Petitioner TC_09

XXVII ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023
TC-09
XXVII ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SINDHIA
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. ---/2022
CLUBBED WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. ---/2022
IN THE MATTERS OF
WRIT PETITION NO. ---/2022
MEN’S PROGRESSIVE ALLIANCE
V.
UNION OF SINDHIA
[UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA]
CLUBBED WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. ---/2022
INDIAN ORTHODOX FEMINIST ORGANIZATION
V.
UNION OF INDIA
[UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA]
[THE ABOVE MENTIONED MATTERS HAVE BEEN CLUBBED UNDER ARTICLE
139A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA]
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TOPIC PG.NO
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 6
STATEMENT OF FACT 7-8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 10
AGRUMENTS ADVANCED 11-30

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE AMENDED SECTIONS 354 AND 375 OF
THE SINDHIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES
14 AND 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA?
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL COURT IS JUSTIFIED

TO LEVY PRO TEM COMPENSATION BASED ON THE FACTS AND
PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL IN VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
SINDHIA?
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF THE EXCEPTION

CLAUSE FOR SECTION 375 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA?
PRAYER 31
2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1. Art Article
2. Hon’ble Honourable
3. SC Supreme Court
4. UOI Union of India
5. PIL Public Interest Litigation
6. CJI Chief Justice of India
7. NGO Non-Government Organisation
8. IPC Indian Penal Code
9. CJ Chief Justice
10. Sec Section
11. HC High Court
12. Ors Others
13. Crpc Criminal Procedure Code
14. Anr Another
15. LCI Law Commission of India
16. AIR All India Report
17. V Versus
18. SCC Supreme Court Cases
19. Ltd Limited
20. Apl Appeal
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P 1968 AIR 1099
2. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75 SC.
3. Saurabh Chaudhari v UOI, AIR 2004 SC 2212
4. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, 1958 AIR 538
5. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
6. Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 321
7. Girdhar v. State, AIR 1953 MB 147
8. Shayara Bano v UOI (2017) 9 SCC 1
9. Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, Writ Petition(s)(Criminal) No(s).7/2018.
10. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, 1972 (1) SCC 660
11. Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, 1978 AIR 597
12. Own motion v. UOI & others, 12 Feb 2014
13. Avishek Goenka v. Union of India, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.265 OF 2011
14. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 OF 2016
15. Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107
16. Munni Devi v. State of Haryana and Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 14843
17. CPI Devadurga PS, Raichur v. Laxmi, Crl. A. No. 3628/2012
18. Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (6) SCC 770
19. Moodabidri v. Vishwanatha devadiga and Anr., ILR 2019 Kar 4643
20. Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.577 OF 2017
21. Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) CR LJ 2881 (SC)
22. Independent Thought V UOI & Anr, W.P. (C) 382/2013
BOOKS
1. Mahendra Pal Singh, V. N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, Eastern Book
Company, 13rd Edn., Reprint 2019.
2. Justice Jasti Chelameswar, Justice Dama Seshadri Naidu, M.P. Jain Indian
Constitutional Law, LexisNexis, 8th Edition.
3. Justice M. R. Mallick Criminal Manual, Professional Book Publishers, 2020.
4. Rathanlal and Dhirajlal’s, Indian Penal Code, Lexis Nexis, 36th Edition, 2019.
ONLINE RESOURCES
4
1. Taniya Tuli, Gender Neutrality: Rights of one, abrogation of another?, September 25,
2019, https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/gender-neutrality-rights-of-one-
abrogation-of-another/#_edn3
2. Ankita Yadav, Understanding Marital Rape in India: A Discourse on Textual and
Constitutional Perspective, 11 RMLNLUJ (2019) 81.
3. Section 376 R/w 511 IPC: Offence Of Attempt To Rape Can Be Attracted Even If
Accused Had Not Undressed Himself: SC, 20 Nov 2019.
https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/section-376-rw-511-ipc-offence-of-attempt-to-
rape-can-be-attracted-even-if-accused-had-not-undressed-himself-sc-read-judgment-
149990
4. Anushka Yadav, Gender Neutrality of Rape Laws, IJLMH, 2021
STATUTES
1. The Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women, 1993.
2. The Sindhia Penal Code, 1860
3. The Constitution of Sindhia, 1951
4. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
5. The Evidence Act, 1872
5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner No. 1 has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sindhia after the grant of
special leave Petition by this Hon’ble Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of Sindhia.
(Insert A. 136)
The Petitioner No. 2 has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sindhia through the
remedies available to it under Article 32 of the Constitution of Sindhia. (Insert A. 32)
The Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 139A has the power to Club two or more cases that
involves same or substantially the same questions of law.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions, arguments and prayer before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
6
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Union of Sindhia is a democratic country in Asia with rich history dating back thousands
of years. The People's Reformative Alliance (PRA) party, under the support of Sri Ranveer
Lohia, an independent member, staked claim to form a coalition government in the year 2022
in the Union of Sindhia.
Ranveer Lohia, an accomplished law student, was deeply concerned about the discrepancies
between the laws of the Union of Sindhia and those of other democratic and civilized
countries in the world. He introduced a bill to amend Sections 354 and 375 of the Sindhian
Penal Code, 1860, to promote gender neutrality in these sections. The proposed amendment
was presented by the said member in accordance with the Constitution of Sindhia, and
subsequently discussed, deliberated, and approved by both houses of parliament without any
suggestions, changes, or amendments.
Owing to the large number of false sexual assault cases being filed, the government of
Sindhia decided to remove the Doctrine of Reverse Burden under Section 114A of the
Sindhian Evidence Act, 1872.
Elijah, a US national, visited the Union of Sindhia for the purpose to further acquaint himself
with the Eastern philosophy of this country. He interacted with Jigyasa Kaur, a young woman
of 21 years who was a self-proclaimed clairvoyant and aura cleanser. Jigyasa Kaur befriended
Elijah and arranged to meet him at a secluded part of Anjuna Beach in the State of Glowa.
Elijah was perplexed to find a group of five women, Jigyasa informed him that they were
members of the "Healers of the Lost" and offered him "holy water" to cleanse his body and
soul before proposing to rid him of negative energy which in reality was laced with a narcotic
and psychotropic substance made out of local herbs, leaving him incapacitated and
vulnerable.
The spiritual healers brazenly violated him sexually in order to satisfy her carnal instincts,
forcing him to engage in sexual intercourse against his will and wishes. The group of women
continued to engage in acts of forced sexual intercourse against Elijah's pleas and resistance,
ultimately leaving him with numerous bruises on his body.
At the break of dawn, various people who frequented the said beach found him and rushed
him to St. Thomas Hospital. After due examination, the team of doctors immediately
registered a complaint that Elijah had been sexually violated and assaulted by more than one
person who seemed to have had forcible intercourse with him.
As the incident had gained undue publicity in both national and local media, the police
conducted a preliminary investigation which included a review of Elijah's social media
handles and text messages exchanged between him and Jigyasa, the young woman who had
sexually violated him.
Thus, after conducting an investigation, based on the circumstantial evidence as well as the
testimony of Jacob D’sa, a taxi driver who dropped Elijah on the beach along with the
statement of Elijah, led to the immediate detention and arrest of Jigyasa and four other
women, namely Disha Dinesh, Amyra Rabeeha, Ruth Mendes, and Layla Anjum, on the basis
of the applicability of Sections 354 and 375.
7
In response to the arrest of five women for these offenses, the 'Indian Orthodox Feminist
Organization,' a Neo-Orthodox NGO focusing on women's empowerment, filed a Writ
Petition challenging the amended provisions, claiming they violated Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution of Sindhia. However, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition on the grounds
that it was not maintainable and no violation was made out.
After considering the preliminary inquiry and the testimony of Jacob D'sa, the jurisdictional
court ordered the accused to pay a compensation of 20 lakh rupees each to the victim in
relation to the complaint filed against them. Aggrieved by the above-mentioned decision, the
‘Indian Orthodox Feminist Organization’ approached the Supreme Court of the Union of
Sindhia by filing a Special Leave Petition under the law.
An NGO named ‘The Men’s Progressive Alliance,’ which caters to men’s empowerment,
upon learning that the newly amended provisions of the Sindhian Penal Code, 1860, have
excluded the exception clause for Section 375, got enraged and filed a Writ Petition in the
Supreme Court of Sindhia.
The said matters are set out for final disposal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sindhia,
wherein the said issues are stated to be adjudicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE AMENDED SECTIONS 354 AND 375 OF THE SINDHIAN
PENAL CODE, 1860, ARE VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLES 14 AND 15 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA?
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL COURT IS JUSTIFIED TO LEVY PRO

TEM COMPENSATION BASED ON THE FACTS AND PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL IN
VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA?
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE FOR SECTION

375 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SINDHIA?
9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.Whether the amended Sections 354 and 375 of the Sindhian Penal Code, 1860, are
violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Sindhia?
It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble SC that gender-neutral laws related to sexual offences
are violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Sindhia as it violates the reasonable
classification guaranteed under Art 14 in certain circumstances and Art 15(3) that provides
State to make any special provision for protection of women and children. It also violates Art
21 and Rule of Law guaranteed under the Constitution.
2. Whether the Jurisdictional Court is justified to levy pro tem compensation based on
the facts and proceed with the trial in view of the Constitution of Sindhia?
Jurisdictional Court is not justified to levy pro tem compensation in the present case as under
Sec 357 of Cr. P.C., the Court is empowered to award compensation only when the fine is
imposed as sentence at the time of passing of the judgment, if it considers it appropriate in a
particular case, in the interest of justice.
3. Whether the exclusion of the exception clause for Section 375 is violative of the
provisions of the Constitution of Sindhia?
The exclusion of the exception clause for Section 375 is violative of the provisions of the
Constitution of Sindhia as Exception 2 of Section 375 of IPC has been retained considering
the basic facts of the still evolving social norms and issues. Also, it is necessary that the
provisions of the law should be in such a manner that it cannot affect a particular class of
society.
10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1.ISSUE 1
Whether the amended Sections 354 and 375 of the Sindhian Penal Code, 1860, are violative
of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Sindhia?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Constitution lays down rights,
which cannot be deviated in any circumstances, and the government must exercise its
authority with due process of law.
1.1 Art 14
Art 14 states that “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India”.
Art14 guarantees equal protection of laws and under its ambit includes:
 It does not assess attainment or situations in the same position. Different classes have
various needs that require separate treatment.
 For safety and security different laws for varying places and legitimate control
policies enacting laws lie at the best interest of the state.
 Identical treatment in unequal situations, in fact, would amount as inequality.
The expression ‘equality before law’ is a negative concept and the State has a duty to abstain
from doing any act which is discriminatory in nature. In other words, this provision states that
there is no comparison between equal and unequal thus the state should adopt the mechanism
of positive discrimination. The term positive discrimination means some socio-economic
steps aimed to improve the condition of a particular section of society.
The Petitioner pleads before this Hon’ble Court that Art 14 has provided the provision for
equality of all people before the law, but every person is not the same and therefore it is not
practically possible to have a universal application of equality. Thus, the laws cannot be of a
general character and some classification is permitted under Art 14.
11
In the case of Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P1, the SC held
that:
“Equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not be treated alike. Likes should be
treated alike. It is settled law that in giving effect to the said salutary principle, a
mathematical precision is not envisaged and there should be no fanatical or ‘doctrinaire’ or
wooden approach to the matter. A practical or realistic approach should be adopted. It is open
to the State to classify persons or things or objects, for legitimate purposes.”
In the case of the State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar2, the Hon’ble SC held that the
right to equality is not absolute and it includes some meaningful exceptions.
Reasonable classification in which the legislation is passed on a rational basis for the purpose
of achieving some specific objectives is permitted under the Constitution.
The Hon’ble SC in Saurabh Chaudhari v UOI3 laid down the test that determines whether
the special treatment is based on reasonable classification or not. The classification must be
based on reasonable differentia. It means that the people who are selected must be different in
status or position from those who are left out. In simple words, the statute or the Act must
demonstrate that there are some special or considerable grounds of difference between both
groups. There must be sufficient nexus between the differential classification and the object
sought with the act. In simple words, it is essential to demonstrate that the classification is
necessary for achieving a particular objective.
In the case of Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar4, the Hon’ble SC elaborately explained
the various facets of this Doctrine of Reasonable Classification. Some of the observations are
as follows:
1. An individual can constitute a class and it will be deemed as a reasonable

classification if that particular individual is conferred certain privileges on account
of reasonable conditions or circumstances.
1
Western U.P. Electric Power & Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P 1968 AIR 1099,
2
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75 SC.
3
Saurabh Chaudhari v UOI, AIR 2004 SC 2212
4
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, 1958 AIR 538
12
2. It will be presumed that the classification is reasonable as the state considers the
needs of their citizens and some special treatment is needed for improving their
condition.
3. While assuming constitutionality, the court will take into consideration the intent of
the legislation while enacting the Act. Further, other factors like a matter of reports,
basic knowledge and historical backdrop shall also be duly recognised.
4. The classification can be based on numerous grounds including geographical,
economic and social factors etc.
1.2 Women being subject to violence since ancient times.
It is submitted that even though the ancient Indian scripture and commentaries described
women as ‘Goddess’ or ‘Shakti’ the position of women in India had been considerably
unpleasant. For long she has been treated as a ‘property’ capable of being owned by man. Her
very existence was thought to be for ‘pleasing’ the Mankind. Her personality was to be
controlled within limits by one or the other person at different stages of her life like initially
by her father, after marriage by her husband and then by her son. Her independence was
always shadowed by someone.
On one hand where the beauty of nature ‘motherhood’ was celebrated with the birth of a son;
it was thought to be curse with the birth of a girl child. Birth of a girl child was thought to be
a curse because of the social consequences which were inevitably going to follow such as
expenditure in her marriage, dowry and lifelong obligations towards her in-laws. Hence,
parents preferred to uproot this very reason of unnecessary expenditure in the family. They
ended up aborting the foetus if it was diagnosed to be a girl child. Some parents under the
trauma of consequences of a girl child even ended up killing the girl child mercilessly.
The vulnerability of the women left them as an easy prey in the male dominated world. It was
mainly because of the economic and social dependency of women over men. It was not only
the case with uneducated economically backward women but also with educated and
economically independent women. As soon as women stepped out of their homes, they were
exposed to abuse ranging from outraging their modesty to rape, at work they were abused
ranging from Sexual Harassment at Workplace to being underpaid for the same job as men.
The story did not end there. Females were not completely safe behind the closed doors of
13
their house they were continuously abused in silence ranging from domestic violence to
matrimonial offences. Women were harassed irrespective of their age. Girls of tender age
were sexually exploited at schools, public places by known or unknown people.
In a detailed study conducted by the United Nations called the “In-This study clearly finds
that non-implementation depth Study on all forms of Violence against Women” it was
observed that ineffective implementation of existing domestic laws in most countries was the
single most important reason for continued immunity to perpetrators of violence against
women particularly in intimate relationships.
1.3 Criminal Laws (Amendment) Draft, 2013
An evaluation of the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Draft 2013, the Criminal

Laws (Amendment) Ordinance 2013 and the final Criminal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2013
clarified that at its inception the Justice Verma Committee formulated a gender-neutral draft
in many aspects such as it contained gender neutral rape laws and gender-neutral sexual
harassment at workplace laws.
The saying has always stood perfect that “Changing times and their outcomes provide an
insight to anything irrespective of procuring something good or preventing the occurrence of
an evil in advance”. Likewise, we have witnessed many things which are very influential in
the modification of the society. One of the most controversial issues from the ancient times to
this modern world has had the provocation for the existence of gender-neutral rights.
Due to the barbaric India's daughter gang rape case which shook the masses, the laws were
made more stringent which was thought to have a deterrent effect on the future crimes of
such nature. But a study showed that there has been a sharp increase in sexual violence after
the heinous incitement took place in Dec 2012. Though the sex crimes where not completely
deterred away but these stringent laws surprisingly gave more scope of misuse.
The Criminal (Amendment) Bill, 2019 was introduced in the Parliament by Mr. KTS
Tulsi ,The motto of this bill was to make the Sexual Crimes gender neutral. The bill was
previously introduced in 2012 and it was dismissed in 2013 when it was said by the Ministry
of Home Affairs in a PIL that only a man can be a perpetrator and not a victim.
14
The bill has faced many oppositions starting from the year 2012 when the bill was introduced
for the very first time where the offence of rape was to be made gender neutral and the word
“rape” to be replaced with “sexual assault”. This bill had resistance from the advocates of
various parts of the country and majorly from woman groups.
A Mumbai advocate Flavia Agnes said that they have had opposed even
when the child rape laws were made gender neutral. She even mentioned that many of the
western countries too adopted it in making the rape laws gender neutral and simultaneously
they have witnessed that women are aggrieved again as compared to men. The offence of
rape itself shows physicality in its definition which talks about the dominance of a specific
gender and the aggrieved has an injury to her stigma. If these laws were made gender neutral,
then it would become difficult for the judges to interpret a particular case and the probability
of seeking justice becomes less in number and a woman has to battle both social stigma and
social mind-set.
Another Delhi based advocate Vrinda Grover said that “There are no instances
where a woman has raped a man”. She even mentioned that no man is facing sexual violence
as faced by a woman and the intensity of sexual violence faced by a woman is at a much
higher rate. The other reason for not considering rape to be gender neutral, it is because very
few or none of them are acknowledged to the courts.
It was difficult even when the rape laws were not gender neutral and if at all it is made,
the sufferer would be females at most of the times. It is always possible for the offender to
question on a woman even if she has not committed anything. There are chances that the
offenders would easily set free rather than they are being put behind the bars. When a woman
approaches a court, she always steps in with a mind-set how will the society consider, how is
she going to tackle all the situations and how will she prove her innocence to everyone. The
predominance of a man has been shown in many sexual crimes such as Rape, Stalking,
Voyeurism and Sexual harassment.
1.4 Article 15
Art 15 states that “The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.”
15
This article ensures equality before the law and prohibits any form of discrimination in public
access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, and places of public entertainment. The objective
of Art 15 is to promote equality and eliminate discrimination on the basis of various factors
that historically have been the basis of social inequality and injustice in India.
However, Art 15 also empowers the State to make special provisions for women and children
and for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes.
Art 15(3) states that “Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for women and children.”
The provision recognizes that women and children have historically been disadvantaged and
marginalized due to various social and economic factors, and hence, require special
provisions to promote their welfare and advancement. These special provisions may include
policies and programs that aim to uplift women and children, such as reservations in
educational institutions, employment opportunities, and healthcare facilities, as well as
protection against various forms of discrimination and violence.
Clause 3 of Art 15 also allows the government to frame special laws regarding the protection
of women and abolition of sexual harassment.
Discrimination happens when people treat two individuals differently under the same
circumstances. One thing that should be noted here is that this classification is also known as
positive discrimination in society which will help them to uplift their quality of living. It
creates a bit of discrimination, but it’s far justified because it compensates for early injustice
which was faced by women and children in the male dominating society.
Sexual harassment against women is one of the most occurring crimes in the present years.
Therefore, clause 3 of Article 15 of the Indian Constitution provides power to the government
to pass special laws to protect women from sexual assaults and harassment.
In Muller v. Oregon5, it was observed that Art15(3) further empowers the State to make
special provisions for women and children. The reason is that “women’s physical structure
and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for
subsistence and her physical well-being becomes an object of public interest and care in order
to preserve the strength and vigour of the race”.
5
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
16
In Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay6, the adultery charge was filed against the appellant
under Sec 497 of the IPC, 1860. In this case, the main issue was to determine whether Sec
497 of the IPC, 1860 is in contradiction with Art 14 and 15 or not. This case presented the
argument that Sec 497 of the IPC, 1860 dictates that adultery can only be committed by man
and that women cannot even be punished as abettors. As a result of this argument, there was a
contradiction with regard to whether this was in violation of Art 15, which prohibits
discrimination based on gender. However, it was further stated that Clause (3) of Art 15
clearly states that nothing contained in Art 15 limits the state’s ability to make special
provision for women and children.
Additionally, it was argued that Art 15(3) should not shield women from the threat or
commission of crimes.
In case of Girdhar v. State7, the petitioner was convicted under Sec 342 and 354 of the IPC.
The petitioner claimed that as there are no provisions relating to assault against men with the
intention to outrage his modesty, hence providing such laws for women is discriminatory. Sec
354 is contrary to Art 15(1). The petition was dismissed stating the law to be in consonance
with Art 15(3).
In Shayara Bano v UOI8 it was observed that the conferment of a social status based on
patriarchal values, or a social status based on the mercy of the men-folk is absolutely
incompatible with the letter and spirit of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
Earlier, a PIL was dismissed by the SC headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi and Justice S K Kaul
which was filed by an NGO Criminal Justice Society of India through an advocate Ashima
Mandla where she pointed out that Section 375 of IPC violates Art 14, Art 15 and Art 21 as it
does not provide punishment for the rape committed on Men and Transgenders. The Judiciary
in this plea held that this could be done only by the Legislature (Parliament) as there has not
been any acknowledgement where a man or a transgender is a rape victim and quoted “Men
as perpetrators and Women as victims”.
The SC in 2018, dismissed a PIL seeking gender neutrality in crimes such as rape, sexual
harassment, outraging modesty, stalking, and voyeurism. Centre in its application submitted
6
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 321
7
Girdhar v. State, AIR 1953 MB 147
8
Shayara Bano v UOI (2017) 9 SCC 1
17
that the laws related to rape should not be altered as some section are requisite to keep a
check on the rising crime against women.
Similarly, In the case of Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India 9, Apex Court dismissed the PIL
by Rishi Malhotra where PIL mentioned for making rape laws to be made gender-neutral as
there are no laws to protect males from sexual harassment.
Analysing the Constitutional provisions adopted for the upliftment of women, it can be
inferred that these laws were adopted by the Constitution drafters to catalyse equality and
hence women specific legislations or actions build on them were considered under the head
of intelligible differentia created to strive for the object of attaining equality.
In reference to Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India10, that the Constitution embraces the
substantive equality approach as provided in Article 15(1) and Article 15(3), we are of the
opinion that formative action under sub-article (3) of Article 15 is not merely an enabling
provision but, in the context of Article 14, may be a mandatory obligation.
1.5 Obligation under International Convention
Justice Verma Committee has observed the obligation of the State to ensure protection of
women from different forms of abuses that arise from many sources of international law.
As a party to the Beijing Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, the Judiciary has a
duty to ensure that all persons can live securely under the Rule of Law, especially to women.
The judiciary also has a duty to promote the observance and the attainment of human rights
of women under the Beijing Principles.
The State is also a party to The Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women 1993
and Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women. Here, it is
pertinent to note that the General Assembly has recognized that:
“Violence against women is a manifestation of historically negligent poor relations between

men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by
men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women and that violence against
9
Rishi Malhotra v. Union of India, Writ Petition(s)(Criminal) No(s).7/2018.
10
Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, 1972 (1) SCC 660
18
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
position compared with men…..”
Further Article 14 of The Declaration on Elimination of Violence against Women 1993 states
that:
“….State should pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
violence against women and, to this end should:
(d) develop penal, civil, labour and administrative sanction and domestic legislation to
punish and redress wrongs caused to women; women who are subjected to violence should be
provided with access to the mechanism of justice and, as provided for by national legislation,
to just and effective remedies for the harm that they have suffered; State also informed
women of their rights in seeking redress through such mechanisms.”
Article 24 postulates that State parties will undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
convention. Article 24 also requires State parties to include in their reports information about
sexual harassment, and on measures to protect women from sexual harassment and other
forms of violence of coercion in the workplace.
Thus, we can conclude that women’s rights as basic human rights have been established both in
domestic and international legal regimes. This imposes a mandatory obligation on the State to
guarantee special laws and protection to the vulnerable section of the society i.e women. Failure to do
so would result in a breach of International Convention.
1.6 Article 21
Article 21 states that “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.”
Any form of violence or assault, sexual or otherwise, on women is a violation of the

fundamental right to live with dignity. The fundamental rights of women include safety and
bodily integrity. The said rights, in turn, include secure spaces where they can exercise
autonomy and freewill. Thus, if constitutional obligations towards women are not fulfilled
then the right to equality and dignity have been denied. The role of the State as parens patriae
19
is fundamental to the Constitution. Article 21 is the basic fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution and women must not be deprived of the same.
The law must be implemented in a manner that satisfies the criteria of impartial
administration of justice, which is the fundamental cornerstone of the rule of law.
1.7 Rule of Law
The expression “Rule of Law” is derived from the French phrase ‘le principe de legalite’
meaning the principle of legality.
Rule of Law may be specifically defined as “Supremacy of law.” Prof Wade expressed- “The
rule of law requires that the Government should be subject to the law rather than the law
subject to the Government.”
Rule of law is on the absence of arbitrary power, and discretionary power, equality before
law, and legal protection to basic human rights and these ideals remain relevant and
significant in every democratic country even today. It is considered as a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution and, hence, it cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by the
Parliament.
Rule of law under Art 14 encompasses:

 The supremacy of law
 Equality before law
 The dominance of Legal Spirit
The direct connotation of these words provided under Article 14 is that the law is supreme
and there is no scope of arbitrariness as everybody is governed by the rule of law. Law treats
everybody equally without any biases, which is the basic requirement of Rule of Law.
In the case of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI11, the SC observed that Art14 strikes at arbitrariness in
state actions and ensures fairness and equality in treatment. Rule of law which is the basic
feature of the Indian Constitution excludes arbitrariness. Where there is arbitrariness there is
denial of Rule of Law.
Article 14 ensures the dominance of Legal Spirit i.e ensures legal justice. Hence
implementing gender neutral laws are violative of Art 14 as it treats unequals as equals that in
11
Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, 1978 AIR 597
20
turn denies rule of law which cannot be abrogated. Such a provision denies legal justice to
women.
1.8 Ineffective implementation of measures to ensure women’s safety
Preventing the commission of heinous crimes puts a greater responsibility on the state than
to ensure justice after the crime is perpetrated. Apart from having an efficient and honest law
and order machinery, it is necessary that certain basic measures regarding provision of civic
amenities be undertaken by the State, so as to minimise opportunities for the perpetrators of
the crimes.
In rural India, lack of proper sanitation facilities also contribute to the commission of sexual
crimes against women. At night women have to get out of their houses to use sanitation
facilities and these moments are abused by anti-social elements.
On the issue of mobility, the State transport systems do not appear to have safety measures to
protect women. Not only are appropriate safety measures not in place, but also a large
number of directions issued by various High Court and the Apex Court in this regard, are not
being complied with by the Central Government and various State Governments.
A prime example would be the directions of the Delhi HC in Court on its Own motion v.
UOI & others12, in respect of the use of dark film on car windows. The use of black films has
a very serious and dangerous consequence even in the field of crime. It is a common
knowledge that the cars or vehicles involved in commission of heinous crimes like
kidnapping, abducting, rape and other serious offences, normally carry jet black films, thus,
totally preventing the offenders from being seen/identified by any person on the road.
This position was subsequently reiterated by the SC in Avishek Goenka v. Union of India13,
where the Court observed: “1. Alarming rise in heinous crimes like kidnapping, sexual assault
on women and dacoity have impinged upon the right to life and the right to live in a safe
environment which are within the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. One of
the contributory factors to such increase is use of black films on windows/windshields of
four-wheeled vehicles…”
12
Own motion v. UOI & others, 12 Feb 2014
13
Avishek Goenka v. Union of India, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.265 OF 2011
21
The Justice Verma Committee’s report on amendments to criminal law, 2013, has opined that,
"we are afraid the violation of human rights pertaining to ‘rape cases’ including permission of
rape, distorting investigation in rape, pre-conceived notions of ‘honour,’ certain regressive
court judgment (in some cases, we are told, that the rapist made a magnanimous offer to
marry the girl) are extraordinarily telling euphemisms of misplaced morality. Thus,
complaints of rape become mere matters of formality - low on priority because there is no
understanding of the acuteness of the violation of human rights in respect of a woman by
sexual assault and the psychological trauma she undergoes. This is compounded by
vulnerabilities emanating from class/caste/community disadvantages and also that of poverty.
This has led to a subculture of oppression and we are afraid that unless and until this is
addressed not just in high sounding economic terms but in terms of concrete legislation,
accountability, assertion of rights, guarantees of education and above all to secure spaces,
India’s constitutional claim to republicanism remains overstated.”
It saddens to note that the police forces of this country enforce directions, and indeed law,
only when orders are passed by various courts, and then again, only take action for a few
days. It is also pertinent to note the incapability of the Government the most basic safety
measures with any amount of efficacy. Example: The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government
of India, issued Office Memorandum No. F. NO.15011/48/2009-SC/ST-W dated September
4, 2009, to all State Government and Union Territory Administrations. This Office
Memorandum is titled “Advisory on Crime against Women – Measures needed to curb –
regarding” and takes note of no less than 8 advisories issued by the Central Government to
the States and Union Territories (between 1995 and 2007) in respect of steps to be taken for
prevention of crimes and violence against women.
This clearly shows that the Executive of this country is fully aware of the bare minimum
steps that are required to ensure the safety of women and has been aware of the same. Yet,
despite numerous recommendations, deliberations, consultations, studies, directions from the
judiciary and, most importantly, the protests of civil society, the State continues to fall
woefully short of ensuring the safety of women in this country.
Further, the State has turned a blind eye to poor and destitute women, and women who are
victims of domestic violence and who are unable to provide shelter for themselves. This
fundamental lack of empathy, understanding and engagement reflects poorly on the State,
which has the constitutional responsibility to provide for those who lack access to justice.
22
A landmark judgement in the legal history engraved itself on the 6 th of September 2018, in the
case of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India14, where a five judge constitutional bench of
the SC consisting of CJ Dipak Mishra and Justices Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Ajay
Manikrao Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra and Rohinton Fali Nariman, ruled in favour of
decriminalisation of Section 377 observing that consensual sexual acts between adults cannot
be a crime, and overturned its own judgment pronounced in 2013 in the Naz Foundation case
and held the prior law to be “irrational, arbitrary and incomprehensible.”
The decriminalisation of Section 377, whilst awakening the nation to freedom, failed to
acknowledge the fact that the demand for flexibility in the current legal scenario was
manifest.
Laws are formulated with an imperative objective of protecting the rights bestowed to
individuals; nonetheless, in this case, the right was created as a result of the scrapping of one
legal provision with no simultaneous provision being created to protect the same and with the
existing legal provisions still being guided towards being women specific.
Analysing the Constitutional provisions adopted for the upliftment of women, it can be
inferred that these laws were adopted by the Constitution drafters to catalyse equality and
hence women specific legislations or actions build on them were considered under the head
of intelligible differentia created to strive for the object of attaining equality.
Thus, Arbitrary classification by the legislature known as class legislation is forbidden by the
Constitution but it allows for Reasonable classification in which the legislation is passed on a
rational basis for the purpose of achieving some specific objectives is permitted under the
Constitution. Therefore, the amended Sections 354 and 375 of the Sindhian Penal Code,
1860, are violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Sindhia as it denies the benefit
that women are guaranteed due to socio-economic conditions prevailing in the society under
the said provisions.
14
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 76 OF 2016
23
ISSUE 2
Whether the jurisdictional Court is justified to levy pro tem compensation based on the facts
and proceed with the trial in view of the Constitution of Sindhia ?
It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner No. 1 herein has approached this Hon’ble Court to
seek relief on behalf of all the women against whom injustice is being caused through the
new amended provisions of the Sindhian Penal Code. The amended provisions is being
misused to the advantages and benefits of the dominant class to cause atrocities on the
women class of the country. The Petitioner No. 1 pleads before this Hon’ble Court that it may
be pleased to grant appropriate relief and put an end to the unjust practices that the new
amended provisions has brought about.
It is submitted that the jurisdictional Court in the matter of State of Sindhia v. Jigyasa Kaur
and Ors., (Herein after referred to as ‘Jigyasa Case’) has arbitrarily without applying its
mind have passed an order directing each of the five accused in that matter to pay
compensation of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs only). The Petitioner No. 1 must
point out that the Jigyasa Case is still in this preliminary stages of the trial, where the Hon’ble
Court is to consider whether there is a prime facie case made out, there, the Hon’ble Court
went a step forward and ordered the accused persons to pay compensation to the victim and
in doing so, the court already passed a judgement in the eyes of the citizens, convicting the
accused persons without even giving them a chance to speak for themselves. This is not just
arbitrary and erroneous on the part of the jurisdictional Court but the Court has also violated
all the basic principles of natural justice.
It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that the Petitioner No. 1 is not denying the
existence and necessity of the provisions of compensating the victims of crime, in fact, the
Petitioner No. 1 is an NGO working tirelessly towards achieving the ultimate social justice.
The Petitioner No. 1 only pleads that it would be gross violation of the fundamental rights of
the women in favour of whom the laws are made to empower and protect them from abuse
and discrimination. The order passed by the jurisdictional Court to pay compensation if left
alone without getting into the merits of it, would be gross ignorance of the law and violation
of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.........
24
Justice Krishna Iyer, in Maru Ram v. Union of India15, has held that victimology must find
fulfilment not through barbarity but by compulsory recoupment by the wrongdoer of the
damage inflicted not by giving more pain to the offender but by lessening the loss of the
forlorn.
The Law Commission of India observed that, we have a fairly comprehensive provision for
payment of compensation to the injured party under the CrPC. Its application depends, in the
first instance, on whether the court considers a substantial fine as proper punishment for the
offence. In the most serious cases, the court may think that a heavy fine in addition to
imprisonment for a long term is not justifiable, especially when the public prosecutors
ignores the plight of the victims of the offence and does not press for compensation.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in pursuance of the recommendation of
the Law Commission in its Forty-first Report (1969), a provision was made for the victims of
crime that has been provided in Sec 357 of the CrPC. This provision States that the Court
may award compensation to victims of crime at the time of passing of the judgment, if it
considers it appropriate in a particular case, in the interest of justice. The jurisdictional Court
in pursuance of this provision may have passed an order to pay compensation but the Hon’ble
jurisdictional Court has erred to understand the true applicability of this provision and failed
to interpret the provision in its context. The provision gives the Courts the power to order
payment of compensation to the victims only at the time of sentencing.
In Munni Devi v. State of Haryana and Anr,16 it has been held that there is no escape from
the legal position that in a case where the Court imposes a sentence of fine, compensation can
be awarded only out of the fine amounts in terms of Sec 357(1) of the CrPC.
In State through CPI Devadurga PS, Raichur v. Laxmi,17 Sec 357 conferred the jurisdiction
on the Criminal Courts to pay compensation. The expression ‘whole or any part of the fine
recovered to be applied’ found in subsection (1) of Sec 357 restricted the power of the Court
to award compensation from the fine amount imposed. Further, it was observed in this case
that though subsection (3) of Sec 357 conferred powers under the Code to pay compensation
to the victim, the said provision can be invoked only in the event of a conviction.
15
Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107
16
Munni Devi v. State of Haryana and Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine P&H 14843
17
CPI Devadurga PS, Raichur v. Laxmi, Crl. A. No. 3628/2012
25
The Apex Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra 18 extensively

discussed the scope and the application under Sec 357 of the Code. Interpreting the word
‘may’ appearing under Sec 357 of the Code, it was held that the duty is cast upon the courts
to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation in every criminal case.
State of Karnataka by the police sub-inspector, Moodabidri v. Vishwanatha devadiga and

Anr,19 Sub-Section (1) of Sec 357 of Cr. P.C. enables the Court to impose fine and out of the
fine so imposed, a portion of the same could be awarded as compensation to be paid to the
victim.
On a plain reading of the entire provisions of Section 357 of Cr. P.C., it is evident that the
Court is empowered to award compensation only when the fine is imposed as sentence.
ISSUE 3
18
Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 (6) SCC 770
19
Moodabidri v. Vishwanatha devadiga and Anr., ILR 2019 Kar 4643
26
Whether the exclusion of the exception clause for Section 375 is violative of the provisions of
the Constitution of Sindhia?
Exception clause of Sec 375 states that “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his
own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.”
It is humbly submitted before his Hon’ble Court that the acts of the government through the
Criminal Law Amendment has stunned the people of the nation. Though it is a well
established fact that our country takes the institution of marriage to be the most holy and
spiritual act, that it would not be righteous on the part of the government to impose upon us
such highly westernised system of marriage. The concept of marriage for the people of
Sindhia is much more than just a contract between two individuals and the government has
utterly failed to comply with the present needs of the society.
The SC recently, on 31st March 2017 in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P20, quashed a
rape charge and aptly observed that the legal provisions cannot be allowed to become an
instrument of harassment at the hands of the mis-user of law. The accused in the case had lent
some money to the complainant, her son and her husband which they were not able to return.
The cheques they gave for the repayment bounced in September 2010 and the very next
month the complainant filed a rape case against the accused.
The concept of false allegations of rape charges filled by revengeful women is not new as it
runs parallel to the now more stringent rape laws under Sec 375 of the IPC, 1860. The root
cause of putting false allegation against an innocent man might run from seeking revenge,
providing alibi or obtaining sympathy and attention. Whatever might be the root cause of
false allegations but what grows from it is unredeemable for an innocent man.
According to the National Crime Records Bureau 2015 data, there were 1583 cases of
rape which were dismissed due to mistake of fact or mistake of law out of the total 13460
cases. Therefore, in total of 11.76 % reported cases of rape were misled cases.
The Delhi Commission of Women (DCW) revealed shocking statistics that between April
2013 and July 2014 only 1287 cases were true out of the 2753 and in total of 1464 cases were
20
Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.577 OF 2017
27
found to be ill-founded. The data showed 53.2% of the total reported cases were found to be
false.
It is further submitted that the Law Commission of India in its 172nd Report recommended
that an exception be added to Sec 375 of the IPC to the effect that sexual intercourse by a man
with his own wife, the wife not being under 16 years of age, is not sexual assault. This
recommendation of the LCI did not find favour with an NGO called Sakshi who suggested
deletion of the exception in Sakshi v. UOI21. According to the NGO, “where a husband
causes some physical injury to his wife, he is punishable under the appropriate offence and
the fact that he is the husband of the victim is not an extenuating circumstance recognized by
law.” The LCI did not agree with the NGO and the reason given is that if the exception that is
recommended is deleted, it “may amount to excessive interference with the marital
relationship.”
It is further humbly submitted before his Hon’ble Court that in Sakshi v. UOI, the main
points that were pointed out by the Union of India in explaining the true intent of the
exception clause to Sec 375 are as follows:
 Economic and educational development in the country is still uneven and child
marriages are still taking place. It has been, therefore, decided to retain the age of 15
years under Exception 2 of Section 375 of IPC so as to give protection to husband and
wife against criminalizing the sexual activity between them.
 As per National Family Health Survey-III, 46% of women between the ages 18-29
years in India were married before the age of 18. It is also estimated that there are 23
million child brides in the country. Hence, criminalizing the consummation of a
marriage union with a serious offence such as rape would not be appropriate and
practical.
 Providing punishment for child marriage with consent does not appear to be
appropriate in view of socio-economic conditions of the country. Thus, the age
prescribed in Exception 2 of Section 375 of IPC has been retained considering the
basic facts of the still evolving social norms and issues.
 The Law Commission also recommended raising the age from 15 years to 16 years
and it was incorporated in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2013.
21
Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) CR LJ 2881 (SC)
28
However, after wide ranging consultations with various stakeholders it was further
decided to retain the age at 15 years.
In the case of Independent Thought V UOI & Anr,22 it was observed that Exception 2 of
Sec 375IPC envisages that if the marriage is solemnized at the age of 15 years due to
traditions, it should not be a reason to book the husband in the case of offence of rape under
IPC. It is also necessary that the provisions of the law should be in such a manner that it
cannot affect a particular class of society. Retaining the age of 15 years in exception 2 of Sec
375IPC has been provided considering the social realities of the nation.
The age of consent for sexual intercourse is definitively 18 years and there is no dispute about
this. Therefore, under no circumstance can a child below 18 years of age give consent,
express or implied, for sexual intercourse.
In 2015 through a question submitted in Rajya Sabha, DMK MP Kanimozhi advocated for
removal of the second exception from the definition of rape provided under IPC. The very
same year a private member bill was tabled in Rajya Sabha by the Congress leader Avinash
Pandey. While introducing the bill he acknowledged the fact that marital rape is a very
sensitive issue but on the other hand he stated why it's a proper time to criminalize forced sex
in marriage. Unfortunately, the bill didn't get much support and he was even asked to
withdraw the bill.
Therefore, even after several attempts the removal of this exception was not supported
because of the present social conditions and to meet the needs of the society.
Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC must be read in a purposive manner to make it in
consonance with the POCSO Act, the spirit of other pro-child legislations and the human
rights of a married girl child. It is only through this reading that the intent of social justice to
the married girl child and the constitutional vision of the framers of our Constitution can be
preserved and protected and given impetus.
Thus, removal of the exception clause for Section 375 is violative as it goes against the social
realities of the nation. It makes men prey to false charges and goes against the social norms
that the society is built on. Law is for the people and ensuring justice for them is of
22
Independent Thought V UOI & Anr, W.P. (C) 382/2013
29
paramount importance. Law is subject to changing times of the society and must meet its
requirements effectively to have a sound legislative and judiciary system.
30
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, In the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed before the Hon’ble SC of Sindhia that it may graciously be pleased to
hold, adjudge and declare that:
 The amended Sections 354 and 375 of the Sindhian Penal Code, 1860, are violative of
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of Sindhia.
 The Jurisdictional Court is not justified to levy pro tem compensation based on the
facts and proceed with the trial in view of the Constitution of Sindhia.
 The exclusion of the exception clause for Section 375 is violative of the provisions of
the Constitution of Sindhia.
AND/OR
 Pass any other order or orders as may be deemed fit and proper in the light of facts
and circumstances of the case and in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Counsel for the petitioner shall as in duty bond forever pray
all of which is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Sindhia.
Counsel for the Petitioners
31

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XXVII ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4-5

STATEMENT OF FACT 7-8

AGRUMENTS ADVANCED 11-30

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL COURT IS JUSTIFIED

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF THE EXCEPTION

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL COURT IS JUSTIFIED TO LEVY PRO

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE EXCLUSION OF THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE FOR SECTION

1. An individual can constitute a class and it will be deemed as a reasonable

1.2 Women being subject to violence since ancient times.

1.3 Criminal Laws (Amendment) Draft, 2013

An evaluation of the Criminal Laws (Amendment) Draft 2013, the Criminal

1.5 Obligation under International Convention

“Violence against women is a manifestation of historically negligent poor relations between

Any form of violence or assault, sexual or otherwise, on women is a violation of the

1.7 Rule of Law

Rule of law under Art 14 encompasses:

1.8 Ineffective implementation of measures to ensure women’s safety

The Apex Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra 18 extensively

State of Karnataka by the police sub-inspector, Moodabidri v. Vishwanatha devadiga and

Counsel for the Petitioners

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