A_Compilation_of_Case_Digests_for_Law_on

I .
Legal periods
19. Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989
TITLE RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

CRISTITO MATA, and JUDGE L. D. CARPIO, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V,
respondents.
GR NUMBER 50654
DATE 1989-11-06
PONENTE PADILLA, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Legal Periods

RDS
FACTS The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against

the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao
del Sur, for the collection of damages and attorney's fees. After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the private respondent.
A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8

June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a
notice of appeal with the said municipal court, and on 24 June
1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection
of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the
payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the
case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Davao Del
Sur for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge
thereof ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
Petitioner’s contention that when he received a copy of the

decision of the municipal court on June 8, 1977, he perfected
his appeal on June 24, 1977 which is only fifteen (15) days
had elapsed so the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur in dismissing his appeal, for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to
law. The petitioner contended that the computation of the
period to appeal should commence on the hour he received
copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period
comprising 24 hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977
to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the last day, from
4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24
June 1977.
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether or not petitioner's computation of the time

when to submit the appeal is acceptable.
RULING(S) NO. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the
date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the 15 days after the
appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.
The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
"In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included" is similar, but not identical to Section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise
specially provided, the time within which an act is required by
law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and
including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it
shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of
Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable statute,
the day of the act, event or default after which the designated
period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day
of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run
until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a
legal holiday."
Lastly, the Court stressed that human memory is frail. Human

memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an
extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable
certainty of its correctness. What more for the exact hour
when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party? The
period laid down by the law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.
20. Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969

TITLE NAMARCO vs. Tecson
GR NUMBER 29 SCRA 70
DATE August 27, 1969
PONENTE Concepcion; CJ
NATURE/KEYWO Prescription, Computing a period

RDS
FACTS November 14, 1955: the Court of First Instance of Manila

rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20520 ent itl ed “Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety
and Insurance Co., Inc.” o Defendants will jointly and severally
pay plaintiff PRATRA the sum of P7,200.00 plus 7% interest
plus P500.00 for attorney’s fees , and plus costs.
Defendant Miguel Tecson must indemnify Alto Surety and

Insurance Co., Inc.
November 21, 1955: A copy of the decision was served upon

the defendants.
December 21, 1965: National Marketing Corporation, the

successor of Price Stabilization Corporation, filed a complaint,
Civil Case No. 63701, against the same defendants for the
revival of the judgment rendered in Case No. 20520.
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint

based on the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
prescription of action.
February 14, 1966: Court issued an order reading which stated

that:
Lack of jurisdiction: the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted.

Prescription: Plaintiff admits that court decision became final on
December 21, 1955.
The case was filed December 21, 1965. The Plaintiff forgot the
1960 and 1964 were leap years and so, more than 10 years
have passed. A year having 365 days each (Art 13, Civil Code of
the Philippines).
The complaint made by Namarco was dismissed as having been

prescribed.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the complaint of Namarco should be dismissed

due to lack of jurisdiction and prescription.
RULING(S) Judgment affirmed. There is prescription as years are to be

understood as 365 days; hence, 1960 and 1964 being leap
years, so that ten years of 365 days each or an aggregate of
3,650 days from December 21, 1955 expired on December 19,
1965.
J. Binding effect
21. Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933
TITLE BARRETO GONZALES v. GONZALES
GR NUMBER 37048
DATE March 7, 1933
PONENTE Hull, J
NATURE/KEYWO Absolute Divorce

RDS
FACTS Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine and at

present residents of the City of Manila. They were married
in the City of Manila in 1919, and lived together as man and
wife in the Philippine Islands until the Spring of 1926. They
voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived
together as man and wife.
Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8,
and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both
being represented by attorneys, continued for several months,
whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
support and that of her children, P500 monthly; this amount to
be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands,

betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion,
which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter
the defendant moved to California and returned to these
Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained.
On the same date that he secured the divorce in Nevada he

went through the forms of marriage with another citizen of
these Islands and now has three children as a result of
that marriage. Defendant, after his departure from these
Islands, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly
for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not
made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the CFI of
Manila requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands
confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of
the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which
reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property
as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the
bonds of matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved

with regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children has
not delivered to each of them or to the guardian appointed by
the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of what
would have been due to them as their legal portion if said
spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of
the community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the

guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have been due
to their children as their legal portion from the respective
estates had their parents died intestate on November 28, 1927.
It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff

and defendant be declared dissolved and the defendant be
ordered to render an accounting and to deliver to the plaintiff
her share of the community property, that the defendant be
ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of P500 per
month, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as
counsel fees, the sum of P5,000, and that the defendant be
ordered to pay plaintiff the expenses incurred in educating the
three minor sons. The CFI of Manila found against the
defendant.
ISSUE(S) WON the divorce obtained by the husband in Reno, Nevada is

binding upon them.
RULING(S) While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial
matters they are in unity in trying to secure the courts of this
jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the Reno divorce. On
the record here presented this can not be done. The public
policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set
forth in Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court:
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their
separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which
they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed,
clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the
Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for
themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions
not authorized by our law.
At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been

within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband for the purpose of securing a
divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the court of that State to dissolve the bonds of
matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to

recognize the validity of foreign divorce has usually been
expressed in the negative and have been based upon lack of
matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these
Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition, and legal capacity of persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country.
Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to

approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of
the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign
courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary
to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional
question presented by appellant in his assignment of error.
The judgment of the CFI of Manila must therefore be reversed

and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in
this action.
22. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965
TITLE TENCHAVES V. ESCANO
GR NUMBER G.R. No. L-19671
DATE November 29, 1965
PONENTE REYES
NATURE/KEYWO ART.15 OF NCC (Nationality Rule) - Laws relating to family rights

RDS and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.
FACTS On February 24, 1948, without the knowledge of her parents,

Vicenta Escaño, a 27 year old exchange marriage vows with
Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an ex-army officer and
engineer, before a Catholic army chaplain (Lt. Moises Lavares) in
Cebu City. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
registrar.
Upon discovery of the marriage, parents of Vicenta sought priestly

advice and recommended to them a re-celebration of the
marriage due to lack of authority of the officiating chaplain.
Vicenta did not agree to the re-celebration after subsequently
learning of Pastor’s supposed amorous relationship with their
common friend Pacita Noel. The couple became estranged and
lived separately after that. Thereafter, she initiated a suit for
annulment against pastor in the Misamis Court but this was
eventually dismissed for failure to prosecute.
After some time Vicenta left for the United States. In 1950, she
applied for and was granted a decree of divorce by the court of
Nevada against Pastor Tenchavez on grounds of "extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character".
On September 1954, Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an

American, and eventually had children by him. On August 1958,
she was granted US citizenship.
On July 30 1955, Pastor filed a complaint in the Court of First

Instance of Cebu, and amended on May 31, 1956 for legal
separation against Vicenta and damages against her parents on
the ground of alienation of affection.
The defendant claimed a valid divorce from the plaintiff and an

equally valid marriage to her present husband, Ruselle Leo Mora;
while her parents denied they had influenced their daughter’s
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The lower court did no decree the legal separation, but freed the
plaintiff in supporting his wife and to acquire property to the
exclusion of his wife.
Hence, a direct appeal from the judgment of the Court of First

Instance of Cebu was petitioned by the plaintiff.
ISSUE(S) W/N the decree of absolute divorce obtained from the court of
Nevada should apply to the marriage of Tenchavez and Escaño?
RULING(S) No. The valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
Law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the
wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character". At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject to
Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act. No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly
provided:
"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,

condition and legal capacity of person are binding upon the
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
[WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as

follows; Neither party to recover costs. in the light of the
foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED]
Nationality Rule:
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and

decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the
divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce,
entitled to validity in the country. The spouses were then subject
to Philippine law pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code.
Philippine laws do not recognize divorce.
23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985
TITLE ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL

ROMILLO, JR. AND RICHARD UPTON, respondents.
DATE October 8, 1985
PONENTE Melencio-Herrera
NATURE/KEYWOR BINDING EFFECT

DS
FACTS 1. Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van is citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United
States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong.
2. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United States; and
the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn.
3. On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against
petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila, and be declared
with right to manage the conjugal property.
4. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceeding before Nevada Court where respondent
acknowledged that they had no community property.
5. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines, that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
6. Respondent assert that Divorce Decree abroad cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE(S) (1) Whether or not the divorce obtained the spouse valid to
each of them.
(2) Whether or not Richard Upton may assert his right on
conjugal properties.
RULING(S) 1. As to Richard Upton the divorce is binding on him as an
American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. Alicia Reyes under our National law is still
considered married to private respondent. However, petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
2. The private respondent, as he is bound by the decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, has no legal
standing in the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner, as
the divorce legally dissolved their marriage, to sue Alice Van
Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. She should not
be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.
To maintain the petitioner to still be legally obligated to the

divorced husband is a discrimination against her in her own
country. Hence, it is only just that the petition be granted. The
civil case against petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.
24. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989
TITLE PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
GR NUMBER GR NO. 80116
DATE JUNE 30, 1989
PONENTE REGALADO
NATURE/KEYWO BINDING EFFECT

RDS
FACTS ● On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay

Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, marries the private respondent,
Erich Ekkehard Geiling who is a German national at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. Three
years after their marriage, the private respondent initiated
a divorce proceeding which was promulgated on January
15, 1986 against the petitioner due to failure of their
marriage.
● Five months after its issuance, the private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery against the petitioner alleging
that while they were married, petitioner had an affair with
two men (William Chia and Jesus Chua).
● Pilapil moved unsuccessfully to have the criminal case
dismissed. The main petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense
that cannot be prosecuted de officio since the complainant,
a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing of adultery complaint.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not adultery can still be charge to the petitioner given
the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.
RULING(S) NO. The law specifically provides that in prosecution for adultery
and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse. In this case, the fact that the
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in relation to his nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus,
under the same consideration and rationale, the private
respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner, therefore,
has no legal standing commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
the suit.
K. Human Relations
25. People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 March 5, 1991
TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

HEINRICH S. RITTER, accused-appellant.
GR NUMBER G.R. No. 88582

DATE March 5, 1991
PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Criminal Law; Statutory Rape; Evidence;

RDS
FACTS On October 10, 1986 about midnight, accused Ritter brought

Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in
Olongapo City. Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to
take a bath. When Rosario came out of the bathroom, she was
told to remove her clothes by the accused and to join him in bed.
Accused started fingering Rosario. At that time, Jessie was
already sleepy but Rosario touched him to call his attention.
Jessie saw the accused placing his penis against the vagina of
Rosario and that he was trying to penetrate but it would not fit.
After seeing what happened, he didn’t bother to look and he fell
asleep.
The following morning the accused left after paying the children.
Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted something in
her vagina. Sometime the following day, Jessie asked Rosario
whether the object was already removed from her body and
Rosario said "Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the evening
of that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining of
pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said that the
foreign object was not yet removed.
Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital with

bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul smelling. There was an
operation to remove a portion of a sexual vibrator in her vagina.
The following day, Rosario got serious and was pronounced dead.
A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter.
The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo declared him guilty beyond

reasonable doubt citing the rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused”.
Ritter appealed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of

Olongapo City.
The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of the lower

court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE(S) 1. WON THE TESTIMONIES THAT ROSARIO BALUYOT IS 12

YEARS OLD WHEN THE ACT WAS COMMITTED ARE VALID.
2. WON RITTER IS GUILTY OF RAPE.
3. WON RITTER IS GUILTY OF HOMICIDE.
4. WON the acquittal of Ritter from the criminal charge due to
lack of evidence release him from incurring civil liability.
RULING(S) WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED on
grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to pay the
amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages
to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation is hereby directed to institute proper deportation
proceedings against the appellant and to immediately expel him
thereafter with prejudice to reentry into the country.
1. NO. BECAUSE ALL THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED ARE NOT

ADEQUATE TO ESTABLISH THE EXACT DATE OF BIRTH OF
ROSARIO.
Since Rosario was not established to have been under 12 years of

age at the time of the alleged sexual violation, it was necessary to
prove that the usual elements of rape were present; i.e. that
there was force of intimidation or that she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious in accordance with Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. We agree with the defense that there was no
proof of such facts. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Rosario submitted herself to the sexual advances of the appellant.
In fact, she appears to have consented to the act as she was paid
P300.00 the next morning while her companion, Jessie Ramirez
was paid P200.00 (T.S.N. p. 50, January 6, 1988). The
environmental circumstances coupled with the testimonies and
evidence presented in court clearly give the impression that
Rosario Baluyot, a poor street child, was a prostitute inspite of her
tender age. Circumstances in life may have forced
her to submit to sex at such a young age but the circumstances
do not come under the purview of force or intimidation needed to
convict for rape.
2. NO. There are no clear facts to prove that Ritter committed

rape.
3. NO. There was no clear evidence that the Vibrator which

caused the health problem resulting to death of Rosario was
owned by Ritter.
4. No. Ritter’s corruption of herein minors is contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy (Article 21 NCC) and thus he is
liable to compensate the parents of Rosario for damages. Article
29 of the Civil Code provides that even when the accused is
acquitted, a preponderance of evidence for the same act or
omission is sufficient to demand civil liability from the offended
party.
26. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
TITLE CASE: JOYCE V. ARDIENTE v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA.

THERESA PASTORFIDE
GR NUMBER G.R. NO. 161921
DATE July 17, 2013
PONENTE Peralta, J.
NATURE/KEYWO NATURE OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari under

RDS Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Humamrcan Relations
FACTS FACTS: Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto S.

Ardiente own a housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan
de Oro City and on June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in
favor of Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the
housing unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00.
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water connection in
the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed
until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water connection of
Ma. Theresa was cut off.
Petitioner requested for the water disconnection. Petitioner claims
that her request for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in respondent
spouses' name.
ISSUE(S) ISSUE: Whether petitioners abuse their rights as enshrined in

Article 19 of the Civil Code resulting to awarding of damages?
RULING(S) HELD: Yes. Petitioners abuse their rights and they are liable to
pay damages.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require
the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce
such right is not to cause the disconnection of the respondent
spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and
must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach. In the present case, intention to harm
was evident on the part of petitioner when she requested for the
disconnection of respondent spouses’ water supply without
warning or informing the latter of such request.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Generally,
an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would
be proper.
L. Prejudicial Question
27. Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441, April 15, 1988 21.
TITLE Donato v. Luna
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
28.Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731
TITLE Rolando Landicho, petitioner, vs. Hon. Lorenzo Relova, in his

capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
Branch I, and the People of the Philippines, respondents
GR NUMBER L-22579
DATE 1968-02-23
PONENTE Fernando
NATURE/KEYWO Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Certiorari, Art. 36 of NCC,

RDS Prejudicial Question
FACTS - On Feb. 1963, petitioner Landicho was charged before the CFI
of Batangas, presided by the respondent judge, with the offense
of bigamy by Elvira Makatangkay, his wife. Said petitioner
contracted second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
- On March 1963, Fe Lourdes Pasia filed an action seeking to
declare her marriage with petitioner null and void ab initio on
grounds of his bigamous character and use of force, threats, and
intimidation.
- On June 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case filed a third-
party complaint against third-party defendant Makatangkay, the
first spouse, seeking to declare their marriage null and void on
the grounds of force, threats, and intimidation, and that she
compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before
the Justice of the Peace in Makati.
- Thereafter, on Oct 1963 petitioner moved to suspend the
hearing of the criminal case while the civil suits on the nullity of
two marriages involved are pending, raising prejudicial question
as a defense.
- Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Landicho
filed a motion for reconsideration, but was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition with a preliminary injunction to restrain the judge
from further proceeding with the bigamy case. A petition for
certiorari was also filed to include the People of the Philippines as
another respondent.
ISSUE(S) W/N the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of marriage
of the second wife against petitioner, and the petitioner filing a
civil suit for the annulment of marriage with the first spouse,
constitutes a prejudicial question in a pending criminal suit of
bigamy against him.
RULING(S) NO. The court ruled that even assuming that even the first
marriage was declared null and void, it is not material to the
outcome of the criminal case. There is no prejudicial question
since situations in cases are different. At the time the petitioner
was indicted bigamy on Feb 1963, he had already contracted
two marriages. Then on March 1963, it was the second spouse,
not the petitioner who filed an action for nullity. It was also
sometime later on June 1963 that petitioner sought for the
nullity of his first marriage. Respondent judge answered that
only competent courts have authority to declare marriages null,
and not the parties to a marriage. A person who contracts a
second marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy. Hence, the respondent judge did not abuse his
discretion in failing to suspend the motion sought by the
petitioner. The petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of
preliminary injunction is dissolved.
ADDITIONAL NOTES:
Prejudicial question – one raised in a criminal case by the accused
which if decided favorably in a civil case, will cause the supposed
crime to disappear. The prejudicial question must be
determinative if the case before the court, and, that jurisdiction to
try said questions must be lodged in another tribunal. For this
reason, the criminal case must be suspended until the
determination of such question in a civil proceeding.
III. CIVIL PERSONALITY
29. Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973
TITLE ROE vs. WADE, 410 US 113
GR NUMBER
DATE January 22, 1973
PONENTE Justice Blackmun
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas,
which granted the declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff
who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Criminal
abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against
enforcement of such statutes.
In 1970, Normal L McCorvey (pseudonym - Jane Roe) was

pregnant (allegedly a result of rape) and unmarried, yet she
was unable to receive a legal abortion in Texas by a licensed
physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and she was unable to travel
somewhere else to have a legal abortion.
She filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry

Wade questioning Texas State Laws, which proscribe procuring
or attempting an abortion except on medical advice for the
purpose of saving the mother’s life.
She argues that said laws are unconstitutionally vague and that
they abridge her right of personal privacy as guaranteed and
protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue “ on

behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated;”
thereby becoming a class suit.
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, alleged that

statues were vague and uncertain, for he had been previously
arrested for violations of the Texas abortion statute. He
described conditions of patients who came to him seeking
abortions, and he claimed that for many cases he, as a
physician, was unable to determine whether they fell within or
outside the exception recognized by Article 1196
John and Mary Doe was a childless couple. Mary was suffering
from "neural-chemical" and physician advised her to avoid
pregnancy until her condition improved She discontinued using
birth control pills because of her condition but if she should
become pregnant, she would want to terminate the pregnancy
by an abortion performed by a competent, licensed physician
under safe, clinical conditions.
The actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly

convened three-judge district court. Roe and Dr. Hallford had
standing, the Does do not. The District Court held that the
"fundamental right of single women and married persons to
choose whether to have children is protected by the Ninth
Amendment, through the Fourteenth Amendment," and that the
Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face because
they were both unconstitutionally vague and constituted an
overbroad infringement of the plaintiffs' Ninth Amendment
rights.
Court dismissed the Does' complaint, declared the abortion

statutes void, and dismissed the application for injunctive relief.
Note:
The court declined to address the question of when life begins.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected by the

constitution includes the right to abort her child.
RULING(S) Yes. The “right of privacy x x x is broad enough to

encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal
privacy includes abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.”
“A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that

exempts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf
of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and without
recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests),
is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but

the right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation.
Dissent.
Justice Rehnquist: The right to an abortion is not universally
accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently
involved in this case.
Discussion.
The Court finds that an abortion statute that forbids all
abortions except in the case of a lifesaving procedure on behalf
of the mother is unconstitutional based upon the right to
privacy. However, it does allow for regulation and proscription
of abortion when the statute is narrowly tailored to uphold a
compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or
the viable fetus. The court declined to address the question
of when life begins.
Other Issue: Whether a plaintiff still has standing to bring a

case based on her pregnancy once she has given birth.
Holding: Yes. The mootness doctrine does not bar her case
from being heard, even though this individual plaintiff's position
would no longer be affected, and she did not have an actual
case or controversy. This situation fits within the exception to
the mootness rule that covers wrongs that are capable of
repetition yet evading review. Most cases are not heard through
to appeal in a period shorter than a pregnancy, so strictly
applying the mootness doctrine would prevent these issues
from ever being resolved.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/410/113/#F22
30. Geluz v. CA, . 2 SCRA 801 July 20, 1961 _ANTONA
TITLE ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
DIVISION EN BANC
DATE July 20, 1961
PONENTE REYES, J.B.L., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
RDS husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion,
could recover damages from physician who caused the same.
FACTS Nita Villanueva came to know the petitioner Dr.
Antonio Geluz through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950, Nita
became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parents, and on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted
by the Dr. Geluz. After her marriage with the respondent Oscar
Lazo, she was then employed in COMELEC and her second
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted
again by the defendant in 1953. Less than two year later, she
again became pregnant.
On February 21, 1955, Nita, again aborted a 2-
month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of 50 pesos. Lazo
was at this time in Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the
provincial board; he did not know, nor did he give consent to
the abortion. It is at the third instance of abortion that
constitutes Lazo's filing this action and award for damages.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff Lazo, and predicated the award for damages upon Art
2206. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S) W/N an action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
covers an unborn fetus not endowed with personality and whether
such right accrued to its parents?
RULING(S) No. An action for pecuniary damages for the death of a person
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed
with personality being incapable of having rights and
obligations. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to
anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child under Art. 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive. In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from the maternal womb.
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was
dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing
American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally
held that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn
child. In the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral
damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife. The lower courts have found that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the
probabilities are, that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet
despite the repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken
no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even
after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been
directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment
for an "indemnity” claim.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint

ordered dismissed. Without costs.
31. Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970
TITLE CARMEN QUIMIGUING vs. FELIX ICAO
GR NUMBER G.R No. L-26795
DATE July 31, 1970
PONENTE REYES, J
NATURE/KEYWO Provisional Personality of conceived child; Donations;

RDS
FACTS Petitioner and Defendant had a confidential relation with each

other. The latter, through force and intimidation, had several
intercourse with the former and eventually became pregnant. She
prayed to the court to compel Felix Icao for support at 120pesos
per month, damages, and attorney’s fees.
In the trial court, defendant objected claiming that the complaint

did not allege that the child had been born. Subsequently,
petitioner gave birth to a baby girl and a moved to amend the
complaint but was dismissed by reason of the original complaint
had no cause of action. Hence this case.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the conceived child has personality and thus has
the right to support from the defendant
RULING(S) YES. The child is given provisional personality. Article 40 of the

Civil Code provides that a conceived child, although unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it. In effect, the child may receive donations under
Article 742 of the Civil Code. At the time of the first complaint,
petitioner has cause of action for damages hence the lower court
erred in its ruling.
Petitioner is also entitled for compensation under Article 21 and
Article 2219 of the same code.
32. De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 November 28, 1933
TITLE ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR

SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
GR NUMBER L-39110
PONENTE STREET
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS ● · Caesar Syquia, was an umarried man and a scion

of a prominent family in Manila, frequented a barbershop
where Antonia Loanco worked as a cashier. He soon
developed emotions for Antonia, which led to a relationship
between them where Antonia became impregnated with
defendant’s child.
● During the time of pregnancy, defendant frequented the
petitioner’s house and even wrote a letter to a padre
stating:
"The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my
name to be given to it.”
● Caesar then left for Japan, asking Antonia to take care of
‘junior’. After the baby was born, Caesar and Antonia lived
together for a year, which Syquia paid for all expenses.
When Antonia exhibited signs of a second pregnancy,
Caesar left and got married to another woman soon after.
● Antonia filed an action in court against Cesar Syquia
demanding (a) damages for breach of promise to marry;
(b) recognition of their two children, Ismael and Pacita;
and (c) maintenance of five hundred pesos per month. The
trial court decided in favor of Antonia, ordering Caesar to
pay support and recognize the child as his own.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the unborn child has rights under this case;
RULING(S) A child, being conceived bears legal rights and is considered as

a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. Under Article 40 of
the Civil Code, the child shall be born for all purposes
favorable to it, provided it be born according to the following
article.
In the case at hand, the child is presumed to be born, since
recognition is for a purpose favorable to the child, along with
the support which comes with it. It is then considered to be a
living person, with legal rights.
33. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
TITLE Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante
GR NUMBER 80 Phil. 776
DATE April 27, 1948
PONENTE Ponente: HILADO, J.

NATURE/KEYWOR Termination of Personality, NCC 42
DS
FACTS Pedro Fragrante applied for a certificate of public convenience to

install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. However, while
his application was pending, he died. He was considered a Filipino
Citizen at the time of death.
If he had not died, there can be no question that he would have

had the right to prosecute his application before the commission
to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right.
He would certainly have been financially able to maintain and
operate said plant if had he not died.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public

convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with
a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the
Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said
plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable
of maintaining the proposed service.
Petitioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal

representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party
applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a
contravention of the law.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the estate of Fragante be extended as an

artificial judicial personality.
RULING(S) Yes.
o The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial

judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, he would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has not changed except for his death, and the
economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately
operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the
same that it received from the decedent himself.
o It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the

mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this
legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or
juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice
resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights
and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Hence,
the Court held that within the framework of the Constitution,
the estate of Fragante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which include the exercise during
the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his
death.
34. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472 April 30, 1976
TITLE Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
DATE April 30, 1976
PONENTE AQUINO, J:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS · On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a

case Against Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio,
Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang.
· On June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed

the summons and copies of the complaint in his behalf and his
co-defendants.
· On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to

pay Quality Plastic Products Inc the amount of P3,667.03 plus
the legal rate of interest from November, 1958 to avoid
foreclosure of their surety bonds.
· Dead at that time (Died on April 23, 1959), Oria failed to

pay the said amount. The lower court ordered the foreclosure of
his surety bond and the sale at public auction of the land given
as a security for the bond.
· On September 24, 1962, Oria’s land was sold through

auction by the sheriff.
· On the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of

the deceased Oria, his testamentary heirs sued Quality Plastic
Products and prayed for the annulment of the judgment against
him and the sale of his land. Quality Plastics did not know about
Oria’s death.
· The Lower Court held that Soliven acted in bad faith

because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead. He
had acquired jurisdiction over the person" of Oria and that the
judgment was valid as to him.
· Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not there is jurisdiction over the person of the

deceased Oria and the judgment against him and the sale of his
land be enforced even after his death?
RULING(S) The lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land is also void.
No. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality and his
juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was
lost through death. In the first place, he was not, and he could
not have been, validly served with summons. (Arts. 37 and 42,
Civil Code).
However, Dumlaos (heirs) are not entitled to claim the

attorney’s fee from the corporation due to the fact that Quality
Plastic Products Inc. acted in good faith and was unaware of
Oria's death.
35. Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990
TITLE Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez
GR NUMBER 85140
DATE 1990-05-17
PONENTE PADILLA, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS · Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana

Vargas her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents – the Vargases, filed on 27 September 1988, a
petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis
Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her
desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it
was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
· The respondent court in an order dated 28 September
1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was
returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body
of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according
to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the
burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of
which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.
· Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart
failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28
August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner
claimed legal custody of her body.
· Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus
proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition
therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature
of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for
habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a
dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
· The respondents claimed that there was no existing
marital legal relationship between Eugenio and Vitaliana and
therefore they have the custody over the body of the latter.
· The RTC said that since there was no surviving spouse or
children of Vitaliana and that petitioner was merely a common
law spouse , her brothers and sisters have the custody. Also, it
was held that Eugenio was legally married to another woman.
ISSUE(S) WON - the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana be given to

her full blood brothers and sisters or her common law spouse.
RULING(S) The Philippines do not recognize common law marriages. Under

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption
from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. That the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly
providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. The
Petitioner was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her, since he
was legally married to another woman, which bars him from
being legally capacitated to contract marriages. Hence,
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to
her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103
of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
"(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a

child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the
nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means to defray the
necessary expenses."
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
36. Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 May 29, 1953
TITLE Joaquin v. Navarro
GR NUMBER G.R. Nos. L-5426-28
DATE 1953-05-29
PONENTE TUASON, J.:
NATURE/KEYWOR Commencement and termination of personality; Natural Persons

DS
FACTS The case at hand is a petition for review on the decision of the
Court of Appeals which modified that of the Court of First
Instance regarding the summary settlement of the estates of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro,
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased, particularly
the sequence of their deaths. The Court of Appeals, compelled
to fall back to statutory presumption, declared Joaquin Navarro,
Jr. to have survived his mother, applying Rule 123, section
69(ii) of the Revised Rules of Court.
The decision of the CA radically affected the right of
succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was
an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted
child of the deceased spouses, and of Antonio C. Navarro,
respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
ISSUE(S) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in applying Rule 123 of
the Rules of Court instead of Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889
on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence?
RULING(S) No. The Supreme Court held that neither of the two provisions
was applicable because where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls and for the reasons to be presently set forth.
Both provisions, Rule 123, section 69(ii) of the Revised
Rules of Court and Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now
article 43 of the New Civil Code, as their language plainly
implies, are intended as a substitute for facts, and so are not to
be available when there are facts. The SC held that the
preceding testimony by a survivor contained facts quite
adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory
presumption out of the case.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility was
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way around.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., according to the testimony, was killed
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the burning
German Club where Mrs. Angela Navarro was left behind, alive
and unhurt. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have
negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died
within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building.
The testimony also provided that the collapse of the clubhouse
occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro Jr. was shot in
the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that
killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this
inference ought to prevail.
The particular circumstances from which the parties and
the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or
incorrectness of those conclusions raised a question of law, not
of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into.
The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the
statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
Thus, the Supreme Court was constrained to reverse the
decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the
decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of
passing upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put
forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's
death preceded that of her son. Without costs.
37. Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919
TITLE Smith Bell v. Natividad
GR NUMBER 15574
DATE September 17, 1919
PONENTE J. Malcolm
NATURE/KEYWO Juridical Persons, Corporation having majority of alien

RDS stockholders
FACTS ● Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
● A majority of its stockholders are British subjects.
● It is the owner of a motor vessel known as the Bato built
for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen
tons gross.
● The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between
ports in the Islands. Application was made at Cebu, the
home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a
certificate of Philippine registry.
● The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
were not citizens either of the United States or of the
Philippine Islands.
● Counsel argues that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd.,
the equal protection of the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the
corporation from owning vessels, and because classification of
corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their
stockholders is capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its property without due process of law because by
the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of
every beneficial attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the
naked title to a boat it could not use
ISSUE(S) Whether or not whether the Government of the Philippine

Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the registry of
vessel in its coastwise trade to corporations having alien
stockholders.
RULING(S) Yes. Act No. 2761 provides:
Investigation into character of vessel. — No application for

a certificate of Philippine register shall be approved until the
collector of customs is satisfied from an inspection of the vessel
that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade
and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined
in section eleven hundred and seventy-two of this Code.
Certificate of Philippine register.
Upon registration of a vessel of domestic ownership, and of

more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register
shall be issued for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of
fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of Philippine
register shall be optional with the owner. While Smith, Bell & Co.
Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the
protection afforded by the due-process of law and equal
protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights,
nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd., the right
to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which must
always be condemned, but does fall within authorized exceptions,
notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.
38. Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 November 24, 1906
TITLE Barlin v. Ramirez,
GR NUMBER Promulgation: No. 2832
PONENTE J. Willard
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS Petitioner Rev Jorge Barlin as apostolic administrator of

Bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva
Caceres filed an appeal against Priest Vicente Ramirez from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines.
Defendant, Priest (Father) Vicente Ramirez was appointed

parish priest and took possession of the church on the 5 th of
July 1901 wherein he administered until 14 th day of November
1902. When his successor, Father Agripino Pisino was
appointed, Father Pisino demanded for the delivery of the
church, convent, and cemetery and the sacred ornaments,
books, jewels, money and other property which the Defendant
declined. Ramirez replied by a written document of that date,
refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of
Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish priest of thereof, has
seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his
representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church,
the head of which is at Manila.
In 1/4, the plaintiff brought this action against defendant
alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic
Church was the owner of the church building, the convent,
cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging
thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof
and that the defendant render an account of the property which
he had received and which was retained by him, and for other
relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not that the subject property wherein the said
church situated were own by the government or by the Catholic
Church having the capacity as Juridical Personality
RULING(S) The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the Catholic
Church because of its Juridical Personality here in the
Philippines. The Church belongs to God and therefore the use of
the church should be to glorify God which is the Catholic Church
used to do. The public properties are the Roads and other
properties wherein the public should have. The ownership of the
Churches in the Philippines is not covered by the treaty of Paris
which were contracted between US and Spain.
It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church
has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This
suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates
by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe,
and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in
Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of
Mecca," does not require serious consideration
NOTES: Catholic Church has the capacity to own properties.
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
A. General rule : presumption of capacity
39. Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911
TITLE Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas
GR NUMBER 19 Phil. 363 (G.R. No. 5921)
DATE July 25, 1911

PONENTE Arellano, C.J.
NATURE/KEYWO Article 38: Restriction on Capacity to Act: Minority, insanity or

RDS imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as
when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations,
such as easements. (32a)
Monomania; Insanity; Restrictions on Capacity to Act
FACTS Petitioners: The Standard Oil Company of New York (STANDARD

OIL)
Defendants: Juan Codina Arenas, et. al. (ARENAS)
Appellant: Vicente Sixto Villanueva (VILLANUEVA)
Facts of the Case:

1. December 1908, Villanueva and Siy Ho, as sureties,
assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the
corporation, The Standard Oil Company of New York, the
sum of P3,305. 76, with interest.
2. Said sureties-debtors failed to pay their obligations thus
Standard Oil sued them.
3. August 1909- CFI of the City of Manila sentenced all the
defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff
company the sum of P3,305.76, together with the interest
4. Thereafter, Villanueva’s wife petitioned that his husband

be relieved from the judgment/sentence and to reopen the
trial for the introduction of evidence because according to
her, on July 1909 his husband Villanueva was declared to
be insane by the CFI of Manila.
a. Whereas due to the said insanity, she was
appointed as Villanueva’s guardian.
b. As his guardian, however, she was not aware of the
proceedings (i.e. her husband giving the bond).
c. More so, when her husband gave the bond, he was
already in the state of permanent insanity,
including when summoned and in the course of
litigation to which he neither appeared nor
defended himself.
5. Court granted petition, however, did not relieve Vicente
Villanueva from judgment because when he executed in
December 1908 the bond in question, he understood
perfectly well the nature and consequences of the act
performed by him and that the consent that was given by
him for the purpose was entirely voluntary and, thus valid.
6. Wife appealed to the Supreme Court saying that the lower
court erred in ruling that the monomania of great wealth,
suffered by the defendant Villanueva, does not imply
incapacity to execute a bond such as the one herein
concerned.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Villanueva’s (Appellant)’s state of monomania

imply incapacity on his part to execute the bond in the case at
bar?
RULING(S) No. SC agrees with Trial Court in saying that that a person's
believing himself to be what he is not is not a positive proof of
insanity or incapacity to bind himself in a contract. Capacity to
act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not
previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is
presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved. And this has not been proved in this case. It is very
evident that on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he possessed the
necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect
to the bond which he freely executed.
· Medico-legal doctrine:
o Supported the conclusion that such monomania
of wealth does not necessarily imply the result
that the defendant Villanueva was not a person
capable of executing a contract of bond.
· No proof to the claim alleged by the wife.
o It was not shown whether monomania was
habitual and constituted a truthful mental
perturbation in the patient; that the bond
executed by the defendant Villanueva was the
result of such monomania, and not the effect of
any other cause; and that the monomania
existed on the date when the bond was
executed.
· Bond was executed December 1908, and his incapacity
was not declared until July 24, 1909 (a year after executing
the bond).
● Testimonies given by physicians and CFI Judge
○ Testified to the sanity of Villanueva particularly
during the time of the execution of the bond.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with

the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
B. Restrictions on capacity to act - NCC 38-39
40. Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215 December 1, 1917

41. Young v. Tecson, 39 O.G. 953
42. Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil. 417 January 30, 1928 (Llovit)
TITLE ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO VS. GERMAN MARAMBA AND

GENOVEVA MUERONG
GR NUMBER 51 PHIL. 417
DATE JANUARY 30, 1928
PONENTE ROMUALDEZ, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Appeal from Judgment/Restrictions On Capacity To Act;

RDS Minority/En Banc
FACTS Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura was the sole heir of the deceased
Isidro Bambalan y Calcotura and thus was the owner of the land
which was allegedly purchased by Genoveva Muerong.
The petitioner contended that he signed the transfer document

(Exhibit 1) dated July 17, 1922, as a minor and by intimidation
made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Muerong
who threatened Prado with imprisonment.
The petitioner's mother and her second husband Vicente Lagera

received P200 in 1915 by loan from Muerong as shown in Exhibit
3, but according to Prado's testimony was only P150
Muerong having learned that the land had a Torrens title issued in
favor of the plaintiff's father caused the plaintiff to sign a
conveyance of the land.
ISSUE(S) W/N the sale of the land was valid considering that the seller was
a minor and the sale was unregistered
RULING(S) No. The land was not sold to the defendant by the plaintiff
because the latter was a minor and the sale was unregistered
Minority
The contract of purchase and sale of real property executed by a
minor is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards said minor.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs.
Espiritu (37 Phil., 215), wherein the minor was held to be
estopped from contesting the contract executed by him
pretending to be of age, is not applicable herein. In the case now
before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his minority
was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one
who purchased the plaintiff's first cedula to be used in the
acknowledgment of the document.
Registration
A contract of purchase and sale of real property registered in
accordance with the Torrens system, does not bind the property if
it is not registered and is only valid between the parties and as
authority for the register of deeds to make the proper
registration. Therefore, the purchaser, by virtue of the deed of
sale alone, does not acquire any right to the property sold and
much less if the vendor is a minor.
Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1

alone, did not acquire any right to the property sold and much
less, if it is taken into consideration that, according to the
evidence in the record, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y Prado, the
herein plaintiff, was a minor.
Purchase
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to
have given the plaintiff and her son in 1922 as the price of the
land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was
given to the alleged vendors in said year.
The sum of P663.40 is arrived at, approximately, by taking the

P150 received by Paula Prado and her husband in 1915 and
adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent per annum.
43. Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
TITLE SIA SUAN AND GAW CHIAO VS. RAMON ALCANTARA

DATE MARCH 4, 1950
PONENTE PARAS, J
NATURE/KEYWO Minority
RDS
FACTS · On August 3, 1931, a deed of sale was executed by

Rufino Alcantara and his sons Damaso Alcantara and Ramon
Alcantara conveying to Sia Suan five parcels of land in Laguna.
Ramon Alcantara was then 17 years, 10 months and 22 days
old.
· On August 27, 1931, Gaw Chiao (husband of Sia Suan)

received a letter from Atty. Alfonso, attorney of Ramon
Alcantara, informing Gaw Chiao that Ramon Alcantara was a
minor and accordingly disavowing the contract. After being
contacted by Gaw Chiao, however, Ramon Alcantara executed
an affidavit ratifying the deed of sale. On said occasion Ramon
Alcantara received from Gaw Chiao the sum of P500.
· In the meantime, Sia Suan sold one of the lots to Nicolas

Azores from whom Antonio Azores inherited the same.
· On August 8, 1940, Ramon Alcantara filed an action in

the RTC for the annulment of the deed of sale as regards his
undivided share in the two parcels of land. The trial court
absolved all the defendants but the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision on the ground that the deed of sale is not binding
against Ramon Alcantara in view of his minority on the date of
its execution.
· Hence, this petition by Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not Ramon Alcantara’s minority at the time of the

execution of the deed of sale can be used as valid ground to
invalidate the Contract?
RULING(S) NO, the respondent cannot use minority at the time of the
execution of the deed of sale as valid ground to invalidate the
Contract.The circumstance that, about one month after the date
of the conveyance, the respondent informed the petitioners of
his minority, is of no moment, because respondent's previous
misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing
the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the petitioners in fact did not know that he was a
minor on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes
his bad faith, when it is borne in mind that no sooner had he
given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon
receiving from the petitioners the sum of P500.
As held in Mercado v. Espiritu, “The courts, in their

interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale
of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age,
when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of law; and the judgment that holds
such a sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws relative to
the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical rules established
in consonance therewith.
44. De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959
TITLE ROSARIO L. DE BRAGANZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. FERNANDO

F. DE VILLA ABRILLE, respondent.
DATE April 13, 1959
PONENTE BENGZON, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Minority as limitation on capacity to act

RDS
FACTS The above petitioners, it appears, received from Villa Abrille,

as a loan, on October 30, 1944, P70,000 in Japanese war notes
and in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him
P10,000 "in legal currency of the Philippine Islands two years
after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon as
International Exchange has been established in the Philippines",
plus 2 % per annum. Because payment had not been made, Villa
Abrille sued them in March 1949.
In their answer before the Manila court of first Instance,
defendants claimed to have received P40,000 only — instead of
P70,000 as plaintiff asserted. They also averred that Guillermo
and Rodolfo were minors when they signed the promissory note.
After hearing the parties and their evidence, said court rendered
judgment, which the appellate court affirmed.
There can be no question about the responsibility of Mrs.
Rosario L. Braganza because the minority of her consigners note
release her from liability; since it is a personal defense of the
minors. It is not denied that at the time of signing, Guillermo and
Rodolfo Braganza were minors-16 and 18 respectively. However,
the Court of Appeals found them liable pursuant to the following
reasoning:
. . . . Perhaps defendants in their desire to acquire much
needed money, they readily and willingly signed the promissory
note, without disclosing the legal impediment with respect to
Guillermo and Rodolfo. When minor, like in the instant case,
pretended to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will not
later on be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of
the obligation contracted by them or to have it annulled.
(Mercado, et al. vs. Espiritu, 37 Phil., 215).
ISSUE(S) W/N Guillermo and Rodolfo had the capacity to act when they
signed the promissory note
RULING(S) We cannot agree to above conclusion. From the minors' failure

to disclose their minority in the same promissory note they
signed, it does not follow as a legal proposition that they will not
be permitted thereafter to assert it. They had no juridical duty to
disclose their inability.
The Mercado case cited in the decision under review is
different because the document signed therein by the minor
specifically stated he was of age; here the promissory note
contained no such statement. In other words, in the Mercado
case, the minor was guilty of active misrepresentation; whereas
in this case, if the minors were guilty at all, which we doubt it is
of passive (or constructive) misrepresentation. Indeed, there is a
growing sentiment in favor of limiting the scope of the application
of the Mercado ruling, what with the consideration that the very
minority which incapacitated from contracting should likewise
exempt them from the results of misrepresentation. Accordingly,
the appealed decision should be modified in the sense that
Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e., P3,333.33 plus
2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo and Guillermo
Braganza shall pay jointly to the same creditor the total amount
of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March 7, 1949, when the
complaint was filed. No costs in this instance
45. US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88 March 13, 1914
TITLE THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EVARISTO

VAQUILAR, defendant-appellant.
GR NUMBER 9471 / 9472
DATE 1914-03-13
PONENTE TRENT, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Insanity
RDS
FACTS Evaristo Vaquilar was charged in two separate information with

parricide for the killing of his wife and of his daughter. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment, indemnify the heirs, to the
accessory penalties and to the payment of the costs in each
case.
Several witnesses were introduced on his behalf testifying that
he appeared to be insane when committed the crime. They
testified that he had been complaining of pains in his head and
stomach prior to the killing.
Martin Agustin testified that his uncle that the appellant had
“felt pains in his head and stomach” and that his “eyes were
very big and red and his sight penetrating”.
Diego Agustin, witness, testified that he looks like a madman;

crazy because he would cut everybody at random without
paying attention to who it was.”
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether or not appellant Vaquilar was suffering

from insanity when he killed his wife and his daughter?
RULING(S) Court said that there is a difference between an insane person

and one who has worked himself such frenzy of anger that he
fails to use reason or good judgment. A person acts crazay is
not conclusive that he is insane. Crazy is not synonymous with
the legal terms “insane” idiot or lunatic. It is not at all
unnatural for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife
and child, to fly into a passion and strike promiscuously at those
who attempt to capture him.
Citing People vs Mortimer: Those who have not lost control of
their reason by mental unsoundness are bound to control their
tempers and restrain their passions and are liable to law if they
do not. Where persons allow their anger to lead them so far as
to make them reckless…”
Court also cited US v Carmona that a night of the crime the

defendant was sick with fever and out of his mind wounding his
wife and other members of the family without any motives.
However, US Supreme Court that in the absence of proof that
defendant lost his reason or became demented during the
crime, it is presumed that he was in normal condition... unless
his insanity and absence of will are proven.
The Court held that appellants conduct is consistent with the

acts of an enraged criminal and not having been satisfactorily
shown that he was of unsound mind at the time he committed
the crime.
46. Standard Oil v. Arenas, supra
TITLE Standard Oil vs. Arenas
DATE July 25, 1911

PONENTE Arellano, CJ
NATURE/KEYWO Monomania, Capacity to Act

RDS
FACTS December 15, 1908 - Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara
del Pino, as principals, and Aipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva
and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as surities sign a bond in favor of
plaintiff for the obliged to pay the amount of Php 3,305.76,
three months from date, with interest of Php 1.00 per month.
April 5, 1909 - The plaintiff sued the debtors regarding the bond
sign and they were summoned. The record shows that
Villanueva received his summons.
May 12, 1909 - Villanueva did not appear and was declared in
default.
While the judgment was in the course of execution, Elisa

Villanueva, wife of Vicente appeared and alleged that her
husband was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and that on Oct.
11, she was authorized by the court as guardian to institute the
proper legal proceedings for the annulment of several bonds
given by her husband while in a state of insanity
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth

necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not
have capacity to act.
2. Whether or not the appellant, was incapable of entering into
contract at the time the bond was executed on December 15,
1908
RULING(S) Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who

has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity
is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not proved,
that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable,
crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this
court, has not been proved in this case
The court affirmed the trial court decision that Villanueva

possessed the capacity to act. The SC held that there is no
evidence to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that a
person suffering from monomania of wealth is really insane and
therefore is deranged and incapable of binding himself in a
contract. From the testimony of his wife, it seemed that Vicente
has the liberty to go wherever he wished, that he had property
of his own and was not deprived of its management, as well as
the fact that he had never squandered any large sum of money.
As for the 2nd issue, there was no direct proof that showed that
at the date of the giving of the bond, December 15, 1908, the
appellant was incapable of acting because of insanity. The
witnesses who as physicians, testified that they observed insane
periods in Villanueva twice prior to 1903, once on 1908, but
none at the time of the execution of the said bond on December
15, 1908. It was also shown that the wife never before sought
to legally deprive her husband management over his estate
knowing full well that he was insane.
47. People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991
TITLE PEOPLE v. RAFANAN
GR NUMBER 54135
PONENTE Feliciano, J
NATURE/KEYWO Insanity
RDS
FACTS Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then

CFI of Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape of
complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount P10,000 by way
of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
In 1976, complainant Ronaya who was then only fourteen was

hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines
Rafanan alias 'Baket Ines' with a salary of P30 a month.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita

Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused to help in their
store which was located in front of their house about 6 meters
away. Attending to the store at the time was the accused. At
11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the
complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the
latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the
complainant inside the store and said, 'Come, let us have sexual
intercourse,' to which Estelita replied, 'I do not like,' and
struggled to free herself and cried.
The accused held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the

handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant
threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced
her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of the
complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her
inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to
report the matter to her mother or to anybody in the house,
otherwise he would kill her.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the

accused learned what happened the night before in the store
between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among
them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When
Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she went
home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried
and cried. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the
mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the
house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina.
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of

her mother whose testimonies he contends are contradictory. It
is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on
direct examination that she immediately went home after the
rape incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross
examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of
appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that
she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have
contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went
to the store in the evening of 17 March 1979 and brought
Estelita home.
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering

from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when
he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of
his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered
appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed
there until 26 June 1978.
ISSUE(S) WON Rafanan is insane at the time of the commission of the

crime.
RULING(S) Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised

Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval. Where the imbecile or an insane person
has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or
asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission
of the same court.
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the
insanity defense, it was only in People vs. Formigones that the
Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused
be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be a complete absence of the power to discern,

or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the
time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, became mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude
imputability.
The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita

with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted
by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was
aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.
The defense sought to suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's last 2
answers above, that a person suffering from schizophrenia
sustains not only impairment of the mental faculties but also
deprivation of the power of self-control. We do not believe that
Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated
the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed
out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if
the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of

a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative
allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear
and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It
has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused
should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the
testimonies of the 2 physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit)
which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
condition during that critical period of time.
They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or

immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
consisted of broad statements based on general
behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had
actually observed and examined appellant during his
confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense chose
to present Dr. Nerit.
V. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
48. Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991
TITLE ABELLA VS. COMELEC
DATE Septmeber 3, 1991
PONENTE GUTIERREZ, JR.

NATURE/KEYWOR ART.50 OF NCC - For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
DS of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of
their habitual residence.
FACTS In the local elections of February 1, 1988, Adelina Larrazabal was

proclaimed as the duly elected governor of the province of Leyte
and petitioner Benjamin Abella who obtained the second highest
number of votes for the said position.
Silvestre De la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City then filed a

disqualification case before the Supreme Court, which issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining the provincial board
of canvassers of Leyte 'from proclaiming Larrazabal as the winning
candidate for Governor, in the event that she obtains the winning
margin of votes (Disqualification Case). Abella likewise raised
objections during the canvass of the election returns and elevated
them to the Comelec (Pre-proclamation Case).
The pre-proclamation and disqualification cases were consolidated

before the Comelec, which unanimously upheld virtually all the
challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers and
ordered the proclamation of the winner after completion of the
canvass. The disqualification case was also dismissed.
The matter was elevated to the Supreme Court (SC) which affirmed
the ruling on the pre-proclamation but reversed the dismissal on
the Disqualification Case and ordered the Comelec to
proceed with the hearing.
The position of petitioners De la Cruz and Abella was that

respondent Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter
of Kananga, Leyte as she claimed but a resident and registered
voter of Ormoc City, a component city of the province of Leyte but
independent of the province thereby disqualifying her for the
position of governor of Leyte.
On the other hand, respondent Larrazabal maintained that she was

a resident and a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. She, too
presented testimonial as well as documentary evidence to prove
her stand.
Eventually, the Comelec Second Division rendered its decision

declaring the disqualification of Larrazabal. The Comelec En Banc
affirmed the disqualification. In the same resolution, the Comelec
En Banc disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of Leyte.
Hence, these petitions.
Meanwhile, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Leyte, Leopoldo Petilla,

took his oath as Provincial Governor of Leyte and assumed the
governorship.
Hence this petition seeks to review the decision and resolution of

the Commission on Elections.
ISSUE(S) W/N Larrazabal lacks the required residence to qualify her to run
for the position of governor of Leyte?
RULING(S) Yes. The COMELEC based its finding that the petitioner lacks the
required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that
despite protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she
has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975 to the
present and not at Kananga, Leyte. Her attempt to purportedly
change her residence one year before the election by registering at
Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of
the province of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself
already a resident of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to
prove otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code
was proper and in consonance with human experience. The
petitioner did not present evidence to show that she and her
husband maintain separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte and
her husband at Ormoc City.
For the purpose of running for public office, the residence

requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any
place where a party may have properties and may visit from time
to time.
The Civil Code is clear that for the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the
place of their habitual residence.
There is no evidence to prove that Larrazabal temporarily left her

residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,
profession or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a
resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon
her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is not present. The fact
that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does
not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is
common among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly
resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein
although for intents and purposes we have already transferred our
residence to other places.
Significantly, the Comelec likewise determined that Larrazabal was

not a registered voter in Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan, Kananga,
Leyte, and, that she and her husband Emeterio Larrazabal
continued to be registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City."
The Court is bound by these factual findings as they are supported
by substantial evidence.
In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set
aside the questioned decision and resolution of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in
grave abuse of discretion.
[WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The

questioned decision of the second division of the Commission on
Elections dated February 14,1991 and the questioned Resolution en
banc of the Commission dated July 18,1991 are hereby AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on August 1,1991 is
LIFTED.]
VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
49. Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952
TITLE FELIPE CABAGUE, petitioner, v. MATIAS AUXILIO,

respondent
GR NUMBER GR No. L-5028 / 92 Phil. 294
DATE Nov 26, 1952
PONENTE Bengzon
NATURE/KEYWOR Breach of Promise to Marry

DS
FACTS 1. In the court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the respondents Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from respondents’'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
2. The complaint alleged, in short;
(a) that respondents promised such marriage to the petitioners,
provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud
and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
(b) that relying upon such promises, the petitioners made the
improvement and spent P700; and
(c) that without cause, the respondents refused to honor their
pledged word
3. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the contract is just an oral agreement and there’s no written
agreement that was executed.
**Under the former rules of procedure: Rule 123, Sec 21 states
that “Oral evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry”
4. The court dismissed the case. It should be observed preliminarily
that when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on
was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for
the respondent.
***Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
5. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the petitioners
reproduced their complaint and the respondents reiterated their
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE(S) (1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry may be proven in

the court even not in writing
RULING(S) (1) Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises. The evidence of such mutual
promise is admissible.
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue

Socorro for damages. However Felipe Cabague's action may not
prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to
marry"and neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against
Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
50. Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916
TITLE DOMALAGAN V BOLIFER
DATE 02-08-1916
PONENTE JOHNSON
NATURE/KEYWO BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

RDS
FACTS ● On November 1909, plaintiff Jorge Domalagan alleged that

he and the defendant, Carlos Bolifer entered into a
contract upon the marriage of their son and daughter in
which he was to pay the defendant the sum of P500.
● And so, the defendant completed his obligation under the
said contract and together paid the sum of P16 as “hansel
or token of future marriage”. That notwithstanding said
agreement, the daughter of Bolifer, Bonifacia, was joined
in lawful wedlock to another man (Laureano Sisi).
● Domagan filed an action and demanded of the defendant
to return the sum of P516 which he has given together
with the interest and damage.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S) YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied
upon by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to
writing. Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in Civil Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract
may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will
be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract
shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced
by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides
the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be
proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid,
which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those
mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may
be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with
the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with said
section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is
made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to
prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute,
is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an
action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the
admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one
in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties
as if it had been reduced to writing.
51. Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629
TITLE FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
GR NUMBER No. L-14628
PONENTE CONCEPCIÓN, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO 1. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT

RDS ACTIONABLE. — It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry.
2. SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction"
contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one
of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is
the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman,
who was an insurance agent and former high school
teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10
years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had
intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind"
him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is
morally guilty of seduction.
FACTS FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise.
● Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
● The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
● CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
● Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S) Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
52. Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964
TITLE Title: Wassmer v. Velez
GR NUMBER GR.No. L-20089
DATE December 26, 1964
PONENTE Bengzon J.P.

NATURE/KEYWO Breach of promise to marry
RDS
FACTS FACTS: On August 23, 1954 Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.

Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances.The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He went to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
ISSUE(S) ISSUE: Is Francisco Velez liable to pay damages after his

breach of promise to marry Beatriz Wassmer?
RULING(S)
HELD: Yes. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21 which provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
Defendant urges that the damages awarded were excessive. No
question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be
totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in
Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant
contends that the same could not be adjudged against him
because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is
devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that
considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be
a reasonable award.
53.. Estremos v. Ephan, (CA) 83 OG 4022 No. 35
● Guy sorry copy-paste lang na digest to, hindi ko

● talaga mahanap ung full text.
- Adlawan
TITLE Estremos v. Ephan
GR NUMBER
DATE
PONENTE
NATURE/KEYWOR ART. 21 of the Civil Code

DS
FACTS Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos were college sweethearts. They
engaged in consensual sex several times, resulting in Erlinda
getting pregnant. When the parents of both parties found out, they
arranged for them to get married. Virgilio didn’t want to go through
with it but his father insisted. So Erlinda, her mother Estrella ,
Virgilio, and his father Gonzalo, went to the Local Civil Registrar to
apply for a marriage license.
Later on, however, Virgilio disappeared, but first coursing a letter

through a pedicab driver explaining his actions.
● “now is not the right moment for me to marry… I want to
marry when I am already prepared…”
● “… I can already work if I want to work but do not have yet
money for capital in a small business, this is one thing that
stop me from getting married.”
● “… I would not like to ask money from my parents after I
get married, and every person has a different principle and
this is my principle.”
● They had planned to get the baby aborted by a “Hilot” but
since Erlinda was already 4 months on the way, he did not
continue because he “did not want to add more to [his]
sins.”
Erlinda’s parents are now suing Virgilio’s parents for damages.

They had already bought Erlinda a wedding gown and sandals, and
prepared some animals for slaughter. The CFI ruled in favor of the
Sps. Ephan, awarding them P20,000 in moral damages P10,000 in
exemplary damages, P1,000 in attorney’s fees, and P400 in
wedding reparations. Hence present appeal.
ISSUE(S) WON the Ephan’s are liable for the breach of promise to marry?
RULING(S) No, the Ephan’s are not liable.
As a general rule, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. The Supreme Court, however laid down a certain
exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v Valdez. Under Art. 21 of
the Civil Code, the SC found that “to formally set a wedding and
go through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different from a
mere breach of promise to marry. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs for which defendant must be answerable
for damages in accordance with Art. 21.
The Court differentiated the present case from Wassmer in that the
parents of both contracting parties connived Virgilio into marrying
Erlinda. In Wassmer, the contracting parties themselves entered
into the agreement to marry.
The Court then opined that Erlinda should suffer for her libertarian
conduct. She entered into it with “eyes wide open and with mutual
passion.” Virgilio shouldn’t suffer alone. If Virgilio felt that he was
not prepared for marriage in the first place then he should not go
through with it. It will only make him a bitter husband and
consequently an inept father, which do not make for a good family
life.
VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
49. Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952
TITLE FELIPE CABAGUE, petitioner, v. MATIAS AUXILIO,

respondent
GR NUMBER GR No. L-5028 / 92 Phil. 294
DATE Nov 26, 1952
PONENTE Bengzon
NATURE/KEYWOR Breach of Promise to Marry
DS
FACTS 1. In the court of Basud, Camarines Norte, Felipe Cabague and his
son Geronimo sued the respondents Matias Auxilio and his
daughter Socorro to recover damages resulting from respondents’'
refusal to carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
2. The complaint alleged, in short;
(a) that respondents promised such marriage to the petitioners,
provided the latter would improve the defendants' house in Basud
and spend for the wedding feast and the needs of the bride;
(b) that relying upon such promises, the petitioners made the
improvement and spent P700; and
(c) that without cause, the respondents refused to honor their
pledged word
3. The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that
the contract is just an oral agreement and there’s no written
agreement that was executed.
**Under the former rules of procedure: Rule 123, Sec 21 states
that “Oral evidence is not admissible to prove an agreement made
upon the consideration of marriage other than a mutual promise to
marry”
4. The court dismissed the case. It should be observed preliminarily
that when the complaint did not state whether the contract sued on
was in writing or not, the statute of frauds could be no ground for
the respondent.
***Under the new Rules "defendant may now present a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the contract was not in writing, even if
such fact is not apparent on the face of the complaint. The fact
may be proved by him."
5. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, the petitioners
reproduced their complaint and the respondents reiterated their
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE(S) (1) Whether or not breach of promise to marry may be proven in

the court even not in writing
RULING(S) (1) Geronimo may continue his action against Socorro for such
damages as may have resulted from her failure to carry out their
mutual matrimonial promises. The evidence of such mutual
promise is admissible.
Extra:
ISSUE:
Who can sue using the “breach of promise to marry”?
RULING:
The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the
defendants on the other, really involves two kinds of agreement.
One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another,
the agreement between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to
marry".
For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo may sue

Socorro for damages. However Felipe Cabague's action may not
prosper, because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio this
action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to
marry"and neither may it be regarded as action by Felipe against
Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."
50. Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916
TITLE DOMALAGAN V BOLIFER
DATE 02-08-1916
PONENTE JOHNSON
NATURE/KEYWO BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

RDS
FACTS ● On November 1909, plaintiff Jorge Domalagan alleged that

he and the defendant, Carlos Bolifer entered into a
contract upon the marriage of their son and daughter in
which he was to pay the defendant the sum of P500.
● And so, the defendant completed his obligation under the
said contract and together paid the sum of P16 as “hansel
or token of future marriage”. That notwithstanding said
agreement, the daughter of Bolifer, Bonifacia, was joined
in lawful wedlock to another man (Laureano Sisi).
● Domagan filed an action and demanded of the defendant
to return the sum of P516 which he has given together
with the interest and damage.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the verbal contract entered into by the plaintiff
and the defendant in regard to the delivery of the money by
reason of a prospective marriage is valid and effective.
RULING(S) YES. The court ruled that a contract such as the one relied
upon by the plaintiff in order to be valid, must be reduced to
writing. Paragraph 3 Section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in Civil Action does not render oral contracts invalid. A contract
may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the parties will
be unable to prove it. Said section provides that the contract
shall not be enforced by an action unless the same is evidenced
by some note or memorandum. Said section simply provides
the method by which the contracts mentioned therein may be
proved. It does not declare that said contracts are invalid,
which have not been reduced to writing, except perhaps those
mentioned in paragraph 5 of said section (335). A contract may
be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with
the necessary form. If it is not made in conformity with said
section of course it cannot be proved, if proper objection is
made. But a failure to except to evidence presented in order to
prove the contract, because it does not conform to the statute,
is a waiver of the provisions of the law. If the parties to an
action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the
admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one
in question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence
other than a writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties
as if it had been reduced to writing.
51. Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629
TITLE FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
PONENTE CONCEPCIÓN, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO 4. DAMAGES; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; NOT

RDS ACTIONABLE. — It is the clear and manifest intent of
Congress not to sanction actions for breach of promise to
marry.
5. SEDUCTION AS GROUND FOR AWARD OF MORAL
DAMAGES; NATURE OF SEDUCTION CONTEMPLATED IN
ARTICLE 2219 OF NEW CIVIL CODE.—The "seduction"
contemplated in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code as one
of the cases where moral damages may be recovered, is
the crime punished as such in Articles 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code.
6. WHEN SEDUCTION DOES NOT EXIST.—Where a woman,
who was an insurance agent and former high school
teacher, around 36 years of age and approximately 10
years older than the man, "overwhelmed by her love" for a
man approximately 10 years younger than her, had
intimate relations with him, because she "wanted to bind"
him "by having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy," it cannot be said that he is
morally guilty of seduction.
FACTS FACTS:
● Complainant Soledad Cagigas was a teacher in the Sibonga
Provincial High School and later on she became a life
insurance underwriter in Cebu. The petitioner was almost
ten (10) years younger than she. They used to go around
together and were regarded as engaged, although he had
made no promise of marriage prior thereto.
● One evening, in 1953, when after coming from the movies,
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot.
● In February, 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was
in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her.
Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17,
1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one
Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954. Referring now to
the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil
Code of Spain (Articles 43 and 44) permitted the recovery
of damages for breach of promise to marry.
● On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said court
of first instance a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise.
● Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed
willingness to support the later, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant.
● The court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay,
by way of alimony pendente lite, P50 a month, which was,
on February 16 1955, reduced to P30 a month. Sentencing
defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of P4,500 for actual
and compensatory damages; the sum of P5,000 as moral
damages; and the further sum of P500 as attorney's fees
● CA affirmed this decision.except as to the actual and
compensatory damages and the moral damages, which
were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
● Francisco filed a petition for review by Certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals
ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws,
for breach of promise to marry.
RULING(S) Ruling: 1. NO. Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866),
that "the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in
the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is
this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in
the so-called Balm suits in many of the American States.
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
52. Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964
TITLE Title: Wassmer v. Velez
GR NUMBER GR.No. L-20089
PONENTE Bengzon J.P.

NATURE/KEYWO Breach of promise to marry
RDS
FACTS FACTS: On August 23, 1954 Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P.

Wassmer applied for a license to contract marriage. Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances.The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28
years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He went to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.
ISSUE(S)
RULING(S)
54. Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994 December 17, 1966
TITLE Apolonio Tanjanco, petitioner, vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and

Araceli Santos, respondents
PONENTE Reyes
NATURE/KEYWO Art. 19-21 of NCC, Breach of Promise to Marry

RDS
FACTS - From Dec 1957, petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted
respondent Araceli Santos, who in due time reciprocated his
feelings. Petitioner promised to marry respondent, and the
latter consented carnal access regularly until December 1959.
- Respondent eventually conceived a child, and as a result, she
resigned her job as a secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. to avoid
embarrassment and humiliation. Being unable to support herself
and her baby, and petitioner’s refusal to marry, respondent
Santos suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings, and such.
She then filed an action for support and damages, compelling
the petitioner to recognize the unborn child and to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and her baby, plus
fees for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
- The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.
- Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which decreed
that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, as
prescribed on Art. 21 of the Civil Code, which states that, “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
- The CA therefore, directed the court of origin to proceed with
the case.
- The petitioner in turn appealed to the Court, pleading that
actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in
this jurisdiction, and invoking prior rulings of the court in
previous cases.
ISSUE(S) W/N moral and exemplary damages may be sought for a

breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. 21 of the Civil
code of the Philippines.
RULING(S) - NO. The Court looked into the memorandum submitted by the
Code Commission to the Legislature to support the draft of the
Civil Code, and found out that Art. 21 of the Civil Code connotes
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded, that the essential feature is seduction, and not just
mere sexual intercourse or a breach of promise to marry.
- Examining Santos’ complaint, the Court concluded that such
conducts of the respondent, being a woman of an adult age, is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is
voluntariness and mutual passion in her acts. Hence, no case is
made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code. No error was committed
by the CFI in dismissing the complaint.
ADDITIONAL NOTE:
The promise to marry has no obligatory force; therefore, as a
rule, its breach cannot give rise to liability for damages.
(Tolentino, under Art. 19 of the NCC)
55. Baksh v. CA, G.R. 97326 Feb. 19, 1993
TITLE GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
GR NUMBER 97336
DATE February 19, 1993
PONENTE DAVIDE, JR.
NATURE/KEYWO APPEAL by certiorari to review and set aside the decision of the
RDS Court of Appeals.
FACTS In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City,

Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem
Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who
was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate.
On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to

marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced
Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to
get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors
and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for
animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment

where they had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their
relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. It
was revealed that Baksh would tie Marilou’s hands and feet
while he went to school, and gave her medicine at 4am that
made her sleep the whole day until the following day.
As a result of this live-in relationship, Marilou became pregnant,

but Baksh gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
Marilou continued to live with him and kept reminding him of his
promise to marry her. Gashem eventually revoked his promise
of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married
to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later
sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in
moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to

Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino
customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not
familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in imposing

Gashem payment of damages to Marilou as a consequence of
his breach of his promise to marry the latter.
RULING(S) Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou

not really because of his breach of promise to marry her but
based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides: “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se.

In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that
constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His
promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her
into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was
not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met
Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem
had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the
reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of
our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to
study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act
contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to

expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to
cover situations such as this case where the breach complained
of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It was meant as a
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law
penalizing a the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if

the promise to marry was made and there was carnal
knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be
recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the
promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may
be recovered.
56. Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 September 9, 1933_ ANTONA
TITLE JOSE R. PAÑGANIBAN, complainant,

vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent
PONENTE MALCOLM, J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent

RDS
FACTS This is a proceeding looking to the disbarment of the Elias

Borromeo for professional malpractice. The respondent admits
that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized a document
which contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good
customs, but by way of defense disclaims any previous
knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
In 1931, a couple, subscribed a contract before

Borromeo. The contract had been prepared by the municipal
secretary. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of
the document and had, at least, some knowledge of its
contents, although he may not have been fully informed
because of a difference in dialect. The contract in substance
purported to formulate an agreement between the husband and
the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a
concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with
another man, without opposition from either one of them.
ISSUE(S)
W/N the contract sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose?- YES
W/N a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary

public? - YES
RULING(S) YES! The contract was executed when the Spanish Penal Code
was in force. However, more liberal provisions RPC should be
given application, it is provided that the consent by the
offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution for adultery or
concubinage. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of
the Legislature to legalize adultery and concubinage. They still
remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be
instituted if the offended party consented to the act of the
offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not
matter for legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We
hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals
and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.
There can be no question as to the right of the

court to discipline an attorney who, in his capacity as notary
public, has been guilty of misconduct. The notary public
exercise duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for
the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to
certify, and to take part in no illegal enterprise. We are led to
hold that a member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to
account by the court even to the extent of disbarment.
As mitigating circumstances, (1) that the attorney

may not have realized the full purport of the document to which
he took acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was
attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a
notary public has been revoked. Accordingly, we exercise
clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to
severe censure.
57. In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940
TITLE In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO
GR NUMBER A.C. No. 932
DATE June 21, 1940
PONENTE LAUREL, J
NATURE/KEYWO Contract of separation between spouses; legal malpractice

RDS
FACTS Spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares were living

separately for 9 consecutive years. Baniquit who is inclined to
contract another marriage with Trinidad Aurelio, sought the
advice of herein defendant, Atty Roque Santiago who was
practicing law and a notary public.
Santiago then assured Baniquit that the former can secure a
separation from Colares and in effect allow the latter’s marriage
to Trinidad Aurelio. Atty Santiago asked both parties to bring his
legal wife (Colares) in his office and on the afternoon of May 29,
1939, the executed a document stating “ that the contracting
parties, who are husband and wife authorized each other to
marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever
right of action one might have against the party so marrying.”
Ernesto Baniquit said, “would there be no trouble?” and upon
hearing this, the defendant stood up and points at his diploma
and said “I would tear that off if this document turns out not to
be valid." Subsequently, Ernesto Baniquit contracted a second
marriage with Trinidad Aurelio.
Defendant did not deny the preparation of the document but
claims that at the time of the execution he had the idea that
seven years of separation of the contracting parties entitled
them the right to contract a second marriage. However, when
he knew about his error, he asked the parties to return to his
office and to sign a deed of cancellation of the document in
question.
ISSUE(S) ISSUE:
Whether or not a married couple may terminate their marriage
through a contract of separation
Whether or not the defendant’s act of executing a contract of
separation of marriage valid and if not, the said act may
constitute as malpractice of law
RULING(S) 1. NO. The law specially provides for its invalidity.

Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of
the absolute community of property between husband and
wife;
(3) Every collusion to obtain a decree of legal separation,
or of annulment of marriage;
2. No. The advice and document execute by him is contrary to
law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the
family. Malpractice through recklessness and sheer ignorance
justifies the disbarment. However, majority of the court
followed the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable
Sotero Rodas, to suspend him from practice for one year.
58. Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 May 19, 1975
TITLE SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant, vs. ALEJANDRO E.

MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
GR NUMBER A.M. No. 804-CJ
DATE May 19, 1975
PONENTE Aquino
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS ● Saturnino filed a complaint against Judge Alejandro

Mendoza for gross ignorance of the law due to his act of
preparing and ratifying a document which had
extrajudicially liquidated the conjugal partnership of the
petitioner and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.
● Under the document, the following were stipulated:
1. Either spouse would withdraw the complaint for
adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the
other and;
2. Waiver of the right to prosecute each other for whatever
acts of infidelity either one would commit against the
other;
● Pertaining to Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code, respondent
judge believes that, “the husband and the wife may agree
upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval." This was his
defense.
● The judge then proceeded to divide the property amongst
complainant and his wife; to the complainant a thirteen-
hectare Riceland and to the wife the residential house and
lot. The last paragraph of the acknowledged instrument,
licensed any of the spouses to then commit an act of
infidelity, which then ratifies their separation. The
agreement becomes void because it is contrary to the
provisions of the Civil Code.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal

partnership without judicial approval is void;
RULING(S) It is void. Under Article 221 of the Civil Code:

The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
In the present case, the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership ratified by respondent judge falls under this
provision which makes such act void. His unawareness if the
legal prohibition led him to prepare said void agreement and
acknowledge such.
However, given the circumstance that the judge in good faith,
intended to resolve the marital conflict between complainant
and his wife, a drastic penalty should not be imposed upon him.
But, he is still censured for such acts.
59. Lichauco-De Leon v. CA, 186 SCRA 345, June 6, 1990
TITLE SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner, vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE
VICENTE DE LEON, respondents
DATE 1990-06-06
PONENTE Ponente: MEDIALDEA, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR Marriage- Not subject to stipulation NCC 221

DS
FACTS · In 1969, Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united to Jose

Vicente De Leon in wedlock before the Municipal Mayor. On
August 28, 1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon was born from
this union.
· In 1972, due to irreconcilable marital differences, a de

facto separation between the spouses occurred.
· In 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she

obtained American citizenship. Sylvia filed with a petition for
dissolution of marriage against Jose Vicente at the Superior Court
of California, County of San Francisco. Along with this, Sylvia also
filed claims for support and distribution of properties.
· In 1977, Sylvia had a Letter-Agreement with her mother-

in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon. After hearings, it was
declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses dissolved
and both can enjoy his or her separate estate, without the
consent of the other.
· In 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the order.

However, Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration alleging that
Sylvia made a verbal reformation as there was no such
agreement for the payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to
commence from the alleged date of separation, and he was not
notified that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the
agreement contained in the joint petition.
· While the motion for Reconsideration was pending, Macaria

De Leon filed with the trial court the motion for leave to intervene
as she claimed to be the owner of the properties stated in the
Letter-Agreement. The motion was granted.
· In October 1980, Macaria and her husband filed her

complaint in intervention. She assailed the validity and legality of
the Letter-Agreement which for its purpose the termination of
marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However,
the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
before the case started.
· The judge favored the intervenor, and ordered Sylvia to

restore to intervenor the amount of P380,000.00
· Sylvia filed an appeal in the COA but the motion for

Reconsideration was denied.
· The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement reads, "In

consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations
between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded husband, Jose
Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:"
· The use of the word “relations” is ambiguous and therefore

subject to interpretation. Sylvia insisted that the “relations” in the
Letter-Argument was of property relations while Macaria and Jose
Vicente argued that it was merely marital relations.
· It was made to appear that the said properties are

conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the
questioned properties are owned by her, and neither Sylvia nor
Jose Vicente countered it.
· Macaria also claimed that Sylvia intimidated her by

threatening Jose Vicente with adultery suits
· Macaria also raised the defenses that she signed the

Letter-Agreement because of her fear that Slyvia would take her
inheritance rights.
· Such condition was but an incident of the consideration

thereof which the termination of marital relations. In the ultimate
analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws.
· The pari delicto rule, which refuses remedy to either party

to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not
apply in this case. Instead, Article 1414 0f the Civil Code, an
exception to the pari delicto rule, is suited to be applied.
· "When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal

purpose, the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties
before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage
has been caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may,
if the public interest will thus be subserved, allow the party
repudiating the contract to recover the money or property."
· The Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose

has been accomplished, so justice would be served by allowing
Macaria to be placed in the position in which she was before the
transaction was entered into.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the Letter-Agreement was valid.
RULING(S) No. The letter-Agreement is invalid because it contravenes

the following provisions of the civil code:
Article 221. The flowing shall be void and of no effect:

(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband
and wife.
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife.
B. Law Governing Validity
60. Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, October 5, 2005

TITLE Republic v. Orbecido III
PONENTE QUISUMBING, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS · On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City, Philippines. They had a son
and a daughter.
· In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer.
· In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife, who had been
naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree in the USA, and then married a certain Innocent Stanley
and lived in California since then.
· Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Article 26, Paragraph
2 of the Family Code. The court found merit in the petition and
granted it.
· The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
files a petition for review assailing the decision.
· Petitioner contends that Article 26, Paragraph 2 does not
apply to Cipriano since it only applies to a valid marriage
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The petitioner stated
that the proper remedy is to file a petition for annulment or for
legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation.
· On the other hand, the respondent insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by
operation of law.
ISSUE(S) WON where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen

and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Article
26 of the Family Code?
RULING(S) Yes. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code

deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the

rule of reason, the court held that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were
a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties

at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Yet there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record

regarding the respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, allowing the respondent
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent's submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the

Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
61. Garcia-Recio v. Garcia, 366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2001
TITLE Garcia-Recio v. Garcia
GR NUMBER 138322
PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J.:

NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS · Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha

Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
· On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.
· On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government.
· The Petitioner, a Filipina and respondent were married
on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.
· Not long after, however, the couple was living separately
in Australia without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
· In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Rederick on the ground of
bigamy for he allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she learned of
his marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
· Rederick contended that his first marriage to Editha
Samson had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989, thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
· While the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree in
Australia because the "marriage had irretrievably broken
down.” Consequently, he prayed in his Answer that the
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause
of action.
ISSUE(S) WON – Whether or not the divorce between respondent and

Editha Samson was proven.
WON - the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is
admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to remarry.
RULING(S) 1st Issue:

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family
court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
First, a divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a

writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country: (1) an official publication or (2)
a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
2nd issue:
No, since according to Australian divorce decree it contains a
restriction that reads:
“A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree
becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits
the offence of bigamy.”
This provision bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained
by respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce
ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
applicant for a marriage license.
*WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo
for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively
show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing
in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
62. Republic v. Manalo, GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018

63. Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
TITLE Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
GR NUMBER No 7037
DATE May 7, 1952
PONENTE J. JBL Reyes
NATURE/KEYWO Marriage effected through force and Intimidation, Cohabitation

RDS
FACTS Petition:
Appeal from a decision of CFI Davao declaring the two
marriages celebrated one after another on April 28, 1949 null
and void on the ground of plaintiff’s consent was obtained
through force and intimidation employed upon her by her father
Facts:
On April 28, 1949, two marriages of Juanita Sison and Te Lay Li
were celebrated: a civil wedding before Judge Delfin Hofilena of
MC of Davao in the morning, and remarried in accordance with
rites of Republic of China before Chinese Consul S.T. Mih in office
in Davao City in the afternoon.
The plaintiff’s testimony:

1. Defendant never wooed her
2. Wedding was arranged by her father, who often whipped
her as she opposed the marriage
3. She ran away from home but was found by her father and
promised not to force her again with the marriage
4. She was locked in the house and her father handed a knife
telling her to choose between her life or his and because of
fear that her father might kill her she agreed to the
marriage
5. Her testimony was corroborated by mother
6. She lived with her husband in his parent’s home but
considered him a stranger since she doesn’t love him
7. She was kept a prisoner in the house; she never occupied
the same bed with husband
8. Never had sexual intercourse except on June 1, 1949
forced by husband using a knife—she mustered courage to
escape from her husband’s home
Defendant’s claim:
1. Marriages were regular and legal
2. Entered into marriage freely and voluntarily
3. Plaintiff not kept a prisoner
4. Plaintiff would everyday ask her father in law to give her
and her husband their own house and business
5. She slapped her—only when she ran away with P1200 and
when asked where she came from she
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not the marriage effected through force and

intimidation is valid
2. Whether or not consent was ratified by cohabitation
RULING(S) 1. No. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating consent

have been complied with, there is no valid marriage where
the parties do no intend to enter into the marriage.
The testimony of Juanita being compelled by her father to
marry a man she did not like was corroborated by the
testimonies of her mother and the officiating Judge. The
respondent also did not deny that Juanita was induced to
marry him only through fear and compulsion.
2. No. While a consent in marriage obtained by force and

intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation,
such cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from
Juanita’s testimony that there was no voluntary
cohabitation on her part and she never acquiesced to the
status of wife
64. Vilar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil 659 March 14, 1955
TITLE Vilar v. Paraiso
GR NUMBER 96 Phil 659
DATE March 14, 1955
PONENTE Justice Bautista Angelo

NATURE/KEYWO Election contests, Ecclesiastic ineligible to hold municipal office
RDS
FACTS 1. During the election held in November 13, 1951, Pedro

Vilar the petitioner along with the respondent, Gaudencio
Paraiso ran for the office of the Mayor of Rizal Nueva Ecija and
wherein the respondent declared winner with 41 plurality.
Petitioner, Pedro Vilar contended that Paraiso is ineligible to
hold office as mayor because he was then a minister of the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Vilar instituted a quo warranto
proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be
declared null and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly
elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent
Paraiso.
2. Paraiso claimed that he resigned as minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines on August 21m 1951 and
that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church,
August 27, 1951. And also contended that even if he is not
eligible to the office, petitioner could not be declared elected
to take his place.
ISSUE(S) * Whether or not Gaudencio Paraiso being ecclesiastic is

ineligible to hold position as Mayor of Nueva Ecija under section
2175 of the Revised administrative Code
*Whether or not he actually resigned as minister before
the date of elections.
*Whether being ineligible, the petitioner can be declared
elected, having obtained second place in the elections.
RULING(S) 1. Court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of

mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and consequently, it delared his
proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from
declaring petitioner as mayor elect for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
2. As Respondent, failing to file his resignation to the

Bureau of Public Libraries being a minister and having a
license to solemnize marriages constitutes that his license has
never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church
nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that
respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United
Church of Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of
candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister. Having
said all this, the respondent as an ecclesiastic is ineligible to
hold a municipal office under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code. All these lead the court to believe with
the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance
were made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the
respondent.
3. As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible,

petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second
place in the elections As to the question whether, respondent
being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having
obtained second place in the elections. when the person
elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the
candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even
if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration
of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality
of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy.
"Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised
Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee is
declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it
may be gathered that the law contemplates no such result,
because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered
candidate irrespective of whether the latter occupied the next
highest place or the lowest in the election Returns.
65. Aranes V. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002
TITLE Aranes V. Occiano
GR NUMBER A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390
DATE April 11, 2002
PONENTE Puno, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Formal Requisites of Marriage; Authority of Solemnizing Officer;
RDS Marriage License
FACTS Petitioner/s: Mercedita Mata Aranes (ARANES)

Respondent/s: Judge Salvador M. Occiano (OCCIANO)
Nature of Action: Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn
Letter-Complaint
Facts:
Mercedita Aranes (Petitioner) charged Judge Occiano
(Respondent), Presiding Judge of the MTC of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, with Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing
Aranes’ marriage to her late groom, Dominador Orobia (1) outside
his territorial jurisdiction at Nabua, Camarines Sur and (2)
without marriage license. As a result, the marriage was a nullity
and her right to inherit the "vast properties" left by Orobia was
not recognized and she was likewise deprived of receiving the
pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Thereafter, the Office of the Court Administrator required

respondent judge to comment to which he averred:
1. He was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo to solemnize
the marriage of the parties and having been assured that
all the documents to the marriage were complete, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala.
2. The groom, however, had difficulty walking and could not
travel so he agreed to solemnize the marriage in Nabua,
which was outside of his jurisdiction.
3. He also refused to solemnize the marriage upon
discovering that the parties did not have the marriage
license, BUT due to the earnest pleas of the parties,
the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded out of human compassion
as he feared that resetting the wedding might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a
stroke.
4. After the solemnization he reiterated the necessity for the
license and its absence would render the marriage void to
which the parties had assured that they would give him
the license in the afternoon of the same day but failed to
do so despite his follow ups.
5. Thus, he attributes the hardships and embarrassment
suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.
Petitioner Arañes, after reading the respondent judge’s
comment, filed her Affidavit of Desistance attesting to the facts
said by the judge. She confessed that the administrative case was
file out of rage, and after realizing her own shortcomings, she is
now bothered by her conscience.
ISSUE(S) 1. WON Judge Occiano (Respondent) can be held subject

to administrative liabilities upon solemnizing a marriage
outside his territorial jurisdiction and without a duly issued
marriage license?
2. WON Judge Occiano (Respondent) can be exculpated
upon the filing of the Affidavit of Desistance by Mercedita
Aranes (Petitioner)?
RULING(S) 1. Yes. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

1980, or B.P.129, the authority of RTC judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the SC.
a. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality
of Balatan, Camarines Sur and his act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and
Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur is contrary to
law and subjects him to administrative liability.
Although his act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage. (Note: Precedent
Case - Navarro v. Domagtoy)
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.
b. A marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot
render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess
such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. Thus, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law. (Note:
Precedent Case – People v. Lara)
.
2. No. Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the
Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of
the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise,
the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.
a. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not
involve purely private or personal matters. They
can not be made to depend upon the will of
every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot
be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves the Court's
constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught,
undermine the trust character of a public office
and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court
as a disciplining authority.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano,

Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
68. Macua V. Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014 (Llovit)
TITLE Peregrina Macua Vda. De Avenido V. Tecla Hoybia Avenido
PONENTE Perez, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Certiorari/Formal Requisites; Marriage Certificate/Second

RDS Division
FACTS This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to
have been validly married to the same man now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido instituted on 11 November
1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that
she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio).
Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on

30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the
Parish Priest of the said town.
The fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate

recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of
Talibon, Bohol, which was destroyed due to World War II.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot

four children. In 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his
whereabouts was not known. In 1979, Tecla learned that
Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of
Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and
void for being bigamous — an action she sought to protect the
rights of her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer with counterclaim,

averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who
died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao
City.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence, including

the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period
1900 to 1944.
On 25 March 2003, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Davao

City Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the
first marriage.
On 31 Aug. 2005, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Tecla and

declared Eustaquio's second marriage bigamous and thus null and
void.
It also ruled that the RTC committed a reversible error when it

disregarded:
(1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO a
witnessed to the wedding celebration of her older brother to
Tecla, [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who
testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his father and
[Tecla] herself
(2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the outset.
Peregrina filed a petition for review on certiorari of the CA's

decision.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N secondary evidence may be considered with the

unavailability of the original marriage certificate
2. W/N Tecla is the legal wife of Eustaquio
RULING(S) 1. Yes. In Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,

"While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence
of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents."
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage
certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted has been
aptly delineated in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, thus: It
should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were
shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
The Court has also held that “[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by anyone who ha[s]
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in
the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost.”
Due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,

who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner
herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown
by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
2. Yes. The starting point is the presumption of marriage. In

Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was

completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the
unrebutted fact of the birth within the cohabitation of Tecla and
Eustaquio of four (4) children coupled with the certificates of the
children’s birth and baptism; and the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
The decision of CA was affirmed which declared the marriage of

Tecla and Eustaquio valid and the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio null and void.
69. ABBAS vs. ABBAS, 2013-01-30, G.R. No.183896
TITLE ABBAS vs. ABBAS
GR NUMBER 183896
DATE 2013-01-30
PONENTE VELASCO, JR., J.

NATURE/KEYWO Lack of a Marriage License
RDS
FACTS The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Abbas (“Syed”) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria Goo-Abbas (“Gloria”) with the RTC on account of the
alleged absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article
4 of the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the
annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
Syed, Pakistan citizen, and Gloria, Filipino, met in Taiwan in

1992 where they were married. Upon arriving in the Philippines,
he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to
welcome him to the Philippines. He said he did not know that
the ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria.
Later on, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Syed, alleging that
he married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura, during the
existence of their marriage. And to avoid the bigamy case, Syed
filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gloria.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria, testified that
Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and
asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to
their house and said that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license
to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on
January 9, 1993 at their residence.
Syed in return, presented a certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar which states that the marriage license, based on its
number, indicated in their marriage contract was never issued
to them but to someone else.
The RTC held that given the lack of a valid marriage license, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed was void ab initio. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed the RTC. The CA held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license
of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said
certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA
ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not valid marriage license has been issued to the
parties.
RULING(S) No valid marriage license had been issued. The Supreme

Court upheld the RTC’s decision that no valid marriage license
had been issued. The pertinent provisions that would apply to
this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which provides
for the formal requisites of marriage, effects of the absence of
the essential and formal requisites of marriage.
In proving the validity of their marriage, Gloria failed to present

the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. On the other hand, to prove
that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence

of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)."
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to
34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus,
having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.
70. Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001
TITLE HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE

ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan,
respondent.
GR NUMBER A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
DATE 2001-03-08
PONENTE DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Marriages exempt from license requirement
FACTS Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges

respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a
sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator. Complainant avers that she was the lawful
wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to
him on 21 May 1966. Four children were born out of that
marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that
the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew
was that the two had been living together as husband and
wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According
to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married,
he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy.
He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
The Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severely.
Judge Sanchez filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea
for the dismissal of the complaint where he presented two
separate affidavits of the late Manzano and of Payao,
which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff
upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they
were married and that since their respective marriages
had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left
their families and had never cohabited or communicated
with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges
that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with
Article 34 of the Family Code.
ISSUE(S) W/N the marriage of Manzano and Payao can be

exempted from license requirement under the Article 34
of the Family Code.
RULING(S) NO. Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man
and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at
bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano
and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it
was indicated that both were "separated." The fact that
Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.
Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have
obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds
are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
72. Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
TITLE Republic vs Albios
GR NUMBER 198780
PONENTE Mendoza, J
NATURE/KEYWO Requisite of Marriage, Voudable Marriage

RDS
FACTS
1) On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen,
and Albios were married before a judge in
Mandaluyong City.
2) On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of
their essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and
void ab initio.
3) Albios contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage only
to enable her to acquire American citizenship and in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000. After the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways but she did not pay him the $2,000
because he never processed her petition for citizenship.
ISSUE(S)
Whether or not a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also
legally void and inexistent.
RULING(S) No. Respondent’s marriage is not void because the consent

given by the parties are valid and there’s no law that declares
a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than
what the Constitution or law declares.
Ratio:
1) Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an
essential requisite of marriage. For consent to be valid,
it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given”
consent requires that the contracting parties willingly
and deliberately enter into the marriage.
2) Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code,
such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
3) Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. Their
understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
4) Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
5) Their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage.
6) A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is
no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, as long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.
7) Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage
of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse
it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
73. Perido v. Perido, G.R. No. L-28248, March 12, 1975
TITLE Perido v. Perido
GR NUMBER L-28248
DATE March 12, 1975
PONENTE Makalintal, C. J.
NATURE/KEYWO Presumption of marriage, Legitimate children, Exclusive and

RDS Conjugal properties
FACTS Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married

twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita.
After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom
he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo.
Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the 3 children belonging to the first marriage only

Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio,
Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased,
but is survived by 2 sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived

by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and
Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but
survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's 5 children by his second wife, two are already

dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his
children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina
Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first
and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial
Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots
Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of
the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of

Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition, praying
for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and
Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots
mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced
by the defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that
the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in
1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
The lower court rendered its decision, annulling the

"Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However,
it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the
plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children
of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were
legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of
Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio
Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, alleging that the trial court
erred in declaring (1) the 5 children of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat to be legitimate; (2) that Lucio Perido was
the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part,
807, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife; and (3)
in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership
property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
ISSUE(S) 1. WON the children of the 2nd marriage were illegitimate.

NO
2. Were the 1st 7 lots the exclusive property of Lucio? YES
3. Was the 8th lot a property of the 2nd marriage? YES
(11/12)
RULING(S) The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children
of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist
that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first
three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio
Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of
wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after
their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that
Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were
born, that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as
shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said
year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the
testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
CA found that there was evidence to show that Benita Talorong,

died during the Spanish regime. This finding is conclusive
upon us. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal
impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their
first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the

certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the CA correctly held
that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not
actually married to Marcelina Baliguat.
In view of the foregoing the CA did not err in concluding that the
five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born
during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of

whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and
808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In
disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong
to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court

that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from
his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish
through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime.
Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the
CA, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this
Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the

CA sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458
was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that

they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the
conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife,
Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional
5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly
belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first
marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised
here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently,
the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA is hereby affirmed, with costs

against the petitioners.
74. Fiel v. Banawa, No. 56284-R| March 26, 1979

TITLE DOMINGA FIEL V. JULIO BANAWA, ET AL.
GR NUMBER No. 56284-R
DATE March 26, 1979
PONENTE GUTIERREZ, H.E., J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Presumption of marriage

RDS
FACTS Dominga Fiel lived in a common law relationship for 25 years

with Natalio Banawa, a widower and with no children, the said
relationship started during the early part of the year 1945 up to
his death on June 29, 1970. Upon the death of Natalio Banawa,
he was survived by his brothers and nephews, the respondents
herein. Natalio Banawa died, a victim of robbery and murder.
Dominga Fiel herself admitted in open court that she was legally
married to another man who was still alive when Banawa was
robbed and killed and who is apparently alive until the present.
Emiliano Cuering, one of the nephews of the late Natalio

Banawa, brought Atty. Percival Catane to the house of Banawa
and Fiel to draw the document of partition of properties.
Because of the advice of Atty. Catane to Dominga Fiel, the later
signed the partition and was not given a copy.
A few months after, Dominga Fiel realized that her share in a

partition was very much less than what she ought to received.
She went to Atty. Percival B. Catane to secure the copy of the
partition. On March 3, 1971 a complaint was filed by Dominga
Fiel.
The lower court rendered its decision ordering the plaintiff and
the defendants to divide the properties which the Court found to
be owned in common by Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa, one
half to Dominga Fiel and the other half to the heir of Natalio
Banawa.
The defendants in their appeal raised that the lower court erred
in not giving force and effect to the deed of partition executed
by the parties, not declaring null and void the donations made
by Natalo Banawa to Dominga Fiel, not finding that there was
no informal civil partnership between Natalio Banawa and
Dominga Fiel and in not dismissing the compliant.
According to Dominga Fiel when she signed the document of

partition, she was still in, a state of shock, fear, mental anguish,
and hysteria because she and Natalio Banawa were the victims
of a robbery which resulted in the death of her common-law
husband
Hence, Dominga Fiel filed a complaint for the annulment of a

partition of the properties allegedly owned in common by her
and Natalio Banawa.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the common-law relationship between Natalo Banawa

and Domingo Fiel,who co-habit for many years and represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife maybe
considered legally "married"?
2. W/N the donation made between Natalo Banawa to
Domingo Fiel during their common-law relationship was valid?
RULING(S) 1. No. Philippine law does not recognized common-law

marriages. A man and woman not legally married who co-
habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and wife in the
community where they live maybe considered legally
"married" in common law jurisdiction but not in the
Philippines. At the same time, our law cannot brush aside the
fact that such relationship are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties which must be
governed by law. For want of a better term, we call the
relationship as "common-law relationships" or even "common-
law marriages" erroneous through the latter term maybe.
Note: Dominga Fiel herself admitted in open court that

she was legally married to another man who was still alive
when Banawa was robbed and killed and who is apparently
alive until the present.
2. No. because Natalio Banawa could not validly make a

donation to Dominga Fiel while they were living together.The
Supreme Court held not to include the following property in
the partition.
The lower Court excluded and donated properties from the
partition and identified them as Paragraph 1 of the
partition recites that Natalio Banawa donated a parcel of
land, portion of Lot No. 5197, Case 5, located at Labinay,
Ozamis City, in favor of Dominga Fiel (Exhibit C) March 15,
1945.
Paragraph 3, Lot of 640 square meters located at Baga,

Tangaub City, and the house therein situated, together
with the furnitures enumerated in the deed of donation
dated September 4, 1963, Doc. No. 47, Page No. 8, Book
No. 1, series of 1963, (Exhibit F) were donated to plaintiff
Dominga Fiel by the late Natalio Banawa.
Article 739 of the Civil Code expressly provides that donations

made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at that
time of donation are void. Not merely voidable but void. There is
no question that Dominga Fiel was living in adultery with Natalio
Banawa when the latter donated the two lots to her. She herself
admitted in open court that she was legally married to another
man who was still alive when Banawa was robbed and killed and
who is apparently alive until the present. The lower Court erred
that "final conviction of the donee or donor is required as a
condition precedent before a donation of this nature can be
declared void."
We find the donation upon which the donee (plaintiff)

premises his cause of action not only unauthenticated, but
null and void as contrary to the public policy. The donation
are, therefore, null and void not only because of Article
739 but also because they are contrary to public policy.
[WHEREFORE, the judgement of the lower Court is

hereby modified to conclude the portion of Lot No. 5197,
C-5 mentioned in Paragraph One and the lot and house
mentioned in Paragraph three of the agreement of
partition among he properties owned in co-ownership by
Dominga Fiel and Natalio Banawa. in all,other respects, the
judgement appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.]
75. People v Mendoza 95 PHIL 845 September 28, 1954
TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. ARTURO

MENDOZA, respondent
PONENTE PARAS, C.J
NATURE/KEYWORDS BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE, ILLEGAL MARRIAGE
FACTS 1. On August 5, 1936, Jovita de Asis and Arturo Mendoza got

married in Marikina, Rizal.
2. On May 14, 1941, during their marriage, Arturo was marred
to Olga Lema in Manila.
3. When Jovita died on February 2, 1943, Arturo contracted
another marriage with Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna. This
last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction
of the crime of bigamy.
4. Arturo contends that his marriage with Lema is null and void,
therefore non-existent at the time he married Jovita and his
marriage with Panlillio was valid because it occurred after
the death of Jovita and cannot be the basis of a charge for
bigamy.
5. Solicitor General argues that, even assuming that Arturo's
marriage to Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal
liability in the absence of judicial annulment of said
bigamous marriage.
6. The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
him guilty of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to
imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years, with costs and the same judgement
has been rendered by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not judicial annulment is needed to render a bigamous
marriage illegal and void?
RULING(S) it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de
Asis.
Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the
appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as
follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any

person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with
any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at
the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by
a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage

contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse
illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
If appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the

belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for
seven consecutive years or generally considered as dead will render
said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent
court.
Also, the cited People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, invoked by the
Solicitor General is essentially different, because the defendant in
the case, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for
lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his
factual contention to be without merit.
CONCLUSION Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
76. People v. Aragon
TITLE PEOPLE V. ARAGON
DATE 1957-02-28
PONENTE LABRADOR, J
NATURE/KEYWO Marriage ; Void Marriage ; Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages

RDS
FACTS ● The accused, Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with

Maria Gorrea on September 28, 1965. While his marriage
with Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused, under the
name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage
with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita
church in Iloilo City.
● After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a
traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he
maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained
his first wife, Maria Gorrea.
● When Gorrea died, the accused brought Faicol to Cebu
where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She later on
suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Proceso and was sent to Iloilo to undergo
treatment. While she was in Iloilo, Proceso Rosima
contracted a third marriage with certain Jesusa Magsalang
in Cebu.
ISSUE(S) ● Whether or not the third marriage entered into is null and
void?
RULING(S) ● No. It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon

complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the
appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife
and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the
last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution
for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
● "The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law of
Act 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted
by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal
and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its validity, as distinguished from
mere annuable marriages. There is here no pretense that
appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de
Asis, had been absent for seven consecutive years or
generally considered as dead, so as to render said
marriage valid until declared null and void by a subsequent
court."
77. Tolentino v. Paras
TITLE SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs.

HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN,
respondents
GR NUMBER L-43905,
DATE May 30, 1983
PONENTE MELENCIO-HERRERA. J.:
NATURE/KEYWO Civil Law; Family Relations; Correction of entry in death

RDS certificate; Publication; Publication, not absolutely necessary
when no other parties are involved; Purpose
of publication; Bigamy; Presumption;
FACTS On July 31, 1943, Amado Tolentino was married to Serafia

Tolentino and this was still subsisting when the
former contracted a second marriage with Maria Clemente on
November 1, 1948. Petitioner charged
Amado with Bigamy and with his plea of guilty, he was
sentenced to suffer the corresponding penalty. After
he served prison sentence, he continued to live with Maria
Clemente until his death. Indicated in his death
certificate is the “Name of Surviving Spouse - Maria Clemente”.
Petitioner sought to correct the name from Maria Clemente to
Serafia G. Tolentino. The lower court
dismissed the petition for the correction of entry under the
Special Proceedings No. 1587-M due to lack of
the proper requisites under the law.
Petitioner then filed the case against private respondent and the
LCR of Paombong Bulacan for her
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of
the death certificate of Amado. It was
dismissed because the correction of entry in the LCR is not the
proper remedy because the issue involved
is marital relationship, a publication is needed in a case like this
pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and there was none, and the subject matter of this case has
been discussed in the first case, Special
proceedings 1587-M, which the Court has already dismissed.
Tolentino filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(S) WON THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN MARIA CLEMENTE

(RESPONDENT) AND AMADO TOLENTINO IS
VALID.
2. WON SERAFIA TOLENTINO SHOULD BE LAWFUL SURVIVING
SPOUSE IN THE DEATH CERTIFICATE
OF AMADO.
RULING(S) WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent

Court is hereby set aside and petitioner,
Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of
the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the
corresponding correction be made in the latter’s death
certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar
of Paombong, Bulacan.
1. NO. The marriage between Maria Clemente and Amado
Tolentino during the lifetime of his spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect.
Amado, under his own plea, was
convicted for Bigamy. The sentence provides the necessary
proof of the existence of marriage
between Serafia and the deceased. There is no better proof of
marriage than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such marriage.
2. YES, since the marriage of Maria and Amado is null and void
from beginning and of no force and
effect. Serafia should be the lawful surviving spouse. The
following reasons was addressed:
● The suit was also a proper remedy because it is an adversary character
as contracted to a mere summary proceeding and a claim of right is
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it.
● The publication required pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
absolutely not necessary for

no other parties are involved and it was the court that was
called upon to order publication.
● The court ruled for the petitioner for the merits. Amado, upon his own
plea, was convicted for

bigamy. There is no better proof than the admission by the
accused of the existence of such
marriage which makes the second marriage with the private
respondent invalid.
78. Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 August 19, 1986
TITLE Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499
GR NUMBER L-53703
PONENTE Paras, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

RDS
FACTS Karl Heinz Wiegel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage celebrated in July 1978 in Makati with Lilia Olivia
Wiegel on the ground that Lilia has previous existing marriage
with Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed
on June 25, 1972 in Quezon City.
Lilia admitted the existence of the said prior subsisting marriage
but claimed that it’s null and void as it was vitiated by force and
that the first husband was already married to someone else.
Petitioner wanted to present evidence of her alleged first void
marriage but was denied at the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City; hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S) What’s the status of the first marriage and the second
marriage?
RULING(S) The first marriage is not void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment
has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent(second marriage) is
VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact
and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel. Accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law.
80. Terre v. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992
TITLE Dorothy B. Terre v. Atty. Jordan Terre
GR NUMBER A.M. No. 2349
DATE July 3, 1992

PONENTE Per Curiam
NATURE/KEYWO "grossly immoral conduct", Procedure in action for declaration

RDS of nullity, requisite for valid remarriage
FACTS - on Dec. 1981, petitioner Dorothy B. Terre charged

respondent Jordan Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with
"grossly immoral conduct" due to contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman whilst their marriage
- the Court required the respondent to answer the complaint, but
he moved from one place to another so that he could not be
found in his residence or place of employment
- after 3 yrs and a half, the Court resolved to suspend respondent
until he appears or files his answer to the complaint
- on Sept. 1985, respondent finally filed an answer with a motion
to set aside and/or lift suspension order, denying petitioner's
allegations; the petitioner denied respondent's reply as well
- the Court denied respondent's motion and referred the
complaint to the OSG for investigation
- the OSG reported the ff. facts: that petitioner met respondent
as 4th yr high school classmates in Cadiz City High School while
she was married w/ Merlito Barcenilla; that respondent was aware
of her marital status; that he courted her continuously until they
moved to Manila to pursue their education, and even resorting to
convincing her that her marriage was void ab initio since she and
her husband were 1st cousins; that she agreed to marry him, and
despite her objection, he wrote "single" as her status explaining
that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to
go to court to declare it as such; that Jason Terre was born out of
their union; that she supported him financially until he
disappeared; and that she found out that he married a certain
Vilma Malicdem
- Jordan claimed that he had believed in good faith that his
marriage with Dorothy was null & void ab initio and that no action
for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary
ISSUE(S) W/N a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage of

respondent Jordan Terre to petitioner Dorothy Terre is
necessary before entering into a subsequent marriage with
Vilma Malicdem.
RULING(S) YES. Under Art. 40 of the Family Code, it says that, "The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." Even if the 1st marriage
is void, there is still a need for a summary proceeding declaring
such marriage void ab initio. Thus, if a 2nd marriage is
contracted without first securing the declaration of nullity with
regard to the 1st marriage, then the 2nd marriage is also void.
Plus, bigamy is also committed.
Respondent was thus disbarred for his "grossly immoral conduct"
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for his actions.
82. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. MARIA FE CANTOR_ ANTONA
TITLE Republic vs. Cantor
PONENTE BRION, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Petition of Declaration of Presumptive Death

RDS
FACTS The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20,

1997. They lived together as husband and wife in their conjugal
dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato.
Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel
brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach
"sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate
moments; and (2) Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling
and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from
the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the respondent filed before
the RTC a petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death.
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the
respondent’s petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It
concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that
her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years
had passed without the former receiving any news about the
latter or his whereabouts.
ISSUE(S) W/N the respondent had a well-founded belief that her

husband is already dead?
RULING(S)
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive
death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was
already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are
four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all
the requisites are present. Article 41 of the Family Code
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief "
that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. The law did
not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." Its
determination depends upon the circumstances on a case-to-
case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one). In the present case, efforts of the respondent fell
short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence. Also, it has not escaped this Court's
attention that the strict standard required in petitions for
declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by
the lower courts.
82. Republic vs. Granada, 672 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 187512_Agoncillo
TITLE Republic vs. Granada
GR NUMBER 187512
DATE June 13, 2012
PONENTE SERENO, J.
NATURE/KEYWO PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the Court

RDS of Appeals.
FACTS In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda)

met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) where both were then working, and
eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on March 1993,
resulting in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio
Granada.
When the company where they’re both working closed down in

1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment and since
then, Yolanda had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have

Cyrus declared presumptively dead and on February 2005, the
RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, filed a

Motion for Reconsideration contending that Yolanda had failed
to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove
her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in
an Order in June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Yolanda moved to dismiss the appeal contending that the

Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death based under Art.
41, Family Code was a summary judicial proceedings in which
the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
The CA granted the motion in January 2009 on the ground of

lack of jurisdiction and ruled that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a
summary proceeding.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was

likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated April 3, 2009.
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not the filed petition for presumption of Death of

husband is proper.
2. Whether or not the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s

grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent presented.
RULING(S) 1. Whether or not the filed petition for presumption of Death of

husband is proper.
In the assailed Resolution dated January 23, 2009, the CA

dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code.
We affirm the CA ruling. Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”
(Underscoring supplied.)
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the Republic likewise appealed

the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s

gran t of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for

Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by
Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco, United States v. Biasbas

and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro as authorities on
the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s

affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British
subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving
birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel
working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of
the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to
establish his “well-founded belief that the absentee is already
dead,” as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling
thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more
stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.
The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no

news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the
spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. In comparison,
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
The Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief”

that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As
noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to

prove the existence of a “well-founded belief” that the absent
spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited
United States v. Biasbas, which it found to be instructive as to
the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to

exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his
first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a
suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner
Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the
RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the
respondent therein had not been able to prove a “well-founded
belief” that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed
the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria
for determining the existence of a “well-founded belief” under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
“For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos
racionales.”
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper

and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by present spouse.” (Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner

points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent
search to locate her absent husband. While her brother
Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In
short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for
her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have
sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the
Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this
end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions. The
Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to

prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law
than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the

modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
NOTES.
No appeal can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
(Republic vs. Tango, 594 SCRA 560 [2009])
The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only to final

and executory decisions—since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or
principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division
may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become
final; A decision rendered by a Division of the Supreme Court in
violation of Section 4(3), Art. VIII of the Constitution would be
in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid—any entry of
judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious” since the
decision is void for being unconstitutional. (Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr.,
643 SCRA 23 [2011])
83. Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937
TITLE In re Intestate of the deceased Marciana Escano. ANGELITA

JONES, petitioner-appellant and appellee, vs. FELIX
HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-
appellant and appellee.

DATE March 6, 1937
PONENTE CONCEPTION, J
NATURE/KEYWO Absentee spouse; Effects

RDS
FACTS Marciana Escano was married to Arthur W. Jones and had a child
named Angelita Jones. The husband, after 4 years secured a
passport to go abroad and since then, nothing was heard from
him. Marciana then instituted on October 1919 in the Court of
First Instance of Maasin, Leyte to have her husband judicially
declared an absentee. On October 25 the declared jones as an
absentee. After satisfaction of having the declaration published in
the Official Gazette and newspaper “El Ideal” from the months of
December 1919, January to June 1920, as provided in Article 186
of the Civil Code, the court, issued another order for the taking
effect of the declaration of absence. Subsequently, on May 6,
1927, Mariciana Escano married Felix Hortiguela.
The Marciana died instestate thereby having Felix as the
administrator of the entire estate. The latter presented an
inventory of properties of the deceased and partitioned the
intestate estate as well as his usufructuary right and the
remaining property given to Angelita Jones (a minor, hence
represented by her guardian, Paz Escano de Corominas).
Angelita Jones married Ernesto Lardizabal and fied a motion which
averred that the marriage between Marciana and Felix is void and
that Angelita is the only heir of the deceased and that because
she was a minor during the partition, she was only represented by
her guardian and not by a counsel.
Angelita contended that the declaration of absence must be
understood to have been made not in the order of October 25,
1919 but in April 23, 1921 to May 6,1927 – only 6 years and 14
days elapsed thus violative of the requirement of 7 years to have
the person declared as an absentee (Sec III par 2, General Orders
No. 68)
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the requirements for the declaration of absence

of Arthur Jones was satisfied and in effect making the marriage
between Marciana Escano and Felix Hortiguela valid
RULING(S) Yes. In contrary, the absence of Arthur Jones should be

counted from January 10, 1918 (the date on which the last
news concerning him was received) until May 6, 1927, the day
of the second marriage, which is more than nine (9) years has
elapsed. Therefore, said marriage is valid and lawful.
Principle:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not
necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared
an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for
its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however,
the law only requires that the former spouse has been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage, that the spouse present does not know
his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No.
68).
85. Republic v. CA and Molina
TITLE Republic v. CA and Molina
PONENTE Panganiban J.
NATURE/KEYWO Psychological Incapacity

RDS
FACTS Facts:
• A year after their marriage in 1985, Reynaldo Molino was
not anymore completely fulfilling his responsibility as a husband
to his wife Roridel Molina and a father to his children which are
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility.
• Reynaldo and Roridel's relationship was strained after an
intense argument. This led to Roridel quitting her job and living
in Baguio City with her parents a year after. A few weeks later,
Reynaldo left Roridel and their child.
• Reynaldo was deemed psychologically incapable because
he spent more time and money with his friends rather than his
family, his parents still provided him with financial assistance,
and he was not honest in providing Roridel with information
about his spending.
• Reynaldo contended that their frequent quarrels were due
to Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends, her refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals and her failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
• The CA affirmed his marriage void in the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• Solicitor General insists that CA made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case.
• The petitioner argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a
defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and
duties."
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of

psychological incapacity.
RULING(S) No. – The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina

subsists and remains valid.
Reynaldo and Roridel's marriage remains valid because
Reynaldo's actions at the time of the marriage did not constitute
as psychological incapacity. There were mere differences and
conflicting personalities between Reynaldo and Roridel, which
both do not satisfy the definition of psychological incapacity.
Roridel's presented evidence showed that she and her husband
were incompatible at worst. Furthermore, the expert testimony of
Dr. Sison presented that incompatibility is not considered a
psychological incapacity and neither is it incurable.
86. Choa v. Choa

TITLE Choa v. Choa
GR NUMBER 143376
PONENTE Panganiban, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Void Marriages - Psychological Incapacity

RDS Family Code, Article 36
FACTS FACTS:
· On March 15, 1981, Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa were married
and then bore two children, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan.
· Respondent (husband) filed before the RTC of Negros
Occidental a complaint for the annulment their marriage.
· On November 8, 1993, he filed an Amended Complaint for the
nullity of their marriage on the grounds of psychological
incapacity.
· After the respondent submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits
petitioner (wife) filed a Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to
Evidence)
· RTC denied the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
the respondent established a quantum of evidence that the
petitioner must controvert.
· Likewise, her Motion for Reconsideration was denied leading
her to elevate the case to the CA by way of a Petition for
Certiorari.
· CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely
interlocutory and that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed Orders.
· Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari to the SC
ISSUE(S) WON Alfonso Choa presented quantum evidence for the

declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity?
RULING(S) [WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed

CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer
to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of
petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.]
No. The court is convinced that the evidence against Leni Choa
is insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity
that would warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Respondent basically complains about the petitioner’s (1) lack

of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an
intention of procreative sexuality. None of these three
constitutes psychological incapacity.
[Santos v. CA] the Court explained that psychological

incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.
The meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious

cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely

shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other.
The totality of evidence presented by respondent was
completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.
87. Barcelona v CA and Tadeo
TITLE Barcelona v CA and Tadeo
GR NUMBER No. 130087
PONENTE Carpio, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Psychological Incapacity

RDS
FACTS · The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner

Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a
whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached
to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon
City. The union begot five children.
· But, on 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R.

Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. This was the “first petition”
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. But,
On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw
Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June
1995.
· On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition

for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This was
the "second petition" before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second
petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to
state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.
The petition alleged that Diana was psychologically

incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their
marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
Since, during their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Ms. Barcelona, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out
of the house. She would go to her sister's house or would play
tennis the whole day
· When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered and the sickness of a child, Ms. Barcelona, withdrew to
herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
· On November 1977, Ms. Barcelona, who was five months
pregnant and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with
the respondent, requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling.
· Since, Diana at the time of the celebration of their marriage
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and
until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found
in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the allegations of the second petition for
Annulment of Marriage sufficiently state a cause of action.
RULING(S) · RTC – through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued the Order

("first order") deferring resolution of the Motion until the
parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing.
· Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration.
However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna
Pison, issued the Order ("second order") denying the motion.
· YES. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison
explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint's
failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such
fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that
contrary to petitioner Diana's claim, a perusal of the allegations
in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated
respondent Tadeo's right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.
· CA - Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial court's first order deferring action on the
Motion and the second order denying the motion for
reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration.
· YES. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the
allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
· SC – YES. A cause of action is an act or omission of the

defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff (Mr.
Tadeo). We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a
cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. “Shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that
either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at
the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its celebration. Since, the petition
stated the legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of Diana,
and her act or omission as seen in facts. And furthermore, the
new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages do not
require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the
petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Hence,
the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. Thus, the
second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to
dismiss on these grounds.
*WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision
dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August
1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
89. Republican v. Encelan- De Los Reyes
TITLE Republican v. Encelan
GR NUMBER 170022
PONENTE Arturo Brion
NATURE/KEYWOR Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological

DS Incapacity, Legal Separation
FACTS FACTS:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita. To support his
family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15,
1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia,
learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with
Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the
conjugal home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since
then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16,
1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition against Lolita for
the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on
Lolita’s psychological incapacity.
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin and insisted
that she is not psychologically incapacitated and she left
their home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and
subsequent abandonment of the family home. He testified
that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and
their children even after he learned of her illicit affair with
Alvin. Also, he presented the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita and found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness, but had been
"unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good and lasting marital relationship.
The RTC ruled and declared in its June 5, 2002 decision,

Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), appealed to the CA. The CA originally set aside the
RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of
personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely
refused to comply with her marital obligations which she
was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration and thereafter the CA set
aside its original decision and entered another, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision, the
CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious
psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her
marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and
deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not sexual infidelity, refusal to perform marital
obligation and abandonment of conjugal dwelling constitute
psychological incapacity, as such, a ground of declaration
of nullity of marriage.
RULING(S) NO. Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the

conjugal dwelling do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds
for legal separation.
To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment
were manifestations of any psychological illness.
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s
alleged psychological incapacity as he merely mentioned
Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling. Also, the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita established that Lolita did not suffer from
any major psychiatric illness. Her interpersonal problems
with co-workers cannot be equated to a wife’s
psychological fitness as a spouse since workplace
obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their
marital counterparts.
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
Psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations"; not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the
juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the
celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the
condition of the errant spouse.
WHEREFORE, SC GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE
the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, respondent
Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan is DISMISSED
90. Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz

TITLE Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
GR NUMBER | G.R. No. 201988
DATE 2017-10-11
PONENTE Justice Del Castillo
NATURE/KEYWO Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Psychological Incapacity,

RDS Legal Separation
FACTS · Petitioner, Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi)

and respondent Nilo Cruz are married sometime in October
21, 1986 and this marriage produced 2 sons. On July 7, 2005,
Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of
psychological incapacity which she averred that it was
medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from "inadequate
personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated
with unresolved oedipal
· complex, while she herself was found to be suffering
from a personality disorder of the mixed type, Histrionic,
Narcissistic with immaturity
· In his answer, Nilo claimed that he was madly in love
with Marivi; that at the start of their relationship, both he and
Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which they
overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were
suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not
singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He
stressed that Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of
their union. In October 13, 2008 the RTC denied the petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution
of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being
a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex."
· The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself
from her father as her standard of an ideal husband when she
married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being
already very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance
that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her
standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her
psychologically incapacitated.
· As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of
"oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his work over
the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his
psychological incapacity because what he did was still for his
family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in
Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this was a result
of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated naggings and her
revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies. CA
Affirmed.
ISSUE(S) · Whether or Not the Article 36 of the Family Code is

applicable in this case
RULING(S) No, Article 36 is not applicable in this case.

· The court ruled that when there a psychological
incapacity-, "that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability
(i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."
The showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. -
The mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity." “Nor does failure of the parties to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons"
amount to psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
The Court found that the conclusions reached by these expert
witnesses (Clinical Psychologists and Doctors) do not irresistibly
point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the
spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality
disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality
disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties
psychologically incapacitated to carry out and carry on their
marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of
evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality
disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable or
permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be
reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.
SC overturned the findings of the RTC and the CA.
Furthermore the evidence on record do not square with the
existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated by law
and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the
breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not necessarily
attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be
imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary human
failings. The court believes that the protagonists in this case are
in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution for each other’s
personality differences, and have thus becomeoverwhelmed by
feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one
another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not and
void marriage.
91. Garlet v. Garlet, G.R. No. 193544, August 2, 2017
TITLE Garlet v. Garlet
DATE August 2, 2017
PONENTE Leonardo-De Castro, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity

DS
FACTS Petitioners: Yolanda E. Garlet
Respondent: Vencidor T. Garlet
Nature of Action: Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage
Facts:
Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet
(respondent) became intimately involved upon partying
and drinking liquor which resulted to the latter getting
pregnant. Vencidor doubted if he fathered the child,
refused to provide support, and even urged Yolanda to
have an abortion. Disagreeing with the proposed abortion,
she gave birth to (Michael) out of wedlock and worked in
Japan as a cultural dancer to support their son. Sometime
in 1992, Yolanda instructed Vencidor to scout for a real
property for investment to which a 210-square meter lot
was bought in Morong, Rizal. The title, however, was
registered under Vencidor’s name. He also sold a 69-square
meter portion of the same property to his in-laws without
consent and mortgaged the property, forcing Yolanda to
redeem it for 50,000 php.
Despite these, the two still got married on March 4,

1994, ending up with a second child (Michelle). During the
marriage, however, the family relied on Yolanda as the
breadwinner, forcing her to go back to Japan to work upon
the exhaustion of her savings. She also found out that
Vencidor squandered her hard-earned money, pawned her
jewelry, incurred debts in her name, and even allowed a
male friend to sleep in the master’s bedroom upon
returning to the Philippines. Issues of gambling, drinking,
and womanizing were also raised. Such prompted Yolanda
to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of Vencidor's psychological incapacity to fulfill his
essential marital obligations to Yolanda and their children,
which Ms. De Guzman assessed to have stemmed from
Vencidor’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder in her
Psychological Report.
The RTC declared the marriage of Yolanda and

Vencidor null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity of respondent in accordance with Art. 36 of the
Family Code.
o The property relation between the
petitioner and respondent under Article
147 of the Family Code was dissolved
o Custody of the children, Michael and
Michelle, awarded to the petitioner subject
to visitorial right of the respondent once a
week at the most convenient time of the
said children.
o Support of 3, 000 php a month and at
least one-half of the cost of their education
were also directed
o The petitioner also shall revert to the use
of her maiden name.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC

judgment, finding that the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained.
o Presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio.
Petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration which the CA

denied for being filed out of time. Hence, the filing of
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE(S) WON Vencidor Garlet’s (Respondent) negative character
traits and vices (alleged drinking, gambling, womanizing,
and refusal to find a job) constitute psychological capacity
and hence be a valid ground for the nullity of his marriage
with Yolanda Garlet (Petitioner)?
RULING(S) No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the
totality of petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish
respondent's psychological incapacity. Yolanda imputes
almost every imaginable negative character trait against
Vencidor, but not only do they not satisfactorily constitute
manifestations of psychological incapacity as contemplated
in the Family Code, but are also riddled with inconsistencies
that are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
- It appears that Vencidor took on several

jobs (refusal to look for a job per se is not
indicative of a psychological defect).
- Vencidor’s alleged drinking and gambling

vices were based on hearsay evidence and
thus, no probative value.
- Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal

to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity.
- Utter lack of factual basis for 'Vencidor's

purported sexual infidelity. (sexual infidelity,
by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is
suffering from psychological incapacity,
Navales v. Navales).
- Verbal exchange between the parties in the

Kasunduang Pag-aayos, reveals that Vencidor
only hid Yolanda's money and jewelry as a
desperate attempt to stop Yolanda from
leaving him, taking with her the children. In
fact, Vencidor repeatedly expressed concern
about saving their marriage, offering to return
the money and jewelry back to Yolanda as
long as they stay together. It was Yolanda
who categorically stated that she no longer
wanted to live with Vencidor, offering to the
latter P300,000 cash, the Pila property, the
jeepney and the tricycle, just for Vencidor to
leave their marital home.
The court also held that Ms. De Guzman's sources and

methodology is' severely lacking the requisite depth and
comprehensiveness to judicially establish respondent's
psychological incapacity. She merely relied on the
information given by petitioner. To put it simply, Ms. De
Guzman is saying that Vencidor was a spoiled child, and
while it can be said that Vencidor has grown up to be a
self-centered and self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of
establishing his psychological incapacity characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to
render Vencidor's marriage to Yolanda void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for

Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated
August 24, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89142 are AFFIRMED.
94. Fujiki V. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 (Llovit)
TITLE Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and The Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of The National Statistics Office
DATE June 26, 2013
PONENTE Carpio, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Certiorari/Who can invoke nullity/Second Division

RDS
FACTS Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who

married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese Shinichi Maekara

(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara
and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for “Judicial

Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage).” Fujiki prayed that:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara
be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
RTC dismissed the petition based on improper venue and the lack
of personality of petitioner. RTC ruled that the petition was in
“gross violation” of the provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). RTC took the view that only
“the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay,
can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was

consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines
on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.
It was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only
to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue.
Fujiki argued further that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of

Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court which provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to “marriages,”
“judgments of annulments of marriage” and “judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning” are subject to cancellation or
correction, is applicable.
RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition and argued that
Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who
can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.
Fujiki filed for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a

petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy
RULING(S) 1. Yes. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not

apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous

marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy
is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only
share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes,
he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,

the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested
in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse “is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse.”
Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in

order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he
can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to

the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be

admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine
Foreign Service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as

a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a

marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which
was already tried and decided under foreign law.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine

courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only

authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the
proceedings.
95. GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN, 2013-07-31 , G.R. No. 189121
TITLE GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN
GR NUMBER 189121
DATE 2013-07-31
PONENTE PONENTE: PEREZ., J.

NATURE/KEYWO Void Marriage
RDS
FACTS · A Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of

Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents Elise
Quiazon & Ma. Lourdes Belen who are Eliseo’s daughter and
common-law wife. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon
(Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
· Elise claimed that she is a natural child of Eliseo having

conceived at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Filiation was proven by her Birth
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon by claiming it was
bigamous.
· Amelia opposed the issuance of the letters of

administration asserting that the venue of the petition was
improperly laid. However, the RTC rendered its decision in favor
of Elise. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.
· Hence, the petition was filed before the SC raising the

argument that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition
for letters of administration and that the CA erred in declaring
that Eliseo and Amelia were no legally married because Elise
has no cause of action on it.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not Elise has a cause of action for declaration of

nullity of marriage despite the death of his father, hence cannot
be deemed as an interested party.
RULING(S) Yes, Elise has a cause of action. The Court ruled that in a
void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of right, such that any interested party may attach the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
Having successional rights that would be prejudiced by her

father’s marriage to Amelia, Elise may without a doubt impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned by filing an action
attaching its validity, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse. As a compulsory heir, Elise has a cause of action for the
declaration of nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia.
Likewise, Elise who stands to be benefited by the distribution of

Eliseo’s estate is deemed to be an interested part. An interested
part is one who would be benefited in the estate. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party.
96. Republicv. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
TITLE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.

MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, RESPONDENT.
DATE 2014-02-10
PONENTE PERALTA, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity

FACTS Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics
Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she
discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye
Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that
she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear
before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She,
thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the
Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife
portion thereof.
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of
Olaybar. Finding that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to
straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions
of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
and held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Considering that
respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to
contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be
feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for
Review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and
Order based on the petitioner’s grounds.
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries
sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the entries
made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided
by the person who appeared and represented her personal
circumstances
ISSUE(S) W/N cancellation of the wife portion in a marriage contract
nullifies the marriage through a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING(S) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the

procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural
requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with.
More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged
marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as
evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different
from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards. The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature
in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore,
was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she
claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.
The Court still maintained their decision in Fujiki v
Marinay where a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry, but stated that in allowing
the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by
cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not,
in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.
98. Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 July 3, 1992
TITLE Terre vs Terre
DATE July 3, 1992
PONENTE Per curiam
NATURE/KEYWO Bigamy, Requisite of Marriage, Voidable Marriage

RDS
FACTS ● Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high
school classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to
Merlito Bercenilla.
● Jordan courted her and this continued when they moved to
Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman law
student, told Dorothy that her marriage with Bercenilla was void
ab initio because they are first cousins.
● Believing in Jordan and with the consent of her mother and
ex-in-laws, she married Jordan on June 14, 1977. Jordan wrote
“single” as Dorothy’s civil status despite latter’s protests.
Jordan said it didn’t matter because marriage was void to begin
with.
● After their marriage, Dorothy supported Jordan because he
was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, who was born
on June 25, 1981. Shortly after she gave birth, Jordan
disappeared.
● She learned that he married Vilma Malicdem. Dorothy filed
charges for abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly
immoral conduct.
● Jordan was already a member of the Bar then. Jordan
claimed that he was unaware of Dorothy’s first marriage and
that she sent her out of the house when he confronted her
about it.
● He contracted the second marriage, believing that his
marriage to Dorothy was void ab initio because of her prior
subsisting marriage.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to

enter into a subsequent marriage
RULING(S) Yes, a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a

subsequent marriage. The Court considered the claim of Jordan
Terre as spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which
underscores that former was in bad faith. In the second place,
the pretended defense is the same argument by which he
inveigled complainant into believing that the complainant’s prior
marriage on Merlito Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab
initio, she was free to contract a second marriage with the
respondent. Applying Article 40 of the Family Code “the
absolute nullity of previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void” for purposes of
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. Since respondent Jordan
Terre is a lawyer he is bound to know that the aforementioned
argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of the Supreme
Court. In this case, before entering to a subsequent marriage,
judicial declaration of nullity must be obtain in accordance with
99. Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376, February 6, 2004
TITLE Morigo v. People
GR NUMBER 145226
PONENTE Quisumbing, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Requisites of a valid marriage, Marriage ceremony

RDS
FACTS Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates

at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City for a period of
4 years. After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was
surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore,
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for

Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the
Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married
on August 30, 1990 at Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in

Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991,
Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992
and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992,
appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago
at Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial

declaration of nullity of marriage in the RTC. The complaint seek
among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually
took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy

in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran.
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the

ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage
with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion
for reconsideration by the prosecution.
Trial court rendered a decision declaring the marriage between

Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision,
which then became final and executory.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate

court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit
Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.
The CA also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by

Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity
in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code and
given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil Code, a declaration of
public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage

ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer.
The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in
accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code.
In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the
date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to
the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married." The records
show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long
become final and executory.
ISSUE(S) Whether petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his

defense of good faith is valid.
RULING(S) NO. Lucio did not commit bigamy as his first marriage was
declared void ab initio or legally inexistent. Under the eyes
of the law, Lucio was never married to Lucia. His defense
of good faith is now moot and academic.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused

must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking,
the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is
no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never
married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it
bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The
existence and the validity of the first marriage being an
essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner,
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was

performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and
Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own.
The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally

construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every
circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure
that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present
case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent,
which is now moot and academic.
100. Tenebro, v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 150758 | February 18, 2004
TITLE Tenebro, v. Court of Appeals
PONENTE YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Judicial Declaration of Nullity (Article 40, Family Code); Effect of
RDS Absence or Defect in the Essential and Formal Requisites
FACTS Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas in

1990. They lived together continuously until the latter part of
1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to Villareyes in 1986. Tenebro showed
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro thereafter
left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
In 1993, Tenebro contracted a third marriage with Nilda

Villegas, before Judge Lee, Jr. of Branch 15, RTC of Cebu City.
When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from
Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to Tenebro. In
a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that Tenebro, was
indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy
against Tenebro.
For his first defense, Tenebro admitted to co-habiting with

Villareyes but he denied that he and Villareyes were validly
married to each other since no marriage ceremony took place to
solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his
office in connection with his work as a seaman. He presented a
certifications issued by the NSO and the City Civil Registry of
Manila attesting that the respective issuing offices have no
record of a marriage celebrated
between Tenebro and Villareyes
For his second defense, Tenebro argues that the declaration of

the nullity of the second marriage to Ancajas on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his
marriage lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding that

Tenebro was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this instant petition for review was filed by Tenebro.
ISSUE(S) 1.W/N the validity of marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes

was sufficiently proved by presentation of marriage contract?
2.W/N there is a valid marriage between Tenebro and
Ancajas?
RULING(S) 1. Yes. The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by

a public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between Tenebro
and Villareyes on and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as

positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of
any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is
absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition
precedent for the validity of a marriage.
The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not

invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.
2. No. A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid

marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of
criminal liability for bigamy.
Note: Entering into a subsequent marriage without complying

with Article 40 makes the second marriage bigamous. Rule
148 governs the property regime of the second void marriage.
[WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto. Whether or
not the decision of the RTC declaring the second
marriage null and void ab initio, is erroneous is
beside the point. Neither the private respondent nor the
State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed
the decision of the court. Entry of judgment was made of
record before the court a quo rendered its decision. Hence,
both the State and the private respondent are bound by
said decision.]
Other Discussion/s: Bigamy – Revised Penal Laws (Reference

only)
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family
Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar
as the State's penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the

subsistence of petitioner's valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner's marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner's psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void,
the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
101. Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
TITLE JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS
DATE July 3, 2013

PONENTE PERALTA, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS ELEMENTS OF BIGAMY
FACTS 1. In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But

then, just three months later in December 1999, he married
another woman named Shirley Tismo.
2. In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity
of the second marriage between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004,
Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
3. Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action
filed by Karla Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage with
Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting marriage
between Medina and Capili.
4. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the bigamy case.
He alleged that since the second marriage was already declared
void ab initio that marriage never took place and that therefore,
there is no bigamy to speak of.
5. The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy
case.
6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and
remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the

second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy
RULING(S) When Capili married Tismo, all the elements of bigamy are
present. The crime of bigamy was already consummated. It is
already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, like in the
case of Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently declared void.
The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no

bearing to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the
bigamy case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential

requisites for validity.
The Supreme Court notes that even if a party has reason to

believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a
second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially
declared as void. The parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is
that the marriage exists.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
102. People v. Odtuhan

TITLE People v. Odtuhan
DATE 2013-07-17
PONENTE PERALTA, J
NATURE/KEYWO Information of Bigamy ; Motion to Quash Information

RDS
FACTS ● On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo Odtuhan, married

Jasmin Modina (Modina). On October 28, 1993, respondent
married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon). He later filed a
petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina. The
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition
and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for
lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003,
Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of
respondent’s previous marriage with Modina, thus, filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent with Bigamy.
● The respondent moved to quash the information on two
grounds: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy;and (2) that the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished.
● The RTC held that there was a valid marriage between
respondent and Modina and without such marriage having
been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon – constitute the crime of bigamy.
● The trial court further held that neither can the information
be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability.
● Respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari
before the CA, assailing the denial of his motion to quash
the information despite the fact that his first marriage with
Modina was declared null and void ab initio prior to the
filing of the bigamy case.
ISSUE(S) ● Whether or not the respondent is proper to raise the

motion to quash information
RULING(S) ● A motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or
information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face
of the information.”
● An examination of the information filed against

respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the
allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it
contained the following allegations: 1) that respondent
is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4)
that the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. Respondent’s evidence showing
the court’s declaration that his marriage to Modina is null
and void from the beginning because of the absence of a
marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish
a fact contrary to that alleged in the information that a
first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he
contracted the second marriage. This should not be
considered at all, because matters of defense cannot be
raised in a motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to
resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit
of a full blown trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution
dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further
proceedings.
103. Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
TITLE SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN

BANGAYAN, JR., respondent.
GR NUMBER G.R. No. 201061.

DATE July 3, 2013
PONENTE CARPIO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS Documentary Evidence; Void Marriages; Marriage License;

Bigamy; Marriages; Property Relations; Land Registration;
FACTS On September 10, 1973, Benjamin Bangayan married

Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. They had 3 children. In 1979,
Benjamin had a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan.
In 1982, Azucena left for US. In 1982, Benjamin and Sally
lived together as husband and wife. On March 7, 1982, Sally and
Benjamin signed a purported marriage contract to appease her
father who was against the relationship. Sally assured Benjamin
that it would not be registered because of the latter’s marital
status. The relationship between Sally and Benjamin ended in
1994 when the former went to Canada with their children.
Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using the simulated
marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage or declaration of nullity
of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage
to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to
a valid marriage.
Benjamin asked the Trial court for the partition of
properties acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of
the Family Code, for him to be the administrator of the properties
and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate
children. A total of 44 properties became the subject of partition.
Benjamin presented his evidences, Sally filed a demurrer to
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a Motion for
reconsideration which the trial court also denied.
In a Decision dated March 26, 2009, the trial court ruled
in favor of Benjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated July 21, 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar that the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was
not issued to Benjamin and Sally. The trial court ruled that the
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due
to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of
Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case.
The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and
did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally
could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as
part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court
ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s
parents who gave the properties to their children, including
Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The trial court ruled that these
properties was owned by Benjamin without monetary
contribution from Sally even if some properties were registered
with Sally as a co-owner.
The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena,
without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state
with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited
Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656
and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s
share reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support
and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties’ children. No other relief
granted.
The Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of

Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunction.
ISSUE(S) 1. WON the marriage between Sally and Benjamin which was
solemnized without a license shall be void.
2. WON the Benjamin is liable for Bigamy.
3. WON the properties acquired by Sally and Benjamin
during their cohabitation should be acquired by them in
common proportion.
RULING(S) 1. YES. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued
to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not
match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February
1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35
which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts
under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio
and non-existent.
2. NO. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in
this case. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity
except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this case,
there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and
Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a
marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
3. YES. According to Article 148, the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
But Sally failed to prove that she has monetary
contribution in most of the properties. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can
be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as [CCT]
Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the
respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared
equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall
accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent appellant shall accrue to
her. The rest of the decision stands.
104. Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968
TITLE GLORIA G. JOCSON v. RICARDO R. ROBLES
GR NUMBER L-23433
PONENTE REYES J.B.L.,
NATURE/KEYWO Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

RDS
FACTS On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the

Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles on the ground
that it was bigamous. It was alleged in the amended complaint
that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958,
defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage with Josefina
Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against
the same defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila
Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that
during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical
maltreatment by her husband, resulting in the premature birth
of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that
marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a
married man.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on
the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the case.
It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to
the marriage was secured by force and intimidation employed
upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly
supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother,
dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, submitted the case for judgment on the
pleadings. On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for
summary judgment was denied.
ISSUE(S) Can a judgment in annulling a marriage be promulgated upon a

stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment?
RULING(S) No. The court rule that before it can pass upon plaintiff's
prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
defendant, there is necessity for proof that when he contracted
marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and
subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary requirement to
establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the
motion for summary judgment. Defendant's plea to have his
marriage declared as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding indications of
collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage.
The court is satisfied that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment in
view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or
a confession of judgment.
105. Tolentino v Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1 March 15, 1974
TITLE Tolentino v Villanueva
DATE March 15, 1974
PONENTE MAKASIAR, J.
NATURE/KEYWO
RDS
FACTS Romulo Tolentino (petitioner) was married to Helen Villanueva
(private respondent) under the solemnization of Quezon City
Judge Mariano Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Romulo on April
26, 1962, filed a petition for the annulment of the said marriage
alleging his consent was obtained through fraud and that he
discovered his wife was pregnant even though they had no sexual
relations prior to the said marriage and that they didn't live as
husband and wife immediately. He also stated that his wife left
his house and that he only learned of her whereabouts in January
of 1962.
Helen, even after the serving of the subpoena and the copy of the
complaint did not submit a response with regards to the suit. Due
to that fact, with the motion of Romulo, the court has declared
the respondent in default and have referred to the City Fiscal
office to conduct an investigation within 60 days in order to know
if there is a collusion between parties in accordance with Art. 88
and 101 of the new civil code.
Romulo only filed a copy of the complaint to the fiscal office and
refused to submit himself to interrogation even after the City
Fiscal have already summoned him thru subpoena. Due to his
non-compliance to such, the respondent Judge on November 6,
1962, denied his filed motion to set the date for the reception of
his evidence in the light of the failure of the City Fiscal to submit a
report of his findings despite the lapse of 60 days from July 10,
1962.
The court ordered on July 29, 1963, to dismissed the said

complaint in the view of the fact that the petitioner is not willing
to submit himself for interrogation by the City fiscal pursuant to
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of the New
Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having

been denied on July 29, 1963, and on April 11, 1964, petitioner
now files his petition to annul the said order of July 29, 1963, and
to compel the respondent Judge to receive his evidence.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the non-compliance of the petitioner of the

interrogation by the City Fiscal as part of the investigation to
ascertain if there is a collusion between parties, may be used as a
ground for the dismissal of the Annulment Case?
RULING(S) The investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to annulment of
marriage where defendant has defaulted, thus it is
sufficient for the dismissal of the said case. The prohibition
against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant
stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract
between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails
to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting
officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity
and sanctity of the marital bonds.
As stated by the Court, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in
case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
“ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be

promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
“In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.”
“ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be

promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment. Tolentino vs. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1, No. L-
23264 March 15, 1974N
The Supreme Court has thus affirmed the order dated July
29, 1963, and dismissed the petition with costs against the
petitioner.
___________
ART. 88 is now amended by ART. 48 of the Family Code

and it states:
“Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.”
“In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no
judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.”
ART. 2035 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines provides

Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions
shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)
106. Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil 19
TITLE Buccat v. Buccat
GR NUMBER GR No. 47101
DATE April 25, 1941
PONENTE AQUINO, J
NATURE/KEYWO Marriage, Validity, Fraud

RDS
FACTS - Plaintiff Godofredo, a law student, prays for the annulment

of his marriage w/ Luida on the grounds that, by
consenting to the marriage, he did so because the
defendant had assured him that she was virgin
- They met in March, were engaged in September, and were
married in November all in year 1938
- After 89 days of cohabiting w/ each other, Luida gave birth
to a child of 9 mos. on Feb, 1939
- As a result, plaintiff left her
- CFI Bagiuo ruled in favor of Luida; CFI raised the issue to
the SC since it only raises a pure legal question
- The Court affirmed
ISSUE(S) W/N Lucida’s concealment of her pregnancy constituted as fraud

as a ground for the annulment of a marriage.
RULING(S) No. The Court did not find any proof that she concealed her
pregnancy, if she did so, plaintiff would’ve noticed considering
he is a law student and she is already under very advanced
pregnant condition.
- Marriage is a very sacred institution: it is the foundation on
which society rests. To cancel it, clear and reliable
evidence is necessary. In this case there are no such
proofs.
107. Aquino v. Delizo
TITLE Aquino vs. Delizo
DATE July 27, 1960
PONENTE Gutierrez, David J.
NATURE/KEYWO PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of

RDS Appeals.
FACTS On December 27, 1954, Fernando Aquino (petitioner) married

Conchita Delizo (respondent).
On said marriage, respondent was already four months

pregnant, a fact that she allegedly concealed from the
petitioner.
In April 1955, about four months after their marriage, the

respondent gave birth and a complaint was filed on the basis of
fraud for the annulment of their marriage.
At the trial, only the marriage certificate was presented. The
court noted that no birth certificate was presented to show that
the child was born within 180 days after the marriage between
the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as
alleged by plaintiff does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage thus dismissed the complaint .
The petitioner was then was able to secure birth certificate and
petitioned to reopen the case for reception of additional
evidence, which is the birth certificate, however, it was denied.
On an appeal to the CA, the negligence for securing the birth

certificate was excused, except the theory that it was not
possible for them to have sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding
unbelievable that plaintiff’s claim that he did not notice or even
suspect that the defendant was pregnant when he married her,
thus the complaint was denied.
Plaintiff filed another motion, and in support to that, presented

documents that he prays will show proof to his claims. The CA
acting upon the motion, ordered the defendant and Assistant
Provincial Fiscal to answer the MR and deferred action on the
prayer of new trial until after the case is disposed of and as the
both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, the
CA again denied the motion.
Plaintiff brought the case to the supreme court thru a petition

for certiorari.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the

petitioner constitutes as fraud and is sufficient basis for
annulment of marriage.
RULING(S) The court ruled that the concealment of the respondent of the fact
that she was pregnant at the time of marriage with another man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage.
Since the respondent was naturally plump, the petitioner could

not have known the former was pregnant at the time of marriage.
Based on medical opinion, the enlargement of the woman’s
abdomen only becomes apparent on the sixth month of
pregnancy. Evidences presented are Affidavit of Cesar Aquino who
admitted as father of respondent’s first born and the petitioner’s
brother, birth certificate of the child showing it was born within
180 days after the date of marriage.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case

remanded to the court a quo** for new trial. Without costs.
**court a quo – the court from which an appeal has been taken.
Further discussions
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86,
par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in
the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action for
the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim
that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant was
held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was
already in an advanced stage of pregnancy (7th month) at the
time of their marriage.
That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar.

Here the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or fat as
alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of

pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is still below
the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the
lower part of the abdomen so that it is hardly noticeable and may,
if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of
the abdomen. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general
and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122.)
If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could

hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not
she was pregnant at the time of their marriage, more so because
she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself
who shows and gives her subjective and objective symptoms, can
only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months
and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc.
Pregnancy, p. 10.)
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they
got married and therefore the child could be their own. This
statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the

new trial, taken together with what has already been adduced
would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by
plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should, therefore, not have denied
the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed
to file her answer thereto. Such failure of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal
has been ordered to represent the Government precisely to
prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the
motion and its annexes, the same can best be determined only
after hearing evidence. In the circumstances, we think that justice
would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
109. Sison vs. Te Lay Li
TITLE Sison v. Te Lay Ti (CA)
GR NUMBER No 7037
DATE May 7, 1952
PONENTE J. JBL Reyes
NATURE/KEYWO Marriage effected through force and Intimidation, Cohabitation

RDS
FACTS NO ONLINE RESOURCE AVAILABLE | This is a digest from Civil

Reviewer Compilation, Re-digested and organized by King B.
In accord with the custom of the Chinese, Juanita and respondent

were arranged to be married but this was only brought up to the
former two weeks before the celebration and that Te Lay Li never
wooed (seek and gain the love and support). However, Juanita
(the bride) did not want to get married with the Te. She would
always oppose the impending marriage but her father whips and
threatens her every time she would do so.
Two days before the wedding, Juanita ran away and went to the
office of the Fiscal. Her father convinced her to go back home with
a promise that he will no longer forcer her to marry the
respondent against her will. After such return, she was kept
locked in the house and on the morning of her wedding day, her
father handed her a knife and made her choose between losing
her life or his if she did not marry Te and because of this, Juanita
consented to marry Te Lay Li.
There were two weddings that transpired. The First was

celebrated by Judge Hofilena and the second wedding was
solemnized by the Chinese consul Mih in conformity with the
Chinese rites. Moments before the first wedding, Juanita
approached Judge Hofilena and told him that she was only being
compelled by her father to marry the groom to be. A certain Mr.
Teng also corroborated this testimony that during the marriage
ceremony, he saw that the Judge was irked by the hesitant
attitude displayed by the bride. Mr. Teng also testified that when
they went to get Juanita from the Fiscal’s office, the Juanita’s
Father confessed that Juanita does not want to marry Te.
After the marriage, Juanita always considered her husband to be
a stranger. She was kept a prisoner in their house and they never
shared the same bed (she slept in a chair). They never had sexual
intercourse except when a time when she was forced by her
husband holding a knife to submit to his wishes. Because of this
mustered courage and escaped
ISSUE(S) W/N The consent to marry given by Juanita was obtained through
force and intimidation
W/N Even supposing that that marriage was void due to lack of
consent, that it was ratified through cohabitation
RULING(S) HELD:
1. YES. Based on the testimonies given by the petitioner and the
Judge as corroborated by Mr. Teng, it is evident that that Juanita
did not want to marry Te but only did so due to force, threat and
intimidation given by her father. Te Lay Li and Juanita’s father did
not deny nor refute the Juanita’s claim of objection to the
marriage (Father was never presented as witness). Mere words
without any corresponding intention will not create the
marriage relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities
indicating consent have been complied with, there is no
valid marriage where the parties do not intend to enter the
marriage.
2. NO. While a marriage effected by force or intimidation

may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation, such
cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from Juanita’s
testimony that there was no voluntary cohabitation on her part
and she was never acquiesced to the status of wife.
110. Ruiz vs. Atienza
TITLE JOSE RUIZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. PELAGIA ATIENZA,

defendant and appellee.
GR # / date of G.R. No. 5986 | March 18, 1941

promulgation
Ponente Bengzon, J.
Nature of Action the Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to
"force” or "violence"
Facts · Previous to February 1938, Jose Ruiz and Pelagia Atienza,

both single, were sweethearts. Loving perhaps too well, she
allowed him, in a moment of weakness, to have his way, with the
result that nine months later she became an unmarried mother.
· After the baby’s birth, i.e., on November 14, 1938,
Pelagia’s father Jose Atienza, Atty. Villavicencio (her cousin-in-
law), and three other persons visited Jose Ruiz at the boarding
house where he lived, in Oregon street.
· They requested, and after some discussion, convinced him
to marry Pelagia.
· With his cousin Alfredo Asuncion, he went with Jose Atienza
and companions to Tanduay Street, where Pelagia was living.
From there, the party, joined by Pelagia and others, went to the
Aglipayan church at Maria Clara Street.
· Four days later, alleging that he had been forced into
wedlock, Jose Ruiz brought this suit to secure its avoidance.
· His counsel has dramatized the visit of Jose Atienza and
companions, and the “plans” drawn to force Jose Ruiz into the
marriage, Jose’s passive and downcast attitude, all in an effort to
maintain the proposition that Jose Ruiz went with them that
afternoon “convinced” by the following “arguments”
a) The threats of the father supported by his balisong
b) The unveiled intimidation by Atty. Villavicencio that if he
would not marry Pelagia Atienza, he would have difficulty when he
would take the bar examinations because, as he said, many have
been rejected admission to the bar on the ground of immorality;
and
c) The promise of Atty. Villavicencio that Ruiz would be
physically “safe” if he would go with them.
Issues Whether or not Jose Ruiz was intimidated into marrying

Pelagia Atienza?
Rulings No. When defendant was invited to go with them and marry
Pelagia, he had some fears that he might be subjected to bodily
harm in retaliation for the dishonour inflicted upon her family.
Appellant would make it appear that that afternoon Ruiz was
practically kidnapped by Pelagia's relatives until after the marriage
ceremony. That cannot be true. He had many occasions to escape,
as pointed out in appellee's brief. He had companions in the house
whom he could have asked for help. There was even the
policeman.
Considering that the law presumes strongly the validity of

marriage once the formal ceremonies have been completed, we
are led to the conclusion that although plaintiff may not have
looked upon the ceremony as the happy culmination of youthful
romance, still the evidence does not warrant pronouncement that
his consent to it was obtained through force or intimidation.
Indeed, we may advert to the provision of the Marriage Law (sec
30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force” or "violence", does
not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does
noting legal effect amount to force or violence. (See article 1267,
Civil Code.)
At any rate, it is unnecessary to pass on the effect of this legal
distinction. For even though appellant has presented his case in
the best possible light, yet appellee’s attorney has successfully
met the issues, upholding the judge's conclusion of fact that
neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration.
111. Searao Vs. Guevarra
Plaintiff and Felix B. SARAO

Appellant
Defendant and Pilar GUEVARA

Appellee
GR # / date of 40 OG 15 SUPPL 263 Date: May 31, 1940

promulgation
Ponente Reyes (A.), J.

(State division or
en banc)
Nature of Action Impotence

Facts In 1936, the plaintiff and defendant got married. The
husband (plaintiff) tried to have carnal knowledge with her wife
(defendant) but she refused. When the night came, the husband
tried again to convince her wife to engage with sexual contact.
During the consummation, the husband discovered that the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ. Her wife also
complained of pains in her private parts. Due to the failure of
the coitus, every attempt on husband's part to have a carnal act
with his wife proved a failure and he doesn’t want to make her
suffer.
Few months after their marriage, the uterus and the
ovaries of the wife were removed due to tumor on the said
parts. The removal caused of incapability of procreation, but
did not, in the opinion of the surgeon, incapacitate her for
copulation. The husband declared that he lost all desire to have
access with his wife and has not tried to do it since then.
Court of First Instance of Laguna, dismissed the husband’s
complaint for annulment of marriage on the ground of impotency.
Issues Whether or not their marriage can be annulled on the ground of

physical impotence
Rulings No. The Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.
Under our marriage law, marriage may be annulled if "either

party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of
entering into the married state, and such incapacity
continues, and appears to be incurable." The husband
construed this law to annul their marriage on the ground of
impotency. In the United States it is generally held that the test
of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to
copulate. As stated by a well-known authority, "the defect must
be one of copulation, not reproduction”. According to the
doctor who operated the wife, the operation did not make her
unfit for sexual intercourse. If the man was not able to
consummate the carnal act with his wife, it was due to his own
voluntary desistance. Moreover, the husband contended that
the marriage was procured through fraud since the wife did not
reveal to him that she was afflicted with a disease in her sex
organs. According to the Court, this contention in untenable
since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has not been
proved at the trial.
112. Jimenez vs. Canizares

TITLE Jimenez v. Canizares
GR NUMBER L-12790
PONENTE PADILLA, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Voidable Marriages, Impotence, FC 45 (5), 47 (5)

RDS
FACTS Pet. - Joel Jimenez

Res. - Remedios Cañizares
Action - Filed a decree annulling the marriage on the grounds of
impotency
· On August 3, 1950 pet. And res. were married before a judge of

the municipal court of Zamboanga City
· Pet. left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they
had been married bec. he discovered that the office of the res.
genitals was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
for copulation
· According to pet. the condition of her genitals existed at the
time of marriage and continues to exist
· Petitioner filed a decree annulling his marriage with the
respondent on the grounds of impotency on June 7, 1955 at the
CFI of Zamboanga
· The res. was summoned and served a copy of the complaint.
She did not file an answer.
· In pursuant to Art. 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the
city attorney to intervene for the State to validate if the pet.’s
claim is true by ordering the res. To:
(1) have a physical examination by a competent lady physician
and
(2) submit a medical certificate on the result.
The court also warned that her failure to do so would be deemed
lack of interest in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered.
· After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, the
Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
· The city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
1. That the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law bec. she had not been
physically examined due to her refusal
2. That instead of annulling the marriage the Court should
have only punished res. for contempt of court and
compelled her to undergo the court’s order
3. That the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the
door to married couples, who want to end their marriage
to collude or connive with each other by just alleging
impotency of one of them.
The motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE(S) WON the court can enter a decree to annul the marriage on
the grounds of presumption of impotence in the refusal of
the respondent to take part in the proceeding and in the
absence of an evidence ordered by the court?
RULING(S) No. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must
be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established, bec. from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree
she had abstained from taking part therein. From such attitude
the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence
could not arise or be inferred because women of this country
are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.
"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency." The
lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable
of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear the ties that have
bound them together as husband and wife.
FALLO: The decree appealed from is set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.
113. Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968

Plaintiff and Appellant Gloria G. Jocson
Defendant and Appellee Ricardo R. Robles
GR # / date of 1968-02-10 | G.R. No. L-23433

promulgation
Ponente REYES, J.B.L., J.

(State division or en banc)
Nature of Action Petition for Annulment and Motion for Summary

Judgment.
Facts · On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced
in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action
for the annulment of her marriage to Ricardo
R. Robles on the ground that it was bigamous.
It was alleged in the amended complaint that
previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27,
1958, defendant Robles had contracted a first
marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a
criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
· Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral
and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs,
claiming that during their cohabitation, she was
subjected to physical maltreatment by her
husband, resulting in the premature birth of
their first child, who died three days later.
·Defendant also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents
with having compelled him by force, threat
and intimidation, to contract that marriage
with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that he
is a married man; and that said threat and
intimidation allegedly persisted until January,
1963 when he was finally able to get away and
live apart from the plaintiff.
·Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of
fact is involved in the case and was allegedly
supported by the joint affidavit of plaintiff's father
and brother.
· Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared
as having been brought about by force and
intimidation, was also denied, the court finding
indications of collusion between the parties in
their attempt to secure the nullification of said
marriage.
Issues W/N the parties can use Art. 47, Para. 4 of the
Family Code as a ground for Annulment?
Rulings NO. On the merits, that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for
summary judgment in view of the first paragraph
of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition
of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a
stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition
for summary judgment practically amount to these
methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING, this proceeding is hereby
dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment
appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the
appellant.
114. Tolentino v. Villanueva
TITLE Tolentino v. Villanueva
DATE March 15, 1974
PONENTE MAKASIAR, J
NATURE/KEYWO Voidable marriage; Procedure in annulment

RDS
FACTS Petitioner Romulo Tolentino prays for the nullification of the

order by respondent Judge on November 6, 1962, which denied
petitioner’s suit for the annulment of his marriage unless he
submits himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the
latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties pursuant to the provision of Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge
dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not
willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal. His
motions for reconsideration were denied, thus present petition
to annul said order and to compel the respondent Judge to
receive his evidence.
ISSUE WON a stipulation of facts is enough ground for a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation?
RULING No. The court held that Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in
suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that
in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of
evidence for the plaintiff.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is
predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of
the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of
the State as of the spouses; because the State and the public
have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these
social institutions against desecration by collusion between the
parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against
annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant
stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract
between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant
fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to
preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds (De
Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs.
Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs.
Cardenas, et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et
al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is
without merit. WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963
IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
115. Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937
TITLE In re Intestate of the deceased Marciana Escano

ANGELITA JONES, petitioner-appellant and appellee,
vs. FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir,
oppositor-appellant and appellee.
DATE March 6, 1937
PONENTE CONCEPTION, J
NATURE/KEYWO Subsequent Marriage when Former spouse is absent, Effects

RDS
FACTS 1. On December 1914, Marciana Escaño married Arthur

Jones in Cebu and had a child named Angelita Jones
thereafter. The husband, after 4 years, secured a passport
to go abroad on January 10 1918 and was then never
heard of again.
2. On October 1919, proceedings were held to have her
husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th, he
was declared an absentee pursuant to the provisions of
article 186 of the Civil Code, with the proviso that said
judicial declaration of absence would not take effect
until six months after its publication in the official
newspapers.
3. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication
thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El
Ideal."
4. On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortigüela and Marciana
Escañowere married before the justice of the peace of
Malitbog, Leyte, and they signed the certificate of
marriage.
5. Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence
must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that
from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the
celebration of the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days
elapsed– making marriage null and void
6. She also assigns that one of the errors of the court is
having declared the failure to record said marriage
(marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the
marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog) does not
affect efficacy and validity.
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not the required minimum 7 years of absence

of former spouse was satisfied to celebrate a valid
subsequent marriage
2. Whether failure to register marriage affects the validity of
marriage
RULING(S) 1. Yes. For the celebration of civil marriage, the law only
requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General Orders, No. 68).
The absence of Arthur Jones should be counted from
January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning him was received, and from said date to May 6,
1927, more than nine years elapsed.
2. No. Regarding the failure to record marriage in the

register:
"Section VIII of General Orders, No.68, as amended,
provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must
transmit the original of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such
certificate shall be fined not less than twenty-five and not
more than fifty dollars; but it does not provide that
failure to transmit such certificate to the municipal
secretary annuls the marriage.
Decision:
Court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as

it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the
administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving
the final account and the project of partition, and in so far as said
order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new
project of partition; denies the appointment of Angelita Jones'
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932,
relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make
a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate
estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana
Escaño, reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal properties.
116. Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil 574 February 29, 1956
Petitioner v. Lourdes Lukban
Respondents Republic of the Philippines
GR # / date of February 29, 1956

promulgation
Ponente J. Bautista Angelo
(State division or en
banc)
Nature of Action · Declaration of Civil Status, Presumption of Death

“Juris Tantum”- Petition for Judicial Declaration that
petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead.
· Petition filed for declaration that the petitioner is a
widow
Facts
Petitioner, Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with
spouse Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the
Paco Catholic Church in Manila. On December 27 of the
same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel
and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent
search made by her. She also inquired about him from his
parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his
whereabouts and they have no knowledge if he is still alive.
Petitioner believes he is already dead because he had been
absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires that her civil statues be defined in
order that she may be relieved of any liability under the
law.
Petitioner filed in the court of CFI of Rizal for a declaration

that petitioner is a widow of her husband that is presumed
to be dead and so that she has no legal impediment to
contract a subsequent marriage. Sol Gen opposed the
petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by
law. Hence the Court dismissed the petition hence this
appeal.
Appellant claims that the present petition can be

entertained because article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
in defining bigamy, provides that a person commits that
crime if he contracts a second marriage “before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings” and, it is
claimed, the present petition comes within the purview of
this legal provision.
Issues Whether or not the petitioner’s petition of declaration that
the he is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be
dead and has no legal impediment got her to contract
subsequent marriage may be authorized by law.
Rulings Court believed that the petition comes within the purview of
the decision made in the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off.
Gaz., 1st Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for
judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by
law, and this must be decided with a necessity depends
upon the fact of the death of the husband. This the court
can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that
he is merely presumed to be dead.
It is also held in that case that “A Judicial pronouncement

to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a
prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court
has to pass. It is therefore, clear that a judicial declaration
that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris
tantum only, a subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final.”
Regarding the Petitioner’s argument with the article 349 of

Revised Penal Code, in defining bigamy, the argument is
untenable for the words “proper proceedings used in said
article can only refer to those authorized by law such as
those which refer to the administration or settlement of
the estate of a deceased person.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without

pronouncement; as to costs.
Judgment Affirmed
117. Gue v. Republic, G.R. No. L-14058, March 24, 1960
Petitioner v. Angelina L. Gue

Respondents Republic of the Philippines
GR # / date of G.R. No. L-14058, March 24, 1960

promulgation
Ponente Montemayor, J.
banc)
Nature NATURE OF ACTION: Petition for Declaration of

William Gue presumptively dead
Keywords: PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; PERSON UNHEARD

FROM IN SEVEN YEARS; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH UNNECESSARY.
Topic as per syllabus: Marriage when one spouse is

absent
Facts Note:
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Ysip, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virgilio V. David for appellant.
Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva
for appellee.
Facts of the Case:

A petition was filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare
her husband, William Gue, presumptively dead, pursuant to
the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, before the Court of First Instance of Manila in
1957. They were married on Oct. 11, 1944 in the City of
Manila and thereafter begot two children, Eugeni and
Anthony, although no properties have been acquired by
said spouses during their union. On January 1946, her
husband, a Chinese citizen, flew to Shanghai to which she
had joined him, August of the same year. 3 years after,
petitioner came back to the Philippines and brought along
with her ONLY their children, clinging to her husband’s
promise to follow her. Despite the letters she had sent him
and the inquiries she made from the Bureau of Immigration
in 1955 and 1958 regarding his whereabouts, however,
William Gue had not been heard of, neither had he written
to her, nor in anyway communication with her as to his
whereabouts; hence this petition.
This case, however, had been dismissed by the trial

court in view of the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court in the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death
of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461.
“There is no right being enforced nor is there a

remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final
determination of his right or status as it is clear
that William Gue never left any estate. It merely
asks for a declaration that William Gue (Husband)
be presumed dead because he had been unheard of
for 7 years. Even if such declaration is judicially
made, it would not improve Angelina Gue’s
(Petitioner/Wife) situation because such
presumption is already established by law.
More so, a judicial pronouncement to that effect,
even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption (accepted as correct unless
proved otherwise) only. It cannot be the
subject to a judicial pronouncement, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or
upon which a competent court has to pass.”
Issues Whether or not a judicial declaration of presumption of

death after absence of for seven years is necessary?
Rulings No. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be
made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. A
judicial declaration that a person unheard from in seven
years; being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to
contrary proofs, cannot reach the state of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed
dead because he had been unheard from in seven years,
would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined.
If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively

dead, because he had not been heard from in seven
years, cannot become final and executory even after
the lapse of the reglementary period within which an
appeal may be taken, for such a presumption, is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof,
then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of not benefit to the
petitioner.
“We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of

the case. The appealed order dismissing the petition is
hereby affirmed, with costs.”
120. Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26, May 07, 1976 (Llovit)
TITLE Redentor Albano, Complainant, vs. Municipal Judge Patrocinio

C. Gapusan Of Dumalneg, Ilocos Norte, Respondent
GR NUMBER Adm. Matter No. 1022-MJ
DATE May 07, 1976
PONENTE AQUINO, J.
Administrative Complaint/Agreement to Separate in

NATURE/KEYWORDS fact/Second Division
FACTS Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Municipal Judge

Gapusan of Dumalneg and Adams, Ilocos Norte seeking
disciplinary action involving latter’s malpractice with
incompetence and ignorance of the law for having prepared
and notarized a document providing for the personal
separation of husband and wife and the extrajudicial
liquidation of their conjugal partnership
In 1941 or 5 years before his appointment to the bench,

Judge Gapusan notarized a document for the separation of
spouses Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta and for the
extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership, which
stipulated that if either spouse should commit adultery or
concubinage, then the other should refrain from filing an
action against the other.
Judge Gapusan denied that he drafted the agreement and

that the spouses had been separated for a long time when
they signed the separation agreement and that the wife had
begotten children with her paramour. He said that there was
a stipulation in the agreement that the spouses would live
together in case of reconciliation and that the separation
agreement forestalled the occurrence of violent incidents
between the spouses.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the document stipulating the agreement to

separate between Valentina Andres and Guillermo Maligta is
valid?
2. W/N Judge Gapusan should be reprimanded because
of notarizing the agreement between the spouses?
RULING(S) 1. No. There is no question that the covenants contained

in the said separation agreement are contrary to law, morals
and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the
institutions of marriage and the family. Marriage is not a
mere contract but an inviolable social institution. The family is
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.
To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family, the

law considers as void "any contract for personal separation
between husband and wife" and "every extrajudicial
agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil Code).
Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extra-judicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
sanction was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna
vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15).
2. Yes. A notary should not facilitate the disintegration of
a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of
the spouses and extra-judicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership. Notaries were severely censured by this Court
for notarizing documents which subvert the institutions of
marriage and the family
Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be

censured for having notarized the void separation agreement.
However, his notarization of that document does not warrant

any disciplinary action against him as a municipal judge
especially considering that his appointment to the judiciary
was screened by the Commission on Appointments.
127. Diego De La Vina vs. Antonio Villareal 41 Phil 13
TITLE Diego De La Vina vs. Antonio Villareal 41 Phil 13
DATE July 31, 1920
PONENTE JOHNSON, J:
Premiminary Injunction; Husband as the Administrator of Conjugal

NATURE/KEYWORDS Property
FACTS Narcisa Geopano, a resident of Iloilo, married Diego de la Vina, a
resident of Negros Oriental, in 1888. They produced nine children and
acquired several properties together. In 1917, Narcisa filed a complaint
in the CFI of Iloilo against Diego alleging that since 1913, her husband
had been having an adulterous relationship with Ana Calog, for which
reason, her husband ejected her from their conjugal home and she was
obliged to live in Iloilo.
Upon said allegations Narcisa prayed for (a) a decree of
divorce, (b) the partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony
pendente lite.
Subsequently, Narcisa filed a motion for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction against her Diego who she learned was
attempting to alienate or encumber conjugal partnership property, over
which he was an administrator. Diego opposed the motion and
demurred to the complaint upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cause nor jurisdiction over his
person.
The trial court overruled the demurrer and granted the
preliminary injunction. Hence, this certiorari petition by Diego
contending that (1) the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction for the action
for divorce because the defendant he was a resident of the Negros
Oriental and Narcisa must also be considered a resident of the same
province; and (2) plaintiff was not entitled to the preliminary
injunction, as under the law, the husband is the manager of the
conjugal partnership and, as such, is empowered to alienate and
encumber the conjugal property without the consent of the wife.
ISSUE(S) W/N Dela Vina, as administrator, is empowered to alienate

and encumber the conjugal property without the consent of
the wife?
RULING(S) As to the first contention the maxim that the domicile of the wife
follows that of the husband, cannot be applied to oust the court of its
jurisdiction. The domicile of a married woman, when the tacit consent
of the husband and other circumstances justify it, for the purposes of
determining jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should
be considered as her domicile where her right may be exercised.
If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband
consents or acquiesces, we see no
reason why the law will not allow her to do so when the husband
unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal
home in order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with
another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be more
justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband.
For her to continue living with him, even if he had permitted it, would
have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital
duty.
Yes. In an action for divorce brought by the wife against the

husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed
for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband,
prohibiting the latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
The law making the husband the sole administrator of the
property of the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and
convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very
nature of the relation between husband and wife, the former will
promote and not injure the interests of the latter. So long as this
harmonious relation, as contemplated by law, continues, the wife
cannot and should not interfere with the husband in his judicious
administration of the conjugal property. But when that relation ceases
and, in a proper action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
partition the conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to
protect the interests of the wife, that the husband's power of
administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar
as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned.
128. Gandionco v Penaranda (TE)
TITLE FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner, vs. HON. SENEN C.
PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and
TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.

PONENTE PADILLA, J.
NATURE/KEYWOR Legal Separation on the ground of concubinage

DS
FACTS 1. Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against

the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco with the Regional Trial Court
presided over by respondent judge for legal separation on the
ground of concubinage as a civil case.
2. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her
husband.
3. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of
support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the
respondent judge.
4. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and
the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent
elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him.
5. He contends that the 1985 Rules of Court provide that civil cases
are suspended such as legal separation and the incidents attached to
it like support pendente lite pending a criminal case arising from the
same offense until final judgment has been rendered and the civil
action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action
thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
6. The court rendered the decision ordering petitioner to pay his wife
and child support pendente lite. The court also denied his petitioner’s
petition to suspend hearing pending the criminal case filed against
him by his wife for concubinage.
7. Petitioner also claims that the presiding judge was biased and
should no longer preside over the case by reason of his decision and
his denial of petitions to suspend the hearings.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not a civil action must be suspended pending a criminal

action for the same offense?
RULING(S) No. The court ruled that a civil action for legal separation can
proceed simultaneously with a criminal case arising from the same
offense.
The court interpreted the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure stating

that: “a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may
proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one “to enforce the civil
liability” arising from the offense even if both the civil and criminal
actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil
action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the
legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains, custody of offspring, support, and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse, among
others. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage,
may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the
action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary.
The civil action is not suspended because it does not intend to

produce the civil liability arising from offense prosecuted under the
criminal action but rather it intends to obtain the right to live
separately with the legal consequences aforementioned. The
support pendente lite was also found to be correctly granted, and in
case petitioner does not agree with the amount may file a motion in
court for modification or reduction.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs

against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
137.
TITLE LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMENTE G. RAMOS,
respondents.
DATE 1972-07-29
PONENTE FERNANDO, J
NATURE/KEYWOR Legal Separation; Action for Legal Separation
DS
FACTS ● The petitioner filed in the sala of respondent judge for legal
separation, concubinage as the ground and an attempt by him
against her life being alleged
● She likewise sought of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
for the return to her of what she claimed to ber her paraphernal
and exclusive property, then under the administration and
management of respondent Clemente Ramos
● Opposition to this hearing invoking Art 103 of the CC—if motion is
heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become
dim. Art 103 dictates that no hearing on an action for legal
separation shall be held before the lapse of six months from filing
of the petition.
CFI: AFFIRMATIVE. Ordered the suspension, upon the plea of the other
respondent, the husband, of the hearing on a motion for a writ of
preliminary injunction filed by petition at the same time the suit for legal
separation was instituted
ISSUE(S) Whether or not Art. 103 bars the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction over properties?
RULING(S) No. Art. 103 does not bar the court from hearing questions regarding
property management between the spouses. Art. 103 provides that “the
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but
if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said
property.” This basis is enough for allowing the court to resolve issues
regarding management of property even before the six-month cooling
off period has been lifted.
A suit for legal separation is something else—the hope that the parties
may settle their differences is not all together abandoned-hence the
interposition of a 6-month period before an action for legal separation is
to be tried—the court should remain passive at this time; it is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is a recognition that the question of
management of their respective property need not be left unresolved
even during the 6-month period. There is justification then for the
petitioner’s insistence that her motion for preliminary injunction should
not be ignored by the lower court—to prevent husband for continually
managing her paraphernal properties.
The period of 6 months is evidently intended as a cooling off period—but

this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does
not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support
pendent lite according to the circumstances. Thus there can be no more
impediment for the lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendants-
appellants
GR NUMBER 37720
DATE 1933-03-07
PONENTE BUTTE, J.:
NATURE/KEYWOR an appeal of the decision of the CFI Ilocos Norte

DS
FACTS · Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April
29, 1919, when they had one child. Shortly after the birth of this
child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan
where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or
sending her anything for the support of herself and their son.
· But, the Ms. Sensano, the respondent was poor and illiterate,
and without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an
existence for herself and her son until she met the accused Marcelo
Ramos who took her and the child to live with him.
· However, upon returning in 1925, the husband filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor.
· The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion
of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in
his treatment of his wife, having abandoned her as he did."
· Then, after completing her sentence, the accused left her
paramour. She thereupon appealed to the municipal president and
the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might
ask his pardon and beg him to take her back.
· But, Mr. Ventura, refused to accept his wife and stated, she
could go where she wished, and that he would have nothing more to
do with her, and she could do as she pleased.
· Since, she was abandoned for the second time, she and her
child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos in the year 1924
and they have lived with him ever since.
· Mr. Ventura knew that her wife and Mr. Ramos were again
living together and he did nothing to assert his rights as the
husband. He left for Hawaii and remained there for seven years
abandoning his wife and child.
· Upon his returning, he filed again the second charge of
adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of
being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710
and the Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, para. 1 and 2.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the husband, Mr. Ventura has the right to file a
criminal case of adultery against the respondents.
RULING(S) Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a
mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse,
we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and
his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the
adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he
is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the

seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which
period it was impossible for him to take any action against the
accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible
for the husband to take any action against the accused during the
said seven years.
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
TITLE People v. Schneckenberger
DATE 1941-11-10
PONENTE MORAN, J p
NATURE/KEYWORD Consent as defense

S
FACTS Accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger and complainant Elena Ramirez

Cartagena agreed to live separately from each other after seven years
of marital life. They executed a document which recites that both
parties agree to live separately from each other for the rest of their
lives and that they will not intervene with the private lives of each
other with complete freedom to act in all concepts.
The accused subsequently secured a decree of divorce
from the civil court of Mexico and contracted another marriage with
his co-accused, Julia Medel. Because of the nullity of the divorce
decreed by the Mexico Court, complainant herein instituted two
actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for
concubinage, and was convicted for the former. On the trial for the
offense of concubinage, accused interposed the plea of double
jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal,
accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE W/N the accused should be convicted of concubinage?
RULING The court held no. The accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused
and the complainant in which they agreed to be "in complete freedom
of action in any act and in all concepts," while illegal for the purpose
for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to
the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the
Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement,
each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other.
As previously ruled by the court in People vs. Guinucod
that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a
criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been
given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We
are now convinced that this is a narrow view in no way warranted by
the language, as well as the manifest policy, of the law. We, therefore,
hold that prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar
the offended party from prosecuting the offense.
Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby
acquitted, without costs.
TITLE BROWN v. YAMBAO, 102 Phil. 168 October 18, 1957
GR # / date of No. L-10699. October 18, 1957

promulgation
Ponente J. REYES
banc)
Nature of Action Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Manila.
Facts Petitioner filed a suit in the CFI of Manila on July 14, 1955
and alleged under oath that his wife engaged in
adulterous relationship with one Carlos Field and begot a
baby girl while he interned by the Japanese invaders from
1942 to 1945 in UST internment camp. Per the Plaintiff,
he learned of his wife’s misconduct in 1945 upon his
release from internment and thereafter the spouses lived
separately and later agreed by executing a document to
liquidate their conjugal partnership and assigning of
properties. Petitioner prayed for the confirmation of the
liquidation agreement, custody of the children and that
the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the
plaintiff and for other remedy as might be just and
equitable.
The court then subsequently declared the wife in default

for failure to answer in due time, despite service od
summons and later directed the City Fiscal to investigate
(jn accordance with Art 101 of the Civil Code) whether or
not a collusion exists between the parties. Assistant City
Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-
examined plaintiff Brown and elicited the fact that Brown
had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. The Court then rendered judgment
denying the legal separation on the ground that the
petitioner also had incurred a misconduct of a similar
nature that barred his right of action under Art 100 of the
Civil Code (that the legal separation may only be claimed
by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage)
and Art 102 and that there had been consent and
connivance since petitioner only filed an action in 1955
when he take cognizance of his wife’s infidelity in 1945.
Issues 1. Whether or not a collusion exists between the
parties.
2. Whether or not the Fiscal should be allowed to

focus in cross-examining the appellant’s relationship
with another woman.
Rulings 1. Yes, the fact of Brown’s cohabitation with a woman
other than his wife, since it bars him from claiming
legal separation by express provision of Art. 100.
Wherefore, evidence of such misconduct, and the
failure of the wife to set it up by way of defense, were
proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be
considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between the spouses.
2. Yes, the inquiry of the Fiscal should be allowed to
focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment
are fully justified or not.
The wife has also not interposed prescription as a defense.

The court then can take cognizance thereof, because
actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment
of marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record. statutory
grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of
similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the
action), it becomes unnecessary to delve further into the
case and ascertain if Brown's inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it
did not, his situation would not be improved. It is thus
needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs

against appellant. So ordered.
Judgment affirmed.
147. Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340 May 30, 1956 (Llovit)

TITLE ROSARIO MATUTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. HIGINIO B.
MACADAEG, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch X, and ARMANDO MEDEL, Respondents.
GR NUMBER GR No. L-9325
DATE May 30, 1956
PONENTE Concepcion, J.
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction/Effect of

NATURE/KEYWORDS Decree of Legal Separation Custody of Children/En Banc
FACTS Armando Medel filed legal separation against Rosario Matute,

upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother,
Ernesto Medel docketed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila the latter, finding Rosario guilty of the charge against
her, decreeing said legal separation, and awarding to
Armando the custody of their four (4) minor children,
Florencia, Manuel, Carmelita and Benito.
Thereafter, Armando went to the United States, leaving the

children in the City of Davao under the care of his sister Pilar
Medel, in whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to
be with her offspring.
Armando returned to the Philippines late in 1954. The

children joined their father in Cebu. With his permission,
Rosario brought the children to Manila in April, 1955, to
attend the funeral of her father. Armando alleges that he
consented thereto on condition that she would return the
children to him within two weeks. However, Rosario did not
do so.
Instead, she filed, a motion praying for the custody of their

children (three of which are already over ten years of age),
since they do not want to go back to their father because he
was allegedly living with another woman and to order
Armando Medel, to support said children by paying their
school fees and giving them a reasonable allowance not less
than P200 a month.
Armando opposed this motion with a petition to punish

Rosario for contempt of court, in view of her failure and
refusal to restore the custody of their children to him. Hon.
Higinio B. Macadaeg, issued an order, absolving Rosario from
the charge of contempt of court, for having secured
Armando's consent, but denying her motion for their custody
and ordering her to deliver them to Armando within twenty-
four (24) hours from notice.
Rosario instituted, against Armando and Judge Macadaeg
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction upon the
ground that said order had been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the children's custody should be awarded to

Rosario?
2. W/N Judge Macaraeg committed grave abuse of
discretion?
RULING(S) 1. No. It is conceded that children over ten (10) years of

age, whose parents are divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the
parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by reason
of "moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, in capacity or
poverty" (Rule 100, section 6, Rules of Court).
Rosario is without means of livelihood and, according to her

own admission, she lives on the charily of her brothers. She
has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only she
would shelter them under the roof of her brothers.
The lower court impliedly deduced, from these circumstances,

that "poverty", among other causes, rendered petitioner unfit
to take charge of her children or made it unwise to place
them under her care.
2. No. There is no question but that respondent Judge

had jurisdiction to pass upon the issue raised by petitioner's
motion for custody of the children, and the petition of
respondent Medel, to declare petitioner guilty of contempt of
court, to wit: whether said custody should be retained by
respondent Medel or should be given to petitioner herein.
Whichever alternative taken by respondent Judge would not

vitiate his choice as being "without or in excess" of
jurisdiction. Whatever mistakes, if any, he may have
committed in the appraisal of the situation on which we do
not express our view in determining the best solution to said
issue or which one of the litigants is best qualified or least
disqualified to take charge of the children, would, at best,
constitute "merely errors of judgment." They are not "errors
of jurisdiction", but errors in the exercise of the jurisdiction
which the lower court admittedly had. Such errors do not
affect the legality or validity of the order complained of. They
may be reviewed by appeal, not by writ of certiorari or
prohibition.
It is true that, insofar as it refers to the custody of the minor

children, said decision is never final, in the sense that it is
subject to review at any time that the Court may deem it for
the best interest of said minors. It is no less true, however,
that, unless and until reviewed and modified, said award
must stand. No such modification having been made, at yet,
respondent Judge had, not only the authority; but, also, the
duty to execute and implement said award.
Without deciding whether the adultery committed by herein

petitioner with her own brother-in-law involves moral
depravity, it is clear to our mind that the affirmative
assumption implicit in the order complained of cannot be
characterized as an "abuse of discretion", much less a "grave"
one.
155. Ko et al v Arambulo et al (TE)
TITLE BENJAMIN A. KO petitioner, v. VIRGINIA DY ARAMBURO,

respondents.
DATE Aug 09, 2017
PONENTE TIJAM, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo (Virginia) is Corazon Aramburo
Ko's (Corazon) sister-in-law, the former being the wife of the
latter's brother, Simeon Aramburo (Simeon). Corazon and
Simeon have another sibling, Augusto Aramburo (Augusto), who
predeceased them. Virginia's co respondents are the heirs of
Augusto, while the petitioners in the instant case are the heirs of
Corazon who substituted the latter after she died while the case
was pending before the CA.
2. On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-
respondents, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership with
Declaration of Nullity and/or Alternatively Reconveyance and
Damages with Preliminary Injunction against Corazon
3. Subject of this case are seven parcels of land located in Tabaco
City, Albay
4. The complaint alleged that Virginia and her husband Simeon
(Spouses Simeon and Virginia), together with Corazon and her
husband Felix (Spouses Felix and Corazon), acquired the subject
properties from Spouses Eusebio and Epifania Casaul (Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania) through a Deed of Cession dated April 10,
1970
5. On April 13, 1970, Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses
Felix and Corazon executed a Deed of Cession in favor of
Augusto's heirs, subject of which is the one-third pro-indiviso
portion of the subject properties.
6. However, allegedly with the use of falsified documents, Corazon
was able to have the entire subject properties transferred
exclusively to her name, depriving her co-owners Virginia and
Augusto's heirs of their pro-indiviso share, as well as in the
produce of the same
7. For her part, Corazon admitted having acquired the subject
properties through cession from their uncle and auntie, Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania. She, however, intimated that although the
said properties were previously registered under Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania's name, the same were, in truth, owned by
their parents, Spouses Juan and Juliana Aramburo (Spouses
Juan and Juliana). Hence, when her parents died, Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania allegedly merely returned the said
properties to Spouses Juan and Juliana by ceding the same to
their children, Corazon and Simeon. She further averred that the
said properties were ceded only to her and Simeon, in that, her
husband Felix's name and Virginia's name appearing in the Deed
were merely descriptive of her and Simeon's civil status, being
married to Felix and Virginia, respectively.
8. Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing a third of
the subject properties with the heirs of their brother Augusto
who predeceased them, hence they executed a Deed of Cession
on April 13, 1970 but later on decided to recall and not
implement the same. In fine, thus, Corazon insisted that only
she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the subject
properties.
9. Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974, Simeon sold
and conveyed his entire one-half share in the co-owned
properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon became the sole owner
thereof and consequently, was able to transfer the titles of the
same to her name. Corazon argued that the subject properties
belong to Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's
conformity to such sale was not necessary.
10. The CA also correctly observed that the forgery, as found by the
RTC, is evident from the admitted fact of strained marital
relationship between Simeon and Virginia and the fact that at
the time the question Deed of Absolute Sale was executed,
Simeon had been living with Corazon in Tabaco City, Albay,
while Virginia and her children were living in Paco, Manila
11. Accordingly, without Virginia's conformity, the Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on December 14, 1974 between Simeon and
Corazon purportedly covering one-half of the subject properties
is voidable.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not declaring the parties as co-owners of the subject
properties may allow the subject titles to be nullified and transferred to
the parties as to their respective portions?
RULING(S) The petition is partly meritorious. At the outset, let it be stated that the
law which governs the instant case is the Old Civil Code, not the Family
Code, as the circumstances of this case all occurred before the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Proceeding, thus, to the issue of ownership, The Court find no reason to

depart from the RTC's ruling as affirmed by the CA -->
“WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiffs:
(1) Declaring the plaintiffs Virginia Dy-Arambulo and Vicky Aramburo-
Lee together with the interested parties the owner of ONE-THIRD (1/3)
portion of the property subject mater of this case; (2) Declaring the
co-plaintiffs (heirs of Augusto Aramburo) likewise the owners of One-
third (1/3) portion of the property subject matter of this case; (3)
Ordering the Cancellation of [TCT] Nos. T-41187,T-41183, T-
41184, T-41185, T-41186, T-48918[4] [sic] and T-49819 and another
ones issued upon proper steps taken in the names of the plaintiffs and
interested parties; and the other plaintiffs, Heirs of Augusto Aramburo,
conferring ownership over TWO-THIRDS (2/3) PORTION of the properties
subject matter of this case; (4) Ordering the defendant to reimburse
the plaintiffs TWO-THIRDS (2/3) of the produce of the properties,
subject matter of this case from the time she appropriated it to herself in
1974 until such time as the 2/3 share are duly delivered to them; and
(5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs by way of damages the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and (6) To
pay the cost of suit. SO ORDERED.”
A. Augusto's heirs own one-third pro-indiviso share in the subject

properties
The courts a quo found that the said deed, ceding a third of the subject
properties to Augusto's heirs, was in fact implemented as evidenced by
Corazon's testimony that she was merely administering the said
properties for Augusto's heirs as her nephews and nieces were still
minors at that time.
We are not convinced of Corazon's bare assertion that the said document
was cancelled merely because she and her brother . Simeon decided not
to implement it anymore. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the
testimony of respondent July Aramburo, one of Augusto's heirs, which
was notably quoted by the petitioners in this petition, it is clear that he,
together with his co-heirs, are co-owners of the subject properties along
with Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and Corazon, by
virtue of the Deed of Cession executed in their favor. The said testimony
clearly stated that Simeon was also merely administering the subject
CONCLUSION Accordingly, petitioners Heirs of Corazon Aramburo Ko, respondents
Virginia Dy Aramburo and all persons claiming under her, as Heirs of
Simeon Aramburo, and respondents Heirs of Augusto Aramburo are
deemed co-owners pro-indiviso of the subject properties in equal one-
third (1/3) share. As such, the titles over the subject properties are
ORDERED cancelled insofar as the heirs of Augusto Aramburo's share is
concerned. Virginia Dy Aramburo and all persons claiming under her
have the right to demand for the value of their one-third (1/3) share in a
proper case. SO ORDERED.
TITLE Veloso v. Martinez
DATE 1914-10-24
PONENTE JOHNSON, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage
FACTS Plaintiff Mariano Veloso commenced an action to recover of the

defendant, personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, deceased, the possession of a certain parcel of land together
with the sum of p125 per month. Defendant Lucia Martinez, widow of
Domingo Franco, set up a general denial and a special defense which
consisted of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500 as attorney's fees
for services rendered by the deceased, which was later withdrawn;
and, second, for the recovery of certain jewelry, of the value of
P6,000, particularly described in the answer of the defendant, alleged
to be in the possession of the plaintiff.
ISSUE W/N the defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the
jewelry described in her answer?
RULING The court held yes, the defendant was entitled to the possession of
said jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to return the same to her and in
case of the plaintiff's failure to return said jewelry to the defendant,
then and in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for such failure,
the sum of P6,000. It is admitted that the jewels in question, before
the possession of the same was given to the plaintiff, belonged to the
defendant personally and that she had inherited the same from her
mother. The record further shows that before the death of Domingo
Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500 and gave as
security for the payment of said sum the jewelry described in the
complaint.
The defendant positively denies the plaintiff’s contentions
that she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she
promised to redeem the same by paying the amount
due. Said exhibit states that the jewelry was contained in a box. It was
also found that the key was in the possession of the defendant.
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that
the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired
from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must
presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As
such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same, until
and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public.
In absence of proof that she delivered the same to her husband, she
could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without
her consent, and without compliance.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is
entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting
to P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore hereby
affirmed, with costs.
TITLE LUIS LIM, administrator, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISABEL GARCIA,

widow of Hilario Lim, defendant-appellee.
DATE 1907-01-11
PONENTE CARSON, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS an appeal from the order of CFI Zamboanga in distributing the estate of
the deceased, Hilario Lim; FC, 109, para. 3.
FACTS · Hilario Lim died intestate sometime in the year 1903, leaving a
widow and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some
50,000 pesos.
· The trial court was of opinion that the entire estate as shown in
the inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property,
except a house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of
10,000 pesos and the 700 pesos for the purchase price paid for a certain
lot, which it had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim.
· Counsel for the administrator, and for the surviving children,

contends that none of the said property should be treated as the property
of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario
Lim, brought to the marriage these properties, and his widow, brought
nothing to the conjugal partnership.
· The setting aside of 700 pesos as the separate property of the

husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the
balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings
thereon, were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds. Hence,
it is a conjugal property.
· It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were

conveyed to the appellee during the coverture by the said Hilario Lim
either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either in event
such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458
of the Civil Code.
· It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land

were not acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and
that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of
exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's
estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate
property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396.
ISSUE(S) Whether not the said lot was a separate property of the appellee
RULING(S) Yes, since, the trial court did not prove that was acquired as a part of
her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption
that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate
(paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character. No error was
assigned by either party touching the amount of the usufructuary
interest in the estate of her husband allowed to the widow by the trial
court, and we cannot, therefore, review the action of the trial court in
this connection.
The judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of
twelve days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten
days thereafter the record remanded to the court below for proper
action. So ordered.
CONCLUSION
64. Maramba v Lozano (TE)
TITLE HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NIEVES DE

LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
DATE June 29, 1967
PONENTE MAKALINTAL., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. On November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the
defendant Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for the
collection of a sum of money.
2. On June 23, 1959, the court rendered a judgment in favor of Maramba
and ordered Lozanos to pay the total sum of Three Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with legal interest
thereon from date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
3. On August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land in the name
of Nieves de Lozano. The notice of sale at public auction was published in
accordance with law and scheduled for September 16, 1960.
4. On September 16, 1960, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made
a partial satisfaction of the judgment in the amount P2,000.00, and
requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960.
5. On October 17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14,
alleging that on November 11, 1952, during the pendency of the case,
defendant Pascual Lozano died. She ruled that the property levied upon
was her paraphernal property, and praying that her liability be fixed at
one-half (½) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending
the resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from
carrying out the auction sale scheduled on October 26, 1960.
6. On October 26, 1960, the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of
Nieves de Lozano which has been levied upon was sold to the judgment
creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12, the balance
of the judgment debt.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds
of the properties sold at public auction in view of the presumption that it
is conjugal in character although in the of only one of the spouses?
RULING(S) No. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the
fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative.
Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in
question is paraphernal.
However, it has been by this Court that the construction of a house at

conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses doe
not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that meantime the conjugal
partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so not
as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The ownership of
the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this
payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership
(Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284; Paterno vs. Bibby Vda. de Padilla, 74
Phil. 377; Testate Estate of Narciso Padilla, G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26,
1961). The record does not show that there has already been a
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between the late Pascual Lozano
and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property levied upon, being
the separate property of defendant Nieves de Lozano, cannot be made
to answer for the liability of the other defendant.
CONCLUSION The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which occurred after
the perfection of the present appeal and which should therefore be
submitted to and passed upon by the trial court in connection with the
implementation of the order appealed from, which is hereby affirmed,
with costs
91. Gayon v Gayon (TE)
TITLE PEDRO GAYON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SILVESTRE GAYON and

GENOVEVA DE GAYON, defendants-appellees.
PONENTE CONCEPCION, C.J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS
FACTS 1. On July 31, 1967, Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the
spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that, on
October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to
Pedro Gelera, for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land
therein described, and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of
Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements thereon, subject
to redemption within five (5) years or not later than October 1, 1957
2. The plaintiff contends that Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code
require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to a land
acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an
order be issued in plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in
and to the aforementioned property.
3. Mrs. Gayon alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on January
6, 1954, that the signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not
hers and contends that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's favor" a.
4. Soon later, she filed a motion to dismiss stating that there is a
"necessity of amending the complaint to suit the genuine facts on
record." Presently, or on September 16, 1967, the lower court issued the
order appealed from, reading:
“Considering the motion to dismiss and it appearing from Exhibit "A"

annexed to the complaint that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of
the land in question, and considering the fact that Silvestre Gayon is now
dead and his wife Genoveva de Gayon has nothing to do with the land
subject of plaintiff's complaint, as prayed for, this case is hereby
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.”
ISSUE(S) Is there a need for an earnest effort toward a compromise in this case?
RULING(S) No. According to Art. 222 of the Civil Code that provides:
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the
limitations in article 2035.”
The phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be

construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which:
Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Genoveva is plaintiff's sister-in-law. "Sisters-in-law" are not listed under

Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Hence,
the case does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's
failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
same.
CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the lower court for the inclusion, as defendant or
defendants therein, of the administrator or executor of the estate of
Silvestre Gayon, if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of
such administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased Silvestre
Gayon, and for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this decision,
with the costs of this instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de
Gayon. It is so ordered.
TITLE Carmen Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio Sy
GR NUMBER L-30977
PONENTE Reyes, J.B.L., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Legal Separation
FACTS On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for

legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in
the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September
1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child;
that they acquired properties during their marriage; and
that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese
woman named Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or
about March 1949.
She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation
that would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio affirmed the allegations and counter-claimed for
the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with
Carmen O. Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and
subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. On May 31, 1968,
Carmen died in a vehicular accident. Counsel for deceased
substituted the deceased Carmen by her father Macario
Lapuz who refused to dismiss the case as filed by Eufemio.
ISSUE(S) 1. Who may file a suit for legal separation?

2. When an action for legal separation is converted by
the counterclaim into one for a declaration of nullity of a
marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
RULING(S)
1. An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses
(there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse
(and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered.
Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself -
actio personalis moritur cum persona.
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for
divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. The heirs
cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse
takes place during the course of the suit (Article 244,
Section 3). The action is absolutely dead.
2. Yes. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication.
They are not inseparable nor was the action for legal
separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by
the counterclaim, for legal separation pre-supposes a valid
marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable
marriage as a pre-condition.
TITLE Development Bank of the Philippines v. Adil
GR NUMBER L-48889
DATE May 11, 1989
PONENTE Gancayco
NATURE/KEYWORDS Charges upon Obligation in CPG, with consent
FACTS February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita

Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the
Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the
Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of
P2,000.00 as evidenced by a promissory note of said date
where they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations.
As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even
after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor,
who was by then a member of the Congress of the
Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11,
1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to
pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.
Spouses were not able to pay the obligation on the
specified date, thus, DBP filed a complaint in the Court of
Iloilo City on September 11, 1970. They were ordered to
pay the DBP jointly and severally. Spouses filed an appeal
to CFI and reversed the decision and counter-claim against
the plaintiff. A motion for reconsideration by the plaintiff
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S) Does the signing of the second promissory note of

respondent Patricio Confessor bind the conjugal
partnership?
RULING(S) Yes: Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such
administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this
case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the
conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
The petition was granted and the decision of the City Court
of Iloilo City was reinstated.
TITLE Modequillo v. Breva
GR NUMBER 86355
DATE May 31, 1990
PONENTE Gancayco
NATURE/KEYWORDS Family Home
FACTS On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the

Court of Appeals in the case entitled "Francisco Salinas, et
al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al. It has become final and
executory and Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay were
held jointly and severally liable. Thus, the Regional Trial
Court of Davao issued a writ of execution to satisfy the said
judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur and an
agricultural land located in Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag,
Davao del Sur both registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao
del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution
was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging that the
residential land located at Poblacion, Malalag is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement
of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the
Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155,
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against
the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of
defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and
the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority was not
approved by the proper government agency. An opposition
was filed by the plaintiffs.
ISSUE(S) Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of

the money judgment aforecited?
RULING(S) No. The debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on
January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the
Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial
court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff
shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the
land.
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
TITLE Casimiro Mendoza v. CA and Teopista Toring Tunacao
GR NUMBER 86302
PONENTE
Cruz, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Filiation; Open and continuous possession of status

FACTS Teopista Toring Tunaca claimed she was the illegitimate
daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her
claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed
him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory
recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of
the court below. Hence, this petition on certiorari.
The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring Tufiacao,
private respondent, alleged that she was born on August
20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and
defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to
Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized
her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and
according her the rights and privileges of a recognized
illegitimate child.
In May 1988, Casimiro Mendoza, then 91 years old, died
and he was substituted by Vincente Toring who claims to be
the sole recognized natural child of Casimiro and stood to
lose much inheritance if Teopista’s claim were to be
recognized.
ISSUE(S) Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her

claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza?
RULING(S) HELD:
Yes. The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in
Article 283 of the Civil Code and it’s reproduced in Article 172
and 175 of the Family Code. Although Teofista failed to prove
that he was in “continuous” possession of the status
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential
requirements, the Supreme Court found that the present
case satisfies the requisites as embodied in Rule 130 Section
39 of the Rules of Court established that status by another
method.
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not
take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to
establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil
Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant
is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence
may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as
well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and
Isaac Mendoza (witnesses), that Teopista was the daughter
of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further
in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court,
providing as follows:
Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and
the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
The requisites in the said provisions were satisfied in the
present case. Hence, the petition was denied. Judgment is
hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be
the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and
entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.
TITLE Title: Feliciano Sanchez v. Francisco Zulueta CA and
Teopista Toring Tunacao
GR NUMBER L-45616
DATE May 16, 1939
PONENTE Avancena, C.J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Support; Petition for Certiorari
FACTS In a civil case no. 3199, plaintiffs, Josefa Diego and Mario
Sanchez claimed for support from Feliciano Sanchez. Josefa
alleged that they are the wife and child of the defendant.
She alleged that the defendant refused and still refuses to
give support since 1932.
In defense, Francisco alleged that Josefa abandoned the
conjugal home on October 7, 1930 without his consent and
that she committed adultery with Macario Sanchez with
whom she had, as a result of that illicit relations a child,
Macario Sanchez.
The following month, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel
the defendant to give them support by way of allowance the
sum of P50.00 monthly. In opposition, Francisco claimed that
Mario is not his legitimate child.
In view of these facts, the defendant filed a petition for
prohibition before the Court of Appeals against the judge of
the Court of First Instance and the plaintiffs. The Court of
Appeals denied the petition, and from this resolution, the
defendant comes to this court on certiorari.
ISSUE(S) ISSUE: Can Francisco be compelled to give support to

Macario Sanchez?
RULING(S) No. We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals erred in
not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the
purpose of determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to
overcome the application. Adultery on the part of the wife is
a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs.
Lerma, 24 Phil., 285). Consequently, as to the child, it is also
a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations, for
in that case, it would not be the child of the defendant and,
hence, would not be entitled to support as such. But as this
defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it
would be unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not
of course necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it
being sufficient the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly
resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of the
merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.
The decision rendered by the Court Appeals is reversed, and
it is ordered that the petitioner be given an opportunity to
present evidence in support of his defense against the
application for support.
TITLE Republic v Marcos
GR NUMBER L-31065
PONENTE Grino-Aquino, J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition for certiori review the order of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Br. Marcos, J.
FACTS On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private
respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of
Nationalist China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino
citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City since her birth on
January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to Sia Bian alias
Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth to
a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958
in the City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her
daughter to be registered as an alien under the name of Mary
Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used
the name Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese
Patriotic School where she studies.
Further, she alleges that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang
Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has
grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz,
as her own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname
"De la Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her
full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la
Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at the
bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the
purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has
not committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment
as she has never been sued in court, and the petition is not
intended to cause damage or prejudice to any third person. She
prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from
May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz.
On February 12, 1969, respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet granted the
petition. The Government, through the Solicitor General,
appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the court's
order is contrary to law.
ISSUE(S) 1. Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction

over the case; and
2. Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition
although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce
proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the
minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang."
RULING(S) 1. Yes. In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified
petition dated March 30,1968, and the published order of the
trial court dated April 4, 1968 read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY
SIA ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG
CHA QUEN, Petitioner.
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions
of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of
the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings, i.e.,
the various names and aliases of the petitioner which she
wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
In Go Chin Beng vs. Republic, L-29574, August 18, 1972, we
held that all aliases of the applicant must be set forth in the
title of the published petition, for the omission of any of such
aliases, would be fatal to the petition even if such other aliases
are mentioned in the body of the petition.
2. Yes. The second ground for the Government's appeal is the
failure of the petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a
proper and reasonable cause for changing the name/names of
her daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change
of name:
(1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
(3) when the change will avoid confusion ;
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage; or
(5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody.
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court,
the reasons offered for changing the name of petitioner's
daughter are: (1) that "her daughter grew up with, and learned
to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; (2)
to afford her daughter a feeling of security and (3) that "Alfredo
de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his
conformity at the foot of this pleading"
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The
general rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if
it will give a false impression of family relationship to another
where none actually exists (Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008,
October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic, L-18284, April 30,
1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963). In Padilla
vs. Republic, 113 SCRA 789, we specifically held that our laws
do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a
person not their father, for to allow them to adopt the surname
of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can result in
confusion of their paternity.
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name
is that it was not filed by the proper party as embodied in
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The petition
for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to
change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by
some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the
petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.
The petition for certiorari is granted.
129. MUŇOZ V. DEL BARRIO
TITLE MUŇOZ V. DEL BARRIO
GR NUMBER G.R. NO. 12505 – R
DATE APRIL 15, 1955
PONENTE FELIX, J.
NATURE/KEYWO Grounds for Legal Separation

RDS
FACTS · Felicidad Muňoz and Jose Del Barrio were married civilly
at the Municipal Court of Manila on September 24, 1942 and
again canonically on October of the same year. Since their
marriage, the couple lived together as husband and wife for the
ensuing six months in the house of the husband’s father at Rizal
Avenue, Manila, and then moved their residence to the
municipality of Bulacan.
· It seems that during their married life, this couple had

frequent quarrels, on which occasions the husband maltreated
his wife by deed, and because the latter was unable to bear
such punishment, in 1947 they unceremoniously separated.
· Notwithstanding this separation of dwellings, they met

each other in the City of Manila, and the wife claims that in
September 1951, she was again maltreated by her husband.
This moved her to institute the present action alleging in the
petition filed on October 26, 1951, among other things, that the
system of conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to
the respondent; that no property has been acquired during the
marriage of the petitioner and respondent except a portion of a
residential land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan, from which no
rentals are derived; that respondent has made several attempts
on the life of the herein petitioner which compelled her to live
separately and apart from the respondent since 1947; and that
respondent has not provided support for petitioner and their
children.
· Hence, she prays the court: (1) that a decree be entered

for the legal separation of petitioner from respondent (2) that
petitioner be awarded the custody of their children (3) that
respondent be directed to contribute to the support of their
children and (4) that petitioner be granted such further and
complete relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
· The respondent filed his answer to the petition denying

the averments made in his wife’s pleading and prayed the court
that said petition be denied and dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE(S) · Whether or not the maltreatments suffered by the

appellant at the hands of the respondent after their separation
of dwelling furnish ground for the legal separation applied for
under Paragraph 2 of Article 97 of the Civil Code.
RULING(S) · In the case at bar the alleged maltreatments to the wife

by the husband occurred before their separation a mensa et
thoro in 1947 must not have amounted to said husband’s
attempts on the life of his wife, since the latter did not institute
any action for the legal separation from him upon the effectivity
of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, and this case was only
brought to court on October 26, 1951, after the alleged
maltreatment of September 1951 had taken place.
· Upon the testimonies of the witnesses regarding the

alleged maltreatments, the respondent only used at most his
bare fists or hands and desisted from giving further
chastisement after the first blows were given at the spur of the
impulse.
· It is argued, however, that this is a civil case and that

appellant is only bound to prove her right of action by
preponderance of evidence and not by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt upon which a conviction for attempted
parricide would rest, and though we may, to a certain extent,
agree with counsel for appellant on this yet we cannot help but
declare that in so far as the intent to kill is concerned, it must
be established with clear and convincing evidence, and that in
the case at bar said intent has not been proved by such
evidence. Petitioner-appellant herself should not have been so
sure of her evidence when instead of the present action she
dared not cause the prosecution of her husband for attempted
parricide as a means of establishing her right to secure the legal
separation she applies for in this case. Wherefore, the decision
appealed from, being in conformity with the law and the
evidence of record, is hereby affirmed without pronouncement
as to costs.
130. Contreras vs. Macaraig_TIJAM
TITLE ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J.

MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
GR NUMBER No, L-29138.
DATE May 29, 1970
PONENTE DIZON, J.:
KEYWORDS Legal separation; One-year period to file action for legal

separation; How computed.
FACTS On March 16, 1952, Elena Contreras married Cesar Macaraig.

Cesar was employed at MICO Offset owned by Elena’s father,
where he met Lily Ann Alcala. After elections of 1961, Cesar
resigned at MICO to be a special agent at Malacanang. He was
rarely home thereafter due to ―series of confidential missions.
It was on September 1962 when Avelino Lubos, the family driver,

saw Cesar living with Lily Ann. On October 1962, Elena refrained
from verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to anger Cesar.
On April 1963, rumors that Cesar was seen with a pregnant

woman. On May 1963, Elena again refrained from asking so as
not to precipitate a quarrel and drive Cesar away.
Elena received reports that Lily Ann had already given birth. To
verify the report Elena sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her father’s
employee. Felicisima saw Cesar carrying a baby in his arms. She
went to the parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar
and Lily Ann. Lucilo Macaraig, Cesar’s father, interceded to
convince Cesar to go back to his wife, but to no avail.
Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, Cesar’s older sister, arranged a meeting
between Lily Ann and Elena, and Lily Ann said that she was
willing to give up Cesar but Cesar did not want to give up the
relationship.
On December 1963, Elena with her 2 children went to see Cesar

and to beg him to return to his legitimate family but Cesar said
that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return.
On December 14, 1963, Elena filed the petition for legal

separation.
CFI dismissed the petition because the 1 year period to file

action has already lapsed
At the time Elena acquired information, which can be

reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living-
in concubinage with another woman, the 1-year period
should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall
not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish
the concubinage before a court of law.
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 00138
dismissing her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed
more than one year from and after the date on which she had
become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.
ISSUE 1. Whether the period of one year provide for in Article 102
of the Civil Code should be counted from September 1962
or from December 1963.
2. WON the legal separation case will prosper.
RULING 1. From December 1963 because the only time Elena really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in
the early part of December 1963 when she went to see
Cesar and beg for his return. It is only on December 1963
that Cesar admitted that he was living with Lily Ann and
would not return to his legitimate wife.
2. Yes, the decision of the court is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and
another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is
entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint;
and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.
142. BUGAYONG v. GINEZ_ De los Reyes
TITLE BUGAYONG V. GINEZ

Benjamin Bugayong, plaintiff-appellant,
Leonila Ginez, defendant-appellee.
GR NUMBER 10033
PONENTE FELIX, J.
KEYWORDS LEGAL SEPARATION, CONDONATION- A ground for dismissal
FACTS Benjamin Bugayong, a US Navy serviceman, was married with

Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan and lived
thereafter with the sisters of Bugayong before he went back to
duty. The couple agreed that Ginez would stay with his sisters
who later moved in Manila.
Sometime on July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-
law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on moved to
Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from plaintiff’s sister-in-
law and some from anonymous writers, which were not
produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of
infidelity of his wife.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for

his wife. They met in the house of the defendant’s godmother.
Thereafter, they both stayed and slept together for 2 nights and
1 day as husband and wife. On the second day, he tried to
verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but
instead of answering, she merely packed up and left which he
took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. Despite such
belief, plaintiff exerted effort to locate her and failing to find
her, he went to Ilocos Norte to soothe his wounded feelings.
On November 18, 1952, He filed a complaint for legal

separation in the Court of First Instance but was dismissed on
grounds which includes the assumed condonation on the act
charged. The same is appealed with the Court of Appeals and
then raised to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE WON the acts of the plaintiff constitute condonation, hence a

ground for dismissal of the action for legal separation
RULING Yes. There was condonation because the husband, Benjamin

actively searched for his wife after she left the conjugal home.
The act of Benjamin in persuading Leonila to come along with
him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be
brought to the house of his cousin and together slept there as
husband and wife and the further fact that in the second night
they slept together in their house as husband and wife
It has been held that a single voluntary act of marital

intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation and where the parties live in the same
house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial
cohabitation.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order

appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
It is so ordered.
143. BROWN V. YAMBAO_Fernandez
TITLE Brown v. Yambao

Petitioner: William H. Brown
Respondent: Juanita Yambao
PONENTE FELIX, J.
KEYWORDS Nature of Action: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance [CFI] of Manila [Tan. J.]
Topic: Legal Separation; Defenses; Recrimination: FC 56 (3)
FACTS On July 14, 1955, Petitioner Brown filed suit in the CFI
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife,
Respondent Yambao. He alleged under oath that his wife
engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of
whom she begot a baby girl while he was interned by the
Japanese invaders and as further fact, he had learned of his
wife's misconduct only in 1945. Upon his release, the spouses
lived separately and later executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to the
erring wife as her share.
The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation

agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage
and that the defendant wife be declared disqualified to succeed
the plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and
equitable. Upon the petition of the plaintiff, however, the wife
was declared in default for failure to answer in due time. Such
led to the Assistant Fiscal’s investigation on whether a collusion
exists between the parties in accordance with Art. 101 of the
Civil Code.
During the cross-examination, it was elicited by the

Assistant Fiscal, Rafael Jose, that after liberation, Brown had
lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment
denying the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had
incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that barred his
right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
ISSUE (Recrimination is the one assigned; Collusion & Prescription are

discussed by Fajutag & Inaldo):
1. Whether or not the Respondent’s adultery and Petitioner
Brown’s misconduct constitute recrimination and/or mutual
guilt and thus bar his right of action for legal separation?
RULING Ruling/s (The SC did not discuss recrimination as it was clear in

the facts and judgment of the CFI. The line below is the ONLY
thing uttered by the SC pertinent to recrimination; those written
as notes are my analysis, as per the facts and judgment of CFI):
Yes. Supreme Court has ruled that there are at least two well
established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought
(commission of similar offense by petitioner and
prescription of the action).
Fallo: The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs

against appellant. So ordered.
Notes: Commission of similar offense by petitioner

(Recrimination)
● Recrimination (Mutual Guilt)
○ Where both parties have given ground for legal
separation, the petition for legal separation must be
dismissed. In other words, for legal separation to
prosper, it must be claimed only by the
innocent spouse and where both spouses are
offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them.
● Based on CFI’s judgment (from the facts)
○ Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying
the legal separation asked, on the ground that,
while the wife's adultery was established,
Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar
nature that barred his right of action under
Article 100.
○ Legal Basis:
Art. 100. The legal separation may be claimed
only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses
are offenders, a legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between
the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause
the dismissal of the petition.
149. PNB v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370
TITLE THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
MA RGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A.
ANSALSO, defendants-appellants.
GR NUMBER G.R. No. L22383

PONENTE VILLAMOR, J.:
KEYWORDS ACTION TO RECOVER SUM OF MONEY
FACTS In a document dated June 20, 1918, the Philippine

National Bank granted the defendants, Margarita Quintos E
Yparraguirre and Angel A. Ansaldo, a credit to the amount of
P31,284, and to secure the payment thereof, as well as the
interest and costs, the defendants mortgaged and pledged to
the bank certain certificates of one hundred fifty-eight shares of
stock of the Bank of the Philippine Islands of the nominal value
of P200 each. Later on, a certificate of fifty shares and another
of forty were substituted by others of 10 and 30 shares,
respectively. Besides these shares, the defendants delivered to
the bank, as additional securities, fifty shares of stock of the
"Compañia Naviera" of the nominal value of P100 each; eighty
shares of stock of the Davao Agriculture and Commercial
Company of P100 each, and 10 second liberty bonds. These
bonds were sold by the plaintiff bank on or before August 19,
1922, having realized the sum of P2,360 from the sale thereof.
On August 21, 1920, the herein defendant, Mr.
Angel Ansaldo, in his answer to a letter of the bank addressed
to him or to his wife, his co-defendant Margarita Q. de Ansaldo,
stated, as may be seen in Exhibit B, that the balance in his
current account in favor of said bank in the sum of P33,558.445
on July 31, 1920, had been examined by him and found correct.
This balance with the interest due from the said date up to
September 30, 1922, amounted to P41,212.05 and after
deducting the credit and deposits from August 1, 1920, to
September 30, 1922, which amount to P9,426.09, there
remains a balance of P31,785.96, payment of which is claimed
in the complaint.
In said document of loan, it does not clearly appear that
the signers were husband and wife, although there is proof in
the record tending to show their civil status as husband and
wife. Nor does it appear in the said document that the signers
have bound themselves solidarily to pay the debt owing to
plaintiff.
ISSUE Whether or not they are jointly liable for the debts incurred
through conjugal partnership?
RULING YES. The aforecited provision negativating solidarity in the

liability of the partners is a consequence of the conclusive rule
of article 1137, of general application to all kinds of obligation,
to the effect that in obligations created by the will of the
parties, solidarity will exist only when it is expressly determined
in the title thereof, giving them such a character. Therefore if
solidarity exists only by stipulation, or by law, it is evident that
the partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the
partnership, because, as Manresa says, there is no legal
provision imposing such burden upon him, and because the
same is not only not authorized by the contract of partnership,
but is contrary to the nature thereof, for gain being the
consideration of the obligation, the latter cannot be extended
beyond the interest that the partner may have therein which is
proportional to his share.
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by
the defendants does not show that they have contracted a
solidary obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the
properties given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of
the conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the
debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly
liable for the payment thereof.
It being understood that the judgment appealed from is
modified in the sense above stated, the motion of the appellants
is denied. So ordered.
169. MANOTOK REALTY INC v. COURT OF APPEALS_ De los Reyes
TITLE MANOTOK REALTY INC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR NUMBER L-45038
DATE April 30, 1987
PONENTE GUTIERREZ JR., J.

KEYWORDS/ACTI Administration of Exclusive Property
ON Petition for Certiorari
FACTS Respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been

occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de
Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained
from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with
the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the
lot.
On April 2, 1950, the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died
and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties
which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were
placed under custodia legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for
the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by
Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. Thus, a remaining
unpaid balance of P5,700.00 which then were not paid due to
unsettled differences with the heirs of the owner upon her
death.
On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a
special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private
respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Subsequently, the petitioner became the successful bidder and
vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision consisting of
44 parcels of land spread out in the districts of Tondo and Sta.
Cruz, Manila, pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor
by the Philippine Trust Company on March 13 and 20, 1959, as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de
Legarda, in Special Proceeding No. 10809 of the Manila probate
court. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale.
In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters
and occupants, the petitioner caused the publication of several
notices and sending of circulars to occupants, advising the
occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court
action with damages would follow.
The private respondent was one of the many occupants who
refused to vacate the lots they were occupying, so that on April
26, 1968, the petitioner filed the action below to recover the
said lot.
The trial court dismissed the petitioner's action after finding that
the Identity of the parcel of land described in the complaint had
not been sufficiently established as the very same piece of land
in the material and physical possession of the private
respondent.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals found the Identity
of the lot sought to be recovered by the petitioner to be the
same as that in the physical possession of the private
respondent and ruled that the only right remaining to the
petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance because
accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor; and
that since the area now in possession of the petitioner which is
that involved in the present case is only 115 square meters, the
balance after deducting the deposit of P1,500.00 is P2,551.85,
and as per order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
said balance should be paid in 18 equal monthly installments,
hence this petition.
ISSUE Whether Don Vicente Legarda could validly dispose of the

paraphernal property?
RULING NO.
The record does not show that Don Vicente Legarda was the
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be
said that the sale which was entered by the private respondent
and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of
Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the Don Vicente on
behalf of Clara Tambunting but was only consummated after
her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have
validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing
administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara
Tambunting.
The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda
and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being
neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property.
Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the
ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate
court.
After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator

of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied
before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court
approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have
been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. But Don Vicente Legarda had no effort to comply
with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the
respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the
installments to the court appointed administrator.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private
respondent is ordered to SURRENDER the material and physical
possession of Lot No. 277, Block I to the petitioner and to pay
the latter the rentals as stated above from May, 1950 until he
surrenders the said lot. The petitioner shall reimburse the
private respondent the amount of P1,500.00 with legal interest
from May, 1950 or offset said amount from the rentals due to it.
Costs against the private respondent.
170. Palanca v. Smith-Bell, 9 Phil. 131 _FAJUTAG
TITLE Alejandra Palanca vs. Smith Bell Co. And Emiliano Boncan
GR # / date of GR No. 3695 / October 26, 1907

promulgation
Ponente J. Johnson
banc)
Nature of Action Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Manila
TOPIC Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive property

Facts Respondent, Smith, Bell & Co., obtained a judgment in a
case filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money and later on executed
and levied upon the property known as no. 16 situated in
an alley running toward the old Santa Mesa race track,
upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co.
After said execution levied upon the property in question,
the parties herein filed an action in the CFI of Manila
against the defendants herein, praying that said court
dictate a sentence declaring Alejandra (Plaintiff) to be the
only and exclusive owner of the property described in the
complaint with a right to the possession of the same and
that said attachment (levy of the property) be dissolved to
which the lower court denied. From this decision,
complainant appealed to SC and raised assignment of
errors, that the court erred in not allowing as proven the
transfer of property No. 16 made on September 20, 1904,
by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra
Palanca de Boncan, and in not finding that she is the sole
and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having
no interest whatever in the property in question.
Issues Whether or not the property can be levied even though

property was declared solely owned by Alejandra, wife of
the respondent.
Rulings YES. Even though the evidence brought to the court shows
that Alejandra Palanca was the indeed the owner of the
said property in the city of Manila, which was given by
Emiliano Boncan, and with the consent of Alejandra was
made as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000
borrowed by Boncan from the International Banking
Corporation. This Php 14,000, borrowed by Emiliano upon
the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal
property, and when the same was reinvested in the
construction of a house which became a conjugal property
and was liable for the payment of the debts of the
husband.
Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer

the assignments of error made by the appellant, and
without discussing the same in detail, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court
should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
174. Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282, Dec 16, 1986 (Llovit)
TITLE EPIFANIA MAGALLON, petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALINA L.
MONTEJO, in her Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, Branch XXI,
CONCEPCION LACERNA, ELECERIA LACERNA and PURITA
LACERNA, respondents

DATE Dec 16, 1986
PONENTE Narvasa, J.
Petition to Review/What Constitutes Conjugal Partnership of

NATURE/KEYWORDS Gains/First Division
FACTS This is a petition which seeks the annulment of a writ of

execution issued by respondent Judge, Hon. Rosalina Montejo
of Davao del Sur Regional Trial Court, in a civil case instituted
by the plaintiffs (private respondents) against Martin Lacerna.
The writ of execution compels the partition of parcel of land in

Barrio Kasuga, Municipality of Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to
which Lacerna had perfected a claim by homestead. The
plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin
Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who died, asserted a
right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her
conjugal partnership with Lacerna.
While Lacerna denied contracting marriage with Pichan, but

admitted cohabiting with her until she allegedly abandoned
him. He also denied paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he
claimed, were fathered by other men, the RTC gave his
denials no credence.
RTC, found that Lacerna had been married to Eustaquia, and

that the plaintiffs were his children with her. Said Court
further found that Martin had begun working the homestead,
and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his
coverture with Pichan. Thus, the plaintiffs were declared
entitled to the half of the land claimed by them.
Martin Lacerna appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court,

which affirmed RTC's decision.
While it was being heard in RTC, no certificate of title to the

land had yet been issued to Lacerna. The Original Certificate
of Title was issued only on November 22, 1978, while
Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC. That said certificate
of title states that it is issued to "MARTIN LACERNA, Filipino,
of legal age, married to Epifania Magallon", the latter being
the present petitioner.
After the decision of the IAC became final and executory, the
respondent Judge, issued an alias writ of execution
commanding the Provincial Sheriff to order Lacerna to divide
and partition the property, ½ of which is the share of
Eustaquia Pichan in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being
Pichan's children are also entitled thereto and deliver portion
of 5 hectares of the aforedescribed lot to the plaintiffs as their
share to satisfy the said judgment.
The writ was served to both Lacerna and Magallon. Magallon

filed a Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution alleging
that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of
herself and Lacerna as stated in the land certificate issued in
1978, and that which is valid, binding and legal unless
declared otherwise in an independent proceedings. She also
prayed that her property be excluded from the enforcement
of the writ of execution. Said motion was denied, as also was
a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Magallon is considered a trustee of the property

in question?
2. W/N Magallon is bound by final judgment rendered in
an action to which she was not made a party?
3. W/N the land certificate proves that the property in
question is a conjugal property of Lacerna and Magallon?
4. W/N the writ of execution should be affirmed by the
Supreme Court?
RULING(S) 1. Yes, Civil Code provides that "If property is acquired

through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes."
The land in question, which rightfully pertained to the

conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan,
the plaintiffs’ mother, and should have been titled in the
names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken,
registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner
herein, Epifania Magallon. In such a situation, the property
should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a
constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto.
2. Yes, it has been held that a judgment against the

husband in an action involving community property, is
conclusive on the wife even if she is not a party, but it has
also been held that a judgment against either husband or
wife with respect to community property in an action to which
the other spouse is not a party does not prevent the other
spouse from subsequently having his or her day in court,
although, of course, a judgment against both husband and
wife is binding on both.
It has been both affirmed and denied that a wife is in such

privity with her husband in respect of property held by them
as an estate in entirety that a judgment for or against him
respecting such property in a suit to which she is not a party
is binding on her.
A judgment affecting a homestead is, according to some

authorities, not binding on a spouse who is not a party to the
action in which it is rendered, unless the homestead is
community property or the homestead claim or interest would
not defeat the action; but, according to other authorities,
where the husband sets up and litigates a claim for the
homestead, an adjudication for or against him is binding on
the wife."
The Court held the petitioner as bound by the judgment

against Lacerna, despite her not having been impleaded in
the action against the latter. This ruling presumes that
petitioner is, as she claims, the legal wife of Lacerna though,
as observed by the IAC, no marriage contract was presented
by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either
before or after the death of Eustaquia Pichan. Indeed, it is
clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land
other than by virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As
a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto.
3. No, the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon" written

after the name of Martin Lacerna in said certificate of title is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the
registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that the
land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner herein.
Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in

Article 160 of the Civil Code that property acquired during the
marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no
proof of her alleged marriage to Lacerna except that which
arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the
certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that
the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been
perfected during Lacerna's marriage to Eustaquia Pichan,
mother of the private respondents.
4. No, the writ of execution, must be set aside, though

not for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of
RTC, affirmed by IAC merely declared the private
respondents entitled to one-half of the land in question,
without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them of
said half portion.
A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it

is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not
clearly included in, what is awarded by said judgment. Even if
the judgment in question is construable as authorizing or
directing a partition of the land, the mechanics of an actual
partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court which does not contemplate or provide for
the intervention of the sheriff in the manner prescribed in the
writ complained of.
175. People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153_ANTONA
TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
FR OILAN LAGRIMAS, accused,
HEIRS OF PELAGIO CAGRO, he irsappellants,
MERCEDES AGUIRRE DE LAGRIMAS, movantappellee.
GR NUMBER G.R. No. L25355
PONENTE FERNANDO., J.:
KEYWORDS/ACTI Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of

ON Attachment and Execution
FACTS An information was filed against the accused, Froilan

Lagrimas, for the murder of Pelagio Cagro. Thereafter, the
heirs of Cagro, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment on the property of the accused,
such motion was granted. The lower court found the
accused guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the appellants. The judgment became final.
A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was issued
by the lower court upon motion of appellants. A levy was
had on eleven parcels of land in the province declared for
tax purposes in the name of the accused. The sale thereof
at public auction was scheduled.
The wife of the accused, Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas,
filed a motion to quash the writ of attachment as well as
the writ of execution with the allegation that the property
levied upon belonged to the conjugal partnership and,
therefore, could not be held liable for the pecuniary
indemnity the husband was required to pay. The then
judge of the lower court granted such motion. Another
judge of the same lower court set aside the above order.
Thereafter, upon appellee filing a motion for the
reconsideration, a third judge revived the original order
declaring the writ of execution as null and void. This order
was appealed to by the heirs of Cagro.
ISSUE W/N the conjugal properties of Froilan and Mercedes Lagrimas

could be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity the husband is
required to pay.
RULING YES. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or

wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after
the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been
covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no
exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; ... ." It is
quite plain, therefore, that the period during which such a
liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal
partnership is
still existing. The law speaks of “partnership assets.” Upon
complying with the responsibilities enumerated in Article
161, the fines and indemnities imposed upon a party of
the conjugal partnership will be satisfied.
If the appealed order were to be upheld, he would be in
effect exempt therefrom, the heirs of the offended party
being made to suffer still further. In doing justice to the
heirs of the murdered victim, no injustice is committed
against the family of the offender.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set
aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for the
reception of evidence in accordance with this opinion.
With costs against appellee Mercedes Aguirre de
Lagrimas.
197. Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson (Voluntary Separation of Property) _FAJUTAG
TITLE ALFONSO LACSON vs. CARMEN SAN JOSELACSON and THE COURT
OF APPEALS
GR # / date of G.R. No. L-23482 / August 30, 1968

promulgation
Ponente J. CASTRO
(State division or
en banc)
Topic Voluntary Separation of Property
Nature of Action Appeal by Certiorari from a decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals
Facts The Issue arises from three cases involving the same parties.
Petitioner herein and Respondent Carmen San Jose-Lacson were
married on February 14, 1953 which to them were born 4 children.
On January 9, 1963. Respondent spouse left the conjugal home
and filed on March 12, 1963 a complaint in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to as the
JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them
and herself. However the spouses succeeded in reaching an
amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support,
and separation of property and on April 27. 1963 they filed a joint
petition in the CFI of Negros Occidental. The amicable settlement
indicate that; Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to judicial
approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code subject to
particular terms and conditions, including Carmen’s waiving of
rights with the properties, custody of their 2 elder children to be
awarded to Alfonso and the younger children to carmen and
monthly allowance to be paid by Alfonso to Carmen for the support
of children in her custody and reciprocal rights of visitation of the
children in the custody of each other. On April 27, 1963 the CFI
approve the foregoing joint petition to “conformable to law” and
incorporating in toto to their compromise agreement, that the
petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to the respondent
house and remitted money for their support.
Carmen then later on prays for relief from the agreement, arguing
that signing it was the only means through which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children. Alfonso opposed the said
motion and moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of res
judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC issued an order sustaining
Alfonso’s opposition and dismissed the case.
Carmen then filed before the CFI a motion for reconsideration of
its judgment with regard to the custody and visitation rights over
her minor children, praying that she be relieved from the
compromise agreement. Alfonso opposed with a motion for
execution. The CFI denied Carmen’s Motion for Reconsideration,
and granted Alfonso’s motion for execution. It further held that
should Carmen fail to return her two older children to Alfonso at
the end of the summer, she may be held liable for contempt.
Carmen appealed both the HDRC and CFI judgments to the CA.
The CA held that the compromise agreement is null and void
insofar as it pertains to the custody and visitation rights over
Enrique and Maria Teresa. The CA also nullified he order granting
Alfonso’s motion for execution. Alfonso thus appealed to his Court.
Issues 1. Whether or not the compromise agreement is valid.
Rulings YES. The compromise agreement and the judgment thereon are
valid insofar as the separation of property and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. The Law allows the separation of the
spouses’ property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership,
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The NCC
provides:
ART 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage

settlements, the separation of property between spouses during
the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.
ART 190 (4), The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife,
as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified any petition
for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
In this case, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of the

separation of their property and the dissolution of their conjugal
property.
However, the judgment thereon is not valid insofar as the custody

and support of the spouses’ children. The JDRC was first to acquire
jurisdiction over the matter of custody and support. However,
when Carmen signed the joint petition embodying the compromise
agreement and filed it with the CFI, she in effect abandoned her
action in the JDRC. This this gave Alfonso the right to as for the
dismissal of the action that Carmen filed with the JDRC. The CFI
therefore was correct to dismiss the case for custody and support
based on those grounds. However, the Court agrees with the CA’s
ruling that the CFI erred in depriving Carmen of the custody of the
younger children, who at the time were 6 and 5 years old
respectively. Art 363 of the NCC provided: “No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such measure. “ A mother and
her child below 7 years of age cannot be separated, unless such
separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by
a court is a mandatory provision. And the CFI’s order granting
custody of children to Alfonso did not state any compelling reason
to separate the 2 children from their mother.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the
resolution dated July 31, 19964 of CA and the orders dated May
28, 1963 and of the JDRC are affirmed.
Decision affirmed with instruction.

201. Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615, Jun 30, 1970 (Llovit)
TITLE OFELIA GOMEZ, as Administratrix of the Estate of the late
ISIDRA GOMEZ Y AQUINO, plaintiff appellee, vs. JOAQUIN P.
LIPANA, defendant-appellant
GR NUMBER GR No. L-23214
DATE Jun 30, 1970
PONENTE Makalintal, J.
Appeal from a decision/Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in

NATURE/KEYWORDS relation to FC 43 (2) and FC 50/En Banc
FACTS The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two

marriages: the first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the
second with Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935. At the time of
the second marriage the first was still subsisting, which fact,
Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage

acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City,
for the price of P3,000.00. The Torrens title for the property
was issued on February 1,1944, in the name of "Joaquin
Lipana married to Isidra Gomez."
On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and childless,

and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives.
On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of

her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the
forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao property in
favor of the said estate, Reliance is placed on Article 1417 of
the old Civil Code.
The trial court, ruled that the second marriage was void ab
initio and that the husband was the one who gave cause for
its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision and declared his
interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of the
estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two

errors to the trial court.
(1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second
marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio;
and
(2) in holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the second marriage may be collaterally

attacked?
2. W/N Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code can be
invoked in this case?
RULING(S) 1. Yes, where the marriage contracted is bigamous and

null and void for being in violation of Section 29 of the
Marriage Law (Act 3613), the marriage is subject to collateral
attack in the intestate proceedings instituted by the judicial
administratrix for the forfeiture of the husband's share in the
conjugal property.
The appellant, relying on Section 30 (b) of Act 3613,

maintains that his marriage to Isidra Gomez was valid and
could be annulled only in an action for that purpose, which in
the light of Section 31 could be filed only by either party
thereto, during the lifetime of the other, or by the former
spouse.
However, it is not Section 30 but Section 29 which governs in

this case, particularly the first paragraph thereof, which says
that "any marriage contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance/' This is the general rule, to which the only
exceptions are those mentioned in subsections:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved and
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid
in either case until declared null and void by a competent
court. of the same provision.
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930
marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or
dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there
is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned in
sub-section (b).
2. No, The first paragraph of Article 1417 states two

causes for the termination of the conjugal partnership: (1)
dissolution of the marriage and (2) declaration of nullity.
Under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1417 it is upon the

termination of the partnership by either of said causes that
the forfeiture of the guilty spouse takes place. Now then,
when did the conjugal partnership formed by virtue of the
marriage of the defendant to the deceased Isidra Gomez
terminate? Obviously when the marriage was dissolved by the
latter's death in 1958.
By that time Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been

eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in 1950.
The legal situation arising from these facts is that while in so
far as the second wife was concerned, she having acted in
good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and gave rise,
just the same, to the formation of a conjugal partnership
wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon dissolution,
no action lies under Article 1417 for the forfeiture of the
husband's share in her favor, much less in favor of her
estate, with respect to which there are after all no children,
but only collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to

recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.
228. Chua Keng Giap v. IAC, 158 SCRA 18, Feb 17, 1988 (Llovit)
TITLE CHUA KENG GIAP, petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT and CHUA LIAN KING, respondents.
DATE Feb 17, 1988

PONENTE CRUZ, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition to Review/Contrary Declaration by Mother/First

Division
FACTS Chua Keng Giap, the petitioner filed on May 19, 1983, a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The private respondent Chua Lian King, moved to dismiss for

lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file
the petition. Chua Keng Giap, it was claimed, had been
declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and
Sy Kao, for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing
Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and
executory.
The motion to dismiss the case was denied by the RTC, who
held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the
maternity of the petitioner.
Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court

reversed RTC's decision in a petition for certiorari filed by the
private respondent. The motion for reconsideration was
denied for late filing. The petitioner then came to this Court to
challenge these rulings.
The petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy

Kao and that it was an error for the respondent court to reject
his claim. He also says his motion for reconsideration should
not have been denied for tardiness because it was in fact filed
on time under the Habaluyas ruling.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N an issue of filiation long been settled by the

Supreme Court can still be resurrected?
2. W/N contrary declaration by the alleged mother is
sufficient proof?
RULING(S) 1. No, the issue of his claimed filiation has long been
settled, and with finality, by no less than the Supreme Court.
That issue cannot be resurrected now because it has been laid
to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals. In that case Sy Kao
flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the
petitioner's mother.
The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled
in a motion to dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is
the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these
allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted. That is correct. He also submits that an order
denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and
therefore reversible not in a petition for certiorari but on
appeal. That is also correct.
There is no point in prolonging these proceedings with an

examination of the procedural objections to the grant of the
motion to dismiss. In the end, the resolution of the merits
would have to be the same anyway as in the aforesaid case.
The petitioner's claim of filiation would still have to be
rejected.
Discussion of the seasonableness of the motion for

reconsideration is also unnecessary as the motion would have
been validly denied just the same even if filed on time.
To allow the parties to go on with the trial on the merits would

not only subject the petitioner's to the expense and ordeal of
litigation which might take them another ten years, only to
prove a point already decided, but more importantly, such
would violate the doctrine of res judicata which is expressly
provided for in Section 49, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
2. Yes, in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, Sy Kao denies that

respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua
Bing Guan. Thus, her filed opposition is based principally on
the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao
and the deceased but of a certain Chua Eng Kun and his wife
Tan Kuy.
Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap
was really her son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who
could say — as indeed she has said these many years — that
Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.
255. Santos v. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344, February 28, 1966 (Llovit)

TITLE PAULINA SANTOS and AURORA SANTOS, petitioners, vs.
GREGORIA ARANZANSO and DEMETRIA VENTURA,
respondents.
PONENTE BENGZON, J.P., J.
NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition for review/ Need for consent/En Banc
FACTS A petition for adoption of Paulina Santos, 17 years old and

Aurora Santos, 8 years old was filed by Simplicio Santos and
Juliana Reyes in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June
4, 1949. The petition, alleged that the whereabouts of the
minors’ nearest of kin, particularly their parents, were
unknown; that since the outbreak of the war said minors have
been abandoned by their parents; and that for years, since
their infancy, said children have continuously been in
petitioners’ care and custody. A guardian ad litem Crisanto de
Mesa, was thereafter appointed for the minors. Said guardian
ad litem forthwith gave his written consent to the adoption.
Paulina Santos, being over 14 years of age, likewise gave her

written consent thereto. After due publication and hearing,
the adoption court (CFI) granted the petition for the adoption.
8 years later, Juliana Reyes died, intestate. Simplicio Santos

filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate. In said petition he stated that the surviving
heirs of the deceased are: he, as surviving spouse, Paulina
Santos and Aurora Santos, 27 and 17 years of age,
respectively. He also asked that he be appointed
administrator of the estate.
Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging that she is first cousin to the

deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment
of administrator. She asserted that Simplicio Santos’ marriage
to the late Juliana Reyes was bigamous and thus void: and
that the adoption of Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos was
likewise void ab initio for want of the written consent of their
parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.
Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise that she is the first cousin

of the deceased Juliana Reyes and adding that she is the
mother of the Paulina Santos, filed an opposition to the
petition of Simplicio Santos to be named administrator, and,
moreover, adopted, as her own, the pleadings filed by
Gregoria Aranzanso.
CFI ruled that the validity of the adoption could not be

assailed collaterally in the intestate proceedings.
While, Court of Appeals reversed CFI's order, finding instead

that the adoption was null and void ab initio due to the
absence of consent by the natural parents of the minor
children, which it deemed a jurisdictional defect still open to
collateral attack.
After denial of their motion for reconsideration by the CA,

Paulina and Aurora Santos appealed to the Supreme Court by
way of petition for review.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N consent by the parents to the adoption is an

absolute requisite?
2. W/N a decree of adoption may be collaterally attacked in
a settlement proceeding?
3. W/N the validity of Simplicio and Juliana's marriage will
affect the right of the adopted children to succeed?
4. W/N Gregoria Aranzanso and Demetria Ventura have the
right to succeed Juliana Reyes, as the latter's first cousins?
RULING(S) 1. No. The Court of Appeals completely relied on American

jurisprudence and authorities to the effect that parental
consent to the adoption is a jurisdictional requisite. The point
to remember, however, is that under our law on the matter,
consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute
requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their
children, consent to the adoption by the guardian ad litem
suffices.
2. No. First of all, it is not quite accurate to say that the

adoption court made no determination of the fact of
abandonment. Abandonment imports “any conduct on the
part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child”.
It means “neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal
obligations of care and support which parents owe to their
children.” It can thus readily be seen that although the CFI
judgment does not use the word “abandoned”, its findings
sufficiently contain a set of facts which truly constitutes a
finding of abandonment.
Second, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of

an inferior or special tribunal depends upon the existence of a
fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact
by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack
upon its order. It follows, therefore, that CA erred in
reviewing, under a collateral attack, the determination of the
adoption court that the parents of Paulina and Aurora Santos
had abandoned them.
Third, it is not in point to argue that Simplicio Santos in fact

concealed the adoption proceedings from the natural parents,
thereby rendering the judgment obtained therein null and void
or being secured by extrinsic fraud. The rule is well recognized
that a judgment can be set aside on the ground of extrinsic
fraud only in a separate action brought for that purpose; not
by way of collateral attack.
3. No, assuming that Simplicio Santos was not validly

married to Juliana Reyes, Juliana Reyes should then be
deemed to have filed the petition for adoption as a person
whose status is single, not married. The defect would then lie
only as to Simplicio Santos, who, as allegedly married to
another person could not adopt without joining his wife in the
petition. It being the estate of Juliana Reyes that is the
subject matter of the settlement proceedings, the flaw, if any,
would not affect the consideration of the right of Paulina and
Aurora Santos to succeed as adopted children of Juliana
Reyes, to the exclusion of respondents.
4. No, Aranzanso and Ventura who claim an interest in the

estate of Juliana Reyes as alleged first cousins, cannot
intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view of
the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted
children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and 1003, New
Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must
be—as in the instant case—considered valid.
Note: In the Motion for Reconsideration of the SC’s decision,

the respondents raised the following arguments:
1. The adoption court made no finding of abandonment,
that such long absence must be willful and that time is not an
element of abandonment.
2. Parental ties are too noble and sacred to be lightly
severed in the absence of a written consent of the parents.
3. If Juliana Reyes was not validly married to Simplicio
Santos their joint petition for adoption would be defective,
since only Simplicio Santos signed ‘the same.
4. That the SC's decision may be interpreted as
foreclosing respondents’ avenue to a direct action to annul the
adoption decree.
SC's ruling:
1. Negligent and careless failure to perform the duties of
parenthood is a significant element of abandonment,
regardless of actual intention. And as to the element of time,
far from being immaterial, it is recognized that: “A strong
basis for a finding of the parents’ abandonment of his or her
child is found in the case where the parent has left the child
permanently or indefinitely in the care of others, given it to
another, or surrendered it entirely.”
2. It cannot be stressed too much that the parental
consent required by the law refers to parents who have not
abandoned their child. And from the findings of the adoption
court, it is rather something remarkable that the natural
parents of the children herein involved paid no heed to the
sanctity and nobility of parental ties for almost twenty years.
3. Simplicio Santos may likewise be deemed to have
signed in behalf of Julian Reyes, as her representative.
Personal signature by the petitioner of the petition to adopt is
not among the requisites of the law. At any rate, any defect
on his has obviously been cured by Juliana Reyes’ subsequent
prosecution of the adoption case.
4. The dispositive portion ought to be read together with
relevant discussions in the body of the decision, especially the
last sentence immediately preceding it: “The same holds true
as long as the adoption must be—as in the instant case—
considered valid.” Should respondents, therefore, succeed by
a direct attack in invalidating the adoption, the dispositive
portion of this Court’s decision herein shall not be deemed to
hinder their rights thereunder.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
282. Naldoza v. Republic, G.R. No. L-55538, March 15, 1982 (Llovit)
TITLE In the Matter of the Change of Names of DIONESIO
DIVINAGRACIA, JR., and BOMBI ROBERTO DIVINAGRACIA to
DIONESIO NALDOZA and BOMBI ROBERTO NALDOZA,
respectively. ZOSIMA NALDOZA, as natural guardian and
guardian ad litem of said minors, petitioner-appellant, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and JUDGE FERNANDO S.
RUIZ of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, Branch IV,
respondents-appellees.
DATE March 15, 1982
PONENTE AQUINO, J.:
NATURE/KEYWORDS Petition to Review/Surnames/Second Division
FACTS Zosima Naldoza was married to Dionesio Divinagracia on May

30, 1970. They begot two children named Dionesio, Jr. and
Bombi Roberto.
Zosima’s husband left her after she confronted him with his
previous marriage with another woman. He never returned to
the conjugal abode. He allegedly swindled Congressman
Maglana in the sum of P50,000.00, one Galagar in the sum of
P10,000.00 also Eloy Gallentes and other persons.
The classmates of Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto allegedly
teased them about their father being a swindler.
Desirous of obliterating any connection between her two
minor children and their scapegrace father, Zosima, filed in
the Court of First Instance of Bohol a petition wherein she
prayed that the surname of her two children be changed from
Divinagracia to Naldoza, her surname. After due publication
and hearing, CFI dismissed the petition.
CFI did not consider as sufficient grounds for change of
surname the circumstances that the children’s father was a
swindler, that he had abandoned them and that his marriage
to Zosima was a second marriage which, however, had not
been annulled nor declared bigamous. It reasoned that the
children’s adoption of their mother’s surname would give a
false impression of family relationship.
From that decision, Zosima Naldoza appealed to this Court
under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N there is a justification for the two minor children to
drop their father’s surname and use their mother’s surname
only?
RULING(S) 1. No, the minors Dionesio, Jr. and Bombi Roberto, who are
presumably legitimate, are supposed to bear principally the
surname Divinagracia, their father’s surname (Art. 364, Civil
Code).
To allow them, at their mother’s behest, to bear only their

mother’s surname (which they are entitled to use together
with their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their
father’s surname, thus removing the prima-facie evidence of
their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in
which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be
consulted. The mother’s desire should not be the sole
consideration.
The change of name is allowed only when there are proper

and reasonable causes for such change (Sec. 5, Rule 103,
Rules of Court).
The reasons adduced for eliminating the father’s surname are

not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the
change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors’
parentage and might create the impression that the minors
are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname
only. That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status
as indicated in their birth records.
The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his
parentage. If, when he fully appreciates the circumstances
and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to
use his mother’s surname only and to avoid using his father’s
surname, then he should be the one to apply for a change of
surname.
Concurring Opinion:
· Barredo, J., concur. At the worst, Dionesio Jr. and
Bombito should be considered as natural children by legal
fiction having the same status, rights and obligations of
acknowledged natural children, (Art. 29, Civil Code), among
which is the right to bear the surname of their father. (Art. 28
(1), Civil Code).

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I .

19. Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989

TITLE RUDY GLEO ARMIGOS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

PONENTE PADILLA, J.:

NATURE/KEYWO Legal Periods

FACTS The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against

A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8

Petitioner’s contention that when he received a copy of the

ISSUE(S) Issue: Whether or not petitioner's computation of the time

Lastly, the Court stressed that human memory is frail. Human

20. Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969

DATE August 27, 1969

NATURE/KEYWO Prescription, Computing a period

FACTS November 14, 1955: the Court of First Instance of Manila

Defendant Miguel Tecson must indemnify Alto Surety and

November 21, 1955: A copy of the decision was served upon

December 21, 1965: National Marketing Corporation, the

Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss said complaint

February 14, 1966: Court issued an order reading which stated

Lack of jurisdiction: the matter of jurisdiction must be admitted.

The complaint made by Namarco was dismissed as having been

ISSUE(S) Whether or not the complaint of Namarco should be dismissed

RULING(S) Judgment affirmed. There is prescription as years are to be

21. Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933

TITLE BARRETO GONZALES v. GONZALES

DATE March 7, 1933

NATURE/KEYWO Absolute Divorce

FACTS Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine and at

Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands,

On the same date that he secured the divorce in Nevada he

The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved

be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the

It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff

ISSUE(S) WON the divorce obtained by the husband in Reno, Nevada is

At all times the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been

While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to

Litigants by mutual agreement cannot compel the courts to

The judgment of the CFI of Manila must therefore be reversed

22. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965

TITLE TENCHAVES V. ESCANO

GR NUMBER G.R. No. L-19671

DATE November 29, 1965

NATURE/KEYWO ART.15 OF NCC (Nationality Rule) - Laws relating to family rights

FACTS On February 24, 1948, without the knowledge of her parents,

Upon discovery of the marriage, parents of Vicenta sought priestly

On September 1954, Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an

On July 30 1955, Pastor filed a complaint in the Court of First

The defendant claimed a valid divorce from the plaintiff and an

Hence, a direct appeal from the judgment of the Court of First

"Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,

[WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as

That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and

23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985

TITLE ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL

GR NUMBER G.R. No. L-68470

DATE October 8, 1985

NATURE/KEYWOR BINDING EFFECT

To maintain the petitioner to still be legally obligated to the

24. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989

TITLE PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA