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Thomas LaRock and Enrico van de Laar
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively
licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in
any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the
advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate
at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Apress imprint is published by the registered company APress
Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: 1 New York Plaza, New York, NY
10004, U.S.A.
This book is dedicated to all the accidental database administrators,
developers, and anyone who has written a database query and wondered
“what the hell is taking so long?”
Also, for Roy, Moss, and anyone else who decided to turn it off and back on
again.
Introduction
“Write the book you wish someone else would have written and handed
to you when you were starting as a DBA.”
Those words were spoken to me by my friend and mentor, Kevin
Kline, roughly 13 years ago. At the time I was writing my first book,
DBA Survivor, and I asked Kevin for advice on how to approach the
project. His answer gave me clarity, and I’ve used the same approach for
this book you are now reading.
At the time I started as a junior DBA, Tom Davidson’s well-known
SQL Server 2005 Waits and Queues whitepaper was years away from
publication. What I knew about waits I would find using DBCC
statements against (the artist formally known as) Sybase ASE and SQL
Server 2000 instances.
In other words, I didn’t know much.
With the release of SQL Server 2005 and the publication of the
Davidson whitepaper, wait statistics became a viable tuning
methodology. Administrators and developers could now use waits and
queues to understand exactly why a query was running longer than
expected. Overnight our team transitioned from reacting to query
performance issues to being proactive in understanding which
resources the overall database workload needed most.
Every request sent to a database server has the same constraints:
memory, processing, disk, network, and locking/blocking. It doesn’t
matter if you want to rely solely on execution plans for query tuning;
the physical and logical constraints for the query remain the same: they
are just presented differently in an execution plan. The waits and
queue tuning methodology reduces the complexity and time
necessary for query performance tuning by an order of magnitude.
Once you understand how the database engine processes requests,
how waits happen, and how to track them, you are well on your way to
being an expert in query performance tuning.
And that’s the goal of this book. When you are done reading, I want
you to have all the skills necessary to be an expert in query
performance tuning. That’s the book I wish someone would have
written and handed to me when I was first starting as a DBA.
To reach the goal, this book has been split into two unequal parts.
Part I, “Foundations of Wait Statistics Analysis,” provides details on how
the database engine processes a query (officially called a request, which
is sent by a session, after a connection to the instance is established)
followed by information on how to query wait statistics information
through various SQL Server dynamic management views (DMVs). Part I
finishes with an overview of the Query Store feature and guidance on
how to create and gather metrics to build your own baselines.
Part II, “Wait Types,” dives into specific waits, the causes, some
examples, and possible resolutions. The chapters are divided by wait
categories, which is a bit tricky as some waits (such as PAGEIOLATCH)
have overlap between more than one possible constraint (memory and
disk). Therefore, the chapters break down specific waits into categories
by CPU, IO, backups, locks, latches, high-availability and disaster-
recovery, preemptive, background and miscellaneous, and In-Memory
OLTP.
Yes, waits for background and miscellaneous are included, despite
their being benign for query performance. It’s important for you to
know why (and when) these waits happen and when they are safe to
ignore (they usually are, but not always).
One thing to note, the examples in this book use a database named
GalacticWorks. This is a modified version of AdventureWorks I use for a
variety of demos when teaching my classes. The examples in the book
will work with AdventureWorks, so don’t panic about not having
GalacticWorks; you’ll be fine with most versions of AdventureWorks.
When you finish this book, I want you to have the confidence to
tackle any query performance tuning problem. You’ll have the details,
information, and knowledge necessary to be an expert. And maybe
soon enough, you’ll be teaching others and maybe someday write your
own book, too.
Any source code or other supplementary material referenced by the
author in this book is available to readers on GitHub
(https://github.com/Apress). For more detailed information, please
visit http://www.apress.com/source-code.
Acknowledgments
There are many people to acknowledge and thank for helping me with
this book. I’ll do my best to include as many as I can, but please don’t be
offended if I forget you; it’s not on purpose.
I’ll start with my wife, Suzanne, for her patience as I spent many off-
hours completing this book. Oh, and for all the time I’ve spent away
from home for the past 15 years.
Thanks to Bob Ward of Microsoft for helping uncover new SQL 2022
features, as well as your willingness to share your knowledge on SQL
Server for the past 25 years. And thanks for your time in Barcelona in
2006 when you inspired me to want to learn more about SQL Server.
Thanks to my partner in #TeamData, Karen Lopez, for your help,
support, and friendship for many years. I became a better technical
writer and presenter by learning from you.
Thanks to Kevin Kline for your guidance and support as I left my
career as a production DBA to become a Technical Advocate and for
providing an example of what proper community leadership looks like.
To Buck Woody, for your support in helping me understand my
strengths and your guidance in career opportunities through the years.
To Craig and Vinny, for giving me the opportunity to fail as a DBA,
and to Frank and Lori for not letting it happen as much as it should
have.
To Rie, Betsy, Rochelle, and everyone on the Microsoft Community
team for awarding me the Microsoft MVP status all these years.
Finally, to Jonathan, for thinking of me when it came time to update
this book for SQL 2022. Thank you for the opportunity to write another
book for you, 12 years later.
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now to explore a rich
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Table of Contents
Part I: Foundations of Wait Statistics Analysis
Chapter 1:Wait Statistics Internals
A Brief History of Wait Statistics
The SQLOS
Schedulers, Tasks, and Worker Threads
Sessions
Requests
Tasks
Worker Threads
Schedulers
Putting It All Together
Wait Statistics
Summary
Chapter 2:Querying SQL Server Wait Statistics
sys.dm_os_wait_stats
sys.dm_os_waiting_tasks
Understanding sys.dm_os_waiting_tasks
Querying sys.dm_os_waiting_tasks
sys.dm_exec_requests
Understanding sys.dm_exec_requests
Querying sys.dm_exec_requests
sys.dm_exec_session_wait_stats
Combining DMVs to Detect Waits Happening Now
Viewing Wait Statistics Using Perfmon
Capturing Wait Statistics Using Extended Events
Capture Wait Statistics Information for a Specific Query
Analyzing Wait Statistics on a Per-Query Basis Using Execution
Plans
Summary
Chapter 3:The Query Store
What Is the Query Store?
Enabling the Query Store
Enable the Query Store Using SSMS
Enable the Query Store Using T-SQL
Query Store Architecture
How Wait Statistics Are Processed in the Query Store
Accessing Wait Statistics Through Query Store Reports
Accessing Wait Statistics Through Query Store DMVs
Summary
Chapter 4:Building a Solid Baseline
What Are Baselines?
Visualizing Your Baselines
Baseline Types and Statistics
Baseline Pitfalls
Too Much Information
Know Your Metrics
Find the Big Measurement Changes
Use Fixed Intervals
Building a Baseline for Wait Statistics Analysis
Reset Capture Method
Delta Capture Method
Using SQL Server Agent to Schedule Measurements
Wait Statistics Baseline Analysis
Summary
Part II: Wait Types
Chapter 5:CPU-Related Wait Types
CXPACKET
What Is the CXPACKET Wait Type?
Lowering CXPACKET Wait Time by Tuning the Parallelism
Configuration Options
Lowering CXPACKET Wait Time by Resolving Skewed
Workloads
Introduction of the CXCONSUMER Wait Type
CXPACKET Summary
SOS_SCHEDULER_YIELD
What Is the SOS_SCHEDULER_YIELD Wait Type?
Lowering SOS_SCHEDULER_YIELD Waits
SOS_SCHEDULER_YIELD Summary
THREADPOOL
What Is the THREADPOOL Wait Type?
THREADPOOL Example
Gaining Access to Our SQL Server During THREADPOOL
Waits
Lowering THREADPOOL Waits Caused by Parallelism
Lowering THREADPOOL Waits Caused by User Connections
THREADPOOL Summary
Chapter 6:IO-Related Wait Types
ASYNC_IO_COMPLETION
What Is the ASYNC_IO_COMPLETION Wait Type?
ASYNC_IO_COMPLETION Example
Lowering ASYNC_IO_COMPLETION Waits
ASYNC_IO_COMPLETION Summary
ASYNC_NETWORK_IO
What Is the ASYNC_NETWORK_IO Wait Type?
ASYNC_NETWORK_IO Example
Lowering ASYNC_NETWORK_IO Waits
ASYNC_NETWORK_IO Summary
CMEMTHREAD
What Is the CMEMTHREAD Wait Type?
Lowering CMEMTHREAD Waits
CMEMTHREAD Summary
IO_COMPLETION
What Is the IO_COMPLETION Wait Type?
IO_COMPLETION Example
Lowering IO_COMPLETION Waits
IO_COMPLETION Summary
LOGBUFFER and WRITELOG
What Are the LOGBUFFER and WRITELOG Wait Types?
LOGBUFFER and WRITELOG Example
Lowering LOGBUFFER and WRITELOG Waits
LOGBUFFER and WRITELOG Summary
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE
What Is the RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE Wait Type?
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE Example
Lowering RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE Waits
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE Summary
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE_QUERY_COMPILE
What Is the RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE_QUERY_COMPILE Wait
Type?
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE_QUERY_COMPILE Example
Lowering RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE_QUERY_COMPILE Waits
RESOURCE_SEMAPHORE_QUERY_COMPILE Summary
SLEEP_BPOOL_FLUSH
What Is the SLEEP_BPOOL_FLUSH Wait Type?
SLEEP_BPOOL_FLUSH Example
Lowering SLEEP_BPOOL_FLUSH Waits
SLEEP_BPOOL_FLUSH Summary
WRITE_COMPLETION
What Is the WRITE_COMPLETION Wait Type?
WRITE_COMPLETION Example
Lowering WRITE_COMPLETION Waits
WRITE_COMPLETION Summary
Chapter 7:Backup-Related Wait Types
BACKUPBUFFER
What Is the BACKUPBUFFER Wait Type?
BACKUPBUFFER Example
Lowering BACKUPBUFFER Waits
BACKUPBUFFER Summary
BACKUPIO
What Is the BACKUPIO Wait Type?
BACKUPIO Example
Lowering BACKUPIO Waits
BACKUPIO Summary
BACKUPTHREAD
What Is the BACKUPTHREAD Wait Type?
BACKUPTHREAD Example
Lowering BACKUPTHREAD Waits
BACKUPTHREAD Summary
Chapter 8:Lock-Related Wait Types
Introduction to Locking and Blocking
Lock Modes and Compatibility
Locking Hierarchy
Isolation Levels
Querying Lock Information
LCK_M_S
What Is the LCK_M_S Wait Type?
LCK_M_S Example
Lowering LCK_M_S Waits
LCK_M_S Summary
LCK_M_U
What Is the LCK_M_U Wait Type?
LCK_M_U Example
Lowering LCK_M_U Waits
LCK_M_U Summary
LCK_M_X
What Is the LCK_M_X Wait Type?
LCK_M_X Example
Lowering LCK_M_X Waits
LCK_M_X Summary
LCK_M_I[xx]
What Is the LCK_M_I[xx] Wait Type?
LCK_M_I[xx] Example
Lowering LCK_M_I[xx] Waits
LCK_M_I[xx] Summary
LCK_M_SCH_S and LCK_M_SCH_M
What Are the LCK_M_SCH_S and LCK_M_SCH_M Wait Types?
LCK_M_SCH_S and LCK_M_SCH_M Example
Lowering LCK_M_SCH_S and LCK_M_SCH_M Waits
LCK_M_SCH_S and LCK_M_SCH_M Summary
Chapter 9:Latch-Related Wait Types
Introduction to Latches
Latch Modes
Latch Waits
sys.dm_os_latch_stats
Page-Latch Contention
PAGELATCH_[xx]
What Is the PAGELATCH_[xx] Wait Type?
PAGELATCH_[xx] Example
Lowering PAGELATCH_[xx] Waits
PAGELATCH_[xx] Summary
LATCH_[xx]
What Is the LATCH_[xx] Wait Type?
LATCH_[xx] Example
Lowering LATCH_[xx] Waits
LATCH_[xx] Summary
PAGEIOLATCH_[xx]
What Is the PAGEIOLATCH_[xx] Wait Type?
PAGEIOLATCH_[xx] Example
Lowering PAGEIOLATCH_[xx] Waits
PAGEIOLATCH_[xx] Summary
Chapter 10:High-Availability and Disaster-Recovery Wait Types
DBMIRROR_SEND
What Is the DBMIRROR_SEND Wait Type?
DBMIRROR_SEND Example
Lowering DBMIRROR_SEND Waits
DBMIRROR_SEND Summary
HADR_LOGCAPTURE_WAIT and HADR_WORK_QUEUE
What Are the HADR_LOGCAPTURE_WAIT and HADR_WORK_
QUEUE Wait Types?
HADR_LOGCAPTURE_WAIT and HADR_WORK_QUEUE
Summary
HADR_SYNC_COMMIT
What Is the HADR_SYNC_COMMIT Wait Type?
HADR_SYNC_COMMIT Example
Lowering HADR_SYNC_COMMIT Waits
HADR_SYNC_COMMIT Summary
REDO_THREAD_PENDING_WORK
What Is the REDO_THREAD_PENDING_WORK Wait Type?
REDO_THREAD_PENDING_WORK Summary
Chapter 11:Preemptive Wait Types
SQL Server on Linux
PREEMPTIVE_OS_ENCRYPTMESSAGE and PREEMPTIVE_OS_
DECRYPTMESSAGE
What Are the PREEMPTIVE_OS_ENCRYPTMESSAGE and
PREEMPTIVE_OS_DECRYPTMESSAGE Wait Types?
PREEMPTIVE_OS_ENCRYPTMESSAGE and PREEMPTIVE_OS_
DECRYPTMESSAGE Example
Lowering PREEMPTIVE_OS_ENCRYPTMESSAGE and
PREEMPTIVE_OS_DECRYPTMESSAGE Waits
PREEMPTIVE_OS_ENCRYPTMESSAGE and PREEMPTIVE_OS_
DECRYPTMESSAGE Summary
PREEMPTIVE_OS_WRITEFILEGATHER
What Is the PREEMPTIVE_OS_WRITEFILEGATHER Wait
Type?
PREEMPTIVE_OS_WRITEFILEGATHER Example
Lowering PREEMPTIVE_OS_WRITEFILEGATHER Waits
PREEMPTIVE_OS_WRITEFILEGATHER Summary
PREEMPTIVE_OS_AUTHENTICATIONOPS
What Is the PREEMPTIVE_OS_AUTHENTICATIONOPS Wait
Type?
PREEMPTIVE_OS_AUTHENTICATIONOPS Example
Lowering PREEMPTIVE_OS_AUTHENTICATIONOPS Waits
PREEMPTIVE_OS_AUTHENTICATIONOPS Summary
PREEMPTIVE_OS_GETPROCADDRESS
What Is the PREEMPTIVE_OS_GETPROCADDRESS Wait Type?
PREEMPTIVE_OS_GETPROCADDRESS Example
Lowering PREEMPTIVE_OS_GETPROCADDRESS Waits
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PREEMPTIVE_OS_GETPROCADDRESS Summary
Chapter 12:Background and Miscellaneous Wait Types
CHECKPOINT_QUEUE
What Is the CHECKPOINT_QUEUE Wait Type?
CHECKPOINT_QUEUE Summary
DIRTY_PAGE_POLL
What Is the DIRTY_PAGE_POLL Wait Type?
DIRTY_PAGE_POLL Summary
LAZYWRITER_SLEEP
What Is the LAZYWRITER_SLEEP Wait Type?
LAZYWRITER_SLEEP Summary
MSQL_XP
What Is the MSQL_XP Wait Type?
MSQL_XP Example
Lowering MSQL_XP Waits
MSQL_XP Summary
OLEDB
What Is the OLEDB Wait Type?
OLEDB Example
Lowering OLEDB Waits
OLEDB Summary
TRACEWRITE
What Is the TRACEWRITE Wait Type?
TRACEWRITE Example
Lowering TRACEWRITE Waits
TRACEWRITE Summary
WAITFOR
What Is the WAITFOR Wait Type?
WAITFOR Example
WAITFOR Summary
Chapter 13:In-Memory OLTP–Related Wait Types
Introduction to In-Memory OLTP
Checkpoint File Pairs (CFPs)
Isolation
Transaction Log Changes
WAIT_XTP_HOST_WAIT
What Is the WAIT_XTP_HOST_WAIT Wait Type?
WAIT_XTP_HOST_WAIT Summary
WAIT_XTP_CKPT_CLOSE
What Is the WAIT_XTP_CKPT_CLOSE Wait Type?
WAIT_XTP_CKPT_CLOSE Summary
WAIT_XTP_OFFLINE_CKPT_NEW_LOG
What Is the WAIT_XTP_OFFLINE_CKPT_NEW_LOG Wait Type?
WAIT_XTP_OFFLINE_CKPT_NEW_LOG Summary
Appendix I:Example SQL Server Machine Configurations
Appendix II:Spinlocks
Appendix III:Latch Classes
Appendix IV:Waits and DMVs
Index
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The earliest details we have of construction are in connection with these three vessels. A committee
consisting of Howard, Drake, Hawkyns, Wynter, Borough, Ed. Fenton, Rich. Chapman, and Mathew and
Christopher Baker, settled the plans.[600] The three were very similar, and it was decided that the one to
be built by Peter Pett (the Defiance) should have a keel length of 92 feet, a beam of 32 feet, and be 15
feet deep ‘under the beame of the maine overloppe.’ Eight feet above the keel ten beams were to be
placed on which ‘to lay a false overloppe so far as neede shall require,’ and under the ten beams ten
riders were to be set; the riders at the footwales were to have two ‘sleepers on every side fore and afte,’
and pillars to be sufficiently bolted to them. The pillars supporting the lower deck had been newly
adopted,[601] and as riders were put into the White Bear twenty years after she was built they also were
possibly a recent improvement. The main, or lower deck, of the Defiance was to have twelve beams,
with side knees and standards, every knee having four bolts and the deck itself was of three-inch plank.
The upper deck was of two-and-a-half inch plank, but three inches in the waist; on this deck were the
poop and forecastle. From the keel to the second wale four-inch plank was to be used, thence to the
‘quickside or waist,’ three-inch, and above that two-inch ‘rabbated to the railles to be inbowed to goe to
the shippes side,’ On the orlop deck there were to be cabins for the boatswain, surgeon, gunner, and
carpenter; the ship’s company were berthed on the main deck.
The Merhonour, and Garland, differed only in details, therefore these vessels, one of which was the
third largest in the Royal Navy, were not even two-deckers in the modern sense. Three-deckers were
unknown in the English service and, beyond the existence of a print, diagrammatic in character, in the
British Museum, which is said, on insufficient authority, to represent the Ark Royal, there is no ground for
supposing that two-deckers were in use. The Warspite, of 648 tons, had possibly only one ordnance
deck but certainly not more than one-and-a-half; ‘having an overloppe and deck before and after, and a
half deck abaft the main mast.’[602] She was ‘planked between the two lower walles and from the lower
walle down to the keele with four-inch plank, and from the second walle upwards to the cheyne walle
with three-inch plank, and from the cheyne walles to the railes upwards on the waste with two-inch
plank.’ The Warspite was one of the few shipbuilding failures of the reign. In 1598, although a nearly
new ship, she cost £712 for repairs and further sums were spent on her in the succeeding years.
The illustration of an Elizabethan man-of-war, reproduced from a drawing in a Bodleian MS., shows
some marked differences from the Tiger of Henry VIII. She is probably a vessel of the earlier portion of
the reign; perhaps the Bull or Tiger of 1570. So far as the hull is concerned, there is distinct
retrogression in that the keel is relatively shorter to the extreme length, and that the poop is built up to a
disproportionate and unseaworthy extent. This last may be explained by the fact that the earlier Tiger
was not expected to be called upon to serve outside the four seas, while the later ship had a wider
cruising scope. The extended field of service called for larger crews, and as the orlop deck was not
introduced till late in the reign, the increased accommodation necessary was obtained by the provision
of more deck structures. In the matter of heavier masts and spars, possibly finer under water lines,
larger sail area, and the multiplication of appliances for more rapid handling, there was an undoubted
advance on the earlier ship.
Philip’s ambassador told him in 1569 that ‘they expect to be able to repel any Decoration of Ships.
attack by means of their fleet,’ and this confidence found natural expression in
an inclination to decorate and adorn the weapons on which they relied. At any rate we now find specific
payments for these purposes made with a frequency new in naval history. The ‘carving of personages in
timber,’ and painting and colouring of ships in 1563 cost £121, 13s 8d and ‘painting and colouring red
the great new ship called the White Bear‘[603] £20. Three ‘great personages in wood for the garnishing
and setting forth’ of the same vessel were £1, 15s each. The upper works of the Bonaventure were
painted black and white,[604] and the Lion in ‘timber colour;’ as the White Bear was red, and the
Revenge and Scout, green and white there was evidently no regulation colour. The Bonaventure had a
dragon on her beakhead, the royal arms on her stern, and two lions and two dragons in gilt and paint on
her galleries. The Foresight carried the Queen’s arms, a rose and a fleur de lis, on her stern, and in
1579 £2, 13s 4d was paid for carving a Saturn and a Salamander for the Swallow. Figure heads were
usual. The Nonpareil, Adventure, Dreadnought and Hope, had a dragon; the Charles, Defiance,
Rainbow, Repulse and Garland a lion; the Mary Rose, a unicorn, and the Swiftsure a tiger. When the
White Bear was rebuilt the carvings included,
‘an image of Jupiter sitting uppon an eagle with the cloudes, before the heade of the shippe
xiˡⁱ; twoe sidebordes for the heade with compartments and badges and fruitages xˡⁱ; the
traynebord[605] with compartments and badges of both sides viiˡⁱ; xvi brackets going round
about the heade at xiiˢ the pece; xxxviii peces of spoyle or artillarie round about the shippe at
xivˢ the pece; the greate pece of Neptune and the Nymphes about him for the uprighte of the
Sterne viˡⁱ xˢ.’[606]
The whole cost of carving was here £172, and of painting and gilding £205, 10s, but these appear to
have been exceptional amounts. Painting the Bonaventure cost £23, 6s 8d, the Dreadnought £20, the
Vanguard £30, and the Merhonour £40, and these sums more nearly represented the ordinary
expenditure. On the Elizabeth however £180 was spent in 1598 for
‘newe payntinge and guildinge with fine gold her beake heade on both sides with Her
Maiesties whole armes and supporters, for payntinge the forecastle, the cubbridge
heades[607] on the wast, the outsides from stemme to sterne, for like payntinge and newe
guildinge of both the galleries with Her Maiesties armes and supporters on both sides, the
sterne newe paynted with divers devices and beastes guilte with fine gold; for newe payntinge
the captens cabbon, the somer decke[608] as well overhead as on the sides, the barbycan,
the dyninge roome and the studdie.’[609]
The Rainbow’s lion figure head was gilt and on her sides were ‘planets, rainbows, and clouds’ with the
royal arms on the upper, middle, and lower counter, but the whole charge was only £58, 6s. Cabins
were painted and upholstered in the favourite Tudor colour of green and ‘Her Maiesties badge’ was
painted in green and red. The White Bear and the Elizabeth are the only two instances in which
comparatively large sums are found to be spent in ornament, and it does not appear that there was as
yet more than a bent towards general embellishment. The smaller vessels are never mentioned in this
connexion. The opinion of a contemporary was that, both for work and appearance,
‘our navy is such as wanteth neither goodly, great, nor beautiful ships who of mould are so
clean made beneath, of proportion so fine above, of sail so swift, the ports, fights, coines, in
them so well devised, with the ordnance so well placed, that none of any other region may
seem comparable unto them.’[610]
The new method of building by contract, and the large number of Tonnage Measurement.
merchantmen upon which the bounty was now paid, necessitated a more exact
measurement of tonnage than had hitherto obtained. In 1582 a rule was devised which remained in use
for nearly half a century and was said to have been due to Mathew Baker, son of the James Baker
shipwright to Henry VIII, and himself one of the principal government shipwrights. The writer says:[611]
‘By the proportion of breadth, depth, and length of any ship to judge what burden she may
be of in merchant’s goods and how much of dead weight of ton and tonnage. The Ascension
of London being in breadth 24 feet, depth 12 feet from that breadth to the hold, and by the
keel 54 feet in length doth carry in burden of merchant’s goods (in pipes of oil or Bordeaux
wine) 160 tons, but to accompt her in dead weight, or her ton and tonnage may be added one
third part of the same burden which maketh her tonnage 213⅓. After the same rate these
proportions follow:
Burden in
Breadth at Depth from Dead weight
Keel cask of oil or
midship beam her breadth tonnage
wine
A Ship of 20 ft. 10 ft. 42 ft. 86½ 115
A Ship of 21 ” 10½ ” 45 ” 102⅒ 136⅛
Prudence of London 24 ” 12 ” 51½ ” 150½ 202⅔
Golden Lion 32 ” 12 or 14 ” 102 ” 403 or 461 537 or 614⅔
Elizabeth Jonas[612] 40 ” 18 ” 100 ” 740 986⅔
To find the burden of any ship proportionately to the Ascension before specified multiply the
breadth of her by her depth, and the product by her length at the keel, the amounting sum you
shall use as your divisor. If 15,552, the solid cubical number for the Ascension do give 160
tons, her just burthen, what shall 8400, the solid number of a ship 20 feet broad, 10 feet deep,
and 42 feet keel. Work and you shall find 86³⁴⁄₈₁ tons of burden while if you add one-third you
shall find your tonnage 114 almost.’
This formula made theory square with fact since the result corresponded with the tuns of Bordeaux wine
experience had shown a ship to be able to carry. But strictly, ‘burden’ and ‘ton and tonnage,’ as used
here do not correspond with our net and gross tonnage, since burden is used in connexion with lighter
material occupying more space than a heavy cargo, such as coal, that would be represented by ton and
tonnage. The Spanish system of measurement in 1590 was to multiply half the breadth by depth of hold
and the result by the length over all.[613] From this 5% was deducted for the entry and run, and the
remainder divided by eight, gave the net tonnage; 20% was added to obtain the gross tonnage.[614]
As early as 1561 the Venetian Resident considered England superior to its The Seamen.
neighbours in naval strength,[615] but he may not have included Spain among
the neighbours. The Spaniards officially in England kept Philip fully acquainted with the character and
equipment of the fleet. He was always apprised of any preparations, and in such detail that we find him
told on one occasion that twelve or fourteen ships were of from 400 to 700 tons ‘with little top-hamper
and very light, which is a great advantage for close quarters, and with much artillery, the heavy pieces
being close to the water.’[616] Eight years earlier his ambassador, De Silva, recommended him to have
ships built in England instead of continuing the chartering system in vogue in Spain as ‘certainly the
ships built here are very sound and good.’[617] These intimations probably did not stand alone, but
neither then nor later did they lead to any change in the type affected in the Peninsula. English seamen
did not favourably impress the Spaniards. One of Philip’s correspondents, in writing to him that four
men-of-war had been prepared for sea, added, ‘the men in them are poor creatures.’[618] Six months
later he was informed that although Elizabeth possessed twenty-two large ships she had only been able
to fit eleven for sea, and would find it impossible to equip more, and that ‘the men on the fleet although
they appear bellicose are really pampered and effeminate different from what they used to be.’[619] The
estimate appears the more extraordinary because English seamen were at this time giving daily proof,
at the expense of Spanish and other commerce, of the wild energy animating them. As late as 1586,
Mendoza wrote that four ships were in commission and others in preparation, but of these latter, only
four were seaworthy, ‘all the rest being old and rotten.’[620] If Philip was continuously misinformed as to
the number of ships available, the difficulties in furnishing them, and the fighting value of the men, it may
help to explain the confidence he showed later.
As a matter of fact, there are very few complaints throughout the reign about embarrassments due to
want of crews. The semi-piratical expeditions preferred by the government were better liked than would
have been a more regular warfare that would have meant harder fighting and fewer chances of plunder.
Hatred of Spain and Popery, conjoined with the hoped for pillage of Spanish galleons, formed an
inducement that never failed to bring a sufficient number of men together, notwithstanding that, as
privateering speculations, most of the voyages were, pecuniarily, failures, although they served their
purpose in destroying Spanish commerce and credit. The proportion of men on board a man-of-war was
three to every five tons, of gross tonnage; one-third being soldiers, one-seventh of the remainder,
gunners; and the rest seamen. In merchantmen the ratio was one man to every five tons of net tonnage,
one-twelfth being gunners and the rest seamen.[621] But in practice the strength of a crew depended on
the number of men required and the success of the impress authorities.
Until 1585 the wages remained at 6s 8d a month, to which it had been raised The Seamen:—Pay and
in 1546 or very shortly afterwards. In 1585, the sailor’s pay was raised to ten Rewards.
shillings a month, through the action of Hawkyns. There must have been some
dissatisfaction with the quality of the men hitherto serving, and the breach with Spain doubtless made
an improvement necessary. Hawkyns coated the pill for Elizabeth by assuring her that fewer men would
be required, of the standard to be attracted by the higher rate, and, ‘by this meane her Maiesties
shippes wolde be ffurnyshed with able men suche as can make shyfte for themselves, kepe themselves
clene withoute vermyne and noysomeness which bredeth sycknes and mortalletye.’[622] Moreover, ships
could then carry more stores and continue longer at sea. Hawkyns was one of the few commanders of
his age who recognised a claim to consideration in his inferiors, and made some attempt to secure their
health and comfort. In 1589 he took care to have his stores ‘of an extraordinary price and goodnes to
keep men in health’; in 1595 he took out clothes for his men and a new kind of ‘lading victuells, a kind of
victuells for sea service devised by Mr Hughe Platte.’[623] Hammocks were introduced in 1597, when a
warrant authorises payment for 300 bolts of canvas ‘to make hanging cabones or beddes ... for the
better preservation of their health.’[624] In 1590, a suggestion, which did not, however, take practical
shape till long afterwards, was made for the benefit of the merchant sailor. John Allington, a draper of
London, proposed the creation of a special office for the registration of contracts between merchants,
owners, and masters of ships. This would have led to something equivalent to the present ‘signing on’
enforced by the Board of Trade, and would have regulated the position of the seamen and simplified the
enforcements of his rights, too often sacrificed to an unscrupulous use of legal forms.[625] Allington, like
most of the projectors and schemers of his day, was no philanthropist. He offered to pay £40 a year for
permission to establish such an office, and apparently expected to obtain five shillings apiece from 500
or 600 ships a year.
No especial provision was made on board men-of-war for the sick or wounded sailor; if the ship went
into action he was placed in the cable tier or laid upon the ballast as being the safest places. If he
survived the medical science of his time, and was landed disabled, he was supposed to be passed to
his own parish. Sometimes he was permitted to beg. A printed licence from Howard, as Lord Admiral,
under date 1590, still exists empowering William Browne, maimed in 1588, to beg for a year in all
churches.[626] By 35 c. 4 and 39 c. 21 of Elizabeth relief was afforded to hurt men; these were both
repealed by 43 c. 3 which enacted that parishes were to be charged with a weekly sum of not less than
twopence or more than tenpence to provide help, the pension however in no case to exceed ten pounds
for a sailor or twenty pounds for an officer. Gratuities were sometimes given. In 1593 Hawkyns was
ordered to pay two shillings a week, for twenty weeks, to 29 injured men, and William Storey, having lost
a leg, received £1, 13s 4d, apparently in settlement of all claims.[627]
Such gifts, in view of the number we can still trace, were probably more frequent than would be
expected from the character of Elizabeth. In 1587 a month’s extra pay was awarded to the crews of
three pinnaces for their good service in capturing Spanish prizes. For 1588 £5, was divided among 100
men who manned the fireships sent into Calais Roads, £80, among the wounded of the fleet generally,
and £7 to sick men in the Elizabeth.[628] In 1591 six months’ pay was given to the widows of the men
killed in the Revenge, and in 1594 there is a gift of £61, 19s 6d to Helen Armourer, widow of John
Armourer of Newcastle, ‘in consideration of his good and faithful services,’ although the name is quite
strange in naval affairs.[629] Merchant seamen were also remembered in these benefactions. On one
occasion forty marks were paid to five men ‘having been lately lamentably afflicted in Naples by pryson
and other punyshments by thinquisition of Spayne as we are informed and by secret escape savid their
lyves.’[630] On another ‘in consideration of the valiantnes done in Turkey by our welbeloved subiecte
John Ffoxe of Woodbridge in our county of Suffolk, gunner by whose meanes 266 Christians were
released out of miserable captivity,’ an assuredly nobly earned pension of one shilling a day was
conferred upon him.[631] When it cost the Queen nothing directly she was sometimes still more liberal.
To Robert Miller, a master mariner, £200, was allowed out of forfeited goods in consideration of his
services and losses at sea; George Harrison received £800, in the same way and for the same reasons.
Sometimes seamen’s wives, whose husbands were prisoners in Spain, petitioned the Council for help.
In one instance the merchants owning the ships were ordered to assist the women; in another their
landlords were directed not to press them for rent.
We can know little of the internal economy of a merchantman in those days. The vessels were
relatively as crowded, and probably as unhealthy, as men-of-war; the victualling was of the same, and at
times even worse quality, seeing that the owners of merchant vessels were expected to buy government
provisions if the victualling department found itself overstocked. In 1596 there is a letter directing the
Lord Mayor to forbid the city butchers to sell meat to ships until the government stores of salt beef were
sold out. This is followed by an order from the Council to the Serjeant of the Admiralty not to allow any
outward bound trader to pass down the river unless a certificate of such purchase was produced.[632]
We have no means of estimating the mortality from disease on board Mortality on Shipboard.
merchant ships, but we know that in men-of-war it was very great. ‘In the late
Queen’s time many thousands did miscarry by the corruption as well of drink as of meat,’ says a
seventeenth century writer;[633] and Sir Richard Hawkyns thought that, in twenty years, 10,000 men
died from scorbutic affections. The length of the voyages now undertaken rendered larger crews
necessary; the accommodation was narrow and ill-ventilated, the requirements of sanitation unknown,
and the food was usually scanty and bad, so that the sailor was placed under conditions that made him
fall an easy victim to disease. In Drake’s voyage of 1585-6 out of 2300 men nearly 600 died from
disease. In the expedition of 1589, out of 12,000 men employed, nearly one-half perished, mainly from
sickness and want of food, and every enterprise, small or great, suffered more or less largely in the
same way. Usually the hope of plunder sustained the men through all such trials, and there is only one
serious case of the mutiny of a crew because of ‘the weakness and feebleness they were fallen into
through the spare and bad diet.’ But in this instance sympathy with their captain may have had much to
do with their action.[634]
The pages of Hakluyt relate much of the suffering endured by our seamen abroad from disease and
privation, but there is one historic illustration at home of the miseries borne by the men and the
callousness or scanty resources of the authorities. On 10th August 1588 Howard wrote to Burghley:
‘Sicknes and mortallitie begin wonderfullie to growe amongste us ... the Elizabeth, which
hath don as well as eaver anie ship did in anie service, hath had a great infectione in her from
the beginning soe as of the 500 men which she carried out, by the time she had bin in
Plymouth three weeks or a month there were ded of them 200 and above, soe as I was driven
to set all the rest of her men ashore, to take out the ballast and to make fires in her of wet
broom 3 or 4 daies together, and so hoped therebie to have cleansed her of her infectione,
and thereuppon got newe men, verie tall and hable as eaver I saw and put them into her;
nowe the infectione is broken out in greater extremitie than eaver it did before, and they die
and sicken faster than ever they did, soe as I am driven of force to send her to Chatham ... Sir
Roger Townsend of all the men he brought out with him hath but one left alive ... it is like
enough that the like infectione will growe throughout the most part of the fleet, for they have
bin soe long at sea and have so little shift of apparell ... and no money wherewith to buy it.’
On the 22nd August he writes to the Queen that the infection is bad, that men sicken one day and die
the next but, in courtly phrase, that ‘I doubt not that with good care and God’s goodnes which doth ever
bles your Maiestie it wyll quenche againe.’ But on the same day he tells the Council more plainly, ‘the
most part of the fleet is grievouslie infected and die dailie ... and the ships themselves be so infectious
and so corrupted as it is thought to be a verie plague ... manie of the ships have hardly men enough to
waie their anchors.’[635] And as illustrating the infection and its probable cause comes a complaint from
him to Walsingham that, although the beer in the fleet has been condemned as unfit for use, it is still
served out to the men, and ‘nothing doth displease the seamen more than sour beer.’
This sickness is usually said to have been the plague or typhus. But Howard and his captains, who
had lived to middle age in a country where the plague was endemic and who must have known its
symptoms well, obviously thought ‘the infectione’ something different. In the passage quoted above he
compares it to the plague and in another letter he writes, ‘The mariners who have a conceit (and I think
it true and so do all the captains here) that sour drink hath been a great cause of this infection amongst
us.’[636] The plague was familiar to them all but this was something they could not easily name. The
same arguments apply, although perhaps not so closely, against typhus which in its general form and
symptoms was familiar under various names to sixteenth century observers. But 1588 was not a
particularly unhealthy year on land and there is no record of any sudden outbreak of epidemic disease
either before or after that occurring on the fleet. Moreover though typhus occasionally kills within a few
hours it has never been known to kill numbers in the rapid fashion suggested by Howard. It is probable
that the complaint was an acute enteritis, caused by the beer, acting on frames enfeebled by bad and
insufficient food, and still further weakened by the scorbutic taint to which all classes, but especially
seamen, were subject in the middle ages.
On the whole the position of the sailor was now steadily deteriorating. In the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries his pay had been relatively very high, and as he was only called upon to serve round the
coasts, or, at furthest, to Bordeaux or the Baltic, his health was not affected by conditions to which he
was only exposed for a short time. But towards the end of the sixteenth century the wages, in
consequence of the general rise in prices, were relatively less than they had been, and less than those
of the artisan classes on shore. In an epoch when the increase in the number of distant voyages set his
services in commercial demand he was required to serve in the royal fleets for longer periods than had
been before known. He was exposed to a merciless system of impressment, cheap for the State
because he had to indirectly bear the cost. And the length of the cruises, their extension into tropical
climates, and the character of the provisions, unsuited to the new conditions, made themselves felt in
outbreaks of disease to which his ancestors, assembled chiefly for Channel work, had been strangers.
Morally the general tone among the men cannot have been high if we may judge them from a phrase
used by the officials sent down to examine into the plunder of the Madre de Dios in 1592, ‘we hold it
loste labor and offence to God to minister oathes unto the generallitie of them.’[637]
It will have been noticed that in his letter of 10th August Howard says that the Seamen’s Clothing.
men have no money wherewith to buy clothes; in another he suggests that a
thousand marks’ worth of apparel should be sent down. But the custom of providing crews with coats or
jackets at the expense of the crown had quite ceased, and even if necessaries were supplied to the men
they had to pay for them. The supply was usually a private speculation on the part of some Admiralty
official. In 1586 Roger Langford, afterwards paymaster of the Navy furnished men with canvas caps,
shirts, shoes, etc., a piece of business by which he lost £140. In 1580 the government sent over clothes
for the men on the Irish station, the cost of which was to be deducted from their wages. The articles
included, ‘canvas for breches and dublettes’—‘coutten for lyninges, and petticoates,’ stockings, caps,
shoes, and shirts.[638] Hawkyns with the forethought always characterising his action as an admiral,
took out with him in 1595 ‘calico for 200 suits of apparel,’ 400 shirts, woollen and worsted hose, linen
breeches and Monmouth caps.[639] There is a sketch in a contemporary treatise on navigation of a
seaman, apparently an officer. He wears a Monmouth, or small Tam o’ Shanter, cap, a small ruff round
the neck, a close-fitting vest, and long bell-mouthed trousers.[640] In 1602 there is a payment in the
Navy accounts of £54, 19s 8d for clothing for Spanish prisoners. Canvas shirts, cotton waistcoats, caps,
hose, and ‘rugge’ for gowns were provided and the articles were doubtless of the same kind and quality
as those worn by the men.
During the earlier years of her reign the Queen, like her predecessors, Royal Ships Lent.
frequently allowed her ships to be hired for trading voyages. In 1561 the Minion,
Primrose, Brigandine and Fleur de Lys, were delivered to Sir William Chester and others for a voyage to
Africa. In this case Elizabeth shared the risk. For her ships, and for provisions to the value of £500, she
was to receive one-third of the profits. The hirers undertook to ship at least £5000 of goods, pay wages
and all other expenses, and each enter into a bond of 1000 marks to carry out the conditions.[641] In
1563 the Jesus of Lubeck was lent to Dudley and others, to trade to Guinea and the West Indies, for
which they paid £500.[642] She was then, after having been in the Royal Navy nearly twenty years,
valued at £2000 for which amounts the hirers had to give their bonds. She returned in 1565, was at
Padstow in October, and ‘cannot be brought to Gillingham till spring of next year.’ The adventurers could
not have procured a 600 ton vessel, for two years, for £500 from any owner but the State. And as she
had to remain at Padstow during the whole winter it may be inferred that she returned in a very
unseaworthy condition, for Elizabethan seamanship was certainly equal to taking a ship up Channel
during the winter months. She was hired by Hawkyns in 1568 and was then the first of the only two men-
of-war lost to Spain during the entire reign. When a convoy was furnished a full charge was levied for
the protection; £558 was received in 1569 from the Merchant Adventurers’ Company for men-of-war
serving on this duty, and again £586 in 1570.[643] As private owners built more and bigger ships the
demand for men-of-war for trading voyages grew less, but the Queen often lent them for privateering
ventures in which she was pecuniarily interested, assessing their estimated value as a portion of the
money advanced by her and on which she would receive a dividend. Under these circumstances her
representatives did not err on the side of moderation when valuing the ships thus temporarily lent. When
Drake took the Bonaventure and the Aid in 1585 they were appraised at £10,000, an obviously
extravagant estimate. Nominally Elizabeth advanced £20,000, of which these two ships stood for half;
she got her ships back, £2000 for the use of them, and the same dividend on £20,000 as the other
persons who had taken shares. Those others lost five shillings in the pound; she must have made a
profit.
In consequence of the greater activity of the Royal Navy the victualling The Victualling
department experienced a corresponding enlargement. In 1560 the buildings at Department.
Tower Hill, formerly the Abbey of Grace, and granted in 1542 to Sir Arthur
Darcy, were purchased from him for £1200, and £700 expended in repairing them.[644] Other
storehouses were hired at Ratcliff and St Katherines, the latter from Anthony Anthony, Surveyor of the
Ordnance, who seems to have taken great interest in naval matters, and to whom we are indebted for
the coloured drawings of ships previously referred to. For his storehouse he was paid £16 a year;
another at Rochester cost £5, 6s 8d a year. By a patent of 24th December 1560, William Holstock was
joined with Baeshe as Surveyor of the Victuals; this was surrendered and replaced by another of 30th
October, 1563 in which John Elliott took Holstock’s place. Neither Holstock nor Elliott had any actual
position, the new patents only giving them the chance of succeeding Baeshe. An agreement with him of
13th April 1565, but which did not cancel the title and fees granted to him by his Letters Patent,
instituted a considerable reform inasmuch as it did away with purveyance, or forced purchase, at rates
fixed by the officers of the crown. Henceforth Baeshe was to be paid fourpence halfpenny a day for each
man in harbour and fivepence a day at sea. For this he was to provide, per head, on Sundays,
Mondays, Tuesdays and Thursdays, 1 lb of biscuit and 1 gallon of beer, and 2 lbs of salt beef, and on
the other three days, besides the biscuit and beer, a quarter of a stockfish,[645] one-eighth of a pound of
butter, and one quarter of a pound of cheese. Fourpence a man per month at sea, and eightpence in
harbour he was to allow for purser’s necessaries, such as wood, candles, etc., and he was to pay the
rent of all hired storehouses and the wages of his clerks. He undertook not to use the right of
purveyance unless ordered to victual more than 2000 men suddenly, and agreed to always keep in hand
one months provisions for 1000 men. The agreement could be terminated by six months’ notice on
either side, and until it ceased the crown advanced him £500 without interest to be repaid within six
months of the cessation of his contract. He was given the use of all the crown buildings belonging to his
department, subject to his keeping them in repair, and was permitted to export 1000 hides in peace time
and as many as he should slaughter oxen during war.[646] The weight of purveyance was felt chiefly in
the home counties, and Elizabeth may have felt it good policy to do away with a ceaseless source of
popular irritation which was really of very little advantage to the crown. From this date payments were
made to Baeshe direct from the Exchequer and no longer through the Navy Treasurer. Isolated
payments relating to storehouses, of no general interest, recur in the accounts, but the growing
importance of Chatham is shown by the removal, in 1570, of buildings at Dover, and their re-erection at
Rochester, at a cost of £300.
In 1569 an additional £1000 was advanced to Baeshe without interest, and in 1573, the harbour rate
was raised to fivepence halfpenny per man, and the sea rate to sixpence. All this assistance, for
probably further sums were lent to him without interest, does not seem to have enabled him to carry on
his work without loss. In 1576 he petitioned the Queen to be forgiven the first £500 advanced to him and
to be permitted to pay off the balance at £1000 a year. He based his claim to consideration on the fact
that he had saved her 1000 marks a year by his contract and had acted without recourse to purveyance,
‘no small benefit to the hole realme.’ He had lost £500 a year, for four years, by the embargo on trade
with the Low Countries, which prevented his exportation of hides, and £ 240 by the fire at Portsmouth.
And:—
‘finally what my service hath bin from tyme to tyme as well to her most noble ffather, brother,
and sister, as to her Maiestie I do referre the same to the report of my Lord Tresorer and my
Lord Admirall and yet hitherto I never receyved from her Maiestie any reward for service but
only her Maiesties gracious good countenance to my comfort.’[647]
The petition does not appear to have obtained anything beyond a continuance of these unsubstantial
favours, but Baeshe struggled on till 6th May 1586 when he gave six months’ notice to determine his
contract. He then anticipated a loss of £534 on victualling eight or ten ships, ‘which I am not able to
beare.’[648] He must have been a very old man and anxiety perhaps hastened his death, which occurred
in April 1587. In the interval, however, the rate had been raised, from 1st November 1586 to 31st March
1587 to sixpence a day per man in harbour, and sixpence halfpenny at sea, and from 1st April 1587 to
31st October to sixpence halfpenny in harbour and sevenpence at sea, ‘on account of the great dearth.’
The Armada was already expected, but on 30th June 1587, when the stores were handed over to
Baeshe’s successor there were only 6020 pieces[649] of beef, and 2300 stockfish in hand.
By Letters Patent of 27th November 1582 James Quarles ‘one of the officers of our household’[650]
had been granted survivorship to Baeshe, and he now took his place from 1st July 1587, at the same
fees and allowances as had been originally given by the patent of 18th June 1550. The rate was
maintained at sixpence halfpenny and sevenpence ‘untill it shall please Almightie God to send such
plentie as the heigh prises and rates of victuall shalbe diminished’. The quantity and quality of the food
provided for the men in 1588 has long been a source of disgrace to Elizabeth and her ministers. An
apology for them has been attempted on the ground that the mechanism at work was new and not
capable of dealing with large numbers of men, and that the failure was mainly due to the suddenness of
the demand. So far as the first statement is concerned it is sufficient to answer that the victualling
branch had been organised for nearly forty years, and found no difficulty in arranging for 13,000 men in
1596, and 9200 men in 1597 after timely notice. The last reason may excuse the victualling department
but will not relieve the statesman in responsible direction. The government had had long notice of the
coming of the Armada, but even as late as March Burghley was occupied with niggling attempts at
making 26 days’ victuals last for 28 days.[651] In 1565 Baeshe had undertaken to keep always one
month’s victuals for 1000 men in store, but in June 1587 there was not even so much. The point
therefore is that if the ministry had thus early recognised the necessity for a reserve, and that two or
three months were requisite for the collection and preparation of provisions for a large force, and if with
the knowledge that such provisions were certain to be required, and in spite of the warnings of those
best able to judge, they neglected the preparations and continued a supply which was merely from hand
to mouth, they must be held guilty of the sufferings inflicted on the men by their miserable policy. When
the moment of trial came Quarles and his superiors did their best, but the accusation against the latter is
that had they exercised the foresight supposed to be one of the qualifications for their dignified posts no
such sudden and almost ineffective efforts would have been necessary. The spirit in which they or the
Queen dealt with the matter is shown by the necessity Howard was under of paying out of his own
pocket for the extra comforts obtained for the dying seamen at Plymouth.[652]
How far Elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point. There is no direct evidence that the delay
in obtaining provisions was due to her orders. On the other hand we know that the postponements in
equipping the ships, and the hesitating action and inconsistent directions and suggestions that
characterised the early months of 1588, were due to her, and there is a strong probability that much of
the shame should rest with her rather than with ministers who perhaps had to carry out commands to
which they had objected in Council. Moreover very few things, especially those involving expense, were
done without the knowledge and approval of Elizabeth. It was a personal government and there is no
reason to suppose that this particular branch was beyond her cognisance. With the fatality that has
usually dogged English militant endeavour the fleet did not even obtain the benefit, at the right time, of
the stores provided. Frequently victuallers were blundering about for weeks looking for it, while the
admirals were sending up despairing entreaties for supplies. In April, Drake wrote to the Queen ‘I have
not in my lifetime known better men and possessed with gallanter minds than your Majesty’s people are
for the most part.’ Whether the cause was incompetence or a criminal parsimony their fate, after having
saved their country, was to perish in misery, unheeded and unhelped except by the officers who had
fought with them. In the conceit of Elizabeth and her like they were only ‘the common sort.’
During the forty years that Baeshe had served the crown he had never been charged with dishonesty
and he died poor. Quarles however had at once serious malpractices imputed to him as having occurred
within his first year of office.[653] His accuser, a subordinate, as usual offered to do his work for 1000
marks a year less, and on examination of the charges it seems likely that some were untrue and that
other defaults occurred in consequence of the orders given to him.
From 1589 the rate again fell to fivepence-halfpenny and sixpence, in harbour and at sea; but for
1590 and 1591 Quarles was allowed £2355, on account of the dearth still existing. He had petitioned
that he had suffered a loss of £3172, between April 1590 and April 1591, being the difference between
the rates paid to him and the cost per head of the victuals.[654] He died in 1595 and was succeeded by
Marmaduke Darell, his coadjutor, ‘clerk of our averie.’[655] Till 1600 the rate remained the same although
heavy extra allowances were made each year to Darell; then it was raised to sixpence halfpenny and
sevenpence. In this year £738 was spent on repairs to Tower Hill where there were separate houses for
beef, bacon, ling, etc., ‘the great mansion being the officers lodgings.’ The storehouses and brewhouses
at Portsmouth, built by Henry VIII, still existed under the names originally given them and were repaired
at a cost of £234.
One ton and a half of gross tonnage, or one of stowage, was allowed on board ship, for one month’s
provisions for four men, of which the beer occupied half, wood and water a quarter, and solid food the
remainder of a ton.[656] There is no reason to suppose that either Baeshe, Quarles, or Darell were either
dishonest or incompetent. The terrible outbreaks of disease that occurred during nearly every long
voyage were not confined to the English service and were the natural result of salt meat and fish, and
beer that could not be prevented from turning sour. They could only do their best with the materials at
command but which were not suitable to the larger field in which the services of English sailors were
now required.
Benjamin Gonson was Treasurer of the Navy when Elizabeth came to the The Administration.
throne and held the post until his death in 1577. The number of vessels added
to the Navy during his term of office shows that he was not inactive, and he was certainly a competent
public servant. John Hawkyns[657] was his son-in-law, and the relationship doubtless inspired Hawkyns
with the hope of succeeding him, and perhaps enabled him to infuse some of his own spirit into the
management of the Navy, while Gonson was still its official head. But mere relationship, although it had
its influence would not alone have sufficed, had not Hawkyns already made his name as a seaman and
as an able commander. In 1567 he received a grant of the reversion to the office of Clerk of the Ships, a
post he could only have looked upon as a stepping-stone, and which he never took up. In 1577, when
Gonson was ill, Hawkyns petitioned the Queen, probably, although it is not specifically mentioned, for
the reversion to his post, and drew up a long catalogue of unrecompensed services.[658] Gonson died in
the course of a year, a landed proprietor in Essex, and a successful man, but he had told his son-in-law,
when the latter was trying to obtain the reversion, that, ‘I shall pluck a thorn out of my foot and put it into
yours.’ Hawkyns lived to realise the truth of the kindly warning. He commenced his duties from 1st
January 1577-8, acting under Letters Patent of 18th November 1577, by which he was granted the
survivorship to Gonson. For seventeen years, during the most critical period of English history, he was,
in real fact, solely responsible for the efficiency of the Navy, and he, more than any other man may be
said to have ‘organised victory’ for the English fleets. His duties included not only the superintendence
of the work at the dockyards, but that of building, equipping, and repairing the ships, of keeping them
safely moored and in good order, of the supply of good and sufficient stores, and apparently of every
administrative detail except those connected with the ordnance, and of victualling and pressing the men.
The technical improvements he himself invented or introduced have already been noticed. In the
administration he made others, which may or may not have been advantageous, but which touched the
interests of subordinates, and which resulted in his having to stand alone and carry on his work impeded
by the sullen enmity of his colleagues and his inferiors.
Hawkyns owed his knighthood to Howard rather than the Queen; his reward after 1588 was to be
allowed a year wherein to unravel his intricate accounts. In fact few of Elizabeth’s officials escaped her
left-handed graces. Baeshe died in poverty after forty years of honest service, and Hawkyns was
continually struggling to clear himself from suspicions that were kept hanging over him, but from which
he was given no proper opportunity to free himself. Elizabeth’s favours and bounties were reserved for
court gallants of smoother fibre than were these men. In 1594, shortly before his last unhappy voyage,
Hawkyns founded a hospital at Chatham for ten poor mariners and shipwrights. He, with Drake,
established the ‘Chatham Chest,’ for disabled seamen, and it should be remembered to his honour that,
in an age when little care was bestowed on inferiors if they had ceased to be of any utility, he never
relaxed his efforts until his craft had rescued from Spanish prisons the survivors of those under his
command in 1568 whom he had been compelled to leave ashore after escaping from San Juan de
Ulloa.
Charges of peculation against persons connected with maritime affairs were rife on all sides. The
shipwrights quarrelled among themselves and with Hawkyns, and two of the former, Chapman and Pett,
were moreover accused by outsiders of gross overcharges.[659] Captains were said to dismiss pressed
men for bribes, to retain wages, and keep back arms;[660] pursers to steal provisions, to make false
entries by which they obtained payments for money never advanced to the men, and to remain ashore
while their ships were at sea.[661] Pursers, cooks, and boatswains, bought their places: the cooks had
the victuals in their care and recouped themselves at the expense of the seamen; boatswains stripped a
ship of movable fittings, on her return home, and stole rigging and cordage.[662] According to the
evidence of a witness, in the inquiry of 1608, these abuses, if they did not commence, took fresh and
vigorous life after the death of Hawkyns. In 1587 he recognised the theft going on and his inability to
completely suppress it; ‘I thincke it wolde be mete their weare a provost marshyall attendante upon ye
Lord Admirall and Offycers of the Navye to doe suche present execucyon aboorde the shippes uppon
the offenders as shulde be apoynted.’[663] Accusations were not wanting during Gonson’s lifetime but
the increased activity of the Navy after his death gave a wider scope both to suspicion and to actual
peculation. Hawkyns was not the only one of the Principal Officers whose conduct was impeached, but
in virtue of his position the brunt of attack fell upon him. There was hardly one of his duties which at
some time or another did not give occasion for a charge of dishonesty.[664]
Hawkyns, if we may judge by the letters remaining in the Record Office, was more frequently in
communication with Burghley, explaining his intentions and desires, than with his official chief the Lord
Admiral. Either therefore Burghley was satisfied with his conduct—and there is one letter that directly
supports this view—or the Lord Treasurer allowed a man whose honesty he doubted to remain in a
responsible office without removing him, or adopting any new measure of supervision. The quality of the
cordage had been a common cause of complaint and, in 1579, Hawkyns wrote that he had taken
measures, of which he doubted not the success, to remedy this and other evils, and that he had a
memorandum ready proposing a course to be followed, ‘wherebye the offyce wolld not onelye
flourysshe but within a few yers be bountyfullye provyded of all maner of provycion without extra charge
to her Maiestie.’[665] Subsequent events show that the suggestions he was here about to make were
accepted and, as a consequence of his new methods, the clamour raised against him grew so loud that
in January 1583-4 a commission sat to inquire into the condition of the ships and the conduct of the
office. Nothing is known of their report but it was evidently not of a character fatal to his reputation. In
another letter to Burghley shortly afterwards he attributes his success in carrying out reforms to the aid
he had received from the minister’s skill,
‘in the passinge of theis greate thinges thadversaries of the worke have contynewallye
opposyd themselves against me ... and their slawnders hathe gone verye farr ... onlye to be
avenged of me and this servis which doth discover the corruption and ignoraunce of the tyme
past.’[666]
By 1587 he had begun to share Gonson’s weary disgust of his surroundings, and intimated that the
work was too much for any one man and should be done by a commission. Howard’s high opinion of
him was expressed freely in his letters during 1588, and shown practically by the knighthood he
conferred. Notwithstanding his services, so fully tested in that year, he does not appear to have won the
shy confidence of Elizabeth, but that he had succeeded in convincing Burghley is I think clearly proved
by the following letter:—[667]
‘My bownden dewtie in humble manner rememberyd unto your good lordshipe; I do
perseve hir Maiestie ys not well sattysfied concernyng the imploymentes of the great somes
of mony that have byne reseaved into thoffice of the navye although your Honour dyd very
honourably bothe take payne and care to se the strycte and orderly course that ys used in
thoffice and thereupon delyver your mynd playnely to her Maiestie as your lordship found yt
for which I shall ever acknowlege myself dewtyfully bownd to honour and serve your lordshipp
to the uttermost of my abillytie: and whereas her Highnes pleasure ys to be farther sattysfied
in myne accomptes ther hathe nothyng byne more desyred nor cold be more wellcome or
acceptible to me and when yt shalbe hir Maiesties pleasure to nomynate the persons that I
shall attend upon I wyll brieffly shew the state of every yeres accompt suffycyently avouched
by boockes to the last day of Desember 1588 which is XI yeres.... If any worlldly thynge that I
possesse cold free me of this mystrust and importyble care and toyle I wold most wyllyngley
depart with yt for as the case stondeth I thynke ther ys no man lyvinge that hathe so carefull
so myserable so unfortunate and so dangerous a lyfe; onlye I se your lordship with care and
trewthe dothe serche into the trew order the sufficiency and valyditye of the course that ys
caryed in the office whiche otherwyse I wold even playnely gyve over my place and submyt
myselfe to her Maiesties mercye thogh I lyvid in pryson all the dayes of my lyffe; the matters
in thoffice growe infenyte and chargeable beyond all measure and soche as hardly any man
can gyve a reason of the innumerable busynesses that dayly grow; yet the mystrust ys more
trobelsome and grievous then all the rest for with the answerynge of thone and towle of
thother there ys hardly any tyme left to serve God or to sattysfie man. The greater sort that
serve in this office be growen so proud obstinate and insolent nothynge can sattysfie
them[668] and the commen sort very dysobedyent so as a man that must answere the
immoderate desyre of all these were better to chuse to dye than so lyve. The paynfull place
that your lordship dothe holde and the imoderate demaunds that comes before you havyng
with the favour of her Maiestie the hellp of an absolute power to bynd and lose may eselye
demonstrate the borden that so meane a man as I am dothe here (which must passe every
thynge by petycon and mystrust), to sattysfie the multytude of demaundes that are in this
office and although they be many and as well satysfied as in any office in all Ingland yet few
are contentyd but go away with grudging and mormoure. It were a great vanytie for me to
comend myne owne service neyther do I go abowt to acumyllatte to myself any comendacon
for that I thought I performyd my dewtie suffycyentlie but yf the estate of thoffice be
consyderyd what yt was when I came into yt and what yt ys now ther wilbe found greate
oddes wherein I have traveyled as carefully as I cold and as my creddytt cold obtayne meane
to reduce the state of thoffice shipes and there furnyture into good and perfitt ordre; in
recompense whereof my onely desyre ys that yt may please hir Maiestie some course may be
taken wherein hir Maiestie may be sattysfied that a playne and honest course hathe byne
taken and caryed in thoffice and then to dyspose of my place to whome yt shall please hir
Highnes and I shalbe reddy to serve hir Maiestie any other way that I shalbe appoynted
wherein my skyll or abyllytie will extend and so I humbly take my leve from Deptford the 16th
April 1590.’
The writer of this letter was either a master hypocrite so skilful in roguery that he feared neither the
investigations of his superiors nor the denunciations of envious and hostile subordinates, or an honest
man who had nothing to dread from inquiry. He had convinced Howard and Burghley, of whom the first
was a seaman who had proved his work by the tests of war and storm, and the second no guileless
innocent, but a politician grown grey among surroundings of fraud and intrigue. Only the penetrating
Elizabeth refused to be deceived.
In 1592 and 1594 he again expressed his wish to resign, but the government had apparently no
desire to lose his services.[669] On Clynton’s decease Charles, Lord Howard of Effingham became Lord
Admiral,[670] and held the office till 1618. His name is indissolubly connected with the maritime glories
his support of Hawkyns and his clear judgment as a commander helped to bring about. Howard was the
first Lord Admiral who transferred some of the privileges of his office. In 1594 he gave over to the Trinity
House the management of buoys and beacons along the coasts and the rights of ballasting in the
Thames.[671] This marks the first practical connection the Corporation had with maritime affairs.
Hawkyns died at sea on 12th November 1595, and the Treasurership was not immediately filled up.
Roger Langford, long an office assistant, and his deputy during his absence, was made ‘General
Paymaster of the Marine Causes,’ but simply worked at the accounts without authority in administrative
business.[672] In 1598 Fulke Grevill, afterwards Lord Brooke, was appointed Treasurer with full powers.
[673] Grevill is said, by a modern writer, to have possessed ‘a dignified indolence of temper,’ and ‘a
refinement in morality which rendered him unfit for the common pursuits of mankind.’ These were not
qualifications peculiarly fitting him for the rough surroundings of naval affairs in 1598 and the real control
passed into the hands of his colleagues.
Till his death in 1589 Sir Wm. Wynter, from 1557 Surveyor of the Ships and Master of the Ordnance of
the Navy, was, after Hawkyns, the most influential officer. He was succeeded by Sir H. Palmer,[674] who
held the post until he became Comptroller in 1598,[675] when he was replaced as Surveyor by John
Trevor.[676] After Wynter’s death there was no longer a separate ordnance department for the Navy.
Richard Howlet, the former Clerk of the Ships, died in 1560, and George Wynter, a brother of Sir William
Wynter was appointed.[677] In 1580 George Wynter was succeeded by William Borough,[678] who, in
1588 was followed by Benjamin Gonson, son of the former Treasurer,[679] who, in turn, was succeeded
by Peter Buck in 1600. William Holstock became Comptroller from 12th December 1561, in succession
to Brooke, and in 1589 William Borough succeeded him until 1598. Nearly all these men commanded
ships or squadrons at sea at various times, in addition to their duties as members of the naval board.
There is a draft document existing[680] which shows that in January 1564 it was intended to add another
officer as ‘Chief Pilot of England,’ on the model of the ‘Pilot Major’ of Spain. Stephen Borough was the
person chosen, and in consequence of the losses of shipping through the ignorance of pilots and
masters no one was to act in such a capacity in vessels of forty tons and upwards, without a certificate
of competence from him, under a penalty of two pounds. Masters’ mates, boatswains, and
quartermasters were to be similarly examined and certified. This plan, however, was not carried into
execution.
Concerning the dockyards the most noteworthy feature is: the rise into Dockyards.
importance of the Chatham yard. For 1563 the expenses of Deptford were
£19,700, while those of Gillingham, chiefly for the wages and victuals of shipkeepers, were £3700. In
1567 it is first called Chatham, a house rented for the use of the Board, and the cost of Chatham and
Gillingham £6300. Next year the ground on which Upnor Castle was to be built was bought for £25,[681]
and in 1574 a fort was ordered for Sheerness which replaced the bulwark built in the reign of Edward VI.
In 1571 more ground was rented at Chatham, and in 1574 the fairway through St Mary’s Creek, by
which the anchorage could be taken in flank, was blocked by piles.[682] Deptford, however, was still in
considerable use, especially for building and repairs of ships, and in the same year the dock was
reconstructed. In 1578 a new pair of gates for the Deptford dock cost £150, and in the following year
most, if not all, of the dockyards were fenced round with hedges.[683] Small additions in the shape of
wharves and storehouses, were being continually made to Chatham; one of the former, built in 1580,
was 378 feet Long, 40 feet broad, and cost five shillings a foot. Various other improvements of the same
kind were carried out in connection with Woolwich and Deptford, and as no drydock was constructed at
Chatham during this reign, all the building and repairs of the big ships was done at the former places.
Portsmouth was hardly used at all. In 1586 a new wharf was made, and sundry small expenses were at
various times incurred for keeping the dock in order, but sometimes for years in succession the only
expenses relating to it are the salaries of the officers in charge. The yard was nearly destroyed by a fire
on 4th August 1576, and was probably not fully restored. It was, moreover, contemned by the chief
officers, who considered it expensive and defenceless.[684] For a few years, from 1601, the Hansa
steelyard was handed over to the Admiralty and used for storage purposes.
In early times the Bridport district had supplied most of the cordage used in the English service; in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it had mostly come from abroad. In 1573 there was an attempt to
secure independence in this respect, and £800 which he was to repay by £100 a year, was advanced to
Thomas Allen to build ropehouses at Woolwich.[685] Allen was ‘Queen’s merchant,’ i.e., crown
purchaser, for Dantzic cordage. The experiment was probably a failure, since there is no other reference
to it, and was not renewed until the next reign.
In addition to the forts at Upnor and Sheerness the ships lying in the Medway required some further
protection, as relations with Spain became more critical and rumours of plots to fire the vessels frequent.
This was given by means of a chain, an old and well known form of defence. In a letter to Burghley, of
March 1585, Hawkyns suggested the chain with two or four pinnaces stationed by it, and the Scout and
Achates at Sheerness to search everything passing.[686] In October the work was nearly completed; it
had been ‘tedyous and cumbersome but now stretched over the river in good order yt dothe requyre
many lyghters for the bearynge of it which are in hand.’[687] One end was fixed to piles, the other
worked round ‘two great wheels to draw it up;’ it was supported by five lighters, and pinnaces were
stationed at each shore end. The Council ordered, as well, that whereas Her Majesty was ‘advertysed
that some practyce and devyce ys taken in hande to bourne and destroye the navye,’ the principal
officers were to sleep on board at the anchorage in turn, for a month at the time, and see that the
shipkeepers did their duty.
The Elizabethan drawing of the Medway and surrounding district, partly reproduced in this volume,
does not show the chain at Upnor and is probably therefore of a date between 1568-85. It is seen that
the ships are moored athwart stream in three groups, from Upnor towards Rochester, the larger ones
being at Upnor. They must have been moored across stream from considerations of space; and the
accuracy of the placing is corroborated by a much later drawing of 1702 which shows vessels in the
same position, and by the fact that we know from other sources that the first-rates were nearest Upnor.
These latter carried lights at night[688] and the whole were in the especial charge of the principal
masters of the Navy of whom, after 1588, there were six and who were allowed three shillings a week
for their victualling. The first sign of the dockyard is possibly shown between Chatham Church and St
Mary’s creek. The vessels are shown dismantled as would have been actually the case.
In 1559 shipwrights’ wages were from eightpence to a shilling, and in 1588 Shipwrights.
from a shilling to seventeenpence a day; they were also provided with free
lodging, or lodging money at the rate of a shilling a week, with three meals a day and as much beer ‘as
shall suffice them,’ and, between 25th March and 8th September, an afternoon snack of bread, cheese,
and beer.[689] From 1st November to 2nd February, they worked from daylight till dark; for the rest of the
year from five o’clock, in the morning till 7 at night, and, on Saturdays till 6 o’clock. They were allowed
one hour at noon, and work was started and stopped by bell; anyone ringing it except by order of the
master shipwright was fined a day’s pay and put into the stocks.[690] The three principal constructors, or
master shipwrights were Peter Pett, Mathew Baker, and Richard Chapman. Pett died in 1589 and was
succeeded by his son Joseph, and then, in 1600, by his better known younger son Phineas, who had
been sent to Cambridge but who did not think it unbecoming his university standing to start in life as a
carpenter’s mate on a Levant trader. Although Pett has the greater reputation, at least one officer of the
Admiralty well qualified to judge—William Borough—considered Baker his superior. John Davis, the
explorer, also specially speaks of him as, ‘Mr Baker for his skill and surpassing grounded knowledge in
the building of ships advantageable to all purpose hath not in any nation his equal.’[691] Baker became
master shipwright by Letters Patent of 29th August 1572, and by virtue of the patent, received a fee of
one shilling a day for life from the Exchequer. Peter Pett already held a similar patent, Richard Chapman
obtained one in 1587 and Joseph Pett in 1590. Little is known of Chapman beyond the fact that from the
ships he built his reputation must have been equal to that of the others, and practically all the important
building of the reign was done by these three men.
There are but few notices of the ships’ officers of this period. In all ranks the Ships’ Officers and Pay.
majority seem to have been disposed to add to their pay by irregular methods.
Some of the accusations made against them have been noticed, and on service, whether the prize was
a captured town or a small merchantman, discipline was at an end until all, from captains downwards
had taken their fill of pillage. At sea captains obeyed or disobeyed, deserted or remained with their
admiral, without usually being afterwards called to account for their conduct. In only one case was a
captain, William Borough, tried for insubordination in 1587, and as this is the first instance of a court
martial the proceedings are here printed in full.[692] If Drake intended to disgrace Borough he failed, for
no result followed, and the delinquent, two years later, became Comptroller of the Navy. Until 1582 the
old system of paying the officers the wages of a ‘common man’ per month, and adding to this by a
graduated proportion representing the dead shares and rewards, still continued. However when wages
were raised in that year the dead shares and rewards were abolished, except as a form of expression,
and each officer had a fixed sum per month, according to the rate of his ship.[693] But sometimes the
scale of pay depended not upon the rate, but was ‘according to the greatness of his charge,’ i.e., on the
nature of the work for which the vessel was commissioned.[694] Wages were again raised about 1602,
[695] and the two scales of payment are thrown together in the following table:—
Harbour pay was from 40% to 50% below these rates. There is nothing known of the reasons moving
the government to the relatively enormous increase of the end of the reign, marked by a liberality
contrary to the traditions of nearly half a century. The relative pays would now, in some cases, be
considered extraordinary; surgeons and trumpeters are put on the same footing, and sixth-rates of 1602
are given the option between them but are not allowed both. A captain’s pay varied between 2s 6d and
6s 8d a day, and he was allowed two servants for every fifty men of his crew, and if he were a knight
four men. This really meant that he was licensed to draw pay and rations, or the value in money of
rations, for the permitted number of servants whether or no they were actually on board. In 1588
lieutenants at £3, and corporals at 17s 6d a month were carried in some of the ships.
Although in 1564 it had been intended to nominate a pilot major to insure a knowledge of seamanship
and navigation in those responsible for the safety of ships, further experience may have brought more
efficient men to the front and rendered it unnecessary. There are very few signs that such a step could
have been requisite, judging from the accounts of the voyages of these years. Men seem to have
handled their ships skilfully in all conditions and under all difficulties, and in navigation landfalls were
made with accuracy, landmarks known and recorded, and the Channel soundings as minutely mapped
out and acted upon as now. The case was very different with Spanish seamen. From 1508 there had
been a great school of cosmography and navigation at Seville, under the superintendence of the Pilot
Major of Spain, but it does not appear to have succeeded in turning out competent officers. The records
of the Spanish voyages show how frequently gross errors in navigation occurred, and travellers
communicated their impressions to the same effect. One of these, writing in 1573, says,
‘How can a wise and omnipotent God have placed such a difficult and important art as
navigation into such coarse and lubberly hands as those of these pilots. You should see them
ask one another, “How many degrees have you got?” One says, “Sixteen,” another “About
twenty,” and another “Thirteen and a half.” Then they will say, “What distance do you make it
to the land?” One answers, “I make it 40 leagues from land,” another “I a hundred and fifty,” a
third, “I reckoned it this morning to be ninety-two leagues;” and whether it be three or three
hundred no one of them agrees with the other or with the actual fact.’[696]
In 1558 there were ordnance wharves and storehouses, connected with the Ordnance and Ship
Navy at Woolwich, Portsmouth, and Porchester; Gillingham was shortly after Armament.
added to these. In her youth Elizabeth appears to have been fond of fireworks
as the ordnance accounts bear £130, 4s 2d expended, between 1558-64, to amuse her in that way. The
report drawn up in 1559[697] tells us that there were 264 brass and 48 iron guns, of all calibres down to
falconets, on board the ships, and 48 brass and 8 iron in store. To these could be added upwards of
1000 small pieces, whole, demi, and quarter slings, fowlers, bases, portpieces, and harquebuses.[698]
Eleven thousand rounds of cannon shot, 10,600 of lead, 1500 of stone and 692 cross bar shot, supplied
the guns; other weapons were 3000 bows, 6300 sheaves of arrows, 3100 morrispikes, and 3700 bills.
The heaviest piece used on shipboard was the culverin of 4500 lbs., throwing a 17⅓ lbs. ball with an
extreme range of 2500 paces;[699] the next the demi cannon weighing 4000 lbs., with a 30⅓ lbs. ball
and range of 1700 paces; then the demi culverin of 3400 lbs., a 9⅓ lb. ball and 2500 paces, and the
cannon petroe, or perier, of 3000 lbs. 24¼ lb. ball and 1600 paces.[700] There were also sakers,
minions, and falconets, but culverins and demi culverins were the most useful and became the favourite
ship guns. The weights given differ in nearly every list found and were purely academic. A contemporary
wrote, ‘the founders never cast them so exactly but that they differ two or three cwt. in a piece,’ and in a
paper of 1564 the average weights of culverins, demi culverins, and cannon periers are respectively
3300 lbs., 2500 lbs., and 2000 lbs.
The equipment of a first-rate like the Triumph (450 seamen, 50 gunners, and 200 soldiers) in small
arms, was 250 harquebuses, 50 bows, 100 sheaves of arrows, 200 pikes, 200 bills, 100 corselets, and
200 morions.[701] There were 750 lbs. of corn, and 4470 of serpentine, powder on board. The Victory
had 200 harquebuses, 40 bows, 80 sheaves of arrows, 100 pikes, 180 bills, 80 corselets, and 160
minions; she carried 600 lbs. of corn powder, and 4347 of serpentine. Twenty-four was the number of
ships usually taken as the standard to be prepared in the numerous estimates of the equipment
necessary for fleets; in 1574 there were 45 demi cannon, 37 cannon periers, 89 culverins, 142 demi
culverins, 183 sakers, 56 minions, and 66 falcons on board 24 vessels in June of that year.[702] The first
list giving the armament of the ships individually is of 1585 and is as follows:[703]
The next list drawn up two months after Elizabeth’s death, gives the armament of the whole Navy.[705]
Upnor Castle possessed, in brass, 1 demi cannon, 3 culverins, 1 minion, 3 fawcons and 4 fowlers; in
iron, 4 culverins, 5 demi culverins and 1 saker. The ships:
Comparing this with the preceding list of 1585 it is noticed that there is a large decrease in cannon and
a corresponding increase in culverins, demi culverins and sakers, which strained a ship less, were
served more quickly and by fewer men, and permitted a heavier broadside in the same deck space.
They were mounted on four-wheeled carriages and may have been fitted with elevating screws, the
latter probably recently introduced as they are mentioned among Bourne’s Inventions. The length of a
cannon carriage was 5½ ft., and of a demi cannon carriage 5 ft., costing respectively £1, 3s 4d and 19s
9d.[711] A ship’s anchors and guns had her name painted on them. [712]
William Thomas, master gunner of the Victory, drew attention in 1584 to the lack of trained gunners
he thought he perceived, nor was he the only person who detected the same deficiency. The Spaniards
who were, under the circumstances, perhaps better judges thought differently, and one of their Armada
captains relates that the English fired their heavy guns as quickly as the Spaniards did their muskets.
[713] The grant of the artillery ground by Henry VIII as a place of practice has already been mentioned,
and, in 1575, it is again brought into notice by an order that sufficient powder and shot should be
allowed to train ‘scollers’ there.[714] Until Wynter’s death in 1589 the supply of ordnance stores for the
Navy remained under his control, and the absence of remark shows that the business progressed
smoothly. It then became a part of the ordinary work of the Ordnance Office, and that department did not
belie the unsavoury reputation it has always held. By 1591 outcry against it ran high, and in 1598 and
1600 its corrupt and lax administration called forth various projects of reform. The superior departmental
officers gave themselves allowances and, through brokers, sold to themselves as representing the
crown; the inferior clerks were in league with the gunners in embezzlement.[715] With such
encouragement it is not surprising to find that
‘the master gunners who do usually indent for the provision of ships and fortified places do
commonly return unreasonable waste of all things committed to their charge, which waste
grows not by any of Her Majesty’s service but by the gunners themselves in selling Her
Majesty’s powder and shot and other provisions, sometimes before they go to sea and most
usually upon their return from the sea.’
Usually the captain shared the proceeds with the gunner and the clerks of the Ordnance department,
and the transaction leaves no mark. Occasionally a captain refused and then we have the incident put
on record as in the case of the master gunner of the Defiance, who, when she returned from sea in
1596 offered his commander £100 for permission to steal half the powder remaining on board.[716] The
patentee for iron shot was a prisoner for debt and forced to sublet his contract; sometimes he bought
shot sold by the gunners, ‘so that Her Majesty buyeth her own goods and payeth double for the same.’
When the pursuit of the flying Armada ceased want of ammunition was as much a reason as want of
provisions. But if the deposition of John Charlton, who lived in a house adjoining to that of Hamon, a
master gunner of the Ark Royal, is to be credited, that ship, at any rate, did not lack powder. Charlton
informed Howard that he had daily seen much powder taken into Hamon’s dwelling. Hamon confessed,
but according to Charlton, very incompletely, for, ‘where it was set downe but iiii barrels I will aprove that
after the fight there came to his house fortie barrels which was to her Maiestie in that fighte greate
hinderance.’ It is significant that a labourer in the employ of the Ordnance Office acknowledged that he
had been hired to pick a quarrel with Charlton and maim or kill him.[717]
The cost of cast iron ordnance was, between 1565 and 1570, from £10 to £12 a ton; in 1600 it had
fallen to £8 and £9 a ton. Brass ordnance was from £40 to £60 a ton. The reputation of our founders
stood so high that the Spaniards were prepared to pay £22 a ton for iron guns and to give a pension to
the man who could smuggle them over.[718] The exportation of ordnance was strictly prohibited, but an
extensive underhand trade went on notwithstanding the efforts of the government. In February 1574 all
gunfounders were called upon to give bonds to £2000 apiece not to cast ordnance without licence and
not to sell it to foreigners. The seat of the industry was Kent and Sussex and the requirements of the
kingdom exclusive of the Royal Navy and of the royal forts, were then estimated at 600 tons a year.[719]
There seem to have been only some six or seven founders in the business, and in the following June,
the Council ordered that no one should enter into it without permission; that all guns should be sent to
the Tower wharf, there to be sold to English subjects who were to give sureties not to sell abroad out of
their ships; and that all founders were to send in a yearly return to the Master of the Ordnance of the
number of guns sold, and to whom.[720] These orders were repeated in 1588 and 1601, but a founder
estimated that 2500 tons of ordnance were cast a year, being three times as much as could be used in
England, and it was supposed that, previous to 1592, out of 2000 tons yearly made 1600 were secretly
sent abroad.
Although the saltpetre had been obtained from the continent powder had long been made in England
as well as bought abroad. In 1562 three persons who had erected powder mills, tendered to supply it on
a large scale—200 lasts a year—at £3, 5s a cwt. (of 100 lbs.) for corn powder, and £2, 16s 8d for
serpentine powder.[721] This offer does not seem to have been accepted although in 1560 the crown
was paying £3, 5s 2d, the cwt. (of 112 lbs.) for serpentine powder, and in 1570, still higher prices. In
November 1588 there was ‘a reasonable store’ of round shot in hand and 55 lasts of powder; 100 tons
of shot and 100 lasts of powder were required to make good deficiencies, but in view of the amount
remaining in stock only the fatal blundering which has always characterised the departments can
explain the constant prayer for supplies that came, vainly, from the fleet.[722] Wynter, whose province it
was to attend to naval requirements in these matters, was himself on service from 22nd December 1587
until 15th September 1588, in command of the Vanguard and the Ark Royal. How the business of his
office was carried on in his absence we do not know with certainty, but from some entries in the Privy
Council Register for 1588, it would appear to have been handed over to the Ordnance Office. The cost
of the powder was here estimated at £100 a last, but in 1589 a tender from George Evelyn, John
Evelyn, and Richard Hills, to deliver 80 lasts a year for eleven years at £80 was accepted. In 1603 they,
with some other partners, were still acting and furnishing 100 lasts a year. Round shot, from cannon
down to fawcon, was obtained at an average of £8 a ton; ‘jointed shot,’ and cross-bar shot were dear,
from 2s 6d to 8s apiece, according to the size of the gun. Stone shot were still used and cost from
sixpence to two shillings each conformable to size.[723]
The naval expenses, especially during the last fifteen years of her reign, must Naval Expenditure.
have seemed appalling to Elizabeth and would have excused her parsimony
had she not been so lavish to herself. From the Audit Office Accounts we are enabled to give on the
next page the amounts for which the Treasurer of the Navy was answerable, but these by no means
included all the expenditure of the crown in various expeditions. The total cost of the Cadiz and Islands
voyages, for instance, of 1596 and 1597 is given as £172,260 and this is only partly represented below.
[724] If the Queen took a share in an adventure the money she advanced was paid from the Exchequer
and is not borne on the Navy accounts.
The £12,000 a year allotted to Gonson, under Mary, for the working of the naval establishments
during peace was reduced from 1st January 1564 to £6000 a year, of which he was to pay Baeshe
£165, 2s a month for harbour victualling.[725] Of course war, or preparation for war, upset all calculations
of economy, but the attempt was steadily made to keep the normal, everyday, expenses of the
department separate from the exceptional ones, and to reduce the former to as low a sum as
practicable. Gonson must have found the £6000 a year impossible, for in 1567 it was raised to £7695,
6s 2d. The economy could have been only nominal, for on the same date as this new order[726] there is
a warrant to Gonson for £10,200 extra for stores and ship repairs which would have formerly been
included in the £12,000 a year. By a statement of 1585 the average for these years was £10,946 yearly,
when building, repairs, and stores purchased were included.[740] From 1571 commences the division
into ordinary and extraordinary, which doubtless had a further saving for its object, although how the
process was to work, except as tending towards clearer bookkeeping, is not now manifest.