the scope of the word paśu to a specific animal, in this case, a goat
(chāga), since the word chāga appears in the Vedic mantra ‘to the marrow of the
goat with the skin of the intestines’ (chāgasya vapāyā medasah³⁴). : If any animal
could be chosen for the Jyotis: t:oma sacrifice, the word chāga in this mantra would
simply have no purpose (anarthavat). In this case, we must accept that the generic
word paśu used in the injunction specifically denotes a goat. In the same way,
argues Sudarśanasūri, the generic word brahman denotes Nārāyana, : the entity
referred to by the specific word śrīnivāsa (‘the abode of Śrī’) in the same verse:
The generic word brahmani : [in Rāmānuja’s verse] aims to indicate generic
Upanis: adic terms such as sat, brahman, ātman, etc. The specific word śrīnivāsa
[in Rāmānuja’s verse] aims to indicate specific terms such as Nārāyana, : etc.
According to the principle stated in the [Mīmāmsā]sūtra, : ‘chāgo vā
:
mantravarnāt’ [MS 6.8.31] [concerning the two scriptural passages], ‘paśunā
yajeta’ [and] ‘chāgasya vapāyā medasah’,: it is determined that the word ‘animal’
(paśu) ultimately means ‘goat’ (chāga) [in the context of the animal sacrifice
performed during the Jyotis:t:oma sacrifice]. Since [this implies that] words
expressing something general (sāmānyavācin) ultimately mean something spe-
cific when there is a specific word [mentioned in their proximity], [Rāmānuja]
suggests [in his introductory verse] that generic words such as sat, brahman, etc.
ultimately denote a specific [entity], namely Nārāyana : alone.³⁵
³³ This injunction is found in a number of scriptural passages; see Benson 2010: 62, fn. 86.
³⁴ See, for instance, Taittirīya Brāhmana: 3.6.8.1. See Benson 2010: 189, fn. 165 for other scriptural
sources of this injunction.
:
³⁵ brahmanīti sāmānyapadam aupanis: adānām : sadbrahmātmādisāmānyaśabdānām :
pradarśanārtham. śrīnivāsa iti viśes:apadam : nārāyanādiviśe
: s: aśabdānām : pradarśanārtham. ‘paśunā
yajeta’ ‘chāgasya vapāyā medasah’ : ity atra ‘chāgo vā mantravarnāt’ : iti (MS 6.8.31) sūtroktanyāyena
paśuśabdasya :
chāgaśabdaparyavasāyitvanirnayāt sāmānyavācipadānām : viśes: apade sati
tatparyavasāyitvāt sadbrahmādisāmānyaśabdānām : nārāyana : eva viśes: e paryavasānam : sūcitam
(Śrutaprakāśikā 2006: 6). The same argument is formulated slightly differently in Sudarśanasūri’s
Tātparyadīpikā on Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasamgraha : (see Tātparyadīpikā: 211–12).
46    - 
While this hermeneutical principle is used in Mīmāmsā : to clarify the performative

nature of certain ritual injunctions, it is used by Sudarśanasūri in his sub-
commentary with a view towards establishing the identity between Brahman and
: In the background of this first argument put forward by Sudarśanasūri is
Nārāyana.
the question of whether Śiva or Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : is the supreme deity referred to in
na
the Upanis: ads as a whole. Sudarśanasūri indeed claims shortly after this explanation
that Nārāyana: cannot be regarded as inferior to Brahman or Śiva:
Because [the word brahman] can technically mean [Nārāyana], : the fact that [the
three deities of the] trimūrti are the same, that [the three deities of the] trimūrti
are one, and that Brahman is superior to [the three deities of the trimūrti] is
refuted. The following position is also rejected: ‘Īśvara alone is Brahman; this
[Brahman] is Sadāśiva [i.e., Śiva] [and] transcends the trimūrti; the three [deities]
beginning with Brahmā are not the Lord [Śiva].’³⁶
Sudarśanasūri rejects the claim that Śiva is a ‘fourth’ entity identical to Brahman and
transcending the trimūrti. It is not clear whether Sudarśanasūri refers here to a
position held by a specific Śaiva author or if he is simply paraphrasing a well-known
Śaiva position, but his reference to a Śaiva paks: a in this context confirms something
we already know, namely that theological debates between Śaivas and Vais: navas :
on the question of which deity is supreme were prevalent prior to the late thirteenth
century. More than a century before Sudarśanasūri, Rāmānuja had indeed argued
against a Śaiva-leaning interpretation of the Upanis: ads in the Vedārthasamgraha :
and other works, while Sudarśanasūri’s predecessor Vātsyavaradaguru, in his
:
Tattvanirnaya, had refuted the Śaiva view that Rudra is the supreme reality
referred to in scriptures. In this same work, Vātsyavaradaguru also makes use of the
aforementioned Mīmāmsā : principle of interpretation, but interestingly only in his
Śaiva pūrvapaks:a. I have not been able to trace this argument in early Śaiva literature.
Sudarśanasūri’s paks:a also shows that the view that Śiva transcends the trimūrti—a
view that is central to Appaya’s polemics in the Śivatattvaviveka and generated
much criticism after him (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1)—was not Appaya’s own contri-
bution but was held centuries before him.
Appaya does not reply directly to this argument in the Śivakarnāmr : : ta. After
paraphrasing Sudarśanasūri on this point at the beginning of his pūrvapaks:a,³⁷
Appaya introduces a [Śaiva] opponent who raises a number of short objections
:
³⁶ rūdhiśaktyā trimūrtisāmyam, : tadaikyam, : brahmanas
: taduttīrnatva
: : ca nis: iddham, ‘īśvara eva
m
brahma, sa trimūrtyatiriktah: sadāśivah, : brahmādayas trayo ’py anīśvarāh’ : iti paks: aś ca vyudastah:
(Śrutaprakāśikā 2006: 6).
³⁷ Compare Sudarśanasūri’s argument (see above, fn. 35) with Appaya’s pūrvapaks: a: sa [=nārāyana] :
eva param : brahmety avasīyate [ . . . ] sadbrahmātmādisāmānyaśabdasya ‘agnīs:omīyam : paśum ālabheta’
iti vidhivākyapat:hitasya gavādisādhāranasya : paśuśabdasya ‘chāgasya vapāyā medasah’ : iti mantrapra-
tipannachāga iva purus: ottama eva ‘chāgo vā mantravarnāt’ : iti s:as:t:hāntyādhikarananyāyena
:
: : ta: 244).
paryavasānāt (Śivakarnāmr
 ś  47
claiming that Śiva, not Nārāyana, : is the central object of the Upanis: ads; each
objection is met by the pūrvapaks:in, who maintains that even in those passages
where Śiva (or Rudra, Īśa or Maheśvara) is explicitly mentioned as supreme,
Nārāyana : is in fact the implied referent.
Towards the end of the pūrvapaks:a, he raises an argument that recurs in his
other Śaiva works, concerning the interpretation of the mantra ‘nārāyanapara : m:
brahma’ found in the Mahānārāyana : Upani :
s ad. The compound nārāya :
naparam
can be analysed in two ways, leading to two opposite interpretations: (a) by taking
nārāyana : as a separate word with an elision of the nominative case ending, thus
expressing the fact that Nārāyana : is the supreme Brahman (i.e., nārāyana : param :
brahma); or (b) by taking nārāyana : in composition with param, and reading the
compound as an ablative tatpurus:a expressing the fact that Brahman is ‘greater’ or
‘other’ than Nārāyana : (i.e., nārāyanāt
: param : brahma). The pūrvapaks: in argues
that the second interpretation, which he ascribes to Pāśupatas, is incorrect.³⁸ First,
reading nārāyana : as a separate word with elision of the nominative ending is
possible, and is seen in similar Vedic passages. Secondly, even if one reads
nārāyana : in composition as Pāśupatas do, it is more appropriate to analyse the
compound as a karmadhāraya rather than an ablative tatpurus: a, in accordance
with the nis: ādasthapati rule of interpretation.³⁹ Thirdly, a tatpurus:a interpret-
ation is untenable in light of other scriptural passages in which the expression
param : brahma is also found, and where a karmadhāraya interpretation is clearly
needed. Therefore, only the first interpretation of the Mahānārāyana : mantra is
legitimate. These three arguments are precisely those put forward by Sudarśanasūri
in his commentary on Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasamgraha, : the Tātparyadīpikā.⁴⁰
The pūrvapaks:a concludes with the assertion that since Nārāyana : is superior to
all deities, He alone should be worshipped and resorted to by those who wish to
achieve liberation.⁴¹ In his siddhānta, Appaya arrives at the opposite conclusion.
³⁸ pāśupatānām : nārāyanāt
: param : brahmeti vyākhyānam, tad ayuktam—‘The Pāśupatas’ interpre-
tation [of the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad mantra], namely “The supreme Brahman is other/greater than
: is incorrect’ (Śivakarnāmr
Nārāyana,” : : ta: 252).
³⁹ Śabara discusses this rule of interpretation in his commentary on MS 6.1.51. In the sentence ‘With
this sacrifice he shall cause a nis:ādasthapati to sacrifice,’ we can either analyse the compound
nis:ādasthapati as meaning ‘leader (sthapati) of the Nis: ādas’ (genitive tatpurus: a) or as meaning ‘leader
who is a Nis: āda’ (karmadhāraya). At first sight, the first interpretation seems better, since Nis: ādas are
non-Aryans who are not allowed to participate in Vedic rites. However, Śabara argues that the second
interpretation is more appropriate because the word nis:āda in nis:ādasthapati literally (śravanena) :
means a ‘Nis: āda’ while the genitive force in ‘of the Nis: ādas’ is arrived at only secondarily or by
implication (laks:anayā).
: In other words, when possible, a karmadhāraya interpretation is always to be
preferred to a tatpurus: a interpretation. On the basis of this principle, Appaya’s pūrvapaks: in holds that
:
the compound nārāyanaparam is better interpreted as a karmadhāraya. See Bronkhorst 2007: 364 for
this explanation of the nis:ādasthapati principle.
⁴⁰ See Tātparyadīpikā: 218.
⁴¹ tasmāt nārāyanasya
: :
sarvakāranatvena sarvottaratvād brahmaśivādīnām : tatparatantratvāc ca
sthirapurus:ārthaprepsubhih: sa evopāsanīyah: prapattavyaś ca—‘Therefore, since Nārāyana : is superior
to all [deities] inasmuch as He is their cause, and since Brahmā, Śiva and other [deities] depend on
Him, He alone should be worshipped and taken as refuge by those who wish to achieve the permanent
48    - 
According to him, all śrutis, smr: tis and Purānas

: concur in claiming that Śiva, not
Nārāyana, : is the cause of the world and the independent ruler of all. For this
reason, Śiva alone ought to be worshipped and clearly understood by those who
wish to achieve liberation.⁴² Appaya revisits most of the issues addressed by the
pūrvapaks:in, in particular the controversial interpretation of the aforementioned
Mahānārāyana : mantra. If we agree with the pūrvapaks:in in taking nārāyana: as a
separate word (i.e., nārāyana : para :
m brahma), argues Appaya, the mantra would
express the fact that there is non-difference (abheda) between Nārāyana : and
Brahman, but merely in the figurative sense that Nārāyana : is a great worshipper
(upāsaka) of Brahman and as such feels oneness with Brahman. Centuries before
Appaya, this interpretation had been held by Haradatta Śivācārya, whom we have
mentioned earlier (Chapter 1, Section 1.1) as a possible source of inspiration for
Śrīkan: t:ha. In verse 42 of his Śrutisūktimālā, Haradatta says:
:
O supreme Lord, Padmanābha [i.e., Vis: nu-Nārāya : is called the supreme
na]
Brahman, the supreme reality and the supreme light, since, delighting only in
the contemplation of You, He is non-different from You, just as the mantra-
: (garutmat) by contemplating Garuda.⁴³
wielder (mantrin) becomes Garuda :
:
This verse offers an explanation as to why Vis: nu-Nārāya : is sometimes called the
na
supreme Brahman: it is because He is identified with Śiva—who is Himself
identified with Brahman—while worshipping Him. Just like the mantra-wielder
(mantrin) who wishes to overcome the effect of a snake’s poison contemplates
Garuda :
: (the divine bird, enemy of snakes) as one with himself, Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na
contemplates Śiva/Brahman as one with Himself while worshipping Him.
:
Haradatta’s commentator, Śivalingabhūpa, introduces this verse with an objection
saying that it makes no sense to hold that Nārāyana: worships Śiva/Brahman, given
that the Mahānārāyana : mantra ‘nārāya :
na para m: brahma’ conveys precisely that
Nārāyana: is identical to Brahman.⁴⁴ In his view, Haradatta interprets this mantra
aim of human existence [namely, liberation]’ (Śivakarnāmr : : ta: 253). Note the use of the gerundive
prapattavyah,: which is arguably a reference to the Śrīvais: nava
: doctrine of total self-surrender (prapatti)
:
to Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na.
⁴² tasmāt sarvakāranatvasarvādhi
: s: t:hātr: tvānanyaniyamyatvādigunaga: nayukta
: : brahma paramaśiva
m
evety asminn arthe sarvaśrutismr: tipurānānām: avipratipatteh: sadāśiva eva paramapurus:ārthaprepsubhir
upāsanīyah: pratipattavyaś ca (Śivakarnāmr : : ta: 285). Note that in this passage, which closely parallels the
one mentioned at the end of the pūrvapaks:a (see above, fn. 41, this chapter), Appaya does not use the
gerundive prapattavyah: (‘resorted to’), but rather pratipattavyah: (‘understood’), which does not have a
:
[Śrīvais: nava] devotional connotation, but merely a cognitive one.
⁴³ brahmocyate param asau paramam : ca tattvam : jyotih: param: ca parameśvara padmanābhah: |
tvadbhāvanaikarasikas tvadananyabhāvān mantrī yathā garudabhāvanayā : garutmān ||
(Śrutisūktimālā: 78–9).
⁴⁴ nanu nārāyanasyopāsakatve
: nārāyana : param : brahma ityādivākyena tasya parabrahmatvād
upāsakadharmābhidhānam : na samgacchata
: ity [ata āha]—‘But surely, if Nārāyana: is a worshipper
[of Śiva/Brahman], the mention of the attribute ‘worshipper’ (upāsakadharma) makes no sense, since
 ś  49
by taking nārāyana: as a separate word and reading it in syntactic agreement with

the word brahman, thus expressing the fact that Nārāyana : is non-different from
the supreme Brahman. However, he stresses that this identity is not factual: it is
due to the fact that, just as the mantra-wielder does not actually become Garuda:
but only feels oneness with Garuda, : Nārāyana: ‘feels one’ with the object of His
intense worship, namely Śiva/Brahman. The point is that the claimed identity
between Nārāyana : and Śiva/Brahman is only figurative: Nārāyana : remains a
worshipper (upāsaka) of Śiva/Brahman.
Although he does not mention Haradatta in this context, Appaya adopts the
same interpretation while examining the karmadhāraya interpretation of the
verse. Whether we take the view that Śiva and Nārāyana : are non-different from
each other or the view that they are different, this interpretation of the verse is
never problematic for Appaya:
As for the [karmadhāraya interpretation of the Mahānārāyana : mantra]

‘nārāyana
: :
h para :
m brahma’, it too is not in any way contradicted when taking
the view that Nārāyana: is non-different from Śiva [since Śiva, being equal to
: remains supreme]. However, in the view [that Nārāyana]
Nārāyana, : is different
[from Śiva], [the mantra] must be interpreted as conveying that Nārāyana’s :
[apparent] identity [with the supreme Brahman, i.e., Śiva] is achieved by con-
templating the state of the supreme Brahman [i.e., Śiva].⁴⁵
Appaya’s intention here is to keep Śiva’s supremacy intact. If one maintains

that Nārāyana: is non-different from Śiva—Appaya is not a priori against this
view, and will actually defend it in his later Śivādvaita work—then the
Mahānārāyana : mantra (interpreted as a karmadhāraya) conveys that Nārāyana :
is the supreme Brahman inasmuch as He is identical to Śiva; Śiva remains
supreme. If one maintains, on the other hand, that Nārāyana: is different from
Śiva, then the verse must be reinterpreted in the way Haradatta does, that is, as
conveying that Nārāyana : is identical with the supreme Brahman (implicitly
identified with Śiva), but only insofar as He contemplates Him. Here too Śiva
:
remains superior to Nārāyana.
in the sentence “nārāyana

: param : is [identical to] the supreme Brahman’
: brahma” [Nārāyana]
(Śrutisūktimālā: 79).
⁴⁵ yat tu ‘nārāyana: h: param: brahma’ iti tad api nārāyanasya : śivābhedapaks: e na kathamcid
: viru-
dhyate. bhedapaks: e tu nārāyanasya: :
parabrahmabhāvabhāvanāsiddhatadbhāvopavarnanaparatayā
neyam (Śivakarnāmr: : ta: 279). It is significant that Appaya explicitly accepts here the view that Śiva is
non-different from Nārāyana : as a valid paks: a; it actually prefigures his view, expressed in several places
in his later Śivādvaita works, that Nārāyana: is as divine as Śiva. This passage from the Śivakarnāmr
: : ta is
sometimes quoted by later defenders of Appaya (e.g., Ayyan: na : Dīks: ita in the conclusion of his
:
Vyāsatātparyanirnaya) who wish to highlight his liberal take on the supremacy of Nārāyana : in order
to demonstrate his leaning towards Advaita Vedānta.
50    - 
Nor does Appaya see any problem with the tatpurus: a interpretation of the
mantra, which the pūrvapaks:in ascribes to Pāśupatas. Not only does it directly
express the superiority of Śiva over Nārāyana, : but it is also grammatically possible,
since, under certain conditions (particularly in Vedic expressions), Pānini’s: sūtra
7.1.39 (supām : suluk . . . ) allows the replacement of a nominative case ending (e.g.,
nārāyana: h)
: with an ablative case ending (e.g., nārāyanāt).⁴⁶
: Note that Appaya, in
line with Śrīkan: t:ha, favours this interpretation in his ŚAMD, and that he quotes
the aforementioned verse from Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā in its support—in spite
of the fact, as we have just seen, that Haradatta himself does not uphold a
tatpurus:a interpretation.⁴⁷
In the rest of his siddhānta, Appaya provides a number of additional arguments
in support of his thesis that Śiva is supreme. One key argument relates to a passage
from the Mahābhārata that admittedly supports the identity between Śiva and
Brahman. The passage reads as follows:
Yudhis: t:hira is the great tree of dharma, Arjuna its trunk, Bhīmasena its branches;
the twin sons of Mādrī its full-grown fruits and flowers, and its roots are Kr: s: na,
:
Brahman and the brahmins.⁴⁸
Appaya argues that the word brahman in this passage is used in the sense of Śiva.
He does not clearly explain here why this is the case, but in other works, he makes
it clear that it is because Śiva helped Yudhis: t:hira to gain back his kingdom. Since
Śiva fulfilled this important role, he is likened to the ‘root’ of the tree of dharma, to
which Yudhis: t:hira is compared. Three ‘roots’ are mentioned in the passage—
: Brahman and the brahmins—and Śiva can only be equated with Brahman.
Kr: s: na,
The argument is only briefly alluded to here, but Appaya returns to it in detail
in the Brahmatarkastava (see Section 2.3, this chapter) as well as in the
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra (see Section 2.4, this chapter).
⁴⁶ nārāyanāt: param : brahma iti pāśupatavyākhyāne ’pi na dos:ah: . . . ‘supām : suluk’ iti sūtrena
:
pañcamyāh: svādeśakalpanasambhavāt : . . . —‘There is no problem either with the interpretation of
Pāśupatas, namely “Brahman is superior to Nārāyana” : . . . because it is possible, by means of the
sūtra supām : suluk [PāS 7.1.39], to postulate a substitution of the nominative case ending (su, i.e.,
nārāyana: h)
: by the ablative case ending [i.e., nārāyanāt]’ : : : ta: 280). PāS 7.1.39 offers a
(Śivakarnāmr
series of replacements for nominal endings (sup) in the Vedic. Applied here, this rule allows for
substituting nārāyana : h: in the mantra with nārāyanāt, : which validates the Pāśupata interpretation.
⁴⁷ In his sub-commentary ad BS 1.2.5, while taking sides with Śrīkan: t:ha’s tatpurus: a interpretation of
the Mahānārāyana : mantra, Appaya acknowledges that Haradatta ‘boldly’ understood nārāyana : as a
separate word in the verse, that is, in sāmānādhikaranya : with the word brahma: tātparyasamgrahe :
tv ācāryaih: nārāyanetyetad: bhinnam : padam iti praudhivādenābhyupagamya
: :
nārāyanasya
parabrahmatvādikam : [ . . . ] upanyastam—‘However, in the Tātparyasamgraha, : the ācārya [i.e.,
Haradatta] insinuates that Nārāyana : is the supreme Brahman, etc. through boldly accepting that [the
word] “Nārāyana” : is a separate word [in the Mahānārāyana : verse]’ (ŚAMD1: 325). The
:
Tātparyasamgraha is another name for the Śrutisūktimālā.
⁴⁸ yudhis:t:hiro dharmamayo mahān drumah: skandho ’rjuno bhīmaseno ’sya śākhā | mādrīsutau
pus: paphale samr: ddhe mūlam : kr: s:no
: brahma ca brāhmanāś : ca || (Mahābhārata 1.1.66).
 ś  51
Appaya also discusses the aforementioned interpretation of BS 1.3.23, accord-

:
ing to which the ‘thumb-sized Person’ (angus: t:hamātrah: purus: a), referred to as the
Lord (īśāna) in the Kat:ha Upanis: ad, denotes the supreme self. Since the name
īśāna is well known to denote Śiva, we must conclude that the author of the BS,
Bādarāyana,: was of the view that Śiva is identical to the supreme self or Brahman.
This is supported here by the fact that Vyāsa—the traditional author of the
Mahābhārata who is also traditionally identified as the author of the BS—claims
this identity in the aforementioned Mahābhārata passage. As in the Śivatattvaviveka,
Appaya barely addresses the interpretation of the BS in the Śivakarnāmr : : ta, even
though he is clearly concerned (as he himself claims in his introductory verses) with
how Śrīvais: navas
: have misinterpreted the Upanis: ads. Aside from his reference to BS
1.3.23 towards the end of the siddhānta, we find a single other mention of the same
sūtra earlier in the siddhānta, in response to the objection that the word īśāna need
not refer to Śiva in particular.⁴⁹
2.3 Brahmatarkastava
Like the Śivatattvaviveka, the Brahmatarkastava (‘Hymn [in the Form of a]

Reflection on [Śiva as] Brahman’) is a devotional hymn (stava) in praise of Śiva
with a self-authored commentary (vivarana).: Here Appaya pursues—albeit in a
less polemical fashion—the same strategy of demonstrating how scriptures (śruti)
and the works supporting those scriptures (upabr: mha : concur in declaring Śiva
: na)
to be the supreme Brahman.⁵⁰ Although exegesis remains central to Appaya’s
argumentation here, the Brahmatarkastava styles itself as more ‘analytical’ than
the other polemical works, as suggested by the word tarka (‘reasoning’) in the title.
⁴⁹ The opponent claims in this context that the word īśāna etymologically denotes the quality of
: and can as such denote any deity. Appaya agrees with this but stresses that
sovereignty (aiśvaryaguna),
this word, in addition, also has a conventional meaning that must prevail over the etymological
meaning in this context: that of the Lord (Īśvara), i.e., Śiva. He refers to BS 1.3.23 in order to make
the point that Bādarāyana : himself implicitly holds the view that īśāna has a specific (asādhārana) :
meaning, namely that of the supreme self (paramātman), and not a general (sādhārana) : one as argued
by the opponent. See Śivakarnāmr : : ta: 259–60. Note, however, that his claim here that īśāna has a
conventional meaning seems to contradict the point he makes in the Śivatattvaviveka (see Section 2.1,
this chapter).
⁵⁰ See v. 1: uccāvacair upanis:advacanaprakān: dair : :
unmīlitaśrutiganair upabr: mha
: naiś
: ca | yat
:
sādaram : samuditam : yaminām upāsya :
m tad brahma śankara bhavān iti tarkayāmah: ||—‘We shall
:
reflect on the fact that You, Śankara, are that Brahman worshipped by ascetics [and] spoken of
reverently in all scriptures, which are unconcealed by the excellent and lofty sayings of the
Upanis: ads, and in the works that reveal the meaning of these scriptures’ (Brahmatarkastava: 1). In
his commentary, Appaya explains that the term upabr: mha : na : and epics, and that
: refers to the Purānas
:
the particle ca in the verse refers to the BS: purānetihāsarūpair upabr: mha
: nai: h: cakārād brahmasūtraiś
ca yat sādaram : pratipāditam : brahma tad bhavān eveti tarkayāmah—‘We : shall reflect on the fact that
no one but You [i.e., Śiva] are that Brahman explained reverently in works supporting scriptures,
namely Purānas: and epics, and [also] in the Brahmasūtras, because of the phoneme ca [in the verse]’
(Brahmatarkastava: 2). However, he barely discusses the BS in this work.
52    - 
The work’s analytical approach is reflected, for instance, in Appaya’s occasional

use of maxims or principles of interpretation (nyāya),⁵¹ as well as in the way he
structures the work as a whole. The work is divided into two parts. The first part
(vs. 2–14) includes arguments establishing (sādhaka) the identity between Śiva
and Brahman; the second part (vs. 15–51) includes counterarguments—‘prattled
:
by fools’ (bāliśaih: pralapita), as Appaya says, again a reference to Vais: navas, given
the nature of the arguments presented (see below)—refuting (bādhaka) this
identity. The underlying logic here, recurrent in contexts of logical argumenta-
tion,⁵² is that for a claim to be logically acceptable, it must be established through
valid arguments (pramāna) : and by showing that there is no other argument
against its validity. The Brahmatarkastava differs from the Śivatattvaviveka in
its shorter length—the former contains fifty-two verses with a much shorter
commentary—and the fact that its arguments are generally less technical and
presented in a simpler way. Unlike the Śivatattvaviveka, which is explicitly
designed for an erudite audience, the Brahmatarkastava might have been written
in order to educate a wider community of Śaivas.⁵³
Most of the analysis deployed in the Brahmatarkastava is based on passages
taken from the Purānas : and epics. Although he also comments on a number of
passages from the Upanis: ads, Appaya devotes little time in the Brahmatarkastava
to establishing that the Brahman eulogized in the Upanis: ads, or in the BS for that
matter, is Śiva. Only verse 2 deals with this topic, and with particular reference to
Upanis: adic statements of creation (kāranavākya).
: In his commentary, Appaya
first argues—against Rāmānuja and his followers, who claim that the names of
Śiva used in the Upanis: ads, such as Hara, Śiva, Rudra, and Maheśvara, do not
denote Śiva but rather Nārāyana—that
: all names of Śiva are really names of Śiva,
and not of Nārāyana. : Since these deities are all described, at one place or another,
:
as supreme in kāranavākyas, it follows that Śiva is supreme, the creator of the
world. In addition, since all kāranavākyas : make use of generic words
(sāmānyapada) such as sat, brahman, and ātman to denote the creator of the
world, it must be the case that these terms refer to Śiva only. This claim presum-
ably responds to the argument advanced by Sudarśanasūri, with which Appaya
engages in the Śivatattvaviveka and the Śivakarnāmr : : ta.
From verse 3 onwards, Appaya turns his attention to the Purānas : and epics.
In verse 3, he cites a number of passages from the Kūrmapurāna : and the
⁵¹ . . . tarkayāmo nyāyair niścinuma ity arthah—‘

: “We shall reflect” means “We shall ascertain by
means of principles of interpretation” ’ (Brahmatarkastava: 2).
⁵² Vācaspati Miśra (fl. 950) holds, in his Bhāmatī ad BS 1.1.1, that it is necessary to engage with both
positive and negative proofs (pramāna) : in a context of logical argumentation: vipratipattih:
:
sādhakabādhakapramānābhāve :
sati samśayabījam uktam—‘Disagreement is said to be a source of
doubt in the absence of [both] positive and negative proofs.’
⁵³ Bronner 2007 has argued that Appaya’s stotras were primarily meant as pedagogical tools to reach
out and educate wider communities of listeners. Another example of a Śaiva stotra arguably intended
for a wider Śaiva audience is the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1).
 ś  53
Śivapurāna: to support his claim, made in verse 2, that the Upanis: ads uphold the
identity between Śiva and Brahman as the creator of the world. Noteworthy here is
his use of the ‘principle of the forest and the lion’ (vanasimhanyāya)
: to explain
how śruti and upabr: mha
: na—the
: : in this context—
Upanis: ads and the Purānas
support one another in demonstrating that Śiva is the supreme Brahman. The
:
vanasimhanyāya denotes a mutually beneficial relationship: the lion needs the
forest to live, and the forest needs the lion to protect it from the numerous
herbivorous animals that would otherwise come and consume its plants, etc. in
too great a quantity. Just as the lion and the forest help each other, so do śruti and
upabr: mha
: na: support each other in reinforcing the identity between Śiva and
Brahman. As Appaya applies it in this context, however, the vanasimhanyāya :
expresses not so much a mutual relationship as a relationship in which one party
benefits the other (anugrāhyānugrāhakabhāva):
Since they agree with [their] root scriptures (mūlaśruti) both in words and
meaning in this way, [auxiliary texts] (upabr: mha
: na)
: support the fact that root
scriptures too are intent on Śiva. Since they are [hermeneutically] powerful on
their own, because of the principle of the forest and the lion, [auxiliary texts]
specifically establish that the supreme Brahman, the cause of the world, is
nothing but Śiva; this is the meaning.⁵⁴
While śruti stands on its own, the role of the upabr: mha
: na—by
: virtue of being in
agreement (lit. of ‘one kind’, ekarūpa) with its root scripture (mūlaśruti), that is,
the specific scripture it supports—is to reinforce what the śruti already claims, in
this case that Śiva is Brahman. Following this principle, the upabr: mha
: na : func-
tions as the benefactor (anugrāhaka), the śruti as the beneficiary (anugrāhya).
Appaya’s use of this principle in order to demonstrate Śiva’s supremacy exempli-
fies the sort of logical argumentation he relies on in this work.
Up to verse 15, where the second part of the Brahmatarkastava begins, Appaya
explores various implications of the denotation argument already discussed in the
Śivakarnāmr
: : ta, namely that the word brahman denotes Śiva in the passage from
the Mahābhārata where Yudhis: t:hira is compared to a tree of dharma and
Brahman to its roots (see Section 2.2, this chapter). The argument is discussed
in greater detail here, and some of the points raised here for the first time are
:
reused in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra. One such point concerns the different
meanings generally attributed to the word brahman. Appaya introduces an
opponent who objects that, until now, it has never been claimed that the word
⁵⁴ [upabr: mha
: ny]
: evam : śabdato ’rthataś ca mūlaśrutyekarūpatayā mūlaśrutīnām apy avicalām :
śivaparatām : pratis:t:hāpayanti. vanasimhanyāyena
: svayam api balavanti santi śivaikāntikam eva
:
jagatkāranaparabrahmabhāva m: vyavasthāpayantīty arthah: (Brahmatarkastava: 8).
54    - 
brahman denotes Śiva in this particular passage from the Mahābhārata.⁵⁵ The
: brahmins, the
word brahman is generally used, he says, to denote either Vis: nu,
Vedas or penance (tapas).⁵⁶ Appaya replies to this argument at the beginning of
verse 5:
: [=Kr: s: na]
Since Vis: nu : and brahmins are mentioned separately [in the
Mahābhārata passage in question] [and] since it would go against the general
reading if we were to accept a reading in which either the insentient Vedas or the
insentient tapas [as the entity denoted by the word brahman] is found between
[two] sentient entities [namely, Kr: s: na
: and the brahmins], it is not appropriate to
interpret [the word brahman] in these [senses].⁵⁷
The word brahman cannot denote Vis: nu/Kr : : s: na

: or brahmins, since these words
are mentioned alongside the word brahman in the Mahābhārata passage (!
kr: s: no
: brahma ca brāhmanāś : ca). Nor is it appropriate to interpret the word
brahman as meaning either the Vedas or tapas—other possible synonyms of the
word brahman—since both of these words denote insentient (acetana) entities,
whereas the word brahman is found in the passage between two words denoting
sentient (cetana) entities, namely Kr: s: na
: and brahmins. We would rather expect
that the word brahman denotes a sentient entity by virtue of being found in the
proximity of these two words. Moreover, the entity denoted by the word brahman
should function as the primary cause (kārana) : for Yudhis: t:hira’s preservation of
his kingdom, since brahman is likened in the passage to one of the roots of the tree
of dharma, which represents Yudhis: t:hira. In the following verses, Appaya pro-
ceeds to show that Śiva alone plays this role in the Mahābhārata since He
repeatedly helps the Pān: davas
: in their struggle to gain back their kingdom. This
leads to further discussion as to why Kr: s: na
: is not, as generally assumed, the one
who really helps Yudhis: t:hira. One of Appaya’s arguments against this, developed
in verse 13 and also reused in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra,: is that the
Bhagavadgītā declares Śiva to be superior to Kr: s: na: insofar as Kr: s: na
: himself claims
that He has taken refuge in Śiva (see Section 2.4, this chapter).
The last argument advanced by Appaya to demonstrate that Śiva is the supreme
Brahman is found in verse 14, and merely rephrases the argument concerning the
interpretation of BS 1.3.23 found in the Śivakarnāmr : : ta and earlier in the
Śivatattvaviveka. Since Vyāsa, the traditional author of the Mahābhārata, is
⁵⁵ brahmapadam : śivaparam iti nādyāpi sampratipannam

: (Brahmatarkastava: 9). The opponent’s
claim that no one ‘until now’ (adyāpi) has ever suggested that the word brahman means Śiva is worth
noting. Was Appaya really the first one to propound this view?
⁵⁶ See, for instance, Amarakos: a 3.3.583: vedas tattvam
: tapo brahma brahmā viprah: prajāpatih.
: This
: but all the other terms mentioned by Appaya are included in it. :
list does not include Vis: nu
⁵⁷ vis: nor
: dvijānām : ca pr: thaggrahanād
: vedatapasor acetanayoś cetanamadhye pāt:hāngīkāre
prāyapāt:havirodhān naites:ām : grahana: m: yuktam (Brahmatarkastava: 9).
 ś  55
himself of the view that Śiva is the supreme Brahman—as confirmed by his usage
of the word brahman in the sense of Śiva in the passage where Yudhis: t:hira is
compared to the tree of dharma—as the author of the BS, he also ‘suggests’
(√vyañj) the same idea in the BS. This idea, namely that Śiva’s supremacy is
merely ‘suggested’ (vyañjita) and not made explicit in a given text, plays a
:
prominent role in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra. Note also that it is the only
place in the Brahmatarkastava where Appaya mentions the BS, despite the fact
that he considers the latter as one of the upabr: mha : nas
: based on which he
intended to prove his claim that Śiva is Brahman. Let us recall once more that
BS 1.3.23 is the only sūtra discussed in the Śivatattvaviveka and in the
Śivakarnāmr
: : ta. I comment below (Section 2.5, this chapter) on the cursory
treatment of the BS in these early polemical works.
With verse 15 begins the refutation of the arguments advanced by opponents
who wish to deny that Śiva is identified with Brahman. The arguments essentially
concern the nature of Śiva. Unlike Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : Śiva allegedly has a number of
na,
‘faults’ or ‘defects’ (dos: a)—ranging from the fact of being born from Brahmā (or
Nārāyana): to that of being endowed with the quality of darkness/ignorance
(tamas)—that prevent Him from being supreme. Appaya first replies to these
accusations with a general argument. In verse 16, he claims that Śiva cannot be
endowed with these defects since He transcends the trimūrti as well as the three
: of sattva, rajas and tamas. Hence Śiva cannot be born from another deity,
gunas
nor can He be subject to the phenomenal interplay of gunas. : He adds that all the
passages cited by opponents in support of their claim that Śiva is endowed with
such defects concern only Śiva’s emanations (vibhūti), such as Rudra the
:
Destroyer (samhārarudra) and others, who as Śiva’s regents do participate in
the phenomenal world. Appaya addresses the topic of emanations in greater detail
:
in his commentary on verse 8 of the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra, and argues there
that the scriptural passages teaching that Śiva is inferior (apakars: a) to other deities
actually present distinctive features (viśes:ana)
: that are understandable only if they
concern Śiva’s emanations.
From verse 17 to verse 34, Appaya examines in detail each of the defects
attributed to Śiva and quotes against this selected passages from the Purānas. : In
his commentary on verse 19, for instance, he reinterprets Purānic : passages where
Śiva is described as originating from Brahmā’s or Nārāyana’s : forehead (lalāt:a).
Rather than betraying Śiva’s dependence on these two deities, these passages
highlight Śiva’s self-willed (! svecchādhīna) manifestation (abhivyakti) out of
Brahmā or Nārāyana. : From verses 20 to 27, he argues that Nārāyana, : not Śiva, is
actually endowed with the quality of tamas. In verse 21, for instance, Appaya
replies to the objection that Śiva has a tamasic character insofar as He committed
cruel acts of punishment (nigraha) against deities, such as when He cut off the
fifth head of Brahmā or destroyed the sacrifice of Daks: a. Such acts, argues the
opponent, are cruel (krura) because they do not have an appropriate object
56    - 
(anucitavis: aya) and are done purely for the sake of violence. Appaya replies that
punishment, albeit cruel in appearance, is often beneficial:
To begin with, punishment has many forms: [there is the punishment] that aims
to benefit and [the punishment] that does not. As for the first [form of punish-
ment], it is threefold: a) to help those who should be helped; b) to help all the
others; and c) to help both [groups]. Among these, the first [form of beneficial
punishment] consists in the punishment of sons, students, etc. with the aim that
they maintain their good behaviour, etc.; and this [form of beneficial punish-
ment] is precisely a quality[, not a fault, on the part of the punisher].⁵⁸
Appaya implies that every time Śiva punished a deity, it was with a view to helping
that deity in need (anugrāhya), never out of uncontrolled anger or for the pleasure
of being cruel. Appaya further argues that if Śiva can be accused of being
overcome by tamas because He presumably acted with cruelty, as claimed by
:
the opponents, the same could be said of Vis: nu-Nārāya : incarnations, such as
na’s
Rāma, who harshly defeated some of his opponents. While he does not attempt to
:
prove here that Vis: nu-Nārāya : has a tamasic nature, Appaya dismisses the claim
na
:
that Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na is endowed with the quality of sattva. To have such a quality,
says Appaya, implies promoting only what is good and true (sattvapravartaka; see
v. 24) and granting liberating knowledge (muktihetujñānaprada; see v. 25) and
unsurpassed bliss (niratiśayasukhaprada; see vs. 26–7) to all beings, all qualities
that Śiva alone possesses.
In the following verses, Appaya offers a number of arguments supporting Śiva’s
supremacy that are not found in his other polemical works. It is worth noting his
:
original interpretation of the origins of the Gangā river in verses 35–7. There are
:
two stories at stake here: (a) the story according to which Śiva placed the Gangā
:
river on His head following Bhagīratha’s request to the goddess Gangā to come to
:
earth; and (b) the story according to which the Gangā river originated from
:
Vis: nu’s toe when Brahmā performed an ablution on Vis: nu’s : foot (in His incar-
nation as Vāmana/Trivikrama).⁵⁹ A Vais: nava : may argue—the argument goes
back at least to the Bhāgavatapurāna : (see below)—that Vi ::
s nu is superior to Śiva
:
because Śiva bears on His head the Gangā river that originated from Vis: nu’s : foot.
: superior because the divine river originated from Him and not
Not only is Vis: nu
from Śiva, but also because Śiva bears on His head something that touched Vis: nu’s :
⁵⁸ nigrahas tāvad vividhah: : anugrahoddeśyakas tadanuddeśyakaś ca. ādyo ’pi trividhah:

:
anugrāhyānugrahoddeśyakas taditarānugrahoddeśyaka ubhayānugrahoddeśyakaś ca. tatrādyah:
sadācārānuvartanādyarthah: putraśis: yādinigrahah.
: sa tu guna
: eva (Brahmatarkastava: 39).
⁵⁹ Multiple versions of both stories are found in Purānas.
:
 ś  57
foot, a clear indication that Śiva is worshipping Vis: nu

: or is at least inferior to
Him.⁶⁰ In his introduction to verse 36, Appaya responds as follows:
:
If Śiva’s bearing of the Gangā for the sake of benefiting the world had been done
:
at the time of [Vis: nu’s] incarnation as Trivikrama, then there might be some
room for the prattling of those frogs in the well who are fully satisfied with
listening to five-syllable [mantras from the Bhāgavatapurāna] : such as ‘Śiva
became Śiva because He bears on His head the best of holy waters, that is, the
:
river that came out [of Vis: nu’s foot] [during] His purification [i.e., the ablution
performed by Brahmā]. One should meditate for a long time on the lotus feet of
: which [are like a] thunderbolt hurled [to shatter] the mountain
the Lord [Vis: nu],
of impurities [stored] in the mind of the meditating [devotee]’! However, [Śiva]
:
bears [on His head] only the [divine] Gangā of the Himālaya mountain, who
pleased Bhagīratha [and] who is located in the world of Brahmā . . . ⁶¹
The ‘frogs in the well’ (kūpaman: dūka) : is a derogative term⁶² used here by
:
Appaya to address Vais: navas who rejoice in listening to ‘five-syllable mantras’
(pañcāks:aramantra)—also a derogative reference here⁶³—from the Bhāgavatapurāna, :
:
a text revered by Vais: navas. In the passage from this work quoted by Appaya here, it
:
is highlighted that Śiva became Śiva because He placed on His head the Gangā river
:
purified by Vis: nu’s :
foot, a clear statement of Vis: nu’s superiority over Śiva. In his
commentary on verse 36, Appaya responds to this argument by saying—his
:
argument is unprecedented, to my knowledge—that there are actually two Gangā
⁶⁰ While several Vais: navas

: interpreted the story in this way—hence Appaya’s response in the
Brahmatarkastava—some medieval scholars interpreted the same story as confirming Śiva’s greatness.
:
At the end of his Nais: karmyasiddhi, the Advaitin Sureśvara praises Śiva for having taken the Gangā
:
river back from Vis: nu : through His yogic power and likens Him to Śankara, the Advaita ācārya who
:
acquired the knowledge of non-duality (Gangā is identified here with vidyā, the ‘science’ of non-
:
duality). Sureśvara in his turn obtained this knowledge from Śankara and taught it in the
Nais:karmyasiddhi out of compassion for those who suffer in order to eradicate what leads to
:
birth and death. See: vis:no : h: pādānugām : yām : nikhilabhavanudam : śankaro ’vāpa yogāt :
sarvajñam:
brahmasamstha: m: muniganasahita
: m: samyag abhyarcya bhaktyā | vidyām : gangām ivāham :
:
pravaragunanidhe h: prāpya vedāntadīptām : kārunyāt
: tām avocam : janimr: tinivahadhvastaye duhkhitebhya
: h:
|| (Nais: karmyasiddhi: 204).
:
⁶¹ evam : lokopakārārtham : śivena kr: tam : gangādhāranam: api yadi trivikramāvatārakāle syāt tadā
‘yac chaucanihsr: : tasaritpravarodakena tīrthena mūrdhni vidhr: tena śivah: śivo ’bhūt | dhyātur manaś ca
malaśailanisr: s:t:avajram : dhyāyec ciram : bhagavataś caranāravindam
: ||’ ityādipañcāks: ara-
śravanaparitu
: s:t:ānām : kūpaman: dūkānā
: m: pralapitasya kiyān apy avakāśa h: syād iti. idam
: tu dhārana : m:
:
bhagīrathaprasāditāyāś caturmukhalokasthitāyā haimavatyā eva gangāyā . . . (Brahmatarkastava: 60).
⁶² The so-called ‘frog in the well’ refers to a frog who lives in a well, knows nothing other than this
well, does not talk to anyone and fears everything else around.
⁶³ Appaya presumably favoured the six-syllable mantra (s:adak : s: aramantra: om namah: śivāya) over
the five-syllable mantra (pañcāks:aramantra: namah: śivāya). In the ŚAMD, for instance, he refers to the
former as śrīs: adak : s: aramahāmantra (ŚAMD1: 4). According to Sanderson, the s:adak : s:aramantra was
used by brahmins, whereas the pañcāks:aramantra was used by non-brahmins (Sanderson 2014: 88, fn.
359). Appaya may be implying here that Vais: navas : living in his place and time are not real brahmins,
though they claim to be so. Alternatively, he might simply be disparaging the fact that Vais: navas : seem
to rejoice in listening to a mantra that is partly paying homage to Śiva.
58    - 
rivers: (a) the river associated with the goddess, which was located in heaven and
brought to earth at Bhagīratha’s request (this is the river that Śiva bears on His head,
as the passage above makes clear); and (b) another river that originated from
:
Vis: nu’s foot at the time of the ablutions performed by Brahmā. While the first
still flows through the north-eastern plains of the Bhārata country and thus
continues to benefit its inhabitants, the second eventually divided into four currents
and entered the ocean, thus becoming useless to the inhabitants of the Bhārata
:
country.⁶⁴ The argument that there is not one but two distinct Gangā rivers was
:
refuted later on by Vais: navas, for instance by the Śuddhādvaitin Purus: ottama in his
Avatāravādāvalī (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2).
:
It is worth noting that in his early Advaita work, the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha,
:
Appaya invokes the metaphor of the Gangā issuing from Vis: nu’s : foot in a positive
:
way while paying homage to Śankara’s tradition in the opening verse (v. 1):
Victorious is the rebirth-destroying discourse [i.e., Brahmasūtrabhās: ya] that

:
issued forth from the revered lotus face of the Bhagavatpāda [i.e., Śankara],
which has as its only object the non-duality of Brahman and which was diver-
:
sified a thousandfold upon reaching previous scholars, just like the river [Gangā],
: [was diversified a thousandfold] upon
which issued forth from the foot of Vis: nu,
reaching different lands.⁶⁵
: : :
This verse compares Śankara’s commentary to the Gangā: just as the one Gangā
:
river was divided into different rivers upon reaching different lands, Śankara’s
commentary, although having a unitary meaning intent on proving the
non-duality of Brahman, was interpreted differently by the Advaita ācāryas of
the past. The idea behind the verse is to explain the variety of interpretations of
the Brahmasūtrabhās:ya, and convey that despite this diversity, a single unitary
meaning underlies it.
The concluding verse of the Brahmatarkastava sums up what has been dis-
cussed in the work, and encapsulates two ideas that are central to Appaya’s later
⁶⁴ See the first sentence of Appaya’s commentary on verse 36 (Brahmatarkastava: 60–1).

⁶⁵ adhigatabhidā pūrvācāryān upetya sahasradhā sarid iva mahībhāgān samprāpya śauripadodgatā
| jayati bhagavatpādaśrīmanmukhāmbujanirgatā jananaharanī : sūktir brahmādvayaikaparāyanā : ||
:
(Siddhāntaleśasamgraha: 1). This verse is also found in another Advaita work authored by Appaya,
namely the Nyāyaraks:āmani : (v. 8). Note that in medieval philosophical and theological works, the
:
waters of the Gangā purified by the contact with Vis: nu’s : foot are sometimes invoked to purify the
readers. See, for instance, Sarvajñātman’s phalaśruti at the end of his Samk
: : s: epaśārīraka:
aviralapadapanktih: padmanābhasya punyā : : ::
caranakamaladhūligrāhi nī bhāratīyam | ghanataram
upaghātam : śreyasah: śrotr: samghāt
: surasarid iva sadyo mārs:t:u māngalyahetuh: ||—‘May this holy
composition containing words compact [with meaning] [and] causing auspiciousness because it
contains the dust from Vis: nu’s: lotus feet, immediately wash away the very heavy impediments to
: :
welfare [caused by samsāra] for the community of scholars [of Vedānta], just like the River of the Gods
: feet gathered during His Trivikrama incarnation and
[i.e., Gangā, which also bears the dust of Vis: nu’s
thus washes away the impediments of samsāra]’ : (Veezhinathan 1972: 543).
 ś  59
Śivādvaita theology and that we have already seen expressed in his other
Śaiva works:
: this
O Lord, who is praised by [all beings, starting with] Brahmā and Vis: nu,
Brahmatarkastava was composed purely out of devotion [to You] [with the idea]
that You can be understood through devotion. Although this [composition] is
:
devoid of any merit (nirguna), may it forever be, through Your compassion, a
bouquet [though devoid of fragrance] offered during worship at Your two feet.⁶⁶
First, Appaya conveys that the non-dual Śiva identified with the supreme
Brahman can be an object of worship, and that pure devotion can lead to the
gnostic understanding of His real nature. He had already expressed this idea in
the Śivatattvaviveka, when he said that without the grace (prasāda) of Śiva, the
attempt to gain knowledge of the attributeless Śiva is bound to fail. This idea also
plays an important role in Śivādvaita Vedānta theology, where devotion to Śiva
and the resulting grace (anugraha) is a sine qua non of the pursuit of the
knowledge of non-duality and self-knowledge (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.6).
Secondly, Appaya says in this concluding verse that Śiva is the supreme deity
because He is worshipped even by Brahmā and Vis: nu. : As noted earlier, Appaya
:
typically hails Vis: nu (or one of His incarnations) as the foremost worshipper of
Śiva, thus highlighting both Vis: nu’s
: greatness and His subordination to Śiva. As
we shall see later, this subordination takes on a specific meaning in Śivādvaita
Vedānta theology, where Vis: nu,: as an aspect (amśa) of Śiva’s śakti, functions as
the material cause (upādānakārana) : of the world.
2.4 Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra
:
:
The Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra (‘The Hymn Summarizing the Gist of the
Mahābhārata’) is also a hymn (stotra) dedicated to Śiva with a self-authored
:
commentary (vivarana).⁶⁷ Shorter than the Brahmatarkastava—it includes
only twenty verses—this hymn was written after it, as Appaya quotes the
⁶⁶ brahmopendrapramukhavinuta brahmatarkastavo ’yam : bhaktigrāhyas tvam iti bhagavan nirmito

bhaktimātrāt | pādadvandve tava karunayā : : ’pi tvadīye pūjāpus:paprakarapadavīm es:a pus:nātu
nirguno :
nityam || (Brahmatarkastava: 103). The adjective nirguna : is a pun: it means both devoid of merit (or
poetic qualities) and devoid of fragrance [i.e., fragrance being a guna : of flowers]. Appaya conveys here
that his hymn of praise is without merit or poetic qualities, and as such is comparable to a bouquet of
flowers devoid of fragrance. Yet, like the bouquet, he hopes that this work can nonetheless be offered for
worship and hopefully be well received.
⁶⁷ Part of the material covered in this section comes from readings in which I participated at the Faculty
:
of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford, in 2015–16. Essays on the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra will be
published with Primus Books (Delhi) in 2021 in a volume edited by Christopher Minkowski, provisionally
titled Studies in Appayya Dīks: ita.
60    - 
Brahmatarkastavavivarana : in it.⁶⁸ Composed in the same accessible style as

his other hymns, presumably, once again, to instruct a wider audience of Śaivas,
:
the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra elaborates upon an idea found in the
Brahmatarkastava, namely that the underlying intent (tātparya) of the
Mahābhārata is to praise the supremacy of Śiva (śivapāramya). Prior to
:
Appaya, Vais: nava scholars had been reading the Mahābhārata as a theistic text
:
focused on the supremacy of Vis: nu-Nārāya : starting with Madhva, who was the
na,
first to promote a Vis: nu-centric
: reading of the Mahābhārata by highlighting the
inferiority of Śiva in the epic.⁶⁹ While broad attempts to harmonize Śaiva religion
with the Mahābhārata had been made by earlier Śaivas,⁷⁰ Appaya is to my
knowledge the first scholar to challenge the Vais: nava: claim about the intent of
the Mahābhārata and to reinterpret it as a Śiva-centred text.
:
One of the key features of the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra is to show that the
import of the Mahābhārata is conveyed by making use of the poetical device
of suggestion (dhvani). Appaya uses a similar argument in his essay on the
Rāmāyana, : the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa
: :
mgrahastotra, but he elaborates the
argument in greater detail here.⁷¹ In the first verse, Appaya states that Vyāsa,
the author of the Mahābhārata, decided to compose a work about the deeds of the
Pān: davas
: with the apparent intention to express the greatness of Kr: s: na,
: who
helped them in various ways. However, his real intention was to teach a higher
truth (param : tattvam), namely that Śiva is the supreme Brahman and the central
deity praised in the epic. The reason he adduces to this effect, and to which he
⁶⁸ The Brahmatarkastava is the only work of Appaya mentioned in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra.

:
At the end of his commentary on verse 6, Appaya restates the argument according to which the word
brahman denotes Śiva in passages from the Mahābhārata. Several such passages, he says, have already
been quoted in his vivarana : on the Brahmatarkastava: suprasiddhāni vacanāni brahmatarkastavavi-
varane: samudāhr: tāni dras:t:avyāni (Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra:
: 340).
⁶⁹ On this topic, I await the work of Vishal Sharma, who is studying the polemic history of the
Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana : in South India, primarily through the commentaries of Mādhvas and
Śrīvais: navas.
:
⁷⁰ For instance, the theologian of Śaiva Siddhānta Bhat:t:a Rāmakan: t:ha (fl. 950–1000) tries to
demonstrate in his vr: tti on Sadyojyotis’s Moks: akārikā that the great sages depicted in the
Mahābhārata epic were actually practitioners of the Śaiva religion.
⁷¹ In his study of the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa
: :
mgrahastotra, Bronner shows that the main task of
:
this essay is to refute the Śrīvais: nava
: thesis, held principally by Venkat:anātha (1269–1370) in his
Abhayapradānasāra and elsewhere, that Vibhīs: ana’s : surrender to Rāma ‘epitomizes the all-important
Śrīvais: nava
: act of total surrender to God (prapadana, prapatti) and presents the core lesson of the
poem’ (Bronner 2011: 48). Appaya argues against this thesis, claiming that the central episode of the
Rāmāyana :
: is not Vibhīs: ana’s surrender, but Rāma’s search for and liberation of Sītā, and that this
episode precisely highlights Śiva’s supremacy. In order to show that the chief import of the Rāmāyana :
is to praise the supremacy of Śiva, Appaya makes use of a dhvani-based argument in his commentary
on verse 20. Whether or not Śrīvais: navas : are also the main opponents in Appaya’s
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra is not entirely clear from the arguments themselves, but is very likely in
:
light of: (a) the fact that the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra and other polemical Śaiva works
are, as I have shown, directed against Śrīvais: navas;
: and (b) the fact that at least two Śrīvais: nava
: works,
:
the Pañcamāmnāyasāra of Samarapungava and the Mahābhāratatātparyaraks: ā, commonly attributed
to Paravastu Vedāntācārya, were written in response to Appaya’s Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra : (see
Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3).
 ś  61
returns again and again in the essay, is that through praising the greatness of
: Vyāsa is effectively praising Śiva, for the Mahābhārata repeatedly men-
Kr: s: na,
: himself worships Śiva, and also that Kr: s: na
tions that Kr: s: na : owes all his powers to
Śiva’s grace. Most of the commentary on this verse consists in providing examples
in support of this claim: the episode from the Ādiparvan where Kr: s: na : worships
Śiva on the occasion of the marriage of Subhadra, Kr: s: na’s: half-sister; the episode
from the Harivamśa’s : pārijāta section where Kr:: :
s na pleases Śiva with his penance
during his journey to Kailāsa; etc.
One could argue against this, however, that if these episodes from the
Mahābhārata convey Śiva’s greatness and Kr: s: na’s : subordination to Śiva, other
episodes do seem to convey the opposite. After all, Vais: navas : have long been
quoting multiple passages from the Mahābhārata in which it is the greatness of
Kr: s: na
: or Nārāyana,: not that of Śiva, that is highlighted. How does one reconcile
these passages with Appaya’s own claim that the chief import of the epic is Śiva’s
supremacy?
Towards the end of his commentary on the first verse, Appaya addresses this
issue with an argument he had briefly alluded to in verse 13 of the
Brahmatarkastava, namely that Śiva’s supremacy is ‘suggested’ (vyañjita) rather
than made explicit in the Mahābhārata. The theory of poetic suggestion goes back
to the great Kashmirian poetician Ānandavardhana (ninth century). According to
him, a great literary work can convey, over and above the conventional modes of
denotation (abhidhā) and secondary or figurative meanings (laks: anā, : gunavr: : tti), a
suggested sense (dhvani, vyañjanā). It is Appaya’s view that the supremacy of Śiva
: (and, by extension, Vis: nu-Nārāya
over Kr: s: na : : as well as His identity with the
na)
supreme Brahman, are precisely cognized through such poetic suggestion in the
Mahābhārata. But, we may ask, why are these features merely suggested and not
stated literally in the text? The answer, which Appaya supports with a quotation of
Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka, is that the Mahābhārata is a great work of
literature, and that in a great work the suggested sense always prevails over the
denoted sense.⁷² In other words, the chief import (pradhāna) of the Mahābhārata
⁷² Appaya quotes the following verse from Ānandavardhana’s celebrated treatise on poetics:
pratīyamānam : punar :anyad eva vastv asti vānī
: s:u mahākavīnām | yat tat prasiddhāvayavātiriktam
vibhāti lāvanyam: ivānganāsu ||—‘On the other hand, the suggested [sense] is something different
[from the denoted sense], found [only] in the works of great poets. It is that which appears [to sensitive
readers] as something different from the well-known elements [of poetry], just as charm in women [is
something that appears as something different from the well-known individual parts of their body]’
(Dhvanyāloka: 48–9; v. 1.4). Another Kashmirian poetician, Mammat:a (c. eleventh century)—whose
work Appaya also knew (see below, fn. 74, this chapter)—offers a classification of different ‘types’
of poetry in his Kāvyaprakāśa, holding that the best (uttama) poetry is that in which the suggested
:
sense (vyangya) dominates the denoted sense (vācya), whereas the worst (avara) poetry is that in
:
which the suggested sense is simply absent: idam uttamam atiśayini vyangye vācyād dhvanir budhaih:
:
kathitah: | . . . | śabdacitram
: vācyacitram avyangyam : smr: tam—‘The best [poetry], in which
: tv avaram
the suggested sense dominates the denoted sense, is called “suggestion” by the learned. . . . But [that
poetry] in which there is no suggestion [and] in which fanciful words and meanings [dominate], is
traditionally known as bad [poetry]’ (Kāvyaprakāśa: 5, 7; vs. 4b and 5b). Appaya adopts this
62    - 
should be suggested rather than conveyed directly, and what is suggested, as

Appaya proceeds to demonstrate, is precisely Śiva’s greatness. In his own words:
In the case of [the Mahābhārata], however, the denoted sense (vācya) is the
unsurpassed greatness of Nārāyana, : which brings about the [false] conception
(sambhāvanā) [that Nārāyana] : is the supreme Brahman. What is being suggested
(vyajyamāna) is the greatness of Śiva—[a greatness] in the form of being the
supreme Brahman endowed with qualities (saguna), : [a being] that surpasses
:
[Nārāyana]—[inasmuch as Śiva] is everywhere described [in the Mahābhārata]
as worthy of being worshipped even by [Nārāyana].: This [suggested greatness] is
the suggestion of a matter of fact (vastudhvani) since [this suggestion]—which is
presented by means of ordinary and aestheticized emotions, poetic adornments
and aesthetic suggestion that are being suggested [to convey Śiva’s greatness]
(tatra)—is inferred to be the main intention of the author [of the Mahābhārata];
this is the idea here.⁷³
Appaya concedes that the greatness (mahiman) of Nārāyana : is conveyed in the

Mahābhārata, but only at the narrative or descriptive level. The underlying
suggested sense of the text, on the contrary, conveys the greatness of Śiva. One
of the main reasons Appaya offers in support of this is that Śiva is repeatedly
:
described throughout the epic as being worshipped by Vis: nu-Nārāya : and His
na
: which ‘suggests’ that He is superior to Vis: nu-Nārāya
incarnation, Kr: s: na, : :
na.
Appaya explains that among the three varieties of poetic suggestion (dhvani)
:
generally acknowledged by Sanskrit poeticians—vastudhvani, alamkāradhvani,
:
classification in the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra (see comm. on verse 20: trividham : hi
kāvyam . . . ), and he is likely to have Mammat:a’s scheme in mind in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra
:
as well. Note, however, that Appaya does not discredit ‘fanciful poetry’ (citrakāvya) in his later work on
poetics. In his Citramīmāmsā,: he refers to Mammat:a’s classification and says that śabdacitra poetry, the
worst type of poetry in Mammat:a’s scheme, is agreeable though devoid of a suggested sense (yad
:
avyangyam api cāru tac citram; Citramīmāmsā: : :
4). In addition to the Citramīmāmsā, Appaya con-
tributed two other significant works to Sanskrit literary theory (all of which were composed under his
:
third patron, Venkat:a II, and therefore after he composed his Śaiva works under Cinnabomma): the
Vr: ttivārttika (edited and translated in Gerow 2001) and the Kuvalayānanda. The Kuvalayānanda, a
manual introducing students to sense-based figures of speech (arthālamkāra), : is still widely studied
today; for more details on this work, see Bronner 2002 and 2004. For a succinct treatment of Appaya’s
understanding of the dhvani tradition instigated by the work of Ānandavardhana, see Bronner 2002.
Appaya may have composed other poetic works as yet unknown to modern scholarship: he says in the
Citramīmāmsā : that he has discussed other types of poetry elsewhere (anyatra), and that this topic is
not discussed in the Vr: ttivārttika or the Kuvalayānanda (see Citramīmāmsā: : 5).
⁷³ iha tu vācyah: parabrahmatvasambhāvanāvaho nārāyanasya : niratiśayamahimā. tasyāpi

pūjyatayā sarvatra nibaddhasya śivasya tadatiśāyisagunaparabrahmabhāvarūpo
: mahimā
vyajyamānah. : ayam eva vastudhvanirūpah, : sa hi tatra vyajyamānaih: bhāvarasālamkāradhvanibhir
:
upaskr: tah: pradhānatayā prabanddhur āśayasthita unnīyata iti bhāvah: (Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra:
:
:
334). Likewise, in the Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra, Appaya argues that the suggested sense
of the Rāmāyana : is Śiva’s supremacy, and that what is narrated directly is Vibhīs: ana’s
: surrender to
Rāma.
 ś  63
and rasadhvani, which respectively depend on whether a ‘matter of fact’ (vastu), a

figure of speech (alamkāra),
: or an emotional state (rasa) is being suggested—the
suggestion involved here is a vastudhvani, because what is suggested is an indu-
bitable fact, namely that Śiva is identical to the supreme Brahman endowed with
:
qualities (sagunabrahma).⁷⁴ While attempts to interpret the Mahābhārata as a
poetic work making use of poetic suggestion go back as far as Ānandavardhana
himself, Appaya is, to the best of my knowledge, the first scholar to defend the view
that a single fact (vastu), namely Śiva’s greatness, is suggested throughout the epic. In
this, he contradicts Ānandavardhana, who had argued that the Mahābhārata’s
predominant suggestion is a rasa, namely the emotional state of peace (śāntarasa).⁷⁵
In support of his view that the author of the Mahābhārata ‘suggests’ Śiva’s
supremacy, Appaya cites excerpts from well-known stories of the Mahābhārata
: sages and other important figures praise Śiva in no uncertain terms.
where Kr: s: na,
He also reuses some of the arguments he had developed in his previous works. In
verse 6, for instance, he restates the argument found in the Brahmatarkastava
according to which the word brahman denotes Śiva in the Mahābhārata passage
where Yudhis: t:hira is compared to a tree of dharma. In verse 8, he refutes claims of
Śiva’s inferiority to other deities by tracing His apparent ‘defects’ (dos:a) to
emanations (vibhūti) of Śiva, as he had done in the Brahmatarkastava. Appaya
additionally makes it clear here that these particular emanations—such as the
different forms of Rudra—do not belong to the supreme form of Śiva identified
with the attributeless (nirguna) : Brahman, but to His personified form as
Sāmbaśiva, in which He is accompanied by His śakti, is endowed with specific
: and governs over the trimūrti and māyā.
qualities (saguna)
One of the key arguments laid down in the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra :
(vs. 10–19) concerns the episode from the Āśvamedhikaparvan, namely the so-called
Anugītā, where Arjuna, having heard Kr: s: na’s
: teaching, asks to hear it again because
he ‘forgot all of it’:
O mighty-armed one, O son of Devakī, I realized Your greatness and lordly

nature when the battle was about to begin. [However,] what you taught me at
that time out of affection, O Keśava, O chief of men, I forgot all of it because my
mind was distracted. However, I again and again wonder about these matters.⁷⁶
⁷⁴ In his Dhvanyāloka, Ānandavardhana does not delineate the different varieties of suggestion, and
hence does not discuss vastudhvani as a separate type of suggestion. It is left to Abhinavagupta (ninth to
tenth century) to do this in his Locanā on the Dhvanyāloka. One more probable source for Appaya’s
understanding of vastudhvani, however, is Mammat:a (c. eleventh century). In his Vr: ttivārttika, Appaya
quotes with approval his views on vastudhvani (he refers to him there as Mammat:ācārya), and cites the
example he gives on vastudhvani in the Kāvyaprakāśa (see Gerow 2001: 28ff.).
⁷⁵ See Tubb 1991 for a study of Ānandavardhana’s literary analysis of the Mahābhārata as
predominantly expressing the ‘flavour of peace’ (śāntarasa).
⁷⁶ viditam: te mahābāho samgrāme
: samupasthite | māhātmyam : devakīputra tac ca te rūpam
aiśvaram || yat tu tad bhavatā proktam : tadā keśava sauhr: dāt | tat sarvam : purus: avyāghra nas:t:am
: me
vyagracetasah: || mama kautūhalam : tv asti tes: v arthes: u punah: punah: [ . . . ] (Mahābhārata 14.16.5–7).
64    - 
Appaya holds that the reason underlying Arjuna’s request to Kr: s: na

: is that two
contradictory teachings had been presented to him beforehand: one in which Śiva
is supreme and another in which Vis: nu: is supreme. The confused Arjuna wishes
to fully understand which is supreme, and therefore asks once again to hear
Kr: s: na’s
: teaching. Throughout the Bhagavadgītā, Kr: s: na,
: the avatāra of Vis: nu,
:
:
claims to have all the signs (linga) of the supreme Brahman, to be the cause of
everything (sarvakārana) : and the inner ruler of all beings (sarvāntaryāmin).
However, as Appaya notes, there are other passages where Kr: s: na: says that he
resorts to a higher entity than himself. One such passage, central to Appaya’s
exegesis in his commentary on verse 19, is Bhagavadgītā 15.4, where Kr: s: na :
declares that he takes refuge in the primordial Person (ādyapurus:a):
Therefore, one should seek that state attaining which one never returns again.
I take refuge (prapadye) only in this primordial Person from which the ancient
process came forth.⁷⁷
Appaya argues at length that the Person (purus: a) in question is none other than
Śiva. The word purus:a must refer to Śiva here, since the same entity is referred to
later on in the Bhagavadgītā (e.g., 15.7) by the noun īśvara—a term well-known to
denote Śiva, as Appaya had already emphasized in previous works when discuss-
ing the interpretation of BS 1.3.23. Therefore, Kr: s: na : himself admits to taking
refuge in Śiva. This is true, he notes, even if a few other passages declare that Kr: s: na
:
does not take refuge in any other entity, and that worshipping Śiva leads to
limited results (parimitaphala). Such passages are exceptional, and for this
reason should be reinterpreted in conformity with the majority of statements in
: is said to worship Śiva: only conformity with the majority of
which Kr: s: na
statements is hermeneutically consistent (bhūyo’nugraha eva ca nyāyya). For
: claims in the Āśvamedhikaparvan that he does not seek refuge
instance, Kr: s: na
in anyone (nāham : kamcid
: upāśraye) in a context where Yudhis: t:hira is taught
:
about the religious practices that have to be carried out by Vais: navas.⁷⁸ Rather
than understanding Kr: s: na’s
: statement as saying that he does not worship anyone,
Appaya suggests that we should reinterpret it as meaning that Kr: s: na : said
⁷⁷ tatah: padam: tat parimārgitavyam : yasmin gatā na nivartanti bhūyah: | tam eva cādyam : purus:am:
prapadye yatah: pravr: ttih: prasr: tā purānī
: || (Bhagavadgītā 15.4). Note that the reading prapadye [yatah]
:
(first person, present tense, ātmanepada), accepted by Appaya, is not generally accepted by Śrīvais: navas
:
and Mādhvas. In his Gītābhās:ya, Rāmānuja mentions various readings, but not prapadye. In his
:
Tātparyacandrikā, Venkat:anātha says that prapadyet [yatah] : (‘one should take refuge . . . ’) is
Rāmānuja’s preferred reading, and notes that any variant involving prapadye would not be consistent,
since it would imply that Kr: s: na
: himself takes refuge in some higher entity. Madhva accepts the reading
prapadye but glosses it as prapadyeta, thereby avoiding the problem of the first person. Nevertheless,
:
Appaya’s reading is not idiosyncratic: it is accepted by Śankara and is also the reading accepted by the
editor of the BORI critical edition of the Mahābhārata.
⁷⁸ Note that the verse is not found in the critical edition of the Mahābhārata, but is found in the
apparatus of the Āśvamedhikaparvan with upāśritah: instead of upāśraye.
 ś  65
this in order to impel Yudhis: t:hira to increase his devotion towards these prac-
tices.⁷⁹ This is an ingenious way of circumventing the problem posed by passages
claiming the opposite of Appaya’s view.
: worship Śiva when he himself
Nevertheless, one may still ask, why would Kr: s: na
repeatedly claims to be supreme? Appaya’s reply to this is that unlike usual
: does not take refuge in Śiva for the sake of his own material
worshippers, Kr: s: na
:
welfare and liberation (abhyudayanihśreyasa), but in order to communicate the
exceptional greatness of Śiva to those who may not already worship Him, so that
: himself worships the excellent Śiva,
they feel compelled to worship Him. If Kr: s: na
all others should do it too! After providing a few more examples in support of this,
Appaya concludes with this telling (and beautifully alliterated) verse in praise of
Vyāsa, the author of the Mahābhārata:
I bow down to Śauri [i.e., Vis: nu]

: who, as Vyāsa, composed the Mahābhārata in
this way [i.e., as intent on Śiva’s greatness] by [making use of] suggestion
(vyakti), who is the most blessed traveller on the path of suggestion and who
pours out Śaiva excellence. I also bow down to [Ganeśa],
: [Vyāsa’s] witness [in his
composition of the Mahābhārata].⁸⁰
Vyāsa is identified with Śauri, another name for Vis: nu-Kr

: : s: na,
: and yet he is
resplendent with the excellence of Śiva. An expert in poetic suggestion, Vyāsa
composed the Mahābhārata with the intention to convey to his readers that Śiva
alone is supreme. As Appaya has said elsewhere, he (as Bādarāyana) : had the same
intent while composing the BS. It will be Appaya’s chief task to demonstrate this
in his later Śivādvaita works.
2.5 Śrīkan: t:ha in Appaya’s Early Śaiva Works
At the beginning of this chapter, I made a distinction between Appaya’s Śaiva

polemical works—which all evidence suggests were composed earlier in his
career—and his Śivādvaita Vedānta works. Although all of Appaya’s Śaiva
works are polemical to some degree and all make the claim that Śiva is identical
to Brahman, the Śivādvaita works differ in that they focus on establishing and
defending a Vedānta theology that is based on the exegesis of the BS, particularly
Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB. In contrast, the four works examined in this chapter focus their
exegesis mainly on the Purānas : and epics, and barely discuss the BS except for
⁷⁹ See Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra:
: 356.
⁸⁰ ittham
: cakre bhāratam
: yah: prabandham : vyaktyā vyāsah: śāmbhavotkars:avars:ī | dhvanyadhva-
nyadhvanyamūrdhany adhanyas tam : śaurim
: tatsāks: ina
: m: cānato ’smi || (Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra:
:
360).
66    - 
brief references to a single sūtra, BS 1.3.23. As a matter of fact, these works contain
no reference whatsoever to Śrīkan: t:ha or to his BMB, even in contexts where we
would expect at least a passing reference to his teachings. The plain absence of
such reference is yet another indication that the polemical works were composed
earlier during Appaya’s Śaiva career.
Let us mention a first example. The first three works examined in this chapter—
the Śivatattvaviveka, the Śivakarnāmr: : ta and the Brahmatarkastava—all refer to
BS 1.3.23 in connection with the interpretation of the word īśāna, referred to in
:
the Kat:ha Upanis: ad as the ‘thumb-sized Person’ (angus: t:hamātrah: purus:a) resi-
ding in the heart. As explained earlier, Appaya argues that the word īśāna
specifically refers to Śiva and not to any other deity. Since the author of the BS
identifies the Person with the supreme self in BS 1.3.23, it follows that Śiva must be
identical to the supreme self (paramātman), i.e., Brahman. However, Appaya is
not the first to defend this view: Śrīkan: t:ha himself defends precisely the same view
in his commentary on BS 1.3.23. To the pūrvapaks: a that the thumb-sized Person
refers to the individual self (jīva), Śrīkan: t:ha replies:
[To this,] we say: it is reasonable to say that the thumb-sized [Person] is the
supreme Lord Himself because scriptures [refer to this Person] with the distinc-
tive marks of the supreme Lord [in passages such as] ‘The Lord of what was and
what will be’, [and] because this scriptural passage—namely, ‘Endowed with
sovereignty over all, Śambhu, the Lord of all, inside the space [in the heart]’—
says that He alone is the Lord of all.⁸¹
Śrīkan: t:ha holds that the thumb-sized Person refers not to the individual self (jīva)
but to the supreme Lord, Brahman qua Śiva, based on two textual passages. The
first passage, taken from the Kat:ha Upanis: ad, is the same as the one cited by
Appaya while discussing BS 1.3.23 in the Śivatattvaviveka and elsewhere. Since in
:
this passage the thumb-sized Person is described with marks (linga) that can only
belong to the supreme Lord—such as being the ‘Lord of what was and what will
be’—it follows that this Person is the supreme Lord. Implicit in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
explanation is that the Lord in question is Śiva. In other words, Appaya defends
the exact same view as Śrīkan: t:ha, yet he does not highlight this in any of the Śaiva
works where he discusses the interpretation of BS 1.3.23. Is it the case that Appaya
knew Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary but decided not to mention it for certain reasons?
Or is it more plausibly the case that he was simply not aware of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary at this point in his career?
:
⁸¹ vadāmah—parameśvara
: evāngus:t:hamātra iti yuktam, ‘īśāno bhūtabhavyasya’ityādiparameś-
:
varalingaśabdāt ‘sarvaiśvaryasampanna
: h: sarveśvarah: śambhur
: ākāśamadhye’ iti tasyaiva
: (ŚAMD1: 450).
sarveśvaratvaśravanāt
 ś  67
Let us consider another example—Appaya’s stance on the mantra

‘nārāyanapara
: m: brahma’ from the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad. As discussed in
:
Section 2.2, the compound nārāyanaparam can be analysed either by taking
nārāyana: as a separate word with a case ending elision or as a tatpurus: a com-
pound. In his commentary on BS 1.2.4–5, Śrīkan: t:ha defends a tatpurus: a inter-
pretation of the compound:
[An opponent objects:] And He [i.e., Nārāyana] : is said to be Brahman [in the
mantra] ‘nārāyanapara
: m: brahma’. Brahman alone, indeed, ought to be wor-
shipped by all. How could He [i.e., Brahman/Nārāyana], : having such nature,
worship another [entity]? [To this, the author of the BS] replies: ‘on account of a
specific scriptural passage’ (śabdaviśes:āt). [He means here that] this specific
scriptural passage, ‘nārāyanapara
: m: brahma,’ conveys that Brahman is ‘other
: This is why the supreme Brahman ought to be worshipped as
than Nārāyana’.
:
[an entity] entirely different than Nārāyana.⁸²
Śrīkan: t:ha interprets the mantra ‘nārāyanapara

: m: brahma’ to mean that Brahman
is para, that is, ‘different’ (anyat) than Nārāyana,: and not in the sense that
Nārāyana : is identical to Brahman. To the best of my knowledge, Śrīkan: t:ha is
the only commentator on the BS to defend a tatpurus: a interpretation of
the compound in this mantra. While Appaya naturally agrees with Śrīkan: t:ha’s
interpretation in his sub-commentary on BS 1.2.5, he does not mention
this interpretation when discussing the mantra in the Śivatattvaviveka or in the
Śivakarnāmr
: : ta. When he addresses the tatpurus:a interpretation in the
Śivatattvaviveka (v. 31), he does not ascribe the view to anyone; he merely quotes
a verse from Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā in spite of the fact, as we have seen, that
Haradatta himself does not uphold a tatpurus: a interpretation. Arguably, it would
have made sense to mention Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation here. Likewise, in the
Śivakarnāmr
: : ta, Appaya has the pūrvapaks:in ascribe the tatpurus: a interpretation
to Pāśupatas, not to Śrīkan: t:ha. While he may well have considered Śrīkan: t:ha a
‘Vedic Pāśupata’ of some sort and have his view in mind here,⁸³ it is still intriguing
⁸² sa cāyam : ‘nārāyanapara
: m: brahma’ iti brahmatvenocyate. brahmaiva hi sarvopāsyam. katham
asya tathābhūtasyānyam : praty upāsakatvam ity ata āha—śabdaviśes:āt [BS 1.2.5]. ‘nārāyanapara : m:
brahma’ iti śabdaviśes:a eva ‘nārāyanāt : param’ iti brahma pratipādayati. ato nārāyanād : anyad eva
param : brahmopāsyam (ŚAMD1: 325).
⁸³ Śrīkan: t:ha was not a Pāśupata Śaiva in the conventional sense of the term. While Pāśupatas regard
Īśvara to be solely the instrumental cause (kevalanimittakārana): of the world, Śrīkan: t:ha, as a Vedāntin,
considers Īśvara to be the material cause as well (nimittopādānakārana). : However, Appaya may have
considered Śrīkan: t:ha as a Vedic Pāśupata of some sort. In his view, Pāśupata scriptures are of two
kinds—Vedic (śrauta) and non-Vedic (aśrauta)—the former accepting Īśvara as both the efficient and
material cause of the world: dvividhas tāvat pāśupatāgamah—śrauto : ’śrautaś ca. [ . . . ] īśvarasya
kevalanimittatvavādah: [ . . . ] tatraiva (=aśrautapāśupate) prasiddhah, : na tu śrautapāśupate—‘First of
all, Pāśupata scriptures are of two kinds: Vedic and non-Vedic. [ . . . ] The position that Īśvara is only the
efficient cause [of the world, and not its material cause as well] [ . . . ] is established only in [non-Vedic
68    - 
that he does not explicitly mention Śrīkan: t:ha or his Śaiva commentary on the BS
in this context. Again, the question arises as to whether he knew Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary or not at this point in his career.
To my knowledge, not a single scholar of Vedānta refers to Śrīkan: t:ha’s inter-
pretation of the Mahānārāyana : mantra before Appaya himself, in spite of the fact
that this interpretation overtly claims—presumably for the first time in a com-
mentary on the BS—that Nārāyana : is subordinate to Brahman, and that Śiva, not
Nārāyana, : is the main deity worshipped in the Mahānārāyana : Upanis:ad. It is
likely that if they were aware of such interpretation, followers of Rāmānuja and
Madhva would have responded to it.⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, long before Appaya,
Śrīvais: nava
: theologians had addressed the interpretation of the Mahānārāyana :
mantra in question. Back in the thirteenth century, Vātsyavaradaguru disagreed
with the tatpurus:a interpretation, and ascribed this interpretation to a Śaiva who
praises Rudra-Śiva as the highest principle.⁸⁵ Not long after, Sudarśanasūri also
rejected this interpretation, which he simply ascribed to ‘others’.⁸⁶ While this
shows that the correct interpretation of the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad was already
:
an object of debate between Vais: navas and Śaivas/Pāśupatas prior to Appaya, the
fact that a well-versed Vedānta commentator like Sudarśanasūri does not refer to
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in this context (or anywhere else, for that matter)
confirms what we argued in Chapter 1, namely that Śrīkan: t:ha was not an early
(or, at the very least, not a well-known) Śaiva scholar.
Pāśupata scriptures], but not in Vedic Pāśupata [scriptures]’ (Śikharinīmālā:: 107). According to
Appaya, the Pāśupata system refuted in BS 2.2.35–38 is aśrauta. Let us recall that in the third
introductory verse of the ŚAMD, Appaya describes Śrīkan: t:ha’s predecessors as having promulgated
the tradition of Mahāpāśupata (mahāpāśupatajñānasampradāyapravartaka), a subdivision of Pāśupata
Śaivism associated with the Śaiva Lākulas or Kālāmukhas. Note also that in his Tattvamuktākalāpa,
:
Venkat:anātha ascribes the view that Śiva is both the efficient and material cause of the world to ‘Vedic
Śaivas’, and contrasts this position to that of Pāśupatas, who hold that Śiva is only the efficient cause of
the world (Tattvamuktākalāpa: 383).
:
⁸⁴ Neither Śankara nor Rāmānuja comments on the Mahānārāyana : Upanis:ad, but both quote from
it. Rāmānuja argues in the Śrībhās: ya that the Mahānārāyana : Upanis:ad should be interpreted in
:
conformity with the view that Vis: nu-Nārāya : is the supreme Brahman; this seems a reasonable
na
:
stance given that the central part of this Upanis: ad magnifies Vis: nu-Nārāya : (hence the title of the
na
Upanis: ad) as the personification of Brahman or Prajāpati, the essence of everything and the inner self
in the heart (Varenne 1960: 37). When this Upanis: ad praises Śiva-Rudra, says Rāmānuja, it should be
:
understood only as a preliminary step towards the praise of Vis: nu-Nārāya : as the supreme Brahman.
na
Nowhere in his commentary does Rāmānuja refute a Śaiva interpretation of this Upanis: ad.
:
⁸⁵ na ca nārāyanapara
: m: brahma nārāyanaparo
: jyotir ity vākyayoh: pañcamīsamāsah: śankanīyah— :
‘And one should not suspect that the two sentences nārāyanapara
: : brahma [and] nārāyanaparo
m : jyotir
[involve] ablative [tatpurus: a] compounds’ (Tattvanirnaya:
: 92).
⁸⁶ kecit nārāyanapara
: m : brahmeti vākye nārāyanaparam
: iti padam : nārāyanāt
: param ity
antargatasamāsam : vadanti. tad ayuktam—‘Some claim that the term nārāyanapara : m: in the sentence
:
nārāyanapara : brahma is a compound understood as such: [the supreme Brahman] is greater/other
m
than Nārāyana.: This is incorrect’ (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 667 (ad BS 3.3.43)). Sudarśanasūri is more
specific in his Tātparyadīpikā on Rāmānuja’s Vedārthasamgraha; : there he ascribes the tatpurus:a
:
interpretation to avaidikas: nārāyanapara : brahma ity atra nārāyanāt
m : param iti kecid avaidikā
: tad ayuktam (Tātparyadīpikā: 218). Note that the 1953 edition also reports the reading vaidika.
viduh,
However, given Sudarśanasūri’s own vaidika background, I doubt the correctness of this reading.
 ś  69
The two examples discussed here suffice to raise the important question of
Appaya’s relation to Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary: when did he become aware of this
commentary? If he was aware of its existence while writing the Śivatattvaviveka
and his other polemical works, why does he not mention Śrīkan: t:ha’s views in
further support of his own position? The only Śaiva figure he actually cites in these
works is Haradatta Śivācārya. Could it be that Appaya knew Śrīkan: t:ha’s com-
mentary but judged it irrelevant to cite his views, perhaps because this commen-
tary was still unknown to a wider audience or disregarded by certain scholars? Or,
more plausibly, could it be that Appaya did not know Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary at
this point in his career, and that he came across it only later? In any case, his
Śivādvaita works signal a new departure in this regard as Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology
suddenly comes to occupy centre stage.
3
Reading Śrīkan: t:ha’s Commentary
In the previous chapter, we have seen that in his early Śaiva works, Appaya
highlights the greatness of Śiva and is concerned with proving His superiority
:
over Vi:snu-Nārāya : Typically in the form of devotional hymns with self-
na.
authored commentary, these works rely for the most part on an exegesis of
passages from the Purānas, : epics and Upani:sads. Some, like the Śivatattvaviveka
and the Śivakarnāmr: : ta, critically engage with Vai:snava
: positions and interlocu-
tors and are more polemical in style. Others, like the Brahmatarkastava, seek to
prove their point by means of sound logical principles as well. In spite of their
Śivādvaita overtones—all of them equate Śiva with the non-dual Brahman of the
Upani:sads, and put forward ideas that we find expressed in later Śivādvaita
Vedānta works—none of these works addresses the interpretation of the BS in
depth; nor do they refer to Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śaiva commentary on the BS, the
Brahmamīmāmsābhā: :sya. In contrast, the correct interpretation of the BS in
light of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary is Appaya’s central concern in his Śivādvaita
works. Here the focus shifts to establishing a theological standpoint (siddhānta)
that combines Śaiva doctrine with the orthodox theology of pure non-dualist
Vedānta (kevalādvaita, śuddhādvaita, aviśi:st:ādvaita). Hence it is not so much Śiva
: and as
as an object of praise—that is, as a deity endowed with attributes (saguna),
such accessible to contemplation—that is emphasized here as Śiva’s identity with
the attributeless (nirguna) : reality of Brahman.
I define Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta works to include all of his Śaiva works
showing an explicit relation to Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary and/or to the theology
deployed therein.¹ While Śrīkan: t:ha composed just a single work pertaining to
Śivādvaita theology, the Brahmamīmāmsābhā : :sya, Appaya authored several
Śivādvaita works, varying in genre, audience and intellectual register. His most
important and also most influential Śivādvaita work is the ŚAMD, the only extant
¹ Appaya uses the term śivādvaita to label Śrīkan: t:ha’s position (siddhānta) at the beginning of his
Śivādvaitanirnaya:
: śrīkan: t:haśivācāryāh: siddhāntam
: nijagaduh: śivādvaitam—‘Śrīkan: t:ha Śivācārya pro-
claimed a śivādvaita doctrine.’ It has been argued (Fisher 2017a) that Appaya had precisely the
Vīraśaiva exegetical tradition in mind when using this term, since it features in the title of a number
of Vīraśaiva works and since the Vīraśaiva tradition also holds a non-dualist Vedānta doctrine centred
on Śiva as Brahman. However, Śrīkan: t:ha himself uses the term śivādvaita as a doctrinal signifier; see
below, Section 3.2.1, this chapter. See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1 for a discussion of the Vīraśaiva
Śaktiviśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta position and Duquette 2020a for a detailed refutation of the abovemen-
tioned argument. I sometimes use the broader term ‘Śaiva Vedānta’ when I wish to refer to the group of
traditions seeking to reconcile Śaiva doctrine with Vedānta, for all practical purposes the Śivādvaita of
Śrīkan: t:ha/Appaya and the Śaktiviśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta of Vīraśaivas.
Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India: The Sˊaiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dı k̄ :sita. Jonathan Duquette,
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  71
Table 3.1 List of Appaya Dīk:sita’s Śivādvaita Vedānta works
:
1. Nayamanimālā Versified summary of Śrīkan: tha’s
: :
Brahmamīmāmsābhā :sya,
included in Appaya’s compendium of Vedānta, the
:
Caturmatasārasamgraha
2. Śivārkamanidīpikā
: Sub-commentary on Śrīkan: tha’s
: :
Brahmamīmāmsābhā :sya
3. Ānandalaharī Sixty verses with self-authored commentary (Candrikā)
4. Ratnatrayaparīk:sā Eight verses with self-authored commentary, including a prose
section discussing the ‘esoteric meaning’ (rahasyārtha)
intended by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary
5. Śivādvaitanirnaya
: Prose work aiming to determine whether Śrīkan: t:ha’s siddhānta
aligns with a non-dualism of the qualified (viśi:st:ādvaita) or
pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaita, aviśi:st:ādvaita)
:
6. Pūrvottaramīmāmsā- Twenty-seven essays on selected Mīmāmsā : and Vedānta topics,
vādanak:satramālā mostly expanding on arguments formulated in the ŚAMD.a
a
I have not been able to determine when the Vādanak:satramālā was composed relative to Appaya’s
Śaiva oeuvre, but most likely, as McCrea (2016: 89) has shown, it followed the composition of the
ŚAMD for it expands upon points discussed in the latter.
sub-commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhā : :sya. Including this work,

I surmise that Appaya composed six major Śivādvaita works, shown in Table 3.1
in their most probable order of composition.²
In this chapter, I examine how Appaya strategically relies on Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB
in order to establish and promote his own theology of Śivādvaita Vedānta. In
the first part (Section 3.1), I discuss Appaya’s doxography of Vedānta schools, the
:
Caturmatasārasamgraha, and highlight how it might have been used to introduce
Śrīkan: t:ha’s teachings to a wider scholarly audience and lend them authority in the
process. In the second part (Section 3.2), I discuss how Appaya creatively reads
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, with special reference to Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of trans-
:
formation (parināmavāda), with a view to aligning its teachings with the doctrine
of pure non-dualism advocated in Advaita Vedānta. In the third part (Section 3.3),
I examine Appaya’s interpretation of the pāśupatādhikarana : (BS 2.2.35–38) in his
ŚAMD, and show how his prior commitment to Advaita Vedānta impacts his
broad understanding of Śaiva scriptures and makes him read passages from those
scriptures rather differently than his Śaiva co-religionists.
² I established this relative chronology mostly on the basis of intertextual references. The
:
Nayamanimālā [1] precedes the ŚAMD [2] because the latter refers to the Caturmatasārasamgraha :
(ŚAMD1: 98), in which the Nayamanimālā: is included. The Ratnatrayaparīk:sā [4] mentions both the
ŚAMD and the Ānandalaharī [3], and the former must precede the latter because the Ānandalaharī
quotes the ŚAMD (Ānandalaharī: 2). In other cases, I have relied on a less rigid criterion. I assume that
the Śivādvaitanirnaya
: [5] was composed after the Ratnatrayaparīk:sā because the latter never mentions
the former (whereas it refers to the ŚAMD and the Ānandalaharī) on points where we would expect its
mention.
72    - 
3.1 Introducing Śrīkan: t: ha’s Vedānta
We have noted earlier (Chapter 2, Section 2.5) that the utter absence of references
to Śrīkan: t:ha or his commentary in the Śivatattvaviveka and other polemical works
could mean that Appaya did not know of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary while writing
these works. The first work in which he mentions Śrīkan: t:ha is, to the best of my
knowledge, his doxography of Vedānta schools, the Caturmatasārasamgraha :
(‘Summary of the Gist of the Four Schools [of Vedānta]’). While doxographies
summarizing the positions taken by various schools of Indian thought (darśana,
mata) was a common literary genre prior to Appaya, especially among Advaitins
and Jainas (Halbfass 1990: 351), the Caturmatasārasamgraha’s : focus on Vedānta
schools makes it quite possibly ‘the first systematic account of this kind ever
produced in the premodern period’ (Pollock 2004: 769). As the title says,³ the
Caturmatasārasamgraha : gives the gist of the positions taken by four systems
(caturmata) of Vedānta, namely: the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva, the Viśi:st:ādvaita
Vedānta of Rāmānuja, the Śivādvaita Vedānta of Śrīkan: t:ha and the Advaita Vedānta
:
of Śankara. Accordingly, the work is divided into four sections: the Nyāyamuktāvalī,
the Nayamayūkhamālikā, the Nayamanimālā : and the Nayamañjarī, respectively.⁴
In each section, Appaya summarizes, sūtra by sūtra (though sometimes omitting
some), the interpretation of the BS advocated by each Vedānta theologian. While the
exposition of the Dvaita, Śivādvaita and Advaita positions is versified, that of the
Viśi:st:ādvaita position is in prose. This suggests that the Nayamayūkhamālikā might
initially have been intended as an independent treatise summarizing Rāmānuja’s
standpoint on the BS. Manuscript evidence supports this interpretation: among the
four sections, only the Nayamayūkhamālikā seems to have circulated widely as an
independent text.⁵ It is plausible that the other three sections were added afterwards
to form a proper compendium of Vedānta.
The fact that Appaya introduces the views of Śrīkan: t:ha to a wider scholarly
audience presumably for the first time in a doxographic work is significant. The
doxographic genre requires Appaya to present Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of the BS
:
alongside the interpretations of Śankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva, three influential
theologians whose work had already led, by Appaya’s time, to extensive commen-
tarial literature and to the formation of monastic institutions with large numbers
of followers. Given that Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita ‘school’ apparently had no follow-
ers, institutional structure or commentarial literature of its own before Appaya
:
³ The Caturmatasārasamgraha :
is also known as the Caturmataleśasamgraha. At least one manu-
:
script refers to this work as the Caturmatatātparyasamgraha, which evokes Haradatta Śivācārya’s
:
Caturvedatātparyasamgraha (see NCC, vol. 6, p. 316).
⁴ I have not yet located any manuscript in which the four sections appear together. However, the
colophons found at the end of each section make it clear that they were intended as sections
(pariccheda) of the same work, the Caturmatasārasamgraha.: The order of the sections mentioned
here is also clear from the colophons.
⁵ See NCC, vol. 6, p. 316.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  73
took it over, it appears that Appaya is implicitly making the claim here that
Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita is not only a school (mata) of its own, but also one that is
as authoritative as the others. We may recall that, except for the possible reuse of
:
Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB in Śivalingabhūpa’s commentary on Haradatta’s Śrutisūktimālā,
no scholar of Vedānta had engaged with Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary before Appaya
himself. In light of this, I agree with McCrea that Appaya’s doxography might
have been ‘designed to popularize Śrīkan: t:ha’s system and establish it as a
legitimate participant in the intense intra-Vedānta debates of the period’
(McCrea 2016: 84). Since Appaya’s doxography does not make significant philo-
sophical contributions to any of the Vedānta schools discussed, it is likely that its
primary purpose was to establish ‘that there are—now—four, and not three,
principal systems of Vedānta’ (ibid.). In addition, in view of the fact that Appaya
criticizes Śrīvai:snavas
: in his earlier polemical works, we could argue that introdu-
cing Śrīkan: t:ha’s mata in this manner was also a convenient way for him to prepare
his scholarly audience for the major theological project he wished to undertake—
that of ‘firmly establishing the doctrine of the supreme Śiva’ (paraśivamatasthāpana,
as the Kālakan: t:heśvara inscription puts it) in opposition to the dominant Śrīvai:snava
:
interpretation of Vedānta. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the Śrīvai:snava
: theology of
Vedānta indeed remains Appaya’s central target in his Śivādvaita work.
However, unlike the earlier polemical works, the Caturmatasārasamgraha : does
not feature polemical attacks against Vai:snavas; : it merely summarizes, without
any obvious alterations, the interpretation of the BS as defended in each of the
four Vedānta schools. To illustrate this, let us consider the pāñcarātrādhikarana :
(BS 2.2.39–42) as Appaya comments on it in the Nayamayūkhamālikā
(Viśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta). In this adhikarana, : the authority of Pāñcarātra—a
:
Vai:snava tantric tradition encompassing both theological-philosophical and
ritualistic topics—is debated. Although Rāmānuja does not provide an elaborate
defence of Pāñcarātra in the Śrībhā:sya, his interpretation of the pāñcarātrādhikarana :
: :
differs largely from Śankara, for instance. While Śankara understands all the sūtras of
this adhikarana : as reasons for rejecting the authority of Pāñcarātra, Rāmānuja (just
like Yāmuna before him) considers the first two sūtras (BS 2.2.39–40) as presenting a
pūrvapak:sa, and the last two sūtras (BS 2.2.41–42) as presenting a siddhānta
establishing the opposite conclusion, namely that the Pāñcarātra teachings are
:
authoritative. Appaya takes sides with Śrīkan: t:ha and Śankara both in his ŚAMD
and Parimala,⁶ refuting the authority of Pāñcarātra based on the argument that it is a
misleading teaching (mohaśāstra) or at best a limited one (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4
for the details of Appaya’s argumentation). But in the Nayamayūkhamālikā, Appaya
⁶ The Parimala is Appaya’s Advaita sub-commentary on Amalānanda’s Kalpataru, itself a sub-

:
commentary on the Bhāmatī, Vācaspati Miśra’s well-known commentary on Śankara’s
Brahmasūtrabhā:sya. It was composed after the ŚAMD, since Appaya refers to the latter in his
:
Parimala ad BS 2.2.45: prapañcas tu manidīpikāyā : dra:st:avyah: .
m
74    - 
does not deviate from Rāmānuja’s interpretation.⁷ Appaya’s interpretation of

Viśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta was so accurate that it was considered authoritative
by Viśi:st:ādvaita scholars themselves: the late seventeenth-century scholar
:
Rangarāmānuja freely reuses several passages from the Nayamayūkhamālikā in his
own Viśi:st:ādvaita commentary on the BS, the Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā (see Chapter 5,
Section 5.1.3).
Thus Appaya is not interested a priori in rejecting or condemning the views of
Rāmānuja and other Śrīvai:snava
: :
theologians (or other Vai:snava theologians, for
:
that matter) in the Caturmatasārasamgraha. At the very beginning of the work, he
states his intention as such:
ānandatīrthamunilak:smanadeśikendraśrīka
: n: t:hayogipadavīr adavīyasīr nah: |
ācāryapādasarani
: m: ca vivicya boddhum : : hyate matacatu:st:ayasāraleśah: ||
: samgr
A little bit of the essence of the four schools [of Vedānta] is summarized [here] in
order [for people] to understand the differences between the paths [set forth by]
Ānandatīrthamuni [i.e., Madhva], Lak:smanadeśikendra
: [i.e., Rāmānuja] [and]
Śrīkan: t:hayogi, not very far in time from me, and the way of the ācāryapāda [i.e.,
:
Śankara].⁸
In Appaya’s view, these four Vedānta schools do not uphold equally valid inter-
pretations of the BS. This is clear from the opening verses found at the beginning
of each section as shown in Table 3.2. Rāmānuja’s teachings are compared to a
path that is both pleasant and beneficial for those who wish to reach Vi:snu, : the
:
Lord of Śrī, while Śrīkan: t:ha’s teachings are likened to a staircase (sopānapankti)
for those who wish to ‘ascend’ (ā+√ruh) to the state of Śiva, thus suggesting that
Śiva’s state (somabhāranapada)
: :
is in effect superior to Vi:snu’s state and closer to
:
the absolute Brahman. However, only Śankara’s teachings lead to the ultimate
:
goal—self-realization (ātmabodha)—and significantly, only Śankara, not the other
theologians, is said to follow the real intention (āśaya) of Bādarāyana, : the author
of the BS (sūtrakr: t). Hence the opening verses seem to present us with an
evaluative sequence in which Advaita Vedānta stands at the apex.⁹ The sequence
also suggests that Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita is at least equal, if not superior to
⁷ As a matter of fact, Appaya reuses sections of the pūrvapak:sa put forward in the pāñcarātrādhikarana
:
of the Nayamayūkhamālikā in siddhāntas on the same adhikarana : in the ŚAMD and the Parimala.
⁸ Caturmatasārasamgraha:
: 57.
⁹ Arranging doxographies in a hierarchical and ‘vertical’ manner is a common feature of Advaita
doxographies, one that is not strikingly present, for instance, in Jaina doxographies. In his study of
Sanskrit doxographies, Halbfass notes that ‘Jaina doxographies do not follow any recognizable schema
in their presentation of the six systems,’ while the ‘Advaita Vedānta doxographic texts are usually based
upon a hierarchical classification at whose apex stands the Vedānta’ (Halbfass 1990: 351). Though Jaina
doxographies may well have a schema of their own, to end a doxography with one’s own school indeed
defines the Advaita Vedānta doxographic genre.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  75
:
Table 3.2 Opening verses in the Caturmatasārasamgraha
Nyāyamuktāvalī ādāv ānandatīrthīyām anusr: tya matasthitim |

(Dvaita Vedānta) nyāyamuktāvalī ramyā viśadārthā viracyate ||
Following at first the position of Ānandatīrtha’s [i.e., Madhva’s]
view, I compose the Nyāyamuktāvalī, which is pleasant and has a
clear meaning.
Nayamayūkhamālikā śreyasām : nidhim iva śriyah: patim : prepsatām : priyahitādhvadarśanī |
(Viśi:stādvaita
: lak:smanāryahr
: : dayānusārinī: tanyate nayamayūkhamālikā ||
Vedānta) I compose the Nayamayūkhamālikā, which follows the thought of
:
Lak:smanārya [i.e., Rāmānuja] and shows a path that is both
pleasant and beneficial for those who wish to reach the Lord of Śrī,
who is like a storehouse for the fortunate ones.
:
:
Nayamanimālā sopānapanktikalpā somābharanapadam : ārurūk:sūnām : |
(Śivādvaita Vedānta) :
kriyate nayamanimālā śrīkan: t:hācāryadr: :st:amārgena ||
:
I compose the Nayamanimālā, which is like a staircase for those
who wish to ascend to the state of Śiva, in accordance with the
path seen by Śrīkan: t:hācārya.
Nayamañjarī ācāryapādadarśitam āśayam anusr: tya sūtrakr: tah: |
(Advaita Vedānta) :
adhikaranamañjarīm aham āracayāmy ātmabodhāya ||
Following the intention of the author of the [Brahma]sūtras [i.e.,
Bādarāyana]
: : as it was understood by the ācāryapāda [i.e.,
Śankara], I compose the adhikaranamañjarī
: [i.e., Nayamañjarī]
for self-realization.a
a
It is possible to read the compound ātmabodhāya in the last verse as a pun, meaning both ‘for
[people’s] self-realization’ and ‘for my own realization’. In both cases, the superiority of Advaita as a
path of realization as opposed to a means of obtaining union with one’s favorite deity (i:st:adevatā) is
suggested. Also noteworthy here is that Appaya refers to Madhva, Rāmānuja and Śrīkan: t:ha by their
: :
names, while he refers to Śankara as the ācāryapāda, which confirms his great respect for Śankara.
Rāmānuja’s Viśi:st:ādvaita. This is a first hint of the direction Appaya intends to

take in his following Śivādvaita works, where the focus is increasingly laid on
distinguishing Śrīkan: t:ha’s position from Rāmānuja’s and positioning the former
above the latter.
3.2 Śrīkan: t: ha’s Teachings and Pure Non-dualism
With his next and most important Śivādvaita Vedānta work, the ŚAMD (‘Jewel-Light
on the Sun of Śiva’¹⁰), Appaya shifts his focus to Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhā
: :sya.
¹⁰ McCrea (2016: 84–5) has suggested another translation of the title where arkamani : functions as
the central compound. The arkamani : refers to the mythical sunstone that burst into flames when
:
touched by the rays of the sun. McCrea understands arkamanidīpikā as the light (dīpikā) (of the sun)
causing the sunstone to burst into flames. The title thus becomes a metaphor: Appaya’s sub-
commentary is like a sun shedding light on, i.e., elucidating, the intended meaning of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
76    - 
As we shall see in this chapter and the next, Appaya does more than clarify
Śrīkan: t:ha’s thought in this massive sub-commentary. Not only does he use the
root text to build up highly original critiques of standard views of Vedānta,
particularly Viśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta, and other schools of Indian thought; he also
:
creatively reinterprets Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology along the lines of Śankara’s pure non-
dualism (śuddhādvaita), a position that Śrīkan: t:ha himself did not seem to fully
acknowledge.¹¹ Appaya’s endorsement of Advaita Vedānta is well known. In
addition to his Nayamañjarī (included in the Caturmatasārasamgraha), : his
Parimala on Amalānanda’s Kalpataru (a commentary in the Bhāmatī tradition),
:
his Siddhāntaleśasamgraha (an analytical survey of various Advaita views on
different topics) and his Nyāyarak:sāmani : (a study of the first adhyāya of the
BS) are among the most remarkable Advaita works composed during the early
modern period. While he seems to have composed his major Advaita works later
:
in his career, Appaya remained a great admirer of Śankara (the bhagavatpāda, as
he often refers to him) and of his Brahmasūtrabhā:sya throughout his entire
:
career.¹² His unconditional commitment to Śankara’s commentary is so
commentary, likened here to the sunstone waiting to burst into flames by the grace of Appaya’s
attention. While this interpretation looks quite plausible, the fact that Appaya sometimes refers to his
:
sub-commentary as the manidīpikā (e.g., Parimala ad BS 2.2.45) and that some later authors refer to
this work as the Śivādityadīpikā suggests another interpretation. I propose to take śivārka as a
karmadhāraya compound, recalling the well-known association between the sun and Śiva in Śaiva
Siddhānta literature. See, for instance, Śrīkan: t:ha’s Ratnatrayaparīk:sā 304–5, where Śambhu is identi-
fied with the sun (bhānu) and His śakti to the sunlight (prabhā); Mok:sakārikā (v. 111), where the śakti
of the Sun-Śiva (śivārka) makes one capable of seeing through the ‘eye of His consciousness’ (a verse
besides quoted by Appaya in his ŚAMD ad BS 1.1.1; ŚAMD1: 96); or the first two benedictory verses of
:
Aghoraśiva’s Pañcāvaranastava, where Sadāśiva is praised as the sun (Śivasūrya). In further support of
this interpretation of the title is the fact that in his Avatāravādāvalī, the Śuddhādvaita theologian
Puru:sottama also interprets the compound śivārka in the title of Appaya’s work as a karmadhāraya
compound; see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2 for more details on this. As for the compound manidīpikā, :
I read it as the light of a jewel, identified here to Appaya’s sub-commentary which throws light on the
Sun that is Śiva. Note that there are other commentaries bearing the title manidīpikā : such as
Rāmacandra Dīk:sita’s commentary on the Unādisūtras,
: :
the Unādima :
nidīpikā (NCC, vol. 2, p. 294).
¹¹ Śrīkan: t:ha distances himself from pure non-dualism in his commentary on BS 2.1.22: na vayam :
brahmaprapañcayor atyantam eva bhedavādinah: , ghat:apat:ayor iva [ . . . ] na vātyantābhedavādinah:
śuktirajatayor iva [ . . . ]—‘We are not among those who uphold the absolute difference between
Brahman and the world, as between a jar and a cloth [ . . . ], nor are we among those who uphold
their absolute non-difference, as between the silver and the shell [ . . . ]’ (ŚAMD2: 31). The
atyantābhedavādins refer to Advaitins who maintain that there is ultimately no difference between
Brahman and the world: just as one believes a shell to be a piece of silver until the latter’s unreality is
realised in an act of clear perception, so does the world appear to be real until the advent of the true
knowledge that the world’s nature is Brahman. Appaya besides cites this passage in the
Śivādvaitanirnaya: in his pūrvapak:sa supporting the view that Śrīkan: t:ha disagreed with pure non-
dualism.
¹² The Nyāyarak:sāmani : and the Parimala are undoubtedly Appaya’s most important Advaita
works, and incidentally the only other works mentioned alongside the ŚAMD in the Kālakan: t:heśvara
inscription. While the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha : is decidedly an ‘oeuvre de jeunesse’ (Gotszorg 1993:
22–3), the Nyāyarak:sāmani : and the Parimala seem to have been written later in his career. The
Parimala was certainly composed after the ŚAMD (see above, fn. 6, this chapter). As for the
Nyāyarak:sāmani, : it is not possible to date its composition based on its benedictory verses, colophons
or intratextual references, but it is likely to also have been composed later in Appaya’s career given that
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  77
important that in several places in his Parimala, he even dismisses the views of
Vācaspati Miśra’s Bhāmatī and Amalānanda’s Kalpataru when they seem to
:
contradict Śankara’s commentary.¹³
Our previous analysis of the Caturmatasārasamgraha: has shown that Appaya
places Advaita above Śivādvaita as far as the final goal of self-realization is
concerned. We have also seen that the way he structures his doxography with
Advaita at its apex reflects a textual practice common among Advaita doxogra-
phers. Appaya’s commitment to Advaita Vedānta also comes to the fore in his
reading of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. By way of illustrating this, I consider here a
single example: Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of the transformation of Śiva into the world.¹⁴
We will see that Appaya closely follows Śrīkan: t:ha’s thought on this topic in his
ŚAMD, but takes another stand in one of his later works, the Śivādvaitanirnaya,:
where he reinterprets Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of transformation (parināmavāda)
: as a
theory of apparent transformation (vivartavāda) in line with Advaita Vedānta.
3.2.1 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Theory of Transformation
The relationship between Brahman, the individual self (jīva) and the world is a
central doctrinal feature of every Vedānta school, and is envisaged differently
from school to school. In Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology, Brahman is identified with Śiva
(parameśvara, paramaśiva, maheśvara)—otherwise known as Īśvara, Rudra,
etc.—as both the efficient and material cause (nimittopādānakārana) : of the
world, the inner controller (antaryāmin) of all beings, and the triad of existence,
:
he sometimes boldly challenges there (in stark contrast to the loyal attitude towards Śankara he displays
:
:
in the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha) Śankara’s interpretation of the BS (see below, fn. 13, this chapter).
:
While Appaya generally praises Śankara in his Śivādvaita Vedānta works and later Advaita works, he
:
also does so in the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha as well as in his early polemical works.
:
¹³ The somewhat ‘fundamentalist’ attitude of Appaya with regard to Śankara’s Brahmasūtrabhā:sya
was pointed out by S. S. Sastri in the introduction to his edition of Lak:smīnr: simha’s
: Ābhoga: ‘[Appaya
:
Dīk:sita] would follow the Bhā:sya [of Śankara] to the very letter. Contradiction to the Bhā:sya from any
quarter would make him stir up for fresh discussion. So much so he has to condemn Bhāmatī and
Kalpataru when they contradict the Bhā:sya [ . . . ] He has gone to the extent of rejecting Śabara and
Kumārila to support the Bhā:sya’; see Deshpande 2016: 120 for this quotation. That being said, there are
:
places in the Nyāyarak:sāmani, : which purposely comments favourably on Śankara’s bhā:sya, where
:
Appaya either adds to or even criticizes Śankara’s way of interpreting the BS. Commenting on the
:
: for instance, Appaya notes that Śankara should have discussed the sphot:a theory in
ak:sarādhikarana,
this adhikarana: rather than in the devatādhikarana : (bhā:sye tu ‘anyabhāvavyāvr: tteh: ’ iti sūtrārthatayā
ne krtam; Nyāyarak:sāmani:
: : :
atraiva sphut:am : kartavyam api sphot:anirākarana : m: devatādhikara : 194).
as Śankara in his exposition of the first
: :
Appaya also does not use the same order of adhikaranas
adhyāya. For more details on Appaya’s criticism of Śankara in this work, see Joshi 1966: 364–7.
¹⁴ The argument that Appaya reads Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary along Advaita lines was discussed in
great detail by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. See the introduction to his edition of the Śivādvaitanirnaya :
(Sastri 1929: 29–44) as well as his excellent study of Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita theology (Sastri 1930: 279ff.).
Sastri provides several examples where Appaya reinterprets doctrinal material along Advaita lines, and
critically addresses their validity.
78    - 
consciousness, and bliss (saccidānanda). Unlike Advaitins who ascribe (nominally

in BS 1.1.2) three functions to Brahman—creation (sr: :st:i), stasis (sthiti), and
:
dissolution (pralaya/laya, bhanga)—Śrīkan: t:ha ascribes to Brahman the five
traditional actions (pañcakr: tya) attributed to Śiva: creation, stasis, dissolution,
and the two actions (kriyā) through which Śiva presides over the souls, namely
concealment (tirodhāna, tirobhāva), and grace (anugraha).¹⁵ Brahman/Śiva is
non-dual (advitīya), and is ‘qualified’ (viśi:st:a) by the world and the selves that
reside in it. In his commentary on BS 2.1.14, Śrīkan: t:ha sums up his philosophical
position in the following terms:
The doubt [here] is whether or not the viśi:st:aśivādvaita [doctrine] that we have
taught earlier—[according to which] nothing but Śiva, who is qualified (viśi:st:a)
by the manifestation of sentient and insentient [entities], is non-dual, the cause
[of the world] and the effect [i.e., the world itself]—[a doctrine] that has been
established on the basis [that all scriptural texts] are in concordance [with it], is
set aside by reasoning.¹⁶
The non-dual Śiva, the cause of the world, is qualified (viśi:st:a) by sentient entities
(citprapañca), i.e., the selves (jīva), and insentient entities (acitprapañca), i.e.,
the worldly constituents. Śrīkan: t:ha says elsewhere that this phenomenal world,
which consists of sentient and insentient entities, constitutes the ‘body’ (śarīra)
of Brahman; or, more specifically, the body that is ‘qualifying’ Brahman
(sarvacidacitprapañcaśarīraviśi:st:am : brahma, BMB 1.2.1), a terminology clearly
reminiscent of Rāmānuja’s viśi:st:ādvaita theology.
Śrīkan: t:ha bases his theory of the phenomenality of the world on the concept of
‘power’ (śakti). Brahman/Śiva is endowed with multiple powers, the greatest of
which has various names in his theology: the ‘supreme śakti’ (paraśakti,
paramaśakti), the ‘supreme source’ (paraprakr: ti), and more often—especially in
¹⁵ Śrīkan: t:ha explains ad BS 1.1.2 that the sūtra word janmādi (in janmādy asya yatah: ) refers to the
five actions ([pañca]kr: tya) of Brahman/Śiva: janmādikam : janmasthitipralayatirobhāvānugraharūpam :
kr: tyam (ŚAMD1: 109, 115). In his sub-commentary on this sūtra, Appaya attempts to demonstrate
how tirobhāva and anugraha can be included in the definition of Brahman/Śiva. From a strictly
Vedānta standpoint, BS 1.1.2 is a tat:asthalak:sana, : namely a definition per accidens of Brahman rather
than a definition by essence (svarūpalak:sana). : In other words, creation, stasis and dissolution do not
inherently define Brahman but are merely defining features of the world (prapañcadharma). Appaya
argues at length, for instance, that anugraha, though it is an attribute of Śiva (parameśvaradharma)
insofar as Śiva bestows grace on His devotees while liberating them, is also an attribute of the world just
like creation, stasis and dissolution. This discussion highlights a key tension in Appaya’s Śivādvaita
theology, which combines the soteriological effectiveness of Śiva’s grace with a pure non-dualist
metaphysics in which the ‘creator’ is not involved in ultimately unreal worldly activities; see
Section 3.2.6, this chapter, for a discussion of Śiva’s grace in Śivādvaita Vedānta. It is a tension that
is not present in Appaya’s Advaita work. In the Parimala on BS 1.1.2, for instance, anugraha and
tirobhāva are simply not included in the definition per accidens of Brahman.
¹⁶ yad uktam : pūrvatra cidacitprapañcaviśi:st:ātmā śiva evādvitīyah: kārana
: m: kāryam : ca bhavatīti
viśi:st:aśivādvaitam, tasya samanvayasiddhasya yuktibādhāpattir asti na veti samśaya: h: (ŚAMD2 ad BS
2.1.14: 19–20).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  79
Appaya’s commentarial work—Śiva’s ‘power of consciousness’ (cicchakti¹⁷). It is

Śiva’s cicchakti that constitutes the ‘body’ of Śiva—that is, the world and selves—
and makes possible phenomenal diversity on the part of the unchanging and non-
dual Śiva.¹⁸ Both Śrīkan: t:ha and Appaya highlight this relationship between Śiva,
śakti and the world while paying homage to Śiva at the beginning of their
respective commentaries. In the second verse of the BMB, Śrīkan: t:ha says:
Victorious is Śiva, the supreme self, the sum of everything that is most important
in scriptures, who painted the multitude of pictures consisting of the entire net of
the world on the canvas that is His own power,
while Appaya begins the ŚAMD with this verse:
Obeisance to Him, Śiva, in just a tiny part of whose fully complete power (śakti)
this world was placed; so have said those who know scriptures. [Obeisance to
Him, Śiva,] the companion of Nārāyanī, : He whose throat is shining with the
[dark] lustre of the tamāla tree.¹⁹
In both verses, Śiva’s śakti is depicted as the locus of the phenomenal world, or the
‘material’ that Śiva uses to create the world and direct its activities. As we shall see,
Appaya stresses the role of śakti as the material cause (upādānakārana) : of the
world in his reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology.
Another element of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology on which Appaya insists is the relation
between Brahman, cicchakti and space. In the BMB, Śrīkan: t:ha establishes a
¹⁷ In Śaiva Siddhānta scriptures (Mr: gendra, Kirana, : etc.), cicchakti is a synonym for jñānaśakti and/
or kriyāśakti, the two complementary powers (śakti) of knowledge and action inherent in Śiva. It
continues to be used in this sense by later South Indian Saiddhāntika exegetes, such as Śrīkan: t:ha (the
author of the Saiddhāntika Ratnatrayaparīk:sā; see v. 180) and Aghoraśiva (see his gloss of cit in his
commentary on Bhoja’s Tattvaprakāśa, v. 1). In non-dualist Kashmirian Śaivism, cicchakti refers to the
power of the supreme consciousness (cit) and is sometimes identified with the goddess. The association
in Krama Śaiva doctrine between Vyomavāmeśvarī, the goddess of space, and cicchakti is particularly
significant here, for it finds a clear echo in Śrīkan: t:ha’s equivocation of cicchakti with the supreme space
(see below, fn. 20, this chapter). For more details on the powers of jñāna and kriyā in Śaiva Siddhānta
scriptures, see Brunner 1992.
¹⁸ In his commentary on the first opening verse of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, Appaya points out that
though Śiva is non-dual, internal difference is not denied insofar as Śiva is qualified by His śakti, which
itself has the form (rūpa) of the diversified phenomenal world. Consequently, he adds, Śrīkan: t:ha’s
doctrine cannot contradict any scripture, whether it teaches duality or non-duality: parabrahmana : h:
śivasyādvitīyatvābhyupagame dvaitaśrutīnām : virodhah: sadvitīyatvābhyupagame tv advaitaśrutīnām iti
:
virodhaśankāyām : nikhilaprapañcākāraśaktiviśi:st:asya śivasyādvitīyatvād āntarganikabhedāpratik
: :sepāc
ca na ko ’pi virodha[h: ]—‘With regard to the [following] doubt of contradiction—[namely,] if we accept
that Śiva, the supreme Brahman, is non-dual, scriptures [that teach] duality are contradicted, and if we
accept that He is dual, scriptures [that teach] non-duality [are contradicted]—there is no contradiction
at all because Śiva is non-dual and because internal difference [in Śiva] is not denied insofar as He is
qualified by [His] śakti in the form of the entire manifested world’ (ŚAMD1: 4).
¹⁹ yasyāhur āgamavidah: paripūrnaśakter
: : kiyaty api nivi:st:am amum
amśe : prapañcam | tasmai
:
tamālarucibhāsurakandharāya nārāyanīsahacarāya namah: śivāya || 1 || (ŚAMD1: 1).
80    - 
distinct relation between śakti and space—not the material or phenomenal space
(bhūtākāśa), one of the five traditional ‘great elements’ (mahābhūta) alongside
fire, air, water, and earth, but transcendent space (parākāśa, paramākāśa,
mahākāśa). Transcendent space is in turn homologically identified with the
devotee’s inner space—alternatively referred to as the space inside the cavity [of
the heart] (daharākāśa), the void of consciousness (cidambara) or the space-as-
consciousness (cidākāśa)—where Brahman resides and ought to be contemplated
by the devotee. Appaya also stresses the relation between Brahman, cicchakti and
space in his reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology.²⁰
Śrīkan: t:ha holds that the śakti of Śiva is inseparably linked to Śiva. It is His very
essence (svarūpa) and the principle whereby Śiva obtains all His attributes
:
(guna)—existence, bliss, omniscience, omnipotence, infinity. Without śakti, Śiva
cannot govern the world and guide the selves in their spiritual endeavours. As he
explains in his commentary on BS 1.2.1:
On the authority of śruti, smr: ti, epics, Purānas

: and statements by [Śaiva] experts,
[we know that] the supreme śakti—the great wealth that consists in the mani-
festation of all sentient and insentient [entities], the supreme knowledge, bliss
and existence, devoid of spatio-temporal limitations, spontaneous—constitutes
both the essence and the attributes of the supreme Brahman, Śiva. Without it, it is
impossible for the supreme Brahman to know all, have all powers, be the cause of
all, control all, be worshipped by all, favour all, be the cause of all human
endeavours, and be present in everything.²¹
Thus it is Śiva’s śakti that creates, pervades and governs the phenomenal world.
What, then, we may ask, is Śiva’s role with regard to the selves and the world?
How does Śiva create the world and what is the ontological status of the self with
respect to Śiva? It is in his commentary on BS 1.4.27 (parināmāt,: ‘because of
transformation’) that Śrīkan: t:ha explains how Śiva created the world, a theory that
²⁰ In his commentary on BS 1.1.2, Śrīkan: t:ha distinguishes supreme space from material space, and
identifies the former with cidambara, paramaśakti and paramaprakr: ti: ākāśata ity ākāśah: prakāśaś
cidambaram ucyate. na bhūtākāśah: , viśe:sābhāvāt. nikhilajagadan: da : :san: dabudbudanikurumbaja-
:
ladhisthānīyā paraprakr: tirūpā paramaśaktir hi cidambaram ucyate—‘[The word] ākāśa [is derived
in the sense of] ākāśate, i.e., that which shines forth; [thus] it is called the shining forth (prakāśa), the
void of consciousness (cidambara). [The supreme ākāśa is not] material space because the latter has no
excellence (viśe:sa). For the supreme power that consists in the supreme prakr: ti, which is like an ocean
[containing] a mass of bubbles that are the myriads of world-eggs, is called the void of consciousness’
(ŚAMD1: 122–3).
²¹ śrutismr: tītihāsapurānābhiyuktasūktiprāmā
: :
nyāt sakalacidacitprapañcamahāvibhūtirūpā mahā-
:
samvid ānandasattā deśakālādiparicchedaśūnyā svābhāvikī paramaśaktih: parabrahmana : h: śivasya
svarūpam : ca gunaś : ca bhavati. tadvyatirekena : parabramana : h: sarvajñatvam : sarvaśaktitvasarvakā-
:
ranatva : sarvaniyantr: tvam
m : sarvopāsyatvam : sarvānugrāhakatvam : sarvapuru:sārthahetutvādikam :
sarvagatatvam : ca na sambhavati
: (ŚAMD1: 302). For Śrīkan: t:ha, abhiyuktasūktis refer to statements
uttered by influential Śaiva scholars of the past (see, for instance, his commentary on BS 1.2.9, where he
refers to a verse from Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā as abhiyuktasūkti).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  81
he describes as being ‘unprecedented’ (apūrva). Based on selected passages from

the Śvetāśvatara and Taittirīya Upani:sads, Śrīkan: t:ha says that at the time of the
dissolution (pralaya) of the world (which precedes every creation), a primaeval
intelligence (prajñā, which he glosses as jñānaśakti, the power of cognition) came
forth from Śiva and dispelled the prevailing darkness in the form of a ‘great
vibration’ (mahāsphurana). : Śiva, then in a causal state consisting of subtle and
undifferentiated entities, resolved to become manifest and entered these entities as
their own selves. Thus Śiva transformed into all the various worldly constituents,
just as a person passes through childhood, youth and so forth.
In light of this exegesis, it is clear that Śrīkan: t:ha understands world creation as a
process of gradual transformation (parināma) : in which Śiva functions both as the
cause and the effect: just as the person who passes through childhood, youth, etc. is
both the cause and the effect of its own transformation, so too is Śiva the cause and
effect of His own transformation into the world. In other words, as Appaya
emphasizes in his sub-commentary on BS 1.4.27, Śiva is the material cause
(upādānakārana) : of the world, the material out of which the world is made. But
how is this transformation of Śiva as a cause possible, if He is unchanging? Appaya’s
take on this question draws upon an analogy with Mīmāmsā : ritual theory:
And so, just as in the sacrifice accomplished with the sacrificial cake referred to in
the sentence [prescribing the originative injunction] (utpattivākya) ‘[A cake] on
eight pans for Agni’,²² the fact that grains of rice, which are not entitled to be
direct means (sāk:sātsādhana) [in the sacrifice], are means—[a fact] taught in
the scriptural passage ‘He should sacrifice with rice’—is justified insofar as they
are needed for the preparation of the sacrificial cake; or just as, in the praise
performed with :rc verses that consists in a statement of qualities (gunābhidhāna),
:
the fact that songs of praise (sāman), which are not entitled to be direct means [in
the praise] inasmuch as they consist in performances of songs, are means—[a
fact] communicated in the scriptural passage ‘He praises with the Rathantara
[sāman]’—is justified because they ‘manifest’ syllables from the :r c verses; or just
as the fact that numbers, which are not entitled, unlike substances, to be direct
instruments of action in ritual actions, are the object of oblations—a fact taught
in the scriptural passage ‘He pours four fistfuls’²³—is justified because there is
[a certain number of] portions of substances in the fist; in the same way, in the
present case too, it is appropriate to justify the fact, [also scripturally] taught, that
Śiva is the material cause of the world by means of puru:sa and prakr: ti, the latter
²² This refers to the originative injunction of the cake offering to Agni, which is the first of the three
main sacrifices performed at both the new-moon and the full-moon sacrifices. The full passage is: ‘In
that the cake for Agni on eight pans is unmoved at the new-moon day and at the full-moon day’
(translation from Benson 2010: 429).
²³ This injunction refers to the pouring out of the grains in the context of the new- and full-moon
sacrifices.
82    - 
of which is mentioned in other scriptural passages as the material cause of the

world.²⁴
Appaya explains here that Śiva transforms into the world by means of two
subordinate principles—puru:sa and prakr: ti. As the rest of his sub-commentary
makes clear, however, it is primarily prakr: ti—that is, Śiva’s śakti—that functions
as the means whereby Śiva transforms into the world (puru:sa being merely one
aspect of prakr: ti; see Chapter 5, Section 4.2.1). Appaya here compares Śiva with
different ritual objects that feature as indirect means in specific ritual contexts. To
take the example of rice: while rice does not have a direct ritual use in the cake
offering to Agni (whereas the cake does), it is nevertheless a means in this ritual
insofar as it is required to make the cake. Likewise, Śiva is not the direct means
(sāk:sātsādhana) whereby the world is created and undergoes transformation, for
He is changeless (nirvikāra) by nature. Nevertheless, it is an indirect means
insofar as it is inseparable from prakr: ti, which is itself the means (just as the
cake is in the cake oblation). In support of the rice’s capacity to be a means
(sādhanatva) is the fact that rice is mentioned as a means in scriptural passages
pertaining to other rituals. Likewise, Śiva’s material causality is scripturally
attested in the Śvetāśvatara Upani:sad and other scriptural passages. In the analogy
used here, the rice and Śiva function as indirect means whereby a result is achieved,
namely the cake oblation and the transformation of the world, respectively.
Śrīkan: t:ha does not invoke any Mīmāmsā : principle to justify his claim that Śiva is
the material cause of the world; he is content with providing a simple exegesis of
the Upani:sadic passages. For Appaya, however, exegesis is not enough and he feels
the need to turn to Mīmāmsā : hermeneutics—a discipline in which he excelled—to
justify the position upheld by Śrīkan: t:ha.
Later in his commentary, Śrīkan: t:ha identifies prakr: ti with māyā and cites the
(first half of the) famous verse from the Śvetāśvatara Upani:sad (4.10) to support
his theory of transformation:
One should know māyā as the source (prakr: ti) [and] the great Lord as the
possessor of māyā (māyin).²⁵
²⁴ tataś ca yathā ‘yad āgneyo ’:st:ākapāla’ ity utpattivākyāvagatapurodāśasādhanake : yāge

sāk:sātsādhanabhāvānarhānā : m : vrīhīnā
: m: ‘vrīhibhir yajete’ iti śrutam : sādhanatvam: purodāśanirvar-
:
:
tanadvāropapādyate, yathā vā gunābhidhānarūpāyā : :r ksādhyāyām
m : stutau gītikriyārūpatayā
sāk:sātsādhanabhāvānarhānā : m : sāmnām : ‘rathantare : stuvīte’ iti śrutipratipannam
na : sādhanatvam
:
:rgak:sarābhivyaktidvāropapādyate, yathā vā sankhyāyāh: kriyāyām : dravyavat sāk:sātkārakabhāvānar-
hāyāś ‘caturo mu:st:īn nirvapati’ iti śrutam : nirvāpakarmatvam : mu:st:idravyāvacchedadvāropapādyate,
tathehāpi śrutam : śivasya jagadupādānatvam : śrutyantarāvagatajagadupādānabhāvaprakr: tipuru:sadvā-
ropapādayitum : yuktam (ŚAMD1: 565).
²⁵ The full verse reads: māyām : tu prakr: tim: vidyān māyinam: tu maheśvaram | tasyāvayavabhūtais tu
vyāptam : sarvam idam : jagat || (ŚU 4.10).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  83
According to Śrīkan: t:ha, this verse conveys that Śiva’s creation of the world is
mediated by māyā, the source (prakr: ti) of the world. As for Śiva, He is not merely
the possessor of māyā, the māyin—as the verse claims—but is qualified by māyā
(māyāviśi:st:a). In other words, the origination of the world occurs through Śiva
qualified by māyā—not through māyā alone or Śiva alone—just as the growth of
hair, nails, etc. occurs through the living man (or soul) qualified by a body. But
what does māyā actually mean here? Once again, Appaya elaborates on the matter
where Śrīkan: t:ha had simply quoted from scriptures.
For most theologians of Śaiva Siddhānta, māyā is a single, eternal, and insen-
tient principle distinct from Śiva, the materia prima (upādānakārana) : out of
which Śiva, the efficient cause (nimittakārana), : fashions the world, and into
which Śiva dissolves it back. In Śrīkan: t:ha’s system, however, just as in every
Vedānta system, the material cause, māyā, is the same as the efficient cause,
Brahman/Śiva. Māyā thus has a radically different, almost opposite meaning
in Śivādvaita Vedānta: it is a principle of consciousness, Śiva’s cicchakti.²⁶ In his
sub-commentary on BS 1.4.27, Appaya invokes the Nighan: t:u, a glossary-cum-
thesaurus with Vedic origins, to prove his point:
In this [verse, i.e., ŚU 4.10], it is Śiva’s power of consciousness (cicchakti) that is

intended [to be expressed] by the word māyā, [this word] being found among
synonyms of knowledge in the Vedic Nighan: t:u.²⁷
Since the word māyā is well known as a synonym of knowledge, it is adequate to

identify its referent as Śiva’s cicchakti, a principle of consciousness. For Appaya,
the first quarter of ŚU 4.10 conveys that māyā, or Śiva’s cicchakti, is the material
cause of the world. In his commentary on this verse, he also highlights the
relationship—not explicitly stated in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary on this portion—
between māyā/cicchakti and space. Appaya argues that the demonstrative pro-
noun asmāt in the previous Śvetāśvatara verse, ‘ . . . From that, the possessor of
māyā projects this whole world . . . ’ (asmān māyī sr: jate viśvam etat, ŚU 4.9),
²⁶ The claim that māyā is identical to Śiva’s cicchakti, and is therefore inseparable from Śiva, brings
Śivādvaita Vedānta closer to the non-dualist Śaivism from Kashmir than to Śaiva Siddhānta, in that the
former holds that it is Śiva who is manifest in the form of souls, māyā and its products. For māyā’s
inseparability from Śiva, see Abhinavagupta’s Tantrāloka 9.149c–150a: māyā ca nāma devasya śaktir
avyatirekinī : | bhedāvabhāsasvātantryam . . . (‘Māyā is in fact the faculty (śakti) of the Lord himself and
[therefore] not other [than Him]. It is His quality as autonomous agent (svātantrya) [when His action
is the] manifestation of duality [in consciousness]’; translation from Sanderson 1992: 288). For the
identity between Śiva and māyā’s products, see Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā 1.5.7: cidātmaiva hi devo
’ntah: sthitam icchāvaśād bahih: | yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam : prakāśayet ||—‘For, just like a yogin,
God, which consists only in consciousness, must manifest externally all the objects residing in [Him],
by the force of His own will, without any material cause.’ However, as we shall see later in this chapter,
Appaya’s non-dualism departs from that of Kashmirian non-dualist exegetes in its acceptance of
vivartavāda.
²⁷ vaidikanighan: t:au jñānaparyāye:su pat:hitena māyāśabdenātra śaivī cicchaktir abhipreyate
(ŚAMD1: 567–8).
84    - 
actually refers to the supreme space (paramavyoman) mentioned in the preceding

verse (ŚU 4.8: :rco ak:sare parame vyoman yasmin devā . . . ). Since the pronoun
asmāt must also refer to māyā—the source from which the māyin ‘projects this
whole world’—it follows that Śiva’s cicchakti is identical to the supreme space. As
for the second quarter of ŚU 4.10—where Śiva is described as the possessor of
māyā, the māyin—Appaya understands it to mean that Śiva is the material cause
(prakr: ti) of the world by means of māyā (māyādvāraka).²⁸
At this point in his sub-commentary, Appaya raises an objection: if we accept
that māyā or cicchakti is the material cause of the world, and that the non-dual
Śiva is immutable, how is it possible to assert—like all Vedāntins do with respect
to Brahman—that Śiva too is a material cause of the world? Appaya’s answer
closely follows the analogy used by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary: just as the body
alone is not the material cause of the growth of hair, nails, etc., but acts in
conjunction with the self for this purpose, in the same way, cicchakti alone is
not the material cause of the world, but is so only inasmuch as it depends on Śiva
(śivāśrita) or has Śiva as its locus (āśraya). But there is another important
implication of the identity between māyā and cicchakti. While for scholars of
Śaiva Siddhānta the insentient māyā is a principle eternally distinct from Śiva,
māyā as cicchakti is inseparable from Śiva. If cicchakti is transforming, then does it
not imply that Śiva too is transforming? This is a question that Appaya tackles in
detail in a later Śivādvaita work, the Śivādvaitanirnaya. : We would expect
Appaya’s answer in this work to be the same as in the ŚAMD: Śiva is the material
cause of the world only by means of cicchakti, such that He is not transforming
directly into the world. But Appaya’s answer turns out to be quite different in this
work, as he holds that Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of [real] transformation (parināmavadā)
:
must be reinterpreted as a theory of apparent transformation (vivartavāda) of the
world, in line with the doctrine held in Advaita Vedānta.
3.2.2 An Argument in the Śivādvaitanirnaya

:
The Śivādvaitanirnaya
: (‘A Deliberation about Śivādvaita’) is possibly Appaya’s
last Śivādvaita work.²⁹ In this treatise, Appaya betrays, more than in any other
²⁸ Appaya ascribes the view that Brahman is the material cause of the world by means of māyā
th
(māyādvāra) or that māyā is the instrumental cause (dvārakārana) : of the world to Sarvajñātman (10
cent.) in the first chapter of his Siddhāntaleśasamgraha:
: : :sepaśārīrakakr: tas tu brahmaivopādānam,
samk
kūt:asthasya svatah: kāranatvānupapatte
: h: , māyādvārakāranam
: . . . ity āhuh: —‘As for the author of the
Samk: :sepaśārīraka, he says that Brahman alone is the material cause [of the world], [and that] since the
immutable cannot by itself be the [material] cause [of the world], māyā is its means . . . ’ (Sastri 1937: 17).
²⁹ The Śivādvaitanirnaya
: was presumably composed after the Ratnatrayaparīk:sā, because the latter
mentions the ŚAMD and the Ānandalaharī but not the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : also in contexts where a
given argument is common to all three works. Sastri has also argued that the Śivādvaitanirnaya : was
composed after the Ānandalaharī based on a comparison of similar passages in both works, on which
the Śivādvaitanirnaya
: elaborates further (Sastri 1929: 19–20).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  85
Śivādvaita work, his inclination towards Advaita Vedānta. His purpose is to

determine whether Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualist position accords with a non-dualism
of the qualified (viśi:st:ādvaita) akin to that of Rāmānuja, or with the pure
:
non-dualism (śuddhādvaita, kevalādvaita, aviśi:st:ādvaita) taught by Śankara.³⁰
In several places in his commentary, Śrīkan: t:ha does imply a parallelism between
his views and those of Viśi:st:ādvaitins. For instance, ad BS 2.1.22, he claims that his
own views are closer to those of the viśi:st:ādvaitavādins than of the bhedavādins,
atyantābhedavādins or bhedābhedavādins. Ad BS 2.1.14, he explicitly designates
his doctrine as viśi:st:aśivādvaita—a term arguably modelled on Rāmānuja’s
Viśi:st:ādvaita Vedānta tradition. But how does Śrīkan: t:ha formulate his
viśi:st:ādvaita doctrine exactly? He clarifies this point in his commentary on BS
2.1.22:
By the identity (ananyatva) of Brahman and the phenomenal world, [I mean]

their necessary connection in terms of cause and effect, as between clay and pot,
and in terms of qualifier and qualificand, as between quality and substance. For a
pot is not seen apart from clay, nor is a [blue] lotus [seen without] blueness.
Likewise, the power (śakti) of the phenomenal world does not exist without
Brahman [and] Brahman is never cognised without [this] power, just as fire [is
never cognised] without heat. [When] a thing cannot be cognised without
another thing, [we say that] this [first thing] is qualified by the [second thing].
The nature of that [first thing] is to be the essence [of that second thing].
Therefore, we say that Brahman is necessarily connected in every way to the
phenomenal world [and] hence identical (ananya) [to it].³¹
For Śrīkan: t:ha, Brahman/Śiva does not exist on His own: it is inseparably con-
nected to His śakti, the power presiding over the existence of the phenomenal
world. He uses the word viśi:st:a to describe this inseparable connection: Brahman
is ‘qualified’ (viśi:st:a) by His power insofar as He is never known apart from it, just
as fire is never known apart from heat. Śrīkan: t:ha holds here a viśi:st:ādvaita view of
the relation between Brahman and the world. Another passage in support of the
view that Śrīkan: t:ha holds such a view is found in his commentary on BS 1.1.5.
Here Śrīkan: t:ha quotes an expert statement (abhiyuktasūkti) in response to the
objection that some scriptural sentences teach that Brahman is undifferentiated
³⁰ The introductory verse reads: śrīkan: t:haśivācāryāh: siddhāntam : nijagaduh: śivādvaitam | tat kim:
viśi:st:am abhihitam aviśi:st:am: veti cintayāmo ’tra ||—‘Śrīkan: t:ha Śivācārya proclaimed a śivādvaita
doctrine. We reflect in this work on whether this [doctrine] was intended [by him] as “qualified” or
“non-qualified”.’
³¹ prapañcabrahmanor : ananyatvam : nāma mr: dghat:ayor iva gunagu
: :
ninor :
iva ca kāryakāranatvena
viśe:sanaviśe
: :syatvena ca vinābhāvarahitatvam. na hi mr: dam : vinā ghat:o dr: śyate, nīlimānam : vinā
cotpalam. tathā brahma vinā na prapañcaśaktisthitih: , śaktivyatirekena : na kadācid api brahma
vijñāyate, vahnir ivau:snya
: m : vinā. yena vinā yan na jñāyate tat tena viśi:st:am eva. tattvam : ca tasya
svabhāva eva. atah: sarvathā prapañcāvinābhūtam : brahma tasmād ananyad ity ucyate (ŚAMD2: 31).
86    - 
(nirviśe:sa). The statement makes it clear, Śrīkan: t:ha says, that the word sat, used to
denote Brahman, does not preclude differentiation as it can denote two entities—
Śiva and Śakti—by means of its root and suffix:
In support of this, there is the [following] expert statement: ‘Śakti and Śiva are
expressed by the root and suffix of the word sat [‘existence’]. Both [Śakti and
Śiva] constitute the entire world inasmuch as they have Brahman as their essence
[lit., have the same flavour as Brahman].’ It is ascertained [in this statement] that
the referent of the word sat is nothing but the supreme Lord, the effect and cause
[of the world], qualified by [His own] Śakti in the form of the manifested world
[consisting of] sentient and insentient entities, coarse and subtle.³²
Appaya cites this passage from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in the pūrvapak:sa of his
: in support of the view that Śrīkan: t:ha defends a non-dualism of
the qualified.³³
Significantly, Appaya maintains that Śrīkan: t:ha merely ‘appears’ to uphold a
viśi:st:ādvaita position in such passages. The truth is that he upholds the opposite
doctrine: pure non-dualism. One of Appaya’s siddhānta arguments in support of
this concerns Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of transformation. According to Appaya,
Śrīkan: t:ha implies in his commentary that Śiva’s cicchakti is non-different from
Śiva. Since Śrīkan: t:ha conceives the world as a product of cicchakti, everything that
constitutes the world—ranging from insentient entities such as bodies, instru-
ments, and objects of enjoyment, to sentient selves (jīva)—must be non-different
from Śiva. Consequently, we must accept that Śrīkan: t:ha holds—in line with
³² tathā hi abhiyuktasūktih: —śaktih: śivaś ca sacchabdaprakr: tipratyayoditau | tau brahmasāmarasyena

samastajagadātmakau || iti. sthūlasūk:smacidacitprapañcarūpaśaktiviśi:st:ah: parameśvara eva
:
kāryakāranarūpa h: satpadavi:saya iti nirnaya
: h: (ŚAMD1: 195).
³³ Appaya’s commentary on this passage reads: atra brahmety ekavacanam : śaktiśivayoh: pratyekam:
na śakyatā, kim : tu śaktiviśi:st:aśiva eva iti jñāpanārtham, yathā ‘vyaktyākr: tijātayah: padārthah: ’ iti
nyāyasūtre vyaktyākr: tijātīnām : na pratyekam, jātyākr: tiviśi:st:avyaktirūpena
: iti jñāpanārtham ekavaca-
nam. samastajagadātmakāv iti viśe:sana : m: tu sadbrahmaśabdayoh: śaktiviśi:st:aśivavācakatvamātre
: : na
na
viśi:st:ādvaitasiddhis tat:asthasya viyadādiprapañcasya sadbhāvād iti śankānirākaranāya : tasya
śaktyamśatayā
: śaktiśivābhyām apr: thaksiddhipradarśanārtham—‘In [this expert statement], the singu-
lar word ‘brahman’ serves to indicate that Śakti and Śiva cannot be [signified] separately, but that only
Śiva qualified by Śakti [is signified], just as the expression in the singular in the Nyāyasūtra “the referent
of a word is an individual, a form and a universal” serves to indicate that the individual, the form and
the universal are not separately [signified] but that an individual qualified by universal and form [is
signified]. As for the qualifier “they [i.e., Śiva and Śakti] constitute the entire world,” it aims to show
that the [manifested world] is inseparably connected to Śiva and Śakti inasmuch as it is a part of Śakti—
this in order to dispel the doubt, “A non-dualism of the qualified is not proved merely by the fact that
the words sat and brahman denote Śiva qualified by Śakti [as just said], because there really exists an
independent manifested world made up of space, etc.” ’ (Sastri 1929: 3). What Appaya’s pūrvapak:sin
says here is that in the expert statement quoted by Śrīkan: t:ha, the qualifier samastajagadātmakau is
added to convey the idea that the manifested world (prapañca) is inseparably connected (apr: thaksid-
dha) with Śiva and Śakti inasmuch as this manifested world is a part (amśa) of Śakti. Thus Śrīkan: t:ha’s
quotation of the statement implies that he (apparently) upholds a non-dualism of the qualified
inasmuch as Śiva is qualified by the world through the intermediary of Śakti.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  87
Advaitins, and in stark contrast with Viśi:st:ādvaitins, who believe that the self
stands in a body-embodied (śarīra-śarīrin) relation to Brahman—that the self is
non-different from Brahman. We must also accept, by implication, that Śrīkan: t:ha
upholds, again in line with Advaitins, a doctrine of apparent transformation
(vivartavāda) of the world. Otherwise, if we were to hold that worldly changes
are real rather than ultimately unreal, it would follow that Brahman/Śiva too, like
cicchakti, is subject to changes. This would be unacceptable in view of the fact that
Brahman/Śiva has an immutable nature.
The pūrvapak:sin³⁴ introduced in the Śivādvaitanirnaya: refutes this argument
:
on two grounds. First, only a real transformation (parināma) of cicchakti into the
world is taught by Śrīkan: t:ha; nowhere is a doctrine of apparent transformation
(vivartavāda) hinted at. Secondly, Śrīkan: t:ha states in several places that there
is a clear difference between cicchakti and Brahman. In support of this,
the pūrvapak:sin cites a well-known passage from the daharavidyā section of the
Chāndogya Upani:sad, where one is enjoined to contemplate Brahman inside
the small space (daharākāśa) in the lotus-shaped heart:
Now, here in this city of Brahman there is a small lotus, a dwelling place, and
within it, a small space. In that space there is something that you should try to
discover and seek to understand.³⁵
As stated earlier, Śrīkan: t:ha holds that the inner space is homologically identified
with Śiva’s cicchakti. The pūrvapak:sin argues that since the Chāndogya passage
mentions that Brahman dwells within (antar) the small space in the heart,
cicchakti and Brahman must be related as support (āsana) and supported
(āsanin), respectively. In other words, both are different entities, and this entails
that the identity between the individual self (jīva), a product of cicchakti, and
Brahman cannot hold.
In his siddhānta,³⁶ Appaya replies to the first objection as follows. In his view,
:
holding to a doctrine of [real] transformation (parināmavāda) is not necessarily
incompatible with a doctrine of apparent transformation (vivartavāda). Rather,
:
parināmavāda is but a step towards the establishment of vivartavāda:
In fact, to describe the [phenomenal world] as transforming is but helpful to

[establish] the doctrine of apparent transformation. For it is after connecting the
phenomenal world with Brahman—through demonstrating that the former is a
³⁴ What follows is extracted from a longer pūrvapak:sa; see Sastri 1929: 47–9.
³⁵ atha yad idam asmin brahmapure daharam : pun: darīka
: m: veśma daharo ’sminn antarākāśah: .
tasmin yad antas tad anve:st:avyam: tad vāva vijijñāsitavyam iti (ChU 8.1.1).
³⁶ What follows is extracted from a longer siddhānta, beginning at Sastri 1929: 49.
88    - 
[real] transformation of the latter—and then refuting this, that the [phenomenal
world] is established to be an apparent transformation of Brahman.³⁷
Appaya supports his assertion with a passage from Sarvajñātman’s Samk: :sepaśārīraka,
a tenth-century Advaita Vedānta work that follows Sureśvara’s interpretation of
:
Śankara’s Brahmasūtrabhā:sya, besides being known to have generated renewed
interest among Advaitins in the early modern period (Minkowski 2011: 211). The
passage cited by Appaya includes six verses from the Samk : :sepaśārīraka, where
Sarvajñātman explains why the author of the BS sometimes defends a doctrine of
:
[real] transformation (parināmavāda) and other times a doctrine of apparent
transformation (vivartavāda). He argues that a single doctrine is actually upheld
by the sūtrakāra, namely vivartavāda, but that this is possible precisely because
:
parināmavāda is accepted first, just as in order to ascend to the first floor we first
need to go through the ground floor:
It is possible to ascend to another floor [only] after having first been on the
ground floor. [Similarly,] in order to establish that [real] change (vikāra) is
unreal, the śāstra too first states the relation of cause and effect [between
Brahman and the world] by teaching [the doctrine] of [real] transformation
:
(parinati) and then refuting [it]. In the teachings of Vedānta, the doctrine of
[real] transformation is the first floor [on the basis of which one ascends] to the
doctrine of apparent transformation. The doctrine of apparent transformation is
naturally arrived at once this doctrine of [real] transformation is established.³⁸
The fact that Appaya relies here on a statement made by an Advaita ācārya to
justify Śrīkan: t:ha’s views exemplifies once more his commitment to Advaita
Vedānta. In his view, Śrīkan: t:ha’s defence of parināmavāda
: is not problematic,
since great Advaitins before him considered its defence a preliminary step towards
establishing a doctrine of apparent transformation. However, it is important to
note that Sarvajñātman explicitly defends vivartavāda, while Śrīkan: t:ha never
does. To cite Sarvajñātman in support of Śrīkan: t:ha’s views is in a sense to assume
what one wishes to prove, namely that Śrīkan: t:ha upheld a doctrine of pure non-
dualism in the first place.
Appaya replies to the second objection put forward by the pūrvapak:sin by
citing several passages from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary where it is stated, or implied,
:
³⁷ tathā hi parināmitvanirūpa : m
na : vivartavādasyānukūlam eva. prapañcam : brahmani :
:
tatparināmatvapradarśanena :
[em.; tatparināmitvapradarśanena ed.] prasajya tatprati:sedhe hi tasya
brahmavivartatvam : siddhyati (Sastri 1929: 49).
³⁸ āruhya bhūmim adharām itarādhirodhu : m : śakyeti śāstram api kāranakāryabhāvam
: | uktvā purā
:
parinatipratipādanena :
sampraty apohati vikāramr: :sātvasiddhyai || vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir
:
vedāntavāde parināmavāda h: | vyavasthite ’smin parināmavāde
: svayam: samāyāti vivartavādah: ||
(Samk: :sepaśārīraka 2.60–61).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  89
that cicchakti and Brahman are non-different. In his commentary on BS 1.1.23,

Śrīkan: t:ha suggests that the supreme space (paramākāśa) is non-different from the
supreme Lord when he describes both entities as the cause of all beings
(sarvabhūtakārana).: Given that the supreme space is already assumed to be
non-different from cicchakti, it follows that Śrīkan: t:ha conceived of no essential
difference between Brahman and cicchakti. As to those passages where cicchakti
and Brahman seem to be treated as distinct entities standing in a specific relation
to one another—such as the passage from the daharavidyā section of the
Chāndogya Upani:sad pointed out by the pūrvapak:sin—they too, says Appaya,
confirm that Śrīkan: t:ha held both entities to be non-different. But Appaya does not
spell out in detail why this is so in the Śivādvaitanirnaya.
: We must turn to the
ŚAMD for further clarification.
3.2.3 Coordination and Coherence: Daharavidyā

in Śrīkan: t:ha’s Commentary
In the Śivādvaitanirnaya,
: the pūrvapak:sin bases his argument on a passage from
the daharavidyā section of the Chāndogya Upani:sad. The daharavidyā is one of
the several contemplative practices (brahmavidyā) taught in the Upani:sads; it
enjoins the contemplation of Brahman in the small space (daharākāśa) in the
heart.³⁹ It occupies an important place in Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology and in Appaya’s
reconstruction of the latter in the ŚAMD. Appaya begins his sub-commentary on
the opening verse of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary by highlighting the fact that
Śrīkan: t:ha is deeply devoted to the daharavidyā teachings.⁴⁰ Śrīkan: t:ha indeed
repeatedly refers to passages taken from the daharavidyā sections of Upani:sads
(particularly from the Mahānārāyana : Upani:sad) and himself claims that the
contemplation of Brahman in the heart is the single most important thing
(pradhānabhūta) across all Upani:sadic contemplative practices.⁴¹ For Appaya,
however, Śrīkan: t:ha’s personal devotion to the daharavidyā has larger implica-
tions: it is the hermeneutical key to uncovering the meaning of the opening verse,
and by extension that of the entire commentary. The verse reads:
³⁹ Each brahmavidyā has its locus classicus in specific sections of the Upani:sads. The key Upani:sadic
sources for the daharavidyā are Chāndogya Upani:sad 8.1–6 and the Nārāyanānuvāka : of the
Mahānārāyana : Upani:sad.
⁴⁰ daharavidyāni:st:ho ’yam ācāryah: —‘This ācārya [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha] is devoted to the daharavidyā
[contemplative practice taught in the Upani:sads]’ (ŚAMD1: 2).
⁴¹ . . . param: brahma daharapun: darīkamadhye
: ’nusandheyam iti paravidyāsv iyam eva
pradhānabhūtā—‘The fact that one should contemplate the supreme Brahman in the lotus[-like] cavity
[of the heart] is the single most important thing in contemplative practices of the supreme’ (ŚAMD2:
351 [BS 3.3.38]).
90    - 
aum namo ’hampadārthāya

: : siddhihetave |
lokānām
saccidānandarūpāya śivāya paramātmane || 1 ||
Obeisance to the supreme self, Śiva, the referent of the word ‘I’, the cause of the
attainment of all the worlds⁴² [and] the one whose nature is being, consciousness
and bliss.
Appaya explains that Śrīkan: t:ha here refers primarily to the supreme self
(paramātman) as defined in a passage from the daharavidyā section of the
Mahānārāyana : Upani:sad, namely ‘In the middle of that flame rests the supreme
self.’⁴³ In other words, the self referred to in Śrīkan: t:ha’s verse ‘rests’ in the heart.
The word śiva, on the other hand, is mentioned to further specify (vi + √śi:s) the
nature of this self in order for good people not to be confused about the true
relationship between Śiva and the self ‘resting’ in the heart, which is one of non-
difference.⁴⁴ According to Appaya, the word paramātman in the verse functions
as a qualificand (viśe:sya) to which attributes or qualifications (viśe:sana) : are
predicated. These qualifications refer to the four other expressions in the verse—
:
namely, aum, ahampadārtha, lokānām : siddhihetu and saccidānandarūpa―each
of which Appaya traces to the daharavidyā sections of different Upani:sads.
As he explains:
Thus [Śrīkan: t:ha] qualifies [the supreme self in the verse] with the four qualifi-
cations (viśe:sana)
: beginning with aum, by means of topics that are found in
daharavidyā sections handed down in other Upani:sads. [He does so] in order to
indicate that what is worshipped (namaskārya)—which is caused to be under-
stood, by means of the word paramātman [in the verse], as the object of worship
in the daharavidyā handed down in the Taittirīya Upani:sad, and [also], by
means of the word śiva [in the verse], as having the nature of the supreme
Lord (parameśvara) designated with words such as Maheśvara, etc. in that same
⁴² My translation here follows Appaya’s commentary. See Appendix 2 for details.

⁴³ The full passage reads: tasyāh: śikhāyā madhye paramātmā vyavasthitah: | sa brahmā sa śivah:
sendrah: so ’k:sarah: paramah: svarāt: || (Mahānārāyana
: Upani:sad 11.13). Appaya refers to this Upani:sad
simply as the Taittirīya Upani:sad.
⁴⁴ kecana sa paramātmā śivād anya iti kathayantah: parān bhramayanti. tadanuvartanena sādhavo
mā bhrami:sur ity abhipretya viśina:st:i śivāyeti—‘Some [people] delude others by proclaiming that this
supreme self [in the heart] is different from Śiva. [Śrīkan: t:ha] specifies [this supreme self with the word]
śivāya [in the verse], with the intention that good people should not be deluded by following [these
people who delude others]’ (ŚAMD1: 2). Note that Appaya acknowledges that Vi:snu : is an object of
contemplation in some passages of the daharavidyā section of the Chāndogya Upani:sad. In his sub-
commentary on BS 3.3.38, however, he argues that the Vai:snava : dahara contemplation is nonetheless
subsumed under the Śaiva dahara contemplation in terms of their respective fruits. See Rao 2016 for more
details on this topic and also on Appaya’s interpretation of the daharavidyā in his Vai:snava : poem, the
Varadarājastava. See Bronner 2007 for a brief discussion of the same motif in the Ātmārpanastuti, : a
devotional hymn in which Śiva is extolled as the invisible divinity found within oneself.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  91
[Taittirīya Upani:sad]—is brought to mind by coordinating qualities [taught] in

the daharavidyā [sections] handed down in other Upani:sads.⁴⁵
What is worshipped (namaskārya)―namely, the supreme self in the heart,

Śiva―is ‘brought to mind’ (! anusamdhāna⁴⁶)
: through ‘coordinating’ various
qualities associated with the four qualifications (viśe:sana) : mentioned in the
opening verse. This process of coordination (upasamhāra) : is text-based: the
syllable aum, for instance, insofar as it generally expresses Brahman, is associated
with a specific instruction in the daharavidyā section of the Ātharvana : (=Praśna)
Upani:sad (PU 5.5), where we are told to meditate upon the supreme puru:sa
dwelling in the heart as the trimātra (i.e., aum) prior to worship. Likewise, the
expression lokānām : siddhihetu refers to the daharavidyā section of the Chāndogya
Upani:sad, which asserts that the worshipper of the small space in the heart obtains
all the worlds he desires (ChU 8.1.6).
Although it could be argued that the relation drawn between the qualifications
in the verse and particular daharavidyā passages is arbitrary―after all, these
expressions could be related to almost any section of any Upani:sad―such ‘skilled
borrowing’ is commonly used among Vedāntins. The term upasamhāra : refers to a
well-known textual strategy whereby different Upani:sadic passages or sections are
‘coordinated’ in order to come up with a more complete interpretation of a
⁴⁵ evam : paramātmaśabdena taittirīyopani:sadāmnātadaharavidyopāsyatayā śivaśabdena

tatratyamaheśvarādiśabdapradarśitaparameśvararūpatayā cāvagamitasya namaskāryasyopani:sadanta-
rāmnātadaharavidyāgunopasa : :
mhāre : kriyamānānusa
na : :
mdhānasūcanāya upani:sadantarāmnātadaha-
:
ravidyāprakaranagatair arthair viśina:st:i—aum ityādibhiś caturbhir viśe:sanai
: h: (ŚAMD1: 3).:
⁴⁶ Appaya uses the term anusamdhāna : in a similar context in his commentary on Venkat:anātha’s
Yādavābhyudaya while analysing the first verse: vande vr: ndāvanacaram : vallavījanavallabham |
:
jayantīsambhava : dhāma vaijayantīvibhū:sanam
m : ||—‘I praise the Power (dhāman) who roams about
in Vr: ndāvana, the beloved of female cowherd-folks, born on Jayantī [and] decorated with the
vaijayantī garland’ (Yādavābhyudaya: 2). In Appaya’s interpretation, dhāman refers to Vāsudeva
and functions as the qualificand (viśe:sya), while the other four expressions—vr: ndāvanacaram, :
vallavījanavallabham, jayantīsambhavam : and vaijayantīvibhū:sanam—are
: its qualifications
(viśe:sana).
: Each of these qualifications is associated with a well-known quality (guna) : of Vāsudeva,
respectively: a) forgiving love (vātsalya), b) excellent conduct (sauśīlya), c) accessibility [to His
creatures] (saulabhya) and d) mastership (svāmitva). In this context, Appaya uses the past participle
:
anusamhita (from the verbal root anu + sam + √dhā, from which the noun anusamdhāna : is also
derived) to explain how the four qualities (guna) : relate to the four qualifications: kramena : ete gunā :
viśe:sanacatu
: :st:ayenānusamhitā
: h: —‘These four qualities are respectively brought to mind by means of
the four qualifications [in the verse]’ (Yādavābhyudaya: 3–4). Following this comment, Appaya
explains how the quality of vātsalya, for instance, is implied or suggested (vyajyate) by the first
qualification, namely vr: ndāvanacaram: : the fact that Vāsudeva roams in Vr: ndāvana
: in the company
of cowherds implies that He has forgiving love for all His devotees. From this, we may infer that
:
anusamdhāna does not merely mean ‘bringing to mind’ in a contemplative sense (a generic sense it
often has in Vedānta), but refers to the technical process whereby qualities (guna) : of a certain qualificand
(viśe:sya) in a textual passage are ‘brought to mind’ through a process of allusion (vyañjana). In our passage
from the ŚAMD, an additional process is also taking place: the ‘coordination’ (upasamhāra) : of qualifica-
tions through associating them with particular daharavidyā sections of Upani:sads. Appaya does not apply
this textual strategy in his commentary on Yādavābhyudaya’s first verse.
92    - 
specific doctrine or devotional practice.⁴⁷ Appaya makes use of this technique

while commenting on Śrīkan: t:ha’s opening verse. Just as Brahman is qualified with
attributes communicated in different Upani:sadic sources for the purpose of
regulating meditation on its being, Śiva is qualified with attributes found in
different daharavidyā sections of Upani:sads to highlight His worship as that of
the supreme self in the heart. At the very end of his commentary on the opening
verse, Appaya adds that each of the four qualifications―namely, aum,
:
ahampadārtha, lokānām: siddhihetu and saccidānandarūpa―relates to the subject
matter treated in the four chapters (adhyāya) of the BS, respectively.⁴⁸ For
instance, by using the word aum, Śrīkan: t:ha implies that all the Upani:sads agree
in teaching that Śiva is the non-dual Brahman; the coherence (samanvaya) of all
the Upani:sads in this respect is precisely the topic of the first chapter. Likewise, the
:
expression ahampadārtha (‘referent of the word I’) indicates that Śiva is non-dual
and thereby removes any kind of doubt as to whether Śiva is non-dual or not; the
second chapter precisely refutes possible objections to (non-dualist) Vedānta,
including those against the non-duality of Brahman defended in this system.
Interpreted as such, the opening verse not only reveals that the supreme self,
Śiva, is the self in the heart eulogized in the daharavidyā sections of Upani:sads,
but also highlights the fact that Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary on the BS forms one
coherent, textually unified whole with the daharavidyā teachings at its centre.
3.2.4 The Argument Continued: Appaya on BS 1.3.16

in the Śivārkamanidīpikā
:
The pūrvapak:sa argument in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : stresses the fact that Brahman
dwells within the space in the heart: how can Brahman be non-different from
cicchakti if it is supported by―and therefore different from―the supreme space,
which is itself identical with cicchakti? In his reply to this objection, Appaya refers
to Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary on BS 1.3.16, a sūtra from the daharādhikarana :
(BS 1.3.13–22) on which Appaya comments substantially in the ŚAMD. In his
commentary on this sūtra, Śrīkan: t:ha explains that the supreme Lord is non-
different from the small space in the heart insofar as some Upani:sads enjoin
:
⁴⁷ In BS 3.3.5, Śankara defines upasamhāra
: as the legitimate coordination of characteristics (guna):
from different texts dealing with the contemplation of the deity. This strategy is applicable if the object
of the meditation is the same (arthābheda) in the different texts. This hermeneutical principle is
modelled on the earlier Mīmāmsā : principle of sarvaśākhāpratyayanyāya, according to which one can
combine a plurality of texts handed down in different Vedic schools (śākhā) so as to come up with a
:
more complete description of rituals. For more details on this procedure and Śankara’s use of it, see
Clooney 1992 and 1994.
⁴⁸ api ca etair om ityādibhiś caturbhir viśe:sanair
: asmin śāstre caturadhyāyīpratipādyair arthaih:
paramātmā viśe:syate—‘Moreover, by means of these four qualifications beginning with aum, the
supreme self [in the heart] is qualified by things that are taught in the four chapters (adhyāya) of
this śāstra [i.e., Brahmasūtra]’ (ŚAMD1: 4).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  93
worshipping Brahman/Śiva in the heart. However, asks Śrīkan: t:ha, what about
those Upani:sadic passages that enjoin the worship of the supreme Lord as
dwelling within the small space? Are they not contradicting the claim that the
supreme Lord is non-different from the small space? Śrīkan: t:ha’s reply more or
less restates what he had said earlier, in BS 1.3.13, namely that Śiva should
be understood in those passages as the small space itself inasmuch as Śiva
shares with it qualities such as being free from sins and other such qualities
(apahatapāpmatvādi).⁴⁹
Appaya’s sub-commentary on this sūtra is more relevant to us, for besides
clarifying Śrīkan: t:ha’s argument, it also clarifies the relationship between cicchakti,
space and Brahman/Śiva, the three concepts basic to Appaya’s argument in the
Śivādvaitanirnaya.
: Appaya explains that two views are at stake here: the view
that Brahman/Śiva is the small space, and the view that it dwells within the
small space. Granted that a thing cannot logically dwell inside itself (svasyaiva
svāntarvartitvasya viruddhatvāt), the two views seem indeed contradictory. That
Brahman is identical to the small space logically follows from the fact that both
entities share common qualities such as being free from sins, etc. The view that
Brahman also dwells within the small space, however, does not seem to be
acceptable at first sight, since the texts say that what dwells there is earth, heaven,
etc. In order to solve this problem, Appaya draws attention to the real import
(tātparya) of the daharavidyā sections, in which one finds passages concerning the
worship of Brahman within the small space. According to him, these passages
consist in injunctions (vidhi) to worship Brahman. Since these injunctions con-
cern an entity that dwells inside the small space, we have to accept that what
dwells there is Brahman. This is required if we wish to maintain the hermeneutical
consistency of the daharavidyā passages in question.⁵⁰
But if Brahman alone is the object of worship, how can it conceivably be
‘placed’, as an object of worship, within the small space in the body
(dehāntarākāśa), i.e., in the heart? While the space in question is physically
⁴⁹ In his commentary on BS 1.3.13, Śrīkan: t:ha refers to ChU 8.7.1: ya ātmā apahatapāpmā vijaro
vimr: tyur viśoko vijighatso ’pipāsah: satyakāmah: satyasamkalpa
: h: [ . . . ]—‘That self free from sins, free
from decrepitude, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger and thirst, with true desires and
true volitions [ . . . ]’ Such a self, he argues, can only be the supreme Lord and not any transmigratory
self. In the daharavidyā section of the same Upani:sad, we are also told: naitam : setum ahorātre tarato na
jarā na mr: tyur na śoko na sukr: tam. sarve pāpmāno ’to nivartante. apahatapāpmā hy e:sa brahmalokah: —
‘Day and night do not cross this dam, nor decrepitude, nor death, nor sorrow, nor merit, nor demerit. All
sins turn away from it, for this world of Brahman is free from sin’ (ChU 8.4.1). Here the ‘world of
Brahman’ (brahmaloka), which is free from sins, etc., refers to the small space in the heart. Both the
supreme Lord and the space in the heart are claimed to be identical on the basis of their similarities.
⁵⁰ . . . daharākāśāntarvarty api parameśvara ity abhyupagantavyam, tadantarvartivi:sayatvād
upāsanavidhānasya. evam avaśyābhyupagantavyārthatayā avirodhenaiva samdarbho : yojanīyah: —‘ . . .
We must accept that the supreme Lord also dwells within the small space because the injunction to
worship concerns what dwells inside [that small space]. The composition [i.e., the daharavidyā section
of the Chāndogya Upani:sad, where the discussed passages are found] must be interpreted without
contradiction to have a meaning that must necessarily be accepted in this way’ (ŚAMD1: 439).
94    - 
constrained, Brahman―inasmuch as it consists in the collection of all objects

(sarvavi:sayasamudāya) and is the locus of unsurpassed bliss (niratiśayapremāspada)
―is not. Appaya’s response is that Brahman cannot be understood as being limited
spatially, for the space in the heart is not material space (bhūtākāśa), but the supreme
space (paramākāśa) identified with Brahman’s power of consciousness (cicchakti). It
is precisely within that space, understood as cicchakti, and not as something located
in the body, that the worship of Brahman is enjoined.⁵¹ To worship Brahman/Śiva in
that space identified with Śiva’s śakti also makes sense in view of the fact that Śiva’s
śakti is established to be the locus (āśraya) of Śiva in certain Upani:sads teaching the
contemplation of Śiva (śivadhyāna) in the heart. Alternatively, it is also proper to
enjoin the worship of Brahman or Śiva as the space in the heart while considering
that what dwells inside it is Śiva’s own śakti in the form of bliss: scriptures also
proclaim that śakti, understood as bliss, is a well-known property of Śiva. This is in
the end only a matter of how one wants to proceed for worship.
In itself, the identity between Brahman and the space in the heart does not
entail any particular commitment to pure non-dualism. Rāmānuja himself argues
in favour of this identity in his Śrībhā:sya on the daharādhirakana, : using basically
the same arguments as Śrīkan: t:ha. What seems to set the two Vedānta theologians
apart on this point, however, is that for Śrīkan: t:ha, as Appaya points out, this
identity is not only rooted in sharing common qualities, such as being free from
sins, etc.; it also follows from the fact that the small space is equated with Brahman
qua its nature as supreme space (paramākāśa), itself identified with cicchakti.
In view of the latter, it is possible to argue, as Appaya eventually does in the
Śivādvaitanirnaya,: that there is no essential difference between cicchakti and
Brahman in Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology, since both ultimately point to the same reality:
And thus the four [following] things are accepted by the ācārya [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha]:
1. the cicchakti of Brahman has the form of the phenomenal world [consisting of]
all sentient and insentient [entities]; 2. this same [cicchakti] has Brahman as its
essential nature; 3. [this cicchakti] consists in the collection of all the qualities that
belong to [Brahman]; and 4. Brahman is changeless. These [four things] make
one firmly understand that the ultimate view (paramasiddhānta) [of Śrīkan: t:ha]
is that Brahman is devoid of attributes (nirguna), : unconnected to the
phenomenal world, non-different from the individual self (jīva) [and] has the
nature of pure non-duality (śuddhādvaita).⁵²
⁵¹ daharākāśasya parabrahmarūpatvena bhūtākāśavailak:sanyād : daharākāśa eva tat samāhitam : na

tu tadavacchedake dehe—‘Since the small space, having the nature of the supreme Brahman, is distinct
from the material space, that [i.e., Brahman] is placed [for meditation] precisely in the small space and
not in the body that delimits that [small space]’ (ŚAMD1: 439–40).
⁵² evam : ca brahmacicchakteh: sakalacetanācetanaprapañcākāratvam : tasyā eva brahmasvarūpatvam :
: narūpatva
tadīyasakalagunaga : m: brahmano : nirvikāratvam iti arthacatu:st:ayam ācāryair abhyupagatam. :
: m
nirguna : ni:sprapañcam
: jīvābhinnam : śuddhādvaitarūpam : brahmeti te:sām : paramasiddhānta iti amum
artham : dr: dham
: avagamayaty eva (Sastri 1929: 62).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  95
Hence Śrīkan: t:ha, just like Advaitins, holds that the self (jīva), a transformation of
cicchakti, is non-different from the pure non-dual Brahman.
3.2.5 Inclusivism and Hermeneutics: Advaita in Śivādvaita
In the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : Appaya asserts that Śrīkan: t:ha’s ‘ultimate view’

(paramasiddhānta) is that Brahman and jīva are non-different (abhinna), and
that his conception of Brahman aligns with pure non-dualism in that he conceives
Brahman to be fundamentally devoid of attributes (nirguna). : This is not made
explicit in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, but it is the conclusion Appaya arrives at in
:
his nirnaya. Another outcome of the non-difference between Brahman and jīva,
according to Appaya, is that Śrīkan: t:ha did not uphold a theory of real transfor-
:
mation (parināmavāda) of the world but a theory of apparent transformation
(vivartavāda). If jīva is a product of cicchakti, and if the former is non-different
from Brahman, cicchakti must also be non-different from Brahman; this, in turn,
implies vivartavāda. As Appaya explains in the Śivādvaitanirnaya::
So since we accept that Brahman is non-different from cicchakti, which has the
form of the entire phenomenal world, it is established that the manifestation of
space, etc. is an apparent transformation (vivarta) of [cicchakti]. Because other-
wise, if it were admitted that transient entities such as space, etc. are [real]
transformations (parināma): of [cicchakti], it would undesirably follow that
[Śrīkan: t:ha’s] acceptance of the immutable (nirvikāra) nature of Brahman, which
:
is non-different from it [i.e., that cicchakti that has undergone parināma], would be
contradicted.⁵³
In Appaya’s view, the transformation of cicchakti into the world, along with the
fact that cicchakti and Brahman are non-different from each other, suggest that
the origination and manifestation of the world are ultimately apparent in
Śrīkan: t:ha’s system. In other words, the transformation of the world is not really
taking place; the world-effect is an unreal appearance of the cause-Brahman, not a
real product of it. All that is real is Brahman/Śiva, a stance that brings Śivādvaita
:
right in line with the pure non-dualist doctrine upheld by Śankara and others who
fully accept the implications of vivartavāda. As for the passages in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary where Śiva is described as immutable while cicchakti is mutable—
which logically implies that they are different entities—they must be understood
merely as provisionally valid statements. In fact, as Appaya argues later in the
⁵³ tathā sakalaprapañcākārāyāś cicchakter brahmābhedābhyupagamena viyadādiprapañcas tadvi-

:
varta iti siddhyati. anyathā viyadāder anityasya tatparināmatvābhyupagame :
tadabhinnasya brahmano
nirvikāratvābhyupagamavirodhāpatteh: (Sastri 1929: 63).
96    - 
Śivādvaitanirnaya: (see below), all statements that appear to support the doctrine
of the non-dualism of the qualified (viśi:st:ādvaita) and to support only a saguna :
view of Brahman, have a propaedeutic purpose: they are concessions made to
less advanced people who can only seek liberation through devotion to a
personal deity endowed with attributes. More precisely, these statements are
meant to help devotees to strengthen their faith in the personified Śiva, so as to
gradually guide them towards the realization that Śiva is fundamentally without
attributes—nirguna : Brahman. As we have seen, this idea is already expressed in
the Śivatattvaviveka. However, in the Śivatattvaviveka, Appaya boldly holds that
worshipping Śiva is not only useful to all aspirants (rather than only to less
advanced people) but necessary, for it is only through Śiva’s grace (anugraha)
that the comprehension of His true reality can arise.
Towards the end of the Śivādvaitanirnaya,: Appaya returns to the most salient
points of his argumentation and provides three basic reasons in support of his
siddhānta that Śrīkan: t:ha’s teachings conform to pure non-dualism. First, unlike
Rāmānuja for instance, Śrīkan: t:ha does not condemn or explicitly reject pure non-
dualism in his commentary. It is true that he does not teach an Advaita-like
māyāvāda, but rather a variant of śaktivāda closer to Śaiva systems; it is also true
that he does not openly declare Brahman to be without attributes (nirguna) : or
explicitly defend vivartavāda. As we have seen, Śrīkan: t:ha even seems to dismiss a
central metaphysical tenet of pure non-dualism when he denies the validity of
atyantābhedavāda, the doctrine of absolute non-difference between Brahman and
jīva, in his commentary on BS 2.1.22. However, unlike Rāmānuja and others, he
does not offer, for instance, any systematic critique of avidyā, one of the pillars
upon which the foundations of Advaita Vedānta metaphysics rest. Secondly, only
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary allows for an interpretation that can be brought in line
with pure non-dualism. This is an important point. Unlike other commentaries on
the BS, Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary features doctrinal elements that ‘suggest’ his
commitment to pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaitavyañjaka). In support of this,
Appaya cites a number of passages where Śrīkan: t:ha seems to look favourably
upon the doctrine of ‘liberation while alive’ (jīvanmukti), dear to Advaitins.⁵⁴
⁵⁴ For Śrīkan: t:ha, liberation comes through meditation on Śiva, typically in the small cavity
(daharākāśa) of the heart. Śiva may be contemplated either with attributes (as the companion of
Umā, as having a blue throat, etc.) or as identical with one’s self. In any case, meditation must be
performed with the idea that the worshipper is identical to the object of his meditation. Thus the
worshipper acquires the essential and distinctive attributes of that which he is worshipping. Śrīkan: t:ha
says that meditation on the personified Śiva, or saguna : Brahman, leads the worshipper to the path of
the gods (devayāna) after death, which eventually ends in the union of the worshipper with Śiva.
However, in his commentary on BS 3.4.50 and elsewhere (BS 3.3.32, BS 4.2.13 and BS 4.3.1), Śrīkan: t:ha seems
to acknowledge the possibility of jīvanmukti, liberation while being alive, for those who worship the ‘non-
related’ (niranvayopāsaka), a term that Appaya understands to mean nirguna : Brahman. Such liberation can
only occur if there is no obstruction due to strong karma (prabalakarmāntarapratibandhābhāva, BS 3.4.50).
In the Śivādvaitanirnaya,
: Appaya refers to such passages to support his view that Śrīkan: t:ha is an Advaitin at
heart. See Sastri 1929: 21–3.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  97
Thirdly, such indications in favour of pure non-dualism bring Śrīkan: t:ha

in line with the sūtrakāra himself who, as Appaya argues elsewhere in the
: intended to teach pure non-dualism in the BS (śuddhādvaitam
eva sūtrakārābhimatam).
These three reasons—non-exclusion, hermeneutical openness and conformity
to the sūtrakāra’s original intention—suffice, in Appaya’s view, to demonstrate
that Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita teachings align with pure non-dualism rather than
with a non-dualism of the qualified. Appaya concludes the Śivādvaitanirnaya : as
follows:
Therefore, only Śrīkan: t:hācārya’s commentary ought to be accepted by sound

people (prāmānika,: i.e., those who rely on means of knowledge to draw their
conclusions), inasmuch as it [alone] teaches, rightly and in detail: a) the under-
standing of the reality of the supreme Brahman without attributes (nirviśe:sa); b)
a method of contemplating non-difference—[a method] used by mediocre
aspirants (madhyamādhikārin)—[between oneself and the supreme Brahman]
qualified (viśi:st:a) by all auspicious qualities and a divine and auspicious body,
and endowed with attributes (saviśe:sa) in order to benefit His seekers; [and] c) a
method of contemplating the relation [of difference] between oneself and one’s
Lord, [a method] used by lower aspirants (avamādhikārin).⁵⁵
Here Appaya reiterates an idea that is central to Śivādvaita Vedānta, namely that
the understanding of the real nature of Brahman as pure non-duality is (or at least
can be) gradual. Depending on the epistemic ‘capacity’ of the aspirant (adhikārin)
to Vedāntic knowledge, different methods are available and can be taught.
However, these methods, although they all lead to the same goal—self-knowledge
and the realization of pure non-duality—are not all equally efficacious: some are
more direct and some less. One may contemplate Brahman as different from
oneself, as Mādhvas do; but it is better to worship Brahman as having certain
attributes (saviśe:sa, saguna),
: as Viśi:st:ādvaitins do; and better still to understand
Brahman as having no attributes at all (nirviśe:sa, nirguna), : as Advaitins do.⁵⁶
⁵⁵ atah: prāmānikānām : nirviśe:sasya parabrahmanas : tattvāvabodhārtham, tasyaiva sādhakānu-

:
grahāya saviśe:sarūpāpannasya nikhilakalyānagu: : nadivyama
naga : ngalavigrahaviśe:saviśi:st:asya madhya-
mādhikārikartavyābhedopāsanārtham, avamādhikārikartavyasvasvāmibhāvopāsanārtham : ca tasya
sarvasyāpi yathāvad viśi:sya pratipādakam : śrīkan: t:hācāryānām
: eva bhā:syam: upādeyam (Sastri 1929:
95–6).
⁵⁶ This hierarchy is implied by the terms Appaya uses to describe the different aspirants to Vedāntic
knowledge, namely madhyamādhikārin and avamādhikārin. Although he does not use a term for those
who achieve a direct understanding of [non-duality] reality (tattvāvabodha), Appaya would probably
have referred to those aspirants as uttamādhikārin. Madhva formulates a threefold classification of
adhikārins in his commentary on BS 1.1.1: mandamadhyottamatvena trividhā hy adhikārina : h: —‘There
are three types of aspirants: the dull (manda), the mediocre (madhyama) and the best (uttama)’
(Brahmasūtrabhā:sya [1980]: 27). For Madhva, the uttamādhikārin is not the adhikārin who seeks the
knowledge of non-dual reality, but he who has mastered scriptures, who is detached, who perceives the
98    - 
Appaya holds that the strength of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary lies not only in its
hermeneutical openness—that is, in its capacity to allow for an interpretation that
is congruous with the doctrine of pure non-dualism—but also in the fact that it
provides scope for all these methods and therefore all types of adhikārins. While it
:
teaches the truth concerning the non-dual reality of Brahman, as Śankara does in
the Brahmasūtrabhā:sya, Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary also provides guidance for less
advanced people who can only seek liberation through devotion to a personal deity.
Whether Śrīkan: t:ha himself intended his commentary to encompass various
levels of understanding and methods of approaching Brahman may be an object of
debate, but this is how Appaya understood it or wished to present it to his
audience. In this respect, Appaya might well have been informed by his own
Advaita-leaning ‘inclusivist’ metaphysics.⁵⁷ We have seen earlier (Chapter 2,
Section 2.1) that Appaya contrasts in the Śivatattvaviveka the embracing approach
of Advaitins—who hold that meditation on Brahman with attributes (saguna) : and
:
without attributes (nirguna) are both means to achieve the absolute Brahman, the
first gradual, the second direct—with the sectarian approach of Viśi:st:ādvaitins
and others who hold that only Brahman with attributes ought to be worshipped.
For Advaitins, the worship of a personified deity is a preliminary step, a means of
:
cleansing the mind of its impurities; it may therefore concern any deity, Vi:snu-
Nārāyana,: Śiva or other deities. Put simply, the Advaita approach is more
‘tolerant’ (and, in the process, effectively ‘inclusive’) than the Viśi:st:ādvaita
approach. Accordingly, Appaya also holds that the Advaitin should accept the
validity of purely theistic interpretations of the BS, despite the fact that the
sūtrakāra intended to teach nirguna: Brahman. In his commentary on the opening
verse of the Madhvatantramukhamardana, he says:
: and abandons
transient and futile nature of all things and who, knowing this, takes refuge only in Vi:snu
all actions. In contrast, the mandādhikārin (Madhva also refers to him as adhamādhikārin) has only
studied scriptures and has devotion towards Vi:snu, : but has not acquired the qualities of tranquillity,
etc. As for the madhyamādhikārin, he has acquired those qualities but not the other things that define
the uttamādhikārin.
⁵⁷ My understanding of ‘inclusivism’ here is partly inspired by Paul Hacker’s definition of

Inklusivismus as the practice of ‘claiming for, and thus including in, one’s own religion what really
belongs to an alien sect’ (Hacker 1995: 244). Hacker linked this practice to the writings of modern
Hindus (or ‘neo-Hindus’ as he called them) such as Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Swami Vivekananda,
and others who adopted the non-dualist views of Advaita and claimed on this basis that all world
religions are equal in their worth and essence. For Hacker, such claims did not constitute cases of
genuine tolerance of other religions but ‘the most comprehensive application which the principle of
inclusivism has ever found’ (ibid.: 405). A similar approach is arguably applied in Advaita doxographies
that posit Advaita as the best system insofar as it presents an ultimate view of reality that can
accommodate and integrate—within itself, as it were—all other schools. That being said, I would
argue, against Hacker, that an inclusivist approach does not necessarily exclude a genuine form of
tolerance for other systems. For a more detailed study of Appaya’s inclusivist approach and how it
differs from the embracing religious universalism of modern Hindu thinkers, see Duquette 2015b.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  99
If some people claim that the object of the BS is Śiva or Vi:snu,

: even if in reality
this [BS] centres on Brahman without attributes (nirviśe:sabrahma), this must be
fully respected. Since we Advaitins worship the Brahman with attributes
:
(sagunabrahma) either in the form of Śiva or Vi:snu,
: we should accept—in
order to understand the greatness of the qualities of that one whom we worship
and indeed His very nature—that they construe the texts as they do to make
known [that greatness of the qualities and the nature of the one to be
worshipped].⁵⁸
Whether one believes Śiva or Vi:snu : to be the object of the BS should not be a
problem for Advaitins insofar as, for them, the worship of the personified
Brahman also has a role to play in the pursuit of self-realization. Theistic inter-
pretations of the BS have their own purpose, namely to make one understand the
nature and the greatness of the qualities of what is worshipped. Later in his
commentary on this verse, Appaya says that theistic interpretations of the BS
also have their own intrinsic value insofar as they help to strengthen the minds of
aspirants who are more inclined to worship entities with attributes.⁵⁹ Here again
the underlying idea is that different aspirants need different methods, though all
methods ultimately lead to the same goal―the realization of the pure non-dual
Brahman―whether directly or gradually. Appaya likens the gradual process
whereby one is led to the ultimate realization of the non-dual Brahman to the
wedding custom in which the groom shows the bride the star Arundhatī. Due to
its faintness, Arundhatī must be shown in steps. First, the brighter stars in its
vicinity are shown, then less visible stars, and finally the barely visible Arundhatī
itself.⁶⁰ Just like Arundhatī, the truth of pure non-duality is not easily accessible to
everyone and may have to be approached gradually, that is, through accepting
provisionally incomplete views of reality, until the goal is reached.
We will see in Chapter 4 that Appaya’s ‘inclusivist’ approach is not always all-
encompassing and that it typically operates within certain limits. This is reflected,
for instance, in the way he integrates the figure of Vi:snu-Nārāya
: : in the triadic
na
⁵⁸ vastuto nirviśe:sabrahmani : prati:st:hitasyāpi śārīrakamīmāmsāśāstrasya

: kecana śivam: vi:snu
: m: vā
vi:sayam: vadanti cet tad i:st:am eva. yatas tac chivarūpam : vi:snurūpa
: m: vā saguna
: m
: brahmopāsīnānām
asmākam advaitavādinām upāsyasvarūpagunamahimāvadhāra : :
nāya tatpratipādanapravr: ttam
:
tadīyam : śāstrasya yojanam : grāhyam (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 1–2).
⁵⁹ tathā śārīrakasūtrānā: m : tatra tatra sagune : yojanāntaram api tat sagunopāsanābhimukhānā
: :
m
:
tatra tatra buddhisthirīkaranārtham . . . —‘And as for the other interpretation of the BS on various
points [with the understanding that Brahman] is endowed with attributes, it aims to make firm,
concerning these various points, the mind of those who are inclined to worship that [Brahman]
endowed with attributes . . . ’ (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 2).
⁶⁰ In Hindu mythology, Arundhatī is the wife of Vasi:st:ha, one of the seven :r:sis associated with the
seven stars in the constellation of Ursa Major. Arundhatī is also associated with one star, typically with
Alcor, a less visible star that forms a pair with Mizar, the star associated with Vasi:st:ha.
100    - 
theology he develops in the Ratnatrayaparīk:sā. Here Vi:snu-Nārāya : : is not

na
considered a jīva, but an entity that fully participates in the non-dual reality of
Brahman, along with Śiva and His śakti. However, in this scheme, Vi:snu- :
Nārāyana : remains clearly subordinate to Śiva and His śakti both in terms of His
role in the functioning of the world and the value of His worship (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.1). Likewise, while Appaya’s take on the Pāñcarātra teachings is much
:
more liberal than that of Śankara, for instance, the authority he concedes to those
teachings applies only under strict conditions and with the result that their
validity practically applies only outside the Vedic sphere (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.4). If Appaya’s Advaita-leaning approach is ‘tolerant’ in the way it
acknowledges the validity of other epistemic approaches to the pursuit of self-
realization, it nevertheless also serves his Śivādvaita project in that it ultimately
allows him to subsume the Vai:snava : interpretation of the BS under the Śaiva
interpretation.
In any case, Appaya’s attempt to interpret Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita teachings
along the lines of pure non-dualism―in spite of the fact that there are no
sufficient grounds for believing that Śrīkan: t:ha was even aware of the possibility
of interpreting his work in this light, or that he would have desired it―discloses a
textual approach that is hermeneutical at its core. We have seen how, in the
ŚAMD, Appaya relies on the textual device of upasamhāra : to read Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary as a textually unified whole, centred on the worship of Śiva as the
non-dual Brahman in the heart. We have also seen how he makes use of an
Advaita argument in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : in order to justify Śrīkan: t:ha’s
:
parināmavāda and then defend the view that Śrīkan: t:ha was a vivartavādin.
Although Appaya relies on a metaphysics that is already explicit in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
BMB―one that is rooted in key concepts such as Śiva, Brahman, cicchakti,
daharākāśa and paramākāśa―the way in which he strategically reinterprets it
in his argumentation in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : is original, and introduces a new
approach to Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of the BS. Appaya’s creative reading of
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary further reveals something that is already hinted at in the
:
Caturmatasārasamgraha, namely that Advaita Vedānta remains for him hier-
archically superior to Śivādvaita Vedānta. This is reflected, for instance, in his
:
reliance on the authority of great Advaita ācāryas such as Śankara and
Sarvajñātman to defend Śivādvaita positions, and more explicitly in his claim
that pure non-dualism was the sūtrakāra’s ‘original’ authorial intention.
3.2.6 Non-duality and Śiva’s Grace
One of the key tensions in Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology is between, on the one
hand, the non-dual and ‘other-worldly’ nature of Śiva, and on the other hand, His
role as the bestower of liberating grace for His devotees. The sixth and seventh
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  101
introductory verses of the ŚAMD are revealing of how Appaya conceives the role
of Śiva’s grace (anugraha) in Śivādvaita theology:
Even though the Upani:sads and [other] religious scriptures, as well as all [other]
compositions, including the several Purānas : and smr: ti texts such as the
Mahābhārata and so forth, culminate in non-duality alone; [even though] the
Brahmasūtras too shine forth, for those who have discernment, as having their
ultimate rest [in that same non-duality]; [and even though] nothing but that
:
[non-duality] was accepted by the best of ancient teachers, such as Śankara and
others—nonetheless, it is only through the grace of the one who has the young
moon as His crest-jewel [i.e., Śiva] that the inclination towards non-duality
appears in people; not otherwise.⁶¹
Here Appaya claims that non-duality alone (advaita eva) is the underlying
teaching of every great religious work, and also that devotion to Śiva is a sine
qua non of the pursuit of true knowledge. The reason for this is clearly stated: it is
only through the grace (anugrahād eva) that Śiva bestows on His devotees—not
otherwise (nānyathā)—that one acquires the inclination towards non-duality
(advaitavāsanā), that is to say, the desire and capacity to fully realize his identity
with the higher reality of Śiva, nirguna : Brahman. We have seen that Appaya
expressed the same idea in the Śivatattvaviveka when he said that without the
grace (prasāda) of Śiva, an attempt to gain knowledge of the attributeless Śiva is
bound to fail.
In verse 8 of the ŚAMD, Appaya states that the grace of Śiva comes in turn to
those who meditate on the personified Śiva together with His śakti. Appaya insists
on the need to worship the personified Śiva, not His attributeless (nirguna): reality,
as the absolute Brahman. Worshipping Śiva with all His attributes does not play a
merely instrumental role in his view, but is an essential step towards the realiza-
tion of non-duality. It is for this reason, continues Appaya in verses 9 and 10, that
Vyāsa (Vedavyāsa, Bādarāyana), : the sūtrakāra, composed the BS in a way that
allows for the possibility of interpreting it in two different ways: as teaching the
understanding of Brahman without attributes (nirguna); : and as teaching the
understanding of Brahman with attributes (saguna), : that is to say, Śiva with His
śakti. In the second method, Śiva’s grace is inextricably linked to the gnostic
: Brahman, and it is precisely because Śrīkan: t:ha taught how
realization of nirguna
to meditate on the personified Śiva that his commentary is relevant. Below is a
schematic representation of Appaya’s argument:
⁶¹ yady apy advaita eva śrutiśikharagirām āgamānām : ca ni:st:hā sākam : sarvaih:

:
purānasmr : tinikaramahābhāratādiprabandhaih: | tatraiva
:
brahmasūtrāny: api ca vimr: śatām: bhānti
viśrāntimanti pratnair ācāryaratnair api parijagr: he śankarādyais tad eva || 6 || tathāpy anugrahād
:
eva tarunenduśikhāma : h: | advaitavāsanā pumsām
ne : āvirbhavati nānyathā || 7 || (ŚAMD1: 2).
102    - 
Meditation on Gnostic
Śrīkantha’s
.. Inclination towards
the personified Śiva’s grace realization of
commentary non-duality
. Śiva
(saguna) (anugraha) Brahman
on the BS (advaitavāsanā)
with His śakti without
attributes
(nirguna)
.
Though it occupies a central place in Appaya’s reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s

theology, the idea that the inclination towards non-duality (advaitavāsanā) arises
from Śiva’s grace (anugraha) is not Appaya’s own. Verse 7 of the ŚAMD indeed
partly parallels a verse from the Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya
: of the twelfth-century
Advaitin Śrīhar:sa. Śrīhar:sa’s verse occurs in a section where he discusses various
aspects of the contemplation of non-duality (advaitabuddhi). Such contempla-
tion, he says, does not only lead to the ultimate liberation—namely, the liberation
‘without the body’ (videhakaivalya) that occurs after death—but also has an
empirically observable result in this very life (pratyak:saphala, dr: :st:ārtha), namely,
:
the removal of the fear of samsāra:
īśvarānugrahād e:sā pumsām

: advaitavāsanā |
mahābhayakr: tatrānā
: dvitrā : m
nā : yadi jāyate ||
If this inclination towards non-duality, by which one is saved from the great fear
:
[of samsāra], arises in two or three men through the grace of the Lord [then, the
worship of the Lord should be attempted by those who seek liberation].⁶²
Since a few men have developed an inclination towards non-duality, which saves
:
one from the fear of samsāra, through the grace of the Lord (īśvarānugraha), then
all seekers of liberation would do well to worship the Lord. In his commentary on
the Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya,
: Ānandapūrna: Vidyāsāgara (c. fourteenth century)
clarifies that the worship of the Lord should be performed by those who seek
liberation for it removes mental impurities that prevent the rise of true know-
ledge.⁶³ Note that the text does not say that worship is compulsory, but that it
should be attempted (yatitavya) if the understanding of non-duality has not arisen
suddenly through studying the Upani:sads, reflecting on them and meditating on
the truth they contain.⁶⁴ In this respect, Śrīhar:sa’s position and that of his
commentator is in line with the standard Advaita position on deity worship.
⁶² Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya:
: 224. Compare verse 7 of the ŚAMD: tathāpy anugrahād eva
:
tarunenduśikhāma : h: | advaitavāsanā pumsām
ne : āvirbhavati nānyathā ||
⁶³ [ . . . ] tasmād e:sā ’dvaitavāsanā samskāra
: h: pumsā
: m : yadi jāyate tarhīśvarānugrahād eva, vidyot-
pattiparipanthikalu:sanivr: ttyartham īśvarārādhane yatitavyam : mumuk:subhir ity abhiprāyah: —
‘Therefore, if this inclination—residual trace—towards non-duality arises in men, then, only through
the Lord’s grace, seekers of liberation should attempt to worship the Lord in order to remove the
[mental] impurities that stand in the way of the rise of [true] knowledge; this is the intention [of
Śrīhar:sa’s verse]’ (Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya:
: 225).
⁶⁴ sakr: cchravanādyanu
: :st:hānenādvaitamatir nodeti . . . (Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya:
: 225).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  103
Whereas priority should be given to studying (śravana),: reflecting (manana) and

meditating (nididhyāsana) on the truths contained in the Upani:sads, worshipping
a deity is instrumental and useful only insofar as it purifies the mental apparatus
(! antah: karanaśuddhi)
: and prepares one for the rise of true knowledge. In
Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology, however, worshipping Śiva and receiving His
grace in return is the only way of ultimately achieving the gnostic realization of
non-duality—nānyathā, as the verse puts it.
Two centuries after Śrīhar:sa, another great Advaitin, Vidyāranya : (fourteenth
century), expressed a position that comes closer to Appaya’s in his Anubhūtiprakāśa:
īśvarānugrahād eva bhaved advaitavāsanā |

tasmād brahmārpitam : karma kuryād īśvaratu:st:aye ||
The inclination towards non-duality arises only through the Lord’s grace.
Therefore, one should perform [ritual] actions as offerings to Brahman so as to
please the Lord.⁶⁵
It is clear from the context that Vidyāranya : is here paraphrasing Mun: daka :
Upani:sad 3.2.3. This well-known Upani:sadic verse claims that the supreme self
cannot be attained by instruction, by intelligence or by learning, because the self
reveals (vivr: nute)
: its own being to the one it ‘chooses’ or ‘elects’ (vr: nute).⁶⁶
: The
:
position of Śankara on this verse is that effort and action cannot cause knowledge
to arise. The nature of the self is such that it is always already achieved
(nityalabdhasvabhāva): not being an object of knowledge, it cannot be ‘attained’
merely by means of hearing and reflecting on scripture. What is also required, says
:
Śankara, is a yearning for liberation (mumuk:sutva), a longing for realizing the self
:
(ātmalābhaprārthanā) or, as Śankara also puts it in his commentary on the
Mun: daka
: Upani:sad, the need to ‘hanker’ (varana): after the self. The implication
is that if the devotee has a strong desire for liberation, the self can elect him or her,
so to speak, and bestow liberation upon him or her through an act of grace. In his
:
commentary on this verse and elsewhere, Śankara does acknowledge the role of
divine grace in the pursuit of liberation, although he does not deny human agency
:
in the process.⁶⁷ Ānandagiri (thirteenth century), who comments on Śankara’s
⁶⁵ Anubhūtiprakāśa: 146.
⁶⁶ nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena | yam evai:sa vr: nute : tena
labhyas tasyai:sa ātmā vivr: nute
: tanum : svām || (MU 3.2.3). That Vidyāranya : has this verse in mind is
clear from the preceding and following verses in the Anubhūtiprakāśa: na vedapāt:habāhulyān na
bahuśrutitas tathā | ātmā labhyo ’tha devo yam : vr: nute
: tena labhyate || (6.84) and īśvarānugrahayuktasya
saccidānandalak:sanām
: | tanum : vivr: nute
: : paramātmā hy aśe:satah: || (6.86). Note that the same verse
svīyām
is also found in Kat:ha Upani:sad 1.2.23. However, it is clear from the other verses mentioned in this context
: has precisely
that Vidyāranya
:
the Mun: daka
: Upani:sad verse in mind.
⁶⁷ In his analysis of Śankara’s commentary on Kat:ha Upani:sad 1.2.23 (the exact same verse as the
:
one discussed here, i.e., MU 3.2.3), Malkovsky argues that Śankara’s explanation ‘may be regarded as
supportive of the operation of divine grace in the life of the aspirant to liberation. It is only through the
104    - 
commentary on the Mun: daka : Upani:sad, clarifies that ‘hankering’ (varana)

: after
the self means to contemplate one’s own non-difference (abhedānusamdhāna) :
with it. No amount of actions (karma) can bring you to the gnostic realization of
the non-dual Brahman, as actions can only purify the mind and facilitate
liberation; only the contemplation of non-duality can bring about its full and
:
effective realization. Neither Śankara nor Ānandagiri overemphasize the role of
grace in interpreting the Mun: daka
: Upani:sad verse, or claim that the Lord’s grace
is the only means to become inclined towards non-duality. Ānandagiri in fact says
that the contemplation of non-duality effectively constitutes this ‘hankering’ and
therefore precedes the Lord’s grace; it is not its result.
:
:
Vidyāranya’s interpretation is broadly in line with Śankara’s position, but more
explicit on the role of grace in the liberation process. Muthukrishna Sastri, author
of the Śrutisamyojinī
: t:īkā on the Anubhūtiprakāśa, explains Vidyāranya’s: above-
mentioned verse to mean that ritual actions should be performed with the idea
(buddhi) that they are offerings (arpana) : to Brahman. Performed as such, ritual
actions may please the Lord (! īśvaratu:st:i) and draw His grace to the devotee.
The implication here is that one should perform (the commentator uses the
optative kuryāt) ritual actions in this manner, since only His grace (!
īśvarānugrahād eva) gives rise to an inclination towards non-duality on the part
of the devotee, which alone leads to liberation. The following verse in the
Anubhūtiprakāśa, which also partly paraphrases Mun: daka : Upani:sad 3.2.3, further
makes it clear that the self reveals its being to the devotee who is fit for the Lord’s
grace (īśvarānugrahayukta). In other words, for Vidyāranya, : the Mun: daka
:
Upani:sad verse is indicative that the Lord’s grace is a necessary precondition in
the pursuit of gnostic knowledge, just as Appaya claims. It is significant that,
unlike Śrīhar:sa for instance, both Vidyāranya: and Appaya use the particle eva to
emphasize that the Lord’s grace is a sine qua non of gnostic realization. I have not
:
found this usage in Advaita texts prior to Vidyāranya.⁶⁸
influence of the ātman that the seeker begins the journey to liberation, and it is only through the ātman,
:
again, that the ātman is found’ (Malkovsky 2001: 321). He adds, however, that Śankara downplays the
emphasis on grace already explicit in the verse and interprets it in a way that leaves more room for
human effort.
⁶⁸ While Śrīhar:sa’s verse reads īśvarānugrahād e:sā [pumsām

: :
advaitavāsanā], Vidyāranya’s verse
reads īśvarānugrahād eva [bhaved advaitavāsanā] and Appaya’s verse reads anugrahād eva [ . . .
advaitavāsanā]. The shift towards emphasizing the need for Śiva’s grace might reflect the increasingly
devotional [Śaiva] context in which both Vidyāranya : and Appaya were positioned in their own time
and place. The devotional Avadhūtagītā, attributed to Dattātreya, is an interesting case in this respect,
for its first verse exactly parallels Śrīhar:sa’s verse, but has eva instead of e:sā: īśvarānugrahād eva
:
pumsām advaitavāsanā | mahadbhayaparitrānād : viprānām
: upajāyate ||. Note that the reading e:sā in
the Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya
: is confirmed by commentaries. The Avadhūtagītā, which is still widely
associated with the Advaita Vedānta tradition but might have been of Nātha inspiration, was written
between the 14th and 18th centuries (Rigopoulos 1998: 195).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  105
The influence of the Advaita Vedānta tradition upon Appaya’s conception of

grace and its soteriological role is also reflected in the fact that he communicates
:
the same idea in his Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, an early compendium of Advaita
Vedānta in which he does not show a priori any commitment to Śaiva doctrine.
The underlying discussion is whether the Upani:sadic sentence ‘The self should be
heard’ (ātmā śrotavyah: , Br: hadāranyaka
: Upani:sad 4.4.22) is an injunction (vidhi)
or not, and if so, what kind of injunction it is. Appaya argues that this sentence is
not at all an injunction to inquire into the self by means of one’s own efforts,
because self-knowledge can only take place through scriptures and the help of a
teacher’s instruction. However, this sentence might be interpreted as a restrictive
injunction (niyamavidhi) conveying that one should recite the Vedānta texts along
with a teacher rather than studying the written texts, etc. by oneself. At this point,
an Advaitin is brought in, claiming that some students eager to inquire into
Vedānta could well interpret this injunction as meaning that they should study
Dvaita Vedānta texts, for dualists too have inquired into Vedānta and established
a position of their own. But this is not something that is acceptable for Advaitins.
Therefore, continues the opponent, the Upani:sadic sentence should be interpreted
as a restrictive injunction conveying that one should inquire specifically into the
non-dual self, and not into the self distinct from Brahman that dualists believe in.
Appaya declines to reinterpret the restrictive injunction in this way, because only
someone who has no faith in non-duality (advaitaśraddhā) would turn to Dvaita
Vedānta, and such a person being in any case deluded, no restrictive injunction,
however constraining it is, would have the power to prevent him from under-
standing the Upani:sadic sentence the way he wants:
No [, such a restrictive injunction is not possible,] because it is possible for

someone who has no faith in non-duality—[a faith] that is gained [solely]
through the Lord’s grace (īśvarānugraha)—to be deluded [in thinking], because
of the interpretation accepted by others [i.e., the dualists], that even the sentence
‘[The self] should be heard’ is an injunction to inquire into the self that has a
second [other than itself, and not the non-dual self]. If it is prompted by a
delusion, the engagement with regard to a certain thing cannot be restrained even
by hundreds of injunctions.⁶⁹
Without a prerequisite faith in non-duality, the student incurs the risk of being
deluded by the interpretation of dualists, in this case their interpretation of the
Upani:sadic sentence as referring to the ‘self that has a second [other than itself]’
(sadvitīyātma). If the student is deluded, a restrictive injunction can have no
⁶⁹ na, īśvarānugrahalabdhādvaitaśraddhārahitasya śrotavyavākye ’pi parābhimatayojanayā sadvi-

tīyātmavicāravidhiparatvabhramasambhavena bhramaprayuktatayā anyatra pravr: tter vidhiśatenāpy
aparihāryatvāt (Sastri 1937: 11).
106    - 
power over him. The important point here is that the inclination—Appaya uses the
word ‘faith’ (śraddhā), which expresses the same idea—to inquire into the non-dual
self is not given, but acquired (labdha) through Śiva’s grace. This is an argument that
Appaya expects his audience of Advaitins to understand and agree with.
If Appaya’s emphasis on divine grace in his reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
theology seems indebted to the Advaita Vedānta tradition, it nonetheless remains
distinctive in three ways. First, if worshipping Śiva is a sine qua non of liberation,
the worship itself centres on the personified form of Śiva, not on His attributeless
:
reality. This is in contrast with Śankara who, on the one hand, lays some emphasis
on human agency in the pursuit of liberation, and who, on the other hand, admits
that the attributeless self, not just a personified deity, can also bestow grace on
devotees. Though it is rooted in an Advaita conception of liberation, the soterio-
logical function of Śiva’s grace is overall more prominent in Appaya’s Śivādvaita
than in Advaita. Secondly, for Appaya, the gnostic realization of the nirguna :
Brahman is a gradual process in which Śiva’s grace plays a key role, not a sudden
realization that can be achieved through one’s own efforts, as Śrīhar:sa for instance
maintains. Thirdly, unlike Vidyāranya, : Appaya does not link the Lord’s grace with
ritual actions. Worshipping the Lord and obtaining His liberating grace is not
achieved through ritual actions that purify the mind but rather, as verse 8 of the
ŚAMD suggests, a cognitive act in itself: to ‘worship’ is to know or recognize (pari
+ √jñā) the personified Śiva as it really is (yathāvat) and then meditate on Him. In
turn, Śiva’s grace alone leads to the true knowledge of pure non-duality.
3.3 Appaya on Śaiva Scriptures
The most important scriptural source in Śrīkan: t:ha’s exegesis of the BS is the
Upani:sads. As far as his exegesis of Śaiva sources is concerned, Śrīkan: t:ha relies
mostly on Purānas : and Upani:sads that have a Śaiva leaning (e.g., the Śvetāśvatara
Upani:sad) or that he reinterprets as Śiva-centred (e.g., the Mahānārāyana :
Upani:sad). As pointed out in Chapter 1, Śrīkan: t:ha was most likely influenced by
the work of South Indian Śaiva scholars like Bhat:t:a Bhāskarācārya and Haradatta
Śivācārya, and to a lesser extent by Kashmirian authors such as Utpaladeva and
K:semarāja. Interestingly, he does not quote from the Śaivāgamas, the scriptures
revealed by Śiva and on which most of the above-mentioned Śaiva theologians
base their own exegeses. What place do Śaiva scriptures have in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
theology? What authority does he ascribe to them in his commentary, particularly
in light of his commitment to Vedānta? More importantly for us, what is the take
of his commentator, Appaya, on these questions? This is a compelling question,
:
for we know that Śankara, whom Appaya reveres above all other scholars, rejects
the Śaiva-Pāśupata position in his commentary on the pāśupatādhikarana :
(BS 2.2.35–38), the section of the BS dealing with the Śaiva/Pāśupata position.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  107
A central tenet of Vedānta theology is that Brahman is both the efficient cause
: and the material cause (upādānakārana)
(nimittakārana) : of the world. We have
seen that Śrīkan: t:ha fully agrees with this in considering Śiva as both the creator
and the material out of which the world is created. Commenting on the
:
pāśupatādhikarana, : however, Śankara, Rāmānuja, and other theologians of
Vedānta deny that the Śaiva/Pāśupata tradition has any authority precisely on
the grounds that it holds Śiva to be only the efficient cause of the world. Several
Śaivas outside the fold of Vedānta, notably tenants of Śaiva Siddhānta, indeed hold
that the insentient māyā, not Śiva, is the material out of which Śiva creates the
world. Śrīkan: t:ha begins his commentary on BS 2.2.35 by tracing this view to a
small number of Śaiva ‘tāntrikas’. He does not mention any particular school or
position, but his comment is directed against Śaivas who are ‘devoted to [Śaiva]
āgamas’ (āgamani:st:ha) but ignorant of their real meaning (abhiprāya). In his sub-
commentary on BS 2.2.35, Appaya sheds additional light on these Śaivas. In
Appaya’s words, the opponent claims:
The fact that the supreme Lord[’s existence] is inferred and that He is only the
efficient cause [of the world] is not only taught in the śāstras of Vaiśe:sikas and
others; it is also firmly established in the Śivāgamas, which are, so to speak, the
storehouse of the secret that is the [semantic] homogeneity of all the Vedas. How
could these [two doctrines] be refuted? For it is not correct to refute the inference
proving [the existence of the] supreme Lord and the fact that He is only the
efficient cause [of the world]—both [doctrines] being firmly established in large
sections of ‘Śiva’s sentences’ [i.e., Śivāgama s], which are equal to the Vedas, as
well as in large sections of commentaries [on these āgamas] composed by
generations of Śaiva scholars—on the basis that [these two doctrines] contradict
a few Vedic sentences and arguments that have their source in the mind of [some
miserable] people. [This is not correct,] because it is proper to interpret a few
sentences with another meaning in accordance with several [i.e., the majority of]
sentences, and because it is proper to hold that arguments having their source in
the mind of miserable people are fantasies inasmuch as they contradict the Vedas
as well as the Śivāgamas.⁷⁰
The opponent portrayed by Appaya here is presumably a South Indian

Saiddhāntika who believes in the authority of the Vedas and their equality with
⁷⁰ parameśvarasyānumānikatvam : kevalam: nimittatvam : ca vaiśe:sikādiśāstre:sv eva nocyate,

sakalavedasāmarasyarahasyanidhānabhūte:su śivāgame:sv api prati:st:hāpyate. tat katham: pratyākhyeyam.
na hi vedasamānaih: śivavākyaih: pūrvapūrvaśaivācāryapranītais
: tadvyākhyānaiś ca mahatā prabandhena
prati:st:hāpitam
: parameśvarasādhakānumānam : tasya kevalanimittatvam: ca katipayavedavākyavirodhena
puru:sabuddhiprabhavatarkavirodhena ca pratyākhyātum : yuktam. bahuvākyānurodhena katipayavā-
:
kyānām arthāntaravarnanasyocitatvāt vedavirodheneva śivāgamavirodhenāpi kimpacānapuru
: :sabud-
dhiprabhavatarkānām: ābhāsīkaranasyocitatvāc
: ca (ŚAMD2: 106).
108    - 
the Śaivāgamas,⁷¹ and who also strongly defends the view that Śiva is only the
efficient cause of the world and that His existence can be inferred through
reasoning.⁷² He argues that the few passages in the Vedic corpus that seem
opposed to these two doctrines should not be read literally but, precisely because
they are few in number, reinterpreted in accordance with the majority of Vedic
statements that claim that Śiva is only the efficient cause and that His existence
can be inferred through reasoning. As for the statements of commentators and
other ‘miserable people’ (kimpacānapuru
: :sa) who deny these doctrines, they
should be duly refuted for their arguments contradict the Vedas and
Śaivāgamas, and are for this reason nothing but fantasies.
Appaya goes on to explain that these Śaiva exegetes are unable to understand
the real meaning of their own scriptures, and it is to refute their mistaken views
: was written:
that the pāśupatādhikarana
The Śivāgamas do not intend to prove [the existence of the] supreme Lord based
on an independently valid inference, nor do they intend [to claim] that He is only
the efficient cause [of the world]. Nevertheless, some candid tāntrikas, commenting
on [the Śivāgamas], understanding their meaning literally [and] ignorant of the
essence of their underlying meaning, have established the doctrine in this way.
For those hearing this doctrine, which has come down [to them] in a [seemingly]
beginningless tradition of exegesis, there might arise the mistaken view that the
intention of the Śivāgamas, too, is precisely this [i.e., to prove the existence of
Śiva through inference and to claim that He is only the efficient cause of the
world]. The effort to undertake another adhikarana : [on this topic, namely the
pāśupatādhikarana]: aims to get rid of this [mistaken view].⁷³
⁷¹ Appaya uses the term śaivāgama interchangeably with the term śivāgama to denote the twenty-
eight scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta, as well as other scriptures such as the Sarvajñānottarāgama and the
Mr: gendrāgama, which do not figure in the standard list of Saiddhāntika scriptures but present
themselves as derived from it (upabheda). Appaya also refers more generally to the body of knowledge
contained in those scriptures as śivaśāstra; see, for instance, his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.38: evam
etāni paraśaktyādīni pr: thivyantāni jadāni
: :sat:trimśatattvāni
: śivaśāstre:su prasiddhāni tatra tatra
śrutinyāyair vyavasthāpitāni—‘Thus the thirty-six insentient principles, beginning with paraśakti
and ending with earth, well-known in Śaiva treatises (śivaśāstra), are specifically established in various
places [in these treatises] by means of scriptures and logical argumentation’ (ŚAMD2: 110).
⁷² Among Śaivas, Saiddhāntikas prominently hold the view that the existence of Śiva can be inferred
(as opposed to being cognised only through scriptures) and that He is only the efficient cause of the
world (not its material cause as well). The view that the Śaivāgamas are on par with the Vedas appears
relatively late among Saiddhāntikas, especially South Indian ones, and was defended for instance by the
sixteenth-century South Indian scholar of Śaiva Siddhānta, Śivāgrayogin (see below, fn. 75, this
chapter).
⁷³ śivāgamānām : parameśvarasya svatantrānumānatah: siddhau tasya kevalanimittatve ca na
tātparyam. tathāpy uttānahr: dayā yathāśrutārthagrāhinas : tattātparyasārānabhijñāh: kecana tāntrikās
tadvyākhyātāras tathā matam :
: pratyati:st:hipan. anādivyākhyānaparamparāprāpta : tan matam
m :
śr: nvatā
: m: tatraiva śivāgamānām api tātparyam iti bhrāntih: syāt. tannirākaranārtho : ’yam
:
adhikaranāntarāra :
mbhayatna[ h: ] (ŚAMD2: 106).
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  109
For Appaya, the problem lies not so much in the fact that some early commen-
tators wrongly interpreted the Śaivāgamas―reading them in an overly literal
sense and with no understanding of their underlying meaning (tātparya)―as in
the fact that later Śaiva scholars (possibly contemporaries of Appaya) read their
works and believed that their interpretation was correct. Although it is proven
earlier in the BS (e.g., BS 1.1.3) that Brahman cannot be inferred on the basis of
logical argumentation, but only cognised through scriptures, and also that He is
both the material and efficient cause of the world, another adhikarana―the :
:
pāśupatādhikarana―must be undertaken in order to refute the interpretation of
these ‘candid tāntrikas’ whose views are mistaken. Note that Appaya does not
adopt this interpretation of the pāśupatādhikarana : in the Parimala, where he
:
agrees with Śankara, Vācaspati and Amalānanda in rejecting the Pāśupata tea-
chings en bloc. On the other hand, Appaya does not point out any problem in
:
Śankara’s interpretation in the ŚAMD, which silently highlights an important
tension in his Vedānta work.
In his commentary on BS 2.2.38, Śrīkan: t:ha ascribes the erroneous interpre-
tation of the Śaivāgamas to previous scholars (pūrvācārya) and refutes it on the
basis that the Vedas and Śaiva scriptures have equal authority:
Previous scholars have come up with the [following] interpretation: ‘In a small
number of Śivāgamas, it is taught that Śiva, the supreme Brahman, is only the
: aims to
efficient cause [of the world]. This section [i.e., the pāśupatādhikarana]
refute this [namely, the claim made in the Śivāgamas that Śiva is only the efficient
cause].’ However, we do not see any difference between the Vedas and
Śivāgamas. The name ‘Śivāgama’ can also be used to denote the Vedas, since
[Śiva] is their author. Therefore, the Śivāgamas are of two kinds, namely for the
three upper classes and for all. The Vedas are meant for the three upper classes
[only,] while the others [i.e., the Śivāgamas] are meant for all. Śiva alone is the
single author of both.⁷⁴
Like some early modern Saiddhāntikas after him, Śrīkan: t:ha holds the view that
both the Vedas and Śaivāgamas are equally authoritative in that both have the
same author, Śiva.⁷⁵ Hence it is appropriate to denote the Vedas with the word
⁷⁴ śivāgamaikadeśe śivasya parabrahmana : h: kevalanimittatvam upapāditam. tatparihārārtham idam

adhikaranam: :
iti pūrvācāryānām vyākhyā. vayam : tu vedaśivāgamayor bhedam na paśyāmah: . vede ’pi
śivāgama iti vyavahāro yuktas, tasya tatkartr: katvāt. atah: śivāgamo dvividhas traivarnikavi : :sayah: sarva-
vi:sayaś ceti. vedas traivarnikavi
: :sayah: . sarvavi:sayaś cānyah: . ubhayor eka eva śivah: kartā. (ŚAMD2: 111).
⁷⁵ For instance, the sixteenth-century Saiddhāntika Śivāgrayogin also holds that scripture is twofold,
Vedas and Śaivāgamas, and that both groups of scriptures were authored by Sadāśiva: tac ca dvividham, :
vedah: śaivāgamaś ceti [ . . . ] ato vedaśivāgamayoh: paramāptasadāśivapranītatvāt : tāv eva
yathārthāvabodhakau—‘And [scripture] is of two kinds, Vedas and Śaivāgamas. Therefore, since the
Vedas and Śaivāgamas were authored by the [same] supremely authoritative [author], namely
Sadāśiva, they alone give the knowledge of truth’ (Śaivaparibhā:sā 1.41). Note that this particular
passage from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary is one of the few cited in later Śaiva literature, for instance in
110    - 
‘Śivāgama’. There are therefore two kinds of ‘Śaiva scriptures’: the Vedas, meant
for the three upper classes, and the scriptures that we normally refer to as
Śaivāgamas, accessible to all. What Śrīkan: t:ha implies in this passage is that the
claim about Śiva being only the efficient cause of the world is not found in the
Śaivāgamas; otherwise, the authority of the Vedas, which he somewhat subsumes
under Śaiva scriptures, would be compromised. Rather, such claim was made by
later exegetes who have misinterpreted the scriptures. In his sub-commentary on
BS 2.2.38, Appaya confirms that the problem does not lie in the Śaivāgamas
themselves, but in their reinterpretation by some Śaiva ācāryas:
Thus in order to make it clear that the position to be refuted in this section [i.e.,
the pāśupatādhikarana], : [namely,] that Śiva is only the efficient cause [of the
world], is not based on āgamas but rather on the tradition of exegetes ignorant of
[the āgamas’] [real] intention, [Śrīkan: t:ha] cites a number of passages from the
:
Vāyusamhitā, [itself] rooted in the Sarvajñānottarāgama, so as to demonstrate
that Śiva is [also] the material cause [of the world].⁷⁶
While it is not clear to me why Appaya holds that the Vāyusamhitā : (or
:
Vāyavīyasamhitā, a portion of the Śivapurā :
na) has its source in the
Sarvajñānottarāgama, the fact that the latter is mentioned in the present context
is not so surprising. The Sarvajñānottarāgama is known as the only early Śaiva
scripture that unambiguously teaches non-dualism (albeit not distinctively
Vedāntic), and is indeed frequently cited by South Indian scholars of Śaiva
Siddhānta with a non-dualist leaning.⁷⁷ That Appaya accorded a high status to
this āgama is clear from a comment he makes later in the same section:
Even though the fact that Śiva is also the material cause [of the world] is
communicated in the Vedic Śivāgama called Sarvajñānottar[āgama]―which
:
has the same object as the Vāyusamhitā―as well as in some parts of other
āgamas, nevertheless, a number of ācāryas have come up with the [following]
interpretation: ‘In Śivāgamas called siddhāntatantras, such as the Kāmika,
: etc., [the fact that Śiva is the material cause] is explicitly refuted. For
Kārana,
Umāpati Śivācārya’s Pau:skarabhā:sya and in Nirmalamani’s

: Prabhā, a commentary on Aghoraśiva’s
Kriyākramadyotikā.
⁷⁶ evam anenādhikaranena : : h: śivasya kevalanimittatvavādo nāgamamūlah: kim

nirākaranīya : tu
tadabhiprāyānabhijñavyākhyātr: paramparāmūla
: ityetad āvi:skartum
: śivasyopādānatvasampratipattau
:
sarvajñānottarāgamamūlam :
: vāyusamhitāvacanajātam udāharati (ŚAMD2: 109).
⁷⁷ For instance, Śivāgrayogin composed a commentary on the Sarvajñānottarāgama and quotes
from it in his Śaivaparibhā:sā 5.38 in order to point out how dualists of his time have failed in trying to
interpret this scripture in line with dualism; see Sanderson 1992: 291.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  111
: has that [refutation] as its

this reason, this section [i.e., the pāśupatādhikarana]
object’; this is the meaning.⁷⁸
For Appaya, the Sarvajñānottarāgama is ‘Vedic’ (vaidika), while other

Siddhāntatantras, such as the Kāmika, Kārana, : etc., are not. As far as we know,
except for the Sarvajñānottarāgama, all demonstrably early scriptures of Śaiva
Siddhānta are dualist.⁷⁹ It may then be that for Appaya, the Sarvajñānottarāgama
is vaidika precisely because it presents or defends non-dualist views. In any case,
in his view, all Śaiva scriptures ultimately concur in teaching that Śiva is both the
efficient and material cause of the world. It is only, as always, a matter of knowing
how to interpret the texts appropriately.
It is clear from the above that Appaya accorded a high authority to Śaiva
scriptures. But he scarcely quotes from them in his commentarial work, or in
his other Śaiva works, for that matter; instead, he generally relies on Purānic :
material to defend his Śaiva views on a textual basis. Like Śrīkan: t:ha, he refers to
Śaiva scriptures as a corpus and does not comment on their individual content.
While he does, at times, display a knowledge of Śaiva doctrine per se,⁸⁰ his views
on the subject are generally idiosyncratic and influenced by his commitment to
Advaita Vedānta. To illustrate this, let us examine one of the rare Saiddhāntika
passages he comments upon in his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.38. The passage is
taken from the Pau:skarāgama, a subsidiary (upabheda) scripture of the
Pārameśvarāgama, itself one of the twenty-eight āgamas recognized as authori-
tative by Śaivas:
⁷⁸ yady api vāyusamhitaikārthe

: sarvajñānottarākhye vaidikaśivāgame tato ’nyatrāpi kvacit kvacid
āgame śivasya upādānatvam api pratipāditam, tathāpi kāmikakāranādi : :su siddhāntatantrākhye:su
śivāgame:su kan: t:hoktyā tat pratyākhyātam. atas tadvi:sayam idam adhikaranam : iti ke:sāmcid
:
ācāryadeśīyānām : vyākhyānam ity arthah: (ŚAMD2: 111).
⁷⁹ The Sarvajñānottarāgama is definitely early (at least demonstrably pre-twelfth-century), but does
not figure in the list of twenty-eight ‘principal’ scriptures of Śaiva Siddhānta mentioned in the
:
Kiranatantra. The Kāmika and Kārana : are part of this list, and the most we can assume about their
date is that they were known to scholars of Śaiva Siddhānta in the tenth century (Goodall 2004: xxiii–xxv).
⁸⁰ At the beginning of his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.38, for instance, Appaya discusses the thirty-
six Śaiva ontological principles (tattva) in some detail. He mentions the following, in order: 1. parāśakti
(=śivatattva, parabindu, kun: dalinī,
: etc.); 2. śakti; 3. sadāśiva; 4. maheśvara; 5. śuddhavidyā; 6.
aparamāyā; 7. kāla; 8. niyati; 9. kalā; 10. vidyā; 11. rāga; 12. puru:sa; 13. avyakta (=prakr: ti); 14. buddhi;
:
15. ahamkāra; 16. manas; 17–21: five faculties of sense; 22–26: five faculties of action; 27–31: five subtle
elements (tanmātra); 32–36: five gross elements (mahābhūta). Śiva, together with His cicchakti, is said
to transcend all tattvas, an idea that parallels the anāśritaśiva of non-dualist Śaivism, and is also found,
for instance, in Aghoraśiva’s Tattvaprakāśavr: tti (see its opening verse, Goodall 1998: xxxi). The order
of Appaya’s list of ‘cuirasses’ (kañcuka), i.e., tattvas 7–11, is not typical, and is identical to that featuring
in the Somaśambhupaddhati, an influential ritual manual with which Appaya was probably thoroughly
familiar given parallels with his own ritual manual, the Śivārcanacandrikā (see Duquette 2020a); it is
also found in Bhojadeva’s Tattvaprakāśa, verse 22 (Goodall 1998: lii), and in Bhojadeva’s paddhati, the
Siddhāntasārapaddhati. Overall, his list of tattvas is very similar to that of Śivāgrayogin, who gives the
exact same order for the kañcukas (see Śaivaparibhā:sā 4.39, 44, 48, 49 and 51); both scholars also refer
to the same rather uncommon category of miśrādhvan (‘mixed path’), the usage of which seems to go
back to the Pau:skarāgama (see v. 30 from the vidyāpāda), but is not found, to the best of my
knowledge, in the writings of other well-known Saiddhāntikas.
112    - 
Just like Śiva, [His] śakti is not a material cause, for it has the nature of
consciousness. Transformation is taught [to be possible] for what is insentient;
it is not possible for what has the nature of consciousness.⁸¹
Appaya’s quotation of this passage in this context is not arbitrary. It is quoted by

the South Indian Śaiva scholar Aghoraśivācārya (twelfth century) in his vr: tti on
Bhojadeva’s Tattvaprakāśa, specifically in his commentary on the twenty-fifth
kārikā, which concerns the origination of ontological principles (tattva) from the
Śiva-principle (śivatattva):
Scholars say that the Śiva-principle (śivatattva) is pervading, one, eternal, the
cause of all [other] principles [and] has the nature of knowledge and action.⁸²
Aghoraśiva quotes the Pau:skara verse above while commenting on the meaning of
śivatattva in this kārikā. In his view, śivatattva cannot refer to Śiva or to His śakti,
because both are beyond tattvas (tattvātīta). If Śiva, for instance, were the material
:
cause (kārana=upādāna) of all other tattvas, as stated in the kārikā, it would
follow that He is insentient (acetana) and subject to change (parināmin) :
(admitting, of course, that the material cause really transforms into the world).
For Aghoraśiva, who aligns with Kashmirian theologians of Śaiva Siddhānta on
this point, the material cause of the world must be insentient in order to explain its
transformation into an insentient world. He adds that it is also not acceptable to
turn to vivartavāda in this context, that is, to hold that the sentient Śiva is the
cause of tattvas, and that He does not really transform into the insentient world,
but only apparently so. We cannot hold this view, says Aghoraśiva, because all our
instruments of knowledge (pramāna) : testify that the world does exist. The verse
from the Pau:skara is quoted afterwards to support the view that only what is
insentient can change and therefore that Śiva (or His śakti) cannot be the material
cause of the world.⁸³
⁸¹ nātra śaktir upādānam : cidrūpatvād yathā śivah: | parināmo

: ’citah: proktaś cetanasya na yujyata ||
(Pau:skarāgama, vidyāpāda 4cd–5ab). See Kiranatantra: :
2.26ab for a parallel passage: parināmo ’ceta-
nasya cetanasya na yujyate. Goodall (1998: 54) reports a variant reading, found in our passage:
:
parināmo ’citah: proktaś cetanasya na yujyate. Some scholars hold that this Pau:skara is not the ‘original’
one, but a later South Indian redaction that was unknown to Saiddhāntikas of old, such as Bhat:t:a
Rāmakan: t:ha (see Goodall 2004: li–lii). Other scholars do not doubt the authenticity of the Pau:skara
(see Colas-Chauhan 2007: 10–12).
⁸² vyāpakam ekam : nityam : kāranam
: akhilasya tattvajātasya | jñānakriyāsvabhāvam : śivatattvam :
jagadur ācāryāh: || (A:st:aprakarana:: 46).
⁸³ na ca cidvivartābhyupagamo yuktah: , sarvapramānasiddhatvena
: jagato ’satyatvābhāvād, vivarta-
sya cāsatyatvābhyupagamāt . . . tad uktam—nātra śaktir upādānam : cidrūpatvād yathā śivah: | parināmo
:
’citah: proktaś cetanasya na yujyate ||—‘And it is not appropriate to accept an apparent transformation
of consciousness [into the world] because all [our] means of knowledge attest that the world is not
unreal [and] because an apparent transformation (vivarta) is accepted to be unreal . . . The following
was said: ‘Just like Śiva, [His] śakti is not a material cause, for it has the nature of consciousness.
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  113
The same verse is quoted by one of Appaya’s South Indian Śaiva contemporaries,
Śivāgrayogin (sixteenth century), in his Śaivaparibhā:sā. He too holds that neither
Śiva nor His śakti can function as the material cause of the world, inasmuch as they
have the nature of consciousness. Śivāgrayogin also rejects vivartavāda as a possible
solution to this problem for the same reasons as Aghoraśiva:
Nor is Śiva’s śakti itself the material cause in this case, because it has the nature of
consciousness. It is well known that [only] what is insentient transforms. If
someone objects: ‘Let there be the apparent transformation of what is sentient,
so that Śiva’s śakti itself apparently transforms into these various forms,’ [we
say:] no. If this were the case, it would undesirably follow that all [worldly]
products are unreal. And this is not desirable, for it is impossible that the world
be so [i.e., unreal], it being established [to be real] through all instruments of
knowledge.⁸⁴
Like Aghoraśiva, he quotes the Pau:skara verse in support of his claim. Hence, by
Appaya’s time, the Pau:skara verse had already been quoted by major Śaiva
scholars to support the view, central to Śaiva Siddhānta, that Śiva is not the
material cause of the world but only its efficient cause.
In his commentary on the pāśupatādhikarana, : Appaya challenges this inter-
pretation of the verse. In Appaya’s understanding, the Pau:skara verse is not at all a
refutation of the fact that Śiva’s śakti can transform; it is merely a ‘bold claim’
:
(praudhivāda) aiming to prevent a specific doubt, namely that Śiva could also
transform into the world, it being the case that His śakti does transform. In
Appaya’s view, any scriptural passage refuting material causality on the part of
Śiva [or His śakti] only serves to emphasize the truth, acknowledged in the Vedic
tradition, that Śiva cannot change; it does not directly refute Śiva’s material
causality. In his own words:
If you say that [some āgamas] deny that Śiva is the material cause [of the world,
i.e., by means of His śakti], [we say:] is it not the case that the Vedas teach [Śiva’s]
changelessness? [In fact,] this [refutation] has as its only intention to elaborate
upon [Śiva’s changelessness].⁸⁵
Transformation is taught [to be possible] for what is insentient; it is not possible for what has the nature
of consciousness’ (A:st:aprakarana:
: 48).
⁸⁴ na cātra śivaśaktir evopādānam, : cidrūpatvāt. acitah: khalu parināma

: h: . nanu cito vivarta evāstu,
:
tathā ca śivaśaktir eva tattadākārena : vivartata iti cen na. tathā sati kāryajātasya mithyātvaprasangāt.
na ce:st:āpattih: , sarvapramānasiddhasya
: jagatas tathātvānupapatte :
h (Śaivaparibhā :
s ā: 81).
⁸⁵ śivasya upādānatvanirākarana : m: te:su śrūyata iti ced vede:su nirvikāratvam : kim: na śrūyate.
tasyaiva prapañcanaparam : tat (ŚAMD2: 112).
114    - 
Appaya’s rebuttal of the common interpretation of this scriptural passage is key to

his argument that Śiva’s śakti does transform into the world. This thesis, as we
have seen, is central to the metaphysics deployed by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary
and is the cornerstone based on which Appaya reinterprets Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of
transformation in conformity with vivartavāda. If one accepts that the sentient
śakti transforms into the insentient world, one has to also admit, in order to
account for śakti’s nature as consciousness (cidrūpa), that this transformation is
only apparent (vivarta). Evidently, Appaya was rather alone in upholding this
thesis. Most Śaiva commentators on āgamas, whether in the tradition of
Kashmirian non-dualism⁸⁶ or in the Vedānta-leaning tradition of Śaiva
Siddhānta, would disagree with the vivarta implications of Appaya’s thesis. Even
Śivāgrayogin, whose brand of Śaiva non-dualism comes close to Śrīkan: t:ha’s and
who shares with him similar views about the authority of Śaiva scriptures,
explicitly rejects vivartavāda.⁸⁷ Most Śaiva scholars would also reject his view
that all Śaivāgamas teach that the material cause of the world is sentient in the
form of śakti.
What this shows, in turn, is how important it is for Appaya to ground the
Śaivāgamas in the Vedic tradition, particularly in the Advaita Vedānta tradition,
which he sees as its culminating point. Not only does he hold that pure non-
dualism is the underlying message of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary; he also takes it to
be the final word of all Śaivāgamas and in fact of all scriptures, as we have seen
earlier in one of the introductory verses of his ŚAMD:
Even though the Upani:sads and [other] religious scriptures, as well as all [other]
compositions, including the several Purānas : and smr: ti texts such as the
Mahābhārata and so forth, culminate in non-duality alone; and [even though]
the Brahmasūtras too shine forth, for those who have discernment, as having
their ultimate rest [in that same non-duality]; [and even though] nothing but that
⁸⁶ We noted earlier (see Chapter 1, Section1.1) the partial influence on Śrīkan: t:ha of Kashmirian
scholars of Pratyabhijñā such as K:semarāja and Utpaladeva. Unlike Śrīkan: t:ha, Appaya never refers to
these authors or to their non-dualist theses in his Śivādvaita works, and barely comments on those
passages of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary where they are mentioned or quoted. His brand of non-dualism is
:
definitely in line with the standard Advaita defended by Śankara, Sarvajñātman and others. As far as
Śaiva doctrine is concerned, Appaya was more familiar with the Kashmirian-influenced Śaiva
Siddhānta works composed in South India. The case of Śrīkan: t:ha’s Ratnatrayaparīk:sā, to which
Appaya’s own Ratnatrayaparīk:sā may be a partial rejoinder (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1), is a good
example.
⁸⁷ In Śaivaparibhā:sā 2.22, Śivāgrayogin analyses the nature of the world as a product of Śiva. He rejects
:
successively transformation (parināma), creation (ārambha), aggregation (samūha) and apparent trans-
formation (vivarta) as viable explanations. His rejection of vivarta reads: nāpi vivartas, tasya atattvato
:
’nyathābhāvātmakatvena jagato ’tyantāsattvaprasangāt—‘Nor is there an apparent transformation [of
the world] because it would undesirably follow that the world does not exist at all, given that [apparent
transformation] consists in transforming in an unreal way.’
 ˊī̣ ̣  ’  115
:
[non-duality] was accepted by the best of ancient teachers such as Śankara and
others—[nonetheless . . . ].⁸⁸
Does this mean that, for Appaya, Śaiva scriptures have the same status as the
Vedas, as Śrīkan: t:ha and Śivāgrayogin understand it? The answer is no. Appaya is
not willing to ascribe them full ‘Vedicness’, as is clear from the following passage
in his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.38:
Therefore, we conclude that the [Śaivāgamas] agree with Vedics scriptures (śruti)
on Śiva’s greatness and on the specific ways of performing His worship—
[features] that are not taught in the extant Vedic scriptures—just like the
Kalpasūtras, of which the purpose is to expand upon the different parts required
for the performance of rituals—of which just a few procedures are taught in the
extant Vedic scriptures—[agree with Vedic scriptures] on specific parts not
taught in the extant Vedic scriptures. Therefore, all the things taught in the
Vedas and Śaivāgamas are exactly the same. Yet there is a difference: while in
[the case of] the Kalpasūtras, it is possible to doubt, with regard to the parts [of
these sūtras] that are contradicted by the extant Vedic scriptures, that they have
their source in the confusion of their [human] author, there is no such doubt in
the case of the [Śaiva]āgamas, insofar as they have Śiva as their author.⁸⁹
While Appaya follows Śrīkan: t:ha in saying that ‘all things taught in the Vedas
and Śaivāgamas are exactly the same,’ he does not ascribe the same status or
authority to the Śaivāgamas. The comparison with the Kalpasūtras (a class of texts
describing domestic sacrifices and one’s social duties) implies that, for him, the
Śaivāgamas have an auxiliary status vis-à-vis the Vedas in that they expand upon
matters (Śiva’s worship, Śiva’s greatness, etc.) that are not taught explicitly in the
extant Vedic corpus. This argument is framed by Kumārila’s discussion of the
status of Kalpasūtras vis-à-vis the Vedas and smr: ti texts in his Tantravārttika.
Kumārila argues there, ad MS 1.3.11–12, that the Kalpasūtras have a higher status
than smr: ti texts: while the former expand upon rules of sacrificial procedures
described in directly perceivable (pratyak:sa), i.e., extant, Vedic texts, the latter are
compilations based presumably upon lost Vedic texts whose existence can only be
inferred (anumeya). However, Kumārila refuses to ascribe Kalpasūtras full
‘Vedicness’ because of their ancillary status vis-à-vis the Vedas. Likewise, the
⁸⁸ yady apy advaita eva śrutiśikharagirām āgamānām : ca ni:st:hā sākam : sarvaih: purāna-
:
smr: tinikaramahābhāratādiprabandhaih: | tatraiva brahmasūtrāny : api ca vimr: śatām : bhānti
:
viśrāntimanti pratnair ācāryaratnair api parijagr: he śankarādyais tad eva || [tathāpy . . . ] (ŚAMD1: 1).
:
⁸⁹ atah: pratyak:saśrutyavagatakatipayetikartavyatākakratvanu:st:hānāpek:sitāngakalāpaprapañca-
:
naparānā : m: kalpasūtrānā
: m: pratyak:saśrutyadr: :st:āngaviśe:sev iva te:sām: pratyak:saśrutyanavagataśiva-
mahimatatpūjanaprakāraviśe:se:sv api śrutyanusāritvam avasīyate. ato vedaśivāgamayoh: pratipādyāni
sarvāni: samānāny:
eva. iyāms: tu viśe:sah: . kalpasūtre:su pratyak:saśrutiviruddhāmśe : : : bhrān-
pranetr
timūlatvam āśankāspadam, : na tu śivakartr: ke:sv āgame:sv iti (ŚAMD2: 112).
116    - 
Śaivāgamas are not mere smr: ti texts for Appaya, yet they are not on par with the
Vedas; they only possess authority insofar as they depend on the Vedas. That
being said, he nuances his comparison: while the Kalpasūtras can sometimes be
wrong insofar as they were composed by human authors, the Śaivāgamas can
never be wrong, for they were composed by Śiva, a perfectly reliable author (āpta).
In other words, the Śaivāgamas obtain a status midway between the Kalpasūtras
and the Vedas in Appaya’s scheme of scriptural authority. In holding such a view,
Appaya departs not only from Śrīkan: t:ha, who clearly subscribes to the equality
between Vedic and Śaiva scriptures, but also from most of his Śaiva co-religionists
in South India.
4
Engaging with Śrīvais: navas
:
In the previous chapter, I discussed how Appaya strategically reinterprets

Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śivādvaita theology along the lines of Advaita Vedānta, the Vedānta
school to which Appaya personally subscribes and which he sees as the
culminating point of the Vedic tradition. It appeared from this analysis that the
positions Appaya upholds in his commentarial work are sometimes at odds with
those defended by Śrīkan: t:ha. While Śrīkan: t:ha’s doctrinal views and conceptual
terminology typically come closer to the Viśis: t:ādvaita theology of Rāmānuja than
:
the theology of Śankara, Appaya argues for just the opposite. This manner of
exegesis does not merely confirm Appaya’s scholarly freedom as an early modern
commentator; it also suggests that, for him, writing about Śivādvaita was a
personal project and that he had his own motivations for arguing as he did.
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, three main religious groups were
competing for prominence: smārta brahmins, who for the most part advocated
pure non-dualism (Advaita Vedānta); Śrīvais: navas,
: who advocated a non-dualism
of the qualified (Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta); and Mādhvas, who defended a realist and
dualist view of reality (Dvaita Vedānta). The Mādhva school, founded by Madhva
in the thirteenth century, achieved great prominence towards the beginning of the
sixteenth century under the lead of Vyāsatīrtha, a versatile scholar and politically
influential figure in the court of Vijayanagara (Stoker 2016). Vyāsatīrtha refuted
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta positions in polemical works such as the Nyāyāmr: ta and
the Tātparyacandrikā, and was soon followed in this by another prominent
Mādhva scholar, Vijayīndra, a near-contemporary of Appaya. We know from
Vijayīndra’s work that his criticism of Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta was mainly directed
against Vyāsatīrtha’s opponents, and also that Vijayīndra’s views were swiftly
rebutted by later Viśis: t:ādvaitins (Sharma 1981: 407). While this shows that both
schools were actively debating at that time, most of the Mādhvas’ invectives were
:
actually directed against Śankara’s school. Like his two predecessors, Madhva
and Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha was very much concerned with the non-realist impli-
cations of the doctrines of avidyā and māyā propounded by Advaitins, as can
be seen from the emphasis he lays on refuting these doctrines in his celebrated
Nyāyāmr: ta. Other Mādhva scholars after him, notably Vijayīndra and Vādirāja,
continued to challenge Advaita positions. As we shall see (Chapter 5,
Section 5.1.1), the Śaiva Vedānta position defended by Appaya had already
garnered enough attention by then to also become an important opponent for
Mādhvas.
118    - 
During the medieval period, Śrīvais: nava

: theologians of Vedānta, starting with
:
Yāmuna and Rāmānuja, also criticized the doctrines of Advaitins. Venkat:anātha’s
Śatadūs: anī: is perhaps the most remarkable example of Śrīvais: nava : anti-Advaita
polemics in the late medieval period. This work continued to enjoy prominence
during Appaya’s time: Mahācārya, a younger contemporary of Appaya, wrote a
substantial commentary on it, the Can: damāruta.
: However, Advaitins did not
:
respond directly to Venkat:anātha’s threat. As far as I know, there is no evidence
that prominent Advaitins criticized Śrīvais: nava : positions prior to the sixteenth
century. I would suggest that the first blow against the Śrīvais: nava : theology of
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta is to be found in Appaya’s Śivādvaita work.¹ In partial
:
support of this is the fact that Mahācārya, Venkat:anātha’s main commentator,
actively responds to Appaya’s theses in his Can: damāruta : (see Chapter 5,
Section 5.1.3), as well as the fact that the hagiographical tradition remembers
Appaya as a major opponent of Śrīvais: navas.
:
The Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta tradition begins with the early works of
Nāthamuni (ninth century), Yāmuna (tenth/eleventh century; Mesquita 1973:
177–93) and Rāmānuja (c.1017–1137). Rāmānuja authored numerous works on
Vedānta, among which two in particular had a lasting influence: the early
:
Vedārthasamgraha and the more mature Śrībhās: ya, his monumental commentary
on the BS. Over the next two centuries, the Viśis: t:ādvaita school acquired a more
systematic form, mainly due to the work of Vātsyavarada (late twelfth/early
:
thirteenth century), Sudarśanasūri (late thirteenth century) and Venkat:anātha
(c.1269–1370), who all commented on the Śrībhās: ya and wrote major treatises
on Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta.² By Appaya’s time, their works were still being read and
commented upon, while several new works on Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta continued to
be written.³ The flowering of Śrīvais: nava
: scholarship on Vedānta in this period
was stimulated further as Śrīvais: nava
: religion grew in prominence in the imperial
capital. In Chapter 2, I showed that Appaya’s main target in his early Śaiva works
were Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta. While these works feature a number of
¹ Note that Appaya does not show great concern for Madhva’s Dvaita Vedānta in his
Śivādvaita Vedānta work. His single most important work criticizing this tradition is the
Madhvatantramukhamardana, which was composed earlier during his Śaiva career, that is, after the
:
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha and the Śivatattvaviveka, but before the ŚAMD.
² Vātsyavarada wrote the Prameyamālā, in which he comments mostly on the first adhyāya of the
Śrībhās: ya, as well as the Tattvasāra, a metrical treatise summarizing the essence of the Śrībhās: ya.
Sudarśanasūri wrote the Śrutaprakāśikā, an extensive sub-commentary on the entire Śrībhās: ya, as well
:
as a shorter commentary, the Śrutapradīpikā. Venkat:anātha wrote the Tattvat:īkā, a commentary on the
Śrībhās: ya in which he defends the views held in Sudarśanasūri’s Śrutaprakāśikā. These three scholars,
:
with Venkat:anātha being the most productive and influential, wrote several other independent works on
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta.
³ According to Potter’s Bibliography (http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter/ckeyt/txt4.htm),
Sudarśanasūri’s Śrutaprakāśikā was commented upon by at least four different authors between 1500
and 1600. During the same period, four other commentaries were written on the Śrībhās: ya alone, and
:
multiple commentaries were written on Venkat:anātha’s work. The production of Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta
material continued steadily over the next centuries and well into the modern era.
  ́̄. .  119
original ideas, their motivation is for the most part polemically driven, their goal
being to defend Śaiva religion against ‘heretics’ who claim that Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na
alone ought to be worshipped.
In this chapter, I demonstrate that Appaya’s Śivādvaita work is in continuity
with his early Śaiva works and reflects the same ambition of counteracting the
ascendency of Śrīvais: navas: in his place and time. However, his ambition here
takes the form of a well focused and clearly defined ‘theological project’, that of
demonstrating the validity and superiority of a Śaiva interpretation of the canonical
BS. As we recall, Appaya barely addresses the interpretation of the BS in his early
Śaiva works. As a matter of fact, the production of Vedānta material in Sanskrit by
Śaivas is virtually non-existent before Appaya.⁴ One way to make sense of Appaya’s
Śivādvaita project, therefore, is to see it as an attempt to fill this gap and consolidate
a Śaiva Vedānta tradition that for the first time takes up the challenge posed by the
Śrīvais: nava
: Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta tradition.
In the first two sections of this chapter (Sections 4.1–4.2), I examine the various
arguments and strategies Appaya employs to criticize Rāmānuja’s theology and
establish Śivādvaita as the superior system. We will see how, from the ŚAMD
to his Śivādvaitanirnaya, : Appaya’s criticism of Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta becomes
increasingly focused, and also how the non-dualist metaphysics he deploys in the
:
process is inspired by, and yet stands in tension with, his commitment to Śankara’s
doctrine. In the third section (4.3), by way of further illustrating his opposition to
Śrīvais: nava
: positions and modes of exegesis, I discuss Appaya’s critique of the
aikaśāstrya thesis upheld by Rāmānuja and Sudarśanasūri, according to which
Pūrvamīmāmsā : and Uttaramīmāmsā: form a single unified corpus. In the last
section (4.4), I examine Appaya’s take on the legitimacy of the Pāñcarātra tradition
in order to clarify his thinking on this key source of Śrīvais: nava
: theology.
4.1 On Rāmānuja’s Reading of the Brahmasūtras

:
:
In the Caturmatasārasamgraha, Appaya suggests that Śankara’s Advaita Vedānta
is hierarchically superior to the three other matas—Dvaita Vedānta, Viśis: t:ādvaita
Vedānta and Śivādvaita Vedānta—in that its teachings alone lead to self-
⁴ By ‘Vedānta material’, I mean works that engage directly with the BS. Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB is, to my
knowledge, the first Śaiva commentary ever written on the BS, on which the only extant sub-
commentary is Appaya’s ŚAMD. In Chapter 1, I alluded to the fact that the Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita
Vedānta tradition of Vīraśaivas, also a Śaiva Vedānta tradition, may be a post-Appaya development
given that all evidence suggests that the main sources of this tradition were composed after the
sixteenth century. Although substantial textual work remains to be done in this area, especially with
reference to pre-modern Śaiva Vedānta literature composed in vernaculars such as Telugu and
Kannada, it is my current view that virtually all Sanskrit works pertaining to Śaiva Vedānta were
composed by Appaya himself and Śaiva scholars after him. See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1, for a discussion
on Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta.
120    - 
knowledge (ātmabodha). For those who can only progress on the spiritual path
through worshipping their own personal deity (is: t:adevatā), Śrīkan: t:ha’s teaching is
better than Rāmānuja’s, for it leads to Śiva, a higher state (pada) than Vis: nu :
insofar as it stands closer to the non-dual and unqualified reality of the absolute
Brahman. What is not made explicit in this doxography, however, is whether the
superiority of Śrīkan: t:ha’s system over Rāmānuja’s is merely due to its leading to a
superior fruit (phala), namely Śiva, as the benedictory verses suggest (see
Chapter 3, Section 3.1). In his next Śivādvaita work, the ŚAMD, Appaya confirms
that this superiority is also manifest in the intrinsically superior value of
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary (insofar as his commentary allows for an interpretation
that is compatible with pure non-dualism), and in the fact that Rāmānuja incor-
rectly interprets certain Brahmasūtras. To demonstrate this, it will be sufficient for
our purposes to examine Appaya’s sub-commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s fifth intro-
ductory verse, where Appaya discusses how other interpretations of the BS—we
will see that he has precisely Rāmānuja’s interpretation in mind—are inconsistent.
The fifth verse reads:
These [Brahma]sūtras by Vyāsa are an eye for the wise ones to see Brahman.
They have been soiled by previous scholars [and now] are cleansed by Śrīkan: t:ha.⁵
Śrīkan: t:ha says here that he composed his commentary in order to ‘cleanse’ or
‘purify’ (pra+√sad) the BS, which have been ‘soiled’ (kalus:ita) by previous scholars
(pūrvācārya) who have misunderstood them. By doing so, Śrīkan: t:ha hopes that
the wise will be able to ‘see’ again, that is, to properly understand the truth of
Vedānta that has been forgotten. The question is then: who misinterpreted the BS?
As we shall see, Appaya understands the pūrvācāryas to be previous commenta-
tors (vyākhyātr: ) on the BS. Before examining the commentaries in question and
their problems, Appaya offers a long digression on the kind of ‘defects’ (kleśa)
found in treatises on Vedic hermeneutics (mīmāmsā) : and grammar (vyākarana). :
He begins by noting multiple interpretive problems that arise in trying to
:
interpret Jaimini’s Mīmāmsāsūtras (hereafter ‘MS’)—such as the need for the
suppletion (adhyāhāra) of unknown words whose meaning can only be under-
stood with a commentary, the use of figurative meanings, the modification of
case endings, the contextual postulation of another meaning for a word with an
already established meaning, etc.⁶—and provides specific examples. One example
⁵ vyāsasūtram idam : netram : vidus:ām : brahmadarśane | pūrvācāryaih: kalus: itam : śrīkan: t:hena
prasādyate || 5 || (ŚAMD1: 6).
⁶ . . . vyākhyānasādhyātyantāpratītādhyāhāragaunalak : s: anāvipari
: :
nāmavyavadhāra :
navikalpanādikleśa-
yuktebhyo jaiminisūtrādibhya [utkars: arūpah] : . . . —‘[ . . . is superior to] the sūtras of Jaimini and other
[works] that have defects, such as [the need to] supply completely unknown [words, the meaning of which
can only] be established with a commentary, figurative meanings, the modification [of case-endings], the
  ́̄. .  121
concerns the animal rite (paśu) taking place during the soma-pressing day of the
Jyotis: t:oma rite.⁷ During the animal rite, a goat is offered to Agni, together with
:
cake oblations (purodāśa). The widely accepted rule is that the animal rite is the
main rite (tantra) in this context, while cake oblations play a subordinate (!
: :
:
prasanga, anga) role. The Mīmāmsāsūtra dealing with this issue is MS 12.2.33:
paśoś ca viprakars: as tantramadhye vidhānād |
And there is the ‘dragging on’ of the animal rite because of a prescription [to
perform cake oblations] in the middle of the tantra.
The sūtra word viprakars: a (lit. ‘dragging on’) conveys that the performance of the
animal rite is ‘dragged on’, that is, pervades (vyāpin) the entire ritual; this is so, the
sūtra says, because the cake oblations are prescribed to be performed in the middle
of the tantra, that is, at midday during the animal rite.⁸ Appaya’s point concerns
the case endings of two nouns used in the sūtra, namely viprakars: a and vidhāna.
First, the term viprakars:a is nominative, which means that what is established
(sādhya) by the sūtra is that the animal rite pervades the entire ritual. Secondly,
the term vidhāna is ablative, which means that the prescription to perform the
cake oblations is the reason (hetu) for establishing the sādhya. According to
Appaya, however, this syntax is wrong. The fact that the animal rite pervades
the entire ritual is well known and established in other scriptural passages, and
therefore has no need to be established. What must be established is rather the
prescription that the cake oblations should take place ‘in the middle’ (madhye) of
the animal rite. Therefore, an inversion of the nominative and ablative case
endings should be made here in order to make sense of the sūtra. Appaya
reformulates MS 12.2.33 as such:
paśor viprakars: āt prātarādikālatrayavyāpitvāt purodāśānā

: :
m
paśutantramadhye vidhānam |
There is the prescription of cake oblations in the middle of the main rite, the
animal rite, because the animal rite is dragged on, i.e., because it pervades the
three times starting with the early morning, etc.
contextual postulation [of another meaning for a word with an already established meaning], etc.’
(ŚAMD1: 6).
⁷ The Jyotis:t:oma rite includes the pressing of the soma plant three times on the main day. At each
pressing, the soma juice is offered to deities and consumed by the priests. An animal rite (paśu) takes
place on the pressing day, and it is this rite that is discussed here.
⁸ The ritual proceeds as follows: at the first pressing, in the morning, the priest uses the insides of the
animal; at the second pressing, at midday, he uses cake oblations; and at the third pressing, he uses the
limbs of the animal.
122    - 
The fault here is the need to invert the case endings in order to make sense of
the logic conveyed by the sūtra. Appaya’s argument, including his reformulation
of the sūtra, is borrowed from Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā (twelfth century) on
Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika on the pratijñāsūtra (MS 1.1.1).⁹ Kumārila himself had
noted that the case endings should be exchanged (vibhaktih: parinamyate)
: in MS
12.2.33, and had cited this example to illustrate how in certain cases it is legitimate
to modify the syntactic construction of the sūtras. While the general rule should
always be to avoid making use of such devices as the suppletion of words
(adhyāhāra), etc. to understand the sūtras, it is legitimate to do so in cases
where the primary meaning of Vedic sentences and sūtras contradict each
other. Kumārila refers to such interventions as technical cases of ‘exclusion by
:
specification’ (parisamkhyā).¹⁰ For Appaya, however, these interventions confirm
that the construction of the MS is sometimes defective. He adds, without
providing examples in this case, that similar kinds of ‘defects’—such as the use
of technical words that are not very well known, the recurrence (anuvr: tti) of rules
that were introduced long before, the modification (viparināma): of case endings,
:
rule-splitting (yogavibhāga), etc.¹¹—are also found in Pānini’s sūtras.
At this point, Appaya makes a significant claim: the BS do not exhibit such
defects. To the contrary, they are pure or ‘clean’ (prasanna) as well as profound
(gambhīra) in meaning, and as such, superior to Jaimini’s sūtras and other
sūtras.¹² This makes sense in this context, because if the BS were subject to
interpretive problems such as those found in the MS, they could obviously not
have been ‘soiled’ (kalus: īkr: ta) by other commentators on the BS, as Śrīkan: t:ha
claims in his verse. What Śrīkan: t:ha does, Appaya explains, is restore the BS’s
‘innate clarity’ (svābhāvikaprasāda) through interpreting them correctly, in line
with the meaning intended by the sūtrakāra. For Appaya, the name śrīkan: t:ha,
which appears in the verse, highlights precisely this important role: just as Śiva, in
His form as Śrīkan: t:ha (another name of Śiva), used His throat to check the poison
during the churning of the ocean in order to protect the universe, Śrīkan: t:ha, the
author of the BMB, used his own ‘throat’ (kan: t:ha) to check the defects (kleśa) of
other commentators. As a matter of fact, Śrīkan: t:ha does not discuss the nature of
⁹ Compare Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā on Ślokavārttika 1.55 with the argument found in ŚAMD1: 8
(beginning with jyotis:t:ome sautye . . . ). The wording is almost exactly the same. The entire discussion
on Mīmāmsā : in this portion of the ŚAMD relies heavily on the Kāśikā.
¹⁰ vaidikam : jaiminīyam : ca yatra vākyam : virudhyate || yathāśrutagr: hīte ’rthe tatredam upadiśyate |
adhyāhārādibhih: sūtram : vaidikam : tu yathāśrutam || neyam . . . —‘In cases where Vedic sentences and
Jaimini’s sentences [i.e., the MS] contradict one another [and] their meaning is understood literally, the
following [exclusion by specification, parisamkhyā] : is indicated: the sūtra must be [re]interpreted by
supplying [the appropriate] words, etc. while the Vedic [sentence] must be interpreted literally’
(Ślokavārttika 1.47cd–49a).
¹¹ vyākarane: tv atyantāpratītapāribhās: ikapadārthagrahanadūrasthānuv
: r: ttiviparināmayogavibhā-
:
gādikleśah: prasiddha eva (ŚAMD1: 9).
¹² naivam : vaiyāsikes: u sūtres: u kleśo ’sti. kim
: tu prasannāni santy eva tāni gambhīrānīti : spas: t:o
jaiminisūtrādita utkars: a iti (ŚAMD1: 9).
  ́̄. .  123
those defects in detail, and it is Appaya’s task to elaborate on the subject for the
benefit of scholars:
Thus in order to show the way to hearers [i.e., those who listen to or read
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary], I will explain a little bit, here and there [in my sub-
commentary], some of the defects found in the commentaries of others
(parabhās: ya), such as the inappropriate supply [of words] and so forth, though
[these defects] are not explained in detail by the author of the commentary [i.e.,
Śrīkan: t:ha].¹³
Appaya then moves on to examine the interpretations of the ‘others’ in question.

He glosses pūrvācāryaih: in the verse with prācīnaih: vyākhyātr: bhih,: which makes
it clear that, for him, the ‘previous scholars’ are former commentators (vyākhyātr: )
on the BS. These commentators, he claims, have not only soiled the BS with the
forced suppletion of words, etc., but have also ‘not followed the letter of the sūtras’
(sūtrāks: arānanusārin) and have thus distorted their original intention. Although
we would expect Appaya—especially in light of his well-known invectives against
Mādhvas—to criticize Madhva’s interpretation of the BS here, he actually focuses
his entire critique on Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās: ya and its sub-commentary by
Sudarśanasūri, the Śrutaprakāśikā.¹⁴ He does not mention Rāmānuja or his
commentator by name, nor does he name their commentaries (he uses the generic
terms parabhās:ya and anadīyabhās:ya), but it is clear from his wording that he is
referring to their views. In his sub-commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s fifth verse, Appaya
criticizes their interpretation of four specific sūtras, in order:
• sarvopetā ca taddarśanāt (BS 2.1.30)

• vipratis:edhāc ca (BS 2.2.42)
• anukr: tes tasya ca (BS 1.3.21)
• śāstrayonitvāt (BS 1.1.3)
Appaya first questions Rāmānuja’s reading of BS 2.1.30 as meaning that Brahman

is endowed with all powers (sarvaśaktyupeta). In his commentary, Rāmānuja
supplies the qualificand (viśes: ya) devatā to designate Brahman, in order to
account for the fact that sarvopetā in the sūtra is feminine (he thus reads parā
devatā sarvaśaktyupetā). The problem for Appaya is that Brahman is not denoted
¹³ evam : bhās:yakārena : viśis: yānudghāt:itam api śrotr nā

: parabhās:yes: v anucitādhyāhārādikleśam : m:
dikpradarśanāya tatra tatra vayam : kimcit
: : pradarśayāmah: (ŚAMD1::
9).
¹⁴ A modern commentator on Venkat:anātha’s Paramatabhanga, Swami Nārāyanācārya, : holds
the same view that the pūrvācāryas referred to in Śrīkan: t:ha’s fifth opening verse refer
primarily to advocates of Rāmānuja’s Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta tradition: etena pūrvācāryaih:
:
viśis: t:ādvaitapravartakarāmānujācāryaprabhr: tibhir ity arthah: (Paramatabhanga: 87). See also
(Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3) Varadācārya’s criticism in his Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana to the effect that
Appaya criticizes only Rāmānuja’s tradition in his sub-commentary on this verse.
124    - 
with a feminine word in the previous or following sūtras, or in any Upanis: adic
statement presupposed by the sūtra (vis:ayavākya). Śrīkan: t:ha reads the sūtra
differently from Rāmānuja. He understands sarvopetā to mean sarvāpi śaktir
brahmāśritā, such that the subject of āśritā (glossing upetā here) is not
Brahman, but all the powers (śakti) that reside (āśrita) in Brahman. Unlike
Rāmānuja, Śrīkan: t:ha understands sarvopetā as two words, and supplies the
word brahman in the accusative. Since it is not compulsory to read sarvopetā as
a compound, and since the word brahman is not feminine but neuter, supplying
the qualificand devatā, as Rāmānuja does, is simply ‘forced’ (klis: t:a).
:
It is worth noting that Śankara reads the sūtra as Rāmānuja does. He interprets
sarvopetā as a compound and supplies the word devatā as the qualificand of
sarvopetā (sarvaśaktiyuktā ca parā devatā). According to Appaya, however,
:
Śankara’s suppletion (adhyāhāra) has a different purpose. Unlike Rāmānuja,
:
Śankara understands the sūtra to mean that avidyā, the primeval nescience, is
the nature of the entire phenomenal world, while Brahman is the substratum
(adhis: t:hāna) of this phenomenal world. Hence, the manifestation of the world
:
is merely apparent (vivarta), not a real transformation (parināma) of Brahman. It
is in order to make it known that Brahman manifests the world out of itself in this
fashion—like a magician who appears to his audience in the form of an army or an
:
ocean—that Śankara supplies the word devatā in his reading of the sūtra.
:
Rāmānuja did it, on the other hand, by blindly following Śankara and without
intending the same meaning.¹⁵ This example illustrates how Appaya must some-
:
times strain to show how the interpretations of Śrīkan: t:ha and Śankara are both
correct, even when they differ. In this case, Rāmānuja obviously reads the sūtra
: :
with the exact same syntax as Śankara. Appaya’s way out is to stress that Śankara’s
metaphysics is at odds with Rāmānuja’s, and therefore that Rāmānuja could only
:
have relied on the same syntax and word supply by blindly following Śankara.
Appaya’s second criticism addresses the interpretation of BS 2.2.42, the last
sūtra from the pāñcarātrādhikarana : (‘vipratis:edhāc ca’). In Chapter 3, Section 3.1,
we noted that Rāmānuja interprets this adhikarana : as establishing that the
Pāñcarātra tradition, an important source of Śrīvais: nava
: exegesis, is authoritative.
:
While Śankara and Śrīkan: t:ha consider the last sūtra as a reason for rejecting the
authority of Pāñcarātra insofar as its teachings contradict [brahmanical] scrip-
tures (vipratis:edhāt=śrutivirodhāt), Rāmānuja reaches the opposite conclusion. In
his interpretation, the last sūtra responds to the pūrvapaks:a objection formulated
in BS 2.2.39 that Pāñcarātra doctrine is not authoritative because it affirms that the
self has an origin, a view indeed incompatible with the Vedānta doctrine of the
eternality of the self. Hence in BS 2.2.42, the sūtra word vipratis:edhāt means that
¹⁵ anadīyabhās: yādigranthes: u tu klis:t:o devatāpadādhyāhārah: kevalam : gatānugatikatayā

:
samāśritah—‘In the commentaries of others, etc., however, the suppletion of the word devatā is forced;
:
it only blindly follows [Śankara’s reading]’ (ŚAMD1: 10).
  ́̄. .  125
the origination of the self is denied (vipratis: edha=pratis:edha) in Pāñcarātra

scriptures. Appaya disagrees with this interpretation of the sūtra, and seems to
have Sudarśanasūri’s sub-commentary on this sūtra in mind when putting forth
his position. First, the Śrīvais: nava
: reading of the sūtra is problematic because it
takes vipratis: edha as a synonym of pratis:edha.¹⁶ The noun vipratis:edha expresses
‘contradiction’ (virodha) and does not have the linguistic capacity (śakti) to
express pratis: edha, just as vismarana : does not have the capacity to express
: its semantic opposite. In order to make sense of the Śrīvais: nava
smarana, : reading,
says Appaya, one is compelled to make use of modes of indirect signification of a
very low and corrupted nature:
Just as the word vismarana : does not have the linguistic capacity to express
smarana, : the word vipratis:edha does not have the linguistic capacity to express
pratis: edha, since [the former] expresses contradiction. The only recourse [to
justify] this is to make use of very low and forced modes of indirect signification,
namely gaunī[v: r: tti] or laks: anā[v
: r: tti].¹⁷
Secondly, if we contend, with Rāmānuja, that the noun vipratis:edha expresses the
fact that some Pāñcarātra statements contradict the origination of the self, thus
bringing the Pāñcarātra teaching in line with Vedānta, we face an interpretive
problem. Since there are Pāñcarātra statements that do contradict the eternality of
the self—Rāmānuja himself acknowledges in his commentary on BS 2.2.39 that
there are such statements—the meaning of vipratis: edha must be interpreted as
having more than one meaning depending on the context. Technically speaking,
:
this is an instance of vyavadhāranakalpanā: the contextual postulation of another
meaning for a word with an already well-known meaning. While this is accepted
:
as a legitimate hermeneutical device by Mīmāmsakas like Kumārila and others,
Appaya considers it a defect (kleśa) when applied to the BS.
Appaya then turns to Rāmānuja’s interpretation of the daharādhikarana : (BS
1.3.14–23) (Table 4.1), in which the doubt is settled as to whether the small space
(daharākāśa) in the heart mentioned in Upanis: ads refers to the jīva or to
Brahman. As mentioned earlier, the daharādhikarana : plays a significant role in
¹⁶ Unlike Rāmānuja, who merely uses the past participle pratis: iddha, Sudarśanasūri clearly inter-
prets the word vipratis: edha in the sense of pratis:edha at the beginning of his sub-commentary on BS
2.2.42. Appaya argues that any interpretation involving the word pratis: edha is wrong. This suggests
that Appaya is targeting Sudarśanasūri here. See Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 405.
:
¹⁷ vismaranaśabdasya : iva virodhavācino vipratis: edhaśabdasya na pratis: edhe śaktir astīti
smarana
gaunī : vā klis:t:ā jaghanyavr: ttir eva tatra gatih: (ŚAMD1: 10). laks: anāv
: laks: anā : r: tti are both
: r: tti and gaunīv
modes of secondary or indirect signification of words. While laks:anāv : r: tti refers to the secondary sense
of a word that is invariably connected with its primary sense, gaunīv : r: tti refers to the secondary sense of
a word that involves qualities (guna) : present in its primary sense as well. An example of gaunīv : r: tti is
‘Devadatta is a lion,’ where the word ‘lion’ signifies Devadatta on the basis of the qualities (valour,
cruelty, etc.) he shares with the lion. According to Appaya, upholding Rāmānuja’s interpretation of BS
2.2.39 requires that we assign far-fetched secondary meanings to the sūtra words.
126    - 
Table 4.1 Interpretation of key terms in BS 1.3.21 in Rāmānuja’s and Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentaries
Rāmānuja Śrīkan: t:ha
tasya daharākāśa jīva

anukartr: pratyagātman jīva
anukārya daharākāśa daharākāśa
dharmin pratyagātman daharākāśa
sādhya the pratyagātman is not the small space the jīva is not the small space
Appaya’s reconstruction of Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology and, not surprisingly, he devotes

to it a large portion of his sub-commentary on the fifth opening verse. He focuses
here on the penultimate sūtra of this adhikarana : (i.e., BS 1.3.21); for the sake of
brevity, I shall consider only one of Appaya’s arguments here. The sūtra reads
anukr: tes tasya ca, ‘and because of the imitation of this’. Rāmānuja takes tasya in
the sūtra to refer to the small space in the heart, and holds that the ‘imitator’
(anukartr: ) of this small space is the inner self (pratyagātman) on the basis that
scriptures define it both as being free from bondage and sins. Since the inner self
‘imitates’—that is, ‘resembles’ (tadanukāras tatsāmyam)—the small space, the
latter must be identical to Brahman and not to the jīva, which is different from
the inner self. Hence the sūtra simply states another reason for identifying the
small space with Brahman. Śrīkan: t:ha reaches the same conclusion. In his view, the
imitator is not the inner self but the individual self (jīva), denoted by the pronoun
tasya in the verse. While Rāmānuja understands tasya as an objective genitive
referring to what is being imitated (anukārya), Śrīkan: t:ha understands it as a
subjective genitive referring to the imitator. Since for Śrīkan: t:ha the jīva imitates
the small space, and since imitated (anukārya) and imitator (anukartr: ) must
logically denote different entities, the small space cannot be identified with the
jīva, but only with Brahman.
For Appaya, the syntactic construction (yojanā) of the sūtra defended by
Rāmānuja is extremely defective (atiklis: t:a) and serves no purpose (vyartha). It is
very clear, both from the context and from previous sūtras, that the property-
bearer (dharmin) in BS 1.3.21 must be the small space. Rāmānuja ignores this and
interprets daharākāśa as the referent of tasya in the sūtra, identifying
pratyagātman with the dharmin. Moreover, he misunderstands the property to
be proved—the major term (sādhya)—by the sūtra. Rāmānuja holds that the sūtra
establishes that the inner self is not the small space, while Śrīkan: t:ha holds that
it establishes that the jīva is not the small space. According to Appaya, Śrīkan: t:ha’s
interpretation is correct. In BS 1.3.18, the pūrvapaks: in holds that the small space is
the individual self because the latter is referred to in a passage from the Chāndogya
Upanis: ad. It thus follows that what must be established (sādhya) in the following
  ́̄. .  127
sūtras is exactly the opposite view, namely that the individual self is not the small
space. The problem, once again, is hermeneutical, as Appaya explains:
The extreme defect in the construction of the sūtra is very evident from the fact
that it relies on a property-bearer and a major term that do not follow [from the
previous sūtras] and are completely unknown. And this defect is pointless,
because what is desired can be established simply by relying on a property-
bearer and a major term that follow [from the previous sūtras].¹⁸
Rāmānuja introduces a dharmin and a sādhya that do not follow from the
previous sūtras, making his interpretation of the sūtra problematic. His reading
of the sūtra is also pointless, for the dharmin and the sādhya following from the
previous sūtras are in themselves sufficient to establish what is desired in the first
place, namely that the small space is Brahman. Appaya’s critique also pinpoints a
significant doctrinal difference between Rāmānuja’s and Śrīkan: t:ha’s systems. For
Rāmānuja, the inner self, by virtue of the fact that it ‘imitates’ the small space, is
different from it, and therefore from Brahman. Śrīkan: t:ha, at least in Appaya’s eyes,
maintains just the opposite, namely that there is no essential difference between the
inner self and Brahman. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2, this is a
difference that Appaya highlights in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : and elsewhere to prove
:
that Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualism aligns with Śankara’s pure non-dualism.
The last sūtra discussed by Appaya is the third BS—śāstrayonitvāt (BS 1.1.3).
Appaya interprets the sūtra compound to mean that the śāstra (which in this
context refers to Vedic scriptures) is a source (yoni), i.e., is authoritative, and
interprets the sūtra itself as a reason (hetu) for the statement made in the previous
sūtra (janmādy asya yatah, : BS 1.1.2). Brahman is the cause of the creation of the
world, etc. precisely because authoritative scriptures say so. Rāmānuja and his
followers take a slightly different view and interpret śāstrayonitvāt as a bahuvrīhi
compound governing the word brahman: Brahman has the śāstra as its source—
that is to say, śāstra is the only authority for acquiring the knowledge of Brahman.¹⁹
¹⁸ [a]nanuvr: ttatayātyantāpratītadharmisādhyāpeks: anena : sūtrayojanāyām atikleśah: spas:t:a eva.

vyarthaś cāyam : kleśa anuvr: ttadharmisādhyāpeks: anenaive
: s:t:asiddheh: (ŚAMD1: 11).
¹⁹ Śrīkan: t:ha puts forward two possible interpretations of the sūtra. The first interpretation reads:
yatah: śāstram : yonih: pramānam: ata eva jagajjanmādilaks: ana : m: brahma bhavatīti śes: ah—‘Since
: śāstra
is a source, i.e., a means of knowledge, Brahman is defined [in BS 1.1.2] as [the cause] of the creation,
etc. of the world; this is what must be supplied to understand the passage’ (ŚAMD1: 137). Appaya
interprets this statement as meaning that Śrīkan: t:ha adopts a genitive tatpurus: a interpretation of the
compound (śāstrasya yonitvam : śāstrayonitvam : tasmād iti s: as:t:hīsamāsāśrayanena : śāstrasya
:
prāmānyād ity arthe sūtram : yojitam; ŚAMD1: 137). But the fact that Śrīkan: t:ha asks, immediately
after this, whether Brahman is known only through scriptures or through another means such as
inference, suggests that this first interpretation is more in line with Rāmānuja’s bahuvrīhi interpretation,
since what is emphasized is that the śāstra is a means of knowing Brahman. The second interpretation
discussed by Śrīkan: t:ha, which he ascribes to ‘some others’ (kecid [āhuh]), : takes the compound as
:
Śankara, for instance, does: brahmana : h: śāstrānā
: m: vedānām : yonitvāt—‘Because Brahman is the source
128    - 
Appaya’s contention here is with the way Sudarśanasūri, Rāmānuja’s commentator,

interprets the compound śāstrayoni in his Śrutaprakāśikā ad BS 1.1.3 in order to
make sense of Rāmānuja’s interpretation. He sums up Sudarśanasūri’s argument as
follows:
Likewise, since it is possible to construe the previous sūtra [BS 1.1.2] as a thesis
(pratijñā) for the reason (hetu) [stated in this] sūtra [BS 1.1.3]— śāstrayonitvāt—
[the following] thesis is supplied in the commentary of another: Brahman is
understood through śāstra. In order to avoid not being able to differentiate what
is established (sādhya) [namely, the fact of being understood through śāstra]
from the reason (hetu) [itself], the [reason] is given the following meaning [in
that commentary]: because [Brahman] does not have something other than
śāstra as a means of knowledge, insofar as [the compound śāstrayoni] involves
a restriction, just as [a restriction is involved] in compounds such as abbhaks: a
[‘to live on water’].²⁰
In Appaya’s interpretation, BS 1.1.3 states the reason (hetu, sādhana) for what is
established (sādhya) in the previous sūtra (BS 1.1.2), namely that Brahman is the
cause of the world, etc. Sudarśanasūri, however, does not understand BS 1.1.2 in
the same way, and regards it as a thesis (pratijñā)—namely, that Brahman, the
cause of the creation of the world, etc., must be understood through śāstra
(śāstrapratipādya), which agrees with how Rāmānuja interprets the compound
in BS 1.1.2. It is this thesis that the reason stated in BS 1.1.3 is supposed to justify.
One problem with this interpretation is that what is to be established (sādhya) in
this case—namely, the fact of being understood through śāstra—conveys the exact
same information as the reason (hetu) stated in BS 1.1.3. In order for the hetu to
have a meaning of its own, Sudarśanasūri gives the compound śāstrayoni in BS
1.1.3 a slightly different meaning by interpreting it as involving a restriction
:
(avadhāranagarbha). He draws a parallel here with another compound, abbhaks: a,
which also involves a restriction.²¹ Although this compound literally means ‘to live
on water’, it in fact implies the restriction to live only on water, that is, not to eat
(i.e., to fast). In the same way, the compound śāstrayoni involves a restriction,
namely that Brahman cannot be understood through other means of knowledge
(yoni) of śāstras, i.e., Vedas’ (ŚAMD1: 151). For Śrīkan: t:ha, both interpretations are implied by the sūtra
and therefore valid.
²⁰ tathā ‘śāstrayonitvād’ iti sautrahetau pūrvasūtra eva pratijñātvena yojayitum : śakye parabhās:ye
brahma śāstrapratipādyam iti pratijñām adhyāhr: tya hetoh: sādhyāvaiśis: t:yaparihārārtham
abbhaks: ādivad avadhāranagarbhatayā
: śāstretarāpramānakatvād
: ity arthe paryavasānam uktam
(ŚAMD1: 12). Though he does not mention Sudarśanasūri by name here—he only refers to ‘the
commentary of another’ (parabhās: ya)—the content of the argument makes it clear that it belongs to
the Śrutaprakāśikā.
²¹ abbhaks: a itivad avadhāranagarbha
: h: śāstrayoniśabda iti bhāvah: (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 1, p. 505).
  ́̄. .  129
than śāstra (śāstretarāpramānaka).

: If we adopt this view, the sādhya and the hetu
have different meanings. For Appaya, this interpretation is once again extremely
defective (atiklis: t:a).
The criticisms laid down in the introduction of the ŚAMD pave the way
for Appaya’s more detailed critique of the Śrīvais: nava
: interpretation of the BS
in the sub-commentary itself. For instance, the same argument put forward
about Pāñcarātra is developed further in Appaya’s sub-commentary on the
pāñcarātrādhikarana. : Beyond the criticisms themselves, however, what attracts
attention here is Appaya’s near-exclusive focus on Rāmānuja and Sudarśanasūri.
Although he does seem to hint at Madhva’s commentary at one point, his efforts
are clearly directed against Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta.²² Given that
Śrīkan: t:ha himself does not attack Rāmānuja and, on the contrary, may have
been inspired by his work (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1), it is fairly clear that
Appaya is defending his own agenda here. Appaya does not attack Rāmānuja’s
doctrine directly, but more precisely the way he either wrongly or forcibly
interprets sūtra words. By doing so, he wishes to point out Rāmānuja’s lack of
:
competency in interpreting the BS as a whole. Moreover, in cases where Śankara
and Rāmānuja share the same interpretation of a sūtra (e.g., BS 2.1.30), Appaya
:
always subsumes Rāmānuja’s interpretation under Śankara’s. This textual strategy
not only provides ample justification for defending and promoting Śrīkan: t:ha’s
interpretation of Vedānta—Rāmānuja’s interpretation being incorrect and hence
in need of being ‘purified’—but also prepares the ground for Appaya’s more
:
elaborate critique of Rāmānuja vis-à-vis Śankara’s ‘orthodox’ interpretation in
his later Śivādvaita works.
²² Following his last criticism of Rāmānuja, Appaya says that the commentarial tradition on
the BS has also been ‘soiled’ by the commentators’ reliance on unknown (and presumably
‘fabricated’) śrutis and smr: tis, a criticism that is likely to be levelled against Madhva:
aprasiddhaśrutismr: tyādikalpanāvalambanabhās: yakārādibhis tu kr: tsnam api śāstram : kalus: itam iti
spas:t:am eva—‘But it is very clear that the entire śāstra was soiled by authors of commentaries and
others who rely on the postulation of unknown śruti, smr: ti and other [works]’ (ŚAMD1: 12). Appaya’s
critique of Madhva’s use of unknown scriptures and untraceable quotations has been studied exten-
sively; see Mesquita 2000 and Okita 2016. Appaya’s criticism of the Śrīvais: nava : interpretation of
the BS is in many ways akin to the attack of Madhva’s interpretation he deploys in the
Madhvatantramukhamardana, and also to his criticism of Vyāsatīrtha’s hermeneutics in the
Upakramaparākrama. In Appaya’s view, Madhva’s interpretation is not acceptable because it trans-
gresses Vedic conventions (vaidikamaryādā, by which he typically means the rules of interpretation of
Vedic texts). He provides several examples of this, ranging from Madhva’s advancing arguments that
lack a logical foundation (nyāya) and using ungrammatical forms to his failing to understand basic
:
principles of Vedic hermeneutics (mīmāmsā). Likewise, in the Upakramaparākrama, Appaya criticizes
:
Vyāsatīrtha’s application of the upakrama-upasamhāra principle of interpretation. However, Appaya’s
criticism of Rāmānuja’s system presents key differences. First, the Madhvatantramukhamardana is the
only work where Appaya criticizes Madhva’s interpretation of the BS, whereas Appaya attacks
Rāmānuja’s system in several Śivādvaita works. Secondly, unlike in Madhva’s case, Appaya’s criticism
of Rāmānuja’s system is inseparable from his attempt to establish the superiority of Śrīkan: t:ha’s system.
In all his Śivādvaita works, he compares both systems and always favors Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation; he
does not do so in the Madhvatantramukhamardana. This supports the argument developed in this
:
chapter, namely that, both in scope and content, Appaya’s anti-Vais: nava polemics were mostly directed
against Śrīvais: nava
130    - 
4.2 Subordination, Tolerance, and Orthodoxy
The ŚAMD begins with the assumption that the Śaiva-leaning approach to
Vedānta defended in Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB is not only relevant to the pursuit of the
ultimate goal—the realization of the non-dual Brahman/Śiva without attributes—
but necessary. In Appaya’s exegesis, this assumption is supported in two ways:
first, by demonstrating that Śrīkan: t:ha’s Śaiva commentary on the BS is internally
coherent, both in terms of its argumentation and its conformity to Upanis: ads and
other scriptures; and secondly, by contrasting Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of the BS
with other interpretations that prove to be inadequate. As just explained, Appaya
targets Rāmānuja and his commentator Sudarśanasūri as the pūrvācāryas respon-
sible for ‘soiling’ the original authorial intention of the sūtrakāra. His criticism
focuses on the wrong or ‘forced’ use of interpretive devices, as well as on their
incorrect interpretations of specific sūtra words.
Appaya does not provide, either in his introduction or later in the ŚAMD, a critical
assessment of Rāmānuja’s teaching. Nor does he clarify for the reader how he
:
conceives the relationship between Śankara’s pure non-dualism, on the one hand,
and the non-dualist theologies of Rāmānuja and Śrīkan: t:ha, on the other hand. These
are questions he explores in his later Śivādvaita works, particularly in the
Ānandalaharī and the Śivādvaitanirnaya.: Before looking at those works, I shall
first discuss a little-known Śivādvaita Vedānta work written by Appaya, the
Ratnatrayaparīks: ā. Although he does not critically engage here with Śrīvais: nava
:
positions and interlocutors, this work is important because it communicates key
features of his own take on Śivādvaita Vedānta in the form of an accessible devotional
hymn; it is also important because it clarifies how Appaya views the role of Vis: nu-:
Nārāyana: in the functioning of the world, in relation to Śiva and His śakti.
4.2.1 Ratnatrayaparīks: ā: Appaya’s Triadic Theology
The Ratnatrayaparīks: ā (‘An Examination of the Three Jewels’, hereafter ‘RTP’)

expounds Appaya’s own original ideas on Śivādvaita Vedānta in the form of a
short devotional hymn (stotra) with self-authored commentary. As it is for the
Brahmatarkastava (Chapter 2, Section 2.3), the format of this stotra—it is written
in an accessible style and contains only eight verses in the sragdharā meter—
suggests that it was meant to educate a wider community of Śaivas. The content
of the stotra, however, is entirely different from what we find in the
Brahmatarkastava. While in the latter Appaya seeks to demonstrate the supremacy
of Śiva and responds to arguments against Śiva’s identity with Brahman, his focus
in the RTP is on demonstrating how the three main deities—namely Śiva, Śakti,
:
and Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na—interrelate with one another and share the same nature
of Brahman. Appaya’s triadic theology displays a more inclusive approach
  ́̄. .  131
overall than the more polemically oriented Brahmatarkastava. Moreover, the RTP
distinctively stresses the value of worship and elaborates on different methods of
worshipping deities.
The RTP is reminiscent of a Śaiva Siddhānta work with the same title, com-
posed by Śrīkan: t:ha, not the author of the BMB but the tenth-/eleventh-century
(probably Kashmirian²³) theologian of Śaiva Siddhānta. In Appaya’s work, the
‘three jewels’ (ratnatraya) are Śiva, Śakti, and Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : which Appaya
na,
claims to have ‘extracted’ from the ocean of milk—a direct reference to the well-
known myth of the churning of the ocean—identified here to Śrīkan: t:ha’s com-
mentary. In Śrīkan: t:ha’s RTP, the three jewels are Śiva, Śakti, and the ‘subtle matter’
(bindu), which Śrīkan: t:ha declares to have extracted from the ocean of Siddhānta,
namely, the teachings of the Śaiva Siddhānta tradition (siddhāntaśāstra).²⁴ It is
possible that Appaya’s work was meant as some sort of rejoinder to the earlier Śaiva
:
Siddhānta work in the way it declares Vis: nu-Nārāya : a sentient principle, to be
na,
the material cause of the world instead of the insentient bindu.²⁵
Appaya’s RTP can be divided into two parts. The first and largest part of the
work is the stotra itself and its self-authored commentary, where Appaya extols
the three deities and explains their respective nature, the methods of worshipping
them and how they interrelate in a triadic theology centred on Brahman. In this
part, Appaya does not cite or refer to Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, but formulates a
theology in which he sums up the ‘esoteric meaning’ (rahasyārtha) intended by
Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary.²⁶ In the second part (where, interestingly, Appaya
starts writing in the first person), he quotes multiple passages from Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary—he refers to those passages as the ‘foundational statements of the
commentary’ (mūlāni bhās: yavacanāni)—that exemplify the basic principles of
this new ‘esoteric’ theology. Table 4.2 lists the topics discussed, in order.
²³ On Śrīkan: t:ha’s Kashmirian lineage, see Sanderson 2006: 41–4.

²⁴ See the concluding verse of Appaya’s RTP: āmadhyabhās:yadugdhābdher āptam : ratnatrayam :
tatah: | śambhur gaurī hariś ceti tac ca samyak parīks: itam ||—‘Three jewels were obtained from the
middle of that ocean of milk that is [Śrīkan: t:ha’s] commentary: Śambhu, Gaurī and Hari, and they have
been properly examined’ (RTP: 40). See v. 2 of Śrīkan: t:ha’s RTP: binduśaktiśivākhyāni trīni :
siddhāntasāgarāt | samuddhr: tya . . . —‘Having extracted from the ocean of Siddhānta the three [jewels]
called bindu, Śakti and Śiva . . . ’ (As:t:aprakarana:
: 147).
²⁵ In Śaiva Siddhānta, bindu represents the eternal subtle matter that, when ‘triggered’ by Śiva’s
śakti, gives rise to the phenomenal world. While the insentient māyā is the material cause
(upādānakārana) : of the ‘impure’ world, the insentient bindu is typically regarded as the material
cause of the ‘pure’ world, although it pervades the impure world as well; hence bindu is sometimes
called the ‘great māyā’ (mahāmāyā). In Appaya’s work, as we shall now discuss, it is the sentient Vis: nu-
:
Nārāyana : who functions as the material cause of the world. The three ratnas thus parallel each other in
both works, except that bindu is insentient whereas Vis: nu: shares the consciousness of Śiva’s śakti. We
have seen earlier (Chapter 3, Section 3.3) that Appaya interprets Śaiva scriptures rather differently than
his Saiddhāntika co-religionists, particularly on the question of material causality. For Appaya, the
material cause is not insentient, but a sentient principle, Śiva’s śakti. He maintains the same position in
the RTP. Appaya’s composition of the RTP raises broader questions about his relation to the Śaiva
Siddhānta tradition, some of which I have addressed in a previous paper (Duquette 2015a).
²⁶ ittham: śrīkan: t:hācāryaviracitabrahmamīmāmsābhā: s: yābhimatam : rahasyārthajātam: samk
: s: iptam
(RTP: 31).
Table 4.2 List of ‘esoteric’ principles discussed in the RTP
Principles of Appaya’s ‘esoteric’ theology Relevant sūtra(s) in Śrīkan: t:ha’s

commentary
1. Śakti embodies all dharmas and the qualities of the dharmin (śakteh: BS 1.2.1
sakaladharmadharmigunarūpatvam)
:
2. [Śakti] is the supreme space that supports the entire world [and beings] ([śakteh] : BS 1.1.2
sakalajagadādhāraparamākāśarūpatvam)
3. [Śakti] is the small space [in the heart] that supports the entire world [and beings] ([śakteh]
: BS 1.3.13–22
sakalajagadādhārabhāvadaharākāśarūpatvam)
4. [Śakti] is the supreme space [and] the supreme state ([śakteh] : paramapadaparamākāśarūpatvam) BS 1.1.13–16
5. The vibration that is the world’s existence is an aspect of Brahman’s power of consciousness BS 2.1.15–23
(jagatsattāsphūrter brahmacicchaktyamśarūpatvam)
:
6. [Śiva] is the bliss [experienced] by all beings ([śivasya] sakalajagadānandarūpatvam) BS 4.4.10
7. The worship of space has the power of consciousness as its object (ākāśopāsteś cicchaktivis: ayatvam) BS 1.1.23
8. The dharmin [Śiva] is the agent of the five actions [in relation to] the entire world, namely emanation, BS 1.4.23–28
protection, dissolution, concealment and grace (dharmina : h:

sakalajagatsargaraks:āsamhara: natirodhānānugraharūpapañcak
: r: tyakāritvam)
9. Nārāyana,
: the Puru sa,
: belongs to the domain of Brahman (puru sasya
: nārāyanasya
: brahmakotitvam)
: BS 1.3.12
10. Umā belongs to the domain of Brahman
(umāyā brahmakotitvam)
:
11. Nārāyana : is the material cause [of the world] insofar as it transforms [into the world] (nārāyanasya : BS 1.4.27
parināmitayopādānatvam)
:
12. Individual selves are not innate transformations [of Śiva]; rather, their nature is only an aspect [of Śiva] BS 2.3.42
(jīvānām : na svarūpena : tadvikāratvam, kim : tu . . . svarūpas tu kevalam: tadamśa
: h)
:
13. Resortinga to Nārāyana : is a method to achieve the state of Śiva (nārāyanaprapadanasya
: BS 2.2.39–42
śivapadaprāptisādhanatvam)
14. The special [and] unlimited powers of Vis: nu : and others are identical to aspects of Umā BS 4.3.14
(vais: navādyaparimitaśaktiviśe
: s: ānām
: umāmśābhedatvam)
:
15. [Umā] bestows the supreme science of Brahman that is established in scriptures ([umāyāh] : BS 1.2.1
śrutiprasiddham : parabrahmavidyāpradātr: tvam)
16. The worship of Śiva directly bestows the divine state (śivopāsanāyāh: sāksād :
: divyasthānapradātrtvam) BS 3.3.57 / BS 4.1.12
17. Both worship and direct experience aim at the identity with Śiva (upāsanāsāks: ātkārayoh: BS 4.1.3
śivābhedavis: ayatvam)
18. The worship of Umā and Nārāyana : are indirect methods of achieving the divine state [i.e., Śiva] BS 4.3.14
(umānārāyanopāsanayo
: h: paramparayā divyasthānaprāptihetutvam)
19. The divine state [i.e., Śiva] is superior to the world of Vis: nu : (divyasthānasya vis: nulokāt
: paratvam) BS 3.3.27–30
20. Those who have reached the world of Śiva, included in the world of the supreme Śiva, never again BS 4.4.22
experience samsāra
: (paramaśivalokāntargataśivalokam : prāptānām : punah: samsara
: nābhāva
: h)
:
a
:
The term prapadana might well be understood here as a synonym of prapatti, the Śrīvais: nava doctrine of self-surrender. While discussing this principle, Appaya argues
that the pāñcarātrādhikarana
: (BS 2.2.39–42) demonstrates that this doctrine is actually a method of reaching Śiva. This is an original idea that he does not develop while
discussing this adhikarana
: in the Caturmatasārasamgraha,
: the Parimala or the ŚAMD.
134    - 
These twenty topics represent, in a nutshell, the basic principles of Appaya’s

triadic theology. Though he systematically traces these principles back to
Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB, some are not explicitly formulated there, and reflect Appaya’s
own creative reconstruction of the commentary’s ‘esoteric meaning’.
In the first verse, often quoted in Śrīvidyā sources,²⁷ Appaya lays the foundation
of his triadic theology:
Eternal, devoid of [even the] trace of a defect and consisting of unsurpassed bliss,
the one [non-dual] consciousness of Brahman assumed the two [related] forms
of dharma and dharmin by separating itself through the power of māyā. Of these
two [forms], dharma is the immediate experience [that objectivizes, on the part
of the dharmin,] the entire [manifestation]; it is the power, in the form of will,
etc., that is conducive to all [of the dharmin’s] activities; it is the collection of [all
its] qualities, and [its] single [and] only ground.²⁸
We are told here that two principles emerged out of the non-dual Brahman
through the power of māyā (māyāvaśena)—dharma (property, which corres-
ponds primarily to Śiva’s śakti) and dharmin (property-possessor, which
corresponds to Śiva)—and that, of the two, dharma represents the dharmin’s
: This first verse already makes
power (śakti), ground (āśraya) and qualities (guna).
it clear that the theology Appaya is deploying is his own take on Śrīkan: t:ha’s
theology, as the dharma-dharmin pair and its emergence from the Vedāntic
Brahman do not feature in Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology. However, the description of the
relationship between Śiva and His śakti in terms of a relationship between
dharmin and dharma is not new; it features in earlier Saiddhāntika works, notably
in Aghoraśiva’s commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s RTP, the Ratnatrayollekhinī. It is very
likely, given the possible relation between the two Ratnatrayaparīks: ās pointed out
earlier, that Appaya knew Aghoraśiva’s commentary and was inspired by some of
its ideas in elaborating his triadic theology.
²⁷ The eighteenth-century Śrīvidyā scholar Bhāskararāya is particularly indebted to Appaya’s RTP,

which he quotes as an authoritative text in his commentary on the Bhāvanopanis:ad. In his edition of
Bhāskararāya’s Varivasyārahasya, Subrahmanya Sastri claims that Bhāskararāya based ‘his [entire]
religious philosophy on the synthetic doctrine promulgated by the illustrious Appayya Diksita in his
Ratna-traya-parīks:ā’ (Sastri 1948: xxxiii). The historical and conceptual linkages between Appaya’s
Śivādvaita work and the Śrīvidyā tradition deserve closer scrutiny.
²⁸ nityam: nirdos: agandham : niratiśayasukham : brahmacaitanyam ekam dharmo dharmīti
rūpadvayam ayati pr: thagbhūya māyāvaśena | dharmas tatrānubhūtih: sakalavis: ayinī :
sarvakāryānukūlā śaktiś cecchādirūpā bhavati gunaga : : cāśrayas tv eka eva || 1 ||. My translation
naś
relies on Appaya’s commentary on this verse; see Appendix 3 for a draft critical edition and translation
of the verses from the RTP. This verse is also quoted in Laks: mīdhara’s commentary on the Śākta hymn
Saundaryalaharī (Sanderson 2014: 82 dates Laks: mīdhara to the first decades of the sixteenth century,
but he might have been active later, given that he quotes from Appaya’s work); and in Rāmeśvara’s
nineteenth-century commentary on the Paraśurāmakalpasūtra, a work belonging to the Śrīvidyā
tradition. Note that Rāmeśvara also quotes the third verse from the RTP.
  ́̄. .  135
Towards the end of his RTP, Śrīkan: t:ha claims that the world would be blinding
darkness without śakti. Without śakti, how could Śiva create things?²⁹ Although
śakti, not Śiva, is responsible for the unfolding of the various activities of the
world, it cannot effectively do this without Śiva. Śrīkan: t:ha therefore holds that
Śiva and His śakti are intimately related to each other, just like two types of grain
belonging to the same family:
Just as, [though they are two different kinds of grain,] the masūra [grain] is not
:
different from the angus:t:ha [grain] for the reasons stated before, in the same way,
śakti, though it is not different [from Śambhu], is regarded as different.³⁰
The verse is not entirely transparent, and Aghoraśiva clarifies how Śrīkan: t:ha’s
simile highlights the relationship between Śiva and His śakti in terms of dharmin
and dharma, respectively:
:
Even if what is called angus:t:ha [i.e., a specific type of grain] belongs to the same
family as what is called masūra, [another] specific type of grain, the former
differs from the latter because it has a [different] form. In the same way, even if
Śiva and śakti are not different entities, their difference as dharmin and dharma
[respectively] is established. Understanding that [both types of grain] are the
same insofar as they belong to the same family, [Śrīkan: t:ha] cites this example
:
because, in reality, the angus:t:ha and masūra [grains] are different [in form].³¹
According to Aghoraśiva, the simile conveys the following idea: though Śiva and
His śakti are not different entities—being from the same ‘family’, as it were—they
relate as two different entities, Śiva being the dharmin and śakti His dharma. In
the following verse, Śrīkan: t:ha clarifies how they relate to one another by using
another simile—the sun and its light. The identification of the sun with Śiva was
familiar to Appaya, and he may have relied on it when working out the title of the
ŚAMD.³²
²⁹ idam andhatamah: kr: tsnam antarā śaktidīpikām || 302 || jāyetānyac ca bhagavān aśaktah: kim :
karis:yati |—‘All of this would become blinding darkness without the light that is śakti. What could the
blessed one, lacking śakti, do?’ (RTP: 199).
:
³⁰ ananyāpi tathā śambhor vibhinnā śaktir is: yate || 303 || yathā masūras tv angus:t:hān nāpi
bhinnoktahetubhih: | (RTP: 199). My translation of this verse follows Aghoraśiva’s commentary.
:
³¹ yathā masūrākhyo dhānyaviśes: o ’ngus:t:hākhyas tajjātīyo ’pi kenāpy ākārena : bhidyate,
evam : śivaśaktyor vastvantaratvābhāve ’pi dharmidharmatayā bhedah: siddha : : atra ca
h.
samānajātīyatvenaikyam abhyupagamya ittham : dr: s: t:āntatvam uktam, vastuto ’ngus:t:hamasūrayor
bhedāt (RTP: 199).
³² The verse in question reads: ananyāpi vibhinnātah: śambhoh: sā samavāyinī || 304 || svābhāvikī ca
tanmūlā prabhā bhānor ivāmalā |—‘That [śakti], though not different [from Śambhu,] is distinct from
that Śambhu. [Śakti] inheres [in Śambhu] and naturally relates [to Śambhu] insofar as it has Śambhu as
its source, just as the pure sunlight relates to the Sun [as] its source’ (RTP: 199). See Chapter 3,
Section 3.2, fn. 10, for my discussion of the title of the ŚAMD.
136    - 
After stating how dharma and dharmin emerged out of the non-dual Brahman,
Appaya explains that the dharmin represents the supreme Brahman in its saguna :
aspect, namely Śiva or Śambhu, the primordial agent (ādikartr: ) responsible for
the pañcakr: tya—the five actions (kriyā) of emanation, stasis (or protection),
dissolution, concealment, and grace. Śiva, the dharmin, owns and governs the
dharma, which manifests in two forms:
(a) the form of a Woman (strīrūpa), namely Śiva’s śakti, His divine queen
(divyamahis: ī), also called Ambikā, Umā or Gaurī;
:
(b) the form of a Man (pumrūpa, :
purus:a), namely Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na.
In verse 2, Appaya identifies Śiva’s śakti with the expanded space of consciousness
(cicchakti), also referred to as the void of consciousness (cidambaraśakti). We
have seen in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1) that Śrīkan: t:ha establishes a distinctive
relation between śakti and space—not the material space (bhūtākāśa), one of
the five traditional ‘great elements’ (mahābhūta) along with fire, air, water and
earth, but transcendent space (parākāśa, paramākāśa, mahākāśa). Appaya stres-
ses this identity in his triadic theology and further argues, based on various
Upanis: adic passages, that this transcendent space constitutes the unsurpassed
bliss of Śiva beyond thought and speech (manovāgavis: aya).
In verses 3 and 4, Appaya moves on to explain how Śiva, the dharmin, relates to
:
the two aspects of His twofold dharma, and also how Vis: nu-Nārāya : fits into his
na
triadic theology:
The dharmin is the agent of the five [actions] beginning with the creation of
the world. The dharma assumes, in the form of a Man, the state of the material
cause of the entire world. In the form of a Woman, the divine queen belongs to
the primordial creator in whom She resides. For those who know scriptures, the
[two] divisions of dharma just mentioned [i.e., the Man and the Woman] are in
the domain of Brahman, just like the dharmin.
That dharmin is Śambhu, and is well known as Śiva, the supreme Brahman.
She is known as Ambikā or Umā, and said to be the undivided queen of this
dharmin. As for the highest Man, the material cause of this world, He is well
known under the name ‘Nārāyana’. : [All of this] is understood from the words of
the blessed Kūrma and Nārada as well.³³
³³ kartr: tvam
: tasya dharmī kalayati jagatām : pañcake sr: s:t:ipūrve dharmah: pumrūpam
: āptvā
sakalajagadupādānabhāvam : bibharti | strīrūpam: prāpya divyā bhavati ca mahis:ī svāśrayasyādikartuh:
proktau dharmaprabhedāv api nigamavidām : dharmivat brahmakot:ī || 3 || yo ’sau dharmī sa śambhu
: h:
sa śiva iti param: brahma ceti prasiddho yā coktā dharmino : ’syāvighat:itamahis:ī sāmbikometi vittā | yaś
copādānabhūtah: para iha purus: ah: sais: a nārāyanoktyā
: khyātah: śrīkūrmavākyair adhigamitam idam :
nāradasyāpi vākyaih: || 4 ||.
  ́̄. .  137
In these two verses, Appaya states that the masculine aspect of Śiva’s dharma is
called Nārāyana : and functions as the material cause of the world; its feminine
aspect is called Ambikā or Umā and resides in Śiva. He also makes the important
claim that these two aspects of dharma, just like the dharmin, belong to the
‘domain of Brahman’ (brahmakot:i). In his commentary on verse 4, Appaya
proceeds with an extended exegesis of passages from the Kūrmapurāna : to
demonstrate that the three deities—the dharmin Śiva and the two manifested
aspects of dharma, namely Śakti and Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na—are ‘three jewels’ (ratna-
traya) insofar as they all share the same divine nature of the non-dual Brahman;
none of the deities are individual selves (jīva). The idea that Vis: nu-Nārāya: :
na
shares the nature of Brahman is significant, for it sharply contrasts with Appaya’s
repeated claim to the contrary in his earlier Śaiva works. As we shall see, the
:
nature of Vis: nu-Nārāya : and His relation to Brahman merits Appaya’s attention
na
in the Ānandalaharī as well (see below, Section 4.2.2).
The identity (abheda) between the ‘three jewels’ does not entail, however, that
they play the same role in the unfolding and functioning of the world: each ‘jewel’
has a specific, irreplaceable and hierarchical function in the overall workings of the
world. Appaya explains that though Śakti and Vis: nu-Nārāya : : are equal (!
na
aikya) from an absolute standpoint, they play different roles on the phenomenal
level. While Śakti, who resides in Śiva, presides over Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : the latter, as
na,
a part (bhāga, avayava) or aspect (amśa) : of Śakti, manifests at the beginning of
every creation as the material cause (upādānakārana) : of the world. Similarly,
though both Śakti and Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na are equal to Śiva in reality (vastutas), they
both function phenomenally as properties or qualities (dharma, guna) : of Śiva,
who is their property-possessor or source (dharmin or pradhāna). Śiva is change-
less and not directly (sāks: āt) involved in worldly operations, but He is indirectly
:
involved through his relation to Vis: nu-Nārāya : and Śakti. It is Vis: nu-Nārāya
na : :
na’s
role to transform into the world, and He does so—as Appaya makes clear in the
ŚAMD as well and elsewhere—precisely inasmuch as He is an aspect of Śiva’s
śakti, and as such relationally subordinate to Śiva.³⁴
:
³⁴ The fact that Vis: nu-Nārāya : functions as the material cause of the world in coordination, as it
na
were, with Śakti is assumed in the RTP, but His relationship with Śiva in this respect is not elaborated
upon. In his sub-commentary on BS 1.4.27 in the ŚAMD, Appaya refutes the objection that Nārāyana :
pervades the world alone (eva)—that is, on His own—and stresses that pervasion is actually performed
by Śiva by means of Nārāyana. : To illustrate this relationship, he gives the example of Devadatta’s hand:
:
[ . . . ] tathāpi nārāyanasya maheśvaraśaktyavayavatvoktisāmarthyāt tadīyā vyāptir avayavadvārā
śivasyaiva, yathā devadattāvayavabhūtahastakartr: kah: sparśo ’vayavadvārā devadattasyaiva
bhavatīti—‘Nevertheless, by virtue of the statement that Nārāyana : is part of Maheśvara’s śakti, the
pervasion [of the world] is [really] done by Śiva [i.e., Maheśvara] alone by means of [that] part [of
Maheśvara’s śakti, i.e., Nārāyana],
: just as touch—the agent of which is the hand of Devadatta, a part of
him—belongs to Devadatta alone by means of [that] part’ (ŚAMD1: 570). Technically speaking, Vis: nu- :
Nārāyana : is not the material cause of the world on His own; Śiva is the cause through the medium of
:
Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na.
138    - 
In verse 5, Appaya proclaims the greatness (mahiman) of Nārāyana : and

explains why He, just like Śiva and Śakti, must also be worshipped by aspirants
to liberation if they wish to achieve the realization of Brahman/Śiva.³⁵ This is a
considerably tolerant claim on the part of Appaya, given that he severely criticizes
:
the worship of Vis: nu-Nārāya : in his earlier Śaiva works. But if Vis: nu-Nārāya
na : :
na
also ought to be worshipped, this worship remains less efficacious than the
worship of Śiva. In verse 7, Appaya describes three types of worship or methods
of contemplation (bhāvanā), one for each deity. While the worship of the per-
: Śiva focuses on the self (ahamgrahopāsanārūpa)
sonified (saguna) : and grants the
divine abode (divyasthānapradātr: ) in which liberation can be achieved, the
:
contemplation of Vis: nu-Nārāya : and Śakti are indirect (paramparayā) means
na
to achieve the state of Śiva. Only the contemplation of Śiva is a means of direct
experience (sāks: ātkāradvāraka)—by which Appaya means the experience of the
non-dual Brahman—and the final cause of liberation (muktihetu). Accordingly, as
stated in the final verse 8, the world achieved through contemplating Vis: nu- :
Nārāyana: is a lower world than that achieved through contemplating Śiva.
Though the world of Vis: nu: (vis: nuloka)
: is a high place (paramapada), there exists
another place beyond (apagamasthāna) that is made of bliss (ānandarūpa) and
where we go only once (apunar)—the world of Śiva (śivaloka). While he acknow-
:
ledges and even praises the worship of Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na—something he does not
do, it should again be emphasized, in his earlier Śaiva works—he ends up
subsuming it within the worship of Śiva in view of the limited results it grants.
:
The role ascribed to Vis: nu-Nārāya : and the place he assigns to His worship in
na
the RTP illustrates well the ‘inclusivist’ approach Appaya adopts in his Śivādvaita
work, an approach that contrasts with his stance in earlier polemical works. We
have seen that Appaya holds that theistic approaches focusing on personified
deities have their own intrinsic merit in that they help certain types of aspirants;
yet such approaches are subsumed under the gnostic realization of the non-dual
Brahman. Similarly, in the RTP, he does not deny or downplay the greatness of
:
Vis: nu-Nārāya : as he does in his earlier polemical works. To the contrary, he
na
:
claims that Vis: nu-Nārāya : shares the nature of Brahman with Śiva and Śakti,
na
and plays a fundamental role in the workings of the world as its primary material
:
cause. However, Vis: nu-Nārāya : remains subordinate to Śiva inasmuch as He is
na
an aspect of Śiva’s śakti. Likewise, the vis: nuloka,
: achieved through contemplating
:
Vis: nu-Nārāya : is recognized as a high place that nevertheless lies below the
na,
śivaloka, the only place where liberation is possible. The worship of Vis: nu- :
:
³⁵ See the end of the comm. on v. 4: tathā nārāyanasya mahimānam, śivaprāptim icchatām : tat-
:
[=nārāyana]samāśraya :
nāvaśya :
mbhāva m: ca darśayati—‘And he [i.e., Appaya himself] [now] teaches
: and that it is necessary, for those who desire to achieve [the state of] Śiva, to
the greatness of Nārāyana,
: (RTP: 18).
resort to [Nārāyana]’
  ́̄. .  139
Nārāyana: does not lead to liberation itself but only to the contemplation of Śiva,
which alone leads to liberation.
Appaya composed another ratnastuti after his RTP, namely the Pañcaratnastuti.³⁶
This shorter stotra interestingly adopts a less inclusive approach. In five verses
with a self-authored commentary, Appaya demonstrates that Śiva is supreme and
superior to all other deities. Although five ‘jewels’—Brahmā, Vis: nu,
: Rudra, Śakti,
and Śiva—are discussed in this work, there is no attempt to bring all of them
under the domain of Brahman (brahmakot:i), nor is Vis: nu : (or other deities)
praised in any way. Instead, Appaya insists on their hierarchical function in the
universe: while Brahmā, Vis: nu : and Rudra respectively accomplish the tasks of
creation, sustenance and destruction of the world, Śakti helps or enables these
tasks to be performed and Śiva controls Śakti. Śiva alone is the creator of the world
and identical to the supreme Brahman.³⁷ Although composed during Appaya’s
Śivādvaita period, this work is closer in tone and argumentation to the earlier
Śaiva works.
4.2.2 Ānandalaharī: A Treatise on Cicchakti
The Ānandalaharī (‘Waves of Bliss [of Śiva]’³⁸) was composed before the RTP (it
is quoted in the latter) and features some key ideas of Appaya’s Śivādvaita
theology. It is a collection of sixty verses with a self-authored commentary (titled
Candrikā) that deals primarily, as the title suggests, with bliss (ānanda), and more
specifically with Śiva’s blissful cicchakti. In this extensive work, Appaya discusses
the nature and various modes of manifestation of cicchakti in light of textual
passages from the Upanis: ads, Purānas, : epics, and other works. The concept of
cicchakti, as we have seen previously, plays a prominent role in Śivādvaita
theology: it is the conscious śakti of Śiva that underlies and facilitates all of
Śiva’s phenomenal activities. As in the RTP, the subordinate role of Vis: nu- :
Nārāyana: as an aspect of Śiva’s cicchakti is invoked to explain how Śiva transforms
into the phenomenal world. In the opening verse, Vis: nu : is pictured as offering His
³⁶ He refers to the RTP in his commentary on the first verse: ratnatrayaparīks:ādis: u prasādhitam
asmābhih: (Pañcaratnastuti: 210).
³⁷ The key statement here is found in the introduction to the fourth verse: atha
brahmavis: nurudrasthitas
: r: s:t:isthitisamhāropayogiśaktiko
: t:iniyāmakatvasiddhena ‘yato vā . . . ’
: :
ityādibrahmalaks: anena
: sakalajaganniyantr: tvena surādisarvārādhyalingarūpatvalingena ca tasya para-
bhāvam : samarthayate—‘Now, the supremacy of [Śiva] is confirmed by His being defined as Brahman
in the [Upanis: adic] passage beginning with “That from which [all beings arise] . . . ”, [a definition]
established by the fact that He controls the domain of Śakti, who enables the creation, preservation and
destruction [of the world], [three processes that are] maintained by Brahmā, Vis: nu : and Rudra
[respectively]; and [the supremacy of Śiva is also confirmed] by a distinctive mark, namely the fact
:
that His linga form is worshipped by all [deities], beginning with the sun-god, etc., inasmuch as He
controls the entire world’ (Pañcaratnastuti: 214).
³⁸ Appaya also refers to this work as the Śivānandalaharī in his RTP and elsewhere.
140    - 
veneration to Śiva, the divine dancer. Bowed down, Vis: nu, : thanks to His blue
complexion, looks like a water lily adorning Śiva’s lotus feet:
May He, the dancer whose lotus feet are ornamented with the water lily that is
Murāri, perform the tān: dava
: dance at eventide on the stage of my heart.³⁹
Appaya begins by stating that his intention in writing this work is to demonstrate
that the Upanis: ads and other supporting works unanimously acknowledge the
existence of Śiva’s cicchakti as a power of blissful nature.⁴⁰ The first problem that
occupies his attention in this connection pertains to a sentence from the section
on bliss (ānandavallī) in the Taittirīya Upanis: ad:
Different from this [entity] consisting of knowledge is the inner self consisting of
bliss . . . Brahman is the tail, the support [of this blissful self].⁴¹
The underlying teaching here is that the ātman is covered with five sheaths
(kośa)—consisting of food (annamaya), breath/life (prānamaya), : mind (mano-
maya), knowledge (vijñānamaya) and bliss (ānandamaya). The Taittirīya sen-
tence raises a question: does the ātman made of bliss refer to Brahman or to the
individual self (jīva)? The four other sheaths clearly belong to the jīva: the jīva has
a physical body, life, mind, and knowledge. What about bliss? The fact that the
Taittirīya sentence claims Brahman to be the ‘support’ (pratis: t:hā) of the
ānandamaya self—just as the bird’s tail (puccha) is the bird’s support in flight—
suggests that the blissful self is the jīva. Otherwise, if Brahman were identical to
the ānandamaya self, how could Brahman also be its support? Appaya points
out here that Advaitins (advaitavādin) and Vais: navas : holding to Viśis: t:ādvaita
(viśis: t:ādvaitavādivais: nava)
: have different views on this problem. Advaitins, headed
:
by Śankara, take it that the ānandamaya self is the jīva and that Brahman is its
support. For Rāmānuja and his followers, however, the ānandamaya self refers to
Brahman: Brahman is the blissful self as well as the support of this self, which
implies that Brahman is its own support. This position, claims Appaya, was first
taught by Śrīkan: t:ha himself:
:
³⁹ so ’yam: madīyāśayarangamadhye sāyam : nat:as tān: davam
: ātanotu | pādāravindābharane : yadīye
dadhāti nīlotpalatām : murārih: || (Ānandalaharī: 1).
⁴⁰ asti tāvad anatiśayānandarūpā śaivī cicchaktir akhilopanis:attadupabr: mha : naprasiddhā.
:
:
tatpratipādakānām upanis: adbhāgānām : sambhāvitasakalaśa
: nkāparihāradvārā tadupapādakatvopapā-
danārtham idam : prakaranam
: ārabdham—‘To begin with, there exists a power of consciousness that
belongs to Śiva, [a power] whose nature is unequalled bliss, [and] that is established in all the Upanis: ads
and works that corroborate them. I undertake this work in order to demonstrate, through eradicating all
conceivable doubts, that the Upanis: adic sections that discuss this [power] confirm this [i.e., the fact that
it belongs to Śiva and has the nature of bliss]’ (Ānandalaharī: 1).
⁴¹ tasmād vā etasmād vijñānamayāt anyo ’ntara ātmānandamayah: . . . brahma puccham : pratis:t:hā
(Taittirīya Upanis:ad 2.5.1).
  ́̄. .  141
:
Vais: navas who uphold the Viśis: t:ādvaita [position] say that the ānandamaya
[self] is Brahman, that Brahman is also the support of this [self] [and] that it is
Brahman that is filled with bliss. [Accordingly, they hold] that the statement that
[Brahman] is its own support conveys that [Brahman] has no other support
[outside itself]. This interpretation, namely that Brahman, the ānandamaya
[self], is the support of [this self], was taught by none other than Śrīkan: t:hācārya.⁴²
According to Appaya, the Vais: nava : interpretation of the Taittirīya sentence about
the blissful self was taught by Śrīkan: t:ha himself. Leaving aside the question this
claim raises about Śrīkan: t:ha’s early date, a close analysis of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commen-
tary on BS 1.1.16 shows, as already pointed out by Sastri (1930: 36–7), that he does
not uphold this position. Śrīkan: t:ha actually puts forward three alternative inter-
pretations of the Taittirīya sentence. Appaya holds in the ŚAMD that the second
position—according to which the blissful self is Śiva’s śakti and Śiva/Brahman
its support—represents Śrīkan: t:ha’s own view. However, nowhere in his own
rendering of this position does Śrīkan: t:ha state that Brahman is its own support.
While Appaya himself, in the Ānandalaharī, holds the view that the blissful self is
Śiva’s śakti, his claim that the Vais: nava : interpretation was also taught by
Śrīkan: t:ha is surprising. Whether or not this discrepancy is due to Appaya’s
carelessness or freedom as a commentator is not clear, but it suggests in any
case how important it is for him to distinguish at the outset Śrīkan: t:ha’s position
:
from that of Vais: nava Viśis: t:ādvaitins.
In the next few verses, Appaya puts forward various arguments in support of
the view that the blissful self is Śiva’s cicchakti, and goes on to describe the nature
of cicchakti in greater detail. After arguing in verse 5 that cicchakti is not only bliss
itself but also a knower ( jñātr: ), Appaya introduces verse 6 with an interesting
question: if Śiva’s śakti is indeed a knower, is the latter pure consciousness
(caitanya), or also a conscious being (cetana) with its own knowledge, desire,
etc.? An opponent is introduced who argues that Śiva’s śakti is pure consciousness,
and as such distinct from the goddess Herself, who is a conscious being with Her
own knowledge, desire, etc.:
But Śiva’s power of consciousness, given that it consists in the knowledge [that is
the] dharma [of Śiva], has the nature of [pure] consciousness (caitanya) only, not
also the nature of a conscious being (cetana). [This is the case] because if [Śiva’s
power of consciousness] was a conscious being, it would undesirably follow that
we should accept, just as [we do] for individual selves, another power of
⁴² ānandamayo brahma tatpratis: t:hārūpam : brahmāpi paripūrnānandarūpa

: m : brahmaiva.
ananyapratis:t:hātvajñāpanāya svasya svapratis: t:hatvoktir iti viśis:t:ādvaitavādibhir vais:navair
: uktam.
śrīkan: t:hācāryair eva ānandamayo brahma tatpratis: t:hārūpa iti sa panthā darśitah: (Ānandalaharī
[1989]: 2).
142    - 
consciousness for that [Śiva’s power of consciousness], in order to [explain] its

mundane activities like knowledge, desire, etc. [This is also the case] because if we
accept that [Śiva’s power of consciousness] has also its own knowledge, desire,
etc., it would undesirably follow, using the exact same reasoning, that the power
of consciousness of [each] individual self too would be a knower (jñātr: ), just as
psychical transformations [in individual selves] such as knowledge, desire, etc.—
insofar as they are transformations [of Śiva’s power of consciousness]—are the
knowledge, desire, etc. of Śiva, His dharmas. Therefore, the power (śakti) named
Gaurī, Śivā, the all-auspicious one, etc., well known as the queen of Śiva, is
different from the power of consciousness that is the dharma of Śiva; it is not the
dharma [of Śiva].⁴³
The opponent then quotes verses from the Laks: mītantra (a ninth-/tenth-century
Pāñcarātra scripture) in support of his position. In the Laks: mītantra, the goddess
Laks: mī declares Herself to be the dharma of Vāsudeva, His I-hood (ahamtā),: all-
pervading and immortal.⁴⁴ According to the opponent, this passage and others of
the same kind are merely figurative (aupacārika). The truth is that Laks: mī is an
independent conscious being, different from Vāsudeva’s śakti, not His property
:
(dharma). In support of this view, he also cites excerpts from Venkat:anātha’s
:
Nyāyasiddhāñjana in which Venkat:anātha describes Laks: mī as different from
Vāsudeva’s śakti. All references to Laks: mī as śakti aim to convey that She is an
attribute (viśes:ana)
: of Vāsudeva in the form of His wife, etc.; they do not mean
that Laks: mī is a power of Vāsudeva or is identical to Him in any way. Likewise,
when terms such as knowledge, desire and I-hood are applied to Laks: mī—as in the
verse from the Laks: mītantra—it does not mean that Laks: mī is the desire, know-
ledge, and I-hood of Vāsudeva, but that She is inclined to be affectionate,
favourable to knowledge, etc. Laks: mī is an independent conscious being, distinct
from Vāsudeva and in an eternal relation with Him. Consequently, concludes the
opponent, the śakti of Śiva cannot be the goddess, a conscious being, for the
goddess must be in relation with Śiva, not identical with Śiva.⁴⁵
⁴³ nanu śivasya dharmajñānarūpā cicchaktiś caitanyarūpaiva, na cetanarūpāpi. cetanatve

:
tadīyajñānecchādivyavahārārtham : tatrāpi jīves:v iva cicchaktyantarasya angīkaranīyatvāpatte
: :
h.
:
tatparināmarūpā : m
nā : jñānecchādiv
:
r: ttīnām
: dharmabhūtaśivajñānecchādirūpatvavat tadīyajñā-
necchādirūpatvasyāpi angīkāre jīvacicchaktīnām api tathaiva rītyā jñātr: tvāpatteh. : atah:
:
śivamahis:ītvena prasiddhā, ‘gaurī śivā sarvamangalā’ ityādināmavatī śaktih: śivadharmarūpāyāś cic-
chakter anyā, na tu taddharmarūpā (Ānandalaharī: 15).
⁴⁴ vāsudevah: param : brahma nārāyanamaya : m: mahat | tasyāham : paramā śaktir
:
ahamtānandacinmayī ||—‘Vāsudeva, the absolute Brahman, the great principle consisting of
Nārāyana:: I am His absolute Śakti, His I-hood, consisting of bliss and consciousness’ (Laks: mītantra,
v. 15.9, p. 48).
⁴⁵ The passages from the Nyāyasiddhāñjana referred to by the opponent are found in the
:
īśvarapariccheda. Venkat:anātha argues there that every entity different from Vāsudeva must be in
relation with Him, and this also applies to Laks: mī, Vāsudeva’s wife. All statements in Pāñcarātra
scriptures and elsewhere to the effect that Laks: mī is identical to Him or is His power (śakti) should be
reinterpreted in this light: tena ca tadvyatiriktasya nikhilasyādhārādheyabhāveśvareśitavyatva
  ́̄. .  143
In the Ānandalaharī, Appaya adopts a strikingly different view from

:
Venkat:anātha on the relation between the godhead (in this case Śiva) and His
śakti. In his view, as we know already, both entities are in a relation of identity
rather than co-eternal partners. Śiva’s śakti is not only pure consciousness, but
also a conscious being, which amounts to saying that the goddess is Śiva’s cicchakti
and not a different entity in relation to Śiva:
What is the problem [in accepting] that cicchakti, which truly exists as the
dharma of Brahman [i.e., Śiva], also exists as another conscious being on Her
own? Some of the [psychical] transformations that belong to Her, such as
knowledge, desire, etc., are [actually] Śiva’s knowledge, desire, etc. Some [of
these psychical transformations] are Śakti’s knowledge, desire, etc. in conformity
with Śiva’s will . . . I do not understand why the many passages from the
Laks: mītantra, etc. [that support this conclusion] are ignored [by Śrīvais: navas].
:
Even if it is not required of me to corroborate these [passages] insofar as I do not
cling to the authority of Pāñcarātra [scriptures], nevertheless, there is not any
contradiction involved in acknowledging [them].⁴⁶
:
Appaya does not understand why Venkat:anātha and other Śrīvais: nava : theolo-
gians insist on reinterpreting sentences from the Laks: mītantra that clearly state
Laks: mī to be a dharma of Vāsudeva. Both views are actually compatible: Śiva’s
śakti (or Laks: mī) can be the consciousness (or knowledge, desire, etc.) of Śiva (or
Vāsudeva) and also be an independent, conscious being with Her own knowledge,
desires, etc. In some cases, Her knowledge, for instance, is really Śiva’s knowledge,
whereas in other cases, Her knowledge is Her own but proceeds in conformity
with Śiva’s will. Interestingly, although he believes it unnecessary to corroborate
passages from Pāñcarātra scriptures that support his view—he avowedly has no
‘attachment’ (abhiniveśa⁴⁷) to these scriptures and their authority—Appaya does
śes:aśes: itvaśarīraśarīribhāvakāryakāranabhāvādayo
: yathāgrahana : m: sambandhāh—‘And
: for this reason,
all [entities] distinct from [Vāsudeva] are accordingly in relation [with Him], as supporter and supported,
ruler and ruled, accessory and principle, body and embodied, effect and cause, etc.’ (Nyāyasiddhāñjana:
490). Right after this passage, the section pertaining to the nature of Śrī/Laks: mī begins with the following
verse: śriyā saha tu dāmpatyam : śāśvatam: tata eva tu | tayoh: sāmyaikyaśaktitvatadvattvādigirām : gatih:
||—‘However, the partnership [of Vāsudeva] with Śrī is eternal. Passages [in Pāñcarātra scriptures and
elsewhere to the effect that] both are equal, identical, [in a relation of] power, in a relation of possession,
etc. [are interpreted] on this basis only’ (Nyāyasiddhāñjana: 491).
⁴⁶ brahmadharmatvena avatis:t:hamānāyā eva cicchakteh: svayam ’pi cetanāntaratvenāpi avasthāne

kānupapattih? : tadīyāh: kecana jñānecchādiparināmā: h: śivasya jñānecchādayo bhavanti. kecana
śivasamkalpānusāre
: : śakter jñānecchādayo bhavanti . . . kim artham
na : tat laks:mītantrādivacanajātam
upeks: itam iti na vidmah.
: asmākam: tu pāñcarātraprāmānye : abhiniveśābhāvād yady api tan nāvaśyam :
samarthanīyam athāpi tadabhyupagame ’pi na kaścid virodhah: (Ānandalaharī: 17).
:
⁴⁷ Śankara uses the term abhiniveśa ad BS 1.1.5 to describe the false identification of the self with the
:
body. Commenting on Śankara in his Bhāmatī, Vācaspati, with whose exegesis Appaya was familiar,
glosses abhiniveśa with mithyābhimāna, a false presumption or misconception as a result of which one
144    - 
spend time in his commentary explaining why such passages make full sense from
the point of view of Śivādvaita theology. All evidence suggests that it is meaningful
for Appaya to try and find support for his own theological views in the Pāñcarātra
scriptures, arguably because he intended a large part of his audience to be
Śrīvais: nava
Later in the Ānandalaharī, Appaya engages in detail with a question he also
touches upon in the RTP, namely whether Vis: nu : is an individual self (jīva) or a
deity that fundamentally shares Brahman’s nature. In verse 21, he puts forward
: is an individual self, and rebuts objections to this
the prima facie view that Vis: nu
view in the following verses. In his commentary on verse 23, for instance, he
argues—contrary to the view that some passages found in the Bhagavadgītā and
the Vis: nupurā
: : as a supreme being—that similar
: unequivocally describe Vis: nu
na
passages are also found in other Purānas: with respect to Brahmā and Rudra. Just
as the claim that Brahmā and Rudra are supreme should be understood in view of
their respective roles in the creation and destruction of the world, so should the
:
claim about Vis: nu’s supremacy be understood in view of His role in the main-
tenance of the world. In this context, Appaya raises an interesting counter-
objection: how can we reconcile the claim that Vis: nu : is an individual self with
the claim—also central to Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology—that He is an aspect
:
(amśa) of Śakti, who Herself shares the divine nature of Brahman? Appaya’s
pūrvapaks:in replies as follows in his commentary on verse 32:
: is an individual self (jīva) and the fact that

Let us accept both the fact that Vis: nu
He is an aspect of Śakti (śaktyamśa);
: there is not any fault [in this]. Nor is there
any contradiction in including Śakti in the domain of Brahman if an aspect of
Śakti [i.e., Vis: nu]
: is an individual self, for the group of thirty-six insentient
principles of existence beginning with Śiva and ending with earth are accepted
to be aspects of Śakti, whose nature is sentient . . . In exactly the same way, it is
: an individual self, to be an aspect of [Śakti] even if Śakti is in
correct for Vis: nu,
the domain of Brahman.⁴⁸
: and claims that His

The position stated here clearly ascribes jīvatva to Vis: nu,
nature as an individual self is not incompatible with His being an aspect of Śakti as
well. If even earth and other insentient principles of existence (tattva) are aspects
becomes attached to worldly phenomena. Presumably, Appaya uses the term here to convey that he has
no misconception about the authority of Pāñcarātra scriptures, and is therefore not ‘attached’ to them
or holding any faith in them. His use of the term is, I suspect, slightly pejorative.
⁴⁸ vis: nor : śaktyamśatvam

: jīvatvam : ity ubhayam apy astu. na ko ’pi dos: ah.
: na ca śaktyamśasya
: jīvatve
śakter brahmakot:yantarbhāvavirodhah. : acidrūpo hi śivatattvādir bhūmyantah: s:at:trimśattattvavargaś
:
cidrūpāyāh: śakter amśo : ’bhyupagamyate . . . tathaiva śakter brahmakot:itve ’pi vis: nor
: jīvasya
:
tadamśatvam upapadyata iti (Ānandalaharī: 64).
  ́̄. .  145
of the sentient Śakti, so too can Vis: nu,

: an individual self, be an aspect of Śakti.
Interestingly, Appaya ascribes this position to followers of Bhat:t:a Bhāskara
(bhat:t:abhāskaramatānusārin). This suggests, first of all, that Bhat:t:a Bhāskara’s
Śaiva theology had been important enough to attract followers and possibly form a
school of its own, a view that has not received any attention so far. Secondly, it
shows that Śaiva theologians were not unanimous on the doctrinal question of
:
Vis: nu’s nature. Indeed, Appaya himself disagrees with this prima facie position.
:
In verse 35, Appaya puts forward his siddhānta, namely that Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na,
along with Śiva and Śakti, shares the divine nature of Brahman and is not an
individual self. He begins his commentary on this verse with this very personal
:
defence of Vis: nu’s divinity:
My tongue could not move to assert, on the basis of a few mantras, arthavādas
and passages from Purānas : found somewhere in a corner, that the revered
:
Nārāyana—who is unanimously worshipped as the supreme Brahman by all
virtuous people [and] whose nature as the supreme Brahman has been ascer-
tained in the blessed Mahābhārata, the Vis: nupurā
: : and other works that have
na,
been composed, for the sake of supporting the Vedas, by the blessed Vedavyāsa,
an expert in the interpretation of all Vedas [and] the crest-jewel among all-
knowing [scholars], who descended [to earth] precisely in order to classify the
Vedas; by the blessed Parāśara, whose [own] knowledge of the highest truth
about deities was granted by Pulastya’s boon; [and] by [other] great sages—is an
individual self (jīva). If I did so, my head would burst into a hundred pieces and
I would be [guilty] of treachery towards the Vedas, the rishis and the deities.
Therefore, my view is that Nārāyana : is in the domain of the supreme Brahman.⁴⁹
:
This position, at odds with the anti-Vais: nava rhetoric he sustains in the earlier
polemical works, is consistent with the position he would uphold later in the RTP:
: is not a separate individual self (jīva) but a deity that belongs, with the two
Vis: nu
other ‘jewels’, to the domain of Brahman (brahmakot:i). However, Appaya is much
: To call Vis: nu
more explicit here in his defence of Vis: nu. : a jīva on the basis of a few
scriptural passages would not only be unfair, but even a treachery (droha) against
the Vedas, the rishis and the deities, for which he would not forgive himself. Note
that Appaya claims in this passage that the Mahābhārata demonstrates that Vis: nu :
is the supreme Brahman, which contrasts strikingly with his earlier thesis in the
⁴⁹ vedavibhāgārtham evāvatīrnena
: :
sakalavedatātparyābhijñena sarvajñaśikhāmaninā bhagavatā
vedavyāsena pulastyavaradānalabdhadevatāpāramārthyavedanena śrīparāśarenānyaiś
: ca mahars: ibhir
vedopabr: mha
: nārtha
: :
m : s:u śrīmahābhāratavis: nupurā
pranīte : : s: u niścitaparabrahmabhāvasya
nādi
sadbhih: sarvair apy avibhāgena parabrahmety eva pūjitasya śrīnārāyanasya : kvacit kone :
nivis:t:amantrārthavādapurānavacanādileśam
: avalambya jīvabhāvam: vaktum: nāsmajjihvā pravartate.
tathā cen mūrdhā ca śatadhā bhavati vedavaidikadroho devatādrohaś ca jāyate. ato nārāyana: h: para-
brahmakot:ir ity evāsmākam: siddhāntah: (Ānandalaharī: 66).
146    - 
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra to the effect that the Mahābhārata aims to demon-
strate that Śiva, not Vis: nu,
: is the supreme Brahman. This shift in Appaya’s
position towards Vis: nu: is characteristic of his Śivādvaita Vedānta work, where
he upholds a non-dualist approach of reality in which all deities are equally
conceived as manifestations of the same absolute Brahman.
In his commentary on the same verse, Appaya also addresses the criticism that,
in several scriptural passages, Śiva is claimed to be inferior to Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na.
This is also not right, he says, because passages from the Mahābhārata and other
works that seem to claim that Śiva is inferior to Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : actually do not
na
concern the supreme Śiva—that is, the form of Śiva that transcends the trimūrti
:
(trimūrtyuttīrna)—but :
only Rudra the Destroyer (samhārarudra), one of His
emanations (vibhūti) typically associated with the trimūrti. This is the same
argument that Appaya had raised in the Brahmatarkastava (Chapter 2,
Section 2.3) to refute claims that Śiva exhibits defects (dos:a) such as anger and
the like: these defects, he had argued, always concern His emanations, never the
transcendent Śiva. In verse 38 and the following verses, Appaya applies a similar
argument to claims highlighting Vis: nu’s : divine nature and those suggesting His
jīvatva. While the latter statements concern Vis: nu : as the individual member of the
trimūrti (trimūrtimadhyagata) in charge of protecting the world (pālanādhikr: ta),
the former statements concern Vis: nu : as the material cause (upādānakārana) : of
the world and a divine aspect (amśa) : of Śakti. Ultimately, these two ‘forms’ of
: refer to the same entity: Vis: nu,
Vis: nu : the individual self, is non-different from
: the material cause that shares Brahman’s nature, a view that once again
Vis: nu,
reflects Appaya’s endorsement of pure non-dualism according to which the
individual self is fundamentally non-different from Brahman.
The Ānandalaharī differs from the earlier Śaiva works in that Appaya clearly
adopts a more tolerant approach to Vis: nu. : If he still insists on Śiva’s supremacy,
he does not deny that Vis: nu : too is supreme.⁵⁰ But this tolerant stance does not
entail a more inclusive approach towards Rāmānuja’s Vedānta theology. In the
last quarter of the Ānandalaharī, Appaya focuses on key differences between
Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Rāmānuja’s non-dualist systems, and argues that the Vis: nu- :
based theology of Rāmānuja is doctrinally inferior. The first problem that attracts
:
Appaya’s attention concerns the relationship between Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Śankara’s
systems. In verse 46, an ‘opponent’—who turns out to be a self-questioning
Appaya this time—recalls, in a language that is reminiscent of the oft-quoted
verse of the ŚAMD discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, that the fundamental
import of all scriptures, Purānas : and epics is pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaita)
alone. He adds that the BS too intend to teach pure non-dualism, and that he has
⁵⁰ On Appaya’s Vais: nava

: : is extolled as the supreme deity, see Rao 2016.
writings in which Vis: nu
  ́̄. .  147
already established this in the Nyāyaraks: āmani,

: one of his major works of Advaita
Vedānta. This raises a key question about Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualist theology:
But the fundamental import of all Upanis: ads and works supporting [scriptures]
: etc. is pure non-dualism alone. The import of the Brahmasūtras
such as Purānas,
too, when thoroughly examined, culminate in that same [pure non-dualism]; and
we established exactly this in the Nyāyaraks:āmani: in the manner described by
:
the blessed Śankara. How is it that the bhās:yakāra [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha] [apparently]
leaves aside [the doctrine of] pure non-dualism and resorts [instead] to the
[doctrine of] non-dualism of the qualified?⁵¹
The objector here is Appaya himself, as the self-reference to the Nyāyaraks: āmani:
shows. The objection itself is revealing, because it shows that Appaya is aware of
an apparent contradiction in his work on Vedānta. On the one hand, he has
already shown in his previous Advaita work that the BS teach pure non-dualism.
On the other hand, his Śivādvaita work relies on a theology [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha’s
:
theology] that apparently does not espouse Śankara’s teachings but rather the
teachings of Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta. He begins to resolve this tension in the
Ānandalaharī. In the important verse 49, he argues on the basis of several passages
from the BMB that Śrīkan: t:ha does not at all deny the doctrine of pure non-
dualism. In fact, he makes multiple allusions that suggest his leaning towards
:
Śankara’s teaching. Not only does Śrīkan: t:ha’s conception of Brahman broadly
:
align with Śankara’s—both ultimately conceive of Brahman as not manifesting
(nis: prapañca), without attributes (nirguna)
: and non-different from the individual
self (jīvābhinna)—but they also share a similar conception of cicchakti.
The argument Appaya puts forward about cicchakti is particularly interesting
given the prominence of this concept in Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology and the fact that
Advaitins do not a priori emphasize this concept in their theology. In support of
his position, Appaya quotes two verses from Sarvajñātman’s Samk : s: epaśārīraka,
an Advaita work on which he also relies in the Śivādvaitanirnaya: to argue that
Śrīkan: t:ha upholds vivartavāda (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). The first verse
(v. 3.228) he quotes is meant to show that Advaitins, too, just like Śrīkan: t:ha,
acknowledge the existence of a power of consciousness (cicchakti) that transforms
:
into the world (jagadākāraparināmin):
The power of consciousness of the supreme Lord is said to be pure consciousness

itself [and to be] real, while the other power of this Lord is insentient [and]
⁵¹ nanu śuddhādvaita eva sarves:ām : vedāntānām : purānādyupab

: r: mha
: nānā
: m: ca mahātātparyam.
: api vicāryamānāni
brahmasūtrāny
: : : paryavasānavanti. yathā caitat tathāsmābhih:
tatraiva tātparyena
śankarabhagavatpādanirūpitena prakārena : nyāyaraks:āmanau: samarthitam. tathābhūtam :
śuddhādvaitam: tyaktvā kim iti viśis:t:ādvaitam: bhās:yakārair āśritam? (Ānandalaharī: 112).
148    - 
consists of ignorance. Through the mutual interaction of these two powers of the
Lord, the world is born [and] the Lord’s power of consciousness undergoes
modifications due to the unreal [/insentient] power [of ignorance].⁵²
But this power of consciousness, continues Appaya, is not real; it is merely a

phenomenal differentiation (vyāvahārikabhedamātravat) with no absolute reality,
: s: epaśārīraka:
as confirmed by the next verse (v. 3.229) from the Samk
So say some other people disposed to believe [easily]. However, this [belief, that
Brahman has a real power of consciousness that transforms into the world,] is
acceptable [only] from a certain viewpoint, but not acceptable to scholars who
take another viewpoint. It is acceptable from the viewpoint of injunctions to
[perform] ritual actions and worship, but it is not acceptable if we consider the
scope of Vedic sentences [i.e., Upanis: ads] to be the attributeless [Brahman].⁵³
Commentators on the Samk : s:epaśārīraka concur in interpreting the second verse

as a refutation of the view presented in the first verse. According to the first view,
Brahman has two powers: a sentient (or conscious) and real power, namely
cicchakti; and an insentient and unreal power, namely avidyā. Both work together
to create the phenomenal world, as cicchakti transforms into the world and selves
through interacting with the power of avidyā. According to commentators, this
:
view, which they refer to as the view of transformation (parināmad r: s: t:i), is refuted
by Sarvajñātman in the second verse on the basis that it is incompatible with his
own view, namely the view of apparent transformation (vivartadr: s: t:i), according to
which the attributeless Brahman only apparently transforms into the world. In
other words, according to Sarvajñātman, Brahman neither possesses a real power
⁵² cicchaktih: parameśvarasya vimalam : caitanyam evocyate satyaivāsya (em., tasyaivāsya ed.)

:
jadāparā bhagavatah: śaktis tv avidyātmikā | samsargāc
: ca mithas tayor bhagavatah: śaktyor jagaj
jāyate ’sacchaktyā (em., sacchaktyā ed.) savikārayā bhagavataś cicchaktir udricyate (em., bhagavatā
cicchaktir ity ucyate ed.) || (Ānandalaharī [1989]: 119). There are problems with the text found in the
two editions of the Ānandalaharī I have consulted (Ānandalaharī 1908 and 1989). First, both editions
: s: epaśārīraka
have tasyaivāsya instead of satyaivāsya, which is the reading in all the editions of the Samk
I have consulted as well as the reading supported by commentaries. The reading tasyaivāsya does not
make much sense (i.e., two successive demonstrative pronouns to denote the same referent), and also
misses the fact that the consciousness in question must be real (satya) to contrast with the insentient
: power identified with avidyā. Secondly, both editions of the Ānandalaharī have sacchaktyā
(jada)
instead of asacchaktyā; this is obviously wrong, since it is the insentient power (asacchakti) that is
meant here to explain how cicchakti transforms into the world. Both the reading asacchaktyā and the
latter interpretation are confirmed by commentaries on the Samk : s: epaśārīraka. Thirdly, both editions of
the Ānandalaharī have bhagavatā cicchaktir ity ucyate instead of bhagavataś cicchaktir udricyate,
which is the reading in editions of the Samk: s:epaśārīraka. The latter reading is needed to convey that
the power of consciousness not only belongs to the Lord but also transforms into the world, which is
what Appaya is in any case trying to highlight here.
⁵³ ity evam: kathayanti kecid apare śraddhālavas tat punah: kasyāmcid
: :
bhuvi sammata m: ca vidus:ām:
: ca bhūmyantare | karmopāstividhānabhūmis: u tathā tat sammata
nes: t:am : : nirgune
m : tattve
tatparavedavākyavis:aye tv ālocite nes:yate || (Ānandalaharī: 119). I have corrected kasyāścid for
:
kasyāmcid.
  ́̄. .  149
of consciousness nor is this power of consciousness really transforming into the

world. That Sarvajñātman disagrees with, or at least does not give much credit to,
the first view is clear from the fact that he pejoratively refers to its proponents as
śraddhālu, i.e., people who are inclined to believe easily what they hear and who
do not base their claims on solid evidence.⁵⁴
In contrast with Sarvajñātman, Appaya loosely interprets the first of the above
two verses as demonstrating that Advaitins do acknowledge the existence of a
transformative power of consciousness (! jagadākāraparināminī : cicchaktis tāvad
asti), though he fully agrees with Sarvajñātman that cicchakti, in the end, has a
purely phenomenal reality. In any case, by quoting these two verses from the
Samk: s: epaśārīraka, Appaya is able to effectively prepare the ground for aligning
Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of cicchakti with the Advaita doctrine of pure non-
dualism. If we accept Śrīkan: t:ha’s view that Śiva’s cicchakti transforms into the
world and selves, as well as the view that this cicchakti is non-different from Śiva,
we must conclude that Śrīkan: t:ha upholds a doctrine of apparent transformation
(vivartavāda). Otherwise, if we were to hold that worldly changes are real rather
than ultimately unreal, it would follow that Śiva, too, like cicchakti, would be
subject to change. As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2, Appaya makes use of a
similar argument in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : to support his conclusion that
:
Śrīkan: t:ha upholds a śuddhādvaita doctrine in line with Śankara rather than a
viśis: t:ādvaita doctrine in line with Rāmānuja. He develops a very similar line of
argumentation in the rest of the Ānandahalaharī.
In verse 56, for instance, Appaya comments on the fact that Śrīkan: t:ha’s
:
interpretation is in line with Śankara’s doctrine, but stresses that this is something
merely suggested (dyotita) in his commentary, not explicitly stated. At first sight,
:
there are indeed key differences between both systems. Unlike Śankara, Śrīkan: t:ha
:
for the most part defends a saguna : interpretation of the BS. While Śankara
interprets the sūtras mostly in a nirguna : fashion, and only in some cases in a
saguna : fashion, Śrīkan: t:ha never interprets sūtras in a nirguna: fashion. On the
contrary, even when a nirguna : interpretation is clearly unavoidable, Śrīkan: t:ha
forcefully interprets the sūtras in a saguna : fashion.⁵⁵ According to Appaya, as
explained earlier, this is precisely what makes Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary so relevant:
⁵⁴ The celebrated theologian of Advaita Vedānta, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the
:
Sārasamgraha, a commentary on the Samk : s: epaśārīraka, writes: tes:ām ukte ’rthe na kimcin
: mānam
asti kim : tu svaguruvākyes: u śraddhāmātrenaiva
: m: vadantīty abhipretya kecid iti—‘[Sarvajñātman says]
“some” [people] with the following idea in mind: they do not have any evidence [to support] the things
they say, but speak in this way merely out of faith in the words of their teachers’
(Samk: s:epaśārīraka: 283). :
⁵⁵ iyāms : tu viśes:ah—śa
: nkarācāryaih: sagunam
: api brahma tatra tatra sūtrādhirūdha : m : kr: tam,
:
śrīkan: t:hācāryais tu nirguna : m: kvacid api sūtrādhirūdha : m : na kr: tam. pratyuta nirgunavi: s: ayatayā
spas:t:am : pratīyamānāny : yatnena sagunavi
api sūtrāni : s:ayatayā yojitāni—‘But here is the difference
: :
[between Śankara’s and Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretations of the BS]: Śankarācārya interprets in some places
the sūtras [to mean that] Brahman is also endowed with qualities, while Śrīkan: t:hācārya never interprets
the sūtras [to mean that Brahman] is without qualities. On the contrary, even when they are clearly
150    - 
without the grace of Śiva, which comes only through meditating on His saguna :
form, the inclination towards pure non-dualism is impossible; and it is this
meditation, especially the meditation on the personified Śiva in the heart, that
forms the central scope of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. In his view, Śrīkan: t:ha’s
emphasis on a saguna : interpretation of the BS is nothing more than a
hermeneutical choice (rīti); it does not entail that he does not personally approve
of a nirguna : interpretation. In support of this, Appaya cites several passages from
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in which a nirguna : interpretation is arguably ‘suggested’
(dyotita).
But why can we not hold a similar argument in support of Rāmānuja’s
commentary? After all, Rāmānuja, too, like Śrīkan: t:ha, emphasizes a saguna :
interpretation of the BS. Appaya partly agrees with this, but notes that there is
still a crucial difference between both commentaries:
This is true. Nevertheless, unlike in the case of the ācārya’s [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha’s]
commentary, there is no indication in Rāmānuja’s commentary, even suggested,
to the effect that he accepts śuddhādvaita as his final teaching. For he does not
accept in [his commentary] that śakti, which transforms into the phenomenal
world, is non-different from Brahman, [the acceptance of which would]
suggest that he ultimately accepts that the phenomenal world is an apparent
transformation of the unchangeable Brahman.⁵⁶
:
Unlike Śrīkan: t:ha, Rāmānuja never provides any indication (linga), even suggested
(vyañjita), that he accepts śuddhādvaita as his final teaching (paramasiddhānta).
In particular, the fact that he, unlike Śrīkan: t:ha, does not conceive cicchakti to be
simultaneously phenomenal (i.e., transforming into sentient and insentient entities)
and non-different from Brahman denies the possibility of a vivarta interpretation of
the sūtras in his case. The implication is that Rāmānuja’s commentary is inferior to
Śrīkan: t:ha’s insofar as it does not align with what Appaya assumes to be the most
:
correct interpretation of the BS, namely Śankara’s interpretation. He concludes the
Ānandalaharī by reaffirming the superiority of Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation, using the
metaphor of a punitive king:
Even if the faults committed by others [i.e., other commentators on the BS] are
not explicitly pointed out in this commentary [of Śrīkan: t:ha], nevertheless, just as
understood [to be about Brahman] without qualities, he forcefully interprets the sūtras [to be about
Brahman] endowed with qualities’ (Ānandalaharī [1989]: 144).
⁵⁶ satyam etat. tathāpi ācāryabhās: ya iva rāmānujabhās:ye śuddhādvaitam

: paramasiddhānta ity
:
abhyupagamasūcakam : nāsti vyañjitam api lingam. na hi tatra prapañcasya
nirvikārabrahmavivartatātparyāvasānābhyupagamasūcakam : :
prapañcaparināminyā h: śakter
brahmābhinnatvam abhyupagatam (Ānandalaharī [1989]: 144).
  ́̄. .  151
a great king, for the sake of protecting his kingdom, suggests by raising his
eyebrow that his own servants should prevent thieves from entering [the king-
dom] and punish them [i.e., the thieves], in the same way, this commentary [of
Śrīkan: t:ha], like a great king sitting on his throne in the kingdom of knowledge,
suggests systematically, [yet] only through indirect statements, that all this [i.e.,
pointing out the faults of other commentators] should be done by commentators
[on Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, in occurrence Appaya himself].⁵⁷
If Śrīkan: t:ha does not point the finger at the obvious faults of other commentators,
it is because—just like a great king who delegates the punishment of thieves to his
servants simply by lifting his eyebrow—he has left this task to his own commen-
tator, namely Appaya himself. Appaya here restates the same idea he had
expressed in his sub-commentary on the fifth introductory verse of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary (see Section 4.1, this chapter), namely that Śrīkan: t:ha uses his ‘throat’
to check the defects (kleśa) of other commentators and does not elaborate on the
subject. Moreover, Appaya compares other commentators—the focus on
Rāmānuja in the last verses makes it clear that Rāmānuja is the main commentator
indicated here—to ‘thieves’ (cora) in the ‘kingdom of knowledge’ (vidyāsāmrājya),
and Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary to a great king (mahāprabhu) ruling alone in
this kingdom. It is worth recalling that Śaivas were themselves later accused of
‘stealing’ from Rāmānuja’s tradition by Śuddhādvaita Vedāntins, also of Vais: nava :
affiliation.⁵⁸
While Appaya devotes only the last quarter of the Ānandalaharī to criticizing
Rāmānuja’s Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta theology, this topic comprises the entire scope
of the Śivādvaitanirnaya.⁵⁹
: As discussed earlier (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2), the
sole purpose of this work is to determine whether Śrīkan: t:ha’s doctrine accords
with a non-dualism of the qualified (viśis: t:ādvaita) such as that taught by
Rāmānuja and his followers, or with the pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaita,
:
kevalādvaita, aviśis: t:ādvaita) taught by Śankara and his followers. Appaya con-
cludes, as in the Ānandalaharī, that Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualist teaching is in line with
the latter. The Śivādvaitanirnaya
: advances new arguments in support of this claim
and also expands upon arguments found in the Ānandalaharī. In this work, too,
Appaya points out that Śrīkan: t:ha never really rejects or condemns śuddhādvaita,
⁵⁷ yady api asmin bhās:ye parāpāditadūs: anoddhara: : m

na : kan: t:hoktyā kr: tam: na dr: śyate,
tathāpi yathā mahān prabhuh: svarājyaraks: anārtha
: : corapraves: ānavakāśīkarana
m : m: tes: ām
: nigrahaś
ca svakīyair bhrūks: epakimkarai
: h: kartavyam iti :
bhrūsamjñayā vyañjayati, tathā
::
vidyāsāmrājyasimhāsanārū :
dhamahāprabhukalpam : bhās: yam
idam : tat sarvam : vyākhyātr: bhih: karta-
vyam ity uktibhangyaiva saprakāram : vyañjayati (Ānandalaharī [1989]: 149).
⁵⁸ See Chapter 1, Section 1.1 and Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2.
⁵⁹ In this respect, I adopt a different interpretation from Elaine M. Fisher (see Fisher 2017a and
Fisher 2018), who has proposed that Appaya’s Śivādvaitanirnaya : was directed against Vīraśaivas; see
Duquette 2020a for a detailed refutation of this argument. I surmise that the Śivādvaitanirnaya : was
composed after the Ānandahalarī; see Chapter 3, fn. 2.
152    - 
but in fact gives numerous indications of his leaning towards the pure non-
:
dualism of Śankara, the interpretation that Appaya believes to represent the
original intention (āśaya) of Bādarāyana.: Appaya also explains why Rāmānuja’s
interpretation, though it also focuses on saguna : Brahman, is inadequate.
Rāmānuja’s commentary contains no suggestion of any leaning towards pure
:
non-dualism; in fact, it explicitly rejects Śankara’s position. Unlike Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary, it does not also offer a path to students who wish to achieve the
gnostic realization of the attributeless Brahman. In other words, not only is
Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology more ‘orthodox’ in that it aligns with what is believed to be
:
the most correct interpretation of the BS (Śankara’s pure non-dualism), but it also
provides scope for different types of aspirants (adhikārin).
4.3 Appaya on Sudarśanasūri’s Defence of Aikaśāstrya
As a way to further illustrate Appaya’s opposition to Śrīvais: nava : theological

positions on Vedānta, I shall now discuss his take on an argument developed
three centuries earlier by Sudarśanasūri in the Śrutaprakāśikā. The argument
:
bears on the relationship between the two Mīmāmsās—the Pūrvamīmāmsā: (also
called Karmamīmāmsā : or simply Mīmā :
msā), on the one hand, which deals with
the correct interpretation of ritual actions enjoined in the Vedas or, more
generally, religious law (dharma); and, on the other hand, the Uttaramīmāmsā :
(also called Vedāntamīmāmsā,: Brahmamīmā :
msā or simply Vedānta), which deals
with the knowledge of Brahman taught in the Upanis: ads. While Śrīvais: nava :
theologians of Vedānta, starting at least with Rāmānuja himself, unanimously
hold that the two Mīmāmsās: form a single unified doctrine and textual corpus—
hence the ‘unity of the śāstras’ (aikaśāstrya)⁶⁰—Appaya argues just the opposite,
namely that they are strictly separate texts expounding different teachings.⁶¹
The starting point of the discussion is the meaning of the word atha in BS
1.1.1—athāto brahmajijñāsā (‘Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman’). Both
:
Śankara and Rāmānuja understand atha in the sense of ‘succession’ (ānantarya),
meaning that the inquiry into Brahman enjoined in the BS must follow some other
event or prerequisite. But the two theologians differ on the nature of what ought to
:
precede the inquiry. While Śankara interprets ‘succession’ in the sense that the
student of Vedānta must already have developed certain qualities—the so-called
sādhanacatus: t:aya, which includes detachment, faith, desire for liberation, etc.—
before he begins his inquiry into Brahman, Rāmānuja understands it to mean that
⁶⁰ The term śāstra must broadly be understood here as denoting both an authoritative teaching and
the text whereby it is communicated.
⁶¹ Pollock 2004 and McCrea 2016 discuss Appaya’s position on aikaśāstrya. My purpose here is to
draw attention to Sudarśanasūri’s argument and Appaya’s response. For a modern defence of the thesis
:
of the original unity of the two Mīmāmsās, see Parpola 1981.
  ́̄. .  153
:
that the study of the BS must be preceded by the study of the Mīmāmsāsūtras
(hereafter ‘MS’), the foundational text of Pūrvamīmāmsā: traditionally ascribed to
:
Jaimini. For Śankara, there is no need to study Pūrvamīmāmsā : beforehand: the
study of the BS aims to achieve the knowledge of the absolute Brahman, which
does not depend on the preliminary knowledge of the ritual actions prescribed in
the Vedas. In other words, there is no necessary logical connection between the
:
two Mīmāmsās, as both have very different goals and methods. For Rāmānuja,
however, both inquiries are strictly related insofar as they are both part of the
same teaching, the same śāstra. Commenting on the word atha in his Śrībhās: ya on
BS 1.1.1, he says:
Since the ritual action, known from the first part of the Mīmāmsā : [i.e.,
:
Pūrvamīmāmsā], [generates] limited and impermanent results, and since the
knowledge of Brahman, determined in the following part [i.e., Uttaramīmāmsā], :
[to the contrary, generates] infinite and imperishable results, it amounts to saying
that Brahman must be known immediately after (anantaram) the knowledge of
ritual actions, which occurs prior to it, and for this very reason.⁶²
The fact that the inquiry into dharma—the central theme of the MS, as declared in
its first sūtra, athāto dharmajijñāsā (‘Now, therefore, the inquiry into dharma’)—
leads only to temporary results justifies, in Rāmānuja’s view, why this inquiry
must logically be followed by an inquiry into Brahman: the latter is required in
order to achieve the infinite and imperishable fruit of liberation (moks: a).
Furthermore, the relationship between the two inquiries is not only strictly logical
but also ‘material’ insofar as, for Rāmānuja, the two śāstras, namely the
Pūrvamīmāmsā : and the Uttaramīmāmsā, : constitute a single work composed of
sixteen chapters (adhyāya), twelve for the Pūrvamīmāmsā : and four for the
Uttaramīmāmsā. : In support of this, Rāmānuja cites the now-lost vr: tti by
Bodhāyana, referred to here as the vr: ttikāra:
The vr: ttikāra said: ‘The desire to know Brahman [takes place] immediately after
the knowledge of ritual actions, which took place before.’ He [also] said [later in
the vr: tti] that the Karmamīmāmsā : and the Brahmamīmāmsā : constitute a single
śāstra: ‘The śāstra dealing with the embodied [Brahman] [i.e., the Brahmasūtras]
is combined with the śāstra of Jaimini in sixteen chapters. Thus is established the
unity of the [two] śāstras.’⁶³
⁶² mīmāmsāpūrvabhāgajñātasya
: karmano: ’lpāsthiraphalatvād uparitanabhāgāvaseyasya
brahmajñānasyānantāks:ayaphalatvāc ca, pūrvavr: ttāt karmajñānād anantaram : tata eva hetor brahma
jñātavyam ity uktam : bhavati (Karmarkar 1959: 3).
⁶³ tad āha vr: ttikārah: — vr: ttāt karmādhigamād anantaram : brahmavividis: eti. vaks: yati ca
karmabrahmamīmāmsayor : : samhitam
aikaśāstryam, : : jaiminīyena s: odaśalak
etac chārīrakam : s:aneneti
:
śāstraikatvasiddhir iti (Karmarkar 1959: 3–4).
154    - 
It is in this passage that Rāmānuja mentions the term aikaśāstrya for the first time
in his commentary. At this point, the question is: if the two śāstras are indeed part
of a single textual corpus, how is it that it appears to be divided into two distinct
parts? After all, the BS seem to mark a new beginning when they say athāto
brahmajijñāsā (BS 1.1.1). Rāmānuja understands the division between the two
Mīmāmsās : as expressing a difference in the theme or subject matter (artha)
discussed. While the Pūrvamīmāmsā : deals with dharma, the Uttaramīmāmsā :
deals with Brahman, an entirely different topic. Hence the division between the
two Mīmāmsās, : indicated by the word atha in BS 1.1.1, is purely pragmatic; it is
meant to signal a change in the theme discussed, in the same way as, for instance,
the second chapter (adhyāya) of the BS is concerned with refuting positions
advocated by other schools while the third chapter (which also begins with the
word atha) deals with means of achieving the knowledge of Brahman.
Aside from his citation of Bodhāyana’s vr: tti, Rāmānuja does not provide any
additional details on the origins of the aikaśāstrya thesis nor does he explore
its doctrinal implications. He does not address, in particular, the conceptual
differences between dharma and Brahman, the respective subject matters of the
two śāstras. Sudarśanasūri, two centuries later, is apparently the first commentator
to do so, in his Śrutaprakāśikā, his monumental sub-commentary on the
Śrībhās:ya. Commenting on Rāmānuja’s own commentary on BS 1.1.1, he offers
a first concise definition of the term aikaśāstrya:
The meaning of the words atha, atas and others is exactly as taught [by Rāmānuja
in the Śrībhās: ya], since the Karmamīmāmsā : and the Brahmamīmāmsā :
constitute a single śāstra. And there is unity [of the two] śāstras (aikaśāstrya)
because [the two śāstras] constitute explanations of a single work, the Vedas, which
is itself made up of two parts that follow each other in a definite way; this is the
sense here.⁶⁴
As is well known, the Vedas include two parts: the Upanis: ads, which contain
salvific knowledge of a gnostic nature (jñānakān: da); : and the mantras and
:
Brāhmanas, which contain information about ritual actions (karmakān: da).
:
Sudarśanasūri holds that these two parts are intrinsically related to one another.
One of the arguments he offers in support of this relates to the ‘unity of the
sentence’ (ekavākyatā), a principle of Vedic exegesis according to which a text,
most notably the Vedas, constitutes a single semantic unit, a single ‘sentence’, as
it were.⁶⁵ By extension, since the two Mīmāmsās : constitute explanations
⁶⁴ athāta ityādipadānām : yathokta evārthah: karmabrahmamīmāmsayor : aikaśāstryāt. aikaśāstryam :

ca niyatapaurvāparyabhāgadvayātmakavedākhyaikaprabandhavyākhyānarūpatvād ity arthah:
(Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 1, p. 35).
⁶⁵ According to this principle, a ‘sentence’ (vākya) is a linguistic unit with a single subject matter or
purpose (artha). Jaimini defines the vākya as follows in MS 2.1.46: arthaikatvād ekam : vākyam :
  ́̄. .  155
(vyākhyāna) of the Vedas, they too must form a single semantic unit, a single
‘sentence’. In other words, they must share the same subject matter (artha) and
therefore constitute a single śāstra.
But what is this artha presumably common to both śāstras? This is a legitimate
question, given that dharma, the topic of inquiry in Pūrvamīmāmsā, : is a priori a
very different entity than Brahman, the topic of inquiry in Uttaramīmāmsā. : It is
on this point that Sudarśanasūri truly innovates with respect to Rāmānuja. While
Rāmānuja understands the division between the two śāstras (indicated by the
word atha in athāto brahmajijñāsā) as merely reflecting a thematic change in the
object of study, Sudarśanasūri sees in it a deeper problem concerning the nature of
the theme itself, the artha. How do we indeed maintain the unity of the two śāstras if
their respective themes—dharma and Brahman—refer to ontologically different
entities? Moreover, if both Mīmāmsās : indeed form a single śāstra, how is it that
the śāstra’s first sūtra (MS 1.1.1) declares that an inquiry into dharma—and not into
some broader theme—must be undertaken? At first sight, the Uttaramīmāmsā : does
not deal with dharma but with Brahman, and dharma forms the scope of the
Pūrvamīmāmsā : alone.
Among the three solutions to this problem advanced by Sudarśanasūri, the
third one is the most compelling, and also the one that attracts Appaya’s attention
in his Śivādvaita Vedānta work. Sudarśanasūri explains:
Alternatively, athāto dharmajijñāsā is precisely the thesis (pratijñā) common [to

both śāstras] since dharma is [generally understood] as a means of achieving the
highest good . . . And dharma has two aspects: [the dharma] to be realized and
[the dharma already] realized. We see in the Mahābhārata that the word dharma
is used in the sense of an entity already realized, for instance [in the passage]:
‘And the sages who know the Vedas and the people who know the inner self talk
of Kr: s: na
: as the supreme self, the eternal dharma.’⁶⁶
Sudarśanasūri proposes to broaden the traditional sense ascribed to the word

dharma as religious law or ritual action (karma), and interpret it in the general
:
sense of a means of achieving the highest good (alaukikaśreyahsādhana). In its
narrow sense, dharma obviously denotes something different from Brahman.
While the knowledge and practice of dharma leads to limited results, such as
heaven and the like, and also depends on the performance of ritual actions for
:
sākānks: am
: ced vibhāge syāt—‘A sentence is single inasmuch as it has a single subject matter (or
purpose). If there were a division [of its parts], it would stand in need [of some other element].’
⁶⁶ athavā, athāto dharmajijñāsety eva sādhāranapratijñā,

: :
alaukikaśreyahsādhanam : hi dharmah: [ . . . ]
dharmaś ca sādhyasiddhabhedena dvividhah. : siddharūpe vastuni dharmaśabdaprayogo mahābhārate
: yathā ‘ye ca vedavido viprā ye cādhyātmavido janāh: | te vadanti mahātmānam
dr: s: t:ah, : kr: s: na
: m: dharmam :
sanātanam’ iti (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 1, p. 36).
156    - 
its fruition, the knowledge of Brahman leads to the highest good, liberation, and
does not depend on the performance of any action. Ontologically speaking,
Brahman is a siddhavastu, an already established entity, that is, an entity that is
not generated through a particular effort and that exists for all eternity. Dharma,
on the other hand, is something that has yet to occur in time (sādhya) as a result of
the performance of certain ritual actions. Sudarśanasūri argues here that the word
dharma in fact conveys both senses, and to this effect cites a passage from the
Mahābhārata in which Kr: s: na: is identified as the eternal dharma, that is, as an
entity already established (siddha) and, being eternal, not realized (sādhya) later in
time. When interpreted in the broader sense of the ‘highest good’, dharma can
function as the theme (artha) common to both śāstras. While the Pūrvamīmāmsā :
deals with dharma in its sādhya aspect—that is, with something to be realized by
means of Vedic injunctions—the Uttaramīmāmsā : deals with dharma in its siddha
aspect, Brahman, an already established entity whose knowledge leads to liberation.
From this perspective, the first sūtra of the BS (athāto brahmajijñāsā) simply
denotes, as Rāmānuja understands it, a thematic change in the object of study,
namely from dharma in its sādhya aspect to dharma in its siddha aspect.
We have seen in Chapter 1, Section 1.1, that Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualist theology
shares several features in common with Rāmānuja’s; this also holds true with regard
to his conception of the relationship between the two Mīmāmsās.: Commenting on
the word atha in BS 1.1.1, Śrīkan: t:ha explains that the inquiry into Brahman
(brahmajijñāsā) must follow the study of the Vedas (vedādhyayana), which is itself
followed by an inquiry into dharma (dharmajijñāsā). This is why, in his view, the
Pūrvamīmāmsā : begins with athāto dharmajijñāsā:
The inquiry into dharma follows immediately the preliminary study [of the
Vedas] with a teacher. After what [activity] should we then undertake [the
inquiry into Brahman]? Immediately after the inquiry into dharma. How [is
this so]? We are not among those who hold that there is a clear-cut difference
between the [two] śāstras, dealing [respectively] with the inquiry into dharma
and the inquiry into Brahman. We are rather among those who hold that they
form a unity [i.e., a single śāstra].⁶⁷
As Śrīkan: t:ha proceeds to explain, the two Mīmāmsās : form a single śāstra,
beginning with athāto dharmajijñāsā (MS 1.1.1, the first sūtra of the MS) and
ending with anāvrttih: śabdāt (BS 4.4.22, the last sūtra of the BS). The first section
of the śāstra, i.e., the Pūrvamīmāmsā,
: teaches dharma as a means of paying
homage (ārādhana) to Brahman, while the second section, i.e., the
⁶⁷ prathamata upadhyāyād adhyayanānantaram : dharmavicāraprāptir iti. tarhi kimanantaram

: dharmavicārānantaram. katham? na vayam
asyārambhah? : dharmabrahmavicārarūpayoh: śāstrayor
: kim
atyantabhedavādinah, : tv ekatvavādinah: (ŚAMD1: 34).
  ́̄. .  157
:
Uttaramīmāmsā, teaches Brahman as what ought to be honoured (ārādhya). Thus
both sections are logically related to each other. Just like Rāmānuja, Śrīkan: t:ha
understands both śāstras as forming a single unit, and he too explains their
apparent division as an intermediary division (avāntarapariccheda), similar to a
change of section or chapter within a text.
Appaya has Sudarśanasūri’s argument in mind when commenting on Śrīkan: t:ha’s
passage above in the ŚAMD. Sudarśanasūri’s argument is that a single subject
matter is taught in the śāstra—dharma, but understood in a wider sense, which
encompasses both its sādhya and siddha aspects—and that this subject matter is
announced right in the first sūtra of the śāstra (athāto dharmajijñāsā). In his sub-
commentary, Appaya paraphrases Sudarśanasūri’s argument, and explains why he
disagrees with it:
And one should not say—As for that thesis [maintained in the entire śāstra], it
follows only from the sūtra ‘athāto dharmajijñāsā’, because the word dharma can
also refer to Brahman, an entity already realized, just as it refers to the Agnihotra,
etc., [the fruits of which] are realized [i.e., obtained] [later], inasmuch as this
[word dharma]—given that it generally denotes a means to achieve the highest
good—applies both to [an entity that is to be] realized as well as [to an entity that
is already] realized—because such an explanation is not appropriate in the case of
:
the [Mīmāmsā]sūtras composed by Jaimini, for he undertook their composition
only with the aim of inquiring into the dharma to be realized.⁶⁸
According to Appaya, we cannot hold that the term dharma, as it appears in the
first sūtra of the MS, denotes an entity to be realized (sādhya) as well as an entity
already realized (siddha), and conclude on this basis that the sūtra also encom-
passes the inquiry into Brahman undertaken in the BS. The reason is that Jaimini
composed the MS only with the aim of inquiring into the first type of dharma,
namely dharma as understood in the sense of ritual action. If Jaimini really
believed that one has to inquire into Brahman as well, he would have composed
the BS too, but he did not. It is more logical, argues Appaya, to assume that
Bādarāyana: composed the BS precisely because Jaimini only had the sādhya aspect
of dharma in mind, and that another śāstra was needed to convey instructions
about the knowledge of Brahman. Appaya’s argument is straightforward: not only
is the Mīmāmsā : tradition itself clear as to how we should interpret the word
dharma, but the author of the MS did not elaborate on the question of Brahman.
⁶⁸ na ca athāto dharmajijñāsā ity anenaiva sūtrena : sāpi pratijñā labhyate,

:
dharmaśabdasyālaukikaśreyahsādhanasāmānyavācina h: siddhasādhyasādhāranasya
: sādhyarūpāgni-
hotrādiparatvavat siddharūpabrahmaparatvasyāpy upapatter iti vācyam, : sādhyadharmavicāramātre
pravr: ttena jaimininā pranītasya
: sūtrasya tathā vyākhyānā ’yogāt (ŚAMD1: 35).
158    - 
If Appaya rejects Sudarśanasūri’s argument about the twofold nature of

dharma, he does not explicitly condemn the aikaśāstrya thesis defended by
Śrīkan: t:ha anywhere in his sub-commentary. However, as discussed elsewhere
(McCrea 2016: 91–2), his last remark on the passage on aikaśāstrya in
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary suggests that he is not disposed to accept all its
implications:
In fact, the only thing that can be established is that the two inquiries necessarily
follow each other, given that the inquiry into dharma is the necessary precondi-
tion for the [correct] performance of rituals. [But] the proof according to which
the inquiry into dharma, insofar as it is required for the inquiry into Brahman, is
the necessary causal condition [for that inquiry] remains far off. Now, if there is
another way of proving this, it should be explained. Why this fixation on wanting
to prove that [the two inquiries] form a single śāstra?⁶⁹
Appaya is ready to accept that the two inquiries are logically related in some way,
but not that they are causally connected. It is not obvious that the inquiry into
Brahman must presuppose the inquiry into dharma, and if there is a way to prove
this, it should be clearly stated. This remark shows that Appaya, the commentator,
does not always agree with Śrīkan: t:ha, and often tends to follow his own philo-
sophical judgement, especially on sensitive matters that involve a doctrine dear to
Śrīvais: nava
: theologians. Unlike Śrīkan: t:ha, who aligns with Rāmānuja’s tradition
in his defence of aikaśāstrya, Appaya believes that the inquiry into Brahman
stands on its own and need not be preceded by an inquiry into dharma. In taking
:
this view, Appaya once again displays his loyal commitment to Śankara’s Advaita
Vedānta.
Appaya’s disagreement with the aikaśāstrya thesis forms the topic of an entire
:
essay in his Pūrvottaramīmāmsāvādanak s:atramālā (‘A Series of Constellations of
Discourses on Pūrvamīmāmsā : and Uttaramīmāmsā’),: a collection of twenty-seven
essays (vāda) on various topics in Mīmāmsā : and Vedānta, presumably composed
after the ŚAMD. As rightly noted by McCrea (2016: 89), the Vādanaks:atramālā is
neither a Mīmāmsā : work nor a Vedānta work per se, but a Śivādvaita work.
Appaya says in the introduction that he aims to elaborate on certain topics
that have been merely stated or suggested in Śrīkan: t:ha’s bhās:ya. Most if not
all of the essays included in the Vādanaks: atramālā indeed expand upon argu-
ments first advanced in the ŚAMD. In the nineteenth essay, entitled
:
aikaśāstryanirākaranavāda (‘Essay on the Refutation of [the Thesis] of the
⁶⁹ tasmād vicārayoh: paurvāparyaniyamamātram api dharmavicārāvaśyakakarmānus:t:hānaupādhika-

tvenaiva samarthanīyam iti dūre tato dharmavicārasya brahmavicārāpeks:itatvena
: atha tatsiddhāv upāyāntaram asti tarhi tad eva pradarśanīyam.
tanniyatasāmāgrītvasiddhih. : kim
aikaśāstryopapādanavyasanena? (ŚAMD1: 37).
  ́̄. .  159
Unity of [the two] śāstras’), Appaya exhaustively refutes the claim, endorsed by
Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary on BS 1.1.1, that Mīmāmsā : and Vedānta form a
single unified śāstra. He begins by summarizing Sudarśanasūri’s argument and
responds to it with the same counter-arguments developed in the ŚAMD, among
which the argument that Jaimini did not intend to teach dharma in its siddha
aspect (i.e., Brahman). Without assuming that he understood dharma strictly in
the sense of a ritual action, it is indeed difficult to understand why another author,
Bādarāyana, : would have felt compelled to write the BS. In his essay, Appaya
advances a number of new arguments against the aikaśāstrya thesis. One of these
arguments pertains to the very concept of dharma. Unlike Sudarśanasūri, who
extends the traditional sense ascribed to dharma to encompass the reality of
Brahman as well, Appaya wants to retain its traditional sense of ritual action.
Bādarāyana : himself, he says, contrasts Brahman with dharma as understood in
the sense of ritual action (karma):
And the word dharma is used, in counterpoint to Brahman, in the sense of

sacrificial actions and other [ritual acts] in the sūtra, ‘Precisely for this reason,
Jaimini [considered] dharma [as the cause of fruits of the ritual act]’ [BS 3.2.40],
in the section [beginning with the sūtra], ‘The fruit [of the action] comes from
that [i.e., Brahman], because [only this] makes sense’ [BS 3.2.38].⁷⁰
For Bādarāyana, : the word dharma denotes the fruit-bearing ritual action, such
as the sacrifice leading to the attainment of heaven. Appaya supports this
interpretation of the word dharma with statements taken from the orthodox
tradition of jurisprudence (dharmaśāstra). He cites the Dharmasūtras of
Āpastamba (whom he refers to as a mahars: i in this context) to the effect that
dharma consists in nothing more than what the ancient āryas have enjoined us to
do: the Vedic ritual act. In refusing to interpret dharma as an entity already
realized (siddhavastu), Appaya also follows another authoritative figure in the
field of legal literature, namely Medhatīthi (ninth century), the well-known
commentator on the Manusmr: ti. In his commentary on Manusmr: ti 2.6,
Medhatīthi explains that the authors of the dharmaśāstra could not have directly
perceived dharma, since the latter is not siddha—that is, an already established
entity that is perceivable in the same way substances are—but only sādhya, that is,
something that is only realized in the future. This is why dharma is only known
through scriptures, and not through any kind of perception.
⁷⁰ dharmaśabdaś ca brahmapratikot:itayā yāgādikarmaparatvena ‘phalam ata upapatteh’

: ity
: ‘dharme jaiminir ata eva’ [BS 3.2.40] iti sūtre prayuktah: (Pūrvottaramīmāmsā-
adhikarane :
vādanaks:atramālā: 238).
160    - 
4.4 Refutation of Pāñcarātra
In Chapter 3, Section 3.3, we examined Appaya’s conception of Śaiva scriptures

based on his sub-commentary on the pāśupatādhikarana : (BS 2.2.35–38), the
section of the BS dealing with the Śaiva/Pāśupata position. We understood that
Appaya ascribes great authority to Śaiva scriptures (śaivāgama, śivāgama). When
these āgamas explicitly claim that Śiva is only the efficient cause (nimittakārana) :
of the world and not its material cause (upādānakārana) : as well—a position
unacceptable to Vedāntins who hold that Brahman is both the efficient and
:
material cause (nimittopādānakārana)—Appaya points the finger not at the
āgamas, but at their incorrect interpretation by some Śaiva ācāryas. However,
for Appaya, the authority of Śaiva scriptures never surpasses that of the Vedas.
While Śrīkan: t:ha ‘does not see any difference between the Vedas and the
Śaivāgamas’, Appaya holds that the āgamas derive their authority from the
Vedas, though they too are ‘revealed’ texts.
How does Appaya conceive, in comparison, Vais: nava: scriptures, in particular
those associated with the Pāñcarātra tantric tradition? Does he fully reject their
:
authority, as Śankara does in the Brahmasūtrabhās:ya, or does he adopt a more
liberal approach? As we recall, in his early Śaiva work, the Śikharinīmālā,
: Appaya
criticizes those who are ‘devoted to Pāñcarātra’ (pāñcarātrasthita) for their claim
: not Śiva, ought to be worshipped as the supreme Brahman. For him,
that Vis: nu,
they are ‘heretics’ (avaidika), as he also implies in this verse from the
Śivakarnām
: r: ta, where he contrasts them with vaidikas who regard Śiva as the
supreme Brahman:
The vaidikas [hold that] Sadāśiva, who is together with Ambā in His embodied
form, is the eternal [and] supreme Brahman, and that the phenomenal world is a
fragment of His emanation. Those who are devoted to the Pāñcarātra [tea-
chings], unable to bear [Śiva’s] supremacy, claim that the purport of all Vedas
:
[is to teach] the supremacy of Vis: nu.⁷¹
Although Appaya does not identify the pāñcarātrasthitas with a specific subgroup
:
of Vais: navas in this work, we have seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.2, that he has
Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta in mind. However, we know that not all
Śrīvais: navas
: considered themselves Pāñcarātrins. Some, like the Vaikhānasas,
did not. Appaya does not make this distinction. One reason for this could be
that it was easier for him to lump all Śrīvais: navas
: together under the umbrella of
pāñcarātrasthitas, given that his purpose was primarily to criticize them. Another
⁷¹ sadāśivah: param: brahma sāmbamūrtih: sanātanah: | vibhūtileśas tasyaiva prapañca iti vaidikā ||
: h: paratve vedānām api tātparyam ūcire ||
pāñcarātrasthitās tasya parabhāve dhr: tāks: amāh: | vis:no
: r: ta: 243).
(Śivakarnām
  ́̄. .  161
reason could be that he was unaware that there were Śrīvais: navas : who did not
follow Pāñcarātra.⁷²
In his sub-commentary on the pāñcarātrādhikarana : (BS 2.2.39–42), the section
of the BS dealing with Pāñcarātra, Appaya shifts his critical focus to Pāñcarātra
:
scriptures. Early commentators on the BS, such as Śankara and Bhāskara, take the
view that Bādarāyana : regarded Pāñcarātra as a heretical tradition, and therefore
wrote sūtras 2.2.39–42 in order to deny its authority. One of the first Vais: nava :
scholars to deny this view and defend the validity of Pāñcarātra scriptures was the
Śrīvais: nava
: scholar Yāmuna (tenth/eleventh century). In his Āgamaprāmānya, : he
tries to show, against the conservative brahmins of the Mīmāmsā : and Advaita
Vedānta traditions, that the distinctive doctrines taught in the tantric Pāñcarātra
tradition are fully compatible with the Vedānta theology deployed in the
BS. A century or so later, Rāmānuja followed in the steps of Yāmuna, arguing in
his Śrībhās: ya that the pāñcarātrādhikarana : supports rather than condemns the
:
authority of Pāñcarātra. While Śankara, for instance, understands the four sūtras
of this adhikarana : as reasons for rejecting this system, Rāmānuja considers the
first two as presenting a pūrvapaks:a against the authority of Pāñcarātra and the
last two as presenting a siddhānta establishing the opposite conclusion, namely
that the Pāñcarātra tradition is authoritative. Although he does not come up with
a very elaborate defence of Pāñcarātra doctrines, Rāmānuja’s interpretation
:
inspired later Śrīvais: nava
: theologians, particularly Venkat:anātha, in whose work
the integration of the Pāñcarātra tradition into Rāmānuja’s Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta
school reaches its culmination.
:
In the BMB, Śrīkan: t:ha agrees with Rāmānuja and Śankara in interpreting the first
two sūtras as denying the validity of Pāñcarātra. But he disagrees with Rāmānuja in
his reading of the third and especially the fourth sūtra (BS 2.2.42)—vipratis:edhāt
(‘because of contradiction’). We explained earlier (Section 4.1, this chapter) that for
Rāmānuja—as well as for Sudarśanasūri, who stresses this point in his sub-
commentary on this sūtra—the sūtra word vipratis: edhāt means that the origination
of the self is denied (vipratis: edha=pratis: edha) in Pāñcarātra scriptures, thus refuting
the opponent’s claim that Pāñcarātra teaches that the self is not eternal. Śrīkan: t:ha
:
disagrees with this, and reads the sūtra as Śankara does, that is, as meaning
that the Pāñcarātra teachings are opposed to Vedic scriptures (vipratis:edhāt =
śrutivirodhāt):
Even if the statement that the self originates is set aside in this way [by those who
defend the Pāñcarātra tradition], the Pāñcarātra position is not accepted because
it contradicts [Vedic scriptures], insofar as it treats of the doctrine that the Lord
[Vāsudeva] is the cause [of the world], [the doctrine] that He is the cause of
⁷² I am grateful to Marion Rastelli for pointing out this nuance to me.

162    - 
liberation, [and] religious practices, such as bearing heated mudras, etc., which
are [all] opposed to [or prohibited in] [Vedic] scriptures. Therefore, the
Pāñcarātra position is incorrect.⁷³
Appaya naturally agrees with Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation in his sub-commentary

on BS 2.2.42, but offers new arguments that deserve attention. Two main points
stand out in Appaya’s argumentation: first, his claim that Vāsudeva’s uttering of
Pāñcarātra doctrines was intentionally misleading; and secondly, his claim that
Pāñcarātra teachings are valid for specific categories of people not entitled to
Vedic education. We shall see that both arguments resonate with, and even reuse,
arguments advanced by earlier Śrīvais: nava
As just noted, Rāmānuja denies that a doctrine of the origination of the self
(jīvotpatti) is taught in Pāñcarātra scriptures. In his commentary on BS 2.2.42, he
:
cites to this effect a verse from the Paramasamhitā, a Pāñcarātra scripture that
affirms the self ’s eternality.⁷⁴ In his sub-commentary on the same sūtra, Appaya
cites the very same verse within an objection raised by someone who is likely a
Śrīvais: nava
: theologian. The objector argues that if Pāñcarātra scriptures teach that
the self originates, we would have to conclude that Pāñcarātra scriptures are
mutually contradictory (! parasparavirodha) insofar as they also claim the
opposite elsewhere. But this cannot be the case, because Vāsudeva, who uttered
the Pāñcarātra scriptures, cannot make mistakes, and must have taught a single
coherent doctrine about the self. In the words of the objector:
But in the Pāñcarātra [scriptural corpus] itself, it is taught, after introducing the
self into the discussion, that ‘[The pervading relation between prakr: ti and
purus: a] is ascertained, according to the highest truth, to have no beginning
and to be infinite.’ If this is the case, in addition to the contradiction of the
Vedas that is about to be explained, some internal contradiction [in the
Pāñcarātra corpus] would also be [covered] by the contradiction (vipratis: edha)
that is the object of the sūtra. But how could the blessed Vāsudeva, about whom
there cannot be even the suspicion of a bit of error, teach the origination of the
self, which contradicts the Vedas, logical reasoning and His own speech?⁷⁵
⁷³ evam : jīvotpattyabhidhāne parihr: te ’pi pāñcarātramatasya nābhyupagamah, : śrutiviruddheś-

:
varakāranavādamuktihetutvataptamudrādhāra :
nādidharmaparatvādinā vipratis: edhāt. atah: pāñcarā-
tramatam asamañjasam (ŚAMD2: 116, 118).
⁷⁴ The Paramasamhitā :: is definitely pre-tenth century, since Yāmuna quotes from it in the
Āgamaprāmānya. : Venkat:anātha also quotes from it in the Pāñcarātraraks: ā, the Stotraratnabhās:ya
and the Gadyatrayabhās:ya (Czerniak-Drożdżowicz 2003: 27–8). The verse in question (v. 2.19) reads:
vyāptirūpena : sambandhas
: tasyāś ca purus: asya ca | sa hy anādir anantaś ca paramārthena niścitah: ||—
‘The pervading relation between [prakr: ti] and purus:a is ascertained, according to the highest truth, to
have no beginning and to be infinite’ (Paramasamhitā: : 11). This statement arguably implies that the
self, the purus:a, is also eternal.
⁷⁵ nanu pāñcarātra eva jīvam : prakr: tya ‘sa hy anādir anantaś ca paramārthena niścita’ ity uktam.
evam : tarhi vaks:yamāno : vedavirodha iva parasparavirodho ’pi kaścana sūtrārthabhūto vipratis:edho
  ́̄. .  163
It is likely that Appaya had Yāmuna’s views in mind here. In the Āgamaprāmānya, :
Yāmuna mentions two possible ways whereby an objector could interpret the
sūtra word vipratis: edhāt: either it means that (a) the Pāñcarātra teachings ‘contra-
:
dict the [Vedic] scriptures’ (śrutivirodha), which is how Śankara, Śrīkan: t:ha and
others understand it; or (b) Pāñcarātra scriptures are mutually contradictory
(parasparavipratis:edha), which is the view referred to by Appaya’s objector.⁷⁶
Yāmuna rejects these two interpretations: the first, on the basis of his previous
argument that the Pāñcarātra scriptures never contradict Vedic scriptures; the
second, on the basis that Pāñcarātra scriptures cannot possibly mutually contra-
dict each other, insofar as their statements were brought about by the use of sound
:
logical principles (nyāyasampāditavacana). As for the objector’s claim that
Vāsudeva cannot contradict ‘His own speech’ (svavacana), it too can be traced
back to Yāmuna. The idea here is that Vāsudeva, the ‘author’ of Pāñcarātra
scriptures, is also traditionally regarded as the author of the BS, Bādarāyana/ :
Vyāsa. For this reason, He could not have uttered a Pāñcarātra doctrine that is
incompatible with the teachings of the BS. As Yāmuna says:
As for [the view that the Pāñcarātra is not Vedic] because it is rejected by the
revered Bādarāyana : [in the BS], it is not true. For how could one [even] imagine
that the revered Dvaipāyana [i.e., Vyāsa, the author of the BS] rejects the
Bhāgavata teachings [i.e., Pāñcarātra], he who is the supreme Bhāgavata [him-
self], a model for the entire world?⁷⁷
The same argument is put forward by Appaya’s objector in order to explain why
the doctrine of the origination of the self cannot possibly be taught in Pāñcarātra
scriptures. If it were, and if Vāsudeva/Vyāsa, the author of the BS, wished to refute
the authority of the Pāñcarātra on this basis, then we would have to conclude that
He contradicts ‘His own speech’, since He is the author of both works. Appaya
gives an interesting reply to this objection:
:
bhavis: yati. nanu yatra bhrāntileśasyāpi śankā na pravartate, sa katham
: bhagavān vāsudevah:
śrutiyuktisvavacanaviruddhām: jīvotpattim
: brūyāt? (ŚAMD2: 116–7).
⁷⁶ yat param: vipratis:edhāt iti caturs:u vedes:u iti śrutipratis:edhāt tantrānā

: m
: parasparavipratis:edhād
:
vā apramānam iti—‘As for the [sūtra word] vipratis: edhāt, [it means that the Pāñcarātra] lacks authority
because it contradicts the [Vedic] scriptures [based on the passage,] “In the four Vedas . . . ”;
or that it lacks authority because the [Pāñcarātra] scriptures are mutually contradictory’ (van
Buitenen 1971: 52).
⁷⁷ yat tu bhagavatā bādarāyanena : nirastatvād iti tad asat. katham : hi bhagavān dvaipāyanah:
sakalalokādarśabhūtaparamabhāgavato bhāgavatam : śāstram : nirasyatīty utpreks: yeta (van Buitenen
1971: 62). I am not aware whether this view was stated before Yāmuna. It certainly appears in the
:
later works of Rāmānuja, Sudarśanasūri, and Venkat:anātha. I thank Marion Rastelli for pointing out to
:
me passages in the works of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, and Venkat:anātha in which Bādarāyana/Vyāsa : is
identified with Vāsudeva.
164    - 
True, [Vāsudeva] could not speak in a deluded manner, but He could well speak
with a desire to deceive [some people]. For we see [that He uses] deceit in some of
His incarnations, and this [deceit] is possible with respect to the Pāñcarātra too,
because it is well known that the latter is a misleading teaching.⁷⁸
Hence Vāsudeva’s teaching about the origination of the self is not due to some
confusion on the part of Vāsudeva, but is an intentional attempt at deluding
certain people. This idea is not Appaya’s own: it is once again found in a
pūrvapaks:a from Yāmuna’s Āgamaprāmānya : pertaining to the interpretation of
BS 2.2.42, and Yāmuna replies to it in detail.⁷⁹ As a matter of fact, Yāmuna uses
this same argument to question the validity of the teachings promulgated by
Rudra-Śiva.⁸⁰ In his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.42, Appaya does not provide an
elaborate justification for his claim that Vāsudeva taught Pāñcarātra doctrines in
order to deceive some people. Although the wording of the argument suggests that
he may have been familiar with Yāmuna’s counter-argument, he does not engage
with it and claims that the Pāñcarātra is a misleading teaching (mohaśāstra)
merely on the basis that it is well-known to be so (! prasiddhi). In Appaya’s
view, this alone is sufficient to raise a serious doubt about the authority of
Pāñcarātra.⁸¹
The next objection raised in Appaya’s sub-commentary on BS 2.2.42 concerns
statements from the Mahābhārata (and other works) that praise Pāñcarātra, and
as such implicitly accept the authority of its teachings. This objection has broad
implications: if Appaya admits the truth of these statements, he must concede that
the Pāñcarātra tradition is authoritative and explain other statements that con-
demn its teachings; if he admits their falsity, he must reject the authority of the
Mahābhārata or explain its apparent inconsistency on this point. His strategy in
⁷⁸ satyam. bhrantyā na brūyād iti vipralipsayā tu brūyād eva. dr: s:t:o hi tasyāvatāraviśes: e
vipralambhah. : k:lptaś ca pāñcarātre ’pi sah,: mohaśāstratvaprasiddheh: (ŚAMD2: 117).
⁷⁹ nanu ca bhagavatah: sarvajñatvenāsambhāvyamānāyām
: api bhrāntau sarvaśaktitvena vipralab-
dham api bhavati . . . —‘But if the Lord [Vāsudeva], being omniscient, cannot conceivably make mis-
takes, He could, being omnipotent, [have composed the Pāñcarātra] in order to deceive [people] . . . ’
(van Buitenen 1971: 60). Yāmuna responds to this that there is no need for Vāsudeva to deceive people in
this manner: omnipotent as He is, Vāsudeva could simply send those people to hell if He wanted to!
Moreover, if Vāsudeva uttered the Pāñcarātra scriptures with this purpose in mind, why not suppose that
He stole the Vedas from Brahmā as well as Brahmā’s memory of being the creator of the Vedas, and then
set in motion a false Vedic tradition?
⁸⁰ yad vā rudrasya mohaśāstrapranet : r: tayā ’vagatatvād vyāmohayitum eva hīdr: śaśāstrapranayanam
:
upapadyata iti nāvaśyam : pramāda evāśrayitavyah—‘Alternatively,
: there is no need to invoke mere
negligence [on the part of Rudra] since it is possible that Rudra, given that He is understood as the
author of a deluding śāstra, could have composed such a śāstra precisely in order to deceive [people]’
(van Buitenen 1971: 45).
⁸¹ Towards the end of his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.42, Appaya says that ‘statements [made in
Pāñcarātra scriptures,] such as those concerning the self ’s origination (jīvotpatti), are not authoritative
at all, because there is no convincing reason to reject their lack of authority, given that [Pāñcarātra] is
well-known to be a misleading teaching’ (jivotpattyādivacanam : tv apramānam: eva, mohaśāstratvena
:
prasiddhe pratītāprāmānyanirāsahetvabhāvāt; ŚAMD2: 118). In other words, Pāñcarātra lacks authority
prima facie because of the prasiddhi that it is a misleading teaching.
  ́̄. .  165
this case consists in invoking the hermeneutical principle of ‘limited reference’

(vyavasthā). This principle of interpretation is commonly used in commentaries
on legal literature (dharmaśāstra), typically in contexts where commentators have
to deal with ‘options’ (vikalpa) that result from conflicting injunctions. The
principle states that the alternatives provided by certain options are not open to
everyone, but restricted to definite groups of people. In this way, there is no
conflict between injunctions, each injunction being intended only for a specific
group of people.⁸² The vikalpa/vyavasthā device is also used in Mīmāmsā : exegesis.
Kumārila, for instance, has recourse to vyavasthā (or vyavasthitavikalpa in his
terminology) in contexts where specific injunctions found in smr: ti texts and Vedas
contradict each other. The solution to this problem is to accept that the different
injunctions concern different kinds of people: while Vedic injunctions are meant
for brahmins, the injunctions found in smr: ti texts are meant for members of other
classes. Appaya applies the exact same principle here, but to a single class of texts,
the Mahābhārata:
[If one objects:] but the authority of the Pāñcarātra is also communicated in
the Mahābhārata and other works [ . . . ], [we reply:] In truth, there is no
contradiction, because the following limited reference (vyavasthā) is possible:
[only] the parts [of the Pāñcarātra scriptures] that do not need to be performed
[according to the Vedic way, i.e., requiring initiation] are authoritative, because
[these parts] concern [only] those who are not entitled to [the study of the]
: golakas, women, śūdras, etc. [However,] explanations [in
Vedas, such as kun: das,
Pāñcarātra scriptures] for which Vedic eligibility [is required] and matters such
as the origination of the self—[matters] that are contradicted by scriptures,
reasoning and [Vāsudeva’s] own speech—are not authoritative.⁸³
The conflict here is between statements from the Mahābhārata and other works
that condemn the Pāñcarātra teachings as misleading, and other statements
from the same works that praise them. According to Appaya, there is no conflict
if one understands that a limited reference (vyavasthā) is implied: the Pāñcarātra
is authoritative only for certain categories of people and it is for their sake that
praising statements are made in the Mahābhārata. More precisely, the only ‘valid’
⁸² For instance, Manusmr: ti 4.95 says that a person should perform a certain rite on the full moon of
Śrāvana: (July–August) or Bhādrapada (August–September). Commentators explain this statement as a
vikalpa, and invoke the vyavasthā principle to resolve the apparent inconsistency. What this statement
intends to communicate is that those who belong to the Sāmaveda tradition should perform the rite on
the full moon of Bhādrapada, whereas those who belong to the Rgveda : tradition should perform this
same rite on the full moon of Śrāvana : (Olivelle 1993: 136).
⁸³ nanu bhāratādis: u pāñcarātrasya prāmānyam: api pratipāditam . . . vastutas tu nāyam : vipratis:edho
’sti, ananus:t:heyāmśe
: s:u kun: dagolakastrīśūdrādivedānadhik
: r: tavis: ayatā : m,
prāmānya : tatra
:
vaidikādhikāravarnanavi s: aye jīvotpattyādiśrutiyuktisvavacanaviruddhavis: aye cāprāmānyam : iti
vyavasthopapatteh: (ŚAMD2: 118).
166    - 
teachings of the Pāñcarātra are those meant for non-Vedic adherents

(avaidikādhikārin)—that is, people who are not entitled (anadhikr: ta) to study
the Vedas and practice their rituals—such as kun: das
: (son of a woman by another
man than her husband), golakas (widow’s bastard), women, śūdras and so on. The
teachings for which entitlement to Vedic study and ritual practice is required have
no authority whatsoever. That being said, Appaya still adopts a more accommo-
:
dating approach than Śankara, who denies any legitimacy to Pāñcarātra scriptures
in the Brahmasūtrabhās:ya. In this case, the interpretation upheld by Appaya in
the ŚAMD differs from the position he upholds in the Parimala, which aligns with
:
Śankara’s position.⁸⁴
Appaya’s vyavasthā-based argument might well have been inspired by
Sudarśanasūri’s commentary on the pāñcarātrādhikarana. : In his Śrībhās: ya on
BS 2.2.42, Rāmānuja discusses a passage from the Mahābhārata (MBh 12.337.59)
in which the Kuru king Janamejaya asks a sage whether Pāñcarātra, Vedas,
:
Sāmkhya, Yoga and Pāśupata are different teachings or not. The problem here
:
is that this passage seems to consider Sāmkhya, Yoga, etc. on par with Pāñcarātra,
though the former systems are rejected in the BS. According to the objector,
the Pāñcarātra should be denied authority on this basis. Rāmānuja naturally
rejects this argument, and so does Sudarśanasūri. In order to explain why the
Mahābhārata apparently praises these systems on par with Pāñcarātra, Rāmānuja
:
holds that Sāmkhya and other such schools are authoritative, but not entirely:
only the selected portions of their teachings that do not contradict the Vedas
(vedāviruddhāmśa): are authoritative. The Pāñcarātra tradition, on the other hand,
is fully authoritative, because it does not contradict the Vedas at all
(kr: tsnāviruddha). Commenting on this passage from the Śrībhās:ya, Sudarśanasūri
explains that the same logic applies to the performance of Vedic rituals: the Vedas
too enjoin different rituals depending on who is entitled to perform them, the time at
which they should be performed and the fruits that accrue from their performance.⁸⁵
Appaya cites the exact same Mahābhārata passage in his sub-commentary
⁸⁴ In the Parimala, Appaya does not uphold the view that Pāñcarātra teachings are valid for certain
:
types of adherents. In line with Śankara and his commentators, he simply denies their legitimacy on the
basis that Pāñcarātra practitioners not only do not practise rituals that are prescribed in the Vedas, but
cannot practise such rituals since they accept the authority of scriptures that have no Vedic origins. See
below.
⁸⁵ See Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 408, starting with ‘mahābhāratapraśastatvahetor . . . ’ In his
:
Pāñcarātraraks: ā, Venkat:anātha invokes a similar argument to determine what kind of religious
practices a Pāñcarātrika ought to perform. The question arises because the Pāñcarātra scriptures are
divided into four main sections, namely the āgamasiddhānta, mantrasiddhānta, tantrasiddhānta and
:
tantrāntarasiddhānta, all of which teach different religious practices. Venkat:anātha insists on the fact
that the initiate should not confuse the different religious practices prescribed in these corpuses, and
perform only those for which he is eligible. The implication is that each corpus has its own separately
established (vyavasthita) set of practices in accordance with the eligibility (adhikāra) of its practi-
tioners. See: tadvad eva yathādhikāram : vyavasthitānus:t:hānatayā siddhāntādisamkaraparihāre
: :
naiva
sarvadānuvartanīyam—‘And likewise, precisely because it eliminates the confusion between [the
different] siddhāntas, etc., [the Pāñcarātra religious practices] should be observed at all times [with
the view] that their performance is separately established in accordance with the eligibility [of their
respective practitioners]’ (Pāñcarātraraks: ā: 43).
  ́̄. .  167
:
on BS 2.2.42. But if Sudarśanasūri relies on it in order to show that Sāmkhya and
similar systems have a ‘limited applicability’, Appaya quotes it to support the
opposite view, namely that it is Pāñcarātra that has a ‘limited applicability’.⁸⁶ This
exemplifies how Appaya productively reuses Śrivais: nava : arguments to his own
advantage at times.
Appaya invokes a similar argument in his sub-commentary on the
pāśupatādhikarana: when he discusses the eligibility of Vedic adherents
(vaidikādhikārin) for the study of Śaiva scriptures associated with the left-hand
path (vāmācāra), typically considered to involve transgressive practices such as
eating meat, the use of illicit substances in rituals, etc. In his sub-commentary on
BS 2.2.38, he says:
Nor is it the case that [the Raudrāgamas associated with the left-hand path] also
lack authority in every respect, since even though some parts [of these scrip-
tures,] such as those concerned with inciting people qualified to study the Vedas
[to perform the rituals enjoined in these scriptures], are misleading teachings,
[these scriptures] are [still] truly authoritative for non-Vedic adherents.⁸⁷
The argument that only non-Vedic adherents (avaidikādhikārin) are entitled to

study specific tantric scriptures or sections of those scriptures can also be found in
Sudarśanasūri’s sub-commentary on the same adhikarana. : In his sub-
commentary on BS 2.2.35, Sudarśanasūri argues that the Śaiva/Pāśupata tradition
can be studied only by ‘heretics’ (trayībāhya) who are not entitled to Vedic study
and ritual practice. As for those who are entitled to Vedic study and ritual practice,
they can study Pāñcarātra because the combination of its teachings with the
Vedas is a means to liberation.⁸⁸ Once again, Appaya may have been reusing
⁸⁶ evam: codāhr: tanānāpurānavacanānusāre

: :
na bhāratādis: u pāñcarātraprāśastya vacanāny
adhikāriviśes:avis: ayatayā tatprāmānyavyavasthāpanaparā
: :
nīty upapādanīyam. bhārate ’pi hi —
:
‘sāmkhya
: m: yogah: pāñcarātram : vedāh: pāśupatam : tathā | kim etāny ekanis:t:hāni pr: thannis:t:hāni vā
mune ||’ iti praśne ‘jñānāny etāni rājars:e viddhi nānāmatāni vai’ iti pāñcarātrādīnām : vaidikamārgān
mārgāntaratvoktyaivāvaidikatvam āvis:kr: tam—‘And it should be established in this way that the
statements from the Mahābhārata and other works that praise the Pāñcarātra in accordance with
the various statements from the Purānas : quoted [earlier] have as their scope a ‘limited reference’
concerning the authority [of the Pāñcarātra], inasmuch as these [statements] concern specific
adherents. For in the Mahābhārata, too, concerning the question ‘O Sage, Sāmkhya, : Yoga,
Pāñcarātra, Vedas and Pāśupata—are they intent on the same [teaching] or distinct [teachings]?’ it is
made clear [in the answer,] ‘O king of rishis, know that these doctrines are different positions,’ that
Pāñcarātra, etc. are non-Vedic by the mere assertion that they are different paths than the Vedic path’
(ŚAMD2: 118).
⁸⁷ na ca tes: ām: api sarvathaivāprāmānya : m : vaidikādhikāripravartanādyamśe : s:u mohaśāstratve ’py
avaidikādhikārivis:aye prāmānyasadbhāvād
: iti (ŚAMD2: 113).
⁸⁸ For Sudarśanasūri’s argument that Śaiva/Pāśupata teachings have authority only for those who
are not entitled to Vedic study, see: tathā gautamaśāpohatatrayībāhyajanādhikāratvam : ca pāśupatasya
:
tantrāntarānām apy aviśes: ena
: pratīyate—‘Likewise, it is known that those who are outside the Vedic
fold because they were cursed by [the sage] Gautama, are eligible [to study the doctrines and perform
168    - 
Sudarśanasūri’s argument to his own advantage here. While Sudarśanasūri

implies that Śaiva scriptures have authority only for non-Vedic adherents,
Appaya claims that this is true only for Śaiva scriptures that teach the left-
hand path.
The fact that Appaya was thoroughly familiar with Sudarśanasūri’s
sub-commentary on BS 2.2.42 is confirmed by the conclusion of his own sub-
commentary on this sūtra. Here Appaya criticizes the fact that Pāñcarātra scrip-
tures teach its followers to give up the performance of all Vedic rituals (!
sakalavaidikakarmaparityāga). In particular, he disapproves the fact that these
followers justify their rejection of Vedic rituals based on a statement found in the
scripture associated with the so-called Ekāyanaśākhā, a particular ‘branch’ or
recension (śākhā) held to have Vedic origins:
As for the imagined idea that the abandonment of all Vedic rituals, which is
taught in Pāñcarātra, is based on a scriptural statement found in the
Ekāyanaśākhā, [namely, the statement] in the form of a question and its answer
beginning with ‘Sir, should one investigate this dharma that is unrelated to the
religious duties prescribed in the three Vedas? Yes, Sir, one should investigate
[it],’ it pleases only those who fancy that the Ekāyanaśākhā [exists].⁸⁹
In Sudarśanasūri’s sub-commentary on the same sūtra, an objection is raised

against the claim that the Pāñcarātra teachings are compatible with the Vedas on
the basis that Pāñcarātra scriptures teach that one should give up Vedic religious
practice (trayīdharma). Sudarśanasūri replies that Pāñcarātra teachings are in fact
fully compatible with the Vedas, since scripture itself—here he cites the above
passage from the Ekāyanaśākhā scripture held to have Vedic origins—incites one
to investigate non-Vedic religious practice (this is understood to include
Pāñcarātra religious practices) and incidentally abandon the religious practices
taught in the Vedas.⁹⁰ Appaya’s wording in his sub-commentary on BS 2.2.42
the rituals] of Pāśupata and other tantras without distinction’ (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 399). For his
argument that those who are entitled to Vedic study are also entitled to the study of Pāñcarātra, see:
atra vedapañcarātrayor . . . vedādhikr: tatraivarnikādhikāratvam
: itarāyogyatvam : vedapañcarātrayoh:
samuccitya moks: asādhanatvam : coktam—‘On this point, it is taught that the three upper classes eligible
[to study] the Vedas are eligible [to study] . . . both the Vedas and Pāñcarātra; that [the Vedas and
Pāñcarātra] are not suitable for other [adherents]; and that [the Vedas and Pāñcarātra], when
combined, are means to achieve liberation’ (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 412).
⁸⁹ ‘kim
: bhos trayīdharmenāsa : myuktam
: imam : dharmam : jijñāsīta | aum bhor jijñāsītā’
ityādipraśnaprativacanarūpam ekāyanaśākhāgatam : śrutivacanam: pāñcarātroktasakalavaidi-
kakarmaparityāge mūlam iti kalpanā tv ekāyanaśākhām : kalpayatām eva śobhate (ŚAMD2: 119).
⁹⁰ ‘kim
: bhos trayīdharmenāsa : myuktam
: imam : dharmam : jijñāsīta | aum bhor jijñāsītā’
ityādipratyaks:aśrutisiddhatvāt trayīcoditadharmaviśes: atyāgasya tanmūlatayā pañcarātravacasām : na
vedaviruddhatvam—‘The sayings of Pāñcarātra do not contradict the Vedas, since the abandonment of
specific religious practices taught in the Vedas has its source [in available Vedic scriptures], it being the
case that it [i.e., the abandonment in question] is established in a [passage] from available [Vedic]
scriptures beginning with ‘Sir, should one investigate this dharma that is unrelated to the religious
  ́̄. .  169
makes it clear that he is replying directly to Sudarśanasūri. His response is

:
straightforward: this argument is valid only for Vais: navas who believe that the
Ekāyanaśākhā ever existed and has Vedic origins. It has no validity whatsoever for
Śaivas like him, who deny that this ‘scripture’ has any Vedic grounding because
there is no evidence to this effect.
In his Parimala, Appaya elaborates further on this lack of evidence and claims
that Pāñcarātrins invoke the existence of this śākhā to disguise themselves as
brahmins:
Those who think of themselves as follows—‘We, Pāñcarātrins, [belong to the]

Ekāyanaśākhā’—establish [their] aptitude for being brahmins under the guise of
demonstrating the authority of Pāñcarātra. To explain further—the aptitude for
being brahmins on the part of those who studied the Vājasaneyiśākhā and then
perform rites in the manner stated in the Gr: hya[sūtras] of their own branch is
established only on the basis of whether they leave their branch [or not]. As for
those [Pāñcarātrins], however, who perform only the rites prescribed in
Pāñcarātra [scriptures] after giving up the rites prescribed in the three Vedas,
[their aptitude for being brahmins] is established through performing non-Vedic
rituals after having given up Vedic rituals. As a matter of fact, we do not find any
śākhā called Ekāyanaśākhā that is [currently] being studied anywhere, based on
which [certain] rites would be Vedic insofar as they are based on this
[Ekāyanaśākhā, which is itself supposedly Vedic in origin]. Moreover, [their]
postulation [of the existence] of an additional śākhā is not based on [any]
evidence. Therefore, concerning the performance [by the followers of the
Ekāyanaśākhā] of rites that are opposed to those prescribed in the Vedas, we
should either assume that it is misleading or that it is prescribed without
considering that [these rituals] are unfit for Vedic religious practice. This is
how we should understand the matter.⁹¹
duties prescribed in the three Vedas? Yes, Sir, one should investigate [it]’ (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2,
p. 412). According to Rastelli, ‘the Pāñcarātrikas who were also followers of the Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta,
as a Vedāntic tradition, did not belong to the Ekāyana sub-group’ (Rastelli forthcoming). If we assume
that Sudarśanasūri was a Pāñcarātrika (Pāñcarātrin) himself, we should therefore understand, as
Rastelli suggests, that his reference to the Ekāyanaśākhā functioned merely as an argumentative device
for ‘strengthening the unity’ of the Pāñcarātra tradition as a whole against opponents who claimed, like
Appaya would later do, that Pāñcarātrikas do not belong to the Vedic tradition.
⁹¹ pāñcarātraprāmānyasamarthanavyājena
: vayam : pāñcarātrina: ekāyanaśākhina ityādi man-
yamānānām : brāhmany : avaikalyam eva pratis: t:hāpitam. tathā hi—ye vājasaneyiśākhām adhītya
tacchākhāgr: hyoktaprakārena : :
samskārān anutis:t:hanti, tes:ām: śākhāran: datayaiva
: :
brāhmany
avaikalyam : pratis:t:hāpitam. ye tu trayīvihitān samskārān
: :
parityajya pāñcarātravihitān eva samskārān
anutis: t:hanti, tes: ām: vaidikakarmāni : parityajyāvaidikakarmānus:t:hānena tat pratis:t:hāpitam. na hy
ekāyanaśākheti kācana śākhā kvacid adhīyamānā dr: śyate, yena tanmūlatayā te samskārā : vaidikāh:
syuh.: khilaśākhātvakalpanam : ca na pramānamūlam. : :
atas trayīvihitasamskāraviparītasa :
m-
skāravidhānāmśe : vyāmohakatvam : trayīdharmāyogyānadhikr: tya tadvidhānam iti vā kalpanīyam ity
es:ā dik (Parimala 1917: 574–5). Appaya ends his sub-commentary on this adhikarana : with the
170    - 
Appaya may have been directly responding here to the final argument presented
in the Āgamaprāmānya,: where Yāmuna attempts to prove that followers of the
Pāñcarātra tradition are brahmins. Yāmuna refers to two groups of Pāñcarātrins
here, namely those who follow the Vājasaneyaśākhā and those who follow the
Ekāyanaśākhā:
As for what [you] said, namely that the Bhāgavatas are not brahmins because they
:
perform other rites (samskāra) [than Vedic ones] starting from impregnation and
ending with cremation, only [your] ignorance is to be blamed in this case too. It is
not a problem for you, gentle Sir, that those who study the Vājasaneyaśākhā
according to the tradition of [their] family perform the rites of impregnation, etc.,
following the method taught in the Gr: hya[sūtras] of Kātyāyana and others. As for
those, on the other hand, who perform the forty rites prescribed only by the
Ekāyana scripture and have abandoned Vedic religious practices such as reciting
the sāvitrī [mantra], they too do not deviate from brahminhood because they do
not perform the rituals of other śākhās, given that they [already] carry out as they
should the things taught in the Gr: hya[sūtras] of their own śākhā.⁹²
In Yāmuna’s view, the first group of followers, who follow the Vājasaneyaśākhā,
are brahmins because they perform the Vedic rites taught in the authoritative
Gr: hyasūtras of Kātyāyana and others. As for the second group of followers, who
follow the Ekāyanaśākhā, they are also brahmins, despite the fact that they gave up
Vedic religious practices such as the recitation of the sāvitrī mantra. The reason is
that these followers carry out appropriately the rituals taught in the Gr: hyasūtras of
their own śākhā, namely the Ekāyanaśākhā. Since the Ekāyana scripture is held to
be as authoritative as the Vedas, the non-performance of the rituals prescribed in
this scripture would itself constitute a deviation from brahminhood (brāhmanya). :
The assumption here is of course that the Ekāyana scripture exists and is as
authoritative as the Vedas, and this is what Appaya disagrees with in the
Parimala passage above.⁹³ In his view, it makes no sense to establish brahminhood
following sentence: evam : ca siddhavad avaidikatvakīrtanam eva pāñcarātrasya

ekāyanaśākhāmūlatvakalpanam api tucchīkarotīty alam : prapañcena—‘And thus, as just proved,
[Amalānanda, the author of the Kalpataru on which Appaya comments,] condemns even the supposition
that Pāñcarātra is based on the Ekāyanaśākhā as nothing but a proclamation of heterodoxy. Enough said!’
(Parimala: 576).
⁹² yad apy uktam : garbhādhānādidāhāntasamskārāntarasevanād

: bhāgavatānām abrāhmanyam :
iti, tatrāpy ajñānam evāparādhyati. na punar āyus:mato dos:ah, : yad ete vamśaparamparayā
:
vājasaneyaśākhām adhīyānāh: kātyāyanādigr: hyoktamārgena : garbhādhānādisamskārān
: kurvate. ye
punah: sāvitryanuvacanaprabhr: titrayīdharmatyāgena ekāyanaśrutivihitān eva catvārimśatsa
: :
mskārān kur-
vate, te ’pi svaśākhāgr: hyoktam artham : yathāvad anutis:t:hamānā na śākhāntarīyakarmānanus:t:hānād
:
brāhmanyāt pracyavante (van Buitenen 1971: 78–9).
⁹³ For a more detailed description of these two groups of Pāñcarātrins, including a complete
translation of Yāmuna’s passage quoted here, see Rastelli 2003 and Rastelli forthcoming.
  ́̄. .  171
on the basis that followers of the Ekāyanaśākhā gave up Vedic rituals to perform
only the rituals prescribed in the Ekāyana scripture. Not only is the recitation of
the Ekāyanaśākhā no longer performed—recitation being one of the criteria for an
authentic Vedic scripture (see Olivelle 1986: 71–3)—but there is no evidence that
the Ekāyanaśākhā actually ever existed.
4.5 Sudarśanasūri: Appaya’s Nemesis?
The previous analysis has, I hope, made it clear that Appaya engages prominently
with Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta in his Śivādvaita work. Although he is
concerned with Rāmānuja’s views and also, to some extent, Yāmuna’s, his most
important target appears to have been the late thirteenth-century Śrīvais: nava :
scholar Sudarśanasūri. Appaya was familiar with his work at the time of
composing his earlier polemical works. We have seen in Chapter 2, Section 2.2,
that he responds, for instance in the Śivakarnām : r: ta, to Sudarśanasūri’s argu-
ment concerning the denotation of terms such as sat, brahman and ātman.
For Sudarśanasūri, these terms ultimately refer to Nārāyana : alone; Appaya
argues just the opposite, namely that they refer to Śiva. In his later Śivādvaita
work, Appaya continues to challenge Sudarśanasūri’s arguments, particularly
those from the Śrutaprakāśikā, Sudarśanasūri’s most important work. In the
:
Caturmatasārasamgraha, Appaya indeed refers to this work as an important textual
source for understanding specific doctrinal points in Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta.⁹⁴ In the
ŚAMD, as we have just seen, he confronts Sudarśanasūri’s reading of certain BS,
refutes his thesis of aikaśāstrya and denies the authority of Pāñcarātra by reusing
arguments advanced in the Śrutaprakāśikā.
Appaya’s concern with Sudarśanasūri seems natural. Just like Sudarśanasūri
was the first scholar to comment extensively on Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās:ya, the
foundational work of the Viśis: t:ādvaita school, all evidence suggests that Appaya
was the first to comment on Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB, the foundational work of the
Śivādvaita school.⁹⁵ In this sense, Sudarśanasūri is a most natural adversary for
Appaya. Another reason, more significant, lies in the fact that Sudarśanasūri was a
fierce critic of Śaivas. Yāmuna’s adversaries were mostly orthodox Advaitins and
:
Mīmāmsakas, and Rāmānuja was mostly concerned with defending his philo-
sophical theology against tenants of other Vedānta schools, particularly Advaitins
and Bhedābhedavādins. In the pāśupatādhikarana, : for instance, Rāmānuja does
not openly criticize Śaivas/Pāśupatas as a religious group or try to refute the
⁹⁴ tatsiddhiprakāras tu śrutaprakāśikādis: u prapañcito dras:t:avyah—‘The

: way to show this [namely,
that words such as Śiva, Brahmā, etc. refer to Nārāyana]
: is described in detail in the Śrutaprakāśikā,
:
etc.’ (Caturmatasārasamgraha: 234).
⁹⁵ This is hypothetically true insofar as the ŚAMD is the only extant sub-commentary on the BMB,
and insofar as Appaya does not mention any earlier commentator.
172    - 
authority of their scriptures. While he draws attention to their unorthodox ritual

practices, most of his commentary is spent on refuting the philosophical view,
typically ascribed to Śaivas of all denominations, that Īśvara is only the efficient
cause of the world and not its material cause as well, as Vedāntins hold. With
Vātsyavaradaguru, Sudarśanasūri’s predecessor, we begin to see some antipathy
exhibited towards Śaivas. The first and foremost pūrvapaks:in in his Tattvanirnaya
:
is someone who claims that Rudra is the supreme reality. In his siddhānta,
Vātsyavaradaguru refutes this claim and cites various passages on creation and
: alone is
liberation from the Upanis: ads in order to support his view that Nārāyana
the supreme Brahman, the cause of the world and the bestower of liberation.⁹⁶
However, it is Sudarśanasūri who first put forward a fully fledged argument
against the validity of the Śaiva/Pāśupata scriptures in the context of the BS. In
his commentary on the last sūtra of the pāśupatādhikarana : (BS 2.2.38),
Sudarśanasūri defends at length the view that this adhikarana : has a broader
purpose than merely refuting the position that Īśvara is only the efficient cause
of the world (nimittamātreśvarapaks:a), as held by Rāmānuja and other Vedāntins
:
such as Śankara, Bhāskara, and Yādavaprakāśa:
:
The three others [namely, Śankara, Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, the three
predecessors of Rāmānuja] do not accept that this [pāśupata-]adhikarana : aims
to examine the Pāśupata [tradition]; they say that it [merely] aims to refute the
position that Īśvara is only the efficient cause [of the world]. Among them, we say
:
the following to [Śankara and Bhāskara]: the one who wishes to refute the
position that Īśvara is only the efficient cause [of the world] should not simply
refute the inference alone but also the scripture on which it is based, because it is
impossible to refute [the position in question] if the [scripture’s] authority
remains alive.⁹⁷
:
Unlike Śankara, Bhāskara, and Yādavaprakāśa before him, Sudarśanasūri defends
: seeks to refute the Śaiva/Pāśupata tradition
the view that the pāśupatādhikarana
⁹⁶ See, for instance: atredam : sādhyate nārāyana : brahmeti. tatra pūrvapaks: ī manyate rudra
: h: param
eva sarvasmāt param : tattvam iti—‘Here [in this work], the following is established, namely that
Nārāyana : is the supreme Brahman. On this point, a pūrvapaks:in considers that only Rudra is the
:
reality superior to all’ (Tattvanirnaya: 60). The siddhānta begins with: atra pratividhīyate—nārāyana : h:
param : :
brahma, kāranavākye s: u tasyaiva paramakāranatvaśrava : :
nāt moks:aprakarane
: s: u
moks: apradatvamuktaprāpyatvaśravanāc : ca—‘To this, we reply: Nārāyana : is the supreme Brahman
because we are told in [Upanis: adic] statements about creation that [Nārāyana] : alone is the supreme
cause [of the world] and because we are told in sections about liberation that [Nārāyana : alone] bestows
liberation and is attained by the liberated ones’ (Tattvanirnaya: : 76)
⁹⁷ itare trayo ’py asyādhikaranasya: pāśupataparīks:ārthatvam anabhyupagacchanto
nimittamātreśvarapaks:anirākaranaparatva
: : varnayanti.
m : tes: u parān aparāmś: ca prati brūmah— :
nimittamātreśvarapaks:am : nirācikīrs: atā na kevalam anumānam eva, kim : tu tanmūlabhūta āgamo ’pi
nirākāryah, : :tatprāmānye
: jīvati tasya nirāsāyogāt (Śrutaprakāśikā, vol. 2, p. 400). Sudarśanasūri always
refers to Śankara as para and Bhāskara as apara in his sub-commentary.
  ́̄. .  173
as a whole—not only its doctrines and ritual practices, but also the scriptures it
holds to be authoritative. In contrast to previous Vedānta commentators and his
own Śrīvais: nava
: predecessors, Sudarśanasūri is more polemical in his engagement
:
with the Śaiva tradition. Although Venkat:anātha will later pursue Sudarśanasūri’s
:
critique of the Pāśupata tradition, notably in his Paramatabhanga, the latter was
the first to do so in the context of a sub-commentary on the BS. Hence it should
come as no surprise that it is Sudarśanasūri’s views that attract most of Appaya’s
attention in his Śivādvaita work.
5
Reception of Appaya’s Śaiva Works
It should now be clear that Appaya was not only thoroughly acquainted with the
:
writings of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, Sudarśanasūri, and Venkat:anātha, but also that
their interpretation of Vedānta material functioned as the primary ‘other’ in his
elaboration of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary into a fully fledged Śivādvaita Vedānta
siddhānta. In contrast to his earlier Śaiva works, in which the tone is clearly
polemical, Appaya’s mode of engagement in his Śivādvaita works is intellectually
more focused and grounded in a more elaborate theological argumentation.
From the Caturmatasārasamgraha : to the Śivādvaitanirnaya,
: the progression
of Appaya’s Śivādvaita oeuvre reveals an increasing concern for positioning
Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology above Rāmānuja’s. At the same time, in these works
Appaya displays a more tolerant attitude towards the figure of Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na
and His worship—an attitude that reflects his leaning towards pure non-dualism
and its tenet that all deities are ultimately manifestations of the same attributeless
Brahman. However, this does not mean that Appaya was any less concerned with
defending Śaiva religion at this point in his career. To the contrary, his move from
outspoken polemics to theological reflection on the BS is in continuity with his
earlier Śaiva works in terms of upholding Śiva’s supremacy: not only is Śiva the
singular object of praise in the Purānas : and epics and Upanis: ads, but He is also
identical to the non-dual Brahman eulogized in the BS. In this sense, Appaya’s
Śivādvaita oeuvre stands as yet another, arguably more efficient, strategy to
promote and defend Śaiva religion against the increasing dominance of
:
Vais: nava scholarship on Vedānta in his time and place.
In order to establish Śivādvaita as a new school (mata) alongside other prominent
schools of Vedānta, and also to demonstrate its effective superiority over
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta in particular, Appaya makes use of various argumentative
strategies. In some cases, he directly opposes Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta positions, such
as when he refutes Sudarśanasūri’s aikaśāstrya thesis (Chapter 4, Section 4.3) and
:
when he argues, against Venkat:anātha, that Śiva’s śakti is both an independent
being and pure consciousness (Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). In other cases, he refutes
the positions of Śrīvais: nava
: theologians by reusing some of their own arguments,
such as when he attacks the authority of Pāñcarātra (Chapter 4, Section 4.4) with
arguments presumably taken from Yāmuna’s Āgamaprāmānya. : The other
:
strategy employed by Appaya is to rely on the authority of Śankara’s theology to
demarcate Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology from Rāmānuja’s, and to establish the former’s
  ’ ś  175
superiority. By reinterpreting Śrīkan: t:ha’s non-dualist theology in line with pure

non-dualism, and highlighting the fact that Rāmānuja’s theology is not compatible
with the latter, Appaya makes the point that Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of the BS is
more ‘orthodox’, and in effect closer to the original intention of the sūtrakāra.
This is most notably exemplified in his attempt to demonstrate that Śrīkan: t:ha,
:
like Śankara, Sarvajñātman, and other Advaitins, implicitly defends a theory of
apparent transformation (vivartavāda) of the world, while Rāmānuja does not
provide any indication to this effect in his own commentary on the BS.
:
Appaya’s systematic attack of Vais: nava Vedānta was met with swift criticism.
Śrīvais: nava
: and Mādhva theologians of Vedānta started responding to his argu-
ments already during his lifetime. In the century that followed, critical works
engaging with Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre continued to be written by a broader range
:
of Vais: nava scholars, and we still find rejoinders to his Śaiva work in the modern
period. While the Śaiva response was generally more favourable, some Śaiva
scholars also took a critical stance on Appaya’s work and developed their own
position on Vedānta. In the following, I discuss the reception of Appaya’s Śaiva
:
work among Vais: nava scholars of Vedānta (Section 5.1), including Vijayīndra
(Dvaita Vedānta), Purus: ottama (Śuddhādvaita Vedānta), and Śrīvais: nava : theolo-
:
gians such as Mahācārya, Rangarāmānuja, and Varadācārya. After a brief excursus
on the Advaita response to his work in early modern Banaras (Section 5.2), I move
on to discuss the reception of his work among Śaiva scholars, with special
reference to the Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta promulgated by early modern
Vīraśaiva scholars of Vedānta (Section 5.3).
:
5.1 The Vais: nava Response
5.1.1 Dvaita Vedānta: Vijayīndra (c.1514–1595)
Appaya severely condemns Madhva’s interpretation of the BS in the

Madhvatantramukhamardana (and his self-authored commentary, the
:
Madhvamatavidhvamsana), and also refutes some of Vyāsatīrtha’s views on
Mīmāmsā : in the Upakramaparākrama. These two works led to the composition
of a series of anti-Appaya works in Mādhva circles, most notably by Vijayīndra
(c.1514–1595), Appaya’s contemporary. Vijayīndra wrote at least three works
rebutting Appaya’s criticism of Madhva and Vyāsatīrtha, namely the Madhvādh-
vakan: t:akoddhāra (also referred to as the Madhvatantramukhabhūs:ana),: the
Appayyakapolacapet:ikā and the Upasamhāravijaya.
: Following the lead of
Vijayīndra, a number of Mādhva scholars wrote rebuttals to Appaya’s
Madhvatantramukhamardana: Nārāyanācārya: (c.1600–1660; see Sharma 1981:
432) wrote the Advaitakālānala; Satyanātha Yati (also referred to as
Satyanāthatīrtha or Satyanāthatīrthayati) (c.1648–1674; see Sharma 1981: 445)
176    - 
wrote the Abhinavagadā; and Vanamālī Miśra (mid to late seventeenth century;
see Minkowski 2018: 890) wrote the Madhvamukhālamkāra.¹ :
However, Appaya does not show great concern for Madhva’s tradition
either in his early Śaiva works or in his later Śivādvaita works. In Chapter 2,
Section 2.1, we have seen that the ‘evil-minded’ people Appaya has in mind in the
Śivatattvaviveka are prominently Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta. Likewise,
when commenting in the ŚAMD on how previous scholars (pūrvācārya) have
‘soiled’ the interpretation of the BS, Appaya does not engage with Mādhvas; his
focus is entirely on Rāmānuja’s Vedānta tradition. The same lack of concern for
Madhva’s tradition is obvious in the Śivādvaitanirnaya : and the Ānandalaharī
since both works aim to demarcate Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Rāmānuja’s non-dualist
theologies.
Nevertheless, Mādhva scholars did respond, sometimes vehemently, to
Appaya’s Śaiva work. One reason for this lies in the fact that while attacking the
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta tradition, Appaya is effectively denying what any Vais: nava
:
:
theologian of Vedānta believes in: the supremacy of Vis: nu-Nārāya : over Śiva
na
and other deities, and His identification with the Upanis: adic/Vedāntic Brahman.
To my knowledge, Vijayīndra is the first Mādhva theologian to critically engage
with Appaya’s Śaiva theses. He was Appaya’s contemporary and may well have
met him in person: a Sanskrit copper-plate inscription² ascribed to Sevappa
Nāyaka narrates that at the royal court of Tañjāvūr, Vijayīndra met with
Appaya Dīks: ita and a member of the prestigious Tātācārya family. Although
Vijayīndra devotes almost entire works to refuting Appaya’s theses from his
early Śaiva works (see below), he does not regard Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology
as constituting a siddhānta of its own, which might be explained by Vijayīndra’s
close contemporaneity with Appaya. In his doxographic work, the Sarvasid-
dhāntasārāsāravivecana (‘Examination of the Relative Quality of All Established
Positions’), Vijayīndra never mentions Appaya or paraphrases his Śaiva positions.
The little he says about the Śaiva siddhānta concerns Śrīkan: t:ha and is contained in
a few lines at the very end of his refutation of Rāmānuja’s system:
¹ For more details on the Advaitakālānala’s content and its criticism of Appaya’s
Madhvatantramukhamardana, see Sharma 1981: 433–43 and Fisher 2017b: 114–20. The
Abhinavagadā is included in a set of four ‘very new’ (abhinava) takes on other works composed by
Satyanātha Yati, together with the Abhinavacandrikā, the Abhinavatān: dava: and the Abhinavāmr: ta.
While the Abhinavagadā deals with Appaya’s Madhvatantramukhamardana—the gadā presumably
refers to the mace carried by Bhīma (and other characters) in the Mahābhārata, and it is metaphori-
cally used here to ‘crush’ Appaya’s attack of Madhva—the three other works comment on Vyāsatīrtha’s
works, the Tātparyacandrikā, the Tarkatān: dava
: and the Nyāyāmr: ta, respectively. The Abhinavagadā
has yet to be edited. Vishal Sharma has kindly provided me with a scanned copy of an almost complete
manuscript preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (no. 707, nāgarī script); for more
details on the content of the Abhinavagadā, see Sharma 1981: 447–8. The Madhvamukhālamkāra : has
been edited; see the bibliography.
² See above, Introduction, fn. 8.
  ’ ś  177
It should be understood that Śrīkan: t:ha’s system is also refuted by refuting

Rāmānuja’s system in this way [i.e., as just done], because [Śrīkan: t:ha’s] system
for the most part follows the manner [of interpretation adopted in] Rāmānuja’s
system. Even if we accept that another manner [of interpretation] is [adopted] in
[Śrīkan: t:ha’s system], it is not very useful to refute [the latter]. Even if it is taught
in this [system] that only Śiva [and not Nārāyana] : is the supreme cause [of the
world] and that Nārāyana : is an aspect of [Śiva’s] power of consciousness—both
of which contradict [our own] conclusions—[and even if] we have not refuted
this with justification, nevertheless, the fact that Nārāyana : alone [and not Śiva] is
the supreme cause [of the world] was explained in detail in [our previous]
refutation of the Pāśupata system. Therefore, there is no need to do anything.³
Vijayīndra considers that Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology is a mere rehash of Rāmānuja’s

theology. Even if we concede that Śrīkan: t:ha defends distinctive Śaiva views such as
the supremacy of Śiva and the subordination of Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : to Śiva inasmuch
na
as He is a part (śakala) of Śiva’s cicchakti, there is no real purpose in refuting his
position in detail; the most important thing has already been proven earlier,
namely the fact that Nārāyana, : not Śiva, is the cause of the world. This in itself
is sufficient to dismiss Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology en bloc. The only other passage in the
Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana in which Vijayīndra mentions Śrīkan: t:ha is at the
very beginning of the work. He argues there that even if Śrīkan: t:ha defends what
appears to be a vaidika position at first sight, it must be rejected along with the
:
systems of Śankara, Yādavaprakāśa, Bhāskara, and Rāmānuja because it is based,
like these other Vedānta systems, on principles that are not accepted in the
Upanis: ads. He refers to Śrīkan: t:ha as a ‘liar’ (mr: s: āvādin) who boldly claimed
that the Yogācāra and Pāśupata positions are in conformity with the teachings
of the Upanis: ads, without critically examining these two positions separately.⁴ In
³ evam: rāmānujamatanirākaranena : śrīkan: t:hamatam api nirastam [iti] veditavyam, tanmatasya

:
prāyena : rāmānujamataprakriyām anusr: tyaiva pravr: tteh. : yady api prakriyāntaram api tatrāngīkr: tam,
:
tathāpi taddūs: ane: nātiprayojanam. yady api śivasyaiva paramakāranatva : m,: nārāyanasya
: tu
cicchaktiśakalarūpatvam : ca siddhāntaviruddham : tatra pratipāditam,
: tad upapādya na nirākr: tam, :
tathāpi pāśupatamatanirākarane : nārāyanasyaiva
: :
paramakāranatva m: vistarenopapāditam
: ity upara-
myate (Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana: 41). Aside from Rāmānuja’s system, Vijayīndra examines the
following other positions, in order: Cārvāka, Saugatamata (Buddhism), Ārhatamata (Jainism),
Pāśupata, Śaiva (in which he includes Śaiva Siddhānta and Pratyabhijñā), Sāmkhya, : Yoga, Nyāya,
:
Mīmāmsā, : Vyākarana,: Śankara’s Vedānta, Yādavaprakāśa’s Vedānta, and Madhva’s Vedānta.
Rāmānuja’s position comes in between Yādavaprakāśa and Madhva.
⁴ yady api mr: s:āvādinā śrīkan: t:hena ca yogācāramatam : pāśupatamatam : ca aupanis: adīkr: tam iti
na tayoh: pr: thak pariganana
: : dūs: ana
m : m: vā yujyate, tathāpy aupanis: adatvanirākaranārtha
: : tayoh:
m
pr: thak pariganana
: : dūs: ana
m : m : ca yujyate.— ‘And even if Śrīkan: t:ha, being a liar, interprets the
Yogācāra position and the Pāśupata position as being Upanis: adic, so that it is not necessary [for
him] to consider or refute these two [positions] separately, it nevertheless makes sense to consider
and refute these two [positions] separately in order to refute the fact that they are Upanis: adic’
(Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana: 3–4). Though it is true that Śrīkan: t:ha defends the Pāśupata tradition
in the BMB (ad BS 2.2.35–38), it is unclear what Vijayīndra means by the term yogācāramata here. In
his commentary on BS 2.2.27–29, Śrīkan: t:ha refutes the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda idealist position on the
178    - 
his view, Śrīkan: t:ha not only upholds positions that are not attested in scriptures,
but also makes claims that lack logical clarity, quite at odds with the ethos of
Madhva’s tradition.⁵ Although he does not engage in detail with Śrīkan: t:ha’s
theological position in this doxographic work, the fact that Vijayīndra pays due
attention to Śrīkan: t:ha in this context confirms that Appaya’s revival of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary had already gained enough traction during Appaya’s lifetime to
attract Vijayīndra’s attention.
If Vijayīndra does not engage with Appaya’s Śaiva work in the
Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana,⁶ he does so in at least four other works of his.
The Paratattvaprakāśikā is a rebuttal to the Śivatattvaviveka.⁷ In his introduction,
Vijayīndra explains that scriptural statements about the creation of the world
:
(kāranavākya) must refer to a single entity (ekavis:aya), that is, a single creator.
Among the common words used in those statements to denote this creator are sat,
brahman, and ātman. The word sat denotes whatever exists and therefore covers
all entities, independently of their size, shape or nature; the word brahman covers
all sentient and insentient entities; and the word ātman covers both the individual
self and the supreme self. These words are used precisely because they are
common (sādhārana) : to several entities and not confined in meaning to a specific
feature or entity. However, the names of deities such as Nārāyana, : Rudra, etc. are
also used in scriptures to refer to the creator of the world, and these words
denote specific sentient beings with specific features. The question is then: how
do the comprehensive terms sat, brahman, and ātman relate to these more
restrictive terms? Vijayīndra writes the Paratattvaprakāśikā in order to show
that all these terms actually refer to Nārāyana: alone. His argument is straightfor-
ward and the exact opposite of what Appaya had argued in the Śivatattvaviveka:
Nārāyana : is the object of all kāranavākyas,
: the supreme Brahman, and only
His worship leads to liberation. One of the key points he addresses concerns
basis that the existence of [real] external objects can be inferred from such cognitions as ‘I cognise the
pot,’ and on the basis that the analogy drawn by Buddhists between dreams and perceptual cognitions
has no objective basis.
⁵ madhvācāryapravartitam : tu matam : śrutyabhipretārthamūlam : sakalapramānāviruddha

: m: ceti tad
eva tattvabubhutsubhir mumuks: ubhiś ca parigrāhyam— ‘However, the position promulgated by
Madhvācārya is based on principles accepted in scriptures and is not contradicted by any means of
knowledge. Therefore, only that [position] should be accepted by those who desire to know the truth
and those who desire liberation’ (Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana: 4).
⁶ Note that the edition of the Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana I have consulted includes a subsec-
tion, titled Śaivasarvasvakhan: dana,
: within the section refuting the Śaiva position. The colophon
indicates that the Śaivasarvasvakhan: dana: is found in another of Vijayīndra’s works, the
Nyāyamauktikamālā (see below). In this section, Vijayīndra refutes the views of a Śaiva opponent
who appears to be Appaya: the eleven positions enumerated echo some of the views Appaya defends in
the Brahmatarkastava and elsewhere.
⁷ Bahulikar & Hebbar 2011 includes a rough translation of the text without edition. The text remains
to be edited and is preserved in various manuscripts. My discussion here relies on a scanned copy of a
complete palm-leaf manuscript kept at the Adyar Library, no. 816, in nāgarī script. For more details on
the Paratattvaprakāśikā, see Sharma 1981: 405.
  ’ ś  179
the controversial interpretation of the mantra ‘nārāyanapara

: : brahma’ from the
m
Mahānārāyana : Upani :
s ad. Contrary to Appaya, who, as we have seen (Chapter 2,
Section 2.2), agrees with a tatpurus: a interpretation of the compound (i.e.,
: param
nārāyanāt : brahma)—according to which Brahman is ‘greater’ or ‘other’
:
than Nārāyana—Vijayīndra argues that the compound can only be interpreted as
a karmadhāraya. Vijayīndra engages directly with Appaya’s argument and sup-
ports his thesis with passages from other Upanis: ads in which the same mantra is
quoted but a tatpurus: a interpretation cannot be logically defended. Another
question of interest to Vijayīndra concerns the various etymological meanings
attached to the name ‘Nārāyana’, : a topic central to another work of his, the
:
Nārāyanaśabdārthanirvacana, in which he presumably opposes Appaya’s attempt
to interpret the name ‘Nārāyana’ : as referring to Śiva.⁸
The Turīyaśivakhan: dana: is a work by Vijayīndra entirely directed against the
Śivatattvaviveka. The work is divided into two parts: a pūrvapaks: a holding that
there is a ‘fourth Śiva’ (turīyaśiva), distinct from and transcending the trimūrti of
Brahmā, Vis: nu: and Śiva (as Hara or Rudra); and a siddhānta affirming just
the opposite, namely that Nārāyana : is the fourth entity in question, not one of
the three deities of the trimūrti. The entire pūrvapaks:a is taken from the
Śivatattvaviveka, mostly from Appaya’s commentary on verse 13, in which
Appaya praises Śiva as a personified deity that is beyond the interplay of gunas.⁹:
One of the main arguments in Appaya’s commentary concerns whether the
‘fourth Śiva’ in question has a form (vigraha, mūrti) or not. Surely, the three
deities of the trimūrti possess various bodily features. But what about this ‘fourth
Śiva’ who transcends them? As discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1, Appaya holds
that if the supreme Śiva identified with Brahman—the ‘fourth Śiva’—is funda-
mentally devoid of qualities (nirguna), : He nevertheless has a form of His own,
distinct from the form of Śiva-Rudra, the deity that forms part of the trimūrti. The
supreme Śiva is neither on par with the trimūrti nor formless. But how can we be
sure that this transcending entity is really Śiva and not Nārāyana, : for instance?
There are several passages in the Purānas : that praise Nārāyana : as supreme.
Appaya’s reply is that such passages are only meant to emphasize Nārāyana’s :
greatness; they do not prove that He transcends the trimūrti in any way. Even if we
wished to include the form of Nārāyana : within the ‘domain of the fourth’
(turīyakot:i)—given that there is actually no strict rule (niyama) to the effect that
Brahman should have only one form—Nārāyana : would still remain subordinate
⁸ See Sharma 1981: 410–11. I could not consult this work to verify his claim. For more details on this
work, see also Fisher 2017b: 121.
⁹ gunātīto
: ’pi tvam
: saguna
: iva māyāśabalitah: paris: kurvan sāmbam: vapurasitakan: t:ha
: :
m trinayanam
| abhikhyābhih: khyātah: śivabhavamukhābhir vijayase niyantā lokānām : sahariharapankeruhabhuvām
||— ‘Though You transcend qualities [of the phenomenal world], You are mixed with māyā and appear
to be endowed with qualities. Adorned with Ambā, a body, a dark throat and three eyes, You are widely
known by the names of Śiva, Bhava and others. You are victorious, the controller of [all] people as well
:
as Hari, Hara and Brahmā’ (Śikharinīmālā: 11, v. 13).
180    - 
to Śiva, just as His śakti is.¹⁰ Note that this argument, first put forward in the
Śivatattvaviveka, prefigures the subordination of Nārāyana : to Śiva within the
‘domain of Brahman’ (brahmakot:i) that is central to Appaya’s triadic theology
in the RTP.
Vijayīndra’s response to Appaya is not that there is no such thing as a ‘fourth’
entity beyond the trimūrti, but simply that Śiva is not that entity: Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na
:
is. The crux of Vijayīndra’s argument lies in his affirmation that Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na
is the entity primarily referred to in all the Upanis: ads. To prove this, he examines
several scriptural and smr: ti passages in which the expression ‘all Vedas’ (sarve
vedāh,: and other variants, meaning here all Upanis: ads) occurs, and shows that
:
these passages always have Vis: nu-Nārāya : as their object. Since Vis: nu-Nārāya
na : : is
na
the primary referent (mukhyārtha) of the word sarva in all those passages, it follows
that He is also the referent of the word brahman used in the Upanis: ads. At this point,
a Śaiva opponent—who may well be paraphrasing Appaya’s thought here—is
introduced, who of course denies that Vis: nu: can be the primary object of ‘all Vedas’:
Do you say that what is primarily intended to be taught in all the Vedas
: [understood as the deity] included in the trimūrti, or
[i.e., Upanis: ads] is Vis: nu
that it is an [entity] different from Him? The last [option] is not [valid,] because
[it is the] desired outcome [for us]. The first [option] is not [valid either,] because
: is what is primarily intended to be taught in all
it is not conceivable that [Vis: nu]
: is included in the domain of the effects (kāryakot:i) and,
the Vedas: since [Vis: nu]
following what was taught [earlier], that He is counted among the emanations of
Śiva, it is not possible [for Vis: nu]
: to be the cause of the creation, etc. of the entire
world—which is how the supreme Brahman, denoted [by the word] paratattva, is
defined—and, for this reason, it is impossible that [Vis: nu] : be the primary
referent of the word brahman [in Upanis: ads].¹¹
According to this Śaiva opponent, Vis: nu

: cannot be the object of the Vedas [i.e.,
Upanis: ads], and this is for two reasons: first, He belongs to the trimūrti, and as
such, forms an integral part of the phenomenal ‘domain of effects’ (kāryakot:i);
¹⁰ athavāstu turīyakot:āv api nārāyanamūrti: : na hi turīyakot:āv ekarūpaiva mūrtir brahmana

h. : iti
niyamah: . . . turīyakot:inivis:t:asyāpi :
nārāyanasya bhavānīvad eva śivopasarjanatvād iha
vyavasthāpanīyasya śivamūrteh: sarvatah: paratvasya na virodhah— : ‘Alternatively, let the form of
Nārāyana: be in the fourth domain too, for there is no strict rule that Brahman should have only a
single form in the fourth domain . . . [However,] even if Nārāyana : were included in the fourth domain,
He would [still] be subordinate to Śiva, just as Bhavānī [i.e., Śiva’s consort]. For this reason, there is no
contradiction [in concluding that] the form of Śiva specifically established here is supreme in every
:
way’ (Śikharinīmālā: 20–1).
¹¹ nanv evam : mahātātparyatah: sarvavedapratipādyatvam : kim
: mūrtitrayāntargatasya vis: nor
: ucyate?
kim: vā tato ’nyasya. nāntya is: t:āpādanāt. na prathamas tasya kāryakot:inivis:t:atvenoktarītyā
śivavibhūtis:u pariganitatvena
: ca paratattvaśabditaparabrahmalaks: anabhūtak
: r: tsnajagajjanmādi-
:
kāranatvāyogena brahmaśabdamukhyārthatvāsambhavena mahātātparyatah: sarvavedaprati-
:
pādyatvāsambhavād iti (Turīyaśivakhan: dana:
: 32).
  ’ ś  181
secondly, He is subordinate to Śiva as one of His emanations (vibhūti).

Vijayīndra’s reply to this objection is straightforward. The name ‘Vis: nu’ : itself
does not refer to the deity belonging to the trimūrti. Rather, it is the specific name
:
(asādhāranābhidhāna) ‘Nārāyana’—derived
: through the specialization (yogarūdhi):
of the general meaning expressed by the word ‘Vis: nu’—that
: is primarily used to
refer to the deity from the trimūrti. Furthermore, though it is true that Vis: nu :
belongs to the phenomenal realm insofar as He sometimes manifests in the form
of avatāras, His primordial form (mūlarūpa) lies beyond this realm.
In the rest of the Turīyaśivakhan: dana,
: Vijayīndra offers various other argu-
:
ments in support of his view that Vis: nu-Nārāya : transcends the trimūrti and is
na
identical with Brahman. Overall, most of his argumentation replicates for Vis: nu- :
Nārāyana: what Appaya had said about Śiva. Both scholars indeed share the same
metaphysical assumption about the twofold nature of their respective deity: on the
one hand, a phenomenal nature, potentially subject to defects and the interplay of
: and embodied in one of the deities of the trimūrti; and, on the other hand, a
gunas,
transcendent nature beyond the trimūrti, identified with the supreme Brahman.
Both attempt to demonstrate that their deity is the ‘fourth entity’ in question by
means of a creative exegesis of scriptures and smr: ti texts, and by making use of
sophisticated linguistic arguments proving that their deity is the referent of given
words used in scriptures. Note that in this work Vijayīndra also refutes the view
that the Bhagavadgītā establishes the supremacy of Śiva. Though I cannot confirm
:
that he has Appaya’s Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra in mind here, I strongly suspect
so, given that the bulk of the work is directed against Appaya.¹² If this is right, this
would support the current view (see, e.g., Bronner 2011, fn. 52) that Appaya’s
idiosyncratic Śaiva take on the epics generated an immediate critical response
among his contemporaries.
It appears from the above that Vijayīndra, in his anti-Appaya works, is mostly
: supremacy. In the
concerned with the latter’s polemical tirades against Nārāyana’s
three works discussed above, Vijayīndra strictly engages with Appaya’s early Śaiva
works. Although he is well aware of Śrīkan: t:ha’s system, he does not mention
or engage with any of Appaya’s later Śivādvaita works. One exception might
be his Nyāyamauktikamālā.¹³ Sharma maintains that this work is a gloss on
Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā (Sharma 1981: 401), but it rather seems to be an
¹² Vijayīndra clearly refutes the view that the Gītā is intent on Śiva (nanv evam
: gītā śivaparāpi kim
:
na syāt?), but keeps the pūrvapaks:a very brief, which makes it difficult to confirm the identity of the
opponent and the text from which he takes the pūrvapaks:a.
¹³ According to Sharma (1981: 401), a manuscript of this work is preserved at the Oriental Research
Institute in Mysore. In 2010, a partial edition of the work was released online by members of the
Satyatīrtha Foundation as part of the Foundation’s Mission Man-e-Script project, whose aim is to make
unpublished works of Dvaita Vedānta available to the wider public. The editors do not mention
their sources, and do not report any variants in their edition. I have failed to reach them through
email to gather more details. Until we find more manuscripts of this work, my discussion of the
Nyāyamauktikamālā should be regarded as tentative.
182    - 
independent work dealing with the interpretation of BS 1.1.1 (athāto

brahmajijñāsā). More than half of the work is devoted to refuting Rāmānuja’s
interpretation of the word atha in this sūtra, and for this purpose, Vijayīndra relies
extensively on Appaya’s sub-commentary on BS 1.1.1 in the ŚAMD. When
reusing Appaya’s text, Vijayīndra systematically sets aside Appaya’s sub-
commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s words, and intersperses the reused portion with his
own remarks. At times, he also criticizes Appaya’s own positions, such as his
rejection of Sudarśanasūri’s argument in support of aikaśāstrya.
As we have seen in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, Appaya disagrees with
Sudarśanasūri’s view that the word dharma in the first sūtra of the MS (athāto
dharmajijñāsā) announces the theme of the entire śāstra (understood to consist of
the two Mīmāmsās).: Sudarśanasūri holds that the word dharma has two
meanings: the dharma to be realized (sādhya), which covers the performance of
ritual actions leading to beneficial results in the future; and the dharma that is
already realized (siddha), which he identifies with Brahman, an already established
entity (siddhavastu) whose knowledge leads to liberation. While Pūrvamīmāmsā :
deals with dharma in its sādhya aspect, Uttaramīmāmsā : deals with dharma in its
siddha aspect. Appaya engages with this view in the ŚAMD, and Vijayīndra reuses
this portion of Appaya’s argument in his work. Appaya argues that if Jaimini had
understood the word dharma in a broader sense, and not only in the traditional
sense of ritual actions, he obviously would have composed the BS too—but he did
not. Vijayīndra disagrees with Appaya on this point:
This is not so [for two reasons]. [First,] Jaimini necessarily intended the thesis
(pratijñā) [in the sūtra] ‘athāto dharmajijñāsā’ to be applicable both to dharma
[understood in the sense of ritual action] and to Brahman. This is the case since
[he] announces that he undertakes [the composition of] the śāstra to examine
[dharma], after developing the general sense of the word dharma by means of the
word dharma [in the sūtra] with an emphasis on the reason for using the word
dharma in two senses—namely [the dharma] already realized and [the dharma]
to be realized—[the reason] being that [dharma] is a means of achieving the
highest good. [Secondly,] it is appropriate, it being simpler, that the reason for
using the word dharma is the general fact that the latter is a means of achieving
the highest good, whether it is already realized or not. In fact, there is no specific
proof that the only reason for using the word dharma should be to be charac-
terized by the fact of being realized later.¹⁴
:
¹⁴ maivam. athāto dharmajijñāsā iti alaukikaśreyahsādhanatvarūpasiddhasādhyobhayadh-
armapada[pra]vr: ttinimittapuraskārena : dharmaśabdārthamātram : dharmapadenopasthāpya
tadvicāraśāstrārambhapratijānānasya jaiminer tatpratijñāyā dharmabrahmobhayasādhāranasya :
tattadabhisandhigocaratvāvaśyambhāvāt. lāghavena siddhatvasādhyatvaudāsīnyenālaukikaśre-
:
yahsādhanatvamātrasya dharmapadapravr: ttinimittatvaucityāc ca. na hi sādhyatvaviśes: itam eva tad
dharmapadapravr: ttinimittatvena vivaks: itam ity atra viśes: apramānam
: asti (Nyāyamauktikamālā: 32).
  ’ ś  183
This first argument opens up an extensive discussion on the subject of aikaśāstrya,

covering more than half of the entire work, in which Vijayīndra systematically
puts forward and refutes all possible arguments against the unity of the two
:
Mīmāmsās. As far as I am aware, Vijayīndra is the first Mādhva theologian to
do so: before him, Vyāsatīrtha had only briefly refuted Rāmānuja’s aikaśāstrya
thesis in the Tātparyacandrikā.¹⁵ Given his extensive engagement with Appaya’s
position in the Nyāyamauktikamālā, it is likely that Vijayīndra’s position was
purely motivated by Appaya’s bold rejection of Sudarśanasūri’s arguments. In the
rest of the Nyāyamauktikamālā, Vijayīndra discusses the other sūtra words in BS
1.1.1, namely atas and brahman, and explores various issues related to the
investigation of Brahman (brahmavicāra), including eligibility (adhikāra) and
the nature of the four standard prerequisites (sādhanacatus: t:aya) for Vedānta
students. Although he is not as concerned with sectarian issues in this work as
he is in the works mentioned above, at the end of the work, he exhaustively refutes
the Śaiva view, again clearly belonging to Appaya,¹⁶ that the word brahman in BS
1.1.1 means Śiva.
All evidence suggests that Vijayīndra is the first Mādhva scholar to engage with
Appaya’s Śivādvaita work, and the fact that he was a contemporary of Appaya
confirms that the latter’s Śaiva views had already gained some prominence in
scholarly circles in South India by the end of the sixteenth century. However, the
other important Mādhva theologian of the sixteenth century, Vādirāja, does not
show any awareness of Śrīkan: t:ha’s or Appaya’s works in his two most important
philosophical works, the Yuktimallikā and the Nyāyaratnāvalī.¹⁷ Although he
does emphasize the supremacy of Vis: nu : at times (for instance, most of the
Śuddhisaurabha in the Yuktimallikā aims to demonstrate Vis: nu’s : nirdos: atva),
he does not address Śaiva views or try to demonstrate the inferiority of Śiva as
Vijayīndra does. In the seventeenth century, at least two reputed Mādhva scholars
engaged with Appaya’s Śaiva works: Nārāyanācārya: (mentioned above for his
Advaitakālānala, refuting Appaya’s Madhvatantramukhamardana) and
Rāghavendra. The first wrote the Vis: nutattvaviveka,
: a rebuttal of Appaya’s
¹⁵ Vyāsatīrtha briefly alludes to the aikaśāstrya thesis and rejects it en bloc in his commentary on the
word atha in BS 1.1.1 in the Tātparyacandrikā (see Tātparyacandrikā [1]: 42). Rāghavendra, who
comments on this work in the Prakāśikā, closely adheres to Vyāsatīrtha’s text and does not elaborate
further on the question of aikaśāstrya. Vādirāja does not discuss this question in his two major
philosophical works, the Nyāyaratnāvalī and the Yuktimallikā, both of which focus on refuting
Advaita Vedānta theses and do not engage with Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta. All evidence suggests that
Vijayīndra is the first Mādhva theologian to take a real interest in this doctrine.
¹⁶ Vijayīndra engages here with a long portion of Appaya’s sub-commentary on BS 1.4.27 in the
ŚAMD, where Appaya deals with the interpretation of the word māyā in Śvetāśvatara Upanis: ad 4.10
(see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1).
¹⁷ Sharma reports the traditional story according to which ‘Vādirāja encountered Appayya Dīks: ita,
the great champion of Śivādvaita doctrine, in a debate’ (Sharma 1981: 417). However, Sharma does not
provide any evidence or cite any textual sources in support of this story. He also notes that a number of
hagiographical works narrate that Vādirāja debated with Vīraśaiva scholars; he does not mention which
works, and again is silent on his sources.
184    - 
Śivatattvaviveka, and the second critically engages with views from Appaya’s
ŚAMD in a few places in his Prakāśikā on Vyāsatīrtha’s Tātparyacandrikā.¹⁸
5.1.2 Śuddhādvaita Vedānta: Purus: ottama (c.1657/1668–1725)
Appaya’s elaborate defence of Śiva’s superiority over Vis: nu-Nārāya

: : and his
na
claim that Śiva is the Brahman eulogized in the Upanis: ads and the BS also drew
criticism from another Vais: nava : school of Vedānta: Śuddhādvaita Vedānta.
Founded by Vallabhācārya (1479–1531?) in the early sixteenth century, this
school differs from Advaita Vedānta in denying any form of dualism between a
real Brahman and an unreal world. In this ‘pure’ (śuddha) non-dualist system, the
world is as real as Brahman. Hence the manifestation of the phenomenal world is
not illusory insofar as it results from a cognitive error on our part; rather, it is as
real as Brahman insofar as it is an effect of Brahman, the cause. Like Caitanya, Jīva
Gosvāmī, and other Vais: nava: theologians of Vedānta, Vallabhācārya identified
the supreme Brahman with Kr: s: na : and regarded devotion (bhakti) to Kr: s: na: as
playing a crucial role on the path towards liberation. He also held the
Bhāgavatapurāna : in high reverence and considered it more authoritative than
the Vedas.
Vallabhācārya shows no awareness of Śrīkan: t:ha in his most important philo-
:
sophical work, the Anubhā s: ya on the BS. Nor does he discuss Śrīkan: t:ha’s system
in his Bālabodha, a comprehensive doxography in which he criticizes competing
religious systems, including Śaiva and Vais: nava : systems.¹⁹ However, the most
important commentator on Vallabhācārya’s philosophical works, Purus: ottama (c.
1657/1668–1725; see Smith 2005: 425), does engage with Śrīkan: t:ha’s work and
refers to him as a navya Śaiva, which suggests that Śrīkan: t:ha’s views were
relatively new to him and the community of scholars to which he belonged.²⁰ In
the Bhās: yaprakāśa, his commentary on Vallabhācārya’s Anubhā : s: ya, Purus: ottama
paraphrases Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in several places, especially when he wants
to summarize the position of Śaivas on certain matters and compare it with
his own position and those of Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vijñānabhiks: u, and Bhat:t:a
Bhāskara. Like Vijayīndra, Purus: ottama is sensitive to sectarian issues and sys-
tematically represents ‘the Śaiva’ (always Śrīkan: t:ha) as defending incoherent
views. His general impression of Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB is also that it is a rehash of
¹⁸ For the Vis:nutattvaviveka,

: see Sharma 1981: 432. In his Prakāśikā on the daharādhikarana : in the
BS, Rāghavendra paraphrases and refutes a position Appaya upholds in the ŚAMD, namely that the
small space in the heart (daharākāśa) must be identified with Śiva (Tātparyacandrikā [2]: 365).
¹⁹ See Smith 2005: 437–50 for a summary of Vallabhācārya’s take on Śaiva and Vais: nava: systems in
his Bālabodha.
²⁰ See Chapter 1, Section 1.2, fn. 27, for the passage in which Purus: ottama refers to Śrīkan: t:ha as a
navya scholar.
  ’ ś  185
Rāmānuja’s commentary, as when he claims, for instance, that his position on

aikaśāstrya was borrowed directly from Rāmānuja, and that many of his other
positions were actually ‘stolen’ from Rāmānuja’s system (see Chapter 1,
Section 1.1, fn. 10).
Purus: ottama seems to be the first Śuddhādvaita Vedānta theologian to engage
with Appaya’s Śaiva work, particularly in two polemical essays (vādagrantha)
included in his Avatāravādāvalī, namely the Prahastavāda and the
Pan: ditakarabhindipālavāda.²¹
: The Prahastavāda—prahasta here means a
‘slap’—takes its name from its most extensive section (nearly 200 pages in the
edition I consulted), entitled ‘The Refutation of the Confused Śaiva’
:
(bhrāntaśaivanirākarana), in which Purus: ottama refutes Appaya’s Śaiva
theses from his Śivatattvaviveka.²² Purus: ottama begins with a lengthy commen-
tary on the very same verse that attracts the attention of Vijayīndra in his
Turīyaśivakhan: da : namely verse 13, in which Appaya argues that Śiva
: na,
transcends the trimūrti and is identical with the supreme Brahman. He denies
that the scriptural passages Appaya quotes in support of his position concern the
supreme Brahman insofar as the entity praised in those passages has māyā as its
limiting factor (māyopahita), while the supreme Brahman is precisely free from
māyā. To prove this, Purus: ottama successively examines every passage quoted by
Appaya. At the end of his detailed analysis of Appaya’s commentary on verse 13,
he moves to Appaya’s following concluding passage:
evam: ca turīyakot:inivis:t:asyāpi nārāyanasya

: bhavānīvad eva śivopasar-
janatvād iha vyavasthāpanīyasya śivamūrteh: sarvatah: paratvasya na
virodhah: —
matadvayam upanyastam : vis: nutattvavinir
: :
naye |
yad atra yuktam: tad grāhyam : vimr: śya vibudhottamaih: ||
matadvaye ’pi bhagavān ambikāramana : h: śivah: |
aśes: abrahmamūrtīnām ādibhūto jagatpatih: ||
bhairavādyā harasyeva matsyādyāh: śrīpater iva |
brahmavis:nuharās
: tasya kalābhedā iti sthitam ||
:
(Śikharinīmālā 1895: 21)
And thus, even if Nārāyana: were included in the fourth domain, He would [still]
be subordinate to Śiva, just as Bhavānī [i.e., Śiva’s consort]. For this reason, there
²¹ According to Smith, the Avatāravādāvalī ‘is not a single sustained work, but a collection of
independent vādagranthas, or prose treatises (usually short) that discuss individual topics. Though it
was likely edited by Purus: ottama himself as a single “volume”, the 24 vādagranthas contained within it
appear to have been printed separately, at least until 18 of them were published as part of an early
twentieth century Pus: t:imārga doxography called Vādāvalī’ (Smith 2005: 451–2).
²² The section in question is found in Avatāravādāvalī: 35–233.
186    - 
is no contradiction [in concluding that] the form of Śiva specifically established

here is supreme in every way.
:
In ascertaining the [nature of the] Vis: nu-principle, two views have been put
forth. The best scholars should consider and accept whatever is correct on this
subject. In both views, we have established that Brahmā, Vis: nu : [and] Hara are
different parts of the blessed Śiva—the lover of Ambikā, the first among all
manifested forms of Brahman [and] the lord of the world—just like Bhairava
and other [deities are different parts] of Hara, and just like Matsya and other
[deities are different parts] of the Lord of Śrī [i.e., Vis: nu-Nārāya
: :
na].
Appaya holds that only two views are possible as far as Vis: nu’s : nature as a
supreme principle is concerned: 1. Vis: nu : is the “fourth state” (turīya) insofar
as He transcends His own emanations (vyūha)—namely, the divine beings
:
Samkar : Pradyumna and Aniruddha—all of which are endowed with various
s: ana,
qualities such as knowledge, power, etc., and are therefore active on a phenomenal
: belongs to the “fourth domain” (turīyakot:i) on a par with Śiva.
level; and 2. Vis: nu
However, none of these two positions, says Appaya, entails the superiority of
: over Śiva: in both positions, Śiva actually retains His superior position. Just
Vis: nu
as Matsya and other incarnations (avatāra) of Vis: nu : are parts (kalā) of Vis: nu,
: and
just as Rudra is a part of Hara (Śiva the Destroyer), so are the three deities of the
: parts of the supreme Śiva. Even if Vis: nu
trimūrti, including Vis: nu, : were to
transcend the trimūrti and “enter the domain of the fourth state” on a par with
Śiva, He would remain in this domain subordinate (upasarjana) to Śiva, just as
Śiva’s consort. To this bold concluding verse, Purus: ottama replies as follows:
yan matadvayam atroktam: vis:nutattvasya

: :
nirnaye |
tad bhrāntyāgrahamūlatvān nopādeyam : sacetasām ||
(Avatāravādāvalī 1928: 81)
Intelligent people should not accept the two views stated here [in the
Śivatattvaviveka] concerning the ascertainment [of the nature] of the Vis: nu-
:
principle, because they are based on a deluded understanding.
According to Purus: ottama, his own exegesis shows without a doubt that the
:
Bhagavat—the name he gives to the highest expression of Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na—not
Śiva, is the supreme Brahman, and this is for two reasons. First, the Bhagavat alone
is the controller (niyantr: ) of the various powers (śakti) associated with the three
deities of the trimūrti. Secondly, He is the ‘principal thing’ (śes:in) that supports all
other beings, including the deities of the trimūrti, which function as its comple-
mentary and subordinate parts (śes:a). Purus: ottama shares with Vais: nava :
Viśis: t:ādvaitins the view that Brahman relates to beings as the self relates to the
  ’ ś  187
body. Just like the self (ātman) controls the body (śarīra) and is ‘principal’ with
regard to it, so too does Brahman relate to beings as their main controller.
According to Purus: ottama, the Upanis: adic and Purānic : passages cited by
Appaya in support of his position actually highlight such a śes:a–śes: in
:
relationship—integral to Vais: nava Vedānta theologies alone—between Brahman
and the trimūrti. Hence only the Bhagavat, not Śiva, can be identified with
Brahman.
Purus: ottama devotes the rest of his refutation of the Śaiva view in the
Prahastavāda to demonstrating that the Bhagavat constitutes the fundamental
nature of the supreme Brahman, and that Śiva is the most important of His
emanations (vibhūti).²³ To support his view, he engages with various other
arguments from the Śivatattvaviveka—on an array of subjects ranging from the
etymology of certain Upanis: adic words to Appaya’s controversial interpretation of
the mantra ‘nārāyanapara
: : brahma’—as well as from the Brahmatarkastava,
m
:
such as the argument that there is not one but two distinct Gangā rivers (see
Chapter 2, Section 2.3). Though at times Purus: ottama also refutes views upheld by
Haradatta Śivācārya (whom he usually refers to as Jñānadhana or
Sudarśanācārya), his focus in the bhrāntaśaivanirākarana : is virtually limited to
a single ‘confused Śaiva’, namely Appaya Dīks: ita. It is also this ‘rogue’ that
Purus: ottama presumably has in mind when concluding his Prahastavāda as
follows:
ye vaidikam manyatayātyanalpais tudanti sādhūn kat:ukūt:ajalpaih: |

sa es: a tes: u prahr: tah: prahastas tādr: kkhalo yena bhaved vihastah: ||
(Avatāravādāvalī 1928: 246)
There are people who proudly think of themselves as vaidikas, and harass good
people with their bitter small talk. This ‘Slap’ here is hurled at them so that this
kind of rogue loses his strength.
If, in the Prahastavāda, Purus: ottama is solely concerned with Appaya’s polemical
views set forth in his early Śaiva works, he does show a greater awareness of his
later Śivādvaita works in his other essay, the Pan: ditakarabhindipālavāda.
: In this
essay, Purus: ottama engages with the RTP and refutes two arguments found in
²³ tasmāc chrutismr: tipurānādibhir

: nirūpādhikamahāmāhātmyasya bhagavaty eva pratipādanāt
sarvākārasyāpi parabrahmanas : tad eva mukhyam : svarūpam. itarāni : tu taratamabhāvāpannāni
vibhūtirūpāni, : tes: u śivo mukhyavibhūtirūpa ity eva sakalaśāstrīyaniścayah—
: ‘Therefore, since scrip-
: and other works communicate that the unconditioned and supreme
tures, smr: ti [literature], Purānas
greatness lies in the Bhagavat alone, that very [Bhagavat] is the fundamental nature of the supreme
Brahman in every way. As for other emanations [of the Bhagavat] that gradually come to existence, Śiva
is the chief emanation among them. This is exactly the conclusion [reached] in all śāstras’
(Avatāravādāvalī: 233).
188    - 
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, which however he ascribes to the ŚAMD. The first
argument, put forward in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary on BS 1.2.3 (anupapattes tu
na śarīrah),: concerns a passage from the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad in which
Nārāyana : is mentioned, and concerning which doubt is raised as to whether the
word ‘Nārāyana’ : here denotes the supreme Lord or not; Purus: ottama argues
against Śrīkan: t:ha that the word ‘Nārāyana’
: refers to the supreme Lord. The second
argument, put forward by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary on BS 1.2.4
(karmakartr: vyapadeśāt), claims that Śiva is the inner controller (antaryāmin) of
Nārāyana : insofar as the latter is designated in scriptures as an agent (kartr: ) who
meditates (! dhyātr: ) on Śiva, while Śiva is designated as the object (karma) that is
meditated upon (dhyeya). Purus: ottama turns this argument upside down based
on his exegesis of the tenth section (anuvāka) of the Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad.
He argues that in the passage from this anuvāka beginning with ‘[He resorts to]
the thousand-headed god’ (sahasraśīrs:am : devam),²⁴ the deity referred to in the
accusative case is the supreme lord (parameśvara) located in the heart. Since the
word ‘nārāyana’ : is repeated in the accusative a few times, it entails that Nārāyana:
is the object (karma) of worship and what ought to be meditated upon (dhyeya)—
not the opposite, as Śrīkan: t:ha argues. In other words, Nārāyana : is the inner
controller (antaryāmin), not Śiva.²⁵ Though Purus: ottama here refutes arguments
found right in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary and not in the ŚAMD, he nevertheless
concludes with a sarcastic wordplay on the title of Appaya’s magnum opus:
Therefore, [Śaiva scholars]—casting away their shame after having clearly under-
stood that the Śivārkamanidīpikā,
: the ‘Jewel-Light on the Sun of Śiva’, has its
light totally obstructed by the splendour of the Sun of Śiva, since [Śiva] meditates
on Nārāyana : and [as a result of His meditation] obtains [Nārāyana’s]
: brilliance—
should respect the things that I have just explained.²⁶
Purus: ottama’s virulent reply to Appaya—this ‘rogue’ among Śaivas—shows that

Appaya’s views were still being debated in the second half of the seventeenth
century, more than a century after Appaya wrote his Śaiva works under
Cinnabomma’s patronage. Moreover, Purus: ottama was most likely active in
Gujarat, where he presumably settled in the temple of Bālakr: s: na
: in Surat
:
²⁴ The tenth anuvāka is also referred to as the Nārāyanānuvāka. The passage in question (numbered
11.1–2 in the edition I used) reads: sahasraśīrs:am : devam : viśvāks: am
: viśvasambhuvam
: | viśvam:
nārāyana: m : devam aks: aram
: paramam : prabhum || 1 || viśvatah: paramam : nityam
: viśvam: nārāyana
: m:
harim | viśvam evedam : purus: as tad viśvam upajīvati || 2 || (Mahānārāyana : Upanis:ad: 99).
²⁵ Note that Rāmānuja refers to the same passage in his Vedārthasamgraha : in support of the
argument that Nārāyana : is denoted by all the words used in scriptures to refer to the supreme cause,
and also to demonstrate that Śiva is dependent on Nārāyana : (van Buitenen 1956: 133, §98).
²⁶ atah: śivārkamanidīpikā
: :
nārāyanadhyātus tanmahimarūpasya śivārkasya tejasā hatadīdhitir eveti
vibhāvya madukta evārtho muktalajjair ādaranīya : h: (Avatāravādāvalī: 263).
  ’ ś  189
(Shastri 1961: 38). This would confirm something we already know, namely that
by the middle of the seventeenth century, Appaya’s work had already left the Deep
South and circulated in scholarly circles in Western India and beyond.²⁷
5.1.3 The Śrīvais: nava

: Response
Like Mādhvas and Śuddhādvaitins, Śrīvais: nava: theologians of Vedānta responded

to Appaya’s Śaiva works early on. One of the first Śrīvais: nava : scholars to do
so was Appaya’s contemporary, Govindarāja, who flourished in South India
in the middle of the sixteenth century.²⁸ Govindarāja is well known as the
author of the most important Sanskrit commentary on the Rāmāyana, :
:
the Rāmāyanabhū s:ana.
: In this work, Govindarāja refutes positions held in the
:
Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra, a hymn with self-authored commentary
in which Appaya refutes the Śrīvais: nava: interpretation of the epic defended
:
by Venkat:anātha and others. Though Govindarāja does not mention Appaya by
name—he refers to him merely as a recent (navīna) scholar—the positions he
paraphrases unmistakably belong to Appaya (Bronner 2011: 60, fn. 52).
Govindarāja wrote at the Ahobilamat:ha (located in the Kurnool district in
modern-day Andhra Pradesh), a Śrīvais: nava : institution heavily patronized by
Vijayanagara kings at a time when Śrīvais: navism
: was on the rise in the capital
(Rao 2015: 113). His swift rebuttal of Appaya’s polemical work is indicative of the
atmosphere of debate that prevailed between Śaiva and Śrīvais: nava : scholars at the
time. Not long after Govindarāja, another Śrīvais: nava: scholar, presumably named
:
Samarapungava, wrote the Pañcamāmnāyasāra in response to Appaya’s treatise
:
on the other epic, the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra (discussed in Chapter 2,
Section 2.4).²⁹ The Pañcamāmnāyasāra had a certain success: it is paid homage
to in a later Śrīvais: nava
: :
work also dealing with the Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra,
the Mahābhāratatātparyaraks: ā.³⁰
²⁷ For the impact of Appaya’s scholarly work on Mīmāmsā, : Vedānta and poetics in early modern
Banaras, see Bronner 2015b: 15–18, and also below, Section 5.2, this chapter. It is worth mentioning
here another important Śuddhādvaita commentator on Vallabhācārya’s work, Giridhara (fl.
1850–1900), who was familiar with Purus: ottama’s work and shared with him the view that
Śivādvaitins stole from Rāmānuja’s tradition (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1, fn. 10). Giridhara was active
in Banaras (see NCC, vol. 6, p. 20).
²⁸ Rao dates Govindarāja’s probable range of activity around 1550–1575 based on the identity of his
teacher, Śat:hakopayati (or Śat:hakopadeśika), and his citations of contemporary figures (Rao 2015: 9).
:
²⁹ For the claim that Samarapungava is the author of this work, see NCC, vol. 11, p. 41, as well as
Raghavan 1979: 67. However, the entry on the Pañcamāmnāyasāra in the Adyar Descriptive Catalogue
:
of Sanskrit Manuscripts (vol. 10, p. 317) mentions the author to be a certain Cholasimhapura. In any
case, the excerpt cited in the entry indicates that the author of this work was a student of the well-
known scholar Mahācārya (NCC, vol. 11, p. 68), who was himself Appaya’s contemporary (see below).
³⁰ This work is attributed to the eighteenth-century (?) scholar Paravastu Vedāntācārya. For the date
of Paravastu Vedāntācārya, see NCC, vol. 31, p. 248, and Raghavan 1979: 79. This scholar should
:
not be confused with Paravastu Venkat:adeśika, his grandfather, whom Vedāntācārya refers to in a
190    - 
The Śivatattvaviveka and the shorter Śivakarnām : r: ta also attracted criticism

soon after their composition. The great Śrīvais: nava
: scholar Mahācārya—variously
referred to as Vādhūla Śrīnivāsācārya, Dod: dayācārya
: and Rāmānujadāsa, and who
all evidence suggests was a contemporary of Appaya³¹—wrote an entire work
opposing the Śivakarnām
: r: ta, titled Śrutitātparyanirnaya.
: He begins this work as
follows:
May the glorious Nārāyana, : the cause of the creation, etc. of the entire world, the
inner self of Śiva and other [deities], compassionate towards those who are
honest, protect us . . . Nārāyana: is the supreme Brahman; not Brahmā, not
:
Śankara [i.e., Śiva]. He is the teacher of people, the self of all, and the Purus: a
: is the self of all and pure is
greater [than everything] . . . The fact that Nārāyana
certain because the fact that Brahmā [and] Īśāna [i.e., Śiva] are not [the self of
all and pure] is very evident insofar as it was denied in scriptures. That Brahmā,
Rudra and other [deities] are the cause [of the world] has been explicitly
refuted. Though such things are [already] proclaimed in the Upanis: ads and
other works, some [scholars] have written in some of [their compositions] that
[Brahmā, Rudra or other deities] are undoubtedly superior to [Nārāyana]. : These
compositions have been refuted extensively and systematically by great sages
such as Vyāsārya, Vedāntācārya, Mahārya and other [Śrīvais: nava : scholars].
Nonetheless, the Śrutitātparyanirnaya: comes forth today in order to refute the
excessively obstinate and conceited Śivakarnām : r: ta.³²
: :
benedictory verse (tam : mangalagunopeta
: m: paravastugurum : bhaje). He also refers to Venkat:adeśika’s
son, his own father, Ādivarahācārya (śrīmadādivarāhāryān paravastuguroh: sutān | vande yes: ām :
padāmbhojam
: : śarana: m : mama nihsamam
: ||). See NCC, vol. 31, p. 73, for details on Paravastu
Venkat:adeśika, and Raghavan 1979: 60–1 for details on both Paravastu figures. In the
Mahābhāratatātparyaraks:ā, Paravastu Vedāntācārya pays homage to the Pañcamāmnāyasāra in
another benedictory verse (prapadye pañcamāmnāyam : dugdhāmbudhim ivāparam) as well as in the
conclusion. For the benedictory verses mentioned here, see Adyar Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit
Manuscripts (vol. 10, p. 356). The Mahābhāratatātparyaraks:ā not only focuses on the refutation of
:
Appaya’s Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra, but also engages with the Brahmatarkastava and the
:
mgrahastotra. Vishal Sharma has completed an edition of this work for his
doctoral dissertation; I am grateful to him for kindly sharing with me a nāgarī-script paper manuscript
of the Mahābhāratatātparyaraks: ā (GOML, R6813).
³¹ For the date of Mahācārya, see Raghavan 1979: 57 and Charumathy 1999 (beginning of Chapter 2,
unpaginated).
³² śrīmān nārāyano : ’śes:ajagajjanmādikāranam
: | antarātmā śivādīnām avyād avyājavatsalah: || [ . . . ]
:
nārāyana: h: param : brahma na brahmā na ca śankarah: | śāstā janānām : sarvātmā tato jyāyāmś : ca
purus:ah: || [ . . . ] nārāyanasya
: : nirmalyam api niścitam || śrautān nis: edhān na brahma
sārvātmyam
neśāna iti visphut:āt | kan: t:hoktyā brahmarudrādeh: kāranatva
: : nirāk
: :
m rtam || udghus: yatsv api vedāntes: v
evamādis: u kecana | nibabandhus tato ’nyatra pāramyam aviśānkayā || prabandhās te pratipadam :
pratyākhyātāh: savistaram | vyāsāryavedāntācāryamahāryādyair mahātmabhih: || tathāpy
:
atyāgrahodīrnaśivakar : r: tasya tu | nirāsāyonmis:aty adya śrutitātparyanirnaya
nām : h: || (Adyar
Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, vol. 10, pp. 424–5).
  ’ ś  191
Although eminent Śrīvais: nava: scholars such as Sudarśanasūri (Vyāsārya),

:
Venkat:anātha (Vedāntācārya), and Periyappadeśika (Mahārya?)³³ have already
established that Nārāyana : is supreme, and refuted arguments to the contrary
advanced by previous scholars, Mahācārya writes the Śrutitātparyanirnaya : in
order to attack the recent work of an obstinate Śaiva scholar—Appaya’s
Śivakarnām
: r: ta. Like Vijayīndra and Purus: ottama, Mahācārya pays attention to
the Upanis: adic and Purānic: passages Appaya quotes in this work in support of
Śiva’s supremacy, and argues that they actually prove Nārāyana’s : supremacy.
Mahācārya was not the only Śrīvais: nava : scholar to respond to the
Śivakarnām
: r: ta: the Vedāntakaustubha by Paravastu Vedāntācārya is also a rejoin-
der to this work (see below). As far as I know, only Śrīvais: navas
: wrote rebuttals to
the Śivakarnām
: r: ta, which supports my earlier claim (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2)
that Appaya had Śrīvais: navas
: in view while writing this work.
A century or so after Mahācārya, a rebuttal to Appaya’s Śivatattvaviveka was
composed: the Pañcamatabhañjana. This work is commonly attributed to
Pañcamatabhañjana Tātācārya, a member of the Tātācārya family of Et:t:ūr. The
seventeenth-century Śrīvais: nava
: hagiography by Anantācārya, the Prapannāmr: ta,
narrates a rivalry between him, Appaya and Mahācārya:
The eminent Appaya Dīks: ita, best among the experts on the Śaiva system,
gleamed with great fame in Cidambaram by conquering his enemies. Appaya
Dīks: ita composed the work titled Advaitadīpikā [i.e., the Śivārkamanidīpikā³⁴].
:
:
Hostile to the Lord [i.e., Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na], he was always devoted to the Śaiva
religion.
Having heard about this [work], Mahācārya composed a great work titled
Can: damāruta
: to match it. The Advaitadīpikā [i.e., the Śivārkamanidīpikā]
: was
destroyed by this Can: damāruta.
: How on earth could the light of a lamp (dīpikā)
[i.e., Appaya’s Śivārkamanidīpikā]
: [endure] in the presence of a fierce wind
(māruta) [i.e., Mahācārya’s Can: damāruta]?
:
³³ Periyappadeśika was possibly Mahācārya’s father and another of Mahācārya’s gurus (Charumathy
1999, Chapter 2, unpaginated).
³⁴ The Advaitadīpikā is a work by Nr: simhāśrama, a predecessor of Appaya whom the tradition
regards as a source of inspiration for the latter’s Advaita works. However, the evidence in support of
this is far from convincing; see Gotszorg 1993: 7–10 and Minkowski 2011: 224. The Advaitadīpikā is a
work responding to dualists (in particular, their thesis that there is difference (bheda) between jīvas,
and between jīvas and Brahman), and does not engage with Rāmānuja’s system per se; it would be odd
if the Can: damāruta
: was a rebuttal to this specific work. As a matter of fact, the Advaitadīpikā was
attacked by an adherent of the Mādhva tradition: Vijayīndra composed a rejoinder to the
Advaitadīpikā, the Advaitaśiks:ā (Sharma 1981: 412). According to Charumathy (1999, beginning of
Chapter 2, unpaginated), Mahācārya composed the Can: damāruta
: to answer ‘the criticisms raised by
Nr: simhāśramin
: in his Bhedadhikkāra, against the Śatadūs:anī’.
: However, the Bhedadhikkāra is also, as
the title suggests, a critique of the dualist concept of bheda. In light of this, it is more likely that the
hagiographer Anantācārya had the ŚAMD, Appaya’s most famous Śaiva work, in mind. As we shall see
below, Mahācārya addresses Appaya’s magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta in the Can: damāruta. :
192    - 
Tātayācārya protected the undefeated doctrine of the illustrious Rāmānuja by

composing the Pañcamatabhañjana. The resplendent Mahācārya protected that
[same] undefeated doctrine of the best of ascetics [i.e., Rāmānuja] by composing
the Can: damāruta.³⁵
:
This excerpt from the Prapannāmr: ta asserts that Pañcamatabhañjana Tātācārya

wrote the Pañcamatabhañjana, presumably to oppose Appaya’s ŚAMD. This
claim is not entirely accurate. First, the Pañcamatabhañjana was most probably
:
written by Rangarāmānuja (late seventeenth century),³⁶ Tātācārya’s student, and
only revised by Tātācārya, for the author of the Pañcamatabhañjana praises
Tātācārya for the help he offered him while the work was being written.³⁷
Secondly, the Pañcamatabhañjana engages with the Śivatattvaviveka, not with
the ŚAMD. In the introduction, the author does not mention Appaya by name
but refers to a ‘calamity’ (upadrava) caused by ‘recent rogues’ (durvr: ttair
arvācīnaih: . . . ).³⁸ The emphasis on Appaya’s Śaiva polemical views in the rest of
the work suggests that Appaya is being targeted here. The title of the work conveys
that ‘five views’ (pañcamata) are being refuted. These five views are: 1. the view
that there is a single self in all beings; 2. the view that there is a single deity
presiding over the world; 3. the view that the three deities constituting the trimūrti
are the same (tulya) in terms of their knowledge, powers, etc.; 4. the view that
these three deities form a unity (aikya); and 5. the view that Śiva is the ‘fourth
entity’ transcending these three deities.³⁹ Like Vijayīndra and Purus: ottama, the
³⁵ śaivaśāstravidām : śres:t:hah: śrīmān appayadīks: itah: || citrakūt:e jitārātir aśobhata mahāyaśāh: |

advaitadīpikābhikhyam : grantham appayadīks: itah: || cakāra bhagavaddves: ī śaivadharmaratah: sadā |
mahācāryah: sa tām : śrutvā tasyāh: pratibhat:e tadā || can: damārutanāmāna
: m: vidadhe grantham utta-
mam | advaitadīpikānāśas tato ’bhuc can: damārutāt
: || pracan: damārute
: dīpaprakāśah: syāt katham :
bhuvi | vidhāya tātayācāryas tat pañcamatabhañjanam | śrīrāmānujasiddhāntam avyāhatam
apālayat || mahācāryo mahātejāh: sa kr: tvā can: damārutam
: | avyāhatam : yatīndrasya tam: siddhāntam
apālayat || (Ayyangar 1986: 203).
³⁶ See NCC, vol. 22, p. 281.
³⁷ tātāryakalitam : hr: dyam : matapañcakabhañjanam | sahakr: tvā sadā me syād apahr: tyākhilam :
tamah: ||— ‘ . . . impelled by [my teacher] Tātārya [i.e., Tātācārya], with whom I worked constantly
on the delightful Pañcamatabhañjana and who dispelled all darkness for me . . . ’ (Adyar Descriptive
Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, vol. 10, p. 316). According to the editor of the Catalogue, Tātācārya
would have revised the work and gave it its title, which would explain why the tradition regards him as
the author and why the epithet ‘Pañcamatabhañjana’ was added to his name. The entry on the
:
Pañcamatabhañjana in NCC (vol. 11, p. 40) also mentions the author to be Rangarāmānuja.
³⁸ The Pañcamatabhañjana was fully edited in a dissertation written in Sanskrit and submitted to
the Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati, in 1982. The dissertation’s title is Śrī
Tātadeśikaviracitasya Pañcamatabhañjanasya Samīks:ātmakam : Sampādanam.
: My brief discussion of
this work is based on photographs I took from the introduction in Tirupati in 2017.
:
³⁹ These five views refer to a verse from Venkat:anātha’s Rahasyatrayasāra, namely the introductory
verse (in Sanskrit) of the sixth chapter on the nature of the supreme deity (paradevatādhikarana): :
ātmaikyam : devataikyam : trikasamadhigatā tulyataikyam : trayānā : m: anyatraiśvaryam ityādyani-
:
punapha :
nitīr ādriyante na santah— : ‘There is a single self; there is a single deity; the three [deities of
the trimūrti] are, when properly understood, the same [in terms of their knowledge, powers, etc.]; the
three [deities of the trimūrti] are one; something else [than these three deities] is the Lord. Good people
disregard such statements made by naive people’ (Rahasyatrayasāra: 218).
  ’ ś  193
author of the Pañcamatabhañjana is concerned with the fifth view, namely

the idea, developed by Appaya in the Śivatattvaviveka, that Śiva transcends the
trimūrti.
Overall, Śrīvais: nava
: theologians responded to Appaya’s early Śaiva work with
more vigour than other Vais: nava: theologians of Vedānta. Not only did a greater
number of them write individual works directed against Appaya, but some of
these works continued to be written well into the early modern period: Paravastu
Vedāntācārya wrote a rebuttal to the Śivatattvaviveka and the Śivakarnām : r: ta,
the Vedāntakaustubha, a century or so after the Pañcamatabhañjana was
composed.⁴⁰ Unlike other Vais: nava : theologians of Vedānta, Śrīvais: navas
: also
extended their criticism beyond Appaya’s polemical works to include his
Śivādvaita works. To my knowledge, the first Śrīvais: nava : scholar to engage with
Appaya’s Śivādvaita work is Mahācārya. In the Prapannāmr: ta, Anantācārya
claims that the Can: damāruta
: is a rebuttal to Appaya’s ŚAMD. This is once again
:
not entirely accurate: the Can: damāruta
: is a commentary on Venkat:anātha’s
Śatadūs:anī—a
: polemical treatise refuting Advaita Vedānta positions—in which
Mahācārya deals with various topics pertaining to Advaita metaphysics and epis-
temology. However, he does critically engage in this work with arguments found in
Appaya’s magnum opus of Śivādvaita.
:
In his commentary on Venkat:anātha’s proof in support of the unity of
śāstras (aikaśāstryasamarthanavāda), Mahācārya introduces a long pūrvapaks:a
attributed to ‘someone who makes use of shaky arguments’ (kaścit pāriplavamiti).
The scholar in question is Appaya: the arguments Mahācārya paraphrases are all
found in the ŚAMD, specifically in the portion of his sub-commentary on BS 1.1.1
where he discusses aikaśāstrya. For instance: the pūrvapaks:in first mentions, then
refutes, an argument, based on the grammatical tradition, in support of the unity
:
of the two Mīmāmsās: :
just as the Kāśikāvr: tti on Pānini’s sūtras constitutes a single
work even though two authors, namely Jayāditya and Vāmana, contributed to its
composition, in the same way, the two Mīmā : msās
: also constitute a single work
despite the fact that they have different authors, namely Jaimini and Bādarāyana. :
This argument, put forward by Sudarśanasūri in the Śrutaprakāśikā, is refuted by
Appaya in the ŚAMD. The pūrvapaks: in also refutes the above-mentioned
argument pertaining to the word dharma, understood both as ritual action
and Brahman. We have seen in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, that this argument,
which again belongs to Sudarśanasūri, is one of the key arguments refuted by
Appaya in the ŚAMD as well as in his Vādanaks: atramālā.⁴¹ In his siddhānta,
Mahācārya claims that whatever Appaya thinks about the doctrine of aikaśāstrya
⁴⁰ I could not consult manuscripts of this work. A few details can be gathered from the Adyar
Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, vol. 10, p. 401.
⁴¹ The relevant pūrvapaks:a section in the Can: damāruta
: is found in Śatadūs: anī:
: 86–8. Mahācārya
begins his siddhānta at p. 88 with tad etat sarvam . . .
194    - 
is due to his ‘misfortune of not having [properly] studied the good words of the
ācārya’.⁴² The ācārya in question is none other than Sudarśanasūri himself, from
whose Śrutaprakāśikā Mahācārya quotes long passages here to systematically
refute Appaya’s position. Mahācārya’s focus on Appaya and Sudarśanasūri not
only confirms what we have already shown in Chapter 4, namely that Appaya had
Sudarśanasūri in mind in his critique of aikaśāstrya, but also that Appaya’s
rejection of the distinctive position upheld by Śrīvais: nava
: scholars on the unity
of Mīmāmsās : was quickly addressed by his Śrīvais: nava
: contemporaries. As far as
I know, Appaya is the first theologian of Vedānta ever to have refuted this
position.⁴³
Mahācārya also engages with Appaya’s Śivādvaita work in his Pārāśaryavijaya,
a commentary on the BS in line with Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās: ya.⁴⁴ While he mostly
criticizes in this work positions upheld by Dvaitins and Advaitins, in a few places
he also refers to views upheld by ‘Nīlakan: t:ha’ or ‘followers of Nīlakan: t:ha’s
position’ (nīlakan: t:hamatānusārin), most certainly a reference to Śrīkan: t:ha and
Appaya.⁴⁵ The longest pūrvapaks: a attributed to Nīlakan: t:ha in the Pārāśaryavijaya
is found in Mahācārya’s commentary on BS 1.1.1, and concerns the question of
whether the inquiry into Brahman (brahmajijñāsā) should be undertaken or not.
The pūrvapaks: a is taken directly from Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB ad BS 1.1.1 and is
interspersed with long sections from Appaya’s ŚAMD on the same sūtra. Once
again, the fact that Mahācārya reports this position in his commentary on the BS,
alongside Advaita and Dvaita positions, suggests that the Śivādvaita position had
by then already gained enough traction in South India to draw the attention of
Śrīvais: nava
: scholars.
Another Śrīvais: nava
: scholar familiar with Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta work
:
was Rangarāmānuja (late seventeenth century), whom we mentioned earlier in
:
connection with the Pañcamatabhañjana. Aside from this work, Rangarāmānuja
wrote commentaries on the ten major Upanis: ads (hence he is also known as
the daśopanis: adbhās:yakāra) and a number of explanatory works on the BS in
line with Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās: ya. In his sub-commentary on Sudarśanasūri’s
:
Śrutaprakāśikā, the Bhāvaprakāśikā, Rangarāmānuja displays the influence
of Appaya’s Vedānta terminology and ideas, and at times reuses arguments
⁴² tad etat sarvam ācāryasūktyaśravanahetudaurbhāgyanibandhanam

: (Śatadūs: anī:
: 88).
⁴³ As discussed earlier in this chapter, Vijayīndra seems to be the first Mādhva scholar to engage in
detail with the issue of aikaśāstrya, and was likely inspired by Appaya in this regard. Appaya’s Advaita
predecessor, Nr: simhāśrama,
: does not discuss this issue as he is mostly preoccupied in his work with
refuting positions taken by Mādhvas. I do not know of any Advaitin before him who discussed this
issue.
⁴⁴ The edition I have consulted contains only the first pāda of the first adhyāya.
⁴⁵ I have identified two passages where Mahācārya explicitly refers to Nīlakan: t:ha or his followers.
The first passage, discussed here, is taken from Appaya’s ŚAMD, and not from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commen-
tary. I have not been able to locate the second passage in Appaya’s ŚAMD ad BS 1.1.1 (the passage is
found in Mahācārya’s discussion of BS 1.1.1), but I surmise it could be located elsewhere in the text or
in another of Appaya’s works.
  ’ ś  195
found in the ŚAMD.⁴⁶ His indebtedness to Appaya is more explicit in the

:
Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā (otherwise known as the Arthadīpikā), Rangarāmānuja’s
:
own commentary on the BS. In this work, Rangarāmānuja borrows extensively, and
often verbatim, from the Nayamayūkhamālikā, Appaya’s exposition of
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta included in the Caturmatasārasamgraha.
: Nearly every
sūtra is introduced in the same way in both works, and in several cases the content
of the commentary is virtually the same. Table 5.1 provides a single example from
their respective commentaries on BS 1.1.21.
:
The fact that Rangarāmānuja relies extensively on Appaya’s exposition of
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta in his own commentary on the BS is significant.⁴⁷ Not
only does it show that he considered Appaya’s exposition as an authoritative work
:
on his own tradition; it also shows that Rangarāmānuja did not approach
Appaya’s Vedānta work from a strictly critical perspective. Unlike Mahācārya
:
and Sudarśanasūri before him, Rangarāmānuja does not reject Appaya’s Śaiva
positions or criticize his leaning towards Advaita Vedānta. Although he could
certainly have done so in the Bhāvaprakāśikā, for instance, in response to
Appaya’s criticism of the Śrutaprakāśikā, he does not. This does not entail,
however, that the attitude of Śrīvais: nava
: scholars became more receptive towards
Appaya’s Śaiva work as time went on. As noted earlier, nearly a century after
:
Rangarāmānuja, Paravastu Vedāntācārya was still opposing Appaya’s Śaiva theses.
This anti-Appaya trend in fact continued throughout the nineteenth and twenti-
eth centuries.
Perhaps the most virulent attack against Appaya’s Śivādvaita Vedānta work is
to be found in a short polemical treatise published in the 1960s by the Śrīvais: nava
:
pandit Varadācārya. In his Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana, Varadācārya argues that
Appaya literally ‘invented’ the figure of Śrīkan: t:ha and himself composed the
BMB in order to attack Rāmānuja’s Vedānta tradition. Varadācārya offers various
arguments in support of this, among which the fact that Appaya addresses only
Rāmānuja in his sub-commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s fifth introductory verse in the
ŚAMD. In this verse, as we recall (Chapter 4, Section 4.1), Śrīkan: t:ha claims that
⁴⁶ In my reading of the ŚAMD, I have encountered expressions that only have a parallel in the
:
Bhāvaprakāśikā. For instance, Appaya uses the compound prakaranopapadādisa :
mkocakābhāva (or
variants of it) in the ŚAMD (ad BS 1.4.25), the Nayamayūkhamālikā and his commentary on the
Yādavābhyudaya; the only other place where I found this compound is in the Bhāvaprakāśikā. In his
:
commentary on BS 1.4.28, Rangarāmānuja very closely paraphrases one of Appaya’s arguments
found in the ŚAMD ad BS 1.4.23 (beginning with yady atra sarvavijñānam : prādhānyād abhiprāyam :
gauna: :m
: syāt . . . ). Note that some of Appaya’s Advaita Vedānta works may also have had an influence
on Rangarāmānuja. According to Gopalachariar Brahmasri, who wrote the introduction to the Sri Vani
:
Vilas edition of Appaya’s Varadarājastava, Rangarāmānuja ‘quotes appreciatively and at length from
Dikshitar’s Parimalam and Nyayarakshamani although the absence of any reference by name to the
work or author quoted from, may leave the reader in ignorance of the source’ (Varadarājastava: ix).
I have not yet located these quotations.
:
⁴⁷ Rangarāmānuja extensively reuses material from the Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā in the
Vis:ayavākyadīpikā, his commentary on the Upanis: adic passages referred to in Rāmānuja’s Śrībhās: ya.
Hence Appaya’s words also figure in this work.
Table 5.1 Comparison of the Nayamayūkhamālikā and the Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā ad BS 1.1.21. I have underlined the differences between
the textual passages.
Nayamayūkhamālikā ad BS 1.1.21 Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā ad BS 1.1.21
jagatkārana : m: vastu īksa: naśrava

: nāt
: ‘tat tvam asī’ty upasamhārāc
: ca mā jagatkārana
: m: vastu īksa: naśrava
: nāt
: ‘tat tvam asī’ty upasamhārāc
: ca mā
bhūt pradhānam : mābhūc ca jīvasāmānyam : tato bhedakanirdeśāt, tathāpy bhūt pradhānam : mābhūc ca jīvasāmānyam : tato bhedakanirdeśāt, tathāpy
upacitapunyaviśe
: s: ānā
: m: brahmendracandrasūryādīnām : viśvāmitrādīnām upacitapunyaviśe
: s: ānā
: m: brahmādīnām : viśvāmitrādīnām r: s: īnā
: m: vā
r: sī
: nā
: m
: ca madhye yah: kaścij jīvaviśesa
: h: kalpabhedena syāt, madhye yah: kaścij jīvaviśesa
: h: kalpabhedena syāt,
tatrānandavallyuktajīvasāmānyavyāvartakasakalamahimopapatter iti tatrānandavallyuktajīvasāmānyavyāvartakasakalamahimopapatter iti
: a : b
pratyavasthānāt sangatih. : śankāyām: etad adhikaranotthāna
: m.
:
a
Caturmatasārasamgraha:
: 140.
b
Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā: 28.
  ’ ś  197
previous scholars (pūrvācārya) misinterpreted the BS. According to Varadācārya,

Appaya’s exclusive focus on Rāmānuja in his sub-commentary on this verse
:
undoubtedly proves his deep antipathy towards Vais: navas:
When hearing the words ‘[these Brahmasūtras by Vyāsa] have been soiled by
previous scholars,’ the existence of several commentaries [on the BS composed]
before Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary naturally comes to everyone’s mind. However,
out of those [commentaries on the BS], Dīks: ita cites only Rāmānuja’s commen-
tary as an example. In fact, a commentator of sound reason and without envy
should really have cited other commentaries as well, in accordance, for instance,
with the plural used in the root text [i.e., the plural word pūrvācāryaih: used in
Śrīkan: t:ha’s verse] or by making use of the principle of the rice in the cooking
pot.⁴⁸ Dīks: ita neglected all of this and misconstrued the words on which he
commented, namely ‘[these Brahmasūtras by Vyāsa] have been soiled by previ-
ous scholars,’ by taking only Rāmānuja’s commentary as an example. What
:
hatred he displays towards Vais: navas!⁴⁹
This is a point I have already raised when discussing Śrīkan: t:ha’s verse in
Chapter 4, Section 4.1. The fact that Appaya does not at all address the deficiencies
of Madhva’s commentary on the BS, or other commentaries for that matter,
indeed strongly suggests that his Śivādvaita work was directed precisely against
Śrīvais: nava
: theologians of Vedānta. In Varadācārya’s view, it is his hatred of
Śrīvais: navas
: that led Appaya to compose his early polemical works and to
establish a new school of Vedānta on the basis of a commentary of his own
creation—the so-called Brahmamīmāmsābhā : s:ya by Śrīkan: t:ha:
In fact, Dīks: ita [ . . . ] gave up his dispute with [other] positions out of his hatred
:
for Vais: navas [and], desirous to start a quarrel between Śaivas and Vais: navas,
:
first composed the Śivatattvaviveka and the Śivakarnām : r: ta. After that, when the
time came to show that the things he had said [in those works] were in agreement
with the traditions of the past, he proclaimed that these things are already found
in a commentary on the BS following the Śaiva position. When asked to fetch this
⁴⁸ This principle states that since all grains of rice in a cooking pot were cooked in the same way, it
can be inferred, upon finding a well-cooked grain of rice, that all other grains were also well cooked.
The same principle could have been applied here to infer that other commentaries too, not just
Rāmānuja’s, are deficient.
⁴⁹ ‘pūrvācāryaih: kalus: itam’ iti padaśravana: eva śrīkan: t:habhās:yāt pūrvam : bahūnām: bhās: yānā
: m:
sattvam : svata eva dhiyam ārohet sarves:ām. dīks: itas tu tatra nidarśanatayā rāmānujabhās: yam ekam
eva pradarśayati. nirmatsarena : prāmānikena
: vyākhyātrā hi mūlagatabahuvacanādyanusārena : anyāny
api bhās: yāni: sthālīpulākanyāyena vā pradarśanīyāny eva. tat sarvam : parityajya rāmānujabhās: yam
ekam : pradarśya ‘pūrvācāryaih: kalus:itam’ iti padasamghāta : m: vyākhyātam abhimanyamānena
: s:u kiyān pradves:ah: prādarśīti (Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana: 42).
dīks: itena vais:nave
198    - 
commentary, he sat day and night and himself composed some commentary
under the name of Śrīkan: t:ha.⁵⁰
Varadācārya rightly identifies the Śivatattvaviveka and Śivakarnām : r: ta as having

been composed before Appaya undertook his Śivādvaita project. Although, as
I have argued earlier (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2), he is probably wrong about
Appaya’s authorship of the BMB, he is right, I think, in linking Appaya’s
conflictual relation with Śrīvais: navas
: to his Śivādvaita work. That being said, it
is doubtful that Appaya wrote these works strictly with the hope of ‘starting a
quarrel’ between Śaivas and Vais: navas.
: Both the historical evidence and Appaya’s
:
early remarks to the effect that Vais: navas condemned the worship of Śiva suggest
that the relation between these two socio-religious groups was already quite
complicated by the time he composed his work, and that Appaya’s Śivādvaita
work was written in defence of Śaivism rather than plainly for the purpose of
attacking Śrīvais: navas.
:
5.2 Two Advaitins in Banaras
Towards the end of the Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana, Varadācārya wonders whether

Appaya, during his ‘Śaiva career’ under Cinnabomma’s patronage, promoted the
cause of Śaivas or rather that of Advaita Vedānta, the philosophical tradition he
cherishes the most. Was Appaya a Śaiva at heart who wished to defend his religion
:
:
against Vais: navas, and who used Śankara’s theology to establish that Śrīkan: t:ha’s
non-dualist theology is more ‘orthodox’, and therefore superior to Rāmānuja’s
theology? Or was he an Advaitin, essentially uninterested in sectarian debates, but
eager to use this opportunity to defend his belief that all deities, including Śiva,
must be respected as different aspects of the same absolute Brahman? We shall see
later that these two motives are closely intertwined in Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre.
What attracts our attention here is the fact that this tension is reflected in the
ambivalent response his Śaiva work generated among early modern Advaitins.
While some Advaitins celebrated Appaya as the greatest representative of
:
Śankara’s tradition of the last few centuries, others disagreed with the new system
he ushered in. Varadācārya expresses the latter view when he says in the
Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana that several of the positions Appaya upholds in the
ŚAMD and his other Śaiva works—ranging from his view that Śiva is the supreme
⁵⁰ ayam : hi dīks:itah: [...] vais:navavidve

: s:āt siddhāntabhāgavivādam : parityajya
śaivavais:navakalaham
: udbodhayis: uh: śivatattvavivekam: śivakarnām
: r: tam
: ca prathamam : pranināya.
:
anantaram : svoktārthe pūrvatanasammatipradarśanakāle prāpte sthitam idam : śaivamatānusārini:
brahmasūtrabhās:ya eva ity akathayat. ānīyatām : tad bhās:yam iti pr: s:t:o ’harniśam upaviśya
śrīkan: t:hanāmni kimcid
: bhās: yam
: svayam: racayāmāsa (Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana: 75).
  ’ ś  199
Brahman to his reading of the two epics as Śiva-centred—are wholly irreconcilable

:
with the positions taken by Śankara in the Brahmasūtrabhās: ya.
A similar argument was put forward nearly three centuries earlier by
Nīlakan: t:ha Caturdhara, an Advaitin active in Banaras in the second half of the
seventeenth century who wrote several works criticizing Appaya’s idiosyncratic
take on Vedānta. In the Vedāntakataka, Nīlakan: t:ha aims to purify the ‘nectar that
is the coherence of Upanis: ads’ (vedāntasamanvayāmr: ta), previously muddied by
‘crypto-heretics’ (prachannapākhan: daka)
: like Appaya and others (Minkowski
2014: 98). Appaya is a crypto-heretic, he says, because his views are at odds with
:
the teachings of Śankara, Nr: simhāśrama
: and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Many of
the views he defends in his Śivādvaita work are in fact closer to Viśis: t:ādvaita
Vedānta than Advaita Vedānta. By trying to prove that Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary—
which, as we have seen, is itself thoroughly influenced by Rāmānuja’s theology—
:
aligns with Śankara’s commentary, and that his own peculiar views on liberation
: :
are endorsed by Śankara, Appaya is in effect ‘[turning] Śankara’s teaching into a
teaching of duality’ (ibid.: 101).
Nīlakan: t:ha wrote at least two works—the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā and the
Śivādvaitanirnaya—in
: which he indirectly challenges Appaya’s Śaiva interpret-
ation of the BS and Upanis: ads. Though both works remarkably share their title
with Appaya’s Śivādvaita works, they do not engage with those works or mention
Appaya by name. Nevertheless, it is clear that Nīlakan: t:ha targets Appaya here.
The Ratnatrayaparīks: ā develops a triadic model in which the ‘three jewels’
(ratnatraya) are not Śiva, Śakti, and Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : as in Appaya’s model,
na,
but Brahman, Īśvara, and the individual self (jīva)—the three key ontological
categories in Advaita metaphysics (ibid.: 97). While for Appaya the three jewels
are deities that all share the nature of Brahman, in Nīlakan: t:ha’s scheme only
Īśvara is a deity and it does not share the nature of Brahman. Indeed, in Advaita
Vedānta, the individual self and Īśvara are considered ultimately unreal manifes-
tations of Brahman, the only thing that is real. This is a key Advaita doctrine from
which Appaya is arguably departing here. Likewise, if Nīlakan: t:ha does not
mention Appaya in his own Śivādvaitanirnaya, : he refutes the pūrvapaks:a—
primarily held by Appaya, as we have seen earlier—according to which Śiva is
the ‘fourth’ (caturtha) entity transcending the trimūrti and identified with the
supreme Brahman.⁵¹ Nīlakan: t:ha disagrees with this identification and defends an
essentially non-Śaiva, Advaita position in this work.
Around the same time as Nīlakan: t:ha, also in Banaras, another Advaita scholar
was taking a more positive stance on Appaya’s Śaiva work—Dharmmaya Dīks: ita
(fl. 1640). Dharmmaya was one of several descendants of Appaya active in
⁵¹ See v. 1: caturtham : vijñeyam: tam iha śivam āhuh: [ . . . ]. I have discovered two manuscripts of
Nīlakan: t:ha’s Śivādvaitanirnaya
: at the Sarasvati Bhavan Library: a palm-leaf manuscript (no. 51583)
and a paper manuscript (no. 93201), both in nāgarī script.
200    - 
Banaras.⁵² Aside from a commentary on Appaya’s Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, : he

composed a commentary (titled Darpana) : on the Advaitavidyātilaka by
:
Samarapungava Dīks: ita, a nephew of Appaya otherwise known for his
Yātrāprabandha.⁵³ The Advaitavidyātilaka is a versified commentary on the BS
:
in the form of a devotional hymn (stuti) to Śiva: verse by verse, Samarapungava
addresses Śiva in the vocative and sums up his interpretation of every sūtra. The
theology deployed here shares key affinities with Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology:
Śiva is hailed as the supreme absolute identified with Brahman, the cause of the
world and the object of worship in one’s heart. Both in terms of its genre and the
emphasis laid on Śiva as the non-dual deity recognized within oneself, the
Advaitavidyātilaka resembles Appaya’s Ātmārpanastuti.⁵⁴
: While it is difficult to
:
confirm from the verses alone whether or not Samarapungava was influenced by
Appaya, his commentator, Dharmmaya, directly links both scholars’ theologies. In
the introduction to his commentary, Dharmmaya reuses Appaya’s introduction to
:
the Śivatattvaviveka to explain why Samarapungava pays homage to Śiva in his
hymn, although Śiva is fundamentally devoid of attributes:
Even if it is not possible to make the attributeless Śiva-principle (śivatattva) an

object of praise—[given that it is an entity] from which the entire spectrum of
differences in terms of agent, actions, etc. has been removed, [and an entity]
beyond the reach of speech and thought, [both properties that are] communi-
cated in various scriptural and traditional passages such as [ . . . ]—nevertheless,
:
[Samarapungava], wishing to pay homage to that same supreme Lord known as
: by men who are not free [and] as having no attributes
having attributes (saguna)
: by men who are free [ . . . ], first composes, at the beginning of his work,
(nirguna)
two benedictory verses in conformity with the precedent set by the [good]
conduct of the learned.⁵⁵
:
According to Dharmmaya, Samarapungava’s praise of Śiva as the non-dual
Brahman implies that he adopts the same view as Appaya on the reality of Śiva
and His praise: although Śiva is fundamentally devoid of attributes (nirguna),
: it is
nevertheless meaningful for those who are not yet free (baddhapurus:a) to
⁵² See Bronner 2015b: 12–15 for a discussion of Appaya’s descendants in Banaras. For the date and
region of activity of Dharmmaya Dīks: ita, see Minkowski 2011: 208.
:
⁵³ The Yātrāprabandha recounts the history of Sūryanārāyana : Dīks: ita, Samarapungava’s elder
brother and Appaya’s nephew, and contains interesting details about Appaya’s life. See Bronner
2016: 17–21.
⁵⁴ For a short study of this interesting hymn to Śiva by Appaya, see Bronner 2007: 11–15.
⁵⁵ yady api [ . . . ] ityādiśrutismr: tisamdohasampratipanna
: m: nirastasamastakartr: karmādibhe-
:
daprapañcam akhilavānmanasapathātītam : nirguna
: m: śivatattvam : na stutigocarīkartum : śakyam, :
tathāpi [ . . . ] baddhapurus:āpeks:ayā saguna
: m : muktapurus: āpeks: ayā nirguna: m: pratipāditam: tam eva
:
parameśvaram : stotukāma ādau śis:t:ācārapariprāptam : mangalam : ślokadvayarūpena : kr: tam:
prabandhādau nibadhnāti (Advaitavidyātilaka: 2–3). See Chapter 2, Section 2.1, for the corresponding
passage in Appaya’s Śivatattvaviveka.
  ’ ś  201
approach Him as an embodied entity (saguna) : in order to gradually apprehend

His higher reality, and then become free (muktapurus: a). Throughout his com-
:
mentary, Dharmmaya reads Samarapungava’s verses broadly in line with
:
Śankara’s theology, yet identifying the non-dual Brahman with Śiva, as Appaya
does. In his commentary on verse 4 (ad BS 1.1.1), for instance, he invokes
:
Śankara’s theory of superimposition (adhyāsa) to explain why we falsely perceive
our self to be different from Śiva: only I-cognitions (ahampratyaya)
: such as ‘I am
fat’ and ‘I am thin’ prevent us from recovering our true identity with Śiva, and
only śruti can sublate these false cognitions and take away our primordial
ignorance. Likewise, in verse 5 (ad BS 1.1.2), he has recourse to the well-known
Advaita analogy of the rope and the snake to explain how Śiva’s nature as the
:
creator of the world (jagatkāranatva)—although a property falsely imposed
(kalpita) upon Śiva—help reveal His higher reality. At the same time,
Dharmmaya describes Śiva exactly as Appaya does, that is, as qualified (viśis: t:a)
by His śakti, Umā, a defining feature of Śiva in Śivādvaita Vedānta theology.⁵⁶
Although Nīlakan: t:ha Caturdhara and Dharmmaya Dīks: ita were both active in
Banaras around the same time, they shared opposite views on Appaya’s Śivādvaita
work. While Nīlakan: t:ha resists Appaya’s Śaiva theses and opposes his non-
dualist theology, centred on Śiva, in favour of the ‘purer’ non-dualism of
:
Śankara, Nr: simhāśrama,
: and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Dharmmaya relies on
and even reuses elements of Appaya’s Śivādvaita work when commenting on
:
Samarapungava’s commentary on the BS. For Dharmmaya, there is no funda-
:
mental difference between Appaya’s and Śankara’s theologies, and in this he
agrees with how Appaya himself conceived and tried to represent Śivādvaita
Vedānta. While various factors, ranging from lineage to intellectual affiliation to
religious background, might have contributed to Dharmmaya’s endorsement of
Appaya’s views, the fact that he does so suggests at least that there were different
factions of Advaitins active in early modern Banaras. Some, like Nīlakan: t:ha
Caturdhara, wished to come back to a purer, orthodox interpretation of
Advaita, while Dharmmaya and others maintained a view of Advaita that was at
least superficially compatible with Śaivism. In any case, the interest in Appaya’s
Śivādvaita work seems for the most part to have subsided among Advaitins during
the modern period. Most Advaitins now remember Appaya solely for his com-
:
mentarial work in Śankara’s tradition.⁵⁷
⁵⁶ See Dharmmaya’s commentary on verse 1: . . . umāviśis: t:aśivānusandhānasya paramapu-

rus:ārthahetutvāvagamāt . . . (Advaitavidyātilaka: 3).
⁵⁷ Appaya is mostly remembered these days for his Parimala, Nyāyaraks:āmani : and
:
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, not for his ŚAMD or Śivādvaitanirnaya.
: The increasing lack of interest in
:
Appaya’s Śivādvaita works among Advaitins is better understood when we understand that Śankara’s
tradition never lost its prominence throughout the early modern period. Right after Appaya’s death, his
:
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha was commented upon by Yajñeśvara Dīks: ita (1600), and commentaries on this
:
work have continued to be written until recent times (Dharmmaya Dīks: ita, 1640; Kr: s: nānanda
Sarasvatī, 1670; Sadāśiva Brahmendra, 1720; Vāsudeva Brahmendra Sarasvatī, 1900; etc.). Today, the
202    - 
5.3 The Śaiva Response
The reception of Appaya’s Śaiva oeuvre among Śaivas has naturally been more
:
favourable than among Vais: navas. Among those Śaiva scholars who have
wholeheartedly endorsed it, we have first and foremost some of Appaya’s
descendants. Aside from Dharmmaya Dīks: ita, whom we have just discussed, we
should mention the famous poet and scholar Nīlakan: t:ha Dīks: ita, Appaya’s grand-
nephew, who flourished in early-seventeenth-century Madurai. Nīlakan: t:ha
praised Appaya for having established Śrīkan: t:ha’s school and for his composition
of the monumental ŚAMD. He also considered Appaya an authority on Śaiva
ritual, as he repeatedly refers to his ritual manual, the Śivārcanacandrikā, in his
own ritual manual, the Saubhāgyacandrātapa (Fisher 2017b: 11). Another des-
cendant of Appaya, Viśvanātha Vājapeyin, wrote a work called Durūhaśiks: ā, in
which he defends Śiva’s supremacy partly inspired by the ŚAMD and
Śivakarnām
: r: ta.⁵⁸ Also worth noting is Tyāgarāja Śāstri (1815-1904), also a des-
cendant of Appaya, who wrote the Śivatattvavivekadīpikā, a substantial commen-
tary on the Śivatattvaviveka. There are still other scholars with a Śaiva background
who were inspired by Appaya’s Śaiva work. Amr: tānandatīrtha, who seems to have
been active in North India after the second half of the seventeenth century, wrote a
number of Śaiva works supporting Appaya’s views, among which the
:
Paramapadanirnāyakaprakara : in which he criticizes Nīlakan: t:ha Caturdhara
na,
and quotes from Appaya’s Śaiva works with approval.⁵⁹ We may also mention the
famous grammarian Bhat:t:oji Dīks: ita, who used Appaya’s Madhvatantramukha-
mardana as his main source of inspiration for his critique of Mādhva Vedānta in
:
his Tantrādhikārinirnaya and Tattvakaustubha (Deshpande 2016). His son,
Rāmāśrama, favourably cites Appaya’s Śivatattvaviveka on the question of the
authenticity of the Bhāgavatapurāna : (Minkowski 2010: 120). It is fair to assume
that aside from Bhat:t:oji and his son, who were both active in Banaras, there were
other Śaiva scholars in Banaras who responded positively to Appaya’s Śaiva work,
given the well-known prominence of Appaya’s work on Advaita Vedānta,
Mīmāmsā : and poetics in seventeenth-century Banaras.
Parimala is still studied in a number of traditional centres of Advaita learning. Note that by ‘Advaitin’,
:
I mean Vedānta scholars who accept Śankara’s interpretation of the BS. There are ‘Śaiva Advaitins’, in
particular Vīraśaivas, who did engage with Appaya’s Śaiva works during the modern period, but they
:
do not endorse Śankara’s work (see Section 5.3.1, this chapter).
⁵⁸ This work is different from the Mīmāmsā: work of the same title composed by Appaya Dīks: ita III,
Appaya’s grand-nephew (fl. 1660). See NCC, vol. 9, p. 74, for details about the authors and manuscripts
of these two works, and the Adyar Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts (vol. 10, p. 507) for
details on the content of the Śaiva Durūhaśiks:ā.
⁵⁹ See NCC, vol. 1, p. 355. Amr: tānandatīrtha also wrote a work called Śivatattvaviveka. The fact that
manuscripts of his works are mostly found in Oudh suggests that he may have been active in North
India. He certainly wrote after the second half of the seventeenth century, because he engages with
Nīlakan: t:ha Caturdhara.
  ’ ś  203
I have written elsewhere (Duquette 2015a) on the relationship between

Appaya’s Śivādvaita theology and the work of early modern theologians of Śaiva
Siddhānta, such as Śivāgrayogin and Umāpati Śivācārya. Although these two
theologians do not mention Appaya in their work—they were close
contemporaries who may or may not have known each other—both knew
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary and acknowledged the doctrinal similarities between
their position and the position defended by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary
(Sivaraman 1973: 38). The first Saiddhāntika response to Appaya’s Śivādvaita
work that I am aware of is found in the work of Śivajñānayogin, a Tamil scholar of
Śaiva Siddhānta who flourished in the middle of the eighteenth century. In his
Tamil commentary on the Śivajñānabodhasūtra, the Māpādiam, : Śivajñānayogin
examines stances taken by different schools on the origination of the world from
Śiva, among which Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of transformation. As we have seen
(Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1), Śrīkan: t:ha holds that Śiva is the material cause of the
world and that He is qualified (viśis: t:a) by māyā, a principle of consciousness. For a
Saiddhāntika like Śivajñānayogin, however, only the insentient māyā can be the
material cause of the world, because if it were otherwise, Śiva’s immutability
would be compromised. Although he considers Śrīkan: t:ha’s position to be a
pūrvapaks:a in this respect, Śivajñānayogin admits that Śiva can be denoted as a
material cause if this does not entail any form of real changeability on the part of
Śiva. Śivajñānayogin remarks that this is actually how Appaya understands
material causality in the ŚAMD, and concludes that there is therefore no funda-
mental contradiction in content between Appaya’s view and his own.⁶⁰ It appears
from this that Śivajñānayogin felt the need to accommodate the views of Appaya
within his own system, presumably because Appaya had by then already achieved
great fame as a Śaiva scholar. Despite the fact that Appaya’s leaning towards pure
non-dualism departs from the realistic doctrine of Śaiva Siddhānta, his Śaiva work
greatly inspired Śivajñānayogin: not only does he quote the ŚAMD with approval,
but he also translated the Śivatattvaviveka into Tamil (Mudaliar 1985: 13).
Other Śaiva scholars took a more critical stance on Appaya’s Śivādvaita work,
most notably the author of the Śivadarpana.⁶¹ : In this extensive work, the author
⁶⁰ Śivajñānayogin refers to the last portion of Appaya’s sub-commentary on BS 1.1.2, where Appaya
discusses Śrīkan: t:ha’s interpretation of Śvetāśvatara Upanis: ad 4.10. In this passage, Appaya defines
material causality (upādānatva) as being the locus of phenomenal transformation. If we interpret
material causality as such, Brahman/Śiva can be denoted as a material cause insofar as He is the locus of
māyā (i.e., cicchakti), which itself transforms into worldly constituents: satyam : māyopādānam iti
brahmāpy upādānam eva. apr: thaksiddhakāryāvasthāśrayatvarūpam : hi māyāyā upādānatvam :
samarthanīyam. tat samarthyamānam eva brahmaparyantam āyāti— ‘Since it is true that māyā is
the material cause, Brahman too is really the material cause. For it is established that material causality
on the part of māyā consists in the fact of being the locus of the effected state (kāryāvasthā) that is
inseparable (apr: thaksiddha) [from it, i.e., Brahman/Śiva]. When this is clearly established, [the fact of
being a material cause] includes Brahman [too]’ (ŚAMD1: 134–5). See Duquette 2015a: 11–13.
⁶¹ This work is commonly attributed to Brahmavidyādhvarīndra; see Sastri 1930: 16 and Sanderson
2014: 91. The Adyar Descriptive Catalogue (vol. 10, p. 532) reports that manuscript R2545 (see below,
fn. 62) ‘mentions in one of the introductory verses the Rāmāyanavyākhyā
: Virodhabhañjana as being
one of his [i.e., the author of the Śivadarpana]
: works. Therefore, it might be presumed that the author
204    - 
refutes Appaya’s thesis according to which Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary on the BS

implicitly teaches a doctrine of pure non-dualism.⁶² After introducing Śrīkan: t:ha
as an avatāra of Śrīkan: t:ha, the dark-throated form of Śiva, he praises him for
having written a commentary on the BS centred on Śiva as a non-dual (advaita)
entity qualified (viśis: t:a) by His śakti. His goal in writing the Śivadarpana
: is not
only to unfold the meaning of this ‘profound’ (gambhīra) commentary, but also to
‘purify’ Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary from ‘all the impurities deposited on it by
followers of a recent and wrong doctrine’ (navīnakumatānuvartisamāro-
pitasakalakalus: a-), namely the doctrine promulgated by Appaya. Thus he hopes
that this work will not only benefit Śaiva devotees at large, but also Śaiva scholars
who are confused by Appaya’s new interpretation. The author proceeds to prove
his point by examining a number of key arguments put forward by Appaya in
early Śaiva treatises and hymns such as the Śivatattvaviveka and the
Brahmatarkastava, and in later Śivādvaita works such as the ŚAMD and the
: Though he strongly disagrees with Appaya’s interpretation,
he nevertheless regards him as a great scholar of Advaita (advaitavidyācārya) and
even as another avatāra—that is, along with Śrīkan: t:ha, the author of the BMB—in
relation to knowledge (jñānasambandhyaparāvatāra). As we shall see, a similar
:
stance towards Appaya was taken by Nāgalinga, an early modern Vīraśaiva
scholar who wrote on Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta, to which we now turn.
5.3.1 The Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta of Vīraśaivas
In Chapter 1, I discussed early Sanskrit-language Vīraśaiva works that show the

influence of Vedānta, and commented on their conceptual affinities with and
was Brahmavidyādhvarin, who wrote Virodhabhañjanī.’ According to NCC (vol. 29, p. 28), the
:
Virodhabhañjanī is the same as the Rāmāyanatātparyavirodhabhañjanī, a commentary on the
Rāmāyana : indeed composed by Brahmavidyādhvarīndra of the Vāna family, the son of Nr: simha : and
Bhavānī, and the pupil of Ahobala. The latter presumably belonged to the At:reyagotra and was a
:
disciple of Parānkuśa, the sixth head of the Śrīvais: nava
: Ahobilamat:ha (Krishnamachariar 1937: 23).
This would suggest that Brahmavidyādhvarīndra, the author of the Virodhabhañjanī, was of Śrīvais: nava:
descent. However, the author of the Śivadarpana
: is clearly a devotee of Śiva, for which reason I doubt that
the attribution of the Śivadarpana
: to this Brahmavidyādhvarīndra is correct. It is worth noting that the
paper transcript R5496 does mention the Virodhabhañjanī in one of its benedictory verses, but that the
other paper transcript, T2861, does not (see below, fn. 62). Both paper transcripts are based on the same
Telugu manuscript, namely R2545. It is possible that the reference to the Virodhabhañjanī in R5496 was
added by mistake.
⁶² According to Sastri, the Vedāntasarvasvaśivadarpana : by Brahmavidyādhvarīndra would be a

commentary on Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB (Sastri 1930: 16). This is not correct: the work he is referring to is
evidently the Śivadarpana,
: a rejoinder to Appaya’s interpretation of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. See also
Sanderson 2014: 91, who confirms this. This work has never been printed. My brief description of this
work here is based on: 1. a paper transcript in nāgarī script preserved at the Adyar Library (T2861); and
2. a paper transcript in nāgarī script (R5496) restored in 1929–30 from R2545, an incomplete (it ends
with the janmādyadhikarana) : and ‘much injured’ palm-leaf manuscript in Telugu kept at the
Government Oriental Manuscripts Library. The scribe of T2861 says the transcript was ‘collated . . .
from the Telugu manuscript, collected by R.A. Sastri’, which is presumably R2545.
  ’ ś  205
differences from Śrīkan: t:ha’s theology of Vedānta. We have seen that one key
difference is that early Vīraśaiva scholars writing in Sanskrit do not use the term
śivādvaita in the sense of a doctrine, as Śrīkan: t:ha does, but rather in the general
sense of a mystical union with Śiva—a union wherein the worshipper is in a state
of non-duality (advaita) with Śiva. As a matter of fact, the term śivādvaita, as a
doctrinal signifier, starts to be used rather late in the history of Vīraśaiva literature
composed in Sanskrit. It is still not used, for instance, in the Kriyāsāra, which
I believe to have been composed in the seventeenth century (or beginning of
the eighteenth century) and to be the first Vīraśaiva work to engage with the BS.
Although the author of the Kriyāsāra comments on the BS—likely on the basis of,
or partly inspired by Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary (see Appendix 4)—he does not
explicitly formulate a distinctive Vīraśaiva Vedānta position (siddhānta). To
my knowledge, the first Vīraśaiva scholar to do so is Maritōn: t:adārya, an
eighteenth-century scholar who wrote under the rule of Basavappa Nāyaka II
during the late Ke:ladi period.⁶³ Incidentally, Maritōn: t:adārya is also the first,
I suspect, to use the term śaktiviśis: t:aśivādvaita (or simply śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita) as a
label to describe the Vīraśaiva position on Vedānta. For this reason, I believe that
the so-called Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta tradition, whose origins have recently been
traced back to a period preceding Appaya (Fisher 2017a), actually began with
Maritōn: t:adārya (and other scholars) and achieved prominence only during the
modern period.⁶⁴
⁶³ Basavappa Nāyaka II ruled over the Ke:ladi kindgom between 1739 and 1757. Before
Maritōn: t:adārya, I am aware of a single early modern Vīraśaiva work (except for the Kriyāsāra) dealing
to some extent with Vedānta: the Śivādvaitamañjarī by Svaprabhānanda Śivācārya. This work was
composed before the second half of the eighteenth century, because Maritōn: t:adārya quotes from it with
approval in his Vīraśaivānandacandrikā (Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 23). Svaprabhānanda was
presumably the teacher of Siddhanañjeśa, a Vīraśaiva scholar credited with the authorship of the
:
Pañcavarnamahāsūtrabhā s: ya. Siddhanañjeśa had a disciple, Cikkanañjeśa, who may have lived around
1650 (Fisher 2018: 25). If this date is right, Svaprabhānanda could have lived as early as the beginning of
the seventeenth century; see Fisher 2018: 21–6 for more details on the not so well-known figures of
Siddhanañjeśa and Cikkanañjeśa. The modern Vīraśaiva compendium, the Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaita-
tattvatrayavimarśa, dates the Śivādvaitamañjarī to 1700 (Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa: 20).
The Śivādvaitamañjarī does not develop a fully fledged doctrine of Vedānta as in Maritōn: t:adārya’s
work, but nevertheless engages with the BS: it begins with a lengthy refutation of the doctrine of
:
superimposition (adhyāsa) defended by Śankara in his Brahmasūtrabhās:ya and ends with an original
attempt at reconciling the BS with the Śivasūtras, a scripture of the Trika system. Svaprabhānanda
quotes from Kashmirian non-dualist sources and early Vīraśaiva works such as Māyideva’s
Anubhavasūtra. He was probably South Indian, as suggested by: 1. the fact that he quotes from the
South Indian Varadarāja’s vārttika on the Śivasūtras; and 2. some of the expressions he uses (e.g.,
prakāśavimarśasāmarasya, a compound found in the Dīpikā on the Yoginīhr: daya by the fourteenth-
century South Indian scholar Amr: tānanda, but not in Kashmirian sources). Note that Svaprabhānanda
shows no awareness of Śrīkan: t:ha’s or Appaya’s work in the Śivādvaitamañjarī.
⁶⁴ This does not mean that Maritōn: t:adārya’s work shows no influence from the earlier Vīraśaiva
theological tradition—in fact it does, as we can discern from his reliance on Māyideva’s s: at:sthala
scheme and arguments from the Kriyāsāra, as well as his possible composition of a commentary on the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani—but: only that he is possibly the first author writing in Sanskrit to formulate the
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta siddhānta with a great degree of clarity, and to defend it against other
Vedānta siddhāntas. Note that he was probably much influenced in his endeavour by the
Śivādvaitamañjarī of Svaprabhānanda Śivācārya (see above, fn. 63).
206    - 
Maritōn: t:adārya’s most important work is the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā, of

which only one section (kān: da), : the vādakān: da,
: has been published.⁶⁵ The
vādakān: da: is a doxography akin to the Sarvadarśanasa :
mgraha except that, in
addition to the usual darśanas, it deals with various Vedānta schools, namely the
:
schools of Madhva, Rāmānuja, Śankara, and ‘Nīlakan: t:ha’, whom I identify with
Śrīkan: t:ha.⁶⁶ In his hierarchical evaluation of these schools, Maritōn: t:adārya places
Nīlakan: t:ha’s position above Rāmānuja’s Viśis: t:ādvaita (rāmānujamata), but below
:
Śankara’s Advaita (advaitamata), which interestingly occupies the penultimate
position before his own position (vīraśaivamata). Like his Vīraśaiva predecessors
and their Saiddhāntika co-religionists in South India, Maritōn: t:adārya rejects the
non-realist implications of the Advaita doctrines of māyā and avidyā, as well as
the doctrine of vivartavāda. He indeed begins his doxography with a lengthy
refutation of the latter doctrine, in which he argues that every Vīraśaiva scholar
should disregard this doctrine ‘agreeable only at first glance’.⁶⁷ Having said that,
he introduces the following objection by an Advaitin:
But surely, the explanation of non-duality accepted [by Vīraśaivas] cannot be

proved at all [and this for three reasons]: 1. because the established position of
Vīraśaivas (vīraśaivasiddhānta)—[namely,] the non-duality [of the self] with
Śiva qualified by [His] śakti, which is itself the material cause that transforms
[into the world and selves], [a non-duality] which consists in the close union of
: :
Śiva (linga) and the self (anga)—must be proved to be different from all forms of
dualism; 2. because the non-dualist interpretation put forward by Advaitins
(vivartavādin) depends on [the concept of] superimposition (adhyāsa) and is
therefore refuted [by you]; and 3. because we do not know of any explanation of
⁶⁵ The catalogue of the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore also lists manuscripts of a kriyākān: da
:
and a kathākān: da. : Maritōn: t:adārya is also known to have composed a commentary on the
Siddhāntaśikhāmani, : the Tattvapradīpikā (published by the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore).
However, his authorship of the latter work is hard to ascertain. Although the Tattvapradīpikā was
edited a number of times along with the Siddhāntaśikhāmani, : and the colophons found in these
editions mention Maritōn: t:adārya as the author, there appears to be a single extant manuscript of this
commentary, kept at the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore (C. 4612/9, paper, incomplete); the
name Maritōn: t:adārya does not appear in the colophon.
⁶⁶ See below, fn. 72, this chapter. The term vāda refers here to a category of philosophical debate,
traditionally defined as involving tattvabubhutsukathā, the discourse of scholars desirous to know the
truth, as opposed to jalpa and vitan: dā,
: which respectively refer to discourses in which the scholar is
merely desirous to win an argument or refute the opponent’s view without putting forth his own view.
⁶⁷ tasmād advaitedamparyapravr: ttavaiyāsikasūtrasamdarbhānanvitatvena
: vivartavādasyāpātara-
:
:
manīyatayā pratīyamānatvāt sa vīraśaivais tattvavidbhih: padapadārthasangatijñair anādaranīya :
eva— ‘Therefore, since the doctrine of apparent transformation (vivartavāda) [of Advaitins] is
understood to be agreeable [only] at first glance, given that it does not agree with the sūtra composition
of Vyāsa [i.e., the BS], which has been undertaken with non-duality as its scope, Vīraśaivas, who know
reality as it is as well as how words relate to their meaning, should totally disregard this [doctrine of
apparent transformation]’ (Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 23).
  ’ ś  207
non-duality that is distinct from the [non-dualist interpretation defended by

vivartavādins] . . . ⁶⁸
The Advaitin objects that there is only one consistent non-dualist position on
Vedānta, namely the pure non-dualist interpretation of the BS put forward by
:
Śankara and other vivartavādins. This interpretation is primarily based on the
concept of superimposition (adhyāsa): it is only when we realize that we have
falsely superimposed various names and forms (nāmarūpa) upon Brahman that
the pure non-dual nature of reality is revealed. Since Maritōn: t:adārya has
already rejected the concept of adhyāsa at this point (that is, in his previous
refutation of the Advaita doctrine of avidyā), he is left with no way to justify his
own non-dualist take on Vedānta. In this passage, Maritōn: t:adārya incidentally
provides us with a first formal definition of the Vīraśaiva position on Vedānta
(vīraśaivasiddhānta): the non-duality [of the self] with Śiva qualified by His
śakti (śaktiviśis: t:aśivādvaita).⁶⁹ Just like Śrīkan: t:ha, Maritōn: t:adārya holds that
Brahman/Śiva—which he occasionally refers to as the ‘six-station Brahman’
(s: at:sthalabrahman)—is qualified (viśis: t:a) by His śakti and that the latter functions
as the material cause (upādānakārana) : of the world. However, he also equates the
non-duality between the self and Śiva with the close union (sāmarasya) or contact
: :
:
(samyoga) between linga (Śiva) and anga (self), a distinctive concept of early
Sanskrit-language Vīraśaiva theology with a prominent devotional component
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.3).
Significantly, Maritōn: t:adārya replies to this objection with a quotation of a verse
from Maheśvarānanda’s Mahārthamañjarī (c.1300), a medieval South Indian work
conversant with Śaiva Kashmirian non-dualist sources. We have mentioned this
work earlier in connection with the triadic identification of space, consciousness,
and the goddess featuring in the Śaiva theologies of Śrīkan: t:ha and early Vīraśaivas.
Maritōn: t:adārya quotes the following important verse:
san hr: dayaprakāśo bhavanasya kriyāyām : bhavati kartā |

saiva kriyā vimarśah: svasthā ks: ubhitā ca viśvavistārah: ||
: :
⁶⁸ nanu vīraśaivasiddhāntasya lingāngasāmarasyātmakaparināmyupādānarūpaśaktiviśi
: s:t:aśivād-
vaitasya sakaladvaitavilaks: anatvena
: :
sādhanīyatayā vivartavādipratipāditādvaitasamdarbhasyādh-
yāsādhīnatvena tasya dūs: itatvāt tadatiriktādvaitanirvāhasyānupalabhyamānatvāt svābhimatā-
dvaitanirvāha eva na siddhyet . . . [iti cet] (Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 23). I interpret the term
śivādvaita here in the sense of the liberating non-duality of the self with Śiva—not as a doctrinal
: :
signifier—because the compound lingāngasāmarasya, which agrees syntactically with śivādvaita in the
compound, is a synonym of liberation in Vīraśaiva works.
⁶⁹ Although the author of the Kriyāsāra does not explicitly use the terms śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita or
śaktiviśis:t:aśivādvaita to describe his siddhānta, he does emphasize the idea that Brahman/Śiva is
qualified (viśis:t:a) by His śakti and that both entities are inherently related, like ‘pot’ and ‘potness’:
yathā ghat:a iti jñāne ghat:atvam : syād viśes: anam
: || tathā brahmani : śakter ity avadhāryatām
: vaiśis:t:yam
|— ‘Just as “potness” is the qualifier of the cognition “[this is a] pot,” so too should one understand śakti
to qualify Brahman’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 18, vs. 93cd–94ab).
208    - 
The light in the heart, [pure] existence, becomes [in the process of manifestation]
the agent with regard to the creative activity. When it rests in itself, this activity is
reflective awareness; when agitated, it is the extension of the universe.⁷⁰
This verse introduces one of the core concepts of the Śaiva non-dualist philosophy
of Pratyabhijñā: vimarśa, the ‘reflective awareness’ or ‘conscious grasping’ that
underlies every conscious act. In the previous verse, Maheśvarānanda had defined
prakāśa—the other core concept of this philosophy—as the conscious light and
:
‘beneficial lamp’ (mangalapradīpa) that vibrates and shines forth on everything.
In this verse, he locates this ‘light’ in the heart of the devotee and identifies it with
pure existence (sat), Śiva, the agent (kartr: ) of creation. When Śiva’s creative
activity rests in itself, this activity is called vimarśa. When it develops or manifests,
this activity takes the form of the phenomenal world. Hence Śiva is not merely the
efficient cause and witness of this world, revealing its objects like a lamp. He
Himself consciously apprehends those objects in manifesting them, in an active,
free, and spontaneous manner. The implication here is that Śiva, as dynamic
consciousness, can change into the phenomenal world without this affecting His
immutable nature. In other words, this verse justifies, against what the objector
had said, that it is possible to uphold a non-dualist stance without complying with
the non-realist implications of the vivartavāda defended by Advaitins.
It is remarkable that Maritōn: t:adārya justifies his siddhānta on the basis of this
single verse, which he obviously regards as an authoritative statement.⁷¹ Unlike
the author of the Kriyāsāra (whom Maritōn: t:adārya quotes with approval on the
rejection of the Advaita doctrine of avidyā), he does not find inspiration for his
siddhānta in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary (assuming that the commentary on
which the author of the Kriyāsāra relies is indeed Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB; on this, see
Appendix 4), but on a work that is conversant with Kashmirian non-dualist
sources. As a matter of fact, Maritōn: t:adārya treats Śrīkan: t:ha’s position as a rival
position outside the fold of Vīraśaiva theology. In the 22nd chapter of the
Vīraśaivānandacandrikā, he rejects a Śaiva Vedānta position ascribed to
⁷⁰ Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 23.
⁷¹ Though substantial scholarly work has been done on the social history and theology of the
Mahārthamañjarī (see Silburn 1968, Cox 2006, and Cox 2017 [Chap. 5]), we do not know much about
its reception in late medieval and early modern South India. Most of the quotations of this work
(especially its self-authored commentary, the Parimala) that I am aware of are found in works
composed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Parimala is quoted, for instance, by the
eighteenth-century scholar Laks: mirāma in his Parātriśikāvivr: ti; in the commentary on the
Vijñānabhairava by the eighteenth-century scholar Śivopādhyāya; by the eighteenth-century scholar
Bhāskararāya in his commentary (Saubhāgyabhāskara) on the Lalitāsahasranāmastotra; and by the
nineteenth-century scholar Rāmeśvara in his Paraśurāmakalpasūtra. Maritōn: t:adārya’s quotation of the
Mahārthamañjarī stands as another interesting example and provides further insights into how this
influential work was received and reused in early modern Śaiva circles in South India. Note that
Maritōn: t:adārya’s argument, including the quotation of this specific verse, is borrowed textually from
the Śivādvaitamañjarī by Svaprabhānanda Śivācārya.
  ’ ś  209
‘Nīlakan: t:ha’ (nīlakan: t:hamata), who all evidence suggests is identical with our
Śrīkan: t:ha.⁷² The crux of his refutation concerns Śrīkan: t:ha’s defence of the
unity of the two Mīmāmsās : (aikaśāstrya), a doctrine that Maritōn: t:adārya dis-
agrees with and traces back to Rāmānuja. Just as Vijayīndra does in his
Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana (see Section 5.1.1, this chapter), he rejects fea-
tures of Śrīkan: t:ha’s system on the grounds that he has already refuted these
features when discussing Rāmānuja’s position earlier:
:
So if there are such differences [between the two Mīmāmsās], what scholar would
claim that they form a unity? For this reason, it is totally inappropriate [to hold]
that the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāmsās : form a unity. As for everything else that
remains [to be refuted in Śrīkan: t:ha’s system], it is for the most part refuted by
[our previous] refutation of Rāmānuja’s position. Seeing that nothing more
should be written on this topic by the principle of ‘grinding the flour’, I let it go.⁷³
Both Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Rāmānuja’s systems are so alike that there is no further need
to pursue the examination of the former, just as it is superfluous for a man to grind
flour that has already been pounded. Though he positions Śrīkan: t:ha’s system
above Rāmānuja’s insofar as it is Śaiva-oriented, it is clear from this passage that
Maritōn: t:adārya does not have a high opinion of Śrīkan: t:ha. Incidentally, he shows
no interest in Appaya’s Śaiva work: he makes no reference to him in his refutation
of Śrīkan: t:ha’s position, and never engages with his Śivādvaita works or with his
interpretation of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary along the lines of pure non-dualism, a
system that he also rejects. Instead, Maritōn: t:adārya regards Appaya as an expert
(abhiyukta) in the Advaita Vedānta tradition, and quotes (only once) from his
:
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha. The case of Maritōn: t:adārya not only shows that there
were Śaiva scholars who did not espouse Appaya’s view that Śaiva Vedānta must
culminate in pure non-dualism; it also shows that there were scholars seeking to
reconcile Śaiva doctrine with Vedānta by using different textual sources for their
exegesis—in this case, not Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary but the Mahārthamañjarī.
⁷² Since Maritōn: t:adārya does not quote from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in this chapter, it is not
possible to determine on this basis alone whether he has Śrīkan: t:ha in mind in this refutation of
‘Nīlakan: t:ha’s’ system. However, we can infer that this is indeed the case on three grounds. First, he
claims that ‘followers of Nīlakan: t:ha’ (nīlakan: t:hīyāh)
: defend the view that Śiva is ‘qualified by [His]
śakti[, which transforms into] subtle sentient and insentient entities’ (sūks: macidacic-
chaktivaiśis:t:yavādino nīlakan: t:hīyāh;
: Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 292), which is essentially the doctrinal
position defended by Śrīkan: t:ha. Secondly, he refutes Nīlakan: t:ha’s position on the basis that he upholds
the thesis of the unity of the two Mīmāmsās : (aikaśāstrya), which Śrīkan: t:ha indeed upholds. Thirdly,
and most importantly, he refers to the adherent of Nīlakan: t:ha’s position as Śrīkan: t:ha in the sixth
introductory verse of this section.
⁷³ tasmād etādr: śabhede vidyamāne kah: pan: dita : h: śāstraikyam : brūyāt? tasmād aikaśāstryam :
pūrvottaramīmāmsayor : iti nirupapattikam eva. avaśis:t:am : sarvam api rāmānujamatanirākaranena :
nirākr: taprāyam iti nātra pis:t:apes: ananyāyena
: likhitavyam ity upeks: ya visr: s:t:am asmābhih:
(Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 431).
210    - 
Although his siddhānta is virtually the same as Śrīkan: t:ha—Śiva is qualified by His
śakti, which transforms into the world and selves—Maritōn: t:adārya interprets this
doctrine within a prominently Vīraśaiva theological framework.
Another Vīraśaiva scholar with a similar outlook on Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary is
:
Nirvānamantrirāja (middle of eighteenth century?), the author of a commentary
(titled Bhūs: ana)
: on the Kriyāsāra. Like Maritōn: t:adārya, Nirvānamantrirāja
: dis-
tinguishes the position of ‘Śrīkan: t:ha’s followers’ (śrīkan: t:hīyāh)
: from his own. As
:
discussed in detail in Appendix 4, Nirvānamantrirāja quotes the entire commen-
tary of Śrīkan: t:ha on BS 1.1.4 when discussing this sūtra in his own commentary,
and introduces Śrīkan: t:ha’s position with the particle tu to signify that this group
of followers interprets the sūtra differently. Nevertheless, though he disagrees with
the views of Śrīkan: t:ha, he repeatedly refers to Appaya as a figure of great
importance—he calls him the ‘venerable Dīks: ita’ (dīks:itacaranā : h)—and
: quotes
from some of his Śaiva works in spite of the fact that Appaya defends a pure non-
dualist version of Śivādvaita that goes against his own position. For instance, when
discussing the relation between Brahman/Śiva and His śakti, Nirvānamantrirāja :
emphasizes that this relation cannot be understood as one of pure non-duality
(kevalādvaita). In his view, śakti (and its epiphenomena) is not an ultimately
unreal entity, non-different from Brahman/Śiva, but an entity that is both distinct
from and identical with Him. In support of this, he quotes a long passage from
Appaya’s RTP, a work in which Appaya’s Advaita views are not as prominent as
in other works of his, such as the Ānandalaharī or the Śivādvaitanirnaya. :
:
Nirvānamantrirāja never mentions these two works or even argues against
Appaya’s idiosyncratic take on Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. It is likely that his
selective engagement with the RTP, which he quotes at length more than once,
was meant to lend support to the Śaiva Vedānta position developed in the
Kriyāsāra—with the seal of the great Appaya’s approval, as it were—without
having to address some of his undesirable positions.
Another Vīraśaiva scholar who praised Appaya’s Śaiva work and yet subtly
: :
approached it with criticism is Nāgalinga, the author of the Śivādvaitaparyankikā,
a short rejoinder to Appaya’s Śivādvaitanirnaya, : probably composed during the
:
modern period.⁷⁴ After introducing his lineage, Nāgalinga sets out the context for
his work in three verses:
:
⁷⁴ The author of the Śivādvaitaparyankikā refers to a commentary (vivr: ti) on Nandikeśvara’s
: : :
:
Lingadhāranacandrikā (Śivādvaitaparyankikā: :
44). The Lingadhāranacandrikā was presumably com-
posed during the eighteenth century or afterwards (see Appendix 4, fn. 1). It is reasonable to assume on
:
this basis that the Śivādvaitaparyankikā is a modern work. Aside from the fact that he cites Vīraśaiva
: :
: Nāgalinga’s Vīraśaiva back-
sources and discusses distinctive Vīraśaiva topics such as lingadhārana,
ground is confirmed by his Ārādhya lineage: he mentions that he was born in the lineage of
Udbhat:ārādhya (udbhat:ārādhyavamśaja): and that his teacher was Vīreśvarārādhya (śrīmad-
:
vīreśvarārādhyakalyānagurusevaka).
  ’ ś  211
Śrīkan: t:ha revealed that the non-duality of Śiva is qualified in order to reveal the
truth to cultivated people with an impartial mind. The fact that [this non-duality]
:
is qualified was cut into pieces by Śankara. Rāmānuja extolled this fact to a large
degree [but] condemned the fact that [this non-duality proclaims] the greatness
of Śiva. As for the illustrious Appaya Dīks: ita, he extolled all of this [namely, the
fact that the non-duality of Śivādvaita is qualified and that it proclaims the
supremacy of Śiva].⁷⁵
:
The first thing we notice here is that Nāgalinga implies that Śrīkan: t:ha lived before
: :
Śankara, a doubtful claim that we also encountered in the Śankaravijaya, for
instance (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1, fn. 5). Unlike Maritōn: t:adārya and
:
Nirvānamantrirāja, he regards Śrīkan: t:ha’s teachings as authoritative and as a
:
truer form of Vedānta than Śankara’s and Rāmānuja’s systems. Like his
Vīraśaiva predecessors, he denies the legitimacy of the Advaita Vedānta tradition
:
as he pictures Śankara in the second verse as rebutting Śrīkan: t:ha’s doctrine of
non-dualism of the qualified. While Rāmānuja does agree with the fundamentals
of this doctrine—Rāmānuja does defend a doctrine of the non-dualism of the
qualified—he condemns Śiva’s supremacy. It is at this point that Appaya is
introduced as the resurrector of Śrīkan: t:ha’s original teaching. In his view,
Appaya not only shares with Śrīkan: t:ha his belief in Śiva’s supremacy
(śivapāramya), but also the understanding that the non-duality of Śiva is qualified
(saviśes: a). This is a remarkable claim given that Appaya overtly states in the
Śivādvaitanirnaya
: and elsewhere that Śrīkan: t:ha is an Advaitin at heart.
:
As a matter of fact, Nāgalinga denies that Appaya really meant that
Śrīkan: t:ha taught a form of pure non-dualism. He begins his work with the same
question Appaya had asked in the Śivādvaitanirnaya: : what sort of Śivādvaita did
Śrīkan: t:ha teach? While Appaya’s pūrvapaks: a was that Śrīkan: t:ha taught a non-
:
dualism of the qualified (viśis: t:ādvaita), Nāgalinga’s pūrvapaks:a is that he taught
pure non-dualism (kevalādvaita, śuddhādvaita). Among the pūrvapaks:a’s argu-
:
ments put forward by Nāgalinga is the view that Brahman cannot be endowed
with distinctive qualities (saviśes:a); the view that the world is false (jaganmithyā);
and the view that there is non-difference (abheda) between Brahman and the
:
individual self (jīva). After briefly expounding each of these arguments, Nāgalinga
turns to Appaya and to his position, developed in the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : that
śuddhādvaita is Śrīkan: t:ha’s final teaching (paramasiddhānta). He wonders why
an ‘emperor among scholars’ like Appaya would devote an entire work to proving
⁷⁵ nis:paks:apātabuddhīnām : tattvasphūrtyai k:r: tātmanām | saviśes: ah: śivādvaitah: śrīkan: t:hena

prakāśitah: || 18 || tac ca yat saviśes:atvam : śankarena
: vikhan: ditam
: | man: dayāmāsa
: tad bhūyo
rāmānujayatih: param || 19 || tadīyam : śivapāramya
: :
m :
rāmānujavidūs: itam | man: dayāmāsa tat sarvam :
śrīmān appayadīks: itah: || 20 || (Śivādvaitaparyankikā: 4).
212    - 
this when it is clear that Śrīkan: t:ha held a different view. He offers the following
explanation:
If one asks: ‘If Śrīkan: t:hācārya really intended [to teach a doctrine] of non-
dualism of [Śiva] qualified [by His] śakti (śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita), how is it that the
eminent [Appaya] Dīks: ita, an emperor among scholars, concluded in a separate
and extensive work, the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : that [Śrīkan: t:ha] really intended [to
teach] only [a doctrine] of pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaita)?’ [I say:] ‘ . . . Since
the study of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary is inevitable given that one cannot acquire
trust in the supreme Lord’s worship without studying Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary,
and since it is not possible to study this [commentary] without refuting the view
that Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary [teaches a doctrine that] goes against his own [i.e.,
Appaya’s own] position, I understand that [Appaya] claimed [in his
Śivādvaitanirnaya]
: that [Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary] teaches pure non-dualism in
order to generate interest in people who suffer from the unending disease of
:
samsāra [and] do not consider [the study of] Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary because
they believe that [it teaches something] different than pure non-dualism, as if he
were saying to sick children who are not taking their medicine that it is made of
sugar.’⁷⁶
:
Nāgalinga’s respect for the ‘eminent Dīks: ita’ is evident in this passage. Surely, he
argues, Appaya knew perfectly well that Śrīkan: t:ha did not teach a doctrine of pure
non-dualism. If he defended this view in the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : it is because he
had a propaedeutic intention in mind: to incite people who are not interested in
studying Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary—thinking that its teachings are different from
pure non-dualism—to study it, just like someone would convince a child to take
his medicine by making him believe it is made of sugar. In other words, if Appaya
defended śuddhādvaita in the Śivādvaitanirnaya, : it is not because he himself
believes in this doctrine, but because he wanted to save certain people from the
:
disease of samsāra by having them read Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary and thereby
worship Śiva. Despite the fact that there is plenty of evidence to show that Appaya
was himself an Advaitin at heart and that he believed Śrīkan: t:ha to be one as well,
:
Nāgalinga claims the contrary. Though he effectively refutes Appaya’s siddhānta
⁷⁶ nanu yadi śrīkan: t:hācāryānā

: m: śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita eva paramatātparyam : tarhi
vidvatsārvabhaumair dīks:itavaraih: kim iti śivādvaitanirnaya : iti pr: thak mahatā granthena tes: ām :
śuddhādvaita eva paramatātparyam iti nirnaya : h: kr: ta iti cet, ucyate . . . śrīkan: t:habhās:yapat:hanam
antarena : parameśvaropāsanāviśvāsānutpattyā ca śrīkan: t:habhās:yapat:hanasyāvarjanīyatayā,
śrīkan: t:habhās:yasya svasiddhāntapratyanīkatvanirākaranam : antarena : tatpat:hanasyāsambhāvitatvena
ca, bhes:ajam anaśnatām : rugnānā : m: bālānām aus:adhe gudamayatvaprakhyāpanam
: iva
śuddhādvaitavyatiriktatvabuddhyā śrīkan: t:habhās: yam apaśyatām : durantasamsāravyādhimatā
: m:
janānām : prarocanārtham : śuddhādvaitam : pratipādakatvaprakhyāpanam iti vijñāyate
:
(Śivādvaitaparyankikā: 25–26).
  ’ ś  213
in detail, he does not wish to claim that Appaya was wrong and safeguards his
authority as a Śaiva scholar.
:
Like Maritōn: t:adārya and Nirvānamantrirāja,
: Nāgalinga uses the term
śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita to refer to his own siddhānta. As we move into the modern
period, the term is increasingly used by Vīraśaiva scholars to label their own
position on Vedānta. This is the case, for instance, in the Śivādvaitadarpana : by
Śivānubhava Śivācārya, a short Vīraśaiva Vedānta treatise composed after the
seventeenth century.⁷⁷ Unlike the aforementioned Vīraśaiva works, the
Śivādvaitadarpana : is not polemical in style, although it does feature, for instance,
a brief refutation of the Advaita theory of apparent transformation (vivartavāda).
It is rather a philosophical treatise in which the core doctrines of Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita
Vedānta are presented and defended against possible objections. Most of
Śivānubhava’s exegesis relies for this purpose on the BS, Śaiva-leaning
Upanis: ads like the Śvetāśvatara Upanis:ad and early Vīraśaiva Sanskrit-language
sources such as Māyideva’s Anubhavasūtra, which he systematically quotes as a
scriptural source (āgama, śruti). The work is comprised of four chapters
(pariccheda) in which the author investigates, in order, the nature of Śiva
(śivatattvaviveka), the nature of the individual self (jīvatattvaviveka), the meaning
of śivādvaita (śivādvaitaviveka) and the meaning of the Upanis: adic ‘great sayings’
(mahāvākyārthaviveka). While his position exhibits close affinities with
Śrīkan: t:ha’s system in the way it identifies the non-dual Brahman with Śiva and
conceives śakti as transforming into the world and selves, Śivānubhava elaborates
a system that is distinctively Vīraśaiva.
As we recall from Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), Śrīkan: t:ha mentions the word
śivādvaita once, ad BS 2.1.14, to describe his doctrine. In this passage, Śrīkan: t:ha
describes his doctrine as a form of non-dualism in which Brahman/Śiva, the cause
of the world, is defined as a non-dual (advitīya) entity qualified (viśis: t:a) by
sentient and insentient entities. The term ‘non-duality’ (advaita) in the compound
viśis: t:aśivādvaita therefore refers to Śiva’s ontological nature as a non-dual
entity, not specifically to His relation with the world or His śakti. In the
Śivādvaitadarpana, : Śivānubhava defines śivādvaita slightly differently and with
greater specificity:
[In the compound] śivādvaita, [the word śiva is analysed as a dual, namely]
śivau, i.e., ‘śiva and śiva’, and their non-duality (advaita) is [what we call]
śivādvaita. The first word śiva obtained by means of this derivation signifies
Brahman qualified by śakti in the form of subtle sentient and insentient entities.
The other word śiva signifies the individual self qualified by śakti in the form of
⁷⁷ See Appendix 4, fn. 6, for my view that this work was composed after the seventeenth century.
214    - 
coarse sentient and insentient entities. The word advaita signifies the non-
difference between these two.⁷⁸
Śivānubhava here clearly highlights the role of Śiva’s śakti in qualifying Brahman/
Śiva and the self.⁷⁹ In slight contrast with Śrīkan: t:ha, he understands non-duality
(advaita) specifically in terms of a relation of non-difference (abheda)—more
specifically, as he makes it clear elsewhere, a relation of difference and non-
difference (bhedābheda)—between the self and Śiva, not as an ontological claim
about the non-dual nature of Śiva per se. More importantly, just like
Maritōn: t:adārya, he correlates his conception of advaita with the Vīraśaiva con-
: : : :
cept of lingāngasāmarasya—the unity between Śiva (linga) and the self (anga), the
liberating state achieved by the Vīraśaiva devotee through a combination of
knowledge and devotion. After this passage, Śivānubhava indeed moves on to
explain the role of devotion and the importance of the guru for the realization of
this union, in direct agreement with the scheme presented in Māyideva’s
Anubhavasūtra. On this point, too, Śivānubhava upholds a stance on Vedānta
that is distinct from Śrīkan: t:ha’s own position. As a matter of fact, he does not
quote or engage explicitly with Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary (or Appaya’s Śivādvaita
work for that matter) in the Śivādvaitadarpana.⁸⁰ : Although Śivānubhava does
praise a certain ‘Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya’ as the author of a bhās: ya on the BS, he does
not quote from this work. Interestingly, a modern commentator on the
Śivādvaitadarpana : quotes a long passage from this bhās: ya that is found verbatim
in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary ad BS 1.1.16, but this passage reports a position that
Śrīkan: t:ha attributes to ‘others’ (see Appendix 4).
The author of this modern commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana, : also called
Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya, is presumably the author of another Vīraśaiva treatise on
⁷⁸ śivādvaitam ity atra śivaś ca śivaś ca śivau, tayor advaitam : śivādvaitam iti vyutpattibalalabhyam :
prathamaśivapadam : sūks: macidacidrūpaśaktiviśis: t:abrahmabodhakam : bhavati. aparam : śivapadam :
sthūlacidacidrūpaśaktiviśis: t:ajīvabodhakam : bhavati. advaitapadam : ca tayor abhedabodhakam : bhavati
(Śivādvaitadarpana: : 22). A similar definition of the compound śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita is provided in two
modern treatises on Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta, namely the Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā and the
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa (see below). In the Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā, the definition reads:
śaktiś ca śaktiś ca śaktī, tābhyām : viśis:t:au śaktiviśis:t:au śivajīvau, tayor advaitam : śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitam
iti (Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā: 39). In the Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa, it reads: śaktiś ca śaktiś ca
śaktī, tābhyām: viśis:t:au jīveśau, tayor advaitam : śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitam iti
(Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa: 18). Both these definitions and the one found in the
Śivādvaitadarpana : convey the same meaning, namely that the self and Śiva are both qualified by
śakti, and that both are in a relation of non-duality (advaita) or non-difference (abheda). Note that
advaita or abheda in these definitions is not understood as pure non-difference (ātyantikābheda) but as
a relation of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda). See, for instance: bhedābhedabodhakah:
sarvaśrutisamanvayasamupapāditah: śivādvaitasiddhānta eva viśis: yata iti (Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā: 40).
⁷⁹ Though Śrīkan: t:ha does not emphasize the role of Śiva’s śakti in the definition of his siddhānta, he
does use the term śaktiviśis: t:a to denote Śiva ad BS 1.1.5. See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2, fn. 32.
⁸⁰ That being said, Śivānubhava may have had Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary at hand (or, less probably,
an earlier textual source also known to Śrīkan: t:ha), since his description of world creation by Śiva
exactly parallels Śrīkan: t:ha’s description in his commentary on BS 1.4.27. See the first pariccheda,
section 8, of the Śivādvaitadarpana. :
  ’ ś  215
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta, the Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā.⁸¹ This denser philosophical

work is comprised of ten topical sections (prakarana) : pertaining to ontology and
epistemology in Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta.⁸² It is worth noting that the author of
this work does not refer to the Śaiva work of Śrīkan: t:ha or Appaya, despite the fact
that Appaya’s Śivādvaita work was already well known in various scholarly circles
across India. This, along with the fact that the author lays great emphasis on
establishing a direct linguistic correlation between the words vīraśaiva and
śivādvaita,⁸³ might be interpreted as an attempt on his part to distance the
Vīraśaiva position from the Śivādvaita tradition of Śrīkan: t:ha and Appaya,
and in effect appropriate the ‘Śivādvaita’ tradition as a whole. In his intro-
duction to the Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā, the editor indeed distinguishes both
schools.⁸⁴ A similar attempt at distancing both traditions is found in the
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa by Candraśekhara Śivācārya, another
modern treatise of Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta. In this work, the distinction
drawn between both schools is not merely nominal but doctrinal. In the view of
the author, Śrīkan: t:ha does not uphold the doctrine of difference and non-
difference (bhedābheda) dear to Vīraśaiva theologians of Vedānta, and for this
reason treats his teaching as representing a different siddhānta:
Even though the Śaiva position established by Śrīkan: t:ha Śivācārya and fully
developed by Appaya Dīks: ita is said to be a Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita position, never-
theless, this [position] really teaches, just like Rāmānuja[’s position], the
difference (bheda) between the individual self and Śiva in the liberated state.
Therefore, even if these [two Śaiva positions, namely the position of Śrīkan: t:ha/
Appaya and that of Vīraśaivas] have the same name, they really teach different
⁸¹ This Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya is not the author of the Kriyāsāra or the author of the bhās: ya on which
the author of the Kriyāsāra relies. According to the editor of the Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā,
Candraśekharaśarmā Hiremat:ha, this Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya was born in 1822 (Śaka era, i.e., 1900
CE) (Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā: 12). I strongly suspect that this Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya is the same as the
author of the commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana. : The author of the Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā is familiar
with the Śivādvaitadarpana : and refers solely to this work when defining the nature of Śivādvaita in the
tenth prakarana. :
⁸² After defining the three main entities (padārtha) accepted in this system—Śiva, Śakti and jīva—
Nīlakan: t:ha examines in detail the three main means of knowing (pramāna) : them, namely perception,
inference and verbal testimony. Other topics discussed in this work include causality, the list of thirty-
six Śaiva principles (tattva) and their relation to Śiva’s śakti, the nature of Śiva as the inner controller of
all beings, the nature of liberation and the means to achieve it, and the definition of Śivādvaita.
⁸³ At the beginning of the ninth prakarana, :: Nīlaka n: t:ha Śivācārya claims that the words śivādvaita,
:
śaktiviśis:t:ādvaita, viśes:ādvaita, s:at:sthala, lingāngasāmarasya and śivayoga are all different ways of
referring to the same Vīraśaiva siddhānta. He adds that the doctrine associated with all those names
is consistently referred to by the word vīraśaiva in Śaiva scriptures (tathā śivāgames: u
sarvanāmasamanvito ’yam : vīraśaivaśabdena vyavahriyate; Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā: 38).
⁸⁴ [ . . . ] śrīkan: t:haśaivadarśanam : śaivaviśis:t:ādvaitam: vīraśaivadarśanam : ca
viśes:ādvaitābhidhāśaktiviśis:t:ādvaitasiddhāntapratipādakam iti vijñeyam— ‘[ . . . ] One should know
that the Śaiva position of Śrīkan: t:ha is a Śaiva non-dualism of the qualified, and that the position of
Vīraśaivas teaches a non-dualism [of Śiva] qualified by śakti, [a position] called viśes: ādvaita’
(Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā: 10).
216    - 
doctrines. For this reason, since the Vīraśaiva Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita [position] aims
[to teach] the difference and non-difference [between the individual self and Śiva
in the liberated state], [the Śivādvaita doctrine of Śrīkan: t:ha and Appaya] is not
included in the [Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita position of Vīraśaivas].⁸⁵
Candraśekhara Śivācārya finds it important to distinguish both Śaiva teachings on

doctrinal grounds. Although the teachings of Śrīkan: t:ha and Appaya are, strictly
speaking, a form of Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita, they differ from the Vīraśaiva position on
Vedānta insofar as they admit that there is some difference (bheda) between the
individual self and Śiva in the state of liberation.⁸⁶ The Vīraśaiva adherents of
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita, on the other hand, conceive of this relation as one of difference
and non-difference (bhedābheda). On this point, Candraśekhara believes that
Śrīkan: t:ha rather aligns with Rāmānuja. Therefore, he does not regard Śrīkan: t:ha
:
as an authority on Vīraśaiva matters as Nāgalinga does, for instance. Furthermore,
he considers Śrīkan: t:ha, the author of the BMB, to be a different scholar from
Nīlakan: t:ha, the author of a Vīraśaiva commentary on the BS who would have
:
been a contemporary of Śankara.⁸⁷
While Vīraśaiva theologians of Vedānta broadly agree on doctrinal matters—
primarily in rejecting the non-realist implications of pure non-dualism, and in
defending the view that Śiva and the self, both qualified by śakti, stand in a relation
of bhedābheda—they do not share the same views on the figure of Śrīkan: t:ha and
:
his relationship to Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta. Some scholars, like Nāgalinga,
regard Śrīkan: t:ha as a great authority and his commentary on the BS as an
important source for Vīraśaiva Vedānta. Others, like Maritōn: t:adārya, reject
Śrīkan: t:ha’s teachings and rely on an entirely different set of authoritative sources
for their exegesis. Others still, like Candraśekhara, draw a clear distinction
between his teachings and the teachings of Nīlakan: t:ha, a contemporary of
:
Śankara and the author of a Vīraśaiva commentary on the BS, now lost. While
these different takes on Śrīkan: t:ha’s authority and identity could be merely idio-
syncratic, they could also reflect a deeper level of complexity within the Vīraśaiva
⁸⁵ yady api śrīkan: t:haśivācāryasthāpitam appayadīks: itaih: paripos:itam : ca śaivamatam :

śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitamatam ity evocyate, athāpi tad rāmānujavad muktāvasthāyām : jīvaśivayor
bhedapratipādakam eva. tasmān nāmasāmye ’pi siddhāntabhedo vartata eva. ato vīraśaivīyam :
śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitam: bhedābhedaparam iti nāsya tatrāntarbhāvah: (Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitatattvatraya-
vimarśa: 19).
⁸⁶ In Śrīkan: t:ha’s system, liberation is the attainment of śivatva, a state of unlimited bliss in which the
devotee is equal to Śiva and possesses His qualities, such as omniscience and the like. In this liberated
state, the self is not Śiva Himself but a being equal to Śiva. See Sastri 1930: 240–4.
:
⁸⁷ In support of this, he quotes a brief passage from the Śankaravijaya in which we are told that a
:
certain Nīlakan: t:ha won over Śankara in a debate (see Chapter 1, Section 1.1, fn. 5). This Nīlakan: t:ha
wrote a bhās:ya on the BS focused on Vīraśaiva doctrine, upon which the author of the Kriyāsāra
commented but which is no longer available today: ebhir vīraśaivasiddhāntaparam
: : nīlakan: t:ha-
bhās:yam : viracitam āsīt. śrīnīlakan: t:haśivācāryādyaśankarācāryānā : m: samakālīnā iti . . . tadīyam :
nīlakan: t:habhās:yam adhunā nopalabhyate. kim : tu kārikārūpena: tadvyākhyānabhūtah: kriyāsārākhyo
granthah: samupalabhyate (Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa: 33).
  ’ ś  217
tradition in terms of lineage, canonical sources and doctrinal background, which

remains to be investigated further.⁸⁸ It is also striking that the majority of early
modern Vīraśaiva scholars of Vedānta barely engage with Appaya’s Śivādvaita
work, despite his pioneering role in the rise of Śaiva Vedānta in early modern
India and his bold defence of Śaiva religion. This is even more surprising given the
fact that the author of the Kriyāsāra, the first Vīraśaiva work broadly commenting
on the BS, reused Appaya’s ritual manual, the Śivārcanacandrikā, in its entirety
(Duquette 2020a). In any case, the general tendency among modern Vīraśaivas
seems to have been to gradually distance themselves from the Śivādvaita of
Appaya while at the same time trying to define their Vedānta siddhānta with
increasing clarity and within a properly Vīraśaiva conceptual framework.⁸⁹
⁸⁸ The work of Maritōn: t:adārya and Svaprabhānanda Śivācārya is revealing in this regard. As noted
earlier in this section, both invoke the authority of the Pratyabhijñā-influenced Mahārthamañjarī—not
the commentary of Śrīkan: t:ha/Nīlakan: t:ha—a work that is besides not referred to in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary or in the other Vīraśaiva works discussed in this chapter. If Maritōn: t:adārya is also the
author of the Tattvapradīpikā, a commentary on the Siddhāntaśikhāmani : (see above, this chapter, fn.
65), this would strengthen what the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā already suggests, namely that
Maritōn: t:adārya was conversant with a number of other Kashmirian textual sources; see Sanderson
2014, fn. 344, on this point. Likewise, the Śivādvaitamañjarī attempts to harmonize the teachings of the
BS with the Śivasūtras, a scripture of the Trika system (see above, this chapter, fn. 63). In addition to
either ignoring or discrediting the teachings of Śrīkan: t:ha, these two works are also silent on the (four
or) ‘five ācāryas’ (pañcācārya) who are praised in several other Vīraśaiva works. While this might be
due to their relatively early dates of composition, it is significant, on the other hand, that
Maritōn: t:adārya’s comprehensive treatise on Vīraśaiva Vedānta, the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā, is not
mentioned at all in the early modern Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā, for instance, an extensive treatise on
Vīraśaiva doctrine that begins with a praise of Viśvārādhya (one of the five ācāryas; see Appendix 4,
fn. 6) and refers to the Śivādvaitadarpana,
: Anubhavasūtra and other key Vīraśaiva sources. Could this
be explained by making the hypothesis that Maritōn: t:adārya and Svaprabhānanda Śivācārya belonged
to a different sub-tradition than the so-called Pañcācārya Vīraśaiva tradition, with a different lineage of
teachers and a more prominent tantric background? For a preliminary study of the Pañcācārya
Vīraśaiva tradition, see Fisher 2018.
⁸⁹ The attempt to consolidate an independent Vīraśaiva Vedānta tradition also makes sense in light
of the argument made earlier (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2), namely that the Śrīkarabhās: ya—which is the
only extant, fully fledged Vīraśaiva commentary on the BS—was composed in modern times. If this is
correct, the attribution of this work to Śrīpati, a revered figure of early Vīraśaiva religion, could have
been an efficient stratagem to further strengthen the authority of the modern Vīraśaiva Vedānta
tradition.
Conclusion
In Defence of Śiva
During nearly thirty years, Appaya Dīksita fought to ‘support the doctrine of the
supreme Śiva’ (paramaśivamatasthāpana), as he says in the Kālakan theśvara
inscription. In his early polemical works, we see him dismantling attempts to
denigrate Śiva and His worship as he argues against ‘evil-minded’ people who
belittle this deity and loudly proclaim that Vis nu-Nārāya
na
alone is supreme. In
his later Śivādvaita Vedānta works, Appaya focuses his critique on Śrīvais nava
adherents of Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta, elaborating the first articulate theological
response to the challenge posed by Rāmānuja’s theological tradition. We have
seen that, in these works, he exhibits an unusual degree of freedom as a commen-
tator on Śrīkan tha’s
Brahmamīmāmsābhā
sya,
making skilful use of numerous
literary devices and arguments to convey his own vision of Śivādvaita Vedānta.
While his various digressions on hermeneutics, language theory and epistemology
in the Śivārkamanidīpikā
may reflect his desire to secure his own reputation and
intellectual legacy as a scholar, it is likely that this ‘show of scholarship’ was also
meant to lend more credibility to his ambitious exegetical project. As we have
seen, the public teaching of the Śivārkamanidīpikā to a ‘crowd of five hundred
scholars’ in Adaiyapālam
and Vellore was part of a larger attempt, backed and
possibly inspired by his Śaiva patron, to popularize Śrīkan tha’s commentary and
his own take on it. Appaya’s project was a success: not only was he ‘bathed in gold’
by his patron, Cinnabomma of Vellore, after the publication of his monumental
sub-commentary, but his Śaiva works continued to generate interest centuries
after he wrote them, far beyond the local milieu in which they were conceived.
The brief intellectual history of Appaya’s Śaiva career that I have mapped out in
this book provides us with a more nuanced portrait of the scholar and his work. It
reveals him not only as the bold and multifaceted intellectual we already know
him to be from Sanskrit disciplines such as scriptural hermeneutics (mīmāmsā)
and poetics (alamkāraśāstra),
but also as a social agent sensitive and responsive to
the sectarian conflicts and key religious questions that set Śaivas and Vais navas
apart in his time and place. However, his emblematic role as a defender of Śaivism
in this context raises intriguing questions about his dual persona as a prominent
scholar of Vedānta and devotee of Śiva. Was Appaya more a Śaiva or an adherent
of Advaita Vedānta, the philosophical tradition he inherited as a smārta brahmin
and which he cherishes the most? How are we to understand his simultaneous
Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India: The Sˊaiva Oeuvre of Appaya Dı k̄ sita.

Jonathan Duquette,
:    ́ 219
commitment to Śaiva religion and philosophical non-dualism? What did it mean

for him to defend Śaivism in light of his belief that all deities are manifestations of
the same absolute Brahman?
The critical reception of Appaya’s Śaiva work among early modern scholars of
Vedānta suggests a first line of response. His interpretation of Śrīkan tha’s com-
mentary along the lines of pure non-dualism was for the most part rejected by
Vīraśaivas and Saiddhāntikas—the two prominent groups of Śaivas in South India
:
in Appaya’s time—while his take on Śankara’s system did not satisfy Advaitins
Caturdhara, who regarded Appaya as a ‘crypto-heretic’ compared
like Nīlakan tha
:
to Śankara, Nrsi mhāśrama
and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Appaya evidently worked
hard at reconciling two doctrinal positions that, a priori, look hardly compatible.
First of all, he deals with a root text—the Brahmamīmāmsābhā sya—that
aligns
with a theological model different from his own: the viśis tādvaita theology
developed by Rāmānuja and others, the very theology he wishes to displace. In
Śrīkan tha’s
theology, Śiva is the conceptual and semantic equivalent of Brahman
with attributes (saguna);
He is qualified (viśis ta)
by the world and selves as well as
contemplated in the devotee’s heart. Like Śrīkan tha,
Appaya does acknowledge the
importance of worshipping the embodied Śiva. He composed numerous hymns in
praise of Śiva and His various attributes, and was evidently a Śaiva practitioner
himself, as demonstrated by his composition of a Saiddhāntika ritual manual
(paddhati) devoted to the private and daily worship of Śiva and His consort, the
Śivārcanacandrikā.¹ In the RTP, Appaya emphasizes the importance of Śiva’s
worship in the pursuit of liberation, and even claims it to be a sine qua non of
the gnostic realization of Brahman in the Śivatattvaviveka. However, deity wor-
ship does not play such a prominent role in the works of Advaitins. Although his
conception of the Lord’s grace (īśvarānugraha) as being conducive to liberation
has precedents in the late medieval Advaita tradition, Appaya nevertheless
:
accords a more central role to it in his soteriology than Śankara does in the
Brahmasūtrabhāsya, for instance. :
On the other hand, Appaya acknowledges the authority of Śankara,
Sarvajñātman and other Advaitins, and shares with them the view that Advaita
Vedānta is the final word in matters of doctrine and hermeneutics as well as the
ultimate vehicle for self-realization (ātmabodha). It is important to realize that
Appaya never ceased writing on Advaita Vedānta during his career: while his
compendium on Advaita Vedānta, the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, is probably one of
his earliest works, his sub-commentary in the Bhāmatī tradition, the Parimala,
was composed after the Śivārkamanidīpikā.
We have seen that Appaya makes
¹ See Duquette 2020a for more details on this work. Let us recall that Appaya presents himself as a
devotee of Śiva (śritacandramauli) in the famous Kālakan theśvara
inscription; he also refers to the
collective surrender of himself and his family to Śiva in the Ātmārpanastuti.
On this point, see Bronner
2007: 14 and Bronner & Shulman 2009: lxvi.
220    - 
ample use of Advaita hermeneutical devices to interpret Śrīkan tha’s

commentary
and defend his own Śivādvaita positions. His reliance on the upasamhāra device
to read Śrīkan tha’s
commentary as centred on the daharavidyā (Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.3), his conception of the gnostic path towards self-knowledge as
being dependent on the capacity of the aspirant (adhikārin) (Chapter 3,
Section 3.2.5) and his conception of parināmavāda as a preliminary for
vivartavāda (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2) all have precedents in the Advaita
Vedānta tradition. If he does acknowledge the importance of worshipping Śiva
as an embodied (saguna) being, he also claims repeatedly that Śiva lies ‘beyond the
:
reach of speech and thought’ (akhilavānmanasapathātīta) and beyond the
trimūrti of deities subject to the interplay of gunas.
Fundamentally, Śiva is for
him identical to the attributeless (nirguna)
Brahman, a reality utterly unspeakable
in which the devotee and his devotion vanish in the experience of pure non-
duality. Furthermore, at times Appaya admits, also in line with the Advaita
tradition on this point, that the gnostic realization of Śiva as Brahman is possible
without worship, a statement hardly reconcilable with the key importance
ascribed to Śiva’s worship in any Śaiva system.
One way to make sense of Appaya’s position is to understand that he remained
an Advaitin at heart throughout his Śaiva career. To be sure, the non-dualism
:
(advaita) he advocates is different from Śankara’s pure non-dualism or from the
bhakti-oriented non-dualism of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, for instance;² in this
respect, Nīlakan tha
Caturdhara’s criticism was probably justified. In some ways,
his brand of non-dualism resembles, and perhaps anticipates, the all-embracing
‘neo-Vedānta’ of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and other modern popularizers of
Advaita, who do not conceive plurality—be it metaphysical, religious or
ideological—as resulting from a cognitive error but rather as an organic expres-
sion of unity, all ‘paths’ leading to the same ultimate goal.³ Already in the
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha, Appaya notes that though Advaitins of the past have
:
interpreted Śankara’s commentary on the BS in different ways, this should not be
² Madhusūdana Sarasvatī propounded a non-dualist theology in which Kr s na is identified with the
Brahman. According to Minkowski, ‘the bhakti path to Him [i.e., Kr s na]
attributeless (nirguna) was not
a preliminary to Advaitin realization, but a genuine alternate path, neither better nor worse than the
Upanisadic
one’ (Minkowski 2011: 212). In contrast to Madhusūdana, who does not make ‘any
qualitative distinction between the philosophy of Advaita-vedānta and the theology of pure love for
Bhagavat, the Supreme Being’ (Gupta 2006: 143), Appaya draws a distinction, most notably in the
Caturmatasārasamgraha,
between the bhakti-oriented soteriologies of Śivādvaita Vedānta and
Viśis tādvaita
Vedānta and the ‘pure’ soteriology of Advaita, which ranks higher in his hierarchical
scheme.
³ While Vivekananda spoke of the ‘infinite arms of Vedānta’ that will be able to embrace all present
and future developments in science, religion and philosophy (see Halbfass 1990: 410), Radhakrishnan
held that ‘Vedānta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance’
(Radhakrishnan 1954: 23). One of the core ideas that we find expressed in the writings of these modern
Advaitins is the all-inclusive notion that all ‘paths’ or ‘approaches’ ultimately lead to the same goal, and
that each ‘path’ or ‘approach’ has its own place and relevance in the broader scheme of things.
:    ́ 221
a cause of dispute, since their intention was the same, namely to prove the unity of
the self.⁴ Even in works in which his identity as a Śaiva polemicist comes to the
fore, Appaya exhibits a liberal attitude in the way he highlights the greatness of
Vis nu-Nārāya
na
and His worship.⁵ We have seen that he highly values the
worship of Vis nu-Nārāya
na
in the RTP—he goes to the extent of claiming that
all those who desire liberation should worship Vis nu-Nārāya
na
(see Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.1)—and there insists on the fact that Vis nu-Nārāya
na
is not an
individual self, but a deity that shares the nature of Brahman just like Śiva and
His śakti. He is particularly clear on this point in the Ānandalaharī—a work in
which his commitment to Advaita Vedānta is moreover evident—where he
movingly claims that his ‘tongue could not move to assert’ that Nārāyana is an
individual self, because his head ‘would burst into a hundred pieces’ out of guilt
for cheating the Vedas and the great rishis of the past (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.2). It should also be noted that Appaya wrote a number of devotional
hymns in which he extols Vis nu-Nārāya
na
as the supreme deity, as well as a
:
lengthy commentary on the Yādavābhyudaya by Venkatanātha, a Śrīvais nava

scholar from the late medieval period whom he deeply admired.⁶
Appaya displays a conciliatory attitude even in works in which he aggressively
attacks Vais nava
positions and argues for Śiva’s supremacy in no uncertain terms.
There are several instances in which Appaya clearly refutes Vais nava
positions in
: :
⁴ Appaya begins the Siddhāntaleśasamgraha by comparing Śankara’s commentary to the Gangā:
: :
just as the Gangā river was divided into different rivers upon reaching different lands, Śankara’s
commentary, although having a unitary meaning intent on proving the non-duality of Brahman, was
interpreted differently by past ācāryas. In the second introductory verse, Appaya makes this revealing
and oft-quoted statement: prācīnair vyavahārasiddhavisaye sv ātmaikyasiddhau param |
samnahyadbhir
anādarāt saranayo
nānāvidhā darśitāh || tanmulān iha samgrahe na
katicit
siddhāntabhedān dhiyah | śuddhyai samkalayāmi
tātacaranavyākhyāvaca
hkhyāpitān
|| – ‘The ways
:
[of interpreting Śankara’s commentary] taught by [Advaita scholars] of the past are manifold because
they disregarded things established in mundane discussions, their focus being only on proving the unity
of the self. In order to purify [my] mind, I concisely bring together in this work some of the different
:
conclusions resulting from these [different ways of interpreting Śankara’s commentary] made known
to me by the words of my dear father’ (Sastri 1937: 1).
⁵ Despite such liberal claims and Appaya’s overall defense of Vis nu in the rest of his Śaiva oeuvre,
Bodhendra Sarasvatī nevertheless rejects the Śaiva position put forward by Appaya in the
Śivatattvaviveka in his Hariharādvaitabhūsa na,
a work arguing for the fundamental identity (advaita,
aikya) of Śiva (Hara) and Vis nu
(Hari). Bodhendra was possibly the 59th pontiff (c.1610–1692) of the
:
Śankara matha in Kāñcipuram, and the immediate disciple of the 58th pontiff, Viśveśvara (or
Viśvādhikendra) Sarasvatī; see the third introductory verse of the Hariharādvaitabhūsa na
(yasya
nāmāpi sarvasmād utkarsa m khyāpayaty aho | viśvādhikaguroh pādapadyam vande mudā sadā ||,
p. 1). A contrasting attitude towards Appaya’s Śivatattvaviveka is found in the work of another
Advaitin who argued for the identity of all deities, Ayyan na Dīksita
(1750?). In his
Vyāsatātparyanirnaya,
Ayyan na
devotes the entire second pariccheda to defending Appaya against
claims that he promoted Śiva’s supremacy only in order to attack Vais nava beliefs. Ayyan na holds,
rightly I think, that Appaya was at heart an Advaitin who believed in the fundamental identity of all
deities.
:
⁶ See Rao 2016 for a discussion of Appaya’s Vais nava works and Venkatanātha’s
influence on
Appaya’s composition of the Varadarājastava. However, it should be emphasized that Appaya’s
Vais nava
works were all commissioned by Vais nava patrons; they were not composed during his
Śaiva career under Cinnabomma of Vellore.
222    - 
response to denigrating claims about Śiva. For instance, when he seeks to prove in
his commentary on verse 21 in the Brahmatarkastava that Vis nu-Nārāya
na
is
endowed with tamasic defects such as being subject to sleep (nidrā), etc., it is
clearly to reject similar claims about Śiva’s cruelty and the like. Appaya actually
concludes his commentary on this verse with a refutation of the argument that
Vis nu-Nārāya
na
has a tamasic nature; what he wants in return, however, is that
the opponent accepts that the same proof holds true of Śiva too.⁷ Likewise, in
another polemical work of his, the Madhvatantramukhamardana, Appaya
responds to the claim that some Purānas arguably describe Śiva as an inferior
deity. Rather than attacking Vis nu on the same grounds—which he could have
done, given that there are numerous Purānic statements suggesting Vis nu’s

inferiority, of which Appaya shows awareness elsewhere—he insists on the fact
that Purānic
statements about the mutual superiority/inferiority of deities are not
objectively true and that they should be understood in their literary context.⁸ In
light of this, it seems clear that Appaya was more intent on defending Śaiva
religion against Vais nava
invectives than on gratuitously attacking or offending
Vais navas.
The nineteenth-century scholar Raghunātha Varma expressed the
same view in his Laukikanyāyaratnākara, citing Appaya himself on this:
This is precisely why the eminent Appa[ya] Dīksita,

in order to oppose the wise
slander by followers of Rāmānuja and others—who hate Śiva, consider them-
selves Vais navas
[and] teach a reversed relation of superiority and inferiority,
and the inferiority of Śiva—and in order to
namely, the superiority of Vis nu
oppose the perpetuation of this view by their own followers, said:
⁷ It is clear from Appaya’s wording in his commentary on verse 21 that he is replying to potential or
actual criticism concerning Śiva’s tamasic nature, such as when he says: kāryadarśanena
tadabhibhūtatvam eva tat kalpyeta – ‘If the fact that [Śiva] is overcome by
kalpyate cet, tarhi visnor
[tamas] is supposed on the basis of seeing effects [such as His change of mood, etc.], then the same
could be supposed about Vis nu Himself ’ (Brahmatarkastava: 40). In his conclusion, Appaya argues
that Nārāyana’s sleep (nidrā) is in fact only apparent: He is actually contemplating the truth of His own
self with His eyes shut. Appaya also says, in favour of Nārāyana, that all forms of cruelty attributed to
Him actually result from evil deeds done by His enemies. Having himself defended Nārāyana in this
way, he invites the opponent to agree with him that the same is true of Śiva: tad evam yathā
: :
nārāyanasya
tamobhibhūtatvaśankā yatnatah pariharanīyāsīn naivam śive kiyaty api śankāprasaram
labhate – ‘I have diligently refuted the doubt that Nārāyana is overcome by tamas. In the same way,
there should not even be the beginning of a doubt [on your part] about Śiva’s [being overcome by
tamas]’ (Brahmatarkastava: 43).
⁸ This argument occurs in his commentary on verse 51, where he explains that statements blaming
(! nindā) some specific deities are actually meant to embellish the praise (stavanaviracana) of other
deities so as to encourage greater devotion towards them. Towards the end of his commentary, he refers
to a statement he made in the Śivatattvaviveka to the effect that sages are not concerned with Purānic
statements of inferiority or superiority, for they understand that they were uttered in relation to specific
historical circumstances: kvacid brahmā kvacid visnu h
kvacid rudra h
praśasyate | nānena tesā
m
ādhikyam nyūnatva m vā katha mcana
|| tattatkalpāntav rttāntam
adhik rtya
mahar sibhi
h
| purānāni

pranītāni
tatra na muhyati || – ‘Sometimes Brahmā, sometimes Vis nu,
vidvāms sometimes Rudra is
praised [in the Purānas].
By this, the superiority or inferiority of these [deities] [is not intended] in any
way. Great rishis wrote the Purānas in relation to events that took place at the end of various kalpas.
[Good] scholars do not get confused about this’ (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 78–9).
:    ́ 223
:
‘Let either Vis nu
or Śankara [i.e., Śiva] be the object intended in the words of the
Upanisads;
the debate on this point clearly does not lead anywhere for us who
have [faith] in non-duality. My effort has rather been to refute the injurious
words of weak-minded people whose hearts are driven by the inner fire of hatred
towards the Lord [Śiva]. You should not suspect that I hate Vis nu for this
reason!’⁹
In this passage, Appaya claims to have faith in non-duality (advaitabhāj) and as

such to be unconcerned with sectarian disputes about whether Śiva or Vis nu is
superior and the object of the Vedas. This question simply does not lead any-
where, for all deities in the end are expressions of the same non-dual Brahman
and, as such, fundamentally equal to one another. If Appaya condemns Vais nava
positions in his Śaiva works, it is because Rāmānuja and others before him have
claimed that Śiva is not a deity but an individual self (jīva) endowed with defects,
that Śaiva Purānas are tamasic and that Śaiva scriptures have no authority. We
have seen that, a few centuries before Appaya, Sudarśanasūri had emphatically
denied the legitimacy of Śaiva/Pāśupata scriptures; his bold arguments arguably
motivated Appaya to focus much of his critical attention on the Śrutaprakāśikā in
his Śivādvaita work. It is not clear to me whether similar attempts at rejecting
Śaiva religion in toto were still being made during Appaya’s time, but it is certain
that Appaya perceived Sudarśanasūri’s criticism as an attack on Śaiva religion that
still deserved a response in his time.
Appaya has nothing against Vis nu-Nārāya
na
and His worship a priori; his only
wish is for Vais navas
to concede that Śiva is as great a deity as Vis nu-Nārāya
na.

Accordingly, he is also not concerned about which deity is referred to in the BS. In
reality (vastutas), he says, the Brahman eulogized in these sūtras has no attributes.
⁹ ata eva śrīmadappadīksitai h śivadvesavai s nava

mmanyarāmānujādyanuyāyibhi
h pratipādita-
visnūtkar
saśivāpakar
saviparītotkar
sāpakar
sapratipādanaparai
h śistanindāvara
nāya
svānuyāyinām
śivavis nvādi
sūtkar
sāpakar
sabuddhyanuv
rttivāra
nāya
coktam — visnur vā śamkaro vā śrutiśikharagirām
astu tātparyabhūmir nāsmākam tatra vāda h
prasarati kim api spa s
tam advaitabhājām | kim tv
:
īśadvesagā
dhānalakalitah
: rdā
m durmatīnām duruktīr bhanktum yatno mamāyam na hi bhavatu tato
visnudve
saśa
nkā || (reported in Gotszorg 1993: 13). I have not been able to trace this quotation in Appaya’s
work, but the characterization of himself as an Advaitin and as indifferent to whether Śiva or Vis nu is supreme
is found with a similar wording in his commentary on the first verse of the Madhvatantramukhamardana:
vastuto nirviśesabrahma
ni
pratisthitasyāpi
śārīrakamīmāmsāśāstrasya
kecana śivam vis nu
m vā visaya
m
vadanti cet tad is tam
eva. yatas tac chivarūpam vis nurūpa
m vā saguna m brahmopāsīnānām asmākam
advaitavādinām . . . (see below, this chapter, fn. 10). Note that Raghunātha Varma’s opinion is also shared by
Ayyan na in the Vyāsatātparyanirnaya
Dīksita (see above, this chapter, fn. 5). Towards the end of the work,
Ayyan na argues that if Appaya expressed at times Vis nu’s inferiority (nikarsa) to Śiva, it was only in order to
refute the opponents’ (prativādin) claim that Śiva is inferior to Vis nu, and to defend the value of worshipping
Śiva as well: appayyadīksitacara
nai
h prativādinirākaranāya h śivāpeksayā
visno nikarsapratipādane
’pi [ . . . ]
(Vyāsatātparyanirnaya: 79). In support of this, Ayyan na quotes the above-mentioned passage from the
Madhvatantramukhamardana and other liberal passages from the Śivakarnām Śivānandalaharī and
rta,
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha.

224    - 
In this respect, it is worth recalling the beginning of his commentary on the

Madhvatantramukhamardana:
If some people claim that the object of the BS is Śiva or Vis nu,
even if in reality
the [BS] centre on Brahman without attributes (nirviśesabrahma),
this must be
fully respected. Since we Advaitins worship the Brahman with attributes
(sagunabrahma)
either in the form of Śiva or Vis nu,
we should accept—in
order to understand the greatness of the qualities of that one whom we worship
and indeed His very nature—that they construe the texts as they do to make
known [that greatness of the qualities and the nature of the one to be
worshipped].¹⁰
In this passage too, Appaya presents himself as an Advaitin (advaitavādin)

uninterested in whether Śiva or Vis nu
is the object of the BS. In his view, neither
of these two positions is ultimately true—what is true is that Brahman is without
attributes (nirviśesa)—and
yet both positions must be ‘fully respected’ (is tam
eva)
insofar as they can help understand how great Brahman is, and thereby encourage
the devotee to pursue the realization of the Brahman without attributes. Though,
as we have seen, Appaya never hesitates to criticize Vais nava
Vedānta positions
and theologians on matters of interpretation, he nevertheless accepts that their
interpretations of the BS are relevant within their own domain and for their own
categories of aspirants. At the same time, he is able to make this claim precisely
because he believes that pure non-dualism offers a more comprehensive approach
to reality that can accommodate and integrate, within itself as it were, all other
approaches and views.
This philosophical posture is also reflected in the way Appaya approaches the
legitimacy of Śaiva scriptures. As a Śaiva, he naturally feels compelled to defend
their authority. However, we have seen (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3) that he
subsumes their authority under that of the Vedas, and also that he distinctively
reinterprets—in stark contrast with his Śaiva predecessors and co-religionists in
South India—some of its key passages in line with Advaita Vedānta. It is true that
Appaya’s attitude towards Śaiva religion and devotional traditions in general is
:
not as restrictive as what we find in the work of Śankara, for instance. His take on
the authority of Pāñcarātra is more liberal, and his acceptance of Śaivāgamas has
:
no precedent in Śankara’s work. Nonetheless, his approach remains ‘orthodox’ in
the way that it operates within the limits of brahmanical norms and beliefs. While
Appaya concedes authority to some of the Pāñcarātra teachings, he does so under
¹⁰ vastuto nirviśesabrahma
ni
pratisthitasyāpi
śārīrakamīmāmsāśāstrasya
kecana śivam visnu
m vā
visaya
m vadanti cet tad istam
eva. yatas tac chivarūpam vis nurūpa
m vā saguna
m brahmopāsīnānām
asmākam advaitavādinām upāsyasvarūpagunamahimāvadhāra nāya
tatpratipādanapravrtta
m
tadīyam śāstrasya yojanam grāhyam (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 1–2).
:    ́ 225
strict conditions and with the result that their validity practically applies only
outside the Vedic sphere (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4). Likewise, if he defends
Śaivāgamas as fully reliable and authoritative texts, he is not willing to consider
them on par with the Vedas and makes it clear that the former depend on the
latter for their authority. In the end, Appaya’s approach to sectarian debates and
religious legitimacy—including the legitimacy of Śaiva religion—is deeply rooted
in his belief that Vedic revelation is the source and focus, par excellence, of the
unity and identity of the brahmanical tradition, and that Advaita Vedānta repre-
sents the culminating point of this revelation. If it is important for him to defend
Śaiva religion in the face of threats to religious freedom, he remains an Advaitin in
his deep conviction that no devotional approach whatsoever can supersede others,
for all ‘paths’ ultimately converge in the same gnostic experience of pure non-
duality. In this sense, Appaya is an early precursor of the view—which would later
be promulgated by Radhakrishnan and other defenders of religious freedom in
colonial India—that Advaita Vedānta encompasses and in effect transcends all
religious approaches.
APPENDIX 1
List of Śaiva Works by Appaya Dīks: ita
I divide Appaya’s Śaiva works into four broad categories: his early polemical works, his
devotional hymns, his ritual manual and his Śivādvaita Vedānta works. All these works
were presumably commissioned by Cinnabomma of Vellore while Appaya was working
under his patronage (1549–1578). I consider here only works for which I am certain of the
authorship, and list them in a probable chronological order (where possible).
1. Śikharinīmālā—hymn
: of praise to Śiva comprised of sixty verses in the śikharinī
:
metre with self-authored commentary (Śivatattvaviveka).
2. Śivakarnām
: rta—short
: :
polemical treatise refuting the view that the Upanisads (and
:
other works) are intent on glorifying Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na.
3. Brahmatarkastava—hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of fifty-two verses with self-
authored commentary.
:
4. Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra—hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of twenty verses
with self-authored commentary, focused on demonstrating that the Mahābhārata is
intent on glorifying Śiva.
:
5. Rāmāyanatātparyasārasa :
mgrahastotra—hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of
twenty-five verses with self-authored commentary, focused on demonstrating that
: is intent on glorifying Śiva.
the Rāmāyana
:
6. Nayamanimālā—versified summary of Śrīkan: tha’s
: :
Brahmamīmāmsābhā :
sya,
:
included in Appaya’s doxography of Vedānta schools, the Caturmatasārasamgraha.
7. Śivārkamanidīpikā—sub-commentary
: on Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhā
: s: ya.
8. Ānandalaharī—treatise on cicchakti comprised of sixty verses with self-authored
commentary (Candrikā).
9. Ratnatrayaparīks: ā—treatise on Appaya’s triadic theology comprised of eight verses
with self-authored commentary. The commentary includes a section discussing the
‘esoteric meaning’ (rahasyārtha) intended by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary.
10. Śivādvaitanirnaya—prose
: work aiming to determine whether Śrīkan: t:ha’s siddhānta
aligns with a non-dualism of the qualified (viśis:t:ādvaita) or pure non-dualism
(śuddhādvaita, aviśis: tādvaita).
:
I am less clear on when the following works were composed:
:
11. Pūrvottaramīmāmsāvādanak s: atramālā—twenty-seven essays on selected
: and Vedānta topics, mostly expanding on arguments formulated in the
Mīmāmsā
Śivārkamanidīpikā.
: Thus this work was certainly written after the latter.
12. Pañcaratnastuti—hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of five verses with self-authored
commentary. This work was certainly written after the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā, from
which it quotes.
228  
13. Śivamahimakalikāstuti—hymn of praise to Śiva comprised of twenty-five verses.

14. Ātmārpanastuti—hymn
: of praise to Śiva comprised of fifty verses in which Appaya
extols Śiva as the invisible deity found within oneself.
15. Śivārcanacandrikā—ritual manual (paddhati) for the private and daily worship of
Śiva.
APPENDIX 2
Opening Verses from the

:
Brahmamīmāmsābhā s: ya and the
:
The text reproduced here is based on the edition prepared by Halasyanatha Sastri,
New Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1986 (reprint of 1908). The variants are also those reported by
the editor. My translation of Śrīkan: tha’s
: verses tries to stay close to Appaya’s interpretation.
A2.1 Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhā

: s: ya
aum namo ’hampadārthāya¹
: : siddhihetave |
lokānām
saccidānandarūpāya śivāya paramātmane || 1 ||
Obeisance to the supreme self, Śiva, the referent of the word ‘I’, the cause of the
attainment of all the worlds² [and] the one whose nature is being, consciousness and
bliss.
nijaśaktibhittinirmitanikhilajagajjālacitranikurumbah: |
sa jayati śivah: parātmā nikhilāgamasārasarvasvam || 2 ||
Victorious is Śiva, the supreme self, the sum of everything that is most important in
scriptures, who painted the multitude of pictures consisting of the entire net of the
world on the canvas that is His own power.
:
bhavatu sa bhavatām : siddhyai paramātmā sarvamangalopetah: |
cidacinmayah: prapañcah: śeso: ’śeso
: ’pi yasyaisa
: h: || 3 ||
May He, the supreme self endowed with all auspicious [qualities] [and] to which this
entire manifested world consisting of sentient and insentient [beings] is an accessory,³
be [a cause of] success for you.
¹ Variant reading: brahmapadārthāya.

² While the expression lokānām : siddhihetu would normally be translated as ‘the cause of success/
welfare for people’, Appaya reads siddhi as ‘attainment’ (prāpti), and loka not as ‘people’, but as ‘all the
worlds desired by the worshippers of the dahara[vidyā]’ (daharopāsakābhilas:itasakala-
lokaprāptihetave).
³ I translate here śes:a in the ritualistic sense of “accessory,” in view of Appaya’s gloss of śes: a as
tadārādhanopayogitayā tadarthah: (where tat means Śiva). Sentient and insentient beings are śes: a to
Śiva in the sense that they help towards (upayogin) His worship (ārādhana). While sentient beings help
insofar as they worship Śiva in accordance with their respective eligibility (adhikāra), insentient beings
help insofar as they function as the place for His worship, instruments of His worship, etc.
230  
namah: śvetābhidhānāya nānāgamavidhāyine |

:
kaivalyakalpatarave kalyānagurave namah: || 4 ||
Obeisance to Śveta, who authored various scriptures, the teacher of the auspicious
ones,⁴ who is [for them] like a wish-fulfilling tree of liberation.
vyāsasūtram idam : netram : vidus: ām: brahmadarśane |
: śrīkan: t:hena prasādyate || 5 ||
pūrvācāryaih: kalus: itam
These [Brahma]sūtras by Vyāsa are an eye for the wise ones to see Brahman. They
have been soiled by previous scholars [and now] are cleansed by Śrīkan: t:ha.
śrīmatām
: vyāsasūtrānā : śrīkan: t:hīyah: prakāśate |
: m
madhuro bhās: yasamdarbho
: mahārtho nātivistarah: || 6 ||
This commentarial composition of Śrīkan: t:ha on the glorious sūtras of Vyāsa shines
with excellence:⁵ it is sweet,⁶ has great meaning and is not too extensive.
sarvavedāntasārasya saurabhāsvādamodinām |
āryānā : śivanis: t:hānām
: m : bhās: yam
: etan mahānidhih: || 7 ||
This commentary is a great treasure for noble men who are devoted to Śiva [and] who
rejoice in inhaling the perfume-like essence of all Upanis: ads.
A2.2 Appaya’s Śivārkamanidīpikā

:
yasyāhur āgamavidah: paripūrnaśakter
: : kiyaty api nivis:t:am amum
amśe :
prapañcam |
:
tasmai tamālarucibhāsurakandharāya nārāyanīsahacarāya namah:
śivāya || 1 ||
Obeisance to Him, Śiva, in just a tiny part of whose fully complete power this world
was placed; so have said those who know scriptures. [Obeisance to Him, Śiva,] the
companion of Nārāyanī,: He whose throat is shining with the [dark] lustre of the
tamāla tree.⁷
⁴ Appaya favours the interpretation according to which the kalyānas : refer to those who bestow the
fruit of prosperity (abhyudaya, i.e., enjoyment in this world and the other) on those who desire welfare
:
(kalyāna); :
in this sense, kalyānaguru refers to Śveta, their teacher. See fn. 1 in Chapter 1 for more
details on this verse.
⁵ Appaya glosses prakāśate as prakars: ena: bhāsate.
⁶ Appaya interprets madhura as connected in word and meaning with the possession of rasa, the
aestheticized sentiment that is ‘tasted’ by sensitive readers or spectators (sahr: daya) in a piece of
literature or a play. He supports his interpretation with a verse from Dan: din’s: Kāvyādarśa (1.51):
madhuram : rasavadvācī vastuny api rasasthitih: | yena mādyanti dhīmanto madhuneva madhuvratāh:
||—‘To be sweet means to have rasa. rasa is also found in things since learned people delight in [things
with rasa] just as bees delight in honey.’
⁷ The tamāla tree is dark; this is a reference to the dark-throated aspect of Śiva.
  231
ākarnak
: r: s: t:adhanurāhitamohanāstram ārān nirīks: ya madanam : kupitasya
: |
kimcit
śambhoh: samādhisamaye vikasatkr: śānujvālākalāpajat:ilam⁸
: nit:ilam⁹
:
smarāmi || 2 ||
I call to mind the forehead of Śambhu, crested with masses of flames of expanding fire
as He, during His samādhi, becomes somewhat angry upon seeing Madana nearby,
who is fixing his bewitching arrow on the bow drawn to his ear.
mahāpāśupatajñānasampradāyapravartakān |
:
amśāvatārān īśasya yogācāryān upāsmahe || 3 ||
I pay homage to the Yogācāryas, partial incarnations of the Lord, who expounded the
traditional doctrine of Mahāpāśupatas.
āsetubandhatat:am ā ca tus: āraśailād ācāryadīks: ita iti
prathitābhidhānam |
advaitacitsukhamahāmbudhimagnabhāvam asmatpitāmaham
aśes: agurum
: prapadye || 4 ||
I take refuge in my grandfather, whose name, ‘Ācārya Dīks: ita’, was famous from the
Himālayas to the slopes of Rāma’s bridge, a complete teacher whose mind was
[always] immersed in the great ocean of non-dual consciousness and bliss.
yam: brahma niścitadhiyah: pravadanti sāks: āt taddarśanād
akhiladarśanapārabhājah: |
:
tam: sarvavedasam aśes: abudhādhirājam : śrīrangarājamakhinam : pitaram:
nato ’smi || 5 ||
:
I bow down to [my] father, the illustrious Rangarājamakhin, a master of all scholars,
who renounced everything. Those with a firm mind called him Brahman incarnate
and achieved the complete mastery of all schools [merely] by seeing him.
yady apy advaita eva śrutiśikharagirām āgamānām : ca nis: t:hā sākam
: sarvaih:
:
purānasm r: tinikaramahābhāratādiprabandhaih: |
: api ca vim rśatām
: : : bhānti viśrāntimanti pratnair
tatraiva brahmasūtrāny
ācāryaratnair api parijagr: he śankarādyais tad eva || 6 ||
:
tathāpy anugrahād eva tarunenduśikhāma : h: |
ne
:
advaitavāsanā pumsām āvirbhavati nānyathā || 7 ||
Even though the Upanis: ads and [other] religious scriptures, as well as all [other]
: and smr: ti texts such as the Mahābhārata
compositions, including the several Purānas
and so forth, culminate in non-duality alone; [even though] the Brahmasūtras too
shine forth, for those who have discernment, as having their ultimate rest [in that same
non-duality]; [and even though] nothing but that [non-duality] was accepted by the
:
best of ancient teachers, such as Śankara and others—nonetheless, it is only through
the grace of the one who has the young moon as His crest-jewel [i.e., Śiva] that the
inclination towards non-duality appears in people; not otherwise.
⁸ Variant reading: vilasatkr: śānuº. ⁹ Variant reading: nayanam.

:
232  
anugrahaś ca devasya śaktyā cidrūpayā saha |

: parijñāya dhyāyadbhih: samavāpyate || 8 ||
yathāvat tam
And the grace of God is obtained by those who know and meditate correctly on Him
and [His] power in the form of consciousness.
iti bhagavatā vedavyāsena sūtrayatā param : sagunam
: api tat sāmbam :
brahma nyarūpi śivābhidham |
yadanukaranād : : arthān anye ’pi sañjagr: hur bahūn paninajamukhā
: h:
sūtrair viśvanmukhatvavibhūsa : nai
: h¹⁰
: || 9 ||
This is why the blessed Vedavyāsa, when composing the [Brahma]sūtras, described
that supreme Brahman as also having attributes with the name ‘Śiva’ [and as being]
:
accompanied by Ambā. Imitating him, others too, like Pānini, expressed several things
in sūtras, being adorned with the quality of facing all directions.¹¹
tad idam: brahmasūtrānā: m: tātparyam
: sagune: śive |
prakat:īkartum ācāryah: praninye
: bhās: yam uttamam || 10 ||
The ācārya [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha] composed this excellent commentary so as to reveal the
intention of the Brahmasūtras with respect to the embodied Śiva.
śrīkan: t:hācāryakr: tam
: bhās: yam
: yad brahmasūtrānām
: |
pratipadam atigambhīram : na śakyate mādr: śair boddhum || 11 ||
Since every word of the commentary on the Brahmasūtras composed by
Śrīkan: t:hācārya is exceptionally profound, [this commentary] cannot be [fully] under-
stood by someone like me.
bhās: yam etad anagham: vivr: nv
: iti svapnajāgaranayo
::
h: samam
: prabhuh: |
cinnabommanr: parūpabhr: t svayam : mām: nyayunkta
mahilārdhavigrahah: || 12 ||
The Lord, whose body is half-female [i.e., Śiva as Ardhanārīśvara], Himself ordered
me, both in my sleep and while awake in the form of the king Cinnabomma, to
comment on this faultless commentary.
śrīcinnabommanr: patih: śritapārijātah: sarvātmanā paśupatim
: śarana
: m:
prapannah: |
yah: sārvabhaumapadavīm adhigamya dhīras tatpūjayaiva manute
saphalatvam asyāh: || 13 ||¹²
:
¹⁰ corr.; vis:vanmukhatvavibhūs:anai
: h: ed.
¹¹ Appaya uses an equivalent term, viśvatomukha, in his commentary on the first verse of the
Madhvatantramukhamardana to express the fact that the BS can be interpreted either in a saguna : or
: fashion: nirgunapara
nirguna : h: sūtrasamdarbha
: h: katham
: sagunaparo
: ’pi syād iti? syād eva, sūtrānā
: m
:
viśvatomukhatvād iti brūmah: (Madhvatantramukhamardana: 2). Padmapāda uses the same term in
the Pañcapādikā and says, like Appaya here, that the quality of bearing several meanings is an
:
adornment (alamkāra) of sūtras: viśvatomukham iti nānārthatām āha. ato ’lamkāra
: eva sūtrānā: m
:
yad anekārthatā nāma (Pañcapādikā: 82).
¹² Halasyanatha Sastri notes that this verse is not found in some manuscripts.
  233
The illustrious king Cinnabomma, who is a pārijāta for those who resort to him,¹³
took refuge with all his being in Paśupati. [Though] he has achieved the status of a
universal monarch, he, being composed, believes that this [status] bears fruit only by
worshipping [Paśupati].
:
asya¹⁴ ksitīśitur :
apāragunāmburāśer as: tāsu
: :
diksu
vitatorjitaśāsanasya |
antah: sadaiva vasatā vibhunā niyukto bhāsya: m : yathāmatibalam
:
viśadīkaromi || 14 ||
Commanded by the all-pervasive Lord, who dwells at all times within this ruler of the
earth—[himself] a limitless ocean of qualities whose mighty dominion extends in the
eight directions—I shall clarify [Śrīkan: t:ha’s] commentary to the best of my intellectual
abilities.
yāvanto niviśante vidusā: m
: vyākhyānabhāratīgumphāh¹⁵ : |
sarves: ām api tes:ām
: dadāti pus: pakam ivaitad avakāśam || 15 ||
However many scholars’ rhetorical explanations there can be [on this commentary by
Śrīkan: tha],
: this [commentary] provides room for them all, like the celestial chariot
Pus: paka.
tasmād atra yathāmati kiyad āśayavarnana
: m: mayā kriyate |
:
tusyantu tato vibudhāh: katipayaratnagrahād ivāmbunidheh: || 16 ||
Therefore, however unimportant is the explanation that I will give here, to the best of
my intellectual abilities, of [Śrīkan: t:ha’s] intention [in writing his commentary], may
scholars be pleased with it, just as [people are pleased] with taking [just] a few jewels
from the ocean.
¹³ Cinnabomma is compared here to a pārijāta tree, a celestial tree with the property of granting all
objects of desire: like the tree, he grants everything to those (including Appaya himself) who resort to
him. The verse arguably contrasts the fact that people resort to Cinnabomma with the fact that
Cinnabomma himself resorts to Paśupati.
¹⁴ Variant reading: yasya. ¹⁵ corr.; gumbhāh: ed.
APPENDIX 3
Verses from the Ratnatrayaparīks: ā
Sanskrit text and translation¹

nityam: nirdos: agandham
: niratiśayasukham : brahmacaitanyam² ekam :
:
dharmo dharmīti rūpadvayam³ ayati prthagbhūya māyāvaśena |
dharmas tatrānubhūtih: sakalavis: ayinī
: sarvakāryānukūlā
śaktiś cecchādirūpā bhavati gunaga
: : cāśrayas tv eka eva || 1 ||
naś
Eternal, devoid of [even the] trace of a defect, and consisting of unsurpassed bliss, the
one [non-dual] consciousness of Brahman assumed the two [related] forms of dharma
and dharmin by separating itself through the power of māyā. Of these two [forms],
dharma is the immediate experience [that objectivizes, on the part of the dharmin,] the
entire [manifestation]; it is the power, in the form of will, etc., that is conducive to all
[of the dharmin’s] activities; it is the collection of [all its] qualities, and [its] single
[and] only ground.
vedajñā dharmam etam : pravitatam akhilādhāram⁴ ākāśam āhuh:
kim: cānandam : manovāgavis: ayam adhikam : dharmino
: varnayanti
: |
sattā sphūrtih: sukham : ca trayam api jagatām: samgirante
: : m
tadamśa :
:
prānākāśādyupāstī : katicid api tadālambanās te vadanti || 2 ||
h⁵
Those who know the Vedas say that this dharma is the expanded space that supports
everything and also describe [it] as the excellent bliss of the dharmin, [a bliss] beyond
the scope of mind and speech. They praise the triad [consisting in] the existence,
manifestation and happiness of the worlds as a constitutive aspect of this [dharma].
They say that the several methods of worshipping the vital breath, space, etc. have this
[dharma] as their object.
: m
kartrtva : tasya dharmī kalayati jagatām
: pañcake sr: s: tipūrve
:
dharmah: pumrūpam
: āptvā⁶ sakalajagadupādānabhāvam : bibharti |
strīrūpam: prāpya divyā bhavati ca mahisī
: svāśrayasyādikartuh:
proktau dharmaprabhedāv api nigamavidām : dharmivad brahmakot:ī || 3 ||
The dharmin is the agent of the five [actions] beginning with the creation of the
worlds. The dharma assumes, in the form of a Man, the state of the material cause of
¹ The Sanskrit text reproduced here is a critical edition-in-progress of the eight verses of the
Ratnatrayaparīks: ā, compiled on the basis of a printed edition [P] (Ratnatrayaparīks:ā 1952); a critical
edition of the text included in D. G. Joshi’s doctoral dissertation [J] (see Joshi 1966: 740–4; his critical
edition is based on two nāgarī paper manuscripts kept at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
namely no. 376 and no. 665); and a nāgarī transcript [A] kept at the Institut Français de Pondichéry
(no. 47870). There are several other manuscripts of the Ratnatrayaparīks:ā that I have not consulted,
and which might prove useful in improving this critical edition. My translation stays as close as possible
to Appaya’s self-authored commentary.
² brahmacaitanyam] P, A; brahma caitanyam J. ³ rūpadvayam] P, A; rūpādvayam J.
⁴ akhilādhāram] P, A; akhilābhāram J. ⁵ prānākāśādyupāstī
: : P, J; prānākāśādyupāsti
h] : m: A.
⁶ āptvā] P, A; ākhyām : J.
  235
the entire world. In the form of a Woman, the divine queen belongs to the primordial
creator in whom She resides. For those who know scriptures, the [two] divisions of
dharma just mentioned [i.e., the Man and the Woman] are in the domain of Brahman,
just like the dharmin.
yo ’sau dharmī sa śambhu
: h: sa śiva iti param : brahma ceti prasiddho
: ’syāvighat:itamahis: ī⁷ sāmbikometi vittā⁸ |
yā coktā dharmino
yaś copādānabhūtah: para iha purusa : h: saisa⁹
: nārāyanoktyā
:
khyātah: śrīkūrmavākyair adhigamitam¹⁰ idam : nāradasyāpi vākyaih: || 4 ||
That dharmin is Śambhu, and is well known as Śiva, the supreme Brahman. She is
known as Ambikā or Umā, and said to be the undivided queen of this dharmin. As for
the highest Man, the material cause of this world, He is well known under the name
‘Nārāyana’.
: [All of this] is understood from the words of the blessed Kūrma and
Nārada as well.
: h: parinatir
tasyaivādyasya pumsa : akhilo ’py ambarādir vikāras
: viriñcāvadhir¹¹ iha nikhilo¹² ’py esa
tasyaivāmśo : samsārivarga
: h: |
: kr: tvaiva tasya prapadanam amr: tasyādyam ānandamūrti-
prāpyam¹³
: bhargasya jus:ta
sthānam¹⁴ : m: tad amrtatanayair
: devadevaih: purānai: h: || 5 ||
Products such as space, etc. are all transformations of this primordial Man only; all
living beings in this world up to Brahmā are parts of Him only. The primordial abode
of Amr: ta [i.e., Śiva], [an abode] characterized by bliss,¹⁵ is reached only by taking
refuge in Him [i.e., the primordial Man], [and] this [abode] of light was worshipped by
the ancient gods of gods, the sons of Amr: ta [i.e., Śiva].
khyātāh: kotyo
: navās:tādaśa
: na parimitāh: sthānu¹⁶
: vaikun: thavedha
: :
h-
śaktīnāmtatkalā
: :
mśās¹⁷ tribhuvanavis: ayāh: śamkarasyaiva
: bhogyāh: |
:
yā vikhyātā krpābdhi h: śrutiśirasi parabrahmavidyāpradātrī
sāhityam: sā bhavānī bhajati niyamatah: śamkaropāsanāsu
: || 6 ||
The famous ninety million [and] hundred and eighty million powers of Sthānu : [i.e.,
Śiva], Vaikun: tha : [and] Vedhas [i.e., Brahmā] are immeasurable; their
: [i.e., Vis: nu]
minutest parts in the three worlds are enjoyed by Śamkara
: [i.e., Śiva] alone. Bhavānī
[i.e., Śakti], who is celebrated in the Upanisads
: as an ocean of compassion and as
bestowing the science of the supreme Brahman, shares as a rule Śamkara’s
: [i.e., Śiva’s]
worship.¹⁸
⁷ ’syāvighat:itamahis:ī] P, A; ’syā vidur iti mahis:ī J.

⁸ vittā] P, A; vitta J (requires a long syllable). ⁹ purus: ah: sais:a] A, J ; purus: aś cais:a P.
¹⁰ adhigamitam] A, J; adhigatam P (unmetrical).
¹¹ viriñcāvadhir] P; viriñcādika A, viriñcyādika J. ¹² nikhilo] A, J; sakalo P.
¹³ prāpyam]: P, J; prāptim : A.
¹⁴ ānandamūrtisthānam] : P; ānandamūrtih: sthānam : A, ānandamūrtisthānām : J.
¹⁵ See Appaya’s commentary: tad eva śivasya divyasthānam ānandamūrtyādinā viśes: itam.
¹⁶ parimitāh: sthānuº]
: : P, A.
J; parimitāsthānuº
:
¹⁷ tatkalāmśās] A; yatkr: tāmśās
: :
J, yatkalāmśās P.
¹⁸ The idea here is that Śiva must be worshipped together with Śakti. See Appaya’s commentary:
śivopāsanāyām : tasyāh: sahopāsanāniyamah. :
236  
śrīmatkūrmena : yā ’tyāśramaratavis: ayā bhāvanoktā tr: tīyā

: sayi
divyasthānapradātrī sagunavi : nī: śamkarālambanā
: sā |
ye tv anye bhāvane te sarasijanayanenādiśaktyā ca yukte
:
prāpinyau te tu tasyāh: kramikaphalayute bhautikam: sāmkhyam
: āpte || 7 ||
The third contemplation, reserved to ascetics, taught by the glorious Kūrma, leads to
the divine abode [and] has the embodied Śamkara
: [i.e., Śiva] as its object. As for the
[two] other contemplations associated with the lotus-eyed one [i.e., Vis: nu] : and the
primeval Śakti, they lead to that [third contemplation], come with gradual results and
focus on the material and mental [realms, respectively].¹⁹
: h: śamkarasya
vidvāmsa : śrutimatimahitopāsanāvāsanābhir
labdha²⁰ svānta²¹ pratis: t:hāh: sudr: dham
: : vilokyātmanaiva |
abhidayā tam
golokasyordhvabhāgād api paramapadād vais: navād : ūrdhvadeśe²²
bhāsvatkot:iprabham: yānty apunar apagamasthānam²³ ānandarūpam || 8 ||
Having contemplated Śamkara
: [i.e., Śiva] very intensely, by means of His name and
with their own self, wise men—who are firmly established in their heart because of the
latent impressions [produced] by [their] worship of Śamkara,
: [a worship] enhanced by
the [recitation of] scriptures and reflection [on these scriptures]—reach, never to
return again, a far-off place made of bliss [and] blazing like ten million suns, in a
: the uppermost part of Kr: s: na’s
region beyond the supreme place of Vis: nu, : heaven.
¹⁹ The terms bhautika and sāmkhya : refer to two among three types of yogins (and their respective
contemplation) described in the Kūrmapurāna. : Appaya mentions the following passage from this
Purāna : in his commentary: yogī ca trividho jñeyo bhautikah: sāmkhya : eva ca | tr: tīyo ’tyāśramī prokto
yogam uttamam āśritah: || prathamā bhāvanā pūrve sāmkhye : tv aks: arabhāvanā | dvitīyā cāntimā proktā
bhāvanā pārameśvarī ||. The first type of yogin, the ‘worldly’ (bhautika) yogin, contemplates the
material world; the second yogin, the ‘intellectual’ (sāmkhya) : yogin, contemplates the imperishable
(aks: ara) aspect of the divinity; and the third type of yogin, the ‘ascetic’ (atyāśramin), contemplates the
supreme divinity. Appaya associates the first and second types of contemplation (bhāvanā) to the worship
: and Śakti, respectively, and the third type, ‘reserved to ascetics’ (atyāśramaratavis: aya), to the
of Vis: nu
worship of Śiva, as the first half of the verse makes clear.
²⁰ labdhaº] P, A; labdhvāº J. ²¹ ºsvāntapratis: t:hāh]: P, J; ºsvāntah: pratis:t:hāh: A.
²² vais:navād
: ūrdhvadeśe] A, J; vais: navasyordhvadeśe
: P.
²³ apagamasthānam] P; agamasthānam J (unmetrical), avagamasthānam A.
APPENDIX 4
Śrīkan: t:ha and Nīlakan: t:ha: Further Details
A4.1 Two Quotations of Nīlakan: t:ha’s Commentary

in Vīraśaiva Sources
The earliest mention of Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary on the BS in Vīraśaiva sources that I am
:
aware of is in Nandikeśvara Śivācārya’s Lingadhāranacandrikā,
: a Vīraśaiva treatise dealing
: :
:
with the practice of wearing a small linga on one’s body (lingadhārana).¹ In two places in
his work, Nandikeśvara quotes from a Brahmasūtrabhās: ya he ascribes to Nīlakan: t:ha
:
Śivācārya. The first quotation occurs when Nandikeśvara argues that the lingadhārana :
practice is enjoined in a verse from the Śvetāśvatara Upanis: ad (3.11):
sarvānanaśirogrīvah: sarvabhūtaguhāśayah: |
sarvavyāpī sa bhagavāms: tasmāt sarvagatah: śivah: ||
Nandikeśvara argues that the compound sarvānanaśirogrīvah: indicates the places on the
:
body—namely, the face (ānana), head (śiras) and neck (grīva)—where the linga (which
Nandikeśvara interprets as the referent of the word śiva in the verse) can be worn. An
objection is raised in this context: the compound in question and the word śiva both have
the same nominative case ending, and thus both terms must denote the same entity. Hence,
it is not meaningful to interpret the compound as denoting the locus (adhikarana)
: : where
:
the linga should be placed, for the concept of location (adhikaranatā) is based precisely on
:
the assumption that there is a difference (bheda) between the thing to be placed (linga=śiva)
and the locus where it is placed. Nandikeśvara responds to the objection with a quotation
from Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary on the ānandamayādhikarana : (BS 1.1.13–16), where
Nīlakan: t:ha (Nandikeśvara refers to him here as nīlakan: t:hācāryacaranā: h)
: explains that
the sense of location can be conveyed even when the entities involved are referred to with
the same case ending in a textual passage. Nandikeśvara first quotes the pūrvapaks: a put
forward in Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary:
Since you [Nīlakan: t:ha] accept that [the suffix] maya [in the compound ānandamaya]
expresses ‘abundance’ (prācurya), it follows that ānanda and brahman relate to each
other as dharma and dharmin [respectively] [i.e., brahman, the dharmin, is ‘full’ of
bliss, the dharma]. [But] how can there be such a dharma-dharmin relationship given
that ānanda and brahman are understood to be non-different from each other in that
they have the same case ending in sentences such as ‘Because of the realization that
bliss is Brahman’ and ‘Brahman is wisdom and bliss’?²
:
:
¹ The Lingadhāranacandrikā is generally ascribed to the seventeenth century, following Sakhare,
who edited the text (Sakhare 1942: 657). However, Sakhare does not provide any evidence for the upper
limit of Nandikeśvara’s date. The work is certainly post-Appaya, for it refers to his Śivakarnām: r: ta; it
also refers to the Śivādvaitadarpana, : which I believe to be :a comparatively late work (see below, this
:
appendix, fn. 6). In light of this, we may assume that the Lingadhāranacandrikā was composed during
the eighteenth century or afterwards.
² tatra ca mayat:ah: prācuryārthakatvasvīkārenānandabrahma
: :
nor dharmadharmibhāvaprāptau
‘ānando brahmeti vyajanāt’ ‘vijñānam ānandam brahma’ ityādivākyagatānandabrahmapadayor
ekavibhaktikatvenābhedabodhanāt katham
: : dharmadharmibhāva [iti pūrvapaks: am : prāpayya]
:
(Lingadhāranacandrikā: 41–2).
238  
This pūrvapaks: a makes it clear that Nīlakan: t:ha accepts the view that the blissful self is
Brahman, and that he understands the suffix maya in the compound ānandamaya to mean
‘abundance’ (prācurya). Nīlakan: tha’s
: response to the objection that a dharma-dharmin
relationship between brahman and ānanda in this case is impossible is that brahman can
still be the locus of bliss (ānandādhikarana) : even if some textual passages describe
brahman and ānanda as non-different from each other. This is possible, he says, because
other scriptural passages, such as ‘Bliss is the form of Brahman’ (ānando brahmano : rūpam),
express their difference.³
In his commentary on the ānandamayādhikarana, : Śrīkan: tha: also interprets the suffix
maya in the compound ānandamaya in the sense of ‘abundance’; he also holds the view
that the blissful self is Brahman. In his commentary on BS 1.1.15, Śrīkan: t:ha’s pūrvapaks: in
also attacks the siddhāntin’s (i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha’s) view that maya means ‘abundance’, just as
Nīlakan: tha’s
: : does. However, he does not raise the dharma-dharmin argument,
pūrvapaksin
or more specifically the fact that brahman and ānanda have the same case ending in certain
scriptural sentences. Instead, Śrīkan: t:ha’s pūrvapaks: in directly refutes the view that the
blissful self can be identified with Brahman even if we accept that maya means ‘abundance’.
This view cannot be defended, he says, because scriptures declare that Brahman is the ‘tail’
(puccha) or ‘foundation’ (pratis: t:hā) of the blissful self, and is therefore different from it. It is
true that Śrīkan: tha
: points out, in his siddhānta ad BS 1.1.16, that bliss is an attribute
(dharma) of Brahman. But this position is ascribed to others.⁴ As we shall see below, this
position, as it is reported by Śrīkan: t:ha, is found in its entirety, and almost verbatim, in a
quotation of Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary on the BS reported in a modern commentary on the
Vīraśaiva Śivādvaitadarpana. : The passage from Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary reported by
Nandikeśvara suggests that it shares clear affinities with Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary in its
interpretation of the ānandamayādhikarana, : but that it is nevertheless: distinct.
The second quotation of Nīlakan: tha’s
: :
commentary found in the Lingadhāranacandrikā
occurs towards the end of the work. Nandikeśvara reports there a passage in which
Nīlakan: t:ha compares Śiva to an ‘ocean of infinite auspicious qualities that are like jewels,
: :
such as [His] limbs, parts, etc.’ (angāvayavādyanantamāngalyagunaga : :
nama :
nijaladhi).
Nandikeśvara says that following this description of Śiva, a question about the said limbs
and parts of Śiva is raised in the commentary, to which Nīlakan: t:ha responds by quoting
from Śaivāgamas.⁵ This whole episode is absent from our edition of Śrīkan: tha’s :
³ ‘ānando brahmano : rūpam’ ityādibhedabodhakavākyāvirodhena ānandādhikarana : m : brahmeti

rāddhāntitam—‘It is concluded that Brahman is the locus of bliss because [this assertion] is compatible
with sentences that express their difference, such as “Bliss is the form of Brahman” ’
:
:
(Lingadhāranacandrikā: 42). I have not been able to trace the exact source of the quoted passage.
⁴ [atra kecid āhuh: . . . ] tatra ‘ānando brahma’ ity ānandasya brahmatvavyapadeśas tu brahmadhar-
matvena tadabhedāt . . . ity ucyate—‘[Some say on this . . . ] As for the designation of bliss as Brahman
[in the passage] “Bliss is Brahman,” it is said: since [bliss] is non-different from [Brahman] given that it
is its attribute . . . ’ (ŚAMD1: 220).
⁵ This passage occurs in Nandikeśvara’s reply to the objection that Śaivāgamas are not authoritative.
Nandikeśvara provides a number of reasons in support of their authority, among which the fact
that Nīlakan: t:ha quotes from them in his commentary in response to a question about the limbs and
parts of Śiva. The passage in question reads: api ca śrīnīlakan: t:haśivācāryacaranak : r: tabhās:ye
: :
‘angāvayavādyanantamāngalyagunaga : :
nama :
nijaladhe h: paramaśivasya’ ityetadgranthena parama-
: :
śivam : viśis: ya, kāni tāny angānīty ukteh: [ . . . ] iti śaivāgamavacanair angāvayavanirūpanena
: [ . . . ]—
‘[Śaivāgamas are authoritative] also because in the commentary composed by the revered Nīlakan: t:ha
Śivācārya, [Nīlakan: t:ha], after having specifically described the supreme Śiva with the passage “of the
supreme Śiva, the ocean of infinite auspicious qualities that are like jewels such as [His] limbs, parts, etc.”,
described, in response to the question “What are those limbs?”, the limbs [and] parts [of Śiva] based on
:
statements from Śaivāgamas’ (Lingadhāranacandrikā:
: 237).
  239
commentary, nor is Śiva ever described as such there. This quotation too suggests that
Nandikeśvara had access to a Śaiva commentary on the BS distinct from the commentary
by Śrīkan: tha
: that features in our edition.
The other quotation from Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary that I am aware of is found in the
Varanasi (Banaras) edition of the Śivādvaitadarpana : of Śivānubhava Śivācārya, a com-
paratively late Vīraśaiva work on Śaktiviśis: tādvaita
: Vedānta.⁶ In his introductory verses as
well as in the colophon, Śivānubhava refers to Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya as the author of a
commentary on the BS.⁷ The editor, Siddhabasava Śāstri, claims in his introduction that
: is different from Śrīkan: tha’s
this bhāsya : BMB, that it is not well known (ananugatapracāra)
and that it has never been published up to now.⁸ Thus, unlike the editor of the
:
:
Lingadhāranacandrikā, Siddhabasava Śāstri believed that the commentary of Nīlakan: t:ha
was still extant in his time. Although he mentions Nīlakan: t:ha as the author of a commen-
tary on the BS, Śivānubhava himself does not quote from the commentary. The quotation
I have located is found in a commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana : (Varanasi edition) by
yet another Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya,⁹ who quotes a long passage from Nīlakan: t:ha’s commen-
tary on the ānandamayādhikarana, : the same adhikarana : I have discussed above.
⁶ In the Śivādvaitadarpana, : the author refers in one of his introductory verses to the five Vīraśaiva
ācāryas (pañcācārya): pañcasūtrakr: to vande pañcācāryān jagadgurūn—‘I praise the five masters, the
teachers of the world who authored the five sūtras’ (Śivādvaitadarpana: : 1, v. 3cd). In the only extant
(paper) manuscript of this work kept in the Saraswati Bhavan Library (no. 26704), this same verse
(which differs only in reading pañcāks:arasamān instead of pañcasūtrakr: to) is followed by a praise of
Viśvārādhya, one of the five Vīraśaiva ācāryas: viśvavandyam : sadā vande viśvārādhyam : jagadgurum—
‘I always praise Viśvārādhya, the teacher of the world, who is worthy of praise by all.’ The list of five
ācāryas typically includes Revanārādhya,
: Maru:lārādhya, Ekorāmārādhya, Pan: ditārādhya
: (identified
with Mallikārjuna Pan: ditārādhya),
: and Viśvārādhya, each being associated with the foundation of a
particular Vīraśaiva mat:ha/pīt:ha. According to Schouten (1995: 265), the list of five ācāryas would be
of relatively recent date: Virūpaks: apan: dita’s
: Cannabasavapurāna, : dated to 1585 (Rocher 1986: 76),
mentions only four ācāryas and leaves out Viśvārādhya, who is associated with the foundation of the
Kāśī Pīt:ha. In the late seventeenth century, the list of four ācāryas is still being used, for instance in the
Caturācāryacāritra (Rice 1921: 69 refers to this work as the Caturāsyapurāna) : of Sampādaneya
Parvateśa, a work dated to 1698; see Fisher 2018: 28 on this work, and for the claim that the four-
ācārya model persisted even after the seventeenth century. Sakhare (1942: 410–11) argues, based on the
lack of references to this figure in early Kannada literature, that Viśvārādhya ‘is very recent’ and that he
was ‘classed along with the other four acharyas only to make the number of acharyas five’. Assuming
that the introductory verses of the Śivādvaitadarpana : are authentic and not later additions, the
mention of the five teachers in these verses suggests that this work was composed after the seventeenth
century.
⁷ At the beginning of the work, Śivānubhava traces the lineage of Nīlakan: t:ha, the bhās: yakr: t, back to
the pañcācāryas (see above, this appendix, fn. 6). After praising the pañcācāryas, Śivānubhava praises,
in order: Vyāsa (the sūtrakāra), Caitanya (the author of an unknown vr: tti on the BS), Nīlakan: t:ha (the
author of the commentary on the BS), Daks: ināmūrti,: Śivācārya, Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya (possibly the
author of the Kriyāsāra), Cidghana, and himself. The editor of the Varanasi edition, Siddhabasava
Śāstri, claims that this lineage is attested in the Pūvallīpat:t:āvalicaritra (Pūvallī being the Sanskrit name
for modern-day Hooli, near Bangalore), which I have not been able to consult. In the colophon,
Śivānubhava refers to Nīlakan: t:ha as Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya and to his commentary as a śivādvaitabhās: ya.
⁸ See Śivādvaitadarpana: : vii. I have not been able to find any evidence for Siddhabasava Śāstri’s
claim, nor whether he had in his possession a copy of the Nīlakan: t:habhās: ya in question. According to
personal acquaintances in India, he passed away a few years ago.
⁹ This third Nīlakan: t:ha Śivācārya is different from the author of the Kriyāsāra and from the
commentator on the BS referred to by the latter. He is possibly the author of the
Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā, who, as we are told in the introduction to an edition of this work, was born in
Karnataka in 1822 (Śaka era, i.e., 1900 CE) and was the pat:t:ādhyaks: a of the Br: hanmat:ha in Pūvallī
(Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā: 12). See Fisher 2018 for a recent study of the Br: hanmat:ha.
240  
The passage quoted is identical to a passage from the same adhikarana : in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary ad BS 1.1.16. There Śrīkan: t:ha reports three alternative interpretations of the
Taittirīya Upanisad : sentence brahma puccham : pratis: thā
: (‘Brahman is the tail, the founda-
tion [of the blissful self]’). The second interpretation, ascribed to ‘others’ (! kecid āhuh), :
corresponds almost verbatim to Nīlakan: t:ha’s siddhānta on the same sūtra as reported by
the commentator on the Śivādvaitadarpana. : At first sight, this suggests the possibility—
assuming, of course, that the commentary from which the commentator on the
Śivādvaitadarpana : quotes is genuine and not a spurious commentary composed after
Śrīkan: tha’s
: commentary—that Śrīkan: tha: could have had Nīlakan: tha’s: position in mind
while stating the second interpretation of the Taittirīya sentence, and that both are
therefore different commentators on the BS.¹⁰ However, a careful comparison of both
commentaries ad BS 1.1.15–16 suggests that borrowing took place, as the two texts closely
follow each other but not entirely: parallel compounds and expressions are more complex
in Nīlakan: t:ha’s text, and the latter provides more details and arguments. Who was the
borrower?
At this point, two observations should be made. First, the passage of Nīlakan: tha’s :
commentary reported in the commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana : does not fully agree
with what we are able to infer from the passage reported by Nandikeśvara in the
:
:
Lingadhāranacandrikā (which is coincidentally from the same adhikarana). : In particular,
Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary does not include the argument about the case ending nor the
reference to the sentence ‘ānando brahmano
: :
rūpam’. Recalling that the passages from
Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary quoted in the Lingadhāranacandrikā
: also did not match the text
of our edition of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, we may infer from this that Nandikeśvara had
access to an altogether different commentary. Secondly, the content of the quotation
reported in the commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana : agrees remarkably with the
Kriyāsāra’s rendering of Nīlakan: tha’s : commentary. In the latter, Nīlakan: tha : reports
three reasons to justify that the Brahman referred to at the beginning of the second vallī
of the Taittirīya Upanis: ad (in the sentence ‘satyam : jñānam anantam : brahma | yo veda
nihitam : . . . ’) is the blissful self mentioned in a later passage of the same vallī (‘anyo
’ntarātmā ānandamayah’): : 1. because both passages have the same object (ekārthatva);
2. because otherwise there would be the problem of having to give up what has already been
introduced as the main subject of discussion (i.e., Brahman), and the problem of pursuing
something that was not introduced earlier (i.e., the ānandamaya self); and 3. because
nothing other than Brahman is taught to be the other entity that is lying within us, i.e.,
the blissful self. In Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, as I have said previously, the same claim
is made about the identity of Brahman and the blissful self, but no supporting reason
is provided. The author of the Kriyāsāra, on the other hand, clearly states the last two
reasons in his kārikās ad BS 1.1.16 as well as the first reason in his kārikā ad BS 1.1.14.¹¹
¹⁰ In Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary ad BS 1.1.16, the passage in question begins with atra kecid āhuh:
paramākāśarūpah: [ . . . ] and ends with sūtritam iti. Compare with the quotation from Nīlakan: t:ha’s
commentary in Śivādvaitadarpana: : 5.
¹¹ The relevant passage in the commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana : is: itaś ca
cidambaraśaktiviśis:t:ah: paraśiva eva ānandamayah,: ‘yo veda nihitam: guhāyām : parame vyoman’ ity
asmin mantre prakr: tam ‘anyo ’ntarātmā ānandamayah’ : iti brāhmane : pracurānandaviśis:t:atayā
ānandamaya iti gīyate, mantrabrāhmanayor : ekārthatvāt, itarathā prakr: tahānāprakr: -
:
taprakriyāprasangād, antaratvapratijñānād anyasya cāntarasyānupadeśāc ca (Śivādvaitadarpana: : 5).
Compare with the following kārikās of the Kriyāsāra ad BS 1.1.14–16 (bold is mine):
:
mantrabrāhmanayor aikyād anyasyānupadeśatah: |
: nānyad iti dhruvam || 219 ||
brahmaivānandaśabdasya vācyam
  241
This suggests at least two possible interpretations: (a) while writing his kārikās on the BS,
the author of the Kriyāsāra relied on Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary (the same mentioned in the
commentary on the Śivādvaitadarpana) : and not on Śrīkan: tha’s
: commentary; or (b) the
commentator on the Śivādvaitadarpana : relied on (or himself composed) a commentary
based (at least partly) on the kārikās of the Kriyāsāra.
Based on this evidence alone, however, it is not possible to conclude which hypothesis is
most likely to be correct, or to determine whether the commentator on the
Śivādvaitadarpana : borrowed from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary or instead relied on an older
commentary by Nīlakan: tha. : I shall simply stress here the significance of the passage
reporting the view of ‘others’ in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary ad BS 1.1.16. While Appaya
claims that this view belongs to Śrīkan: t:ha and says nothing about others who may have
held this view,¹² Śrīkan: t:ha’s wording makes it clear that other Śaivas held views very similar
to his own at the time when he was writing, and raises the possibility that other Śaiva
commentaries on the BS might also have been circulating in this period.
A4.2 Comparison of the two commentaries based on the

kārikās of the Kriyāsāra
To shed additional light on the assumed identity between Śrīkan: t:ha and Nīlakan: t:ha, I now
examine more carefully the commentary on the BS summarized in the first sections
(upadeśa) of the Kriyāsāra on the basis of the commentary by Nīlakan: tha : Śivācārya. The
Kriyāsāra is possibly the first work that refers to Nīlakan: t:ha as the author of a commentary
on the BS, and the only one to summarize or closely rely on this commentary in its entirety.
The first four sections respectively cover the sūtras of the four adhyāyas of the BS; one or
more verses (kārikā) summarize the content of Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary on each sūtra. In
several places, this commentary appears to defend the same views using the same argu-
ments as in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. But in other places, as we shall now see, there are
significant differences. Although it should be kept in mind that the author of the Kriyāsāra
may have reinterpreted Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary to some extent in his kārikās, the
differences noted should raise a reasonable doubt about an overtly easy identification
between Nīlakan: tha’s
: and Śrīkan: tha’s
: commentaries. In the following, I wish to discuss
two examples: 1. the meaning of the particle tu in BS 1.1.4 (tat tu samanvayāt); and 2. the
acceptance of the philosophical view of difference and non-difference (bhedābheda) in
Nīlakan: tha’s
: commentary.
:
taddhetuvyapadeśāc ca māntravarnikagānata h: || 220 ||
: bhavet |
tad evānandayātīti taddhetos tat katham
itaś ca param evātra brahmānandamayah: śrutah: || 221 ||
‘anyo ’ntarātmānandamaya’ iti vākyena kevalam |
anyasya cāntarasyātra nopadeśāt param : śrutam || 222 ||
prāpyasyānyasyāśravanāc: chrutahānih: śrutau bhavet | (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 28)
¹² In his Ānandalaharī, Appaya explains that the second interpretation, although ascribed to
‘others’, is Śrīkan: t:ha’s view: tadanantaram ‘atra kecit’ ityādigranthena ānandamayaś cicchaktis
tatpratis:t:hā śivākhyam : param : brahmeti svābhiprāyo darśitah—‘Immediately
: after this, we see
[expressed], in the passage beginning with “On this, others [say]”, his [i.e., Śrīkan: t:ha’s] own view,
namely that the blissful [self], the power of consciousness that is the foundation [of that blissful self], is
the supreme Brahman called Śiva’ (Ānandalaharī [1989]: 2).
242  
There are instances in the Kriyāsāra where the reading of a sūtra word presented in the
kārikās is markedly different from how Śrīkan: t:ha reads it. One particular sūtra is worth
discussing here in view of the additional piece of evidence that a commentator on the
:
Kriyāsāra, Nirvānamantrirāja (middle of eighteenth century?), provides the reader with in
his commentary. The sūtra in question, BS 1.1.4 (tat tu samanvayāt), deals with the
question of how Upanisadic : texts refer to the Brahman defined in BS 1.1.2. The
Kriyāsāra tells us in verse 1.144:
samanvayāt tu brahmaiva dhāryam : pūjyam: mumuks: ubhih: |
vais: amyadyotanārthāya tuśabdo ’yam: prakāśitah: ||
The first pāda states the sūtra itself (here brahman stands for tat in the sūtra). The second
pāda states that Brahman must be worshipped by those who seek liberation. The last two
pādas state that the purpose of the particle tu in the sūtra is to make clear that there is a
certain problem (vais: amya)—actually an objection—that the sūtra aims to address.
:
Commenting on this sūtra, Nirvānamantrirāja explains that the objection understood
here is the uselessness (ānarthakya) of Upanis: adic texts insofar as these texts can neither
be used for ritual purposes (kriyārtha) nor to reveal an entity, Brahman, that is already
established (siddha); the purpose of the particle tu, as the commentator confirms, is to
dismiss this view (tuśabdah: paksavyāv
: :
rttyartha :
h).¹³ Śrīkan: tha
: does not adopt this inter-
pretation. According to him, tu merely indicates that all scriptural sentences from
Upanis: ads must be considered in the process of ‘coordinating’ (! samanvaya)
:
Upanisadic texts around Brahman (tuśabdena sarvāni : vedāntavākyāni samāhriyante).
At first sight, there does not seem to be any strong internal reason for the author of the
Kriyāsāra to adopt a different interpretation than Śrīkan: t:ha, were he indeed relying on his
:
commentary. Significantly, Nirvānamantrirāja, at the very end of his commentary on this
sūtra, explains that ‘followers of Śrīkan: t:ha’ (śrīkan: t:hīya) indeed interpret this sūtra differ-
ently. He actually quotes the entire commentary of Śrīkan: t:ha on this sūtra, and introduces
this position with the particle tu to signify that this group of followers interprets the sūtra
differently.¹⁴ This is a significant statement, for it entails that according to this commen-
tator on the Kriyāsāra, there were followers of Śrīkan: t:ha in his time and that they
interpreted the BS differently. It is my view that this remark (as well as the long quotation
itself) would hardly make sense if the commentator believed that Śrīkan: tha : was the author
of the commentary referred to by the author of the Kriyāsāra. Does this necessarily imply
that the author of the Kriyāsāra was relying on a different commentary? If we are to trust
the commentator’s judgement, we should answer in the affirmative. However, it is also not
impossible that the author of the Kriyāsāra would have altered Śrīkan: t:ha’s reading of the
sūtra for reasons that are not apparent to us, or to his commentator for that matter.
In some cases, it is the philosophical position defended by Nīlakan: tha : (again, insofar as it
is reported faithfully by the author of the Kriyāsāra) that appears to be different from that
of Śrīkan: t:ha. Although both Nīlakan: t:ha and Śrīkan: t:ha defend essentially the same śakti-
based non-dualism of the qualified (viśis:t:ādvaita), the defence of bhedābheda presented in
the Kriyāsāra is nowhere to be found in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. In line with adherents of
bhedābheda, Nīlakan: t:ha compares the relation between Brahman and the world to that
between fire and a spark of fire. Sparks of fire are not absolutely different from fire because
¹³ Kriyāsāra [1910]: 60.

¹⁴ The passage begins as follows: śrīkan: t:hīyās tu ‘tat tu samanvayāt’ ity atra tacchabdena [ . . . ].
:
From tacchabdena until the penultimate sentence of his commentary on the sūtra, Nirvānamantrirāja
quotes verbatim the entirety of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary ad BS 1.1.4 (Kriyāsāra [1910]: 61–4).
  243
they have its nature, but they are not absolutely non-different from it either, since in
this case they could not be distinguished from fire or from each other. Likewise the
world and Brahman are non-different from each other insofar as their essential nature
is concerned, but different in their manifestation. For instance, Nīlakan: t:ha claims ad
BS 1.4.22 that Kāśakr: tsna defends a bhedābheda relation between Brahman and the
individual self. Just as the bhedābhedavādin Bhāskara (c. eighth to ninth century) in
his Śārīrakamīmāmsābhā: s: ya, he refers to the simile of fire and sparks of fire
:
(visphulingāgnivat) in this context.¹⁵ In his commentary on this sūtra, Śrīkan: t:ha too accepts
the views of Kāśakr: tsna as authoritative, not insofar as they support a bhedābheda position,
but rather because they support the view that the supreme Lord entered all things of the
world as their inner controller (antaryāmin). Nīlakan: t:ha uses the same bhedābheda
metaphor in BS 2.3.42 to describe how the self relates to Brahman as its part (amśa). :
While Bhāskara relies on the same image in his commentary on this verse, Śrīkan: tha :
does not.¹⁶
Another example can be found ad BS 3.2.26. In his kārikās on this sūtra, the author of
the Kriyāsāra introduces the pūrvapaksa : according to which accepting a bhedābheda
relation between Brahman and the world amounts to a contradiction (virodha). The
nature of the contradiction is not made clear, but it could naturally be interpreted as a
vastuvirodha, that is, a contradiction in terms of how things really are: two things cannot be
simultaneously different and non-different. In the Kriyāsāra, this position is refuted on the
basis that the bhedābheda position is taught in smr: ti texts that use the image of the serpent
and its coil, another simile commonly used by bhedābhedavādins to represent the
bhedābheda relation between Brahman and the world. In his commentary, Śrīkan: t:ha argues
that this simile does not correctly represent the relation between Brahman and the world.
Unlike the author of the Kriyāsāra, he understands BS 3.2.26 as a pūrvapaks: a, not a
siddhānta; in this he agrees with the position taken by Rāmānuja in his Śrībhāsya.¹⁷:
The position adopted by Śrīkan: t:ha in his commentary on the above-mentioned sūtras is
not surprising, for he explicitly denies bhedābheda ad BS 2.1.22. Here Śrīkan: t:ha replies to
an objection according to which one should accept a bhedābheda relation between
¹⁵ avasthiteh: kāśakr: tsna iti tad brahmajīvayoh: || na bhedo ’pi na cābhedah: sāmarasyāt tayor
:
dhruvam | bhedābhedābhyupagamād visphulingāgnivat [tadā] |—‘On account of abiding, Kāśakr: tsna
[says] that Brahman and the individual self are neither different nor non-different, because both
are certainly united [and] because [their] difference and non-difference is accepted in the manner
of a spark of fire and fire’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 48, vs. 1.445–6). Compare with Bhāskara’s
:
Śārīrakamīmāmsābhā
: s: ya ad BS 1.4.22: amśo
: hi parasyāyam: jīvo nāma yathāgner visphulingāh—‘For :
this individual self is a part of the supreme just as sparks of fire [are parts of] fire’ (Kato 2011: 138).
:
¹⁶ See Kriyāsāra ad BS 2.3.42: yathā vahner visphulinga īśāmśo : jīva īritah—‘The
: individual is said
to be a part of the Lord just as the spark of fire [is a part] of fire’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 115, v. 2.607).
Compare with Śārīrakamīmāmsābhā : s: ya ad BS 2.3.42 (=2.3.43 in Bhāskara’s numbering): kim :
:
tūpādhyavacchinnasyānanyabhūtasya vācako ’yam amśaśabda : h: prayukto yathāgner visphulingasya—
‘Rather, the word amśa : [in the verse] is used to denote an entity that is not different [from Brahman]
[inasmuch as it is] delimited by a limiting factor just as in the example of the spark of fire and fire.’
¹⁷ For Śrīkan: t:ha, the image of the serpent and the coil imperfectly accounts for the relation between
Brahman and the world. Ad BS 3.2.28, he says that the word vā in the sūtra (pūrvavad vā) aims to refute
the views expressed in the two previous sūtras, that is, the simile of the serpent (āhi) and the coil
(kun: dala)
: (BS 3.2.26), and that of the light (prakāśa) and its substratum (āśraya) (BS 3.2.27): vāśabdah:
paks: advayavyāvr: ttyarthah. : The reason he provides for this is that these images can easily lead one to
conceive of an imperfection (dos: a) in Brahman: itarapaks: advaye brahmana : h: sados: atvam: durvāram. In
his Śrībhās: ya ad BS 3.2.26, Rāmānuja refutes the other views using the exact same wording: vāśabdah:
paks: advayavyāvr: ttyarthah. :
244  
Brahman and the world on the basis that scriptures teach both their difference and their
non-difference. Śrīkan: t:ha refutes this position and explains his own:
We are not among those who maintain absolute difference between Brahman and the
world, as between a jar and a cloth [ . . . ], nor are we among those who maintain their
absolute non-difference, as between the silver and the shell [ . . . ], nor are we among
those who maintain both their difference and non-difference (bhedābhedavādin)
because it is contrary to the nature of things. Rather, we are among those who maintain
a non-dualism of the qualified, as between body and embodied or between quality and
qualified.¹⁸
In the manner of Rāmānuja and his followers, Śrīkan: t:ha defends a Viśis: t:ādvaita position in
which the supreme being and the world relate to each other like embodied (śarīrin) and
body (śarīra), or qualified (gunin) : :
and quality (guna). This position is compatible with
bhedābheda, he says, but strictly in the sense that it does not contradict scriptural sentences
that teach bheda and abheda.¹⁹ While the author of the Kriyāsāra, in line with
bhedābhedavādins like Bhāskara, understands that difference and non-difference are both
real and coexist on the same level (which means that a produced entity exists simultaneously
in a relationship of difference and non-difference with the supreme being), Śrīkan: tha,: like
Rāmānuja, stresses non-difference over difference: non-difference (Śiva/Brahman) is quali-
fied (viśis:t:a) by difference (world/self), which is therefore subordinate to it.²⁰
Nevertheless, the acceptance of bhedābheda as defining the relation between Brahman,
world and self need not entail that Nīlakan: tha : himself defended bhedābheda in his
commentary: it could express the author of the Kriyāsāra’s personal views on the subject.
The philosophical stance of bhedābheda is widely accepted by Vīraśaivas, at least from the
Kriyāsāra onwards, for it agrees with their conception of the path towards liberation: the
worshipper initially worships Śiva as an entity different from himself until he can effectively
: :
unite with Śiva in the experience of lingāngasāmarasya, the union (sāmarasya) of the self
: :
(anga) and Śiva (linga).²¹ Furthermore, the kārikās laid down in the Kriyāsāra sometimes
include arguments, textual references or scriptural passages that are not found in
¹⁸ na vayam : brahmaprapañcayor atyantam eva bhedavādinah, : ghat:apat:ayor iva [ . . . ] na vā

’tyantābhedavādinah: śuktirajatayor iva [ . . . ] na ca bhedābhedavādinah, : vastuvirodhāt. kim : tu
śarīraśarīrinor
: iva gunagu
: :
ninor iva ca viśis:t:ādvaitavādinah: (ŚAMD2: 31).
¹⁹ bhedābhedakalpanam : viśis: t:ādvaitam: sādhayāmah. : [ . . . ] tasmād bhedābhedaśrutīnām aviruddha
evāyam : mārgah—‘We
: defend a non-dualism of the qualified that is compatible with bhedābheda [ . . . ]
Therefore, this interpretation [of ours] is not opposed to scriptural statements [that teach] difference
and non-difference [between Brahman and the world/self]’ (ŚAMD2: 31).
²⁰ The author of the Kriyāsāra recurrently uses bhedābheda in the dual (see, e.g., v. 447:
bhedābhedau vyavasthitau). For Śrīkan: t:ha, this is not acceptable, as it implies, ontologically speaking,
a vastuvirodha; he would rather interpret the compound as bhedaviśis: t:ābheda.
: :
²¹ For the direct relation between lingāngasāmarasya and bhedābheda, see v. 1.447 of the Kriyāsāra:
: :
jīvo hy upāsakah: sāks:ād upāsyam : brahma kevalam | lingāngasāmarasyena bhedābhedau vyavasthitau
||—‘Indeed, the individual self is the worshipper and only Brahman ought to be worshipped. By the
: :
union of the linga (i.e., Śiva/Brahman) and anga (i.e., the self), difference and non-difference is
established’ (Kriyāsāra [1954]: 48). Later Sanskrit Vīraśaiva works expounding on Vedānta also defend
a bhedābheda position; see, for instance, the Śivādvaitadarpana : (see Śivādvaitadarpana:
: 22ff.), the
Śivādvaitamañjarī (see Śivādvaitamañjarī: 9–11) and the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā (see
Vīraśaivānandacandrikā: 26–8, who relies on the latter in his treatment of bhedābheda). The modern
Vīraśaiva treatise on Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta, the Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa, draws a
distinction between the Vīraśaiva Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita and the system of Śrīkan: t:ha/Appaya on the basis
that the latter does not accept bhedābheda. Interestingly, this compendium advocates a form of
bhedābheda that the author claims to be slightly different from that of Bhāskara and other
bhedābhedavādins; see Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa: 372–3.
  245
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary; they also feature distinctive Vīraśaiva concepts and practices that
are obviously not found in Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. Conversely, a number of arguments or
positions advanced by Śrīkan: tha
: are not reported in the Kriyāsāra. To which extent should
we understand these differences as resulting from a reinterpretation of Nīlakan: t:ha’s
commentary on the part of the author of the Kriyāsāra, or as resulting from the fact that
the latter had access to an altogether different Śaiva commentary on the BS?
A4.3 Concluding Remarks

The previous analysis has shown that there are significant differences between the content
of our edition of Śrīkan: t:ha’s BMB and how the author of the Kriyāsāra represents
Nīlakan: tha’s
: interpretation of the BS. The fact that both commentators seem to read certain
sūtras differently and take different positions, for instance, on bhedābheda, suggests at first
sight that they might have been different scholars who wrote distinct Śaiva commentaries
:
on the BS. In support of this view is the fact that Nirvānamantrirāja, the commentator on
the Kriyāsāra, distinguishes the views defended by the author of the Kriyāsāra, which are
based on Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary, from those of the ‘followers of Śrīkan: t:ha’. Also
revealing in this regard is that Śrīkan: tha: refers to the position of other Śaivas in his
commentary, and that this position is expressed with almost the same wording in a
Vīraśaiva quotation of Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary. In this line of thinking, some modern
Vīraśaivas have argued that Nīlakan: t:ha was a scholar who flourished before Śrīkan: t:ha, and
that his Vīraśaiva commentary on the BS inspired Śrīkan: t:ha’s own commentary. A strong
version of this theory has been advocated in recent years by Vīraśaiva Ārādhya members of
the Śiva Jñāna Laharī Foundation in Andhra Pradesh. In their view, Śrīkan: t:ha’s commen-
tary is an adapted version of an earlier Vīraśaiva Nīlakan: thabhā
: : that was put into
sya
circulation by Appaya Dīks: ita himself. Appaya, the supposed ‘compiler’ of Śrīkan: t:ha’s
commentary, took over the Nīlakan: t:habhās: ya and freely adapted its content, removing
certain passages (especially those containing references to Vīraśaiva doctrines or practices)
and adding others. Members of this community maintain that the ‘original’
Nīlakan: t:habhās: ya, lost for centuries, was given to Sri Mudigonda Nagalinga Sastry—a
respected Ārādhya scholar who died in 2007—by none other than Appaya’s great-
grandson, Srinivasa Siromani.²²
However, without discovering a genuine pre-modern manuscript of Nīlakan: t:ha’s
Vīraśaiva commentary,²³ it remains impossible to prove beyond doubt that the author of
the Kriyāsāra relied on another commentary, distinct from Śrīkan: tha’s
: commentary, in his
exegesis of the BS. The alternative hypothesis, in comparison, has the merit of agreeing with
statements made by several Vīraśaiva and non-Vīraśaiva scholars to the effect that
Nīlakan: tha
: and the author of the BMB are the same scholar; it would also explain why
no manuscript of a distinct commentary by Nīlakan: t:ha has been found so far. As for the
noted differences between the exegesis of the BS found in the Kriyāsāra and in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
²² This theory is defended on the official website of the Śiva Jñāna Laharī Foundation (http://www.
sroutasaivasiddhanta.com/), whose mission is to teach ‘Shrouta Saiva Siddhanta’, a form of
brahmanical Vīraśaivism associated with Ārādhyas. The same website reports that Sri Mudigonda
Nagalinga Sastry published the ‘original Nilakantha Bhashyam’ in a work called ‘Siva Chintamani
Prabha’ in 1950. Despite my repeated requests to members of this community, I have not been able to
acquire a copy of this publication.
²³ Despite the prevailing claim among some Vīraśaivas that such a manuscript does exist, my
research has so far been fruitless.
246  
commentary, it could be explained, as suggested earlier, by the author’s intention or

attempt to reinterpret the latter in line with Vīraśaiva doctrine and terminology. If we
take this view, however, we must in turn accept that the quotations of Nīlakan: tha’s :
commentary found in later Vīraśaiva sources refer to another (or other) commentary(ies)
by Nīlakan: t:ha. That there was in any case more than one edition of Nīlakan: t:ha’s com-
mentary in circulation is suggested by the fact that the commentator on the
Śivādvaitadarpana : : seems to read from a different commentary than Nandikeśvara, the
:
author of the Lingadhāranacandrikā. Moreover, other commentaries by Nīlakan: t:ha
have also surfaced in recent times.²⁴ As for the quotation found in the commentary on
the Śivādvaitadarpana : that clearly parallels a passage from Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary ascribed
to ‘others’, it would in this case need to be interpreted as a case of clever textual reuse based on
Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary. In any case, this evidence reveals how the Vīraśaiva Vedānta
tradition is conceptually and historically tied to the Śivādvaita of Śrīkan: tha: and Appaya.
²⁴ I have encountered two other ‘modern’ versions of Nīlakan: t:ha’s commentary. One version is the
recent translation (1994) of a Nīlakan: t:habhās:ya in Telugu by Sri Lokaradhya Nirmala Sankarasastry, a
scholar of Ārādhya descent. We are told in the introduction that Nīlakan: t:ha (referred to as
Nīlakan: t:hārādhya) was one of the ‘twelve founders’ (dvadaśārādhya) of the Ārādhya Vīraśaiva
tradition (the list of twelve founders appears to be a recently extended version of the earlier list of
pañcācāryas; the secondary sources I have consulted provide slightly different versions of it, but
Nīlakan: t:ha is always mentioned as one of the ācāryas). Based on a comparison of this commentary’s
benedictory verses with those of Śrīkan: t:ha’s commentary, I strongly suspect that the former is a
rendering of the latter. I have also briefly consulted, at the Oriental Research Institute in Mysore,
another Nīlakan: t:habhās: ya transliterated in Kannada, which also seems to be based on our BMB.
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Index Locorum
The numbers in parentheses are the page numbers in the book where the work is quoted. The asterisk
indicates that the work was composed by Appaya Dīks: ita.
Advaitavidyātilaka pp. 2–3 (200) Bhās: yaprakāśa ad BS 1.1.1 (13, 20)

p. 3 (201) ad BS 1.1.4 (13)
Āgamaprāmānya: p. 45 (164) Bhāvaprakāśikā ad BS 1.4.28 (195)
p. 52 (163) BMB v. 1, (90)
p. 60 (164) v. 2 (79)
p. 62 (163) v. 5 (120, 197)
pp. 78–9 (170) ad BS 1.1.1 (20, 156)
Amarakośa 3.3.583 (54) ad BS 1.1.2 (78, 80, 127–8)
Ānandalaharī* p. 1 (140) ad BS 1.1.5 (6)
p. 2 (141, 241) ad BS 1.1.16 (238, 240–1)
p. 15 (142) ad BS 1.2.1 (15, 78, 80)
p. 17 (143) ad BS 1.2.4-5 (67)
p. 64 (144) ad BS 1.2.9 (15, 80)
p. 66 (145) ad BS 1.3.13 (93)
p. 112 (147) ad BS 1.3.23 (66)
p. 119 (148) ad BS 1.4.27 (13)
p. 144 (149–50) ad BS 2.1.14 (27, 78, 85)
p. 149 (150–1) ad BS 2.1.22 (76, 85, 96, 244)
ad BS 2.2.38 (16, 109)
Anubhavasūtra 1.4 (23) ad BS 2.2.42 (161–2)
1.7 (23) ad BS 3.2.16 (16)
1.23 (23) ad BS 3.2.26-8 (243)
1.25 (24)
ad BS 3.3.38 (89)
1.30 (24) ad BS 4.4.17 (15)
1.27–8 (23)
2.11 (23) BS 1.1.1 (20, 152–7, 182)
2.32 (25) 1.1.2 (78, 127–8)
8.76 (24) 1.1.3 (123, 127–8)
8.80 (23) 1.1.4 (241–2)
1.2.23 (42)
Anubhūtiprakāśa 6.84–6 (103) 1.3.21 (123)
Avatāravādāvalī p. 81 (186) 2.1.30 (123)
p. 233 (187) 2.2.42 (123–4, 161)
p. 246 (187) 3.2.40 (159)
p. 263 (188) 4.4.22 (156)
Bhagavadgītā 15.4 (64) Brahmasūtrabhās: ya (Madhva)
Bhāmatī ad BS 1.1.1 (52) ad BS 1.1.1 (97)
ad BS 1.1.5 (143) Brahmatarkastava* introductory verse (51)
concluding verse (59)
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra* p. 334 (62)
p. 340 (33, 60) : ad v. 1 (51–2)
Brahmatarkastavavivarana*
p. 356 (65) ad v. 3 (53)
p. 360 (65) ad v. 5 (54)
260  
: (cont.)
Brahmatarkastavavivarana* MU 3.2.3 (103)
ad v. 21 (56) Nais: karmyasiddhi p. 204 (57)
ad v. 36 (57)
Nīlakan: t:havijayacampū 1.3 (4)
Br: hadāranyaka
: Upanis:ad 4.4.22 (105)
Nyāyamauktikamālā p. 32 (182)
Bhūs:ana
: pp. 60–4 (242)
Nyāyaraks:āmani*
: v. 8 (58)
Can: damāruta
: p. 88 (194) p. 194 (77)
:
Caturmatasārasamgraha* p. 57 (74) Nyāyasiddhāñjana p. 490 (142–3),
p. 140 (196)
p. 491 (143)
p. 234 (171)
Pañcapādikā p. 82 (232)
ChU 8.1.1 (87)
8.4.1 (93) Pañcaratnastuti* p. 210 (139)
8.7.1 (42, 93) p. 214 (139)
Pāñcarātraraks:ā p. 43 (166–7)
:
Citramīmāmsā* p. 4 (62)
PāS 7.1.39 (50)
Dhvanyāloka 1.4 (61)
Hariharādvaitabhūs:ana :
Paramasamhitā 2.19 (162)
: p. 1 (221)
Paramatabhaṅ ga p. 87 (13, 29)
Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā 1.5.7 (15, 83)
Pārāśaryavijaya ad BS 1.1.1 (194)
Kāśikā (Sucaritamiśra) ad MS 1.1.1 (122)
Parimala* ad BS 2.2.42 (169–70)
Kat:ha Upanis:ad 1.2.23 (103)
ad BS 2.2.45 (73)
4.5 (38)
Paus: karabhās: ya p. 10 (16)
Kāvyādarśa 1.51 (230)
Paus: karatantra (=Paus: karāgama)
Kāvyaprakāśa pp. 5, 7 (61)
vs. 4cd–5ab, vidyāpāda (112)
Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya
: p. 224 (102) v. 30, vidyāpāda (111)
:
Kiranatantra 2.26ab (112) Praśna Upanis: ad 5.5 (91)
Kriyāsāra [ed. 1954] p. 13, vs. 31d–32 (29) :
Pūrvottaramīmāmsāvādanaks:atramālā*
p. 13, v. 33 (29) p. 238 (159)
p. 18, vs. 93cd–94ab (207)
Rahasyatrayasāra p. 218 (192)
p. 19, v. 100 (29)
p. 28, vs. 219–22 (241) :
mgrahastotra ad v. 20 (62)
p. 48, 445-6 (243–4) RTP* concluding verse (131)
p. 115, v. 607 (243) v. 1 (134)
Laks: mītantra 15.9 (142) vs. 3–4 (136)
ad v. 4 (138)
:
Liṅ gadhāranacandrikā pp. 41–2 (237) ad v. 8 (131)
p. 42 (238)
p. 237 (238) Ratnatrayaparīks:ā (Śrīkan: t:ha) v. 2 (131)
vs. 302cd–303ab (135)
:
Madhvamatavidhvamsana* ad v. 1 (99, 224, 232) vs. 303cd–304ab (135)
ad v. 15 (33) vs. 304cd–305ab (135)
ad v. 51 (222)
Ratnatrayollekhinī p. 199 (135)
MBh 1.1.66 (50)
12.337.59 (166) Śaivaparibhās:ā 1.41 (109)
14.16.5–7 (63) 2.15 (113)
2.22 (114)
: Upanis: ad 11.1–2 (188)
Mahānārāyana
11.13 (90) Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa p. 18 (214)
p. 19 (215–16)
Mahānayaprakāśa 1.15–16a (26)
p. 33 (216)
MS 1.1.1 (20, 153, 155–7, 182)
: s: epaśārīraka 2.60–1 (88)
Samk
2.1.46 (154) 3.228 (147–8)
12.2.33 (121) 3.229 (148)
Moks: akārikā 111 (76) phalaśruti (58)
  261
:
Sārasamgraha p. 283 (149) ad BS 1.4.23 (195)
Śārīrakamīmāmsābhā ad BS 1.4.25 (195)
: s: ya ad BS 1.4.22 (243)
ad BS 2.3.42 (243) ad BS 1.4.27 (81–3, 137)
ad BS 2.1.14 (28)
Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā ad BS 1.1.21 (196) ad BS 2.2.35 (107–8)
Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana ad BS 2.2.38 (108, 110–13, 115, 167)
pp. 3–4 (177–8) ad BS 2.2.42 (162, 164–5, 167–8)
p. 41 (20, 177) ad BS 3.3.38 (89)
:
Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* p. 1 (58, 221) Śivatattvaviveka* introduction (39)
p. 11 (105) ad v. 13 (180, 185–6)
p. 17 (84) ad v. 40 (38)
: opening verse (26)
Siddhāntaśikhāmani p. 107 (68)
p. 5 (25) Ślokavārttika 1.47cd–49a (122)
p. 21 (25)
Śrībhās: ya opening verse (44)
p. 75 (25)
ad BS 1.1.1 (153)
p. 293 (25)
ad BS 3.2.26 (243)
p. 391 (25)
p. 533 (25) Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana p. 42 (197)
Śikharinīmālā* p. 75 (198)
: 4 (34)
12 (40) Śrutaprakāśikā ad BS 1.1.1 (154–5)
13 (40) ad BS 1.1.3 (128)
46 (36) ad BS 2.2.35 (167–8)
61 (37) ad BS 2.2.42 (168–9)
Śivādvaitadarpana ad BS 2.2.38 (172)
: p. 1 (239)
p. 22 (213–4) ad BS 3.3.43 (68)
p. 6 (45–6)
Śivādvaitanirnaya*
: p. 3 (86)
p. 49 (88) Śrutisūktimālā 42 (14, 48)
p. 62 (94) Śuddhādvaitamārtan: da
: p. 37 (13)
p. 63 (95) ŚU 3.11 (237)
pp. 95–6 (97) 4.8 (84)
Śivādvaitaparibhās:ā p. 10 (215) 4.9 (83)
p. 38 (215) 4.10 (82)
p. 39 (214) Taittirīya Upanis:ad 2.5.1 (140)
Śivādvaitaparyaṅ kikā p. 4 (211) Tantrāloka 9.149c–150a (83)
p. 19 (29)
pp. 25–6 (212) Tātparyadīpikā p. 218 (68)
Śivakarnām
: r: ta* p. 243 (43, 160) :
Tattvanirnaya p. 60 (172)
p. 244 (46) p. 76 (172)
p. 252 (47) p. 92 (68)
p. 253 (48) Tattvaprakāśa 25 (112)
p. 279 (49)
Tattvaprakāśavr: tti ad v. 25 (112)
p. 280 (50)
p. 285 (48) Turīyaśivakhan: dana
: p. 32 (180)
ŚAMD* v. 1 (79) Vedāntadīpa ad BS 1.3.23 (35)
v. 2 (15) ad BS 1.4.27 (13)
vs. 6–7 (101, 114–15)
v. 9 (39) :
Vedārthasamgraha p. 133 (36)
ad v. 1 (79, 89–92) Vīraśaivānandacandrikā p. 23 (206–8)
ad v. 5 (21, 120–5, 127–9) p. 292 (209)
ad BS 1.1.1 (33, 76, 157–8) p. 431 (209)
ad BS 1.1.2 (127, 203)
:
Vyāsatātparyanirnaya p. 79 (223)
ad BS 1.2.5 (50)
ad BS 1.3.16 (93–4) Yādavābhyudaya 2 (91)
Index of Sanskrit Works
The asterisk indicates that the work was composed by Appaya Dīks: ita.
Abhayapradānasāra 60 :
Caturmatasārasamgraha* 71–7, 100, 119, 133,
Abhinavacandrikā 176 171, 174, 195–6, 220, 227
Abhinavagadā 176 Chāndogya Upanis: ad (ChU) 42, 87, 89–91, 93, 126
Abhinavāmr: ta 176 Cidgaganacandrikā 26
Abhinavatān: dava
: 176 :
Citramīmāmsā* 62
Advaitadīpikā 191–2
Advaitakālānala 175–6, 183 Dharmasūtras 159
Advaitavidyātilaka 200–1 Dhvanyāloka 61, 63
Āgamaprāmānya : 161–4, 170, 174 Durūhaśiks: ā 202
Amarakośa 54
Ānandalaharī* 35, 71, 84, 130, 137, 139–51, 176, Ekottaraśatasthalī 24
210, 221, 227, 241
:
Anubhā s:ya (Madhva) 31 Gadyatrayabhās:ya 162
:
Anubhā s:ya (Vallabhācārya) 13, 20, 32, 184 Gītābhās: ya 64
Anubhūtiprakāśa 103–4 Gr: hyasūtras 170
Appayyakapolacapet:ikā 175
Ātmārpanastuti*
: 6, 32–3, 90, 200, 219 Hariharādvaitabhūs: ana
: 221
Avatāravādāvalī 58, 76, 185–8
Avadhūtagītā 104 Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā 15, 80, 83
Bālabodha 184 Kaivalyasāra 24

Bhagavadgītā 54, 64, 144, 181 Kaivalya Upanis: ad 37
Bhāgavatapurāna : 56–7, 184, 202 Kalpasūtras 115–16
Bhāmatī 12, 52, 73, 77, 143 Kalpataru 73, 76–7, 170
:
Bhāratasārasamgrahastotra* 31, 33, 35, 37, Kāmakalāvilāsa 15
50, 53–5, 59–60, 62–3, 65, 146, 181, Kāmikāgama 110–11
189, 227 Kāranāgama: 110–11
Bhās:yaprakāśa 13, 20, 184 Kāśikā (Sucaritamiśra) 122
Bhāvaprakāśikā 194–5 Kāśikāvr: tti 193
Bhedadhikkāra 191 Kat:ha Upanis: ad 38, 51, 66, 103
Bhūs:ana: 210 Kāvyādarśa 230
Brahmamīmā : msābhā
: s: ya (BMB), see Index Kāvyaprakāśa 61, 63
Locorum Khan: danakha
: n: dakhādya
: 102, 104
Brahmasūtrabhās:ya (Madhva) 97 :
Kiranatantra 111–12
Brahmasūtrabhās:ya (Śaṅ kara) 1, 7–8, 12, 58, 73, Kriyākramadyotikā 16, 110
76–7, 88, 98, 160, 166, 199, 205, 219 Kriyāsāra, see Index Locorum
Brahmasūtras (BS), see Index Locorum Kr: s: nakar
: : r: ta 43
nām
Brahmatarkastava*, see Index Locorum Kūrmapurāna : 52, 137, 236
Brahmatarkastavavivarana* : 33, 50 Kuvalayānanda* 34, 62
Br: hadāranyaka
: Upanis:ad 105
Bodhapañcadaśikā 15 Laks:mītantra 142–3
Lalitāsahasranāmastotra 208
Can: damāruta
: 118, 191–3 Laukikanyāyaratnākara 222
Cannabasavapurāna : 239 :
Liṅ gadhāranacandrikā 210, 237–40, 246
Caturācāryacāritra 239 : 11
Liṅ gapurāna
    263
Madhvādhvakan: t:akoddhāra 175 Praśna Upanis: ad 91

Madhvamatavidhvamsana*: 31, 175 Pratyabhijñāhr: daya 15
Madhvamukhālamkāra : 176 :
Pūrvottaramīmāmsāvādanaks:atramālā* 71,
Madhvatantramukhamardana* 31, 33, 98–9, 158–9, 193, 227
118, 129, 175–6, 183, 202, 222–4, 232
Mahābhārata (MBh), see Index Locorum Rahasyatrayasāra 192
Mahābhāratatātparyaraks:ā 60, 189–90 :
Rāmāyanabhū s: ana
: 189
Mahānārāyana : Upanis: ad 14, 36, 47–50, 67–8, :
mgrahastotra* 31, 37,
89–90, 106, 179, 188 60, 62, 189–90, 227
Mahānayaprakāśa 26 Ratnatrayaparīks:ā (Nīlakan: t:ha) 199
Mahārthamañjarī 15, 26–7, 207–9, 217 Ratnatrayaparīks:ā (RTP)*, see Index Locorum
Manusmr: ti 159, 165 Ratnatrayaparīks:ā (Śrīkan: t:ha) 114, 134
Māpādiam: 203 Ratnatrayollekhinī 134
Moks: akārikā 60, 76 Rudrapraśna 14
Mr: gendrāgama 108
:
Mīmāmsāsūtras (MS) 45, 120–1, 153 Śaivaparibhās:ā 109–11, 113–14
Mun: daka
: Upanis: ad (MU) 103–4 Śaktiviśis:t:ādvaitatattvatrayavimarśa 205,
214–16, 244
Nais:karmyasiddhi 57 : s: epaśārīraka 58, 84, 88, 147–9
Samk
:
Nārāyanaśabdārthanirvacana 179 Śaṅ karavijaya 12, 211, 216
Nighan: t:u 83 Sārasamgraha: 149
Nīlakan: t:havijayacampū 4 Śārīrakamīmāmsābhā : s:ya 243
Nyāyamauktikamālā 178, 181–3 Śārīrakaśāstrārthadīpikā 74, 195–6
Nyāyāmr: ta 117, 176 Sarvadarśanasamgraha : 206
Nyāyaraks:āmani* : 58, 76–7, 147, 201 Sarvajñānottarāgama 108, 110–11
Nyāyaratnāvalī 183 Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana 20, 176–8, 209
Nyāyasiddhāñjana 142–3 Śatadūs: anī : 118, 191, 193–4
Saubhāgyacandrātapa 32, 202
Pañcamāmnāyasāra 60, 189–90 Saundaryalaharī 134
Pañcamatabhañjana 191–4 Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* : 33, 58, 76–7, 84, 105,
Pañcapādikā 232 118, 200–1, 209, 219–21, 223
Pañcaratnastuti* 32–3, 139, 227 Siddhāntasārapaddhati 111
Pāñcarātraraks: ā 162, 166–7 Siddhāntaśikhāmani : 17–18, 22–7, 205–6, 217
:
Pañcāvaranastava 76 Śikharinīmālā*
: 33–4, 36–43, 68, 160, 179–80,
:
Pañcavarnamahāsūtrabhā s: ya 205 185, 227
:
Pāninisūtras (PāS) 50 Śivadarpana : 17, 203–4
:
Paramapadanirnāyakaprakara : 202
na Śivadr: s: t:yālocana 15
:
Paramasamhitā 162 Śivādvaitadarpana : 18, 213–15, 217, 237–41,
Paramatabhaṅ ga 13, 29, 123, 173 244, 246
Paramātmāgama 11 Śivādvaitamañjarī 205, 208, 217, 244
Pārameśvarāgama 111 Śivādvaitanirnaya*,: see Index Locorum
Pārāśaryavijaya 194 Śivādvaitanirnaya : (Nīlakan: t:ha) 199
Paraśurāmakalpasūtra 134, 208 Śivādvaitaparibhās: ā 214–15, 217, 239
Paratattvaprakāśikā 19, 178 Śivādvaitaparyaṅ kikā 29, 210–12
Parātriśikāvivr: ti 208 Śivajñānabodhasūtra 203
Parimala* 1, 42, 73–4, 76–8, 109, 133, 166, Śivakarnām : r: ta*, see Index Locorum
169–70, 195, 201–2, 219 Śivamahimakalikāstuti* 32–3
Parimala (Maheśvarānanda) 15, 26, 208 Śivapurāna : 53, 110
Pāśupatasūtras 11 Śivārcanacandrikā* 2, 18, 32, 111, 202, 217,
Paus:karabhās: ya 16, 110 219, 228
Paus:karatantra (=Paus:karāgama) 16, 111–12 Śivārkamanidīpikā
: (ŚAMD)*, see Index Locorum
Prakāśikā (Rāghavendra) 183–4 Śivasūtras 205, 217
Prameyamālā 118 Śivatattvaviveka*, see Index Locorum
Prapannāmr: ta 35, 191–3 Śivatattvavivekadīpikā 202
264    
Ślokavārttika 122 :
Tattvanirnaya 44, 46, 68, 172
Somaśambhupaddhati 111 Tattvapradīpikā 25–6, 206, 217
Śrībhās: ya 12–13, 18, 20, 44, 68, 73, 94, 118, 123, Tattvaprakāśa 79, 111–12
153–4, 161, 166, 171, 194–5, 243 Tattvaprakāśavr: tti 111
Śrīkan: t:hasamālocana 20, 123, 195, 197–8 Tattvasāra 118
Śrīkarabhās: ya 17–18, 24, 217 Tattvat:īkā 118
Śrutapradīpikā 118 Turīyaśivakhan: dana
: 179–81, 185
Śrutaprakāśikā, see Index Locorum
Śrutisamyojinī
: t:īkā 104 :
Unādima :
nidīpikā 76
Śrutisūktimālā 14, 18–19, 48–50, 67, 73 Upakramaparākrama* 31, 129, 175
Śrutitātparyanirnaya
: 43, 190–1 :
Upasamhāravijaya 19, 31, 175
Stavacintāmani : 15
Stotraratnabhās: ya 162 Varadarājastava* 2, 33, 90, 195, 221
Śuddhādvaitamārtan: da : 13 Varivasyārahasya 134
Śūnyasampādane
: 27 Vātulatantra 23–4
Śvetāśvatara Upanis:ad (ŚU) 81–3, 106, 183, 203, :
Vāyusamhitā 11, 110–11
213, 237 Vedāntadīpa 13, 35
Vedāntakataka 199
Taittirīya Āranyaka
: 14, 36 Vedāntakaustubha 191, 193
Taittirīya Brāhmana : 45 Vedāntasāra 12
:
Taittirīya Samhitā 14 :
Vedārthasamgraha 12, 36, 44–7, 68, 118, 188
Taittirīya Upanis: ad 81, 90–1, 140–1, 240 Vīraśaivānandacandrikā 18, 22, 29, 205–9,
Tantrādhikārinirnaya: 202 217, 244
Tantrāloka 15, 83 Vis: ayavākyadīpikā 195
Tantravārttika 115 Vis: nupurā
: : 145
na
Tarkatān: dava
: 176 Vis: nutattvaviveka
: 183–4
Tātparyacandrikā (Veṅ kat:anātha) 64 Vr: ttivārttika* 6, 62–3
Tātparyacandrikā (Vyāsatīrtha) 19, 44, 117, 176, Vyāsatātparyanirnaya: 49, 221, 223
181, 183–4
Tātparyadīpikā 45, 47, 68 Yādavābhyudaya 2, 91, 195, 221
Tattvakaustubha 202 Yātrāprabandha 200
Tattvamañjarī 31 Yoginīhr: daya 205
Tattvamuktākalāpa 20, 68 Yuktimallikā 183
General Index
abheda 16, 48, 104, 133, 137, 211, 214, 238, 244 Amalānanda 73, 76–7, 109, 170
abhidhā 61, 215 Ambā 39–40, 43, 160, 179, 232
abhidhāna 10, 29, 38, 48, 81–2, 162, 181, 230–1 Amr: tānanda 205
Abhinavagupta 15–16, 63, 83 Amr: tānandatīrtha 202
abhiprāya 102, 107, 110, 195, 241 :
amśa 35, 59, 79, 86, 133, 137, 144, 146, 166, 230,
abhiyuktasūkti 15, 80, 85–6 234–5, 243
abhyudaya 10, 65, 230 :
amśāvatāra 11, 231
abundance 237–8, see prācurya, and also anadīyabhās: ya 123–4
ānandamaya ānanda 23, 25–6, 40, 42, 78, 80, 90, 92, 103, 132,
ācāryapāda (Śaṅ kara) 74–5 138–9, 142, 229, 234–8, 240–1
accessory 36, 143, 229, see śes: a Ānandagiri 103–4
cf. principal thing ānandamaya 140–1, 237–41
acetana 54, 94, 112 ānandamayādhikarana : 237–9
acitprapañca 78 Ānandapūrna : (Vidyāsāgara) 102
:
Adaiyapālam 1–3, 218 Ānandatīrthamuni, see Madhva
adhikāra 16, 165, 168, 183, 229 Ānandavardhana 61–3
adhikārin 97–8, 152, 166–7, 220 Anantācārya 35, 191, 193
ādhikya 222 ananyatva 85
adhis:t:hāna 124 aṅ ga 121, 206–7, 214, 238, 244
adhyāhāra 120, 122–4 aṅ gasthala 22, 24
adhyāsa 201, 205–7 see also aṅ ga
advaitabhāj 223 animal rite, see paśu
advaitabuddhi 102 :
antahkara :
naśuddhi 103
advaitaśraddhā 105 antarātman 190
advaitavādin 99, 140, 223–4 antaryāmin 64, 77, 188, 243
advaitavāsanā 101–4, 231 anugraha 56, 59, 64, 78, 96, 101–5, 132, 219,
Advaita Vedānta v, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 12, 25, 40, 49, 231–2
71–2, 74–7, 84–5, 88, 96, 100, 104–6, 111, anumāna 107, 172
114, 117, 119, 147, 149, 158, 161, 184, 193, :
anusamdhāna 91, 104
195, 198–9, 202, 209, 211, 218–21, 225 apakars:a 55, 223
cf. non-dualism (pure) Āpastamba 159
advitīya 25, 27–8, 78–9, 223 Appaya (Dīks: ita III) 202
āgama 10–11, 15–16, 25–6, 79, 101, 107, 110–11, apr: thaksiddha 86, 203
113–15, 160, 172, 213, 229–31 āpta 109, 116
āgamanis:t:ha 107 āptavacana 15
agent, see kartr: ārādhana 13, 20, 166, 229
Aghoraśiva (or Aghoraśivācārya) 16, 76, 79, Ārādhya (lineage) 210, 239, 245–6
110–13, 134–5 ārādhya 13, 20, 139, 157
Ahobilamat:ha 189, 204 Aravīdu : (dynasty) 2, 4–5
aikaśāstrya 20, 119, 152–4, 158–9, 171, 174, Ardhanārīśvara 2, 42, 232
182–3, 185, 193–4, 209 cf. form, goddess, Śiva
aikya 13–14, 25, 46, 135, 137, 143, 192, 221, 240 arpana : 104
Akhan: dānanda
: 16 arvācīna 192
akhan: dārtha
: 40 aśarīra 41
:
alamkāra 63, 232 āśaya 62, 74–5, 140, 152, 233, 237
:
alamkāradhvani 62 āspada 94, 115
266  
aspect 24, 82, 102, 133, 136, 230, 234, 236 bhagavatpāda (Śaṅ kara) 8, 58, 76, 147
of Śiva’s śakti 132, 138–9, 145–6, 177, bhakti 11, 22–3, 44, 57, 59, 184, 220
:
see amśa, śaktyamśa
: Bhāskara 161, 172, 177, 243–4
:
cf. part, Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na Bhāskararāya 134, 208
aspirant (or adherent) 96, 99, 103, 138, 224, cf. Śrīvidyā
see adhikārin Bhat:t:a (Bhāskarācārya) 6, 14, 21, 106, 184
non-Vedic º (avaidikādhikārin) 166 followers of º 145
threefold classification of º 97–8 Bhat:t:a (Rāmakan: t:ha) 60
Vedic º (vaidikādhikārin) 167 Bhat:t:oji (Dīks: ita) 31, 202
āśraya 84, 94, 134, 136, 234, 243 Bhava 40–1, 179
atiklis:t:a 126, 129 bhāvanā 14, 25, 49, 138, 236
ātmabodha 74–5, 120, 219 Bhavānī 180, 185, 235
ātman 34–5, 42, 45, 52, 104, 140, 171, 178, 182 bheda 16, 26, 49, 79, 83, 109, 135, 148, 191,
attribute 39, 41–3, 48, 80, 92, 223, see dharma, 215–16, 221, 237–8, 244
: viśes:ana
guna, : bhedābheda 13, 215–16, 241–5
devoid of / without º 130, 200, see bhedābhedavādin 85, 171, 243–4
: nirviśes: a
attributeless, nirguna, bhedavādin 12, 76, 85
with º 96, 99, see saguna, : saviśes: a, cf. cf. Dvaita Vedānta
embodied, form Bhoja(-deva) 79, 111–12
attributeless, see nirguna,: nirviśes: a bhrānti 108, 163
as the nature of Brahman 63, 70, 148, 152, bhūtākāśa 80, 94, 136
174, 220 bindu 131
as the nature of Śiva 39, 43, 59, 101, 106, 200 blame 223, see nindā
atyantabhedavādin 156 of Śiva 34
atyantābhedavādin 12, 76, 85, 244 of deities in general 222
ātyantikabheda 214 bliss 56
authority 5, 13, 23, 71, 80, 115, 127, 202, 213, as identical to cicchakti 139–41
216–17, 219, see prāmānya : as identical to space 136, 234
equal º of Vedas/Vedānta and Śaiva as the nature of Brahman, Śiva or Laks: mī 94,
scriptures 26, 109–10 134, 141, 231, 234, see ānanda,
of authors, see āpta ānandamaya, saccidānanda, cf. sheath
cf. scriptures as the nature of Śiva’s abode 235–6
of Pāñcarātra scriptures 44, 73, 100, 124, :
as the nature of Vis: nu’s world 138
143–4, 161, 163–6, 169, 171, 174 Bodhāyana 153–4
of Śaiva scriptures 16, 106, 111, 114, 116, 160, Bodhendra (Sarasvatī) 221
167–8, 223–5, 238 body 3, 4, 14, 24, 61, 83–4, 93–4, 108, 140, 143,
of the Śaiva/Pāśupata tradition 107, 172 237, see śarīra
of the Upanis: ads 25 of Brahman 13, see śarīra, vigraha
of the Vedas 21, 110 of Śiva 40–2, 79, 179, 232, see vapus
avadhārana : 99, 128, 224 without a º 102, see aśarīra, formless
avaidika 34, 44, 68, 145, 160, 166–8, 170 º/embodied relation 87, 143, 244, cf. embodied
avatāra 4, 57, 64, 164, 181, 186, 204 Brahmā 19, 36, 40–1, 46–7, 54–9, 90, 139, 144,
avayava 61, 137, 238 164, 171, 179, 186, 190, 196, 222, 235
avidyā 96, 117, 124, 148, 206–8 cf. trimūrti
aviśis:t:ādvaita 70–1, 85 brahmakot:i 132, 136–7, 139, 144, 180, 221, 234
Ayyan: na : (Dīks: ita) 49, 221, 223 Brahman
supreme º, see parabrahman
: 51, 65, 74–5, 152, 157, 159, 161, 163, 193,
Bādarāyana as the cause of the world 13, 28, 53 77, 80, 107,
see Vyāsa 128, 213, see jagatkārana:
Banaras 175, 189, 198–202, 239 as “six-station” in Vīraśaiva theology, see
bhāga 23–4, 58, 137, 140, 153–4, 198, 236 s:at:sthalabrahman
bhagavaddves:in 35, 192 as what ought to be worshipped 13, 20, 157,
Bhāgavata 163, 170, see ārādhya
:
see Vāsudeva, Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na as an already realised entity, see siddhavastu
  267
as delimited by māyā, see māyopahita consciousness 76, 131, 174

definition of º, see svarūpalaks: ana,
: as the nature of Brahman (or Śiva) 15–16, 40,
tat:asthalaks: ana
: 134, 207–8, 231, 234
brahmavicāra 156, 158, 183 see also saccidānanda
brahmavidyā 14, 89, 133, 235 as the nature of māyā 203
Brahmavidyādhvarīndra 17, 203–4 as the nature of Śiva’s śakti 26, 112–14, 143
power of º 232, see cicchakti
Caitanya space as º, see cidākāśa, cidvyoman
:
the Vais: nava theologian 184 void of º, see cidambara, cidambaraśakti
the author of an unknown vr: tti on the contemplation
Brahmasūtras 239 methods of º in Upanis: ads 37, see
caitanya 134, 141–2, 148, 234 brahmavidyā
Candraśekhara (Śivācārya) 215–16 cf. meditation
caura (or cora) 13, 151 of non-duality 25, 104, see advaitabuddhi,
cause 13, 27–8, 39, 41, 47, 80–1, 85, 88–90, 95, bhāvanā
127, 143, 159, 180, 184, 188, 198, 221, 229, of Brahman 48–9, 80, 87, 89
see kārana: of Śiva 25, 70, 138–9, 219, see śivadhyāna
of liberation, see muktihetu of a deity 14, 90, 92, 138
of the world 42, 48, 86, 128, 177, 190, 200, 213, of non-difference 97, see anusamdhāna :
see jagatkārana: three types of º 138, 236, see bhāvanā
both material and efficient º, see contextual postulation,
nimittopādānakārana : :
see vyavadhāranakalpanā, cf. defects
efficient (or instrumental) º 67–8, 77, contradiction 31, 77, 93, 125, 143–4, 147, 161–2,
108–10, 172, 208, see nimittakārana : 180, 186, 203, see pratis:edha, vipratis:edha,
material º 15, 16, 25–6, 67–8, 77, 82–4, virodha
110–14, 131, 133, 136–8, 172, 203, 206, 235, internal º, see parasparavirodha
see upādāna, upādānakārana : of Vedic scriptures, see śrutivirodha
material º as either insentient or sentient 112–13 of how things really are, see vastuvirodha
Śiva as only the efficient º of the world 107ff, controller 187, see niyantr:
see kevalanimitta inner º 215, see antaryāmin
supreme º, see paramakārana : coordination 89, 137
cetana 54, 94, 112, 141–3 :
of qualities, see upasamhāra
cicchakti 14, 22, 26, 79–80, 83–4, 86–7, 89, 92–5, of texts or textual passages, see samanvaya
100, 111, 132, 136, 139–43, 147–50, 177, creation 81, 83, 114, 127–8, 137, 144, 197, 208,
203, 227, 241 214, see janma, sr: s:t:i
cidacitprapañca 12, 27–8, 78, 80, 86 statements about º, see kāranavākya
:
cidākāśa 12, 26, 80 cf. cause, five actions of Śiva
cidambara 26, 80 critique 33, 76, 96, 191, 202, 219
cidambaraśakti 136, 240 of aikaśāstrya 119, 194
Cidambaram 191 of Rāmānuja and/or Sudarśanasūri 35, 123,
cidvyoman 26 127, 129
Cinnabomma (of Vellore) 1, 2, 5, 31, 62, 188, of the Śaiva/Pāśupata tradition 173
198, 218, 221, 227, 232–3 cruelty 125
citprapañca 78 on the part of Śiva 55–6, 222
coarse, see sthūla cf. defects [of Śiva]
cf. subtle crypto-heretic 219, see pākhan: daka
:
coherence 89 cf. heretics
of Upanis: ads, see samanvaya
concealment 136, see tirodhāna : 92, 94, 125, 184–6
daharādhikarana
cf. five actions of Śiva daharākāśa 10, 19, 80, 96, 100, 125–6,
conclusion 49, 97, 126, 143, 168, 177, 187, 190, 132, 184
218, 221–2 daharavidyā 14, 92–3, 220, 229
as a final position (siddhānta) 124, 149 in Chāndogya Upanis:ad 87, 89
:
in hermeneutics, see upasamhāra, in Mahānārāyana: Upanis:ad 89–90
cf. introduction in Praśna Upanis: ad 91
268  
:
Daks: ināmūrti 42, 239 devotional hymn 6, 8, 33, 70, 130, 227, see stava,
Dan: din
: 230 stotra, stuti
Dattātreya 104 in praise of Śiva 51, 90, 200
debate(s) 1, 7, 98, 183, 198, 216, 223, 225 :
in praise of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 221
na
between Śaivas and Vais: navas
: 5, 31, 46, 68, 189 dharma 13, 20, 25, 48, 50, 53–5, 63, 78, 132,
between schools of Vedānta 3, 83 134–7, 141–3, 152–4, 162, 168–70, 192,
categories of philosophical º 206 234–5, 237–8
deceit, see vipralambha two meanings of the word º 155–9, 182, see
cf. Pāñcarātra, Vāsudeva sādhya, siddhavastu, cf. unity [of the two
defective 122, see klis: t:a :
Mīmāmsās]
extremely º, see atiklis:t:a dharmaśāstra 159, 165
defects 134, 181, 234 dharmin 43, 126–7, 132, 134–7, 234–5,
absence of º in the Brahmasūtras 122 237–8
in Mīmāmsā : and grammar treatises 120–2, Dharmmaya (Dīks: ita) 199–202
125, see kleśa, cf. contextual postulation, dhvani 60–3, 65
modification (of case-endings), suppletion dhyāna 43, 94
in Rāmānuja’s commentary on the difference 5, 12, 74, 79, 87, 97, 115, 129, 135, 146,
Brahmasūtras 123–9, see kleśa 149–50, 154, 191, 196, 200–1, 205, 237–8,
of Śiva 55–6, 222–3, see dos: a 241, 245, see bheda
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 222
na between Brahman and the world 76
without º, see nirdos: a between Brahman and cicchakti 87, 89
defence 16, 88, 242 between Śiva and the self in the liberating
of aikaśāstrya 152ff., 158, 209 state 215–16
of Pāñcarātra 73, 161 between Rāmānuja’s and Śrīkan: t:ha’s
of Śiva and/or Śaiva religion 5, 37, 184, system 127, 146, 150–1
198, 217 between Mīmāmsā : and Vedānta 154–6, 209,
of Vis: nu: 145 :
cf. unity [of the two Mīmāmsās]
definition 13, 98, 139, 154, 207, 214–15 tenants of º, see bhedavādin
by essence, see svarūpalaks:ana : difference and non-difference 13, 214–16, see
per accidens, see tat:asthalaks:ana : bhedābheda
deity 5, 14, 36–8, 43–4, 46, 51, 55–6, 59–60, 66, acceptance of º by Vīraśaivas 242–4
70, 92, 106, 144–6, 179–81, 188, 192, tenants of º, see bhedābhedavādin
199–200, 215, 221–3, see deva dissolution 131, 136, see pralaya
personal/favorite º, see is:t:adevatā cf. five actions of Śiva
worship of a º 37, 68, 96, 98, 102–3, 138, distinction 168, see vibhāga
219, 228 domain
denotation 36, 44, 53, 61, 171 of Brahman, see brahmakot:i
denoted sense, see abhidhā, vācya of the effects, see kāryakot:i
cf. figurative implication, suggested meaning, of the fourth (entity transcending the
suggestion trimūrti), see turīyakot:i
:
destruction, see samhāra, cf. five actions of Śiva dos:a 28, 50, 55, 144, 146, 170, 243
deva (or devatā) 15, 36–8, 83–4, 123–4, 145, 188, doxography 8, 71–4, 77, 98, 120, 176, 178, 184–5,
192, 232, 235 206, 227
devotion 65, 89, 96, 98, 220, 222, see bhakti droha 34, 145
to Brahman 44 dūs: ana
: 151, 177
to Kr: s: na
: 184 Dvaita Vedānta 5, 7, 9, 72, 75, 117–19, 175
to Pāñcarātra, see pāñcarātrasthita dves:a 197, 223
to Śaivāgamas, see āgamanis: t:ha dyotita 11, 149–50
to Śiva 34–5, 59, 101
importance of º in Vīraśaiva theology 23, effect 13, 28, 81, 95, 184, 222, see kārya
100, 214 domain of the º, see kāryakot:i
role of º in the Vīraśaiva s: at:sthala scheme 22, effected state, see kāryāvasthā
see bhakti cf. cause
cf. self-surrender ekavākyatā 154
  269
Ekāyanaśākhā 168–71, see śākhā generic words, see sāmānyapada

cf. Pāñcarātra, scriptures cf. specific words
ekottaraśatasthala 22, 24 Giridhara 13, 189
elements, see mahābhūta God 2, 33, 61, 96, 139, see deva
eligibility, see adhikāra, adhikārin cf. deity, Īśvara, Lord
in Vedānta, see sādhanacatus:t:aya goddess 26, 31–2, 36, 56, 58, 79, 141–3, 207
emanation cf. power [of Śiva/Brahman]
of Śiva, see vibhūti Govindarāja 189
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : see vyūha
na, grace 61, 76, 105–6
as one of the five actions of Śiva 136, see as arising from the worship of the personified
creation, cf. five actions of Śiva Śiva 101ff., 150
embodied 14, 43, 153, 160, 219 as leading to advaitavāsanā 101ff., 231
º deity, see mūrti, saguna,
: śarīrin as one of the five actions of Śiva 78, 132, 136,
cf. embodied, form cf. five actions of Śiva
emotional state, see rasa of the Lord 100, 232, see anugraha,
of peace, see śāntarasa īśvarānugraha, prasāda
as a type of poetic suggestion, see rasadhvani role of Śiva’s º in achieving knowledge and
epics 7, 31, 33, 37, 44, 51–2, 65, 70, 80, 139, 146, liberation 39, 59, 101ff.
174, 181, 198 greatness 99, 224, see mahiman
error 162, 184, 220, see also bhrānti of Kr: s: na
: 60–1
eternality (of the self) 124–5, 162 of Śakti 24
cf. individual self of Śiva 7, 31, 34, 57, 62–3, 65, 70, 115, 211
etymology :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 59, 62, 138, 179,
na
of the word īśāna 38, 51 187, 221
of the word nārāyana : 179 : 10, 36, 41, 57, 59, 85, 91–2, 125, 190
guna
of Upanis: adic words 187 as attributes of Brahman 42, 94, 97, 99
evil 7, 34–5, 176, 218, 222 as attributes of deities of the trimūrti 40
exegesis 4, 7, 31, 51, 64, 70, 81, 117, 119, 124, 130, :
see also gunamūrti
137, 143, 154, 165, 181, 186, 188 as attributes of Śiva 39, 48, 51, 80, 132, 134,
of Śaiva scriptures 27, 106–8 137, 234, 238, 244
of the Brahmasūtras 65, 106, 245 as attributes of Vāsudeva 91
of Upanis: ads 37, 82 as sattva, rajas and/or tamas 55, 179, 181, 220
by Vīraśaiva scholars 209, 213, 216 :
gunābhidhāna 81–2
:
gunamūrti 41
faith 96, 144, 152, see śraddhā :
gunātīta 40, 179
in non-duality, see advaitabhāj, : r: tti 61
gunav
advaitaśraddhā : 42, 85, 244
gunin
fault 56, 122
see dos:a, dūs:ana,
: cf. defects Hacker (Paul) 98
figurative implication (or meaning) 38, 48–9, Hara 40, 52, 179, 185–6
: r: tti, laks: anā
120, 142, see gunav : cf. trimūrti
five actions of Śiva 136, 235, see kriyā, Haradatta (Śivācārya) (or Sudarśanācārya) 6, 14,
pañcakr: tya 16–21, 48–50, 67, 69, 72–3, 106, 187
cf. creation, destruction, dissolution, Hari 40, 131, 179, 188, 221
emanation, stasis cf. trimūrti
form, see mūrti, nāmarūpa, śarīra, vigraha hatred, see bhagavaddves: in, dves: a, pradves: a
cf. body, embodied heart 14, 37, 66, 68, 90–4, 100, 126, 132, 140, 150,
formless 38, 279, see aśarīra 188, 219, 223, 236, see daharākāśā, hr: daya
fruit, see phala cf. space, worship
heretics 7, 119, see avaidika, trayībāhya
Gaṅ gā 56–8, 187, 221 cf. crypto-heretic
Garuda : 14, 48–9 hermeneutics 4, 95, 129, 218–19
:
Gaudapāda 34 :
cf. Mīmāmsā, principle of interpretation
Gaurī 131, 136, 142 heterodox, see vedabāhya
270  
hetu 56, 58, 80, 90–2, 121, 127–9, 133, 135, 138, inference 127, 215, see anumāna
162, 164, 194, 201, 229, 241 proving the existence of Śiva 107–8, 172, cf.
hr: daya 19, 34, 38, 75, 108, 207 Śaiva Siddhānta
inferiority, see nikars:a, nyūnatva
icchā 15, 55, 83, 134, 142–3, 234 of Śiva 57, 60, 63, 146, 183, see apakars:a
identity 12, 19, 23, 40, 44, 101, 181, 189, 201, 216, :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 46
na
221, 225, 240–1 cf. superiority, supremacy
between Śiva and Brahman 6, 14, 50–3, 61, 70, injunction 45–6, 81, 148, 156, see vidhi
130, 133 conflicting º, see vikalpa, vyavasthā
between Śiva and Śakti 16 restrictive º, see niyamavidhi
:
between Vis: nu-Nārāya : and Brahman 46,
na inquiry 105–6, see jijñāsā, vicāra
48–9 insentient (entities) 12–13, 84, 107–8, 112–14,
between Brahman and cicchakti 89, 94 131, 144, 147–8, 203, 229, see acetana,
between Brahman and the phenomenal world, acitprapañca
see ananyatva see also cidacitprapañca, cf. sentient entities
between Śiva/Brahman and the individual inseparable connection, see apr: thaksiddha
self 87, 95, 211, 214 between Śiva and Śakti 25, 80, 82–5
between the individual self and the space in the intention (authorial) 31, 33, 90, 102, 110, 113,
heart 126, cf. heart, space, worship 140, 212, 221, 246, see abhiprāya, āśaya,
between space, consciousness and the hr: daya, paramatātparya, tātparya
goddess 26, 79 of the author of the Brahmasūtras 42, 74, 97,
between Śiva/Brahman and space 89, 94 100, 123, 130, 152, 175, 232
between cicchakti and space 84, 87, 92, 94, 136 of the author of the Mahābhārata 60–5
between prakr: ti and māyā 82, 84 introduction (hermeneutics), see upakrama, cf.
between Śiva and māyā’s products in conclusion
non-dualist Kashmirian Śaivism 83 īśāna 35, 190
between Śiva and the paramātman 90–1 interpretation of the word º 38, 51, 66
between Śiva and the individual self in is:t:adevatā 75, 120
Vīraśaiva theology, see śivaikya, cf. union Īśvara 3, 46, 51, 64, 67, 77, 142, 172, 199, 219, 231
between Śiva and the Sun 76, 135 cf. God, Lord, Śiva
between the three jewels 137, see abheda īśvarānugraha 102–5
between Brahman and bliss 238 īśvaratus:t:i 104
between Vāsudeva and Śrī 143, see aikya
cf. non-difference jagatkārana : 41, 53, 196, 201
of all deities 221 Jaimini 120, 122, 153–4, 157, 159, 182, 193
imagined (falsely), see kalpita janma 44, 78, 127, 180, 190, 204
incarnation Jayāditya 193
of Śiva 28, see yogācāryas Jayatīrtha 31, 117
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 35, 56–9, 62, see avatāra
na jewels 75–6, 101, 139, 145, 188, 231, 233, 238, see
partial º, see amśāvatāra
: ratna, ratnatraya
Appaya as an º of Śiva 4 three º in Appaya’s Śivādvaita model 130–1,
cf. emanation 137, 199
inclination 85 three º in Śrīkan: t:ha’s Saiddhāntika
towards non-duality 104, 106, 150, see model 131
advaitavāsanā three º in Nīlakan: t:ha’s Advaita model 199
cf. faith jijñāsā 20, 152–7, 182, 194
inclusivism 95, 98–9, 138–9 Jīva (Gosvāmī) 84
individual self 27, 40, 127, 146, 178, 243–4, see jīva jīva 26, 38, 44, 66, 77–8, 86–7, 94–6, 100,
as a product or transformation of cicchakti 125–6, 133, 137, 140, 142, 144–7,
87, 95 191, 196, 199, 211, 213–16, 221, 223,
:
as the nature of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 144–6, 221
na 243–4
in Vīraśaiva theology, see aṅ gasthala jīvanmukti 25, 96
origination of the º 44, see jīvotpatti, cf. jīvatattva 213
Pāñcarātra jīvotpatti 162–5
  271
jñāna 11, 23, 56, 68, 83, 112, 142–3, 153, 167, legitimacy
204, 207, 231, 240 of Advaita Vedānta 211
jñānaśakti 79, 81 of Pāñcarātra 119, 166
Jyotis: t:oma (sacrifice) 45, 121–2 of Śaiva scriptures 223–5
cf. authority, scriptures
kaivalya 10, 102, 230 liberation 23, 33, 47–8, 65, 96, 98, 103–4, 106,
kalaha 198 138–9, 152, 156, 167, 178, 182, 184, 199,
Kālakan: t:heśvara (inscription) 1, 2, 21, 73, 76, 215–16, 219, 221, 230, 242, see jīvanmukti,
218–19 kaivalya, moks: a, videhakaivalya
Kālāmukhas 11, 68 in Vīraśaiva theology 26, 244, cf. union
cf. Mahāpāśupatas limited reference 165ff., see vyavasthā
kalpita 39–40, 201 limiting factor (or limitation), see upādhi
Kāñcipuram 221 lineage 7, 10–11, 19, 20, 131, 201, 210, 217, 239
kārana : 27–8, 39, 41–2, 47–8, 54, 64, 78, 84–6, 89, liṅ ga 139, 206–7, 214, 244
112, 143, 162, 172, 177, 180, 190 supreme º 25
:
kāranavākya 52, 59, 172, 178 Vīraśaiva practice of wearing a small º, see
:
kāranāvasthā 12–13 :
liṅ gadhārana
karma 12, 19, 39, 82, 96, 103–4, 148, 153–5, liṅ ga (distinctive mark, indication) 64, 66,
158–9, 168–70, 188, 200 139, 150
Karmamīmāmsā : 152–4 liṅ gadhārana : 24, 210, 237
cf. Mīmāmsā: liṅ gaikya 25
kartr: 19, 39, 109, 115, 136–7, 188, 200, liṅ gāṅ gasāmarasya 207, 214–15, 244
207–8, 234 liṅ gāṅ gasamyoga
: 22
kārya 27–8, 78, 85–6, 88, 113, 134, 143, 222, 234 liṅ gasthala 22, 24
kāryakot:i 180 linguistic capacity 40, see śakti
kāryāvasthā 13, 203 linguistic connection 215, see vyutpatti
Kāśakr: tsna 243 locus 203, 237, āśraya
kevalādvaita 37, 70, 85, 151, 210–11 Śiva as the º of cicchakti/māyā 84, 203
kevalanimitta 67, 107–10 Śiva’s śakti as the º of the phenomenal
kleśa 120, 122–3, 125, 127, 151 world 79
klis:t:a 124–5 Brahman as the º of bliss 238, see āspada
knowledge 37, 56, 83, 102–4, 108–9, 111, 127, Lord 11, 24, 35, 37, 42, 57, 59, 74–5, 83, 97, 106,
141–3, 145, 151–7, 182, 186, 192, 204, see 164, 186, 191–2, 223, 231–3, see īśāna, pati
jñāna supreme º 89, 92–3, 188, 243, see paramaśiva,
of Śiva’s non-dual nature 39, 59, 101, 106 parameśvara, cf. Maheśvara, Īśvara
as the nature of Śiva/Brahman 112, 140
as a power of Śiva 80, see jñānaśakti Mādhava-Vidyāranya : 11–12
self-º 105, 220, see ātmabodha Madhusūdana (Sarasvatī) 149, 199, 201, 219–20
means of º 97, 127–8, 178, see pramāna, : cf. Madhva 7, 13, 31, 44, 60, 64, 68, 72, 74–5, 97–8,
inference, perception 117–18, 123, 129, 175–8, 184, 197, 206
in Vīraśaiva theology 22–4, 214 mahābhūta 80, 111, 146
kośa 140 Mahācārya 9, 20, 43–4, 118, 175, 189–95
kriyā 78, 82, 112, 136, 207, 242 mahākāśa 80, 136
kriyāśakti 89 Mahāpāśupatas 11, 68, 231
Kr: s: na
: 50, 54, 60–5, 155–6, 184, 236, see avatāra mahāvākya 40, 213
Ks: emarāja 15, 21, 106, 114 Maheśvara 47, 52, 77, 82, 90–1, 111, 137
Kumārila 77, 115, 122, 125, 165 Maheśvarānanda 15, 26, 207–8
mahiman 62, 99, 138, 188, 196, 224
laks: anā
: 61, 125 major term, see sādhya
Laks: mī 142–3 cf. inference, reason
Lākulas 11, 68 Mammat:a 61–3
cf. Mahāpāśupatas manifestation 43, 55, 83, 124, 139, 146, 174, 184,
:
Laks: anadeśikendra :
(or Laks: manārya) 199, 208, 219, 234, 243, see prapañca, cf.
(Rāmānuja) 74–5 phenomenal world
272  
mantra 24, 36, 45–50, 67–8, 145, 154, 170, 179, name
187, 240 of deities 36, 38–41, 51–2, 65, 78, 122, 178–81,
five-syllable º, see pañcāks: aramantra 232, 236, see abhidhāna, cf. denotation
six-syllable º, see s: adak
: s: aramantra º and forms, see nāmarūpa
Maritōn: t:adārya 22, 24, 27, 29, 205–11, 213–14, Nandikeśvara (Śivācārya) 210, 237–40, 246
216–17 :
Nārāyanācārya
māyā 39–40, 42, 63, 82, 111, 117, 134, 183, author of the Advaitakālānala 175–6, 183
206, 234 commentator on the Paramatabhaṅ ga 13, 29,
as a principle of consciousness in Śivādvaita 123
83–4, 203 Nat:anānanda 25
as an insentient principle and efficient Nāthamuni 118
cause in Śaiva Siddhānta 83, 107, navīna 189, 214
131, 203 navya 20, 184
as identical to Śiva in non-dualist Kashmirian Navya-Nyāya 1, 7
Śaivism 83 nescience, see avidyā
as the material cause of the world 84, nididhyāsana 103
131, 203 nigraha 55–6, 151
as an instrumental cause of the world 84 Nijaguna : (Śivayogin) 17
having º as its limiting factor 41, see nikars:a 223
māyopahita Nīlakan: t:ha (Caturdhara) 199, 201–2, 219–20
qualified by º, see māyāviśis:t:a Nīlakan: t:ha (Dīks: ita) 3–4, 32, 202
mixed with º, see māyāśabalita Nīlakan: t:ha (Śivācārya):
māyāśabalita 40, 179 author of a Śaiva commentary on the
māyāvāda 96 Brahmasūtras, possibly identified to
cf. Advaita Vedānta Śrīkan: t:ha 12, 16, 18, 28–9, 194, 206, 209,
māyāvapus 42 214–17, 237–46
māyāviśis: t:a 83 followers of º, see nīlakan: t:hamatānusārin
Māyideva 22–6, 205, 213–14 Nīlakan: t:ha (Śivācārya)
māyin 82–4 author of the Kriyāsāra 24, 28, 215
māyopahita 185 author of the Śivādvaitadarpana : 214–15, 239
Medhatīthi 159 nīlakan: t:hamatānusārin (or nīlakan: t:hīya) 194, 209
meditation 24, 42–3, 103, see dhyāna, Nimbarka 7
nididhyāsana nimittakārana : 67, 83, 107, 160
on Brahman or Śiva 37, 92, 94, 98, 101–2, 106, nimittopādānakārana : 67, 77, 160
188, 232 nindā 34, 222–3
on Śiva in the heart 96, 150, see śivadhyāna nirdos: a 134, 183, 243
:
on Vis: nu-Nārāya : 36, 57
na nirguna : 37, 39, 43, 59, 70, 94–8, 101–2, 147–50,
cf. contemplation 179, 200, 232
Mīmāmsā: 1, 6, 8, 13, 45–6, 71, 81–2, 92, :
nirgunabrahman : Brahman) 38, 63,
(or nirguna
119–22, 129, 152–9, 161, 165, 175, 177, 96, 101, 106, 220
182, 189, 193–4, 202, 209 Nirmalamani : 16, 110
misleading teaching 165, 169, see mohaśāstra, cf. :
Nirvānamantrirāja 210–11, 213, 242, 245
Pāñcarātra, prasiddhi nirvikāra (or nirvikāratva) 82, 94–5, 113, 150
mistaken view, see bhrānti nirviśes:a 86, 97, 99, 223–4
modification (of case-endings), see viparināma : nis: ādasthapati 47
mohaśāstra 73, 164, 167 niyama 158, 179–80
moks: a 153, 168, 172 niyamavidhi 105
mukhyārtha 180 niyantr: 40, 80, 139, 179, 186
muktihetu 56, 138, 162 non-difference 90, 104, 127, 146, 214, 244, see
mumuks: u (or mumuks: utva): 102–3, 178, abheda
242 between Brahman and the world 76
mūrti 23, 43, 179, 185, 235 between Brahman and cicchakti 89, 92, 94,
150, 210
Nāgaliṅ ga 29, 204, 210–13, 216 between Brahman and the individual self 87,
nāmarūpa 13, 207 94–7, 147, 211
  273
between Brahman and bliss 237–8 as a misleading teaching 164–5

between Śiva and the world 25 º scriptures, see scriptures
between Śiva and cicchakti 86, 149, 210 pāñcarātrādhikarana : 44, 73–4, 124, 129, 133,
:
between Vis: nu-Nārāya : and Brahman 48–9
na 161, 166
between Śiva and the worshipper in the pāñcarātrasthita 43–4, 160
liberating state 26, 216 :
Pānini 50, 122, 193, 232
between Vedas and Śaivāgamas 109, 160 parabhās:ya 35, 123, 128
pure º, see ātyantikabheda parabhāva 36, 38, 43, 160
tenants of pure º, see atyantābhedavādin, cf. parabrahman 36, 41, 48–50, 53, 62, 79–80, 94,
Advaita Vedānta 97, 109, 133, 145, 180, 187, 235
cf. identity parākāśa (or paramākāśa) 26, 80, 136
non-dualism 83, 110, 201, 219, see advaita paramakārana : 172, 177
pure º 21, 75–6, 86, 94–8, 100, 120, 127, 130, paramatātparya 212
146, 150, 152, 174–5, 203–4, 209, 216, 219, paramavyoman 84
224, see Advaita Vedānta, aviśis:t:ādvaita, parameśvara 19, 48, 66, 77–8, 86, 90–1, 93,
kevalādvaita, śuddhādvaita 107–8, 148, 188, 200, 202
of the qualified 86, see viśis:t:ādvaita, paraprakr: ti 78, 80
Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta paraśakti (or paramaśakti) 19, 78, 80, 108
Śaiva º 4, 16, 114, 127, 211, 213, 215, see paraśiva (or paramaśiva) 1, 39, 42, 48, 73, 77,
śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita, śaktiviśis:t:aśivādvaita, 133, 218, 238, 241
Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta, śivādvaita, parasparavirodha 162
Śivādvaita Vedānta, viśis: t:aśivādvaita paratattva 36, 180
Kashmirian º 15, 27, 79, 83, 114, 205, 207–8, parātman (or paramātman) 15, 19, 26, 35–6, 38,
cf. Pratyabhijñā 40, 51, 66, 90–2, 103, 229
Nr: simhāśrama
: 191, 199, 201, 219 paratva (or paratā) 43, 53, 133, 160, 180, 185
nyāya 52, 108, 129, 163 Paravastu (Vedāntācārya) 60, 189–91, 193, 195
pis:t:apes: ana: º 209 paravidyā 35, 89
sarvaśākhāpratyayaº 92 :
parināma 80–1, 87–8, 95, 113–14, 124, 142–3
sthālīpulākaº 197 :
parināmad r: s:t:i 148
vanasimha : º 53 :
parināmavāda 71, 77, 80–1, 87–8, 95, 100, 220
Nyāya (school) 1, 177 :
parināmin 88, 112, 133, 147, 149–50
nyūnatva 222 :
part, see amśa, avayava, bhāga, śakala, śes:a
cf. aspect
:
offering, see arpana paśu 26, 34, 45–6, 121
omnipotence 80, 164 Pāśupata
omniscience 80, 164, 216 as a Śaiva system 11, 106–7, 109, 160, 166–8,
option 180, see vikalpa, cf. limited reference 173, 177
orthodox 3, 70, 129, 152, 159, 171, 175, 198, as a type of Śaiva practitioner 20, 47, 50, 67–8
201, 224 º scriptures 172, 223
see also vaidika Vedic and non-Vedic º 67–8
cf. Mahāpāśupatas
padārtha 86, 122, 206, 215 pāśupatādhikarana : 71, 107–11, 113, 160, 167, 171–2
aham : º 26, 90, 92, 229 Paśupati 232–3
paddhati 32, 111, 219, 228 pati 26, 28, 75, 185
Padmapāda 232 patronage 2, 4–6, 31, 188, 198, 227
pākhan: daka
: 199 perception 76, 159, 215
Pālkuriki (Somanātha) 17, 22 person 14, 81, 105, see purus: a
pañcācārya 217, 239, 246 thumb-sized º 38, 51, 66
pañcakr: tya 43, 78, 132, 136, 234 (=pañcaka) primordial º 64
pañcāks:aramantra 57 personified 98, 138, see saguna :
Pañcamatabhañjana (Tātācārya) 8, 35, 191–2 º Brahman 37, 99
Pāñcarātra 8, 34, 73–4, 100, 119, 224 º Śiva 22–3, 39, 43, 63, 96, 101–2, 106, 150, 179
Appaya’s refutation of º 124–5, 129, 160–71, 174 cf. embodied
devoted to º, see pāñcarātrasthita phala 13, 64, 102, 120, 153, 159, 236
274  
phenomenal world 39–40, 55, 78–80, 124, 131, supreme º, see paratattva
139, 148, 179, 184, 208, see prapañca transcendence of º, see tattvātīta
power 57, 61, 91, 143, 148, 186, 192 see also jīvatattva, vis:nutattva
:
of knowledge and action, see jñānaśakti and principle of interpretation, see nyāya
kriyāśakti :
forest and the lion, see vanasimhanyāya
of māyā 40, 134, 234 (under nyāya)
of Śiva/Brahman, see cicchakti, paraśakti, grinding the flour, see pis:t:apes: ananyāya
:
paraprakr: ti (under nyāya)
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 133, 142
na rice in the cooking pot, see sthālīpulākanyāya
as the void of consciousness, see (under nyāya)
cidambaraśakti upakrama-upasamhāra : º 129
in the Vīraśaiva s:at:sthala scheme 22, cf. see also nis:ādasthapati, vyavasthā
devotion [in Vīraśaiva theology] property 94, 201, see dharma
supreme º, see paraśakti as Śiva’s śakti 134, 137
two º of the Lord 147–8 property-bearer (or property-possessor), see
power of consciousness 232, 241, see cicchakti dharmin
as either pure consciousness (caitanya) or a as Śiva 134, 136–7
conscious being (cetana) 141–4 cf. quality-possessor
as a synonym of jñānaśakti and/or pūjā 59, 232
kriyāśakti 79 punishment, see nigraha, cf. defects [of Śiva]
prācurya 237–8 :
Punyānanda 15
pradves: a 197 Purāna: 4, 7, 25, 31, 37, 44, 48, 51–3, 55, 65, 70,
Prajāpati 54, 68 80, 101, 106, 114–15, 139, 145–7, 167, 174,
prakāśa 80, 192, 205, 207–8, 243 179, 222–3, 231, 239
pralaya 78, 81 Bhāgavataº 56–7, 184, 202
pramāna : 52, 112–13, 127–9, 169, 178, Kūrmaº 137, 236
182, 215 Liṅ gaº 11
prāmānya : 44, 80, 127, 143, 165, 167, 169, 172 Śivaº 53, 110
prapadana 60, 133, 235 : º 144–5
Vis:nu
prapañca 12, 19, 27–8, 39, 43, 76, 78–80, purus: a 19, 38, 51, 63–4, 66, 81–2, 91, 107–8, 111,
85–6, 88, 94–5, 115, 150, 160, 200, 132, 136, 162, 190, 200–1, 235
229–30, 244 Purus: ottama 9, 13, 20, 58, 76, 175, 184–9, 191–2
prapatti 48, 60, 133 pūrvācārya 21, 29, 58, 109, 120, 123, 130, 176,
prasāda 34, 39, 59, 101, 122 197, 230
prasiddha 33, 41, 60–1, 67, 108, 122, 133, 136, Pūrvamīmāmsā, : :
see Mīmāmsā
140, 142, 235
prasiddhi 164 qualificand, see viśes: ya
pratijñā 128, 155, 157, 182 qualification, see viśes: ana
:
pratis:edha 125, 161 qualified 92, 211, see saviśes: a, viśis:t:a
pratis:t:hā 140, 236, 238, 240 in the sense of an entity endowed with a
Pratyabhijñā quality, see gunin:
as a philosophical system 15–16, 177, 208, 217 in the sense of being eligible to a teaching 167,
influence of º on Śrīkan: t:ha 21, 114 see adhikāra, adhikārin
pratyagātman 126 non-dualism of the º, cf. non-dualism
prescription, see vidhāna º by Śakti 23, 79, 210, 214, 216, see śaktiviśis:t:a,
primary referent, see mukhyārtha śaktiviśis:t:ādvaita, śaktiviśis:t:aśivādvaita,
principal thing, see śes:in Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta
cf. accessory º by māyā, see māyāviśis:t:a
principle of existence (or ontological principle) quality 51, 55, 83, 232, see dharma, guna :
in Appaya’s Ratnatrayaparīks:ā 131–4 quality-possessor, see dharmin
in Śaiva theology 82–4, 108, see śivatattva, quarrel 198, see kalaha
tattva
in Vedānta 12, 199 Radhakrishnan (Sarvepalli) 98, 220, 225
in Vīraśaiva theology 22–3 Rāghavendra(tīrtha) 31, 183–4
  275
Raghunātha Varma 222–3 Rudra 41–2, 46–7, 52, 63, 68, 77, 139, 144, 164,
rahasyārtha 23, 71, 131, 227 172, 179, 186, 190, 222
Rāmacandra (Dīks: ita) 76 :
as the Destroyer, see samhārarudra
Rāmakr: s: nabha
: t:t:a 13
Rāmāśrama (Dīks: ita) 202 Śabara(-svāmin) 45, 47, 77
Raṅ garāmānuja 74, 175, 192, 194–5 saccidānanda 25–6, 40, 78, 90, 92, 103, 229
rasa 63, 230 s:adak
: s:aramantra 57
rasadhvani 63 Sadāśiva 43, 46, 48, 76, 109, 111, 160
ratna 101, 115, 231, 233 sādhana 81–2, 128, 133, 155, 157, 168, 182
ratnatraya 131, 137, 199 sādhanacatus:t:aya 152, 183
reason 124, 126, see hetu, sādhana sādhya 82, 120–1, 126–9, 155–7, 159, 182
cf. inference, major term Sadyojyotis 60
reasoning 108, 142, 162, 165, see tarka, yukti saguna: 37, 39–40, 62, 70, 96–8, 101–2, 136, 138,
recent, see arvācīna, navīna, navya 149–50, 179, 200–1, 219–20, 223,
reflective awareness, see vimarśa, and 232, 236
also prakāśa :
sagunabrahman (or saguna: Brahman) 63, 99,
relation 25, 40, 88 152, 224
between Brahman/Śiva and the world 6, 85, :
sagunopāsanā 99
213, 242–4 śaivāgama (or śivāgama) 16, 25, 106–11, 114–16,
between Brahman/Śiva and the self 87, 90, 160, 215, 224–5, 238, 252
214, 216, 243 Śaiva Siddhānta 16, 32, 43, 60, 76, 79, 83–4,
between Brahman, world and self 12, 26, 107–8, 110–14, 131, 176, 203
77, 244 Śaiva Vedānta 2, 3, 6–8, 27, 32, 70, 117, 119,
between Brahman and bliss 237–8 208–10, 217
:
between Vis: nu-Nārāya : and Brahman/
na cf. Śivādvaita Vedānta, Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita
Śiva 136ff., 222 Vedānta
between Śiva and Śakti 79, 134–5, 142–3, Śaivism 2, 6–7, 9, 17, 111, 198, 201, 218–19
210, 213 Atimārga º 11
between Brahman, cicchakti and space Kashmirian º 79, 83
79–80, 93ff. Pāśupata º 11, 68
between cicchakti and space 80, 83, 136 śakala 4, 177
between dharma and dharmin 134ff., 237–8 śākhā 36, 50, 92, 168–71
between body and embodied 87, 143, 244 śaktiviśis: t:a 79, 86, 214, 240
between Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Śaṅ kara’s śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita 22, 205, 212–16
theologies 130, 146ff. Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta 9, 22–3, 70, 119, 175,
between liṅ gāṅ gasāmarasya and 204–16, 239, 244
bhedābheda 244 differences with Śrīkan: t:ha’s and Appaya’s
between the two Mīmāmsās : 153ff. Śivādvaita 215–16
restriction 38, 45, see avadhārana : śaktiviśis: t:aśivādvaita 22, 205, 207
result, see phala śaktyamśa: (or śaktyavayava) 86, 132, 137, 144
ritual samanvaya 27, 78, 92, 199, 214, 241–2
Saiddhāntika 43 sāmānyapada 45, 52
Śaiva 32, 172–3 Samarapuṅ gava (Śrīvais: nava: author) 60, 189
Vedic 82, 92, 115, 121, 166–71 Samarapuṅ gava (Dīks: ita) 200–1
Vīraśaiva 22, 24, 28, 32 sāmarasya 86, 107, 205, 243
Mīmāmsā : º theory 81 in Vīraśaiva theology 207, see
cf. worship liṅ gāṅ gasāmarasya
ritual action 104, 106, see arpana,: karma, kriyā Sāmbaśiva 43, 63
as an aspect of the twofold nature of Śambhu 36, 66, 76, 131, 135–6, 231, 235
dharma 152–9, 182, 193, see dharma :
samhāra 39, 139
cf. ritual :
samhārarudra 55, 146
ritual manual 2, 16, 18, 111, 202, 217, 227, see :
samsāra 43, 102, 133, 212
paddhati :
samskāra 102, 169–70
rivalry 5, 35, 191 :
samyoga 207
276  
śāntarasa 63 simile
śarīra 28, 78, 87, 143, 187–8, 244 of two types of grain 135
śarīrin 87, 143, 244 of fire and sparks of fire 242–3
Sarvajñātman 58, 84, 88, 100, 114, 147–9, of serpent and its coil 243
175, 219 of light and its substratum 243, cf. bhedābheda
śāstraikya 209 Śiva
s: at:sthala 22–4, 205, 215 supreme º, see paraśiva
s: at:sthalabrahman 23, 207 as the authoritative author of the Vedas and
Satyanātha (Yati) 175–6 Śaiva scriptures 109, 115–16, see kartr:
saviśes: a 97, 211 as both the material and efficient cause of the
Sāyana : 4–5, 11 world 68, 77–8, 81ff., 107, 110ff., 203, see
scriptures nimittopādānakārana :
Vedic º 36–8, 41, 46, 66, 83, 94, 97–8, 101, 103, as only the efficient cause of the world, see
105, 109, 114–15, 126–7, 129–30, 136, kevalanimitta, nimittakārana :
146–7, 159, 169–71, 178, 181, 188, 190, 235, as qualified by Śakti, see śaktiviśis:t:a,
238, 244, see āgama, śruti śaktiviśis:t:ādvaita, śaktiviśis:t:aśivādvaita
Śaiva º 8, 16, 26, 29, 71, 131, 167–8, 172–3, as endowed with a body or form, see body,
205, 217, 223–4, see āgama, śaivāgama, form
śivaśāstra, śivasiddhāntatantra, śivavākya as connected to māyā, see māyāśabalita,
º of Śaiva Siddhānta 79, 111, see māyāvapus, māyāviśis:t:a
siddhāntaśāstra, siddhāntatantra, upabheda as the thumb-sized person, see person
Pāśupata º, see Pāśupata as transcending the trimūrti 40–1, 46, 185–6,
:
Vais: nava or Pāñcarātra º 13, 125, 142–4, 192, 199, see turīyaśiva
161–6, 168–9 as granting liberation, see muktihetu
wrong interpretation of Śaiva º by Śaiva as half-female, see Ardhanārīśvara
commentators 107–11, cf. mistaken view, as dharmin 134ff.
tāntrikas as possessor of māyā, see māyin
non-dualist vs. dualist Śaiva º 110–11 in Vīraśaiva theology, see liṅ ga, liṅ gasthala
directly perceivable (extant) º incarnations of º, see vibhūti, yogācāryas
(pratyaks: aśruti) 115, 168 relation to the Gaṅ gā 56–8
texts supporting º, see upabr: mha
: na: role in the Mahābhārata 50, 54, 63
self world of º, see śivaloka
individual º 26–7, 40, 80, 87, 96, 125, 127, śivādvaita 23, 25, 27, 205, 207, 211, 223–5
138, 142–7, 178, 186, 201, 243–4, see jīva Śrīkan: t:ha’s use of the term º to define his
supreme or inner º 51, 91–2, 103–6, 126, 140, position 27–8, 78, 213
178, 192, 221, see antarātman, ātman, Śivādvaita Vedānta 1–3, 7–8, 10, 32–3, 38–9, 59,
parātman, pratyagātman 65, 70–5, 84, 95, 97, 100, 117–19, 130, 171,
as made of bliss 240, see ānandamaya 174, 176, 191, 194–5, 201, 218, 220, 227
in Vīraśaiva theology, see aṅ ga, aṅ gasthala Śivāgrayogin 17, 108–11, 113–15, 203
self-knowledge 59, 97, 105, 220, see ātmabodha śivaikya (or śivaikyatā) 22, 25
self-realization 77, 99, see ātmabodha śivajīvaikya 22, 25
self-surrender, see prapadana, prapatti Śivajñānayogin 203
sentient (entities) 12–3, 28, 112–14, 131, 144–5, Śivaliṅ gabhūpa 18–19, 21, 48, 73
148, 150, 178, 209, 213–14, 229, see śivaloka 133, 138
citprapañca, cetana Śivānubhava (Śivācārya) 213–14, 239
see also cidacitprapañca, cf. insentient entities śivapāramya 60, 211
śes:a 20, 143, 186, 229 śivaśāstra 108
śes:in 143, 186 śivasiddhāntatantra 23
Sevappa Nāyaka (of Tañjāvūr) 3, 176 śivatattva 39, 111–12, 144, 200, 213
sheath, see kośa śivātmaikya 25
as consisting of bliss, see ānandamaya śivavākya 107
siddhāntaśāstra 131 Śivayogi (Śivācārya) 24–7
siddhāntatantra 110–11 śivopāsanā 133, 235
siddhavastu 156, 182 smārta 5, 117, 218
  277
smr: ti 3, 39, 48, 80, 101, 114–16, 129, 165, 180–1, station (Vīraśaiva) 23, see ekottaraśatasthala,
187, 200, 231, 243 s:at:sthala, s:at:sthalabrahman, sthala
space stava 31, 51
material º 23, 86, 95, 235, see bhūtākāśa, stealer 151, see caura
mahābhūta sthala 22–3
supreme º 79–80, 83, 92, 207, 234–5, see sthiti 39, 75, 78, 85, 139, 230
mahākāśa, parākāśa, paramavyoman sthūla 28, 86, 214
of/as consciousness, see cicchakti, cidākāśa, stotra 31, 33, 39, 52, 59, 130–1, 139
cidvyoman stuti 31, 39, 82, 200
in the heart 66, 91–4, 126–7, see daharākāśa subordination
difference between material º and supreme º in a ritualistic context, see aṅ ga
80, 94 : to Śiva 61
of Kr: s: na
specific words, see viśes: apada :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : to Brahman 68
na
cf. generic words :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : to Śiva 35, 59, 100, 137ff.,
na
śraddhā 34, 106 177, 179–81, see upasarjana
śraddhālu 148–9 substance 81, 159, 167, see gunin :
Śrīhars: a 102–4, 106 substratum, see adhis:t:hāna, āśraya
Śrīkan: t:ha (form of Śiva) 122, 204 subtle 81, 111, see sūks: ma, cf. coarse
Śrīkan: t:ha (author of Saiddhāntika works) 131, º matter, see bindu, cf. cause, Śaiva Siddhānta
134–5 Sucarita (Miśra) 122
Śrīkan: t:ha (Śivācārya) Sudarśanasūri 7–8, 12, 20, 36, 44–7, 52, 68,
as an avatāra of Śiva 204 118–19, 123, 125, 128–30, 152, 154–9,
teachers of º 10–11 161, 163, 166–9, 174, 182–3, 191,
Rāmānuja’s influence on º 12–14, 193–5, 223
21, 129 as Appaya’s nemesis 171–3
as an invention of Appaya Dīks: ita 195–8 śuddhādvaita 37, 70–1, 76, 85, 94, 96–7, 146–7,
followers of º 245, see śrīkan: t:hīya 149–51, 211–12, 227
Śrīkan: t:hayogi (or Śrīkan: t:hācārya), see Śrīkan: t:ha Śuddhādvaita Vedānta 9, 13, 20, 151, 175,
śrīkan: t:hīya 210, 230, 242 184–5, 189
Śrīpati suggested meaning 61–3, 91, 158, see dyotita,
early exponent of Śaivism 17, 217 vyaṅ gya, vyañjita
Vīraśaiva author of the Śrīkarabhās:ya 17, 24 cf. suggestion
Śrīvais: nava: suggestion (poetic) 61, 65, see dhvani, vyañjana
scholarship prior to Appaya 118 º of a matter of fact, see vastudhvani
as Appaya’s opponents 31, 33, 35, 38, 44, 73, :
see also alamkāradhvani, rasadhvani
123ff., 129, 152, 160 sūks:ma 13, 28, 86, 209, 214
reuse of º arguments by Appaya superimposition, see adhyāsa
162ff., 174 refutation of º 207
Śrīvatsa 26 superiority 21, see ādhikya
Śrīvidyā 134 of Śiva over Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : 7, 31, 37, 49–50,
na
sr: s: t:i 39, 78, 136, 139, 234 70, 74, 133, 139, 184
śruti 4–5, 29, 36, 39, 48, 51, 53, 79–80, 82, 115, :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : over Śiva 56–7, 186, 222
na
124, 129, 133, 161–3, 165, 178, 200–1, of Śiva over Kr: s: na: 54, 62
213–14, 236, 244 of Brahman over the trimūrti 46
śrutiśiras (or śrutiśikhara) 44, 101, 115, 223, of Śrīkan: t:ha’s Vedānta over Rāmānuja’s 8, 75,
231, 235 119–20, 129, 150–1, 174–5
śrutivirodha 124, 161, 163 of Advaita Vedānta over other schools 75,
stasis 136, see sthiti, cf. five actions of Śiva 100, 119
statement cf. inferiority, supremacy
:
of qualities, see gunābhidhāna suppletion 123, see adhyāhāra, cf. defects
:
about creation, see kāranavākya support 15, 87
Upanis: adic º presupposed by a [Brahma]sūtra, Brahman as º of the self 140–1, see pratis: t:hā
see vis:ayavākya Brahman as its own º 141
by experts, see abhiyuktasūkti, āptavacana Śakti as º of the world 132
278  
support (cont.) real º, see parināma

:
space as º of the world 234 of Śiva into the world 81–2
:
Vis: nu-Nārāya : as º of the world 143, 186
na of Śiva’s śakti into the world 14, 95
supremacy impossibility of º for cicchakti 112–13
of Śiva 3, 31–2, 49, 53, 56, 146, 174, 177, 181, jīva as a º of Śiva or cicchakti 95, 133, 142
191, 202, 221, see parabhāva, paratva, psychical º of Śiva’s cicchakti 141–3
śivapāramya space, etc. as a º of Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : 235
na
º of Śiva suggested in the Mahābhārata 55, Śrīkan: t:ha’s theory of º 77, 86, 114, 203
60–3, see śivapāramya, cf. suggestion see also vikāra
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 144, 176, 183, 191, see
na trayībāhya 167
paratva treachery, see droha
Sureśvara 57, 88 trimūrti 40–3, 46, 55, 63, 146, 179–80, 181,
Sūryanārāyana : (Dīks: ita) 200 185–7, 192–3, 199, 220
Svaprabhānanda (Śivācārya) 27, 205, 208, 217 trimūrtyatirikta 46
svarūpa 80, 94, 99, 187, 224 trimūrtyuttīrna : 146
svarūpalaks: ana
: 78 turīya 42–3, 186
svavacana 163, 165, cf. Vāsudeva turīyakot:i 179–80, 185–6
Śveta 10–11, 230 turīyaśiva 179
Tyāgarāja (Śāstri) 33, 202
tamas 55–6, 222–3
tāntrikas 107–9 Umā 19, 38–9, 41–3, 96, 132–3, 136–7, 201, 235
tarka 51, 107 Umāpati (Śivācārya) 16–17, 29, 110, 203
Tātācārya (lineage) 8, 35, 176, 191 union
tat:asthalaks:ana
: 78 of Śiva with the worshipper in Śrīkan: t:ha’s
tātparya 29, 60, 93, 108–9 theology 96
tattva 23, 25, 40–1, 43, 48, 54, 60, 85, 97, 108, between Śiva (liṅ ga) and self (aṅ ga) in
111–12, 144, 148, 172, 180, 206, 211, 215 Vīraśaiva theology 27, 214, see advaita,
tattvātīta 112 liṅ gaikya, liṅ gāṅ gasāmarasya,
theory of apparent transformation, see vivarta, liṅ gāṅ gasamyoga,
: :
sāmarasya, samyoga,
vivartadr: s:t:i, vivartavāda śivādvaita, śivaikya, śivajīvaikya, śivātmaikya
defence by Appaya 84, 86–9, 95, 100, 114, with one’s favorite deity, see is: t:adevatā
149, 175 unity 14, 169, 220, 225
refutation by Saiddhāntikas 112–13 of the two Mīmāmsās : 13, 155–6, 159, 183,
refutation by Vīraśaivas 206–8, 213 194, see aikaśāstrya, aikya, śāstraikya
theory of real transformation 77ff., see of the sentence, see ekavākyatā
:
parināma, :
parināmad r: s:t:i, parināmavāda
: of the deities of the trimūrti 45, 192, see aikya
as a preliminary step towards of the self 221
vivartavāda 87–8, cf. Sarvajñātman between the worshipper and Śiva 24–6, 214,
thesis, see pratijñā cf. union
cf. inference upabheda 108, 111
tirobhāva (or tirodhāna) 78, 132, cf. five actions upabr: mha
: na : 51, 53, 55, 140, 147
of Śiva upādāna 82, 111–13, 136, 203, 207, 234
tolerance 98, 100, 138, 146, 174 upādānakārana : 35, 59, 79, 81, 83, 107, 131, 137,
transcendence, see turīya, turīyakot:i 146, 160, 207
of Śiva over the trimūrti 55, 179, 192–3, 199, upādhi 39, 158
see trimūrtyatirikta, trimūrtyuttīrna, : upakrama 31, 129
turīyaśiva Upanis: ads, see śrutiśiras, vedāntavākya
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : over the trimūrti 179,
na coherence of º, see samanvaya
181, 186 great sayings in the º, see mahāvākya
of Śiva over the gunas, : see gunātīta : upāsaka 48–9, 67, 244
of Śiva over the tattvas 111, see tattvātīta :
upasamhāra 31, 91–2, 100, 129, 196, 220
:
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : over emanations 186
na upāsanā 93, 97, 133, 138, 212, 235–6
transformation upasarjana 180, 185–6
apparent º, see vivarta upāsti 148, 234
  279
Utpaladeva 15–16, 21, 80, 106, 114 vikāra 88, 133

: (Vedānta) 13, 119, 152–8,
Uttaramīmāmsā vimarśa 16, 207–8
182, 209 viparināma: 120, 122
vipralambha 164
vacana 15, 21, 33, 40, 51, 60, 86, 110, 131, 143, vipratis: edha 123–5, 161–3, 165
145, 163–5, 167–8, 197, 238 Virakta (Tōn: t:adārya) 24
Vācaspati (Miśra) 12, 52, 73, 77, 109, 143 Vīraśaiva
vācya 61–2 º school of Vedānta, see Śaktiviśis: t:ādvaita
Vādirāja 117, 183 Vedānta
vaidika 43–4, 68, 83, 111, 122, 129, 145, 160, 165, º mat:ha 239
167–9, 177, 187 synonyms of the word º 215
Vaikhānasa 160, cf. Pāñcarātra º doctrine of “six stations”, see s:at:sthala
Vājasaneyaśākhā 170, cf. Ekāyanaśākhā º ācāryas, see pañcācārya
Vallabhācārya 7, 13, 20, 184, 189 virodha 54, 79, 95, 107, 125, 143–4, 180, 185,
Vāmana (grammarian) 193 238, 243
Vanamālī (Miśra) 176 Virūpāks: a 5, 19
vapus 4, 40, 42, 179 vis: ayavākya 124
Varadācārya 9, 20, 123, 175, 195, 197–8 viśes: ana: 28, 55, 85–6, 90–2, 142, 207
vastudhvani 62–3 viśes: apada 45
vastuvirodha 243–4 viśes: ya 85, 90–1, 123
Vāsudeva 91, 161 viśis:t:a 19, 27–8, 41, 43, 78–9, 83, 85–6, 97, 201,
as author of Pāñcarātra scriptures 162–5 203–4, 207, 213–14, 219, 240, 244
relation to Laks: mī 142–3 viśis:t:ādvaita 12, 29, 78, 86, 96, 149, 151, 211, 219,
Vātsyavarada(guru) 20, 44, 46, 68, 118, 172 227, 242
vedabāhya 25 viśis:t:ādvaitavādin 12, 85, 140–1, 244
vedāntavākya 242, see Upanis: ads Viśis: t:ādvaita Vedānta 3, 5, 7–8, 12–13, 20–1, 28,
Vedas 21, 23, 34, 43–4, 54, 113, 128, 145, 152–6, 37, 72–7, 83, 85, 97, 117–19, 123, 130,
162–3 170, 180, 184, 221, 223–5, 234, see śruti 146–7, 155, 161, 169, 171, 174, 176, 183,
equality to Śaiva or Vīraśaiva scriptures 16, 195, 199, 206, 218, 220
25, 107–10 viśis:t:aśivādvaita 12, 27–8, 78, 85, 213
status vis-à-vis Śaiva scriptures according to vis:nuloka
: 133, 138
Appaya 115–16, 160 :
Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na
as stolen by Vāsudeva 164 as the material cause of the world 131,
eligibility to the study of º and Pāñcarātra 165–9 136ff., 146
Vellore 2–3, 31, 218, 221 as an aspect of Śakti 137–9, 177, see amśa, :
Veṅkat:anātha 2, 7, 13, 20, 29, 60, 64, 68, 91, 118, śaktyamśa:
123, 142–3, 161–3, 166, 173–4, 189, 191–3, 221 as either an individual self or a deity 100,
vibhāga 13, 39, 145, 155 137–8, 144–6, 221
vibhūti 19, 24, 36, 43, 55, 63, 80, 146, 160, as the fourth entity transcending the
180–1, 187 trimūrti 180–1
vicāra 105, 156–8, 182–3 as a worshipper of Śiva or Brahman 35, 48–9,
videhakaivalya 102 59, 62, 140, see upāsaka
vidhāna 93, 121, 148, 169 as endowed with defects 56, 222
vidhi 46, 93, 105 origination of the Gaṅgā river from º’s toe 56–8
Vidyāranya: 11, 103–4, 106 world of º 236, see vis:nuloka
:
view vis:nutattva
: 185–6
of apparent transformation, see vivartadr: s:t:i Viśvanātha (Vājapeyin) 202
:
of real transformation, see parināmad r: s:t:i Viśvārādhya 217, 239
vigraha 42–3, 97, 179, 232 vivarta 95, 114, 124, 150
Vijayanagara (empire) 2, 4, 5–6, 8, 22, 35, 117, 189 vivartadr: s: t:i 148
Vijayīndra 3, 9, 19–20, 31, 117, 175–85, 191–2, vivartavāda 77, 83–4, 87–8, 95–6, 112–14, 147,
194, 209 149, 175, 206, 208, 213, 220
Vijñānabhiks: u 184 vivartavādin 100, 207
vikalpa 26, 165 Vivekananda (Swami) 220
280  
void 26 of Śiva in the heart 26, 90–4, 100, 200, see

of consciousness 136, see cidambara, daharākāśa, daharavidyā
cidambaraśakti of Śiva/Brahman by Vis: nu-Nārāya
: : see
na,
vyaṅ gya 61 :
Vis: nu-Nārāya :
na
vyañjana (or vyañjanā) 61, 91 of Śiva by Kr: s: na
: 61, 64–5
vyañjita 55, 61, 150 :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : 37, 47, 100, 119,
na
Vyāsa (or Dvaipāyana, Vedavyāsa) 145 133, 138, 145, 160, 174, 178, 188,
as author of the Brahmasūtras 39, 51, 54, 101, 221, 223
120, 163, 197, 206, 230, 232, 239 :
of Vis: nu-Nārāya : by Śiva 57
na
as author of the Mahābhārata 51, 54, 60–1, 65 of the embodied Brahman 37, 42, 67,
as author of Pāñcarātra scriptures 163 :
97–9, 224, see sagunabrahman,
: 65
as Vis: nu :
sagunopāsanā
cf. Bādarāyana: of Umā 133
Vyāsatīrtha 5, 19, 31, 35, 44, 117, 129, 175–6, of space 132
181, 183–4 as the object of the Pūrvamīmā : msā,
: see
:
vyavadhāranakalpanā 120, 125 ārādhana
vyavasthā 165–6 purificatory role of º, see
vyoman 26, 84, 240 :
antahkara :
naśuddhi
vyūha 186
vyutpatti 41, 214 Yādavaprakāśa 172, 177
Yāmuna 73, 118, 161–4, 170–1, 174
will, see icchā Yoga 166–7, 236
worship, see dharma, pūjā, upāsaka, upāsanā, upāsti yogācāryas 11, 231
of Śiva 2, 7, 22, 24, 32, 34, 39, 43, 48, 59, 61, : 181
yogarūdhi
68, 80, 96, 101–6, 115, 139, 198, 212, yojanā 99, 126–7
218–20, 228, see ārādhana, śivopāsanā yukti 27, 33, 78, 163, 165

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OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 9/12/2020, SPi

Defending God in Sixteenth-Century India

OXFORD ORIENTAL MONOGRAPHS

Introduction: The Rise of Śivādvaita Vedānta 1

2. Early Śaiva Works 31

5. Reception of Appaya’s Śaiva Works 174

Appendix 1: List of Śaiva Works by Appaya Dīks: ita 227

Once upon a time . . .

2    - 

     3

4    - 

     5

6    - 

     7

Appaya’s main source of exegesis, Śrīkan: t:ha’s Brahmamīmāmsābhās : ya, and

8    - 

     9

The book concludes (Chapter 5) with an analysis of the reception of Appaya’s

The Brahmamīmāmsābhā (hereafter ‘BMB’) of Śrīkan tha

1.1 Śrīkan tha’s

In the BMB, Śrīkan tha

¹ namah śvetābhidhānāya nānāgamavidhāyine | kaivalyakalpatarave kalyānagurave namah ||—

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   11

commentary.² The historicity of Śveta as a Śaiva teacher is problematic. The name

12    - 

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   13

kāryāvasthā and several others clearly echoes the non-dualist theology of

14    - 

¹¹ sudarśanācāryair api tātparyasamgrahe garudaikyabhāvanād

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   15

This well-known verse is oft quoted in Kashmirian sources as well as in early

¹² nijaśaktibhittinirmitanikhilajagajjālacitranikurumbah | sa jayati śivah parātmā nikhilāga-

16    - 

material cause’ for Śrīkan tha

1.2 References to Śrīkan tha

While there is little doubt that Śrīkan tha

¹⁵ See, for instance, Śrīkan tha’s

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   17

¹⁸ See Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for a brief discussion of Brahmavidyādhvarīndra’s work.

18    - 

the Anubhavasūtra, the Śivādvaitadarpana and the Vīraśaivānandacandrikā. For

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   19

pointed out by Sastri indeed reveals strong intertextuality.²² However, it is

20    - 

scholar to show awareness of Śrīkan tha’s

²⁴ Vijayīndra concludes the tenth chapter of his Sarvasiddhāntasārāsāravivecana by saying

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   21

Although, as I shall argue in this book, the prominence of Rāmānuja’s tradition

1.3 Śrīkan tha’s

²⁹ I have located a single example: atra ‘pūrvācāryair’ iti sthāne ‘vrddhavaidyair’

22    - 

³⁰ The term śaktiviśistādvaita

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   23

24    - 

śivādvaitapara (v. 1.25), śivādvaitarahasya (v. 1.30) and śivādvaitaparāyana

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   25

26    - 

liberated state, no difference (bheda) whatsoever is perceived by the worshipper:

̣ ̣     ̣  ̣   27

Svaprabhānanda and Maritōn tadārya