Rambouillet Agreement

The Rambouillet Agreement, formally the Interim Agreement

Rambouillet Agreement
for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, was a proposed
peace agreement between the delegation of the Federal Republic of Interim Agreement for Peace and
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on the one hand and the Self-Government in Kosovo
delegation of political representatives of the ethnic Albanian Type Peace agreement
majority population of Kosovo on the other. It was drafted by the Drafted 23 February 1999
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and named for the
Location Rambouillet,
Château de Rambouillet, where it was initially proposed in early France
1998. Among other things, the accords called for 30,000 NATO
Mediators Robin Cook
peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for
Hubert Védrine
NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; and immunity for NATO and
its agents to Yugoslav law.[1] The Kosovo Albanian side signed the Language English
agreement on 18 March 1999, however the refusal of the Yugoslav Rambouillet Agreement (https://pea
and Serbian side to sign the accords led to the 1999 bombing of cemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouillet
Yugoslavia.[2] agreement99)

Provisions
The provisions of the agreement included:

1. "Kosovo will have a president, prime minister, and

government, an assembly, its own Supreme Court,
constitutional court and other courts."
2. "Kosovo will have the authority to make laws not
subject to revision by Serbia or the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, including levying taxes, instituting The Château de Rambouillet where the
programs of economic, scientific, technological, negotiations took place
regional and social development, conducting foreign
relations within its area of responsibility in the same
manner as a Republic."
3. "Yugoslav army forces and Serb security forces will withdraw completely from Kosovo,
except for a limited border guard force (active only within a 5 kilometer border zone)."
4. "The parties invite NATO to deploy a military force (KFOR), which will be authorized to use
necessary force to ensure compliance with the accords."
5. "The international community will play a role in ensuring that these provisions are carried out
through a Civilian Implementation Mission (CIM) appointed by NATO".
6. "The Chief of the CIM has the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties on all
important matters he sees fit, including appointing and removing officials and curtailing
institutions."
7. "Three years after the implementation of the Accords, an international meeting will be
convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will
of its People."
8. "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment,
free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of
 Yugoslavia including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as
required for support, training, and operations."
9. "NATO is granted the use of airports roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties,
dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use."
10. "Yugoslavia and Kosovo shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services,
including broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO, This shall
include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to
communicate and the right to use all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of
cost."
11. "In the conduct of the Operation, NATO may need to make improvements or modifications to
certain infrastructure in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility
systems."
12. "NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal."
13. "NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the
Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal or disciplinary offenses
which may be committed by them in the FRY."
14. "NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the
authorities in the FRY."

Proposed autonomy for Kosovo

The Rambouillet Agreement included provisions for creating a system of democratic self-governance in
Kosovo. It would have established three branches of government, a system of local government and law
enforcement institutions.[3][4][5]

Competencies
Kosovo would have the authority to make laws in areas it has competence including levying taxes,
instituting programs of economic, scientific, technological, regional and social development, and could
conduct foreign relations within its area of responsibility in the same manner as a republic within the
federation.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have competency over territorial integrity, maintaining a
common market, monetary policy, defense, foreign policy, customs services, federal taxation, and federal
elections. Serbia would have competence republic level elections in Kosovo. Kosovo would be entitled to
at least 10 seats in the federal parliament and at least 20 seats in the Serbian parliament. The federal
government would maintain border crossings at Kosovo's external borders with Albania and North
Macedonia and would exercise authority in connection with the enforcement of federal immigration laws.

Legislative branch
Kosovo was to have an 120 member assembly of which 80 would be directly elected. Of the remaining 40
members, 10 would be elected by communities representing between 0.5 and 5% and 30 would be shared
equally between the Albanian and Serb communities. The assembly would be led by a president, two vice-
presidents.

Executive branch
Kosovo would have had a president elected by the assembly for a three year term renewable once.
Executive power would be exercised by a government led by a prime minister, proposed by the president
and conformed by the assembly.

Judicial branch
Kosovo was to have a constitutional court, a supreme court, district courts, and communal courts. The
constitutional court and supreme court would each have 9 judges. An office of the prosecutor, led by a chief
prosecutor, would be responsible for prosecuting individuals who violate the criminal laws of Kosovo. With
the exception of immigration and customs related crimes, any person arrested within Kosovo would subject
to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts. The rights and freedoms set forth in the European Convention on
Human Rights would apply directly in Kosovo. An ombudsman institution would be established to protect
human and community rights in Kosovo.

Local government
Kosovo's existing communes would continue to exist and would elect their own assemblies and executive
councils.

Law enforcement
Communal police units would be established throughout Kosovo with responsibility police patrols, crime
prevention, criminal investigations, arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd control, and traffic
control. Communal police officers may be equipped with a sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and, a radio and
would be required to wear a badge, picture identification, and name tag. Each unit would be led by a
communal commander, appointed by the local communal assembly. A criminal justice administration would
be established to coordinate law enforcement operations across Kosovo.

Negotiating parties
The negotiations were chaired by British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and French Foreign Minister
Hubert Védrine. At times, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer also took part in the talks.

Three parties were involved in the negotiations:

the Contact Group, which included representatives from the United States, the European
Union and Russia; Christopher Hill for the US, Wolfgang Petritsch for the EU and Boris
Majorski for Russia).

the 16-member delegation of Kosovo Albanians: Hashim Thaçi (leader of the Kosovo
Liberation Army), Ibrahim Rugova (the leader of the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo),
philosophy professor and Rugova confidant Fehmi Agani, journalist Veton Surroi, Rexhep
Qosja, KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi, former Rugova employee and KLA representative
Ram Buja, among others.[6]
the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was initially led by Serbian Deputy
Prime Minister Ratko Marković before Serbian President Milan Milutinović took over the
leadership when he joined the delegation at the beginning of the second week of
negotiations, on 13 February. The deligation included Federal Deputy Prime Minister Nikola
 Šainović, Federal Deputy Prime Minister Vladan Kutlešić, Serbian Deputy Government
Spokesman Vladimir Stambuk, Chairman of the Socialist Party in Kosovo Vojislav Živković,
Member of the Kosovo and Methoja Provisional Executive Council Guljbehar Sabović, the
representative of the national Muslim community Refik Senadović, the representative of the
Turkish national community and the Turkish Democratic Party Zejnelabidin Kurejs,
representative of the national community of the Gorans Ibro Vait, President of the Kosovo
Democratic Initiative Faik Jasari, President of the Democratic Reform Party of Albanians
Sokolj Cuse, the representative of the Roma national community Ljuan Koka, the
representative of the Egyptian national community Cerim Abazi.[6]

Negotiations

Rambouillet
On 23 February 1999, the co-chairmen Robin Cook and Hubert Védrine of the negotiation process put out
a statement saying that the negotiations "have led to a consensus" on substantial autonomy for Kosovo,
including on mechanisms for free and fair elections to democratic institutions, for the governance of
Kosovo, for the protection of human rights and the rights of members of national communities; and for the
establishment of a fair judicial system". They went on to say that "a political framework is now in place"
leaving the further work of finalizing "the implementation Chapters of the Agreement, including the
modalities of the invited international civilian and military presence in Kosovo".[7] However, this
assessment was at best overly optimistic, and at worst absolutely ignored the divergence of interests
between the two major parties. The Albanians were unwilling to accept a solution that would retain Kosovo
as part of Serbia, while the Serbs did not want to see the pre-1990 status quo restored, and they were
implacably opposed to any international role in the governance of the province, including the offer of a
face-saving measure wherein blue-helmeted UN peacekeeping troops would be used instead of NATO
troops.[8] To add to the problem, the NATO Contact Group countries were desperate to avoid having to
make good on their threat of force—Greece and Italy were opposed to the idea. Consequently, when the
talks failed to achieve an agreement by the original deadline of 19 February, they were extended by another
month.

Paris
In the end, on 18 March 1999, the Kosovo Albanian, American and British delegation signed what became
known as the 'Rambouillet Accords'[9] while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused. The accords
called for NATO administration of Kosovo as an autonomous region within Yugoslavia; a force of 30,000
NATO troops to maintain order in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav
territory, including Kosovo; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. In addition, NATO
forces would have the right to use local roads, ports, railways, and airports without payment of duties, dues,
tolls or charges, as well as the right to use the electromagnetic spectrum without payment. NATO would
also have the right to requisition public facilities for its use free of cost. NATO forces would have the right
to hire local personnel who upon employment with NATO would be exempt from local laws in respect to
acts performed in their official capacity, national service obligations, local labor laws, and taxes on their
salaries. Local infrastructure would be subjected to improvements or modifications to by NATO forces
when deemed necessary to facilitate the mission.[1] According to Tim Judah, the Serbian side used Annex B
only later on as a reason for the failure of talks; at the time, the Serbs rejected any discussion of the
involvement of foreign troops, let alone the extensive rights that would have been afforded them by Annex
B.[10]

Signing
The agreement was signed by Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi, Rexhep Qosja and Veton Surroi on behalf
of "Kosovo" in the presence of Christopher Hill and Wolfgang Petritsch on 18 March 1999. The delegation
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia refused to sign the agreement.[11][12]

Aftermath
Events proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet. The international monitors from the OSCE were
withdrawn on 22 March for fear of the monitors' safety ahead of the anticipated bombing by NATO. On 23
March, the Serbian assembly issued a resolution that condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE monitors,[13]
and accepted the principle of "autonomy" for Kosovo[14] and non-military part of the agreement.

NATO leaders had expected that a brief bombing campaign would lead to Serb forces withdrawing from
Kosovo, hence ending the humanitarian crisis; but Milošević may have gambled that his government and
armed forces could withstand a few days of bombing without serious harm.[10]

Reactions
In commentary released to the press, former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that:

The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was
a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb
could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented
in that form.[15]

— Henry Kissinger, The Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1999

The historian Christopher Clark supports this view, asserting that the terms of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum to Serbia appear lenient compared to the NATO demands.[16]

A former hand on the State Department's Yugoslavia desk, George Kenney, reported in May 1999 that a
senior State Department official had briefed journalists off the record that "[we] deliberately set the bar
higher than the Serbs could accept".[17]

For the Serbs, signing the Rambouillet agreement would actually have been signing away all Serbian
sovereignty over Kosovo. It was not even a "take it or leave it" proposition, as Secretary of State Albright
emphasized back in February 1999; rather, it was "sign it or get bombed." There were, in fact, no
negotiations at all, and no sovereign, independent state would have signed the Rambouillet agreement.[18]
Historian Noel Malcolm wrote that as the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the agreement on the 18th,
the Yugoslav delegation boycotted the ceremony and declared its opposition to the plan and that military
maneuvers were being planned, so that by March 20 there were more than 26,000 Serbian troops inside the
province and another 15,000 stationed just beyond its eastern border.

See also
Kosovo Verification Mission
Clark-Naumann agreement
1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
Kumanovo Agreement
Ahtisaari Plan

References
1. "The Rambouillet text - Appendix B" (https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/apr/28/balkan
s12). The Guardian. 28 April 1999. Retrieved 5 October 2021.
2. Suy, Eric (2000). "NATO's Intervention in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (https://www.c
ambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/natos-intervention-i
n-the-federal-republic-of-yugoslavia/0ABB9520FBC5FD26A849699480A48D09). Leiden
Journal of International Law. 13 (1): 193–205. doi:10.1017/S0922156500000133 (https://doi.
org/10.1017%2FS0922156500000133). S2CID 145232986 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/
CorpusID:145232986).
3. https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99
4. https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=8676&lang=EN
5. https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_990301_rambouillet.html
6. World: Europe Kosovo talks: The negotiators (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/27383
0.stm) BBC, 6. Februar 1999.
7. "Contact Group Statement – Rambouillet, 23 February 1999" (https://web.archive.org/web/20
070926234216/http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560). Office of
the High Representative. 23 February 1999. Archived from the original (http://www.ohr.int/oth
er-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content_id=3560) on 26 September 2007.
8. Judah 2009, p. 323.
9. "Rambouillet Agreement -Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo" (htt
ps://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html). US State
Department. March 1999.
10. Judah 2009, p. 324.
11. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990123_RambouilletAccord.pdf
12. https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/fdhxj/download
13. Herring 2000, p. 227.
14. "Conclusions of Serbian parliament" (https://web.archive.org/web/20080214160503/http://w
ww.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10030.html). SerbiaInfo. Serbian Government. 24
March 1999. Archived from the original (http://www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10030.
html) on 14 February 2008.
15. Bancroft, Ian (24 March 2009). "Serbia's anniversary is a timely reminder" (https://www.thegu
ardian.com/commentisfree/2009/mar/24/serbia-kosovo). The Guardian. London. Retrieved
22 May 2010.
16. Clark, Christopher (2012). The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went To War In 1914 (2012 ed.).
London: Allen Lane. pp. 456–457. ISBN 978-0-713-99942-6.
17. Kenney, George (27 May 1999). "Rolling Thunder: the Rerun" (https://web.archive.org/web/2
0181222221758/https://www.thenation.com/article/rolling-thunder-rerun/). The Nation.
Archived from the original (http://www.thenation.com/article/rolling-thunder-rerun/) on 22
December 2018. Retrieved 1 March 2016.
18. Hatchett 2009, p. 63.

Bibliography
Hatchett, Ronald (2009). Kosovo: The Score 1999-2009 (http://balkanstudies.net/sites/default/fil
es/newsletter/Kosovo%20The%20Score%201999%202009.pdf) (PDF). Washington D.C.-
Chicago-Ottawa: The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies. ISBN 978-1-892478-05-4.
Archived (https://web.archive.org/web/20201001062607/http://balkanstudies.net/sites/defaul
t/files/newsletter/Kosovo%20The%20Score%201999%202009.pdf) (PDF) from the original
on 1 October 2020.
Herring, Eric (2000). "From Rambouillet to the Kosovo Accords: NATO'S War against Serbia and
Its Aftermath". The International Journal of Human Rights. 4 (3–4): 224–245.
doi:10.1080/13642980008406901 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13642980008406901).
S2CID 144283529 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:144283529).
Judah, Tim (2009). The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (3rd ed.). New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-15826-7.

Further reading
Weller, Marc (1999). "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo". International Affairs. 75 (2):
211–251. doi:10.1111/1468-2346.00069 (https://doi.org/10.1111%2F1468-2346.00069).
JSTOR 2623341 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/2623341).

External links
Full text of the proposed agreement (https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreemen
t99)
Full text of Rambouillet Accords (https://web.archive.org/web/20000816032139/http://www.al
b-net.com/kcc/interim.htm)
Beginning of discussion (May 14, 1999 to June 8, 1999, specifically) of Appendix B of the
Rambouillet Treaty on H-Diplo, the academic diplomatic history forum (http://h-net.msu.edu/c
gi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=9905&week=b&msg=kpjsP0IkA283E2EWIF
YvvA&user=&pw=)
Goldstone Report (https://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm)
Minutes of the British inquiry in the Kosovo war (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199
900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/0062005.htm)
The Rambouillet Accord: A Declaration of War Disguised as a Peace Agreement (http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~lormand/agenda/9905/16.pdf), By Richard Becker, Western Regional
Co-Director of the International Action Center

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