De Guzman v.

CA
Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Issues: (1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier (2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods Held: (1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.

(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and e. Order or act of competent public authority." The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. MELO, J.: The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ. The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count); E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year). (p. 14, Rollo.) On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime. Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request. In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons: 1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available. It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents. 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests. 3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. (pp. 77-78, Rollo.) Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied. On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing: WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date. SO ORDERED. (pp. 110-111, Rollo.) Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that: PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE: I. BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUSIN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES; II. PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;

III. THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND IV. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.) On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing: NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684. GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999. (pp. 120-121, Rollo.) The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda. From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty? The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows: The Extradition Request The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by: 1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force; 2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts; 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and 4. Such other documents or information in support of the request. (Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.) Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides . . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task? In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by: 1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; 3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is requested; 4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; 5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense; 6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable. (Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.) 7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there; 8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and 9. A copy of the charging document. (Paragraph 3, ibid.) The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs). In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation." The Extradition Petition Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of

the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee. The Extradition Hearing The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.). The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
1wphi1.nt

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings? A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers. However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of

Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation. Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination? The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64). The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or quasijudicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment. The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court. It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-

incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property. Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature. The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty. Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing. As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law"

(Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366). Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106). True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant. These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as: 1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed. Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above? Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government. American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853). In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815). In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:

1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and viceversa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel. 2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing. 3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.) 4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).] 6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186). 7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned. From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary

of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the petition for extradition. Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process. We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling: The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. (Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656) The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency. (pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.) In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]). There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fasttracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition. In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with? Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest. Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside. Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads: Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are

"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.). Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute. The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing". When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions. In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming. We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12). The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence. Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410). Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial. A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises. One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy. Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto? The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA

602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's nonperformance of its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration. How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069? Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals: . . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses. . . . (at p. 671) Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent. In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are

protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent. Puno, J., please see dissent. Vitug, J., see separate opinion. Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion. Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion. Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ. Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion. Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban. Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban. Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions VITUG, J., separate opinion; The only real issue before the Court, I would take it, is whether or not private respondent can validly ask for copies of pertinent documents while the application for extradition against him is still undergoing process by the Executive Department. There is, I agree with the majority, a right of access to such extradition documents conformably with the provisions of Article III, Section 7, of the Philippine Constitution.1 The constitutional right to free access to information of public concern is circumscribed only by the fact that the desired information is not among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guaranty and that the exercise of the right conforms with such reasonable conditions as may be prescribed by law. There is no hornbook rule to determine whether or not an information is of public concern. The term "public concern" eludes exactitude, and it can easily embrace a broad spectrum of matters which the public may want to know either because the subject thereof can affect their lives or simply because it arouses concern.2

I am not convinced that there is something so viciously wrong with, as to deny, the request of private respondent to be furnished with copies of the extradition documents. I add. The constitutional right to due process secures to everyone an opportunity to be heard, presupposing foreknowledge of what he may be up against, and to submit any evidence that he may wish to proffer in an effort to clear himself. This right is two-pronged substantive and procedural due process founded, in the first instance, on Constitutional or statutory provisions, and in the second instance, on accepted rules of procedure.3Substantive due process looks into the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the law that figures to interfere with the right of a person to his life, liberty and property. Procedural due process the more litigated of the two focuses on the rules that are established in order to ensure meaningful adjudication in the enforcement and implementation of the law. Like "public concern," the term due process does not admit of any restrictive definition. Justice Frankfurter has viewed this flexible concept, aptly I believe, as being ". . . compounded by history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the democratic faith."4 The framers of our own Constitution, it would seem, have deliberately intended, to make it malleable to the ever-changing milieu of society. Hitherto, it is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application that makes it appropriate to accept an enlarged concept of the term as and when there is a possibility that the right of an individual to life, liberty and property might be diffused.5 Verily, whenever there is an imminent threat to the life, liberty or property of any person in any proceeding conducted by or under the auspices of the State, his right to due process of law, when demanded, must not be ignored. A danger to the liberty of the extraditee, the private respondent, is real. Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America provides that in case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person prior to the presentation of the request for extradition. I see implicit in this provision that even after the request for extradition is made and before a petition for extradition is filed with the courts, the possibility of an arrest being made on the basis of a mere evaluation by the Executive on the request for extradition by the foreign State cannot totally be discounted. The conclusion reached by the majority, I hasten to add, does not mean that the Executive Department should be impeded in its evaluation of the extradition request. The right of the extraditee to be furnished, upon request, with a copy of the relevant documents and to file his comment thereon is not necessarily anathema to the proceedings duly mandated by the treaty to be made. I vote to deny the petition.

KAPUNAN, J., separate concurring opinion; I vote to dismiss the petition, both on technical and substantial grounds. The petition in the case at bar raises one and only issue, which is the validity of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion on August 9, 1999 in Civil Case No. 99-94684. The TRO directed respondents in said case to:

. . . maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with the Regional Trial Court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty days from the service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.1 (Emphasis ours.) The petition itself categorically states that "(t)he issue sought to be presented and litigated here is solely-the validity of the TRO."2 Notably, there is no allegation in the petition that respondent Judge is without jurisdiction to hear the case below or that he has exceeded his jurisdiction in hearing the same. Nor is there any other act, ruling, order, or decision, apart from the TRO already mentioned, of respondent Judge that is being challenged in the petition before us. Since, as alleged in the petition, a copy of the TRO was served on respondents below on August 10, 1999, the TRO ceased to be effective on August 30, 1999; consequently, the instant petition has become moot and academic. This Court does not exercise jurisdiction over cases which are moot and academic or those not ripe for judicial consideration.3 Assuming that the present case has not become moot and academic, still, it should be dismissed for lack of merit. The substantive issues raised in this case are: (a) whether a person whose extradition is sought by a foreign state has due process rights under Section 2, Article III of the 1997 Constitution before the Department of Justice as the request for extradition is being evaluated, or whether due process rights maybe invoked only upon the filing of a petition for extradition before a regional trial court; and (b) whether or not private respondent has a right of access to extradition documents under Section 7, Article III of the 1997 Constitution. Petitioner contends that due process rights such as the right to be informed of the basis of the request for extradition and to have an opportunity to controvert are not provided in the extradition treaty or in P.D. 1069 and therefore does not exist in this stage of the proceedings. Further, he argues that the documents sought to be furnished to private respondent only involve private concerns, and not matters of public concern to which the people have a constitutional right to access. While the evaluation process conducted by the Department of Justice is not exactly a preliminary investigation of criminal cases, it is akin to a preliminary investigation because it involves the basic constitutional rights of the person sought to be extradited. A person ordered extradited is arrested, forcibly taken from his house, separated from his family and delivered to a foreign state. His rights of abode, to privacy, liberty and pursuit of happiness are taken away from him a fate as harsh and cruel as a conviction of a criminal offense. For this reason, he is entitled to have access to the evidence against him and the right to controvert them. While the extradition treaty and P.D. 1069 do not provide for a preliminary investigation, neither does either prohibit it. The right to due process is a universal basic right which is deemed written into our laws and treaties with foreign countries.

Like a preliminary investigation, the evaluation by the Department of Justice of the extradition request and its accompanying documents is to establish probable cause and to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. In this connection, it should be stressed that the evaluation procedure of the extradition request and its accompanying documents by the Department of Justice cannot be characterized as a mere "ex-parte technical assessment of the sufficiency" thereof. The function and responsibilities of the Department of Justice in evaluating the extradition papers involve the exercise of judgment. They involve a determination whether the request for extradition conforms fully to the requirements of the extradition treaty and whether the offense is extraditable. These include, among others, whether the offense for which extradition is requested is a political or military offense (Article 3); whether the documents and other informations required under Article 7(2) have been provided (Article 7); and whether the extraditable offense is punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year (Article 2). Consequently, to arrive at a correct judgment, the parties involved are entitled to be heard if the requirements of due process and equal protection are to be observed. With respect to petitioner's claim that private respondent has no right to demand access to the documents relating to the request for extradition, suffice it to say, that any document used in a proceeding that would jeopardize a person's constitutional rights is matter of public concern. As Martin Luther King said, "injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere," so any violation of one's rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights is everybody's concern because they, one way or another, directly or indirectly, affect the rights of life and liberty of all the citizens as a whole. Due process rights in a preliminary investigation is now an established principle. The respondent has a right of access to all of the evidence. He has the right to submit controverting evidence. The prosecuting official who conducts the preliminary investigation is required to be neutral, objective, and impartial in resolving the issue of probable cause. I see no reason why the same rights may not be accorded a person sought to be extradited at the stage where the Department of Justice evaluates whether a petition for extradition would be filed before a regional trial court. If denied such rights, not only denial of due process rights but of equal protection may be raised. It is suggested that after a petition for extradition is filed with a regional trial court, the person sought to be extradited may exercise all due process rights. He may then have access to all the records on the basis of which the request for extradition has been made. He may controvert that evidence and raise all defenses he may consider appropriate. That, it is urged, meets the due process requirement. But why must he wait until the petition for extradition is filed? As succinctly expressed, if the right to notice and hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented.4 Like the filing of an information in a criminal case, the mere filing of a petition for extradition causes immediate impairment of the liberty of the person sought to be extradited and a substantial curtailment of other rights. His arrest may be immediately ordered by the regional trial court. He would be compelled to face an open and public trial. He will be constrained to seek the assistance of counsel and incur other expenses of litigation. The public eye would be directed at him with all the concomitant intrusions to his right to privacy. Where the liberty of a person is at risk, and extradition strikes at the very core of liberty, invocation of due process rights can never be too early.

QUISUMBING, J., concurring opinion; As I concur in the result reached by the ponencia of Justice Melo, may I just add my modest observations. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. Stated otherwise, the constitutionally mandated duties of our government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land. For this primordial reason, I vote to DENY the petition. Moreover, considering that the Extradition Treaty between the USA and Philippines appears mute on the specific issue before us, the Court in the exercise of its judicial power to find and state what the law is has this rare opportunity of setting a precedent that enhances respect for human rights and strengthens due process of law. As both majority and dissenting colleagues in the Court will recognize, American authorities follow two tracks in extradition proceedings: (1) the interstate practice where, pursuant to statute, the state Executive upon demand furnishes the would be extraditee or counsel copies of pertinent documents as well as the request for extradition; and (2) the international practice where the Executive department need not initially grant notice and hearing at all. Rules of reciprocity and comity, however, should not bar us from applying internationally now what appears the more reasonable and humane procedure, that is, the interstate practice among Americans themselves. For in this case the American people should be among the most interested parties. Truly, what private respondent is asking our Executive department (notice, copies of documents, and the opportunity to protect himself at the earliest time against probable peril) does not, in my view, violate our Extradition Treaty with the USA. His request if granted augurs well for transparency in interstate or intergovernmental relations rather than secrecy which smacks of medieval diplomacy and the inquisition discredited long ago. That private respondent is a Filipino citizen is not decisive of the issue here, although it is obviously pertinent. Even if he were a resident alien (other than American perhaps), he is, in my view, entitled to our full protection against the hazards of extradition (or deportation, similarly) from the very start. More so because, looking at the facts adduced at the hearing and on the record of this case, the charges against him involve or are co-mingled with, if not rooted in, certain offenses of a political nature or motivation such as the ones involving alleged financial contributions to a major American political party. If so, long established is the principle that extradition could not be utilized for political offenses or politically motivated charges. There may, of course, be other charges against private respondent in the USA. But then they are, in my view, already tainted there with political color due to the highly charged partisan campaign atmosphere now prevailing. That private respondent's cases will be exploited as

political fodder there is not far-fetched, hence the need here for cautious but comprehensive deliberation on the matter at bar. For, above all, it is not only a Treaty provision we are construing; it is about constitutional and human rights we are most concerned.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., concurring opinion; I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo with its conceptive analysis of a citizen's right to be given what is due to him. I join in his exposition of this Court's constitutional duty to strike the correct balance between overwhelming Government power and the protection of individual rights where only one person is involved. However, I am constrained to write this short concurrence if only to pose the question of why there should be any debate at all on a plea for protection of one's liberty which, if granted, will not result in any meaningful impediment of thwarting any state policy and objectives. I see no reason why respondent Mark Jimenez, or other citizens not as controversial or talked about, should first be exposed to the indignity, expense, and anxiety of a public denunciation in court before he may be informed of what the contracting states in an extradition treaty have against him. There is no question that everything which respondent Jimenez now requests will be given to him during trial. Mr. Jimenez is only petitioning that, at this stage, he should be informed why he may be deported from his own country. I see no ill effects which would arise if the extradition request and supporting documents are shown to him now, instead of later. Petitioner Secretary of Justice states that his action on the extradition request and its supporting documents will merely determine whether or not the Philippines is complying with its treaty obligations. He adds that, therefore, the constitutional rights of an accused in all criminal prosecutions are not available to the private respondent. The July 13, 1999 reply-letter from petitioner states the reasons why he is denying respondent Jimenez's requests. In short, the reasons are: 1. In evaluating the documents, the Department merely determines whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutional rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are, therefore, not available. 2. The United States Government has requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain grand jury information. 3. The petitioner cannot hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. For extradition to be an effective tool of criminal law enforcement, requests for surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. I respectfully submit that any apprehensions in the Court arising from a denial of the petition "breach of an international obligation, rupture of states relations, forfeiture of confidence,

national embarrassment, and a plethora of other equally undesirable consequences" are more illusory than real. Our country is not denying the extradition of a person who must be extradited. Not one provision of the extradition treaty is violated. I cannot imagine the United States taking issue over what, to it, would be a minor concession, perhaps a slight delay, accorded in the name of human rights. On the other hand, the issue is fundamental in the Philippines. A citizen is invoking the protection, in the context of a treaty obligation, of rights expressly guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution. Until proved to be a valid subject for extradition, a person is presumed innocent or not covered by the sanctions of either criminal law or international treaty. At any stage where a still prospective extraditee only seeks to know so that he can prepare and prove that he should not be extradited, there should be no conflict over the extension to him of constitutional protections guaranteed to aliens and citizens alike. Petitioner cites as a reason for the denial of respondent's requests, Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7 enumerates the required documents and establishes the procedures under which the documents shall be submitted and admitted as evidence. There is no specific provision on how that Secretary of Foreign Affairs should conduct his evaluation. The Secretary of Justice is not even in the picture at this stage. Under petitioner's theory, silence in the treaty over a citizen's rights during the evaluation stage is interpreted as deliberate exclusion by the contracting states of the right to know. Silence is interpreted as the exclusion of the right to a preliminary examination or preliminary investigation provided by the laws of either one of the two states. The right to be informed of charges which may lead to court proceedings and result in a deprivation of liberty is ordinarily routine. It is readily available to one against whom the state's coercive power has already been focused. I fail to see how silence can be interpreted as exclusion. The treaty is silent because at this stage, the preliminary procedure is still an internal matter. And when a law or treaty is silent, it means a right or privilege may be granted. It is not the other way around. The second reason alleging the need for secrecy and confidentiality is even less convincing. The explanation of petitioner is self-contradictory. On one hand, petitioner asserts that the United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of certain information. On the other hand, petitioner declares that the United States has already secured orders from concerned District Courts authorizing the disclosure of the same grand jury information to the Philippine Government and its law enforcement personnel. Official permission has been given. The United States has no cause to complain about the disclosure of information furnished to the Philippines. Moreover, how can grand jury information and documents be considered confidential if they are going to be introduced as evidence in adversely proceedings before a trial court? The only issue is whether or not Mr. Jimenez should be extradited. His innocence or guilt of any crime will be determined in an American court. It is there where prosecution strategies will be essential. If the Contracting States believed in a total non-divulging of information prior to court hearings, they would have so provided in the extradition treaty. A positive provision making certain rights unavailable cannot be implied from silence. I cannot believe that the United States and the Philippines with identical constitutional provisions on due process and basic rights should sustain such a myopic view in a situation

where the grant of a right would not result in any serious setbacks to criminal law enforcement. It is obvious that any prospective extraditee wants to know if his identity as the person indicated has been established. Considering the penchant of Asians to adopt American names when in America, the issue of whether or not the prospective extraditee truly is the person charged in the United States becomes a valid question. It is not only identity of the person which is involved. The crimes must also be unmistakably identified and their essential elements clearly stated. There are other preliminary matters in which respondent is interested. I see nothing in our laws or in the Treaty which prohibits the prospective extraditee from knowing until after the start of trial whether or not the extradition treaty applies to him. Paraphrasing Hasmin vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216; Trocio vs. Manta, 118 SCRA 241 (1941); and Salonga vs. Hon. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the purpose of a preliminary evaluation is to secure an innocent person against hasty, faulty and, therefore, oppressive proceedings; to protect him from an open and extensively publicized accusation of crimes; to spare him the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial; and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trails. Even if the purpose is only to determine whether or not the respondent is a proper subject for extradition, he is nonetheless entitled to the guarantees of fairness and freedom accorded to those charged with ordinary crimes in the Philippines. The third reason given by petitioner is the avoidance of delay. Petitioner views the request to be informed as part of undesirable delaying tactics. This is most unfortunate. Any request for extradition must be viewed objectively and impartially without any predisposition to granting it and, therefore, hastening the extradition process. In the first place, any assistance which the evaluating official may get from the participation of respondent may well point out deficiencies and insufficiencies in the extradition documents. It would incur greater delays if these are discovered only during court trial. On the other hand, if, from respondent's participation, the evaluating official discovers a case of mistaken identity, insufficient pleadings, inadequate complaints, or any ruinous shortcoming, there would be no delays during trial. An unnecessary trial with all its complications would be avoided. The right to be informed is related to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional guarantee extends to the speedy disposition of cases before all quasi-judicial and administrative bodies (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16). Speedy disposition, however, does not mean the deliberate exclusion of the defendant or respondent from the proceedings. As this Court rules in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247 (1970), "the right to a speedy trial, means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt (in this case, his being extradited) determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose." The right to be informed and the right to a preliminary hearing are not merely for respondent. They also serve the interests of the State.
1wphi1.nt

In closing, I maintain that the paramount consideration of guaranteeing the constitutional rights of individual respondent override the concerns of petitioner. There should be no

hurried or indifferent effort to routinely comply with all requests for extradition. I understand that this is truer in the United States than in other countries. Proposed extraditees are given every legal protection available from the American justice system before they are extradited. We serve under a government of limited powers and inalienable rights. Hence, this concurrence.

PUNO, J., dissenting opinion; If the case at bar was strictly a criminal case which involves alone the right of an accused to due process, I would have co-signed the ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Jose A.R. Melo, without taking half a pause.But the case at bar does not involve the guilt or innocence of an accused but the interpretation of an extradition treaty where at stake is our government's international obligation to surrender to a foreign state a citizen of its own so he can be tried for an alleged offense committed within that jurisdiction. The issues are of first impression and the majority opinion dangerously takes us to unknown shoals in constitutional and international laws, hence this dissenting opinion. Extradition is a well-defined concept and is more a problem in international law. It is the "process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons merely suspected of having committed an offense but against who no charge has been laid or to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment."1 The definition covers the private respondent who is charged with two (2) counts of conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, four (4) counts of attempt to evade or defeat tax, two (2) counts of fraud by wire, radio or television, six (6) counts of false statements or entries and thirty-three (33) counts of election contributions in the name of another. There is an outstanding warrant of arrest against the private respondent issued by the US District Court, Southern District of Florida. A brief review of the history of extradition law will illumine our labor. Possibly the most authoritative commentator on extradition today, M. Cherif Bassiouni, divides the history of extradition into four (4) periods: "(1) ancient times to seventeenth century a period revealing almost exclusive concern for political and religious offenders; (2) the eighteenth century and half of the nineteenth century a period of treaty-making chiefly concerned with military offenders characterizing the condition of Europe during that period; (3) from 1833 to 1948 a period of collective concern in suppressing common criminality; and (4) post-1948 developments which ushered in a greater concern for protecting the human rights of persons and revealed an awareness of the need to have international due process of law regulate international relations."2 It is also rewarding to have a good grip on the changing slopes in the landscape of extradition during these different periods. Extradition was first practiced by the Egyptians, Chinese, Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians but their basis for allowing extradition was unclear. Sometimes, it was granted due to pacts; at other times, due to plain good will.3 The classical commentators on international law thus focused their early views on the nature of the dutyto surrender an extraditee whether the duty is legal or moral in character. Grotius and de Vattel led the school of thought that international law imposed

a legal duty called civitas maxima to extradite criminals.4 In sharp contrast, Puffendorf and Billot led the school of thought that the so-called duty was but an "imperfect obligationwhich could become enforceable only by a contract or agreement between states.5 Modern nations tilted towards the view of Puffendorf and Billot that under international law there is no duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral. Thus, the US Supreme Court in US v.Rauscher,6 held: ". . . . it is only in modern times that the nations of the earth have imposed upon themselves the obligation of delivering up these fugitives from justice to the states where their crimes were committed, for trial and punishment. This has been done generally by treaties . . . Prior to these treaties, and apart from them there was no well-defined obligation on one country to deliver up such fugitives to another; and though such delivery was often made it was upon the principle of comity . . ." Then came the long and still ongoing debate on what should be the subject of international law. The 20th century saw the dramatic rise and fall of different types and hues of authoritarianism the fascism of Italy's Mussolini and Germany's Hitler, the militarism of Japan's Hirohito and the communism of Russia's Stalin, etc. The sinking of these isms led to the elevation of the rights of the individual against the state. Indeed, some species of human rights have already been accorded universal recognition.7 Today, the drive to internationalize rights of women and children is also on high gear.8 The higher rating given to human rights in the hierarchy of values necessarily led to the re-examination of rightful place of the individual in international law. Given the harshest eye is the moss-covered doctrine that international law deals only with States and that individuals are not its subject. For its undesirable corrally is the sub-doctrine that an individual's right in international law is a near cipher. Translated in extradition law, the view that once commanded a consensus is that since a fugitive is a mere object and not a subject of international law, he is bereft of rights. An extraditee, so it was held, is a mere "object transported from one state to the other as an exercise of the sovereign will of the two states involved."9 The re-examination consigned this pernicious doctrine to the museum of ideas.10 The new thinkers of international law then gave a significant shape to the role and rights of the individual in state-concluded treaties and other international agreements. So it was declared by then US Ambassador Philip C. Jessup in audible italics: "A very large part of international affairs and, thus, of the process of international accommodation, concerns the relations between legal persons known as states. This is necessarily so. But it is no longer novel for the particular interest of the human being to break through the mass of interstate relationship."11 The clarion call to re-engineer a new world order whose dominant interest would transcend the parochial confines of national states was not unheeded. Among the world class scholars who joined the search for the elusive ideological underpinnings of a new world order were Yale Professor Myres McDougal and Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano. In their seminal work. Law and Minimum World Public Order, they suggested that the object of the new world should be "to obtain in particular situations and in the aggregate flow of situations the outcome of a higher degree of conformity with the security goals of preservation, deterrence, restoration, rehabilitation and reconstruction of all societies comprising the world community."12 Needless to stress, all these prescient theses accelerated the move to recognize certain rights of the individual in international law. We have yet to see the final and irrevocable place of individual rights, especially the rights of an extraditee, in the realm of international law. In careful language, Bassiouni observes that today, "institutionalized conflicts between states are still rationalized in terms of sovereignty, national interest, and national security, while human interests continue to have limited, though growing impact on the decision-making processes which translate national values and goals into specific national and international policy."13

I belabor the international law aspect of extradition as the majority opinion hardly gives it a sideglance. It is my humble submission that the first consideration that should guide us in the case at bar is that a bilateral treaty the RP-US Extradition Treaty is the subject matter of the litigation. In our constitutional scheme, the making of a treaty belongs to the executive and legislative departments of our government. Between these two departments,the executive has a greater say in the making of a treaty. Under Section 21, Article VII of our Constitution, thePresident has the sole power to negotiate treaties and international agreements although to be effective, they must be concurred in by at least two thirds of all the members of the Senate. Section 20 of the same Article empowers the President to contract or guarantee foreign loans with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. Section 16 of the same Article gives the President the power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. In addition, the President has the power to deport undesirable aliens. The concentration of these powers in the person of the President is not without a compelling consideration. The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. Beyond debate, the President is the single most powerful official in our land for Section 1 of Article VII provides that "the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines," whereas Section 1 of Article VI states that "the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives . . . except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum," while Section 1 of Article VIII provides that "judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Thus, we can see that executive power is vested in the President alone whereas legislative and judicial powers are shared and scattered. It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data.14 In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant andthe President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences. These are some of the dominant policy considerations in international law that the Court must balance against the claim of the private respondent that he has a right to be given the extradition documents against him and to comment thereon even while they are still at the evaluation stage by the petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the President. The delicate questions of what constitutional rights and to what degree they can be claimed by an extraditee do not admit of easy answers and have resulted in discrete approaches the world over.15 On one end of the pole is the more liberal European approach. The European Court of Human Rights embraces the view that an extraditee is entitled to the benefit of all relevant provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It has held that ". . . in so far as a measure of the extradition has consequences adversely affecting the enjoyment of a convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant convention guarantee."16 At the other end of the pole is the more cautious approach of the various Courts of Appeal in the United States. These courts have been more conservative in light of the principle of separation of powers and their faith in the presumptive validity of executive decisions. By and large, they adhere to the rule of non-inquiry under which theextraditing court refuses to examine the requesting country's criminal justice

system or consider allegations that the extraditee will be mistreated or denied a fair trial in that country.17 The case at bar, I respectfully submit, does not involve an irreconcilable conflict between the RP-US Extradition Treaty and our Constitution where we have to choose one over the other. Rather, it calls for a harmonizationbetween said treaty and our Constitution. To achieve this desirable objective, the Court should consider whether the constitutional rights invoked by the private respondent have truly been violated and even assuming so, whether he will be denied fundamental fairness. It is only when their violation will destroy the respondent's right to fundamental fairness that his constitutional claims should be given primacy. Given this balancing approach, it is my humble submission that considering all the facts and facets of the case, the private respondent has not proved entitlement to the right he is claiming. The majority holds that the Constitution, the RP-US extradition and P.D. No. 1069 do not prohibit respondent's claims, hence, it should be allowed. This is too simplistic an approach. Rights do not necessarily arise from a vacuum. Silence of the law can even mean an implied denial of a right. Also, constitutional litigations do not always involve a clear cut choice between right and wrong. Sometimes, they involve a difficult choice between right against right. In these situations, there is need to balance the contending rights and primacy is given to the right that will serve the interest of the nation at that particular time. In such instances, the less compelling right is subjected to soft restraint but without smothering its essence. Proceeding from this premise of relativism of rights, I venture the view that even assuming arguendorespondent's weak claim, still, the degree of denial of private respondent's rights to due process and to information is too slight to warrant the interposition of judicial power. As admitted in the ponencia itself, an extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is, thus, futile to determine what it is. What is certain is that it is not a criminal proceeding where there is an accused who claim the entire array of rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Let it be stressed that in an extradition proceeding, there is no accused and the guilt or innocence of the extraditee will not be passed upon by our executive officials nor by the extradition judge. Hence, constitutional rights that are only relevant do determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee. Indeed, an extradition proceeding is summary in nature which is untrue of criminal proceedings.18 Even the rules of evidence are different in an extradition proceeding. Admission of evidence is less stringent, again because the guilt of the extraditee is not under litigation. 19 It is not only the quality but even the quantum of evidence in extradition proceeding is different. In a criminal case, an accused can only be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt.20In an extradition proceeding, an extraditee can be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existed of a prima faciecase."21 If more need be said, the nature of an extradition decision is different from a judicial decision whose finality cannot be changed by executive fiat. Our courts22 may hold an individual extraditable but the ultimate decision to extradite the individual lies in the hands of the Executive. Section 3, Article 3 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty specifically provides that "extradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determined that the request was politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation." In the United States, the Secretary of State exercises this ultimate power and is conceded considerable discretion. He balances the equities of the case and the demands of the nation's foreign relations. 23 In sum, he is not straitjacketed by strict legal considerations like an ordinary court. The type of issue litigated in extradition proceedings which does not touch on the guilt or innocence of the extraditee, the limited nature of the extradition proceeding, the availability of adequate remedies in favor of the extraditee, and the traditional leeway given to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs have compelled courts to put a high threshold before considering claims of individuals that enforcement of an extradition treaty

will violate their constitutional rights. Exemplifying such approach is the Supreme Court of Canada which has adopted ahighly deferential standard that emphasizes international comity and the executive's experience in international matters.24 It continues to deny Canada's charter protection to extraditees unless the violation can be considered shocking to the conscience. In the case, at bar and with due respect, the ponencia inflates with too much significance the threat to liberty of the private respondent to prop us its thesis that his constitutional rights to due process and access to information must immediately be vindicated. Allegedly, respondent Jimenez stands in danger of provisional arrest, hence, the need for him to be immediately furnished copies of documents accompanying the request for his extradition.Respondent's fear of provisional arrest is not real. It is a self-imagined fear for the realities on the ground show that the United States authorities have not manifested any desire to request for his arrest. On the contrary, they filed the extradition request through the regular channel and, even with the pendency of the case at bar, they have not moved for respondent's arrest on the ground of probable delay in the proceedings. To be sure, the issue of whether respondent Jimenez will be provisionally arrested is now moot. Under Section 1 of Article 9 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, in relation to Section 20(a) of PD No. 1069, the general principle is enunciated that a request for provisional arrest must be made pending receipt of the request for extradition. By filing the request for extradition, the US authorities have implicitly decided not to move for respondent's provisional arrest. But more important, a request for respondent's arrest does not mean he will be the victim of an arbitrary arrest. He will be given due process before he can be arrested. Article 9 of the treaty provides: PROVISIONAL ARREST 1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice. 2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain: a) a description of the person sought; b) the location of the person sought, if known; c) a brief statements of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense; d) a description of the laws violated; e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against the person sought; and f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow. 3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any denial.

4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7. In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides: Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest. (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree. (b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph. (c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request. (d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody. The due process protection of the private-respondent against arbitrary arrest is written in cyrillic letters in these two (2) related provisions. It is self-evident under these provisions that a request for provisional arrest does not mean it will be granted ipso facto. The request must comply with certain requirements. It must be based on an "urgent" factor. This is subject to verification and evaluation by our executive authorities. The request can be denied if not based on a real exigency of if the supporting documents are insufficient. The protection of the respondent against arbitrary provisional arrest does not stop on the administrative level. For even if the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation agrees with the request for the provisional arrest of the respondent, still he has to apply for a judicial warrant from the "presiding judge of the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province of city having jurisdiction of the place. . . . ." It is a judge who will issue a warrant for the provisional arrest of the respondent. The judge has comply with Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "no . . . warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the . . . persons or things to be seized." The message that leaps to the eye is that compliance with this requirements precludes any arbitrary arrest. In light of all these considerations, I respectfully submit that denying respondent's constitutional claim to be furnished all documents relating to the request for his extradition by the US authorities during their evaluation stage will not subvert his right to fundamental fairness. It should be stressed that this is not a case where the respondent will not be given an opportunity to know the basis of the request for his extradition. In truth, and contrary to the impression of the majority, P.D. No. 1069 fixes the specific time when he will be given the

papers constituting the basis for his extradition. The time is when he is summoned by the extradition court and required to answer the petition for extradition. Thus, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 provides: Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices. (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. He may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof. (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case. Upon receipt of the summons and the petition, respondent is free to foist all defense available to him. Such an opportunity does not deny him fairness which is the essence of due process of law. Thus, with due respect, I submit that the ponencia failed to accord due importance to the international law aspect of an extradition treaty as it unduly stressed its constitutional law dimension. This goes against the familiar learning that in balancing the clashing interests involved in extradition treaty, national interest is more equal than the others. While lately, humanitarian considerations are being factored in the equation, still the concept of extradition as a national act is the guiding idea. Requesting and granting extradition remains a power and prerogative of the national government of a State. The process still involves relations between international personalities.25Needless to state, a more deferential treatment should be given to national interest than to individual interest. Our national interest in extraditing persons who have committed crimes in a foreign country are succinctly expressed in the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1069, viz: WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations; WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished. . . . . The increasing incidence of international and transnational crimes, the development of new technologies of death,and the speed and scale of improvement of communication are factors which have virtually annihilated time and distance. They make more compelling the vindication of national interest to insure that the punishment of criminals should not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. This overriding national interest must be upheld as against respondent's weak constitutional claims which in no way amount to denial of fundamental fairness. At bottom, this case involves the respect that courts should accord to the Executive that concluded the RP-US Extradition Treaty in the conduct of our foreign affairs. As early as

1800, the legendary John Marshall, then a congressman, has opined that the power to extradite pursuant to a treaty rests in the executive branch as part of its power to conduct foreign affairs.26 Courts have validated this forward-looking opinion in a catena of unbroken cases. They defer to the judgment of the Executive on the necessities of our foreign affairs and on its view of the requirements of international comity. The deferential attitude is dictated by the robust reality that of the three great branches of our government, it is the Executive that is most qualified to guide the ship of the state on the known and unknown continents of foreign relations. It is also compelled by considerations of the principle of separation of powers for the Constitution has clearly allocated the power to conduct our foreign affairs to the Executive. I respectfully submit that the majority decision has weakened the Executive by allowing nothing less than an unconstitutional headbutt on the power of the Executive to conduct our foreign affairs. The majority should be cautions in involving this Court in the conduct of the nation's foreign relations where the inviolable rule dictated by necessity is that the nation should speak with one voice. We should not overlook the reality that courts by their nature, are ill-equipped to fully comprehend the foreign policy dimension of a treaty, some of which are hidden in shadows and silhouettes. I vote to grant the petition.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion; With due respect, I dissent. The main issue before us is whether Private Respondent Mark B. Jimenez is entitled to the due process rights of notice and hearing during the preliminary or evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding against him. Two Staged in Extradition There are essentially two stages in extradition proceedings: (1) the preliminary or evaluation stage, whereby the executive authority of the requested state ascertains whether the extradition request is supported by the documents and information required under the Extradition Treaty; and (2) the extradition hearing, whereby the petition for extradition is heard before a court of justice, which determines whether the accused should be extradited. The instant petition refers only to the first stage. Private respondent claims that he has a right to be notified and to be heard at this early stage. However, even the ponencia admits that neither the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor PD 1069 (the Philippine Extradition Law) expressly requires the Philippine government, upon receipt of the request for extradition, to give copies thereof and its supporting documents to the prospective extraditee, much less to give him an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of the petition in court. Notably, international extradition proceedings in the United States do not include the grant by the executive authority of notice and hearing to the prospective extraditee at this initial stage. It is the judge or magistrate who is authorized to issue a warrant of arrest and to hold a hearing to consider the evidence submitted in support of the extradition request. In contrast, in interstate rendition, the governor must, upon demand, furnish the fugitive or his attorney copies of the request and its accompanying documents, pursuant to statutory provisions.1 In the Philippines, there is no similar statutory provision.

Evaluation Stage Essentially Ministerial The evaluation stage simply involves the ascertainment by the foreign affairs secretary of whether the extradition request is accompanied by the documents stated in paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the Treaty, relating to the identity and the probable location of the fugitive; the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case; provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense charged and the punishment therefor; its prescriptive period; such evidence as would provide probable cause for the arrest and the committal for trial of the fugitive; and copies of the warrant or order of arrest and charging document. The foreign affairs secretary also sees to it that these accompanying documents have been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippines in the United States, and that they are in English language or have English translations. Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty, he also determines whether the request is politically motivated, and whether the offense charged is a military offense not punishable under non-military penal legislation.2 Upon a finding of the secretary of foreign affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the justice secretary, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case. The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request under consideration.3 When the Right to Notice and Hearing Becomes Available According to private Respondent Jimenez, his right to due process during the preliminary stage emanates from our Constitution, particularly Section 1, Article III thereof, which provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. He claims that this right arises immediately, because of the possibility that he may be provisionally arrested pursuant to Article 9 of the RP-US Treaty, which reads: In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice. xxx xxx xxx

Justice Melo's ponencia supports private respondent's contention. It states that there are two occasions wherein the prospective extraditee may be deprived of liberty: (1) in case of a provisional arrest pending the submission of the extradition request and (2) his temporary arrest during the pendency of the extradition petition in court.4 The second instance is not in issue here, because no petition has yet been filed in court. However, the above-quoted Article 9 on provisional arrest is not automatically operative at all times, and in enforcement does not depend solely on the discretion of the requested state. From the wordings of the provision itself, there are at least three requisites: (1) there must be

an urgency, and (2) there is a corresponding request (3) which must be made prior to the presentation of the request for extradition. In the instant case, there appears to be no urgency characterizing the nature of the extradition of private respondent. Petitioner does not claim any such urgency. There is no request from the United States for the provisional arrest of Mark Jimenez either. And the secretary of justice states during the Oral Argument that he had no intention of applying for the provisional arrest of private respondent.5 Finally, the formal request for extradition has already been made; therefore, provisional arrest is not likely, as it should really come before the extradition request.6 Mark Jimenez Not in Jeopardy of Arrest Under the outlined facts of this case, there is no open door for the application of Article 9, contrary to the apprehension of private respondent. In other words, there is no actual danger that Jimenez will be provisionally arrested or deprived of his liberty. There is as yet no threat that his rights would be trampled upon, pending the filing in court of the petition for his extradition. Hence, there is no substantial gain to be achieved in requiring the foreign affairs (or justice) secretary to notify and hear him during the preliminary stage, which basically involves only the exercise of the ministerial power of checking the sufficiency of the documents attached to the extradition request. It must be borne in mind that during the preliminary stage, the foreign affairs secretary's determination of whether the offense charged is extraditable or politically motivated is merely preliminary. The same issue will be resolved by the trial court.7 Moreover, it is also the power and the duty of the court, not the executive authority, to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the extraditee committed the crimes charged.8 The sufficiency of the evidence of criminality is to be determined based on the laws of the requested state.9 Private Respondent Jimenez will, therefore, definitely have his full opportunity before the court, in case an extradition petition will indeed be filed, to be heard on all issues including the sufficiency of the documents supporting the extradition request. 10 Private respondent insists that the United States may still request his provisional arrest at any time. That is purely speculative. It is elementary that this Court does not declare judgments or grant reliefs based on speculations, surmises or conjectures. In any event, even granting that the arrest of Jimenez is sought at any time despite the assurance of the justice secretary that no such measure will be undertaken, our local laws and rules of procedure respecting the issuance of a warrant of arrest will govern, there being no specific provision under the Extradition Treaty by which such warrant should issue. Therefore, Jimenez will be entitled to all the rights accorded by the Constitution and the laws to any person whose arrest is being sought.
1wphi1.nt

The right of one state to demand from another the return of an alleged fugitive from justice and the correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding country exist only when created by a treaty between the two countries. International law does not require the voluntary surrender of a fugitive to a foreign government, absent any treaty stipulation requiring it.11 When such a treaty does exist, as between the Philippines and the United States, it must be presumed that the contracting states perform their obligations under it with uberrimae fidei, treaty obligations being essentially characterized internationally by comity and mutual respect.

The Need for Respondent Jimenez to Face Charges in the US One final point. Private respondent also claims that from the time the secretary of foreign affairs gave due course to the request for his extradition, incalculable prejudice has been brought upon him. And because of the moral injury caused, he should be given the opportunity at the earliest possible time to stop his extradition. I believe that any moral injury suffered by private respondent had not been caused by the mere processing of the extradition request. And it will not cease merely by granting him the opportunity to be heard by the executive authority. The concrete charges that he has allegedly committed certain offenses already exist. These charges have been filed in the United States and are part of public and official records there. Assuming the existence of moral injury, the only means by which he can restore his good reputation is to prove before the proper judicial authorities in the US that the charges against him are unfounded. Such restoration cannot be accomplished by simply contending that the documents supporting the request for his extradition are insufficient. Conclusion In the context of the factual milieu of private respondent, there is really no threat of any deprivation of his liberty at the present stage of the extradition process. Hence, the constitutional right to due process particularly the right to be heard finds no application. To grant private respondent's request for copies of the extradition documents and for an opportunity to comment thereon will constitute "over-due process" and unnecessarily delay the proceedings. WHEREFORE, I vote to grant the Petition. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994 THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents. Padilla Law Office for petitioner. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Orders dated June 20, 1991 and September 19, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 90-183. The Order dated June 20, 1991 denied the motion of petitioner to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183, while the Order dated September 19, 1991 denied the motion for reconsideration of the June 20,1991 Order. Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business. This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters (Lot 5-A, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 390440) located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 271108 and 265388 respectively and registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana). I On January 23, 1990, private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No. 90-183). The complaint alleged that: (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of petitioner and the PRC, agreed to sell to Ramon Licup Lots 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at the price of P1,240.00 per square meters; (2) the agreement to sell was made on the condition that earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to the sellers, and that the sellers clear the said lots of squatters who were then occupying the same; (3) Licup paid the earnest money to Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in the same month, Licup assigned his rights over the property to private respondent and informed the sellers of the said assignment; (5) thereafter, private respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos that the sellers fulfill their undertaking and clear the property of squatters; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed private respondent of the squatters' refusal to vacate the lots, proposing instead either that private respondent undertake the eviction or that the earnest money be returned to the latter; (6) private respondent counterproposed that if it would undertake the eviction of the squatters, the purchase price of

the lots should be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square meter; (7) Msgr. Cirilos returned the earnest money of P100,000.00 and wrote private respondent giving it seven days from receipt of the letter to pay the original purchase price in cash; (8) private respondent sent the earnest money back to the sellers, but later discovered that on March 30, 1989, petitioner and the PRC, without notice to private respondent, sold the lots to Tropicana, as evidenced by two separate Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and another over Lots 5-B and 5-D; and that the sellers' transfer certificate of title over the lots were cancelled, transferred and registered in the name of Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced petitioner and the PRC to sell the lots to it and thus enriched itself at the expense of private respondent; (10) private respondent demanded the rescission of the sale to Tropicana and the reconveyance of the lots, to no avail; and (11) private respondent is willing and able to comply with the terms of the contract to sell and has actually made plans to develop the lots into a townhouse project, but in view of the sellers' breach, it lost profits of not less than P30,000.000.00. Private respondent thus prayed for: (1) the annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages. On June 8, 1990, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. On June 20, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner's motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner "shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question" (Rollo, pp. 20-21). On July 12, 1991, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. On August 30, 1991, petitioner filed a "Motion for a Hearing for the Sole Purpose of Establishing Factual Allegation for claim of Immunity as a Jurisdictional Defense." So as to facilitate the determination of its defense of sovereign immunity, petitioner prayed that a hearing be conducted to allow it to establish certain facts upon which the said defense is based. Private respondent opposed this motion as well as the motion for reconsideration. On October 1, 1991, the trial court issued an order deferring the resolution on the motion for reconsideration until after trial on the merits and directing petitioner to file its answer (Rollo, p. 22). Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio. On December 9, 1991, a Motion for Intervention was filed before us by the Department of Foreign Affairs, claiming that it has a legal interest in the outcome of the case as regards the diplomatic immunity of petitioner, and that it "adopts by reference, the allegations contained in the petition of the Holy See insofar as they refer to arguments relative to its claim of sovereign immunity from suit" (Rollo, p. 87). Private respondent opposed the intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In compliance with the resolution of this Court, both parties and the Department of Foreign Affairs submitted their respective memoranda.

II A preliminary matter to be threshed out is the procedural issue of whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to question the order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. The general rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is not reviewable by the appellate courts, the remedy of the movant being to file his answer and to proceed with the hearing before the trial court. But the general rule admits of exceptions, and one of these is when it is very clear in the records that the trial court has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint (Philippine National Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer waste of time and energy to require the parties to undergo the rigors of a trial. The other procedural question raised by private respondent is the personality or legal interest of the Department of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case in behalf of the Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190). In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]). In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. InWorld Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae. In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity. In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; United States of America v.

Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion cases). In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved. III The burden of the petition is that respondent trial court has no jurisdiction over petitioner, being a foreign state enjoying sovereign immunity. On the other hand, private respondent insists that the doctrine of non-suability is not anymore absolute and that petitioner has divested itself of such a cloak when, of its own free will, it entered into a commercial transaction for the sale of a parcel of land located in the Philippines. A. The Holy See Before we determine the issue of petitioner's non-suability, a brief look into its status as a sovereign state is in order. Before the annexation of the Papal States by Italy in 1870, the Pope was the monarch and he, as the Holy See, was considered a subject of International Law. With the loss of the Papal States and the limitation of the territory under the Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, the position of the Holy See in International Law became controversial (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law 36-37 [1992]). In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]). The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]). In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested that the treaty created two international persons the Holy See and Vatican City (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37). The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

One authority wrote that the recognition of the Vatican City as a state has significant implication that it is possible for any entity pursuing objects essentially different from those pursued by states to be invested with international personality (Kunz, The Status of the Holy See in International Law, 46 The American Journal of International Law 308 [1952]). Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations. B. Sovereign Immunity As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]). Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character." The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii. The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading.

This Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) the conduct of public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]). On the other hand, this Court has considered the following transactions by a foreign state with private parties as acts jure gestionis: (1) the hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of legislation defining what activities and transactions shall be considered "commercial" and as constituting acts jure gestionis, we have to come out with our own guidelines, tentative they may be. Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit. As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra): There is no question that the United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied. In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27). The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Ordinarily, the procedure would be to remand the case and order the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish the facts alleged by petitioner in its motion. In view of said certification, such procedure would however be pointless and unduly circuitous (Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994). IV Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels. Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,

919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the forerunner of the International Court of Justice: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by reporting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law (The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Reports 293, 302 [1924]). WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Feliciano, J., is on leave. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86773 February 14, 1992 SOUTHEAST ASIAN FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT CENTER-AQUACULTURE DEPARTMENT (SEAFDEC-AQD), DR. FLOR LACANILAO (CHIEF), RUFIL CUEVAS (HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE DIV.), BEN DELOS REYES (FINANCE OFFICER), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JUVENAL LAZAGA, respondents. Ramon Encarnacion for petitioners. Caesar T. Corpus for private respondent.

NOCON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the July 26, 1988 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission sustaining the labor arbiter, in holding herein

petitioners Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD), Dr. Flor Lacanilao, Rufil Cuevas and Ben de los Reyes liable to pay private respondent Juvenal Lazaga the amount of P126,458.89 plus interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits, and the resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said decision dated January 9, 1989. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand on December 28, 1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country (Article 1, Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC). On April 20, 1975, private respondent Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate an a probationary basis by the SEAFDEC-AQD and was appointed Senior External Affairs Officer on January 5, 1983 with a monthly basic salary of P8,000.00 and a monthly allowance of P4,000.00. Thereafter, he was appointed to the position of Professional III and designated as Head of External Affairs Office with the same pay and benefits. On May 8, 1986, petitioner Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated at the close of office hours on May 15, 1986 and that he is entitled to separation benefits equivalent to one (1) month of his basic salary for every year of service plus other benefits (Rollo, p. 153). Upon petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay private respondent his separation pay, the latter filed on March 18, 1987 a complaint against petitioners for non-payment of separation benefits plus moral damages and attorney's fees with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC (Annex "C" of Petition for Certiorari). Petitioners in their answer with counterclaim alleged that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case inasmuch as the SEAFDEC-AQD is an international organization and that private respondent must first secure clearances from the proper departments for property or money accountability before any claim for separation pay will be paid, and which clearances had not yet been obtained by the private respondent. A formal hearing was conducted whereby private respondent alleged that the non-issuance of the clearances by the petitioners was politically motivated and in bad faith. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that private respondent has property accountability and an outstanding obligation to SEAFDEC-AQD in the amount of P27,532.11. Furthermore, private respondent is not entitled to accrued sick leave benefits amounting to P44,000.00 due to his failure to avail of the same during his employment with the SEAFDEC-AQD (Annex "D", Id.). On January 12, 1988, the labor arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents:

1. To pay complainant P126,458.89, plus legal interest thereon computed from May 16, 1986 until full payment thereof is made, as separation pay and other post-employment benefits; 2. To pay complainant actual damages in the amount of P50,000, plus 10% attorney's fees. All other claims are hereby dismissed. SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 51, Annex "E") On July 26, 1988, said decision was affirmed by the Fifth Division of the NLRC except as to the award of P50,000.00 as actual damages and attorney's fees for being baseless. (Annex "A", p. 28, id.) On September 3, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Annex "G", id.) which was denied on January 9, 1989. Thereafter, petitioners instituted this petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent Lazaga's complaint since SEAFDEC-AQD is immune from suit owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the State which cannot be maintained without its consent. The petition is impressed with merit. Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. It was established by the Governments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia, Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia. Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam (Annex "H", Petition). The Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16,1968. Its purpose is as follows: The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries development in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the Center, hereinafter called the "Members", and through collaboration with international organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; Annex "H" Petition) (p.310, Rollo) SEAFDEC-AQD was organized during the Sixth Council Meeting of SEAFDEC on July 3-7, 1973 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia as one of the principal departments of SEAFDEC (Annex "I", id.) to be established in Iloilo for the promotion of research in aquaculture. Paragraph 1, Article 6 of the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC mandates: 1. The Council shall be the supreme organ of the Center and all powers of the Center shall be vested in the Council.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. As Senator Jovito R. Salonga and Former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap stated in their book, Public International Law (p. 83, 1956 ed.): Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. Among the notable instances are the International Labor Organization, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Danube Commission. In so far as they are autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species of international personality of their own." (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 83 [1956 ed.]) Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council (Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1, Annex "H",ibid.) and that its national laws and regulations shall apply only insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed amount of money, movable and immovable property and services necessary for the establishment and operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11, ibid.). It expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD (Section 2, P.D. No. 292). The then Minister of Justice likewise opined that Philippine Courts have no jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD in Opinion No. 139, Series of 1984 4. One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e.,that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. (See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44) The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its memberstates. In the case at bar, for instance, the entertainment by the National Labor Relations Commission of Mr. Madamba's reinstatement cases would amount to interference by the Philippine Government in the management decisions of the SEARCA governing board; even worse, it could compromise the desired impartiality of the organization since it will have to suit its actuations to the requirements of Philippine law, which may not necessarily coincide with the interests of the other member-states. It is precisely to forestall these possibilities that in cases where the extent of the immunity is specified in the enabling instruments of international organizations, jurisdictional immunity from the host country is invariably among the first accorded. (See Jenks, Id.; See also Bowett, The Law of International Institutions, pp. 284-1285).

Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court held: A rule, that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which it stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. (Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, 118 SCRA 399; [1982]) Respondent NLRC'S citation of the ruling of this Court in Lacanilao v. De Leon (147 SCRA 286 [1987]) to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over SEAFDEC is misplaced. On the contrary, the Court in said case explained why it took cognizance of the case. Said the Court: We would note, finally, that the present petition relates to a controversy between two claimants to the same position; this is not a controversy between the SEAFDEC on the one hand, and an officer or employee, or a person claiming to be an officer or employee, of the SEAFDEC, on the other hand. There is before us no question involving immunity from the jurisdiction of the Court, there being no plea for such immunity whether by or on behalf of SEAFDEC, or by an official of SEAFDEC with the consent of SEAFDEC (Id., at 300; emphasis supplied). WHEREFORE, finding SEAFDEC-AQD to be an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or local agency of the Philippine government, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC dated July 26, 1988 and January 9, 1989, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been rendered without jurisdiction. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the "Malaya Lolas Organization",Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents. DECISION DEL CASTILLO, J.: The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt.1 There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this matter. Factual Antecedents This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of

the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
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Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.2 Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Issues Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals. Petitioners arguments Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity,3 sexual slavery,4 and torture.5 They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine governments acceptance of the "apologies" made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law. Respondents Arguments Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.6

Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace7 provides: Article 14. Claims and Property a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations. b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation. In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan8 have been satisfactory, and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian Womens Fund.
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Historical Background The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese military forces captured the city of Nanking in China and began a "barbaric campaign of terror" known as the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes and murders of an estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese women, including young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women.9 Document1zzF24331552898 In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end international condemnation10 by establishing the "comfort women" system. Under this system, the military could simultaneously appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain soldiers' activities within a regulated environment.11 Comfort stations would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories.12 Daily life as a comfort woman was "unmitigated misery."13 The military forced victims into barracks-style stations divided into tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30 soldiers per day.14The 30 minutes allotted for sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute increments of unimaginable horror for the women.15 Disease was rampant.16 Military doctors regularly examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the spread of venereal diseases; little notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted on the women by soldiers. Document1zzF48331552898 Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war.17 Their agony continued in having to suffer with the residual physical, psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives. Some returned home and were ostracized by their families. Some committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never returned home.18 Efforts to Secure Reparation

The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay compensatory damages for the comfort women system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Womens International Criminal Tribunal. The Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the creation of the AWF.19 Lawsuits In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort women against the Japanese government. The Tokyo District Court however dismissed their case.20 Other suits followed,21 but the Japanese government has, thus far, successfully caused the dismissal of every case.22 Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women system brought their claims before the United States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia23 "seeking money damages for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II," in violation of "both positive and customary international law." The case was filed pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"),24 which allowed the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a US federal district court.25 On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over Japan, stating that "[t]here is no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy sovereign immunity, plaintiffs' claims are nonjusticiable and must be dismissed." The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.26 On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted the womens petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and remanded the case.27 On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior decision, noting that "much as we may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of the US simply are not authorized to hear their case."28 The women again brought their case to the US Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006. Efforts at the United Nations In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS), submitted a petition to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women and seeking reparations for former comfort women.29 The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy as the issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report reaffirming Japan's responsibility in forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the following recommendations: A. At the national level 137. The Government of Japan should: (a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War was a violation of its obligations under international law and accept legal responsibility for that violation;

(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of the victims are of a very advanced age; (c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort stations and other related activities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War; (d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be substantiated as women victims of Japanese military sexual slavery; (e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical realities; (f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and institutionalization of comfort stations during the Second World War. Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitled Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the Government of Japan for 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the Second World War,30 which contained the following findings: 68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The Japanese Governments arguments to the contrary, including arguments that seek to attack the underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as they were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In addition, the Japanese Governments argument that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second World War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war remains equally unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to admit the extent of the Japanese militarys direct involvement in the establishment and maintenance of these rape centres. The Japanese Governments silence on this point during the period in which peace and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on these peace treaties to extinguish liability in these cases. 69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a testament to the degree to which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a massive scale during the Second World War has added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today. The Government of Japan has taken some steps to apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women and girls who were brutalized in "comfort stations" during the Second World War. However, anything less than full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences

that flow from such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the necessary final steps to provide adequate redress. The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought. Women's International War Crimes Tribunal The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a "people's tribunal" established by a number of Asian women and human rights organizations, supported by an international coalition of non-governmental organizations.31 First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to "adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence against women." After examining the evidence for more than a year, the "tribunal" issued its verdict on December 4, 2001, finding the former Emperor Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape and sexual slavery of women.32 It bears stressing, however, that although the tribunal included prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was organized by private citizens. Action by Individual Governments On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six cosponsor representatives, introduced House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese action in light of the ongoing struggle for closure by former comfort women. The Resolution was formally passed on July 30, 2007,33 and made four distinct demands: [I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s through the duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual enslavement and trafficking of the "comfort women" for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and (4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime while following the recommendations of the international community with respect to the "comfort women."34 In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a resolution similar to House Resolution 121.35 Entitled, "Justice for Comfort Women," the resolution demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of the legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The resolution also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these issues, stating: "the right of individuals to claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for reparations for the survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized, taking into account the age of the survivors."

The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan. Canada's resolution demands the Japanese government to issue a formal apology, to admit that its Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual slavery, and to restore references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes.36 The Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdoms Parliament also produced a report in November, 2008 entitled, "Global Security: Japan and Korea" which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the pain caused by the issue of comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea. Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the comfort system: a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993: The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study. As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere. As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc. Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment. We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.

As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto. b) Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayamas Statement in 1994 On the issue of wartime "comfort women", which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women, I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and apologies" c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women. As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who endured immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women. I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations. d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005 Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in modern world history, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering on the people of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House hereby express deep remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995) e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have been consistent. I will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have been apologizing sincerely to those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological wounds as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have issued letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same feeling. This has not changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11, 2007). I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007). I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my apologies for the extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to President George W. Bush, April 3, 2007).

I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime comfort women. As a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of Japan I need to apologize to them. My administration has been saying all along that we continue to stand by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced these women to go through that hardship and pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an interview article "A Conversation with Shinzo Abe" by the Washington Post, April 22, 2007). x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who suffered extreme hardships as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were forced to endure such extreme and harsh conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of the world during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which no human rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make significant contributions to that end. (Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007). The Asian Women's Fund Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government's concrete attempt to address its moral responsibility by offering monetary compensation to victims of the comfort women system.37 The purpose of the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to restore their honor, and to demonstrate Japans strong respect for women.38 The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an atonement fund paying 2 million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2) medical and welfare support programs, paying 2.5-3 million ($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding for the program came from the Japanese government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF provided 700 million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; 380 million (approximately $3.8 million) in Indonesia; and 242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the Netherlands. On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Our Ruling Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan. The petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Baker v. Carr39 remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US Supreme Court explained that: x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. In Taada v. Cuenco,40 we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.41 One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."42 The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions relating to foreign policy are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.43 To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.44 However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari. In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,45 the US Supreme Court held that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations." It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -perhaps serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his

confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. x x x This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. Executive Secretary46 and Pimentel v. Executive Secretary;47 its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief) Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:48 x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed. In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since time immemorial, when negotiating peace accords and settling international claims: x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets, and as counters, `chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked, claims deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger political considerations unrelated to debts.49 Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,50 a case brought by a British subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during the war, Justice Chase wrote: I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded, neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace; and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for, British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the

treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied). This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly nothing new. For instance, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,51 the US Supreme Court held: Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the government of another country are "sources of friction" between the two sovereigns. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of another "are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory." L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x x x Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the "United States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of the nation as a whole." Henkin,supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 213 (1965)(President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state x x x [even] without the consent of the [injured] national"). It is clear that the practice of settling claims continues today. Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the spread of communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world. This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the war.52 In a consolidated case in the Northern District of California,53 the court dismissed the lawsuits filed, relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan,54 because of the following policy considerations: The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace: Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception. On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost, losses and suffering.

On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was informed by the experience of six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas MacArthur, confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan's financial condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948, MacArthur expressed the view that "[t]he use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means" and "recommended that the reparations issue be settled finally and without delay." That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The committee noted, for example: Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and policy of x x x the United States x x x. We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf.55 Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case: By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.56

Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim.57 As clearly stated by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.58 (Emphasis supplied)
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The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case. The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State,"59 (ii) affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State;60 and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."61 It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured.62 However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals abroad.63 Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment. 64
1avvphi1

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.65 However, petitioners take quite a theoretical leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan. Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support the modern trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international crimes.66 Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international crimes.67 Of course a customary

duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity."68 Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term describingobligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction: x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.http://www.search.com/reference/Erga_omnes _note-0#_note-0 Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasiuniversal character. The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be realized in practice.69 The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.70 Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,71 but peremptory norms began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.72 The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).73 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,74 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify

a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens."75 In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."76 Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78 Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say, our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners cause. Ours is only the power to urge andexhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, vs. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. The Antecedents In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.13 In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris. We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ. The Issues The petition raises the following issues: 1. Preliminarily 1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. 2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional. The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional. On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17 The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law. RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory"21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22 Petitioners theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decadeslong negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago."24 UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.26 RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our territorial claim" over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
1avvphi1

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose. Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by

optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29 Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters Territorial Sea Exclusive Economic Zone TOTAL 440,994

Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)

166,858 274,136

171,435 32,106 382,669 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31 Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations: What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
1avvphi1

[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles." 2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.

3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35 Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37 Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Actis without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied) UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38 Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution39 or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this: Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied) The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41 In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47 Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2,

paragraph 251 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752 ), are not violated by RA 9522. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III. RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a twofronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE

Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice

CASTRO Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE C. MENDOZA Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

Footnotes Entitled "An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes."
1 2

Entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines."

The third "Whereas Clause" of RA 3046 expresses the import of treating the Philippines as an archipelagic State:
3

"WHEREAS, all the waters around, between, and connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimensions, have always been considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland waters of the Philippines." One of the four conventions framed during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in Geneva, this treaty, excluding the Philippines, entered into force on 10 September 1964.
4

UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The Philippines signed the treaty on 10 December 1982. Article 47, paragraphs 1-3, provide: 1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied) xxxx

UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The deadline for the filing of application is mandated in Article 4, Annex II: "Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same time give the names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and technical advice." (Underscoring supplied)
8

In a subsequent meeting, the States parties agreed that for States which became bound by the treaty before 13 May 1999 (such as the Philippines) the ten-year period will be counted from that date. Thus, RA 9522, which took effect on 27 March 2009, barely met the deadline.
9

Rollo, p. 34.

Which provides: "The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines."
10

Entered into between the Unites States and Spain on 10 December 1898 following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War. Under the terms of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States "the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands" lying within its technical description.
11

The Treaty of Washington, between Spain and the United States (7 November 1900), transferring to the US the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu and the USGreat Britain Convention (2 January 1930) demarcating boundary lines between the Philippines and North Borneo.
12 13

Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16.

Allegedly in violation of Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
14 15

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995).

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 165 Phil. 303 (1976).
16

Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J., concurring). The two other factors are: "the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy and a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition." Id.
17 18

. Rollo, pp. 144-147.

See e.g. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623 (dismissing a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, not for the impropriety of remedy but for lack of merit); Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137 (issuing the writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591); Macalintal v. COMELEC, 453 Phil. 586 (2003) (issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition declaring unconstitutional portions of Republic Act No. 9189).
19

See e.g. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77 (granting a writ of certiorari against the Philippine Senate and nullifying the Senate contempt order issued against petitioner).
20 21

Rollo, p. 31.

Respondents state in their Comment that petitioners theory "has not been accepted or recognized by either the United States or Spain," the parties to the Treaty of Paris. Respondents add that "no State is known to have supported this proposition." Rollo, p. 179.
22

UNCLOS III belongs to that larger corpus of international law of the sea, which petitioner Magallona himself defined as "a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. x x x x" (Merlin M. Magallona, Primer on the Law of the Sea 1 [1997]) (Italicization supplied).
23 24

Following Article 47 (1) of UNCLOS III which provides:

An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of theoutermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied) Under the United Nations Charter, use of force is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory.
25

The last paragraph of the preamble of UNCLOS III states that "matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law."
26 27

Rollo, p. 51. Id. at 51-52, 64-66. Based on figures respondents submitted in their Comment (id. at 182). Under Article 74. See note 7. Presidential Decree No. 1596 classifies the KIG as a municipality of Palawan.

28

29

30

31

32

KIG lies around 80 nautical miles west of Palawan while Scarborough Shoal is around 123 nautical west of Zambales.
33 34

Journal, Senate 14th Congress 44th Session 1416 (27 January 2009). Rollo, p. 159. Section 2, RA 9522. Article 121 provides: "Regime of islands. 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory. 3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."

35

36

37

38

Rollo, pp. 56-57, 60-64.

Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the term "archipelagic waters" separately from "territorial sea." Under UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State may have internal waters such as those enclosed by closing lines across bays and mouths of rivers. See Article 50, UNCLOS III. Moreover, Article 8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides: "Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters." (Emphasis supplied)
39 40

Mandated under Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS III: Article 52. Right of innocent passage. 1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3. 2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published. (Emphasis supplied) Article 53. Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. 2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes. 3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone. 4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same entry and exit points shall not be necessary. 5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points of passage routes to the

exit points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane. 6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes. 7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously designated or prescribed by it. 8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally accepted international regulations. 9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, an archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may designate, prescribe or substitute them. 10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to which due publicity shall be given. 11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes established in accordance with this article. 12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied) Namely, House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738, identically titled "AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES IN THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, PRESCRIBING THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES AND PROVIDING FOR THE ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES THEREIN."
41 42

The relevant provision of UNCLOS III provides: Article 17. Right of innocent passage.

Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Emphasis supplied) Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. 1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law. 2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities: (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; (b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; (c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State; (d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; (e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; (f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; (g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; (h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; (i) any fishing activities; (j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; (k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; (l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage

Article 21. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage. 1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic; (b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations; (c) the protection of cables and pipelines; (d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea; (e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State; (f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof; (g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys; (h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State. 2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards. 3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations. 4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea. The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea applies only to ships and not to aircrafts (Article 17, UNCLOS III). The right of innocent passage of aircrafts through the sovereign territory of a State arises only under an international agreement. In contrast, the right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters applies to both ships and aircrafts (Article 53 (12), UNCLOS III).
43

Following Section 2, Article II of the Constitution: "Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
44

policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." (Emphasis supplied) "Archipelagic sea lanes passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits" to which the territorial sea of continental coastal State is subject. R.R. Churabill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 127 (1999).
45 46

Falling under Article 121 of UNCLOS III (see note 37).

Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the following rights under UNCLOS III:
47

Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone. 1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention. 2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part. xxxx Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the freedom of the high seas, defined under UNCLOS III as follows: Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. 1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States: (a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight; (c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI; (d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject to Part VI;

(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2; (f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
48

See note 13.

Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 698 (1995); Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 580-581 (1997).
49 50

G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

"The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens."
51

"The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources."
52

This can extend up to 350 nautical miles if the coastal State proves its right to claim an extended continental shelf (see UNCLOS III, Article 76, paragraphs 4(a), 5 and 6, in relation to Article 77).
53 54

Rollo, pp. 67-69.

Article 47 (1) provides: "An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1." (Emphasis supplied) in the Area.
55

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

I concur with the ponencia and add the following complementary arguments and observations: A statute is a product of hard work and earnest studies of Congress to ensure that no constitutional provision, prescription or concept is infringed. Withal, before a law, in an appropriate proceeding, is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution must be demonstrated in such a way as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.1 In the same token, if a law runs directly afoul of the Constitution, the Courts duty on the matter should be clear and simple: Pursuant to its judicial power and as final arbiter of all legal questions,2 it should strike such law down, however laudable its purpose/s might be and regardless of the deleterious effect such action may carry in its wake. Challenged in these proceedings is the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA 9522) entitled "An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of [RA] 3046, as Amended by [RA] 5446 to Define the Archipelagic Baselines Of The Philippines and for Other Purposes." For perspective, RA 3046, "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, was enacted in 1961 to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I. Eight years later, RA 5446 was enacted to amend typographical errors relating to coordinates in RA 3046. The latter law also added a provision asserting Philippine sovereignty over Sabah. As its title suggests, RA 9522 delineates archipelagic baselines of the country, amending in the process the old baselines law, RA 3046. Everybody is agreed that RA 9522 was enacted in response to the countrys commitment to conform to some 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) or UNCLOS III provisions to define new archipelagic baselines through legislation, the Philippines having signed3 and eventually ratified4 this multilateral treaty. The Court can take judicial notice that RA 9522 was registered and deposited with the UN on April 4, 2009. As indicated in its Preamble,5 1982 LOSC aims, among other things, to establish, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, "a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans." One of the measures to attain the order adverted to is to have a rule on baselines. Of particular relevance to the Philippines, as an archipelagic state, is Article 47 of UNCLOS III which deals with baselines: 1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. 2. The length of such baseline shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. xxxx

9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.6 (Emphasis added.) To obviate, however, the possibility that certain UNCLOS III baseline provisions would, in their implementation, undermine its sovereign and/or jurisdictional interests over what it considers its territory,7 the Philippines, when it signed UNCLOS III on December 10, 1982, made the following "Declaration" to said treaty: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP] hereby manifests that in signing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it does so with the understandings embodied in this declaration, made under the provisions of Article 310 of the Convention, to wit: The signing of the Convention by the [GRP] shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the [RP] under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines; Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the [RP] as successor of the United States of America [USA], under and arising out of the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of December 10, 1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the [USA] and Great Britain of January 2, 1930; xxxx Such signing shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the [RP] over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto; The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential Decrees or Proclamations of the Republic of the Philippines. The [GRP] maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic state over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty independence and security; The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the economic zone or high sea from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation.8 (Emphasis added.) Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the principal ground that the law violates Section 1, Article I of the 1987 Constitution on national territory which states: Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters

around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) According to Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., himself a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution, the aforequoted Section 1 on national territory was "in substance a copy of its 1973 counterpart."9 Art. I of the 1973 Constitution reads: Section 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title, including the territorial sea, the air space, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (Emphasis added.) As may be noted both constitutions speak of the "Philippine archipelago," and, via the last sentence of their respective provisions, assert the countrys adherence to the "archipelagic principle." Both constitutions divide the national territory into two main groups: (1) the Philippine archipelago and (2) other territories belonging to the Philippines. So what or where is Philippine archipelago contemplated in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions then? Fr. Bernas answers the poser in the following wise: Article I of the 1987 Constitution cannot be fully understood without reference to Article I of the 1973 Constitution. x x x xxxx x x x To understand [the meaning of national territory as comprising the Philippine archipelago], one must look into the evolution of [Art. I of the 1973 Constitution] from its first draft to its final form. Section 1 of the first draft submitted by the Committee on National Territory almost literally reproduced Article I of the 1935 Constitution x x x. Unlike the 1935 version, however, the draft designated the Philippines not simply as the Philippines but as "the Philippine archipelago.10 In response to the criticism that the definition was colonial in tone x x x, the second draft further designated the Philippine archipelago, as the historic home of the Filipino people from its beginning.11 After debates x x x, the Committee reported out a final draft, which became the initially approved version: "The national territory consists of the Philippine archipelago which is the ancestral home of the Filipino people and which is composed of all the islands and waters embraced therein" What was the intent behind the designation of the Philippines as an "archipelago"? x x x Asked by Delegate Roselller Lim (Zamboanga) where this archipelago was, Committee Chairman Quintero answered that it was the area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. He said that objections to the colonial implication of mentioning the Treaty of Paris was responsible for the omission of the express mention of the Treaty of Paris. Report No. 01 of the Committee on National Territory had in fact been explicit in its delineation of the expanse of this archipelago. It said:

Now if we plot on a map the boundaries of this archipelago as set forth in the Treaty of Paris, a huge or giant rectangle will emerge, measuring about 600 miles in width and 1,200 miles in length. Inside this giant rectangle are the 7,100 islands comprising the Philippine Islands. From the east coast of Luzon to the eastern boundary of this huge rectangle in the Pacific Ocean, there is a distance of over 300 miles. From the west coast of Luzon to the western boundary of this giant rectangle in the China sea, there is a distance of over 150 miles. When the [US] Government enacted the Jones Law, the Hare-Hawes Cutting Law and the Tydings McDuffie Law, it in reality announced to the whole world that it was turning over to the Government of the Philippine Islands an archipelago (that is a big body of water studded with islands), the boundaries of which archipelago are set forth in Article III of the Treaty of Paris. It also announced to the whole world that the waters inside the giant rectangle belong to the Philippines that they are not part of the high seas. When Spain signed the Treaty of Paris, in effect she announced to the whole world that she was ceding to the [US] the Philippine archipelago x x x, that this archipelago was bounded by lines specified in the treaty, and that the archipelago consisted of the huge body of water inside the boundaries and the islands inside said boundaries. The delineation of the extent of the Philippine archipelago must be understood in the context of the modifications made both by the Treaty of Washington of November 7, 1900, and of the Convention of January 12, 1930, in order to include the Islands of Sibutu and of Cagayan de Sulu and the Turtle and Mangsee Islands. However, x x x the definition of the archipelago did not include the Batanes group[, being] outside the boundaries of the Philippine archipelago as set forth in the Treaty of Paris. In literal terms, therefore, the Batanes islands would come not under the Philippine archipelago but under the phrase "all other territories belong to the Philippines."12 x x x (Emphasis added.) From the foregoing discussions on the deliberations of the provisions on national territory, the following conclusion is abundantly evident: the "Philippine archipelago" of the 1987 Constitution is the same "Philippine archipelago" referred to in Art. I of the 1973 Constitution which in turn corresponds to the territory defined and described in Art. 1 of the 1935 Constitution,13 which pertinently reads: Section 1. The Philippines comprises all the territory ceded to the [US] by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the [US] and Spain on the tenth day of December, [1898], the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together with all the islands in the treaty concluded at Washington, between the [US] and Spain on November [7, 1900] and the treaty concluded between the [US] and Great Britain x x x. While the Treaty of Paris is not mentioned in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, its mention, so the nationalistic arguments went, being "a repulsive reminder of the indignity of our colonial past,"14 it is at once clear that the Treaty of Paris had been utilized as key reference point in the definition of the national territory. On the other hand, the phrase "all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction," found in the 1987 Constitution, which replaced the deleted phrase "all territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title" 15 found in the 1973 Constitution, covers areas linked to the Philippines with varying degrees of certainty.16 Under this category would fall: (a) Batanes, which then 1971 Convention Delegate Eduardo Quintero, Chairperson of the Committee on National Territory, described as belonging to the Philippines in all its history;17 (b) Sabah, over which a formal claim had been filed, the so-

called Freedomland (a group of islands known as Spratleys); and (c) any other territory, over which the Philippines had filed a claim or might acquire in the future through recognized modes of acquiring territory.18 As an author puts it, the deletion of the words "by historic right or legal title" is not to be interpreted as precluding future claims to areas over which the Philippines does not actually exercise sovereignty.19 Upon the foregoing perspective and going into specifics, petitioners would have RA 9522 stricken down as unconstitutional for the reasons that it deprives the Philippines of what has long been established as part and parcel of its national territory under the Treaty of Paris, as supplemented by the aforementioned 1900 Treaty of Washington or, to the same effect, revises the definition on or dismembers the national territory. Pushing their case, petitioners argue that the constitutional definition of the national territory cannot be remade by a mere statutory act.20 As another point, petitioners parlay the theory that the law in question virtually weakens the countrys territorial claim over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Sabah, both of which come under the category of "other territories" over the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction. Petitioners would also assail the law on grounds related to territorial sea lanes and internal waters transit passage by foreign vessels. It is remarkable that petitioners could seriously argue that RA 9522 revises the Philippine territory as defined in the Constitution, or worse, constitutes an abdication of territory. It cannot be over-emphasized enough that RA 9522 is a baseline law enacted to implement the 1982 LOSC, which in turn seeks to regulate and establish an orderly sea use rights over maritime zones. Or as the ponencia aptly states, RA 9522 aims to mark-out specific base points along the Philippine coast from which baselines are drawn to serve as starting points to measure the breadth of the territorial sea and maritime zones.21 The baselines are set to define the sea limits of a state, be it coastal or archipelagic, under the UNCLOS III regime. By setting the baselines to conform to the prescriptions of UNCLOS III, RA 9522 did not surrender any territory, as petitioners would insist at every turn, for UNCLOS III is concerned with setting order in the exercise of sea-use rights, not the acquisition or cession of territory. And let it be noted that under UNCLOS III, it is recognized that countries can have territories outside their baselines. Far from having a dismembering effect, then, RA 9522 has in a limited but real sense increased the countrys maritime boundaries. How this situation comes about was extensively explained by then Minister of State and head of the Philippine delegation to UNCLOS III Arturo Tolentino in his sponsorship speech22 on the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa with the LOSC: xxxx Then, we should consider, Mr. Speaker, that under the archipelagic principle, the whole area inside the archipelagic base lines become a unified whole and the waters between the islands which formerly were regarded by international law as open or international seas now become waters under the complete sovereignty of the Filipino people. In this light there would be an additional area of 141,800 square nautical miles inside the base lines that will be recognized by international law as Philippine waters, equivalent to 45,351,050 hectares. These gains in the waters of the sea, 45,211,225 hectares outside the base lines and 141,531,000 hectares inside the base lines, total 93,742,275 hectares as a total gain in the waters under Philippine jurisdiction. From a pragmatic standpoint, therefore, the advantage to our country and people not only in terms of the legal unification of land and waters of the archipelago in the light of international law, but also in terms of the vast resources that will come under the dominion and jurisdiction

of the Republic of the Philippines, your Committee on Foreign Affairs does not hesitate to ask this august Body to concur in the Convention by approving the resolution before us today. May I say it was the unanimous view of delegations at the Conference on the Law of the Sea that archipelagos are among the biggest gainers or beneficiaries under the Convention on the Law of the Sea. Lest it be overlooked, the constitutional provision on national territory, as couched, is broad enough to encompass RA 9522s definition of the archipelagic baselines. To reiterate, the laying down of baselines is not a mode of acquiring or asserting ownership a territory over which a state exercises sovereignty. They are drawn for the purpose of defining or establishing the maritime areas over which a state can exercise sovereign rights. Baselines are used for fixing starting point from which the territorial belt is measured seawards or from which the adjacent maritime waters are measured. Thus, the territorial sea, a marginal belt of maritime waters, is measured from the baselines extending twelve (12) nautical miles outward.23 Similarly, Art. 57 of the 1982 LOSC provides that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) "shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."24 Most important to note is that the baselines indicated under RA 9522 are derived from Art. 47 of the 1982 LOSC which was earlier quoted. Since the 1987 Constitutions definition of national territory does not delimit where the Philippines baselines are located, it is up to the political branches of the government to supply the deficiency. Through Congress, the Philippines has taken an official position regarding its baselines to the international community through RA 3046,25 as amended by RA 544626 and RA 9522. When the Philippines deposited a copy of RA 9522 with the UN Secretary General, we effectively complied in good faith with our obligation under the 1982 LOSC. A declaration by the Court of the constitutionality of the law will complete the bona fides of the Philippines vis-a-vis the law of the sea treaty. It may be that baseline provisions of UNCLOS III, if strictly implemented, may have an imposing impact on the signatory states jurisdiction and even their sovereignty. But this actuality, without more, can hardly provide a justifying dimension to nullify the complying RA 9522. As held by the Court in Bayan Muna v. Romulo,27 treaties and international agreements have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary acts, states may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their sovereignty. The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or reciprocal undertaking. On the premise that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. As a signatory of the 1982 LOSC, it behooves the Philippines to honor its obligations thereunder. Pacta sunt servanda, a basic international law postulate that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith."28 The exacting imperative of this principle is such that a state may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty."29 The allegation that Sabah has been surrendered by virtue of RA 9522, which supposedly repealed the hereunder provision of RA 5446, is likewise unfounded. Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial

sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. There is nothing in RA 9522 indicating a clear intention to supersede Sec. 2 of RA 5446. Petitioners obviously have read too much into RA 9522s amendment on the baselines found in an older law. Aside from setting the countrys baselines, RA 9522 is, in its Sec. 3, quite explicit in its reiteration of the Philippines exercise of sovereignty, thus: Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended. To emphasize, baselines are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Having KIG and the Scarborough Shoal outside Philippine baselines will not diminish our sovereignty over these areas. Art. 46 of UNCLOS III in fact recognizes that an archipelagic state, such as the Philippines, is a state "constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands." (emphasis supplied) The "other islands" referred to in Art. 46 are doubtless islands not forming part of the archipelago but are nevertheless part of the states territory. The Philippines sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal are, thus, in no way diminished. Consider: Other countries such as Malaysia and the United States have territories that are located outside its baselines, yet there is no territorial question arising from this arrangement. 30 It may well be apropos to point out that the Senate version of the baseline bill that would become RA 9522 contained the following explanatory note: The law "reiterates our sovereignty over the Kalayaan Group of Islands declared as part of the Philippine territory under Presidential Decree No. 1596. As part of the Philippine territory, they shall be considered as a regime of islands under Article 121 of the Convention."31 Thus, instead of being in the nature of a "treasonous surrender" that petitioners have described it to be, RA 9522 even harmonizes our baseline laws with our international agreements, without limiting our territory to those confined within the countrys baselines. Contrary to petitioners contention, the classification of KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as falling under the Philippines regime of islands is not constitutionally objectionable. Such a classification serves as compliance with LOSC and the Philippines assertion of sovereignty over KIG and Scarborough Shoal. In setting the baseline in KIG and Scarborough Shoal, RA 9522 states that these are areas "over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction." It is, thus, not correct for petitioners to claim that the Philippines has lost 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters upon making this classification. Having 15,000 square nautical miles of Philippine waters outside of our baselines, to reiterate, does not translate to a surrender of these waters. The Philippines maintains its assertion of ownership over territories outside of its baselines. Even China views RA 9522 as an assertion of ownership, as seen in its Protest32 filed with the UN Secretary-General upon the deposit of RA 9522. We take judicial notice of the effective occupation of KIG by the Philippines. Petitioners even point out that national and local elections are regularly held there. The classification of KIG as under a "regime of islands" does not in any manner affect the Philippines consistent position with regard to sovereignty over KIG. It does not affect the Philippines other acts of

ownership such as occupation or amend Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared KIG as a municipality of Palawan. The fact that the baselines of KIG and Scarborough Shoal have yet to be defined would not detract to the constitutionality of the law in question. The resolution of the problem lies with the political departments of the government. All told, the concerns raised by the petitioners about the diminution or the virtual dismemberment of the Philippine territory by the enactment of RA 9522 are, to me, not well grounded. To repeat, UNCLOS III pertains to a law on the seas, not territory. As part of its Preamble,33 LOSC recognizes "the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans x x x." This brings me to the matter of transit passage of foreign vessels through Philippine waters. Apropos thereto, petitioners allege that RA 9522 violates the nuclear weapons-free policy under Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 16, Art. II of the Constitution, and exposes the Philippines to marine pollution hazards, since under the LOSC the Philippines supposedly must give to ships of all states the right of innocent passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage. The adverted Sec. 8, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution declares the adoption and pursuit by the Philippines of "a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory." On the other hand, the succeeding Sec. l6 underscores the States firm commitment "to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." Following the allegations of petitioners, these twin provisions will supposedly be violated inasmuch as RA 9522 accedes to the right of innocent passage and the right of archipelagic sea-lane passage provided under the LOSC. Therefore, ships of all nationsbe they nuclear-carrying warships or neutral commercial vessels transporting goodscan assert the right to traverse the waters within our islands. A cursory reading of RA 9522 would belie petitioners posture. In context, RA 9522 simply seeks to conform to our international agreement on the setting of baselines and provides nothing about the designation of archipelagic sea-lane passage or the regulation of innocent passage within our waters. Again, petitioners have read into the amendatory RA 9522 something not intended. Indeed, the 1982 LOSC enumerates the rights and obligations of archipelagic party-states in terms of transit under Arts. 51 to 53, which are explained below: To safeguard, in explicit terms, the general balance struck by [Articles 51 and 52] between the need for passage through the area (other than straits used for international navigation) and the archipelagic states need for security, Article 53 gave the archipelagic state the right to regulate where and how ships and aircraft pass through its territory by designating specific sea lanes. Rights of passage through these archipelagic sea lanes are regarded as those of transit passage: (1) An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for safe, continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea.

(2) All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air routes. (3) Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the exercise in accordance with the present Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.34 But owing to the geographic structure and physical features of the country, i.e., where it is "essentially a body of water studded with islands, rather than islands with water around them,"35 the Philippines has consistently maintained the conceptual unity of land and water as a necessary element for territorial integrity,36 national security (which may be compromised by the presence of warships and surveillance ships on waters between the islands),37 and the preservation of its maritime resources. As succinctly explained by Minister Arturo Tolentino, the essence of the archipelagic concept is "the dominion and sovereignty of the archipelagic State within its baselines, which were so drawn as to preserve the territorial integrity of the archipelago by the inseparable unity of the land and water domain."38 Indonesia, like the Philippines, in terms of geographic reality, has expressed agreement with this interpretation of the archipelagic concept. So it was that in 1957, the Indonesian Government issued the Djuanda Declaration, therein stating : [H]istorically, the Indonesian archipelago has been an entity since time immemorial. In view of the territorial entirety and of preserving the wealth of the Indonesian state, it is deemed necessary to consider all waters between the islands and entire entity.
1avvphi1

x x x On the ground of the above considerations, the Government states that all waters around, between and connecting, the islands or parts of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective of their width or dimension are natural appurtenances of its land territory and therefore an integral part of the inland or national waters subject to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia.39 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the Philippines maintains the sui generis character of our archipelagic waters as equivalent to the internal waters of continental coastal states. In other words, the landward waters embraced within the baselines determined by RA 9522, i.e., all waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.40 Accordingly, such waters are not covered by the jurisdiction of the LOSC and cannot be subjected to the rights granted to foreign states in archipelagic waters, e.g., the right of innocent passage,41 which is allowed only in the territorial seas, or that area of the ocean comprising 12 miles from the baselines of our archipelago; archipelagic sea-lane passage;42 over flight;43 and traditional fishing rights.44 Our position that all waters within our baselines are internal waters, which are outside the jurisdiction of the 1982 LOSC,45 was abundantly made clear by the Philippine Declaration at the time of the signing of the LOSC on December 10, 1982. To reiterate, paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the Declaration state: 5. The Convention shall not be construed as amending in any manner any pertinent laws and Presidential decrees of Proclamation of the republic of the Philippines; the

Government x x x maintains and reserves the right and authority to make any amendments to such laws, decrees or proclamations pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; 6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence and security; 7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines and removes straits connecting this water with the economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for international navigation. (Emphasis supplied.)46 More importantly, by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, the integrity of the Philippine state as comprising both water and land was strengthened by the proviso in its first article, viz: "The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the [Philippine] archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. (emphasis supplied) In effect, contrary to petitioners allegations, the Philippines ratification of the 1982 LOSC did not matter-of-factly open our internal waters to passage by foreign ships, either in the concept of innocent passage or archipelagic sea-lane passage, in exchange for the international communitys recognition of the Philippines as an archipelagic state. The Filipino people, by ratifying the 1987 Constitution, veritably rejected the quid pro quo petitioners take as being subsumed in that treaty. Harmonized with the Declaration and the Constitution, the designation of baselines made in RA 9522 likewise designates our internal waters, through which passage by foreign ships is not a right, but may be granted by the Philippines to foreign states but only as a dissolvable privilege. In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice