MAT 100 Lecture 09

MAT-100:
Basic University Mathematics - I

Lecture-09
A multiple use of runoff elections was discussed by Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas
Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, an eighteenth Century French mathematician and
political theorist.
Suppose we simultaneously conduct all the “runoff” elections among our candidates.
For example, in the election discussed in Sample Problem 12.1, there are three
runoffs: A versus B, B versus C, A versus C. If any one candidate wins all his/her
runoffs, then surely you would consider that person a winner. We shall call such a
candidate a Condorcet winner.
We find:
B beats A 10–9, =
A beats C 16–3,
=
B beats C 12–7,
so B is a Condorcet winner.
In the election discussed in Sample Problem 12.2, there are six runoffs: A versus B, A
versus C, A versus D, B versus C, B versus D, and C versus D. If any one candidate
wins all his/her runoffs, then surely you would consider that person a winner.
Here, D is a Condorcet winner.

But even in the simple example, A beats B 8 – 4, B beats C 9
– 3 and C beats A 7 – 5, so there is no Condorcet winner.
In elections with several candidates, it is very common to

have no Condorcet winner, even when there are no ties. This
is a serious fault in the Condorcet method.
Looking at Sample Problem 12.1 again, the biggest majority was A beat C 16–3. We’ll
denote this A →C. Then look for the second biggest, then the third-biggest, and so on,
and make a list:
Now go through this list and construct a preference order of the candidates. At each
step, if X →Y, then X precedes Y in the preference list, unless Y already precedes X in
the list. In our example, we must have A before C, B before C and B before A. The
list is BAC and clearly B is the winner. We shall refer to this solution as Condorcet’s
extended method. Note that, if there is a Condorcet winner, the same candidate also
wins under the extended method.
Let us apply this to the above example which has no
Condorcet winner. We have, with the larger majorities
preceding smaller ones,
From B →C and A → B we get the list ABC. Next we see C →A, but A already
precedes C, so this result is ignored. The final list is ABC, and A is elected, even
though a majority of voters would prefer C to A.
Sample Problem 12.3 Consider the election with preference
profile:
Who would win under the Hare method? Is there a Condorcet
winner? Who wins under Condorcet’s solution method?
Solution. The votes for A, B and C are 7, 5 and 3 respectively.

Under the Hare method, C is eliminated. The new preference
profile is:
=
So A wins 10 – 5. Looking at all three runoffs, we see that A beats B 10 – 5, B beats C
12 – 3 and C beats A 8 – 7, so there is no Condorcet winner. For Condorcet’s solution,
we see
The first two yield the list ABC and the last result is ignored, so A is elected.
Point score methods have often been used in sporting contests. For example, they are
commonly used in track meets and in motor racing. When the Olympic Games are
being held, many newspapers publish informal medal tallies to rank the performance
of the competing nations—the usual method is to allocate three points for a gold
medal, two for a silver, one for a bronze, and then add.
In general, a fixed number of points are given for first, second, and so on. The points
are totaled, and the candidate with the most points wins. If there are n competitors, a
common scheme is to allocate n points to first, n−1 to second, . . . , or equivalently
n−1 to first, n−2 to second, . . . . This case, where the points go in uniform steps, is
called a Borda count. One often see scales like 5, 3, 2, 1, where the winner gets a
bonus, or 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, . . . (that is, all below a certain point are equal).
Sample Problem 12.4 What is the result of an election with preference table
if a 3, 2, 1 count is used? What is the result if a 4, 2, 1 count is used?
Solution. With a 3, 2, 1 count the totals are A : 37,B : 36,C : 41, so C wins. With a 4,
2, 1 count the totals are A : 46, B : 43,C : 44, and A wins.
In sequential pairwise voting several candidates are paired in successive runoff
elections. There is an agenda (an ordered list of candidates). For example, if the
agenda is A,B,C,D, . . . then the elections proceed as follows:
1. A against B
2. Winner of AB against C
3. That winner against D
………
Position in the agenda is very important. To see this, consider a four-candidate
election with agenda A,B,C,D, in which all four candidates are equally likely to win.
If repeated trials are made then we would expect the following results:
• A wins first runoff in half the cases
• A wins second runoff in half those cases—a quarter overall
• A wins the third runoff in half those cases—one-eighth overall.
So A has a 1 in 8 chance of winning. B also has a 1 in 8 chance. However, C has a 1
in 4 chance, and D has a 1 in 2 chance. In this case, being later in the list is very
beneficial.
Rather than elections, this model is often used for sporting tournaments (the result of
match is used instead of the result of a runoff election). One often sees playoff rules
like:
(i) Second and third placegetters in preliminary competition play each other (“the
playoff”)
(ii) the winner of playoff meets the leader from the preliminaries.
In this case it is reasonable that the preliminary leader should get an advantage.
However, when the model is used in voting situations, it is very subject to
manipulation.
(ii) The Hare method
(i) Who is elected under the plurality method?
(ii) Who is elected under the Hare method?
11. Fifteen voters must choose one representative from four candidates: A, B, C,
and D. Their preference profile is
What is the result of:
(i) A majority rule election?
(ii) A plurality election?
(iii) An election using the Hare method?
(iii) Who would be elected if the club used a count with scores (5, 2, 1, 0)?
(iv) Is there a Condorcet winner? If not, who would win under Condorcet’s extended
method?
15. Eighteen delegates must elect one of four candidates: A, B, C, and D. The
preference profile is
(i) Who would be elected under the Hare method?

(ii) Who would be elected if the delegates used a point count with scores (2, 1, 0, 0)?
(iii) Is there a Condorcet winner? If not, who would win under Condorcet’s extended
method?
19. Fifty voters are to choose one of five candidates. Their preference profile is
What is the result under the following methods?

(i) Plurality.
(ii) Runoff.
(iii) The Hare method.
(iv) A modified Borda count with scores (5, 3, 2, 1, 0).
(v) Is there a Condorcet winner? If not, who would win under Condorcet’s extended
method?
Thank you!

MAT 100 Lecture 09

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MAT 100 Lecture 09

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

MAT 100 Lecture 09

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MAT-100:

Basic University Mathematics - I

Here, D is a Condorcet winner.

In elections with several candidates, it is very common to

Solution. The votes for A, B and C are 7, 5 and 3 respectively.

if a 3, 2, 1 count is used? What is the result if a 4, 2, 1 count is used?

(i) Who would be elected under the Hare method?

What is the result under the following methods?

You might also like