Sanction and cognizance
Sanction and cognizance
Sanction and cognizance
2016 SCC ONLINE SC 908 . 2016 SCC 9 598 . 2016 SCC CRI 3 696 . 2016 SCC L&S 2 837 .
2016 AIR SC 4125 .
CASE NO.
Criminal Appeals No. 721 of 2016 with No. 722 of 2016, decided on September 6, 2016
DISPOSITION
dismissed
ADVOCATES
K.V. Viswanathan and P.V. Shetty, Senior Advocates (Gautam S. Bhardwaj, Bellippa,
Ashwani Kumar, Dhananjay Bhaskar, D.L. Chidananda and Gurudatta Ankolkar,
Advocates) ;
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Senior Advocate (Joseph Aristotle S., Ms Priya Aristotle, Ms
Shivani Srivastava, Shailesh Madiyal and Chinmay Deshpandey, Advocates)
JUDGES
Dr A.K. Sikri
N.V. Ramana, JJ.
SUMMARY
Before adverting to the question of law that has been raised in these appeals (which is
common to both the cases), we would like to traverse through the facts and the background
which has led to the filing of the present appeals.
Respondent 2 (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”) filed a complaint on the basis
of which a case has been registered against the appellants, who are Accused 3 and 5, for
the offences punishable under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the PC Act”) and Sections 120-B, 427, 447 and 506
read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. The complaint of the complainant contained
the following allegations.
Not only this, Accused 6 also applied for conversion of use of this very land and the
authorities passed the order of conversion in his favour as well.
Dr A.K. Sikri, J.— Before adverting to the question of law that has been raised in these
appeals (which is common to both the cases), we would like to traverse through the facts
and the background which has led to the filing of the present appeals.
2. Respondent 2 (hereinafter referred to as “the complainant”) filed a complaint on the
basis of which a case has been registered against the appellants, who are Accused 3 and 5,
for the offences punishable under Section 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the PC Act”) and Sections 120-B, 427, 447
and 506 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. The complaint of the complainant
contained the following allegations.
3. One Smt Amararnmal was the original owner of immovable property measuring 259.95
acres in Survey No. 597- B and an area measuring 57.30 acres in Survey No. 601- A of
Bellari, having purchased the same from the Government of India under a registered sale
deed dated 19-1-1940, registered in the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Bellari. The complaint
further states that one Smt Akula Lakshmamma and her children had obtained money
decree against one Pitarnbara Modaliyar and in the execution of the said decree the decree-
holder purchased the land measuring 27.25 acres through court and, thus, became owner of
the said property which is situated at Survey No. 597-B. Out of this 27.25 acres of land, an
area measuring 10 acres of land was later acquired by the Government for forming high
level canal by Thungabhadra Project. However, the Revenue Authorities failed to
demarcate the remaining extent of land measuring 17.25 acres which forced Smt Akula
Lakshmamma and her children to file a suit seeking mandatory injunction. In the
meantime, they sold the said 17.25 acres of land to one Mr Parameshwara Reddy, father-
in- law of Mr Gali Janardhana Reddy. On the same day i.e. on 24-10-2002, Smt Akula
Lakshmamma and her family members also entered into an agreement for sale with
Accused 6 (Mr B. Sriramulu) for an area measuring 27.25 acres, which included 10 acres
of land that had already been acquired by the Government. Thus, Accused 6 entered into
agreement for sale even in respect of the acquired land. Moreover, Accused 6 and Mr Gali
Janardhana Reddy are close friends and, therefore, there was no reason to hold that
Accused 6 was not aware of the transaction between Smt Akula Lakshmamma and Mr
Parameshwara Reddy. Accused 6 filed a suit for specific performance based on the said
agreement to sell in which ex parte decree dated 8-4-2003 came to be passed.
4. On 21-4-2003, Mr Parameshwara Reddy (with whom the first agreement to sell was
entered into) sought for change of land use (though in respect of this very land Accused 6
had filed a suit for specific performance). The then Deputy Commissioner accorded his
permission for change of land use vide order dated 17-6-2003. After this conversion order,
Mr Parameshwara Reddy gifted the entire land measuring 17.25 acres in favour of his
daughter, Smt Gali Laxmi Aruna, w/ o Mr Gali Janardhana Reddy vide gift deed dated
21-3-2006. It is alleged that Accused 6 was fully aware of these facts. Notwithstanding the
same, on the basis of the ex parte decree of specific performance obtained by him, he filed
execution petition and obtained the sale deed from the court in respect of the entire 27.25
(a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and
is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government,
of that Government;
(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is
not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of
that Government;
(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his
office.”
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own
knowledge, that such offence has been committed.
(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the Second Class to
take cognizance under sub- section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to
inquire into or try.”
14. When a complaint is received, the court records preliminary evidence of the
complainant on the basis of which it satisfies itself as to whether sufficient evidence is
placed on record which may prima facie constitute such offence. Likewise, police report is
filed under Section 173(2) CrPC on the completion of investigation and on perusal thereof,
the Magistrate satisfies himself about the facts which constitute such offence. Similar is the
position in the third contingency. On this basis, the High Court has opined that since prior
sanction is required only at the time of taking cognizance which stage comes much after
the investigation is ordered under Section 156(3) CrPC at the stage of giving direction to
. The word “cognizance” occurring in various sections in the Code is a word of wide
import. It embraces within itself all powers and authority in exercise of jurisdiction and
taking of authoritative notice of the allegations made in the complaint or a police report or
any information received that an offence has been committed. In the context of Sections
200, 202 and 203, the expression “taking cognizance” has been used in the sense of taking
notice of the complaint or the first information report or the information that an offence has
been committed on application of judicial mind. It does not necessarily mean issuance of
process.”
16. The second judgment in Anil Kumar (2013) 10 SCC 705 referred to above is directly
on the point. In that case, identical question had fallen for consideration viz. whether
sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is a precondition for ordering investigation against
a public servant under Section 156(3) CrPC even at pre-cognizance stage? Answering the
question in the affirmative, the Court discussed the legal position in the following manner:
( & 713-14, paras 13-15 & 21)
“13. The expression “cognizance” which appears in Section 197 CrPC came up for
‘6. … “10. … And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence is
provided by Section 190 of the Code, either on receipt of a complaint, or upon a police
report or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon
his knowledge that such offence has been committed. So far as public servants are
concerned, the cognizance of any offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of the
Code unless sanction is obtained from the appropriate authority, if the offence, alleged to
have been committed, was in discharge of the official duty. The section not only specifies
the persons to whom the protection is afforded but it also specifies the conditions and
circumstances in which it shall be available and the effect in law if the conditions are
satisfied. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought
out by the expression, “no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the
previous sanction”. Use of the words “no” and “shall” makes it abundantly clear that the
bar on the exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of any offence is absolute and
complete. The very cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot be taken notice of.
According to Black's Law Dictionary the word “cognizance” means “jurisdiction” or “the
exercise of jurisdiction” or “power to try and determine causes”. In common parlance, it
means taking notice of. A court, therefore, is precluded from entertaining a complaint or
taking notice of it or exercising jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who is
accused of an offence alleged to have been committed during discharge of his official
duty.”’
14. In State of W.B. v. Mohd. Khalid ( 1995) 1 SCC 684 , this Court has observed as
follows:
‘13. It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same
thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate
applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon
information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The
issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed
before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie
case is made out.’
The meaning of the said expression was also considered by this Court in Subramanian
Swamy case (2012) 3 SCC 64.
15. The judgments referred to hereinabove clearly indicate that the word “cognizance” has
***
21. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants raised the contention that the
requirement of sanction is only procedural in nature and hence, directory or else Section
19(3) would be rendered otiose. We find it difficult to accept that contention. Sub-section
(3) of Section 19 has an object to achieve, which applies in circumstances where a Special
Judge has already rendered a finding, sentence or order. In such an event, it shall not be
reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence
of sanction. That does not mean that the requirement to obtain sanction is not a mandatory
requirement. Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in
various judgments referred to hereinabove, the Magistrate cannot order investigation
against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156(3) CrPC. The above
legal position, as already indicated, has been clearly spelt out in Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6
SCC 372 and Subramanian Swamy (2012) 3 SCC 64 cases.”
Having regard to the ratio of the aforesaid judgment ( 2013) 10 SCC 705 , we have no
hesitation in answering the questions of law, as formulated in para 10 above, in the
negative. In other words, we hold that an order directing further investigation under
Section 156(3) CrPC cannot be passed in the absence of valid sanction.
17. With this, we now address the second question i.e. whether the public servant not being
in the same post, when the offence was allegedly committed, though continuing as a public
servant, loses the protection under Section 19(1) of the PC Act? The contention of the
respondents was that sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act is not required as the
appellants have been transferred from the post which they were holding at the relevant
time. In support of their plea that even on transfer/promotion, the appellants remain public
servant, such a sanction was required, it was submitted that the object of Section 19 of the
PC Act is to protect public servant from harassment and, therefore, exercise of powers
under Section 19 of the PC Act is not an empty formality. Since the Government, as a
sanctioning authority, is supposed to apply its mind to the entire material and evidence
placed before it and on examination thereof, it is to reach the conclusion as to whether the
sanction is accorded or not. It was also argued that sanction is a weapon to ensure
discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent
***
56. Thus, we are of the clear view that the High Court was absolutely right in relying on
the decision in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 to hold that the
appellants in both the appeals had abused entirely different office or offices than the one
which they were holding on the date on which cognizance was taken and, therefore, there
was no necessity of sanction under Section 19 of the Act as held in K. Karunakaran v.
State Of Kerala . (2007) 1 SCC 59 and the later decision in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of
Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1. The appeals are without any merit and are dismissed.”
19. In the aforesaid extracted para 54 there is a reference to the judgment of this Court in
S.A. Venkataraman AIR 1958 SC 107 , 1958 Cri LJ 254. In that case, the issue was
considered in the context of the PC Act wherein the relevant provision, corresponding to
Section 19 of the present PC Act, was Section 6. Interpreting the provisions of Section 6,
this Court held that even when a purported offence is committed by a person at the time he
was a public servant, but he ceases to be a public servant on the date when cognizance of
the offence alleged to have been committed is taken by the court, no such sanction was
required.
20. Likewise, in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1, the contention of
the appellant in that case that permission to obtain sanction throughout service was
necessary, was negatived in the following manner:
“24. The plea is clearly untenable as Section 19(1) of the Act is time and offence related.
26. The underlying principle of Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 have been noted above. Each
of the above sections indicates that the public servant taking gratification (Section 7),
obtaining valuable thing without consideration (Section 11), committing acts of criminal
misconduct (Section 13) are acts performed under the colour of authority but which in
reality are for the public servant's own pleasure or benefit. Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15
apply to aforestated acts. Therefore, if a public servant in his subsequent position is not
accused of any such criminal acts then there is no question of invoking the mischief rule.
Protection to public servants under Section 19(1)(a) has to be confined to the time-related
criminal acts performed under the colour or authority for public servant's own pleasure or
benefit as categorised under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15. This is the principle behind the
test propounded by this Court, namely, the test of abuse of office.”
(emphasis in original)
. ‘23
. Offences prescribed in Sections 161, 164 and 165 IPC and Section 5 of the 1947 Act have
an intimate and inseparable relation with the office of a public servant. A public servant
occupies office which renders him a public servant and occupying the office carries with it
the powers conferred on the office. Power generally is not conferred on an individual
person. In a society governed by rule of law power is conferred on office or acquired by
statutory status and the individual occupying the office or on whom status is conferred
enjoys the power of office or power flowing from the status. The holder of the office alone
would have opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections codify a well-
recognised truism that power has the tendency to corrupt. It is the holding of the office
which gives an opportunity to use it for corrupt motives. Therefore, the corrupt conduct is
directly attributable and flows from the power conferred on the office. This interrelation
and interdependence between individual and the office he holds is substantial and not
severable. Each of the three clauses of sub- section (1) of Section 6 uses the expression
“office” and the power to grant sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove
the public servant from his office and Section 6 requires a sanction before taking
cognizance of offences committed by public servant. The offence would be committed by
.(
) The legislature advisedly conferred power on the authority competent to remove the
)”
23. In the case of the present appellants, there was no question of the appellants' getting
any protection by a sanction. The High Court was absolutely right in relying on the
decision in Parkash Singh Badal (2007) 1 SCC 1 to hold that the appellants in both the
appeals had abused entirely different office or offices than the one which they were
holding on the date on which cognizance was taken and, therefore, there was no necessity
of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act. Where the public servant had abused the office
which he held in the check period but had ceased to hold “that office” or was holding a
different office, then a sanction would not be necessary. Where the alleged misconduct is
in some different capacity than the one which is held at the time of taking cognizance,
there will be no necessity to take the sanction.
24. Insofar as the argument of the appellants that there is no specific averment in the
complaint for having committed the alleged act by them is concerned, we are unable to
agree with this argument. As already pointed out above, the allegations against these two
appellants are that after conducting spot inspection by Accused 1 on 17-1-2003, the first
appellant (Accused 3) who was working as Tahsildar had recommended it on the same day
and thereafter the second appellant (Accused 6) who was working as Assistant
Commissioner had given an endorsement on the very next day to the effect that property is
not the subject- matter of acquisition. On this basis, it is alleged that these officials have
abused their official position. We may record that the learned counsel for the appellants
have contended that they merely acted on the court decree. However, it may be two