Why Does the Buddha Support the ‘All-Existing’?

Investigating Scriptural Proofs

for the Sarvāstivāda School’s ‘All-Existing’ Doctrine through the Perspectives in the
Saṃyukta Āgama and Vijñānakāya

Fang Xin 辛放, Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Abstract: This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine
of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation.
The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This
article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times.’ It argues for an
inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya
exposition on ‘the existence of the three times.’ By scrutinizing the process of
establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes
evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of
the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation,
including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs
for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory.

Keywords: Sarvāstivāda; Vijñānakāya; Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; All-Existing;

Saṃyukta Āgama; Observation

1. Introduction

The concept of ‘all-existing’ (yiqie you 一切有, sarvāsti, sarvam asti) constitutes a
fundamental doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda school, with the term Sarvāstivāda itself
denoting the theory of ‘all-existing.’ This term is etymologically derived from three
Sanskrit words—sarva (all), asti (exists or is), and vāda (theory or doctrine)—which
together articulate the real existence of conditioned dharmas across the past, present, and
future, as well as the real existence (or real being, Skt. dravyato’sti) of three
unconditioned dharmas: space (ākāśa), cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyā-
nirodha), and cessation not due to discrimination (apratisaṃkyā-nirodha). The term ‘real
existence’ refers to existence as a ‘substance’ (dravya), where ‘substance’ denotes
‘dharma’ (Dhammajoti, 2007, p.41).

However, our understanding of ‘all-existing’ often derives from the heterodox

literature of Vasubandhu’s (Shiqin 世 親 ) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Skt. version ed.
Pradhan 1975; Jushe Lun 俱舍論, T1558, Chinese trans. Xuanzang 玄奘, T1559, Chinese
trans. Zhendi 真諦 Paramārtha, henceforth AKBh),1 where ‘all-existing’ is equated with
‘the existence of the three times’ (sanshi shiyou, 三 世 實 有 , traikālyaparīksā,
sarvakālāstitā), Nevertheless, from the perspective of the orthodox Sarvāstivāda school

1
According to Vasubandhu’s biography, he was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, deeply studied the Sarvāstivādin
Abhidharma, and subsequently learned the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school. He wrote the AKBh to critique
orthodox Sarvāstivāda doctrines from a Sautrāntika perspective. This narrative model is described in the
biographies of Vasubandhu recorded by Paramārtha, Xuanzang, and Bu-ston (Kato, J., 1989, p. 5-15). For the sake
of convenience in the following discussion, the term ‘Sarvāstivāda’ will refer to the orthodox Sarvāstivāda
(Vaibhāṣika). ‘T’ stands for Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka (Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大蔵経).
References to the Taishō edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka are to the website of CBETA 2024.R1 version with my
repunctuation.

1
(Vaibhāṣika), 2 these two concepts cannot be directly equated. 3 Previous research has
predominantly focused on the logical proofs of ‘the existence of the three times’
(considered by the AKBh to be equivalent to ‘all-existing’), such as discussions on the
arising, cessation, transformation, and causality of dharmas. 4 Comparatively, less
attention has been given to scriptural proofs.

‘Scriptural proofs’ use scriptures (sūtras) as a foundation for substantiating claims.

In the AKBh, the corresponding Sanskrit expression is sūtraṃ jñāpaka mānayanti, which
means invoking the sūtra as an indicator. For example, the AKBh recounts the
Sarvāstivāda’s theory of ‘the existence of the three times,’ which furnishes four primary
rationales: the initial two constitute scriptural proofs, while the latter two comprise logical
proofs, collectively referred to as ‘two scriptural proofs and two logic proofs.’ Scriptural
proofs aim to demonstrate that the relevant doctrines are grounded in Buddhist scriptures.
A typical way to do so is to show that the relevant concepts or the very doctrines
themselves are explicitly employed in the Āgamas. Conversely, logical proofs consist of
analyzing theses and using logical deductions. For Abhidharma texts adhering to the
principle of scriptural interpretation, both scriptural and logical proofs hold equal

2
In this article, ‘orthodox Sarvāstivāda’ refers to the Vaibhāṣikas. According to Willemen et al. (1998, p. XII), the
Mahāvibhāṣā Śāstra (Dapiposha Lun 大毘婆沙論, T1545, extant only in Chinese, Xuanzang’s translation,
henceforth MVŚ) was the most influential work, becoming the central text of the Vaibhāṣika tradition, which
evolved into the Kashmiri Sarvāstivāda Orthodoxy under the patronage of the Kushan empire. For further
information on the Vaibhāṣikas and their relationship with the Sautrāntika, the Dārṣṭāntika, and other schools, refer
to Dhammajoti (2006) and Saito (2011).
3
Since the AKBh, almost all Buddhist schools have summarized the Sarvāstivāda school’s position with the concept
of ‘the existence of the three times.’ However, this summary might not accurately reflect the school’s doctrine.
Vasubandhu (1975, p.296) states: ‘avaśyaṃ ca kilaitat sarvāstivādena satā’bhyupagantavyam, yasmāt tadastivādāt
sarvāstivādā iṣṭāḥ ye he sarvam astīti vadanti atītam anāmataṃ pratyutpannaṃ ca te sarvāstivādāḥ iṣṭāḥ. Indeed,
this must necessarily be accepted by the Sarvāstivāda. From their doctrine of existence, they are called
Sarvāstivādins, who assert that all exist - the past, the future, and the present; they are belonging to the Sarvāstivāda.’
Additionally, see Xuanzang’s translation: ‘若自謂是說一切有宗，決定應許實有去來世，以說三世皆定實有
故，許是說一切有宗。謂若有人說三世實有，方許彼是說一切有宗。(Ruo zi wei shi shuoyiqieyou zong,
jueding yingxu shiyou qulaishi, yi shuo sanshi jie ding shiyou gu, xu shi shuoyiqieyou zong. Wei ruo youren shuo
sanshishiyou, fang xu bi shi shuoyiqieyou zong).’ (T29, p. 104b22-25). Here, it only emphasizes that affirming the
existence of the past, present, and future is enough to be regarded as Sarvāstivāda. However, the description in
Saṃghabhadra’s (Zhongxian 眾賢) *Nyāyānusāra (順正理論 Shunzhengli Lun, T1562, later Vaibhāṣika literature,
extant only in Xuanzang’s Chinese Translation, henceforth Ny) is: ‘諸有處俗及出家人，信有如前所辯三世，
及有真實三種無為，方可自稱說一切有(Zhuyou chusu ji chujiaren, xin you ruqiansuobian sanshi, ji you zhenshi
sanzhong wuwei, fangke zicheng shuoyiqieyou)。 (T29, p. 630c6-8) All laypeople and monastics who believe in
‘the existence of the three times’ as previously argued, as well as the reality of the three unconditioned dharmas,
can claim to belong to the Sarvāstivāda.’ Therefore, according to the Ny, in addition to acknowledging the existence
of the past, present, and future, one should also recognize the reality of the three unconditioned dharmas: space,
cessation through deliberation, and cessation not due to discrimination, to be considered part of the Sarvāstivāda
school. This is not entirely consistent with the description of ‘the existence of the three times’ in the AKBh. The
statement in the Ny is more in line with the Sarvāstivāda’s doctrine, so we choose to use the term ‘all-existing’ to
describe this position instead of ‘the existence of the three times.’ The statement in the Ny is more in line with the
Sarvāstivāda’s doctrine, so I use the term ‘all-existing’ to describe this position instead of ‘the existence of the three
times.’ The distinction between ‘all-existing’ and ‘the existence of the three times’ has been noted by scholars for
quite some time, for instance, by Kenyo (2007, pp. 179-183), though this difference has not been thoroughly
analyzed. Xin (in press) argues that ‘all-existing’ better reflects the Sarvāstivāda school’s assertion that the seventy-
five dharmas (sarvam) generate cognition as an object (asti). In contrast, ‘the existence of the three times’ is a
strawman deliberately constructed by Vasubandhu to critique the Sarvāstivāda. This concept is more easily
conceived as a metaphysical proposition of a realist substance that remains unchanged over time.
4
Previous research has predominantly concentrated on doctrinal studies (logical proofs) pertaining to ‘the existence of
the three times’ theory, such as Yinshun (1968, pp.91-99), Nishi (1975, pp. 399-405), Fukuda (1988, p.48), Kato,
H. (1990), Frauwallner (1995, pp. 188-190), Willemen et al. (1998, pp. 19-35), Cox (2004, pp. 563-565), Chen
(2008), Dessein (2011), Dhammajoti (2015, pp.144-147), and Guerrero (2023).

2
significance.5 However, just as ‘the existence of the three times’ in the AKBh cannot fully
encapsulate concept of ‘all-existing,’ the scriptural proofs of ‘all-existing’ cited in the
AKBh may not necessarily align with the original approach of the Sarvāstivāda school.
Numerous prior studies have been keen on establishing correspondences between
the sūtras mentioned in the Abhidharma and those in the Āgamas or Nikāyās. This effort
is highly beneficial for further analyzing how these sūtras advance the Abhidharma’s
process of proof. Notable exceptions include Nasu (2017, 2018, 2020) and Akimoto
(2022), who primarily focused on translating the relevant sections of the AKBh and its
commentaries into Japanese. Japanese scholars have translated Abhidharma literature in
the National Translation of All Sūtras (Kokuyaku Issaikyō 國 譯 一 切 經 ), National
Translation of Tripiṭaka (Kokuyaku Daizōkyō 國譯大藏經), and Showa Newly Compiled
National Translation of Tripiṭaka (Shōwa Shinzō Kokuyaku Daizōkyō 昭和新纂國譯大
藏經), conducting detailed investigations on the citations of Buddhist scriptures and
enumerating the sources thereof. Similarly, Pāsādika (1989) also examined the sūtras
referenced in the AKBh. However, there has been minimal subsequent research in this
area, meaning that scholars have yet to explicate why the Sarvāstivāda masters quoted
these specific sūtras or what problems these sūtras addressed.
Chen (2008, pp.149-185) represents the most significant contribution in this field,
as she conducted a comprehensive examination of the scriptural proofs for the ‘all-
existing’ theory in the AKBh and investigated the response to it in the Ny. However,
Chen’s (2008, pp.181-185) interpretation of scriptural proof is biased toward the AKBh,
asserting that the Sarvāstivāda cannot prove ‘all-existing’ through scriptural proof. I
believe this conclusion arises because she may have misunderstood the logical status of
scriptural proofs within the Sarvāstivāda tradition, for reasons to be explicated later. This
misunderstanding is likely precisely due to the influence of the AKBh. Through four
proofs on ‘the existence of three times,’ Vasubandhu diminishes the axiomatic status of
‘all-existing’ to that of a proposition requiring illation.6
This article asserts that the doctrinal position of the ‘all-existing’ theory within
the Sarvāstivāda School is not that of a proposition requiring illation but rather that of an
axiom. It serves as the foundational basis for deriving any conclusions rather than being
a proposition to be validated. This also elucidates the reason behind the school’s adoption
of the name ‘sarvāsti’. The ability to expound upon this axiom is confined solely to the
speech of the Buddha, serving the ultimate purpose of spiritual cultivation and liberation.
Devaśarman’s (Tiposhemo 提婆設摩) Vijñānakāya (Shishenzu Lun 識身足論, T1539,
Chinese trans. Xuanzang, henceforth VK),7 successfully retains this logical foundation.

5
Cf. MVŚ: ‘一切阿毘達磨，皆為解釋契經中義，以廣分別諸經義故，乃得名為阿毘達磨(Yiqie apidamo, jie wei
jieshi qijing zhong yi, yi guangfenbie zhu jing yi gu, nai de ming wei apidamo)。(T27, p. 5b22-24) All Abhidharma
teachings are meant to explain the meanings within the sūtras. By extensively distinguishing the meanings of
various sūtras, they are called Abhidharma.’
6
The intention here is not to criticize Chen’s research. In the actual process of philosophical or ideological debate,
axioms can, of course, be challenged, and therefore Vasubandhu’s critique might be valid. However, from another
perspective, Vasubandhu’s critique represents his understanding of the Sarvāstivāda school’s viewpoint and does
not necessarily equate to the Sarvāstivāda school’s own perspective. This paper aims to convey the Sarvāstivāda
school’s own viewpoint.
7
Dessein (2012, pp.139-142) suggests that it emerged about 100 years post-Buddha’s parinirvāṇa, identifying the name
Mulian (目連) mentioned therein as the Buddha’s direct disciple, Maudgalyāyana. Yinshun (1968, pp.69-70)
argues that it is influenced by the Jñānaprasthāna, likely dating to the 1st century CE. Dhammajoti (2015, p. 64)
posits that the mentioned Mulian (目連) refers to Moggaliputta Tissa, thus supporting the theory of its origin around
100 years after the Buddha’s demise, although it may have undergone later revisions. Fu (2024, p.36, footnote 7)
points out that the Vijñānakāya was authored by Devaśarman in the region of Vaiśākha in central India, which,
during Xuanzang’s visit, predominantly adhered to the Sammitīya school. Thus, it is speculated that this area might

3
However, due to the significant influence of the AKBh on the interpretation of
Sarvāstivāda thought and its explicit presentation of scriptural proofs, I consider it
necessary firstly to examine its perspective. Subsequently, the investigation will shift
toward exploring the citations found in the VK and its close relationship with the
Saṃyukta Āgama (Za’ahan Jing 雜阿含經, henceforth SĀ). SĀ is particularly significant
among the four Āgamas or Nikāyas and critical to studying earlier Buddhist doctrines
(Yinshun, 1994, pp. 488-491, 630-634; Wang and Jin, 2014, pp.3-5). An extant Chinese
translation of the SĀ (T99) was accomplished by Guṇabhadra (Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀
羅), whose source text was believed to belong to the Sarvāstivāda school’s tradition.8

2. Scriptural Proof of the ‘All-Existing’ Theory in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

First, it is necessary to clarify the criteria for any citation of scriptures to qualify as
‘scriptural proofs.’ ‘Scriptural proofs’ consist of either explicitly presenting a specific
viewpoint in the scriptures as scriptural proofs or deriving further inferences based on the
scriptures to substantiate the facts under examination. The ‘scriptural proofs’ refer to
instances where ‘as the Buddha said’ is invoked, signifying that the original text of the
sūtra explicitly mentions the viewpoint in question. As this viewpoint is often articulated
by the Buddha, it is considered beyond dispute. Consequently, subsequent discussions
utilize Buddha’s words as a foundation for further reasoning.
Vasubandhu’s summary of the arguments for ‘the existence in the three times’
consists of ‘two scriptural proofs and two logical proofs.’ The arguments buttressing this
viewpoint can be summarized into four points, bifurcated into ‘two scriptural proofs and
two proofs.’ The first scriptural proof is as follows (Vasubandhu, 1975, p.295):

AKBh: uktaṃ hi bhagavata ‘atītaṃ ced bhikṣavo rūpaṃ na abhaviṣyan na

śrutavān āryaśrāvako’tīte rūpe’napekṣo’bhaviṣyat. yasmāt tarhy asty atītaṃ
rūpaṃ tasmāc chrutavānāryaśrāvako’tīte rūpe’napekṣo bhavati. anāgataṃ ced
rūpaṃ na abhaviṣyat na śrutavānāryaśrāvako’nāgataṃ rūpaṃ na
abhyanandiṣyat. yasmāt tarhy asty anāgataṃ rūpam’ iti vistaraḥ.
The Blessed One has said, ‘O monks, if past matter did not exist, the learned noble
disciple would not have the abandon of expectations (apekṣa) of the past matter.
Indeed, because past matter indeed exists, the learned noble disciple who heard it
has expectations of the past form. If future matter did not exist, the learned noble
disciple would not rejoice (abhyandan) in the future matter. However, because
future matter does exist, [the learned noble disciple rejoices in the future matter]…’
and so forth.9

have previously been a stronghold of the Vātsīputrīya school, which emerged about three hundred years after the
Buddha’s demise, positioning Devaśarman within this timeframe. Fu’s argument seems plausible considering these
factors. I propose that the name Mulian (目連) mentioned in this context is unlikely to be the direct disciple of the
Buddha, as significant texts would likely have referred to him with the honorific zunzhe (尊者, ārya) (as seen in
Jñānaprasthāna: T26, pp. 1021c29-1022a2; MVŚ: T27, p. 66a15-16; T27, p. 77b17-18) rather than merely as
shamen (沙門, śramaṇa). Moreover, I lean towards the view that it is also unlikely to be Moggaliputta Tissa, as he
too would probably be referred to with a respected title such as shangzuo (上座, sthavira), a term applicable to
revered figures across sects or schools.
8
After the division of the Buddhist schools, each school developed its own distinct textual traditions. It is generally
believed that the Chinese translation of the SĀ is the preserved text of the Sarvāstivāda school (Yinshun, 1994,
p.97; Maeda, 2006, p.8), specifically Mūlasarvāstivāda school (Schmithausen, 1987, pp.343-350; Kuan, 2019,
p.11).
9
Additionally, Chinese parallel, please see Xuanzang’s translation: ‘謂世尊說：苾芻當知，若過去色非有，不應
多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。以過去色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。若未來色非有，

4
 Analogous expressions emerge thrice in the SĀ, specifically in sūtra 8, sūtra 46,
and sūtra 79 (sūtra numbers are based on the Taishō Tripiṭaka). These sūtras aim to
demonstrate that as the Buddha instructed his disciples in their practice, they should
neither dwell on past matter nor crave future matter. Pāsādika (1989, p.97) identifies it as
sūtra 97, with its Pāli parallel text being Saṃyutta Nikāya (henceforth SN) 7.20.
Nevertheless, only in sūtra 79 of the SĀ is there a transparent expression akin to the
statement that past matter exists, and future matter exists in the passage cited from the
AKBh:

SĀ: 若無過去色者，多聞聖弟子無不顧過去色；以有過去色故，多聞聖弟
子不顧過去色。若無未來色者，多聞聖弟子無不欣未來色；以有未來色故，
多聞聖弟子不欣未來色。若無現在色者，多聞聖弟子不於現在色生厭、離
欲、滅盡向；以有現在色故，多聞聖弟子於現在色生厭、離欲、滅盡向。
受、想、行、識亦如是說。10 (T02, p. 20a14-22)
If there were no past matter, the learned noble disciples would not be without
expectations (gu 顧 *apekṣa) on the past matter; because there is past matter, the
learned noble disciples do not expect on the past matter. If there were no future
matter, the learned noble disciples would not be without craving (xin 欣
*abhinadati)11 for future matter; because there is future matter, the learned noble
disciples do not crave for the future matter. If there were no present matter, the
learned noble disciples would not develop aversion (shengyan 生厭 *saṃvega),
renunciation (liyu 離慾 *naiṣkrāmya), and cessation (miejin 滅盡 *nirodha)
toward present matter; because there is present matter, the learned noble disciples
develop aversion, dispassion, and cessation toward the present matter. This is also
said for feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness.

The first scriptural proof explicitly mentions ‘the past matter exists’ (asty atītaṃ
rūpam) and ‘the future matter exists’ (asty anāgataṃ rūpam). In Vasubandhu’s
perspective, these two statements can serve as direct evidence for ‘the existence in the
three times.’ The significance of this sūtra as scriptural proof can also be observed in Ny:

Ny: 然應去來定是實有，說有相故猶如現在。如契經說：過去未來色尚無
常，何況現在。無常即是有為相故，現有彼相實有極成。若執去來非實有

不應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求。以未來色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求 (Wei shizun

shuo: Bichu dangzhi, ruo guoqu se feiyou, buying duowen shengdizhi zhong yu guoqu se qinxiu yanshe. Yi guoqu
se shi you gu, ying duowen shengdizhi zhong yu guoqu se qinxiu yanshe. Ruo weilai se fei you, bu ying duowen
sheng dizhi zhong yu weilai se qinduan xinqiu. Yi weilai se shi you gu, ying duowen shengdizhi zhong yu weilai se
qin duanxinqiu)。’ (T29, p. 104b6-12)
10
Pinyin of citation: Ruo wu guoqu se zhe, duo wen shengdizhi wu bugu guoqu se; yi you guoqu se gu, duo wen
shengdizhi bu gu guoqu se. Ruo wu weilai se zhe, duo wen shengdizhi wu bu xin weilai se; yi you weilai se gu, duo
wen shengdizhi bu xin weilai se. Ruo wu xianzai se zhe, duo wen shengdizhi bu yu xianzai se shengyan, liyu, miejin
xiang; yi you xianzai se gu, duo wen shengdizhi yu xianzai se shengyan, liyu, miejin xiang. Shou, xiang, xing, shi
yi ru shi shuo.
11
According to the parallel text of this sūtra in the SN, the Pāli term for expectation should be apekkho, which is
inferred to be *apekṣa in Sanskrit. The Pali word for rejoice is abhinandati (with the same form in Sanskrit), which
is consistent with the Sanskrit quote from the AKBh. The concepts mentioned above are all synonymous with desire
(rāga). Cf. SN 22.9: ‘Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ atītānāgataṃ; ko pana vādo paccuppannassa! Evaṃ passaṃ,
bhikkhave, sutavā ariyasāvako atītasmiṃ rūpasmiṃ anapekkho hoti; anāgataṃ rūpaṃ nābhinandati;
paccuppannassa rūpassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti.’ All Pāli texts are quoted from the Chaṭṭha
Saṅgāyana by the Vipassana Research Institute: www.tipitaka.org/

5
 者，應非如現在說有有為相，非畢竟無空花馬角亦容可說彼有無常，故知
去來定是實有。12 (T29, p. 630a14-19)
Therefore, the past [dharma] and future [dharma] must indeed exist, as they are
said to have characteristics similar to the present [dharma]. As stated in the sūtras:
‘Even the past and future matter is impermanent, let alone the present.’
Impermanence (wuchang 無常 *anitya) is characteristic of conditioned [dharmas]
(youwei xiang 有 為 相 *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa); their existence with these
characteristics is well established (jicheng 極成 *prasiddha). If [one] insists that
the past and future do not truly exist, then it should not be said that they have the
characteristic of conditioned [dharmas] like the present. It would also be
acceptable to say that the utterly non-existent, such as flowers in the sky and
horse’s horns, have impermanence. Hence, it is known that the past and future are
indeed existent.’

Chen (2008, pp. 152-153) points out that the Sarvāstivāda school regards the
disconnection (lixi 離繫 visaṃyukta) of the saints and the connection (yukta) of ordinary
beings as evidence for the existence of dharmas across the three times since actions must
have an object upon which they are performed. In addition to the aforementioned reasons,
Chen (2008, pp. 153-156) adds another perspective, introducing another Sarvāstivāda
school claim presented in the Ny and the *Tattvasiddhi (Chengshi Lun 成實論, T1646).
This claim asserts that since the Buddha could declare that conditioned dharmas are
impermanent, it proves the existence of conditioned dharmas.
However, in my opinion, the Sarvāstivāda school’s interpretations aim to provide
supplementary explanations for existing positions rather than to prove the existence of
the dharmas of the past and future through this argument. Because, in a logical
relationship, the existence of the dharmas of the past and future must be logically prior,
serving as the logical basis for disconnection and impermanence. Otherwise, it would
constitute inference by incomplete induction. We cannot infer that all dharmas in set A
have property α based on the evidence that a dharma with property α belongs to set A.
For example, we cannot infer the nature of all dharma from the nature of matter dharma;
therefore, we also cannot infer the existence of all dharma from the existence of certain
dharma.
In other words, the purpose of the Sarvāstivāda school in citing this scriptural
proof is not to use the disconnection and impermanent aspects of existence as proof but
merely to establish the logical basis of ‘the existence of three times’ through the
statements that past matter exists and future matter exists. In this case, the existence of
‘past dharmas’ and ‘future dharmas’ is not a fact to be proven but a logical axiom used to
deduce other facts. The Sarvāstivāda school quotes the sūtra to emphasize the
fundamental significance of ‘the existence in the three times’ as an axiom rather than to
prove the existence in the three times through a series of conclusions derived from axioms
based on ‘the existence in the three times.’
The Sarvāstivāda school lists disconnection and impermanent dharma as evidence
only to provide an illustration of this axiom, just as a math teacher might draw a diagram
to explain the axiom that parallel lines never intersect at a point and assert that all parallel

12
Pinyin of citation: Ran ying qu lai ding shi shiyou, shuo youxiang gu youru xianzai. Ru qijing shuo: Guoqu weilai se
shang wuchang, hekuang xianzai. Wuchang ji shi youweixiang gu, xianyou bi xiang shiyou jicheng. Ruo zhi qu lai
fei shiyou zhe, ying fei ru xianzai shuo youyouwei xiang, fei bijing wukonghua majiao yi rong keshuo bi you
wuchang, guzhi qu lai ding shi shiyou.

6
lines satisfy this axiom. The parallel lines drawn on the blackboard are not evidence of
the axiom of parallel lines but rather an illustrative example based on the definition of
parallel lines. The same holds true for the Sarvāstivāda school; ‘the existence in the three
times’ is not established because past and future karma exists but is an axiom, and the
existence of past and future function (vyāpāra) 13 or attribute 14 is an example that
illustrates ‘the existence in the three times.’
The second scriptural proof asserts that consciousness arises through two
conditions (eryuan shengshi 二緣生識 dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpādaḥ), referring to
the presence of both sense bases and objects. The emergence of consciousness depends
on these two conditions. The following quote is taken from Vasubandhu (1975, p.295):

AKBh: ‘dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasya utpādaḥ’ ity uktam. dvayaṃ katamat. cakṣū
rūpāṇi yāvat mano dharmā iti.15
It is said, ‘Consciousness arises from two conditions (pratyaya).’ What are the
two [conditions]? Namely, from the eye and matter up to the mind and dharmas.

This scriptural proof focuses on the correspondence between sense bases and
objects. It is closely related to the first logical proof, which posits that consciousness is
always dependent on an object (shi biyou jing 識必有境 Horiuchi (2011, pp.61-62)
constructs it as sadviṣayāt, sadālambanatvād vijñānasyeti), implying that cognition
necessarily has a corresponding object. However, the emphasis of the second scriptural
proof and the first logical proof differs. The second scriptural proof also serves as a logical
starting point. The logical proof emphasizes the relationship between consciousness and
cognitive objects, stressing that non-existent things cannot serve as cognitive objects. The
SĀ contains numerous examples of the statement ‘consciousness arises from two
conditions.’ The most representative one is the 214th sūtra (Pāsādika, 1989, p.97, with
its Pāli parallel text being SN 35. 93):

SĀ: 有二因緣生識，何等為二？謂眼色、耳聲、鼻香、舌味、身觸、意
法……16 (T02, p. 54a23-25)
There are two conditions for the emergence of consciousness. What are the two
[conditions]? Namely, eye and matter, ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and
taste, body and touch, mind and mental dharmas...

The above text summarizes the two types of scriptural proof for the Sarvāstivāda
doctrine of ‘the existence of three times’ in the AKBh. At first glance, there does not seem
to be a necessary connection between the first scriptural proof and the second scriptural
proof. However, upon further examination of scriptural proof one, its close relationship

13
The Sarvāstivāda school posits that dharmas possess two types of ability (shili 势力 śakti): activity (zuoyong 作用
kāritra) and function (gongneng 功能 vyāpāra). Activity specifically refers to producing results, while function
encompasses a broader range of abilities, including activity. For further details, see Fukuda (1988, pp.49-52) and
Dhammajoti (2015, pp. 141-145).
14
I argue that the AKBh’s interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda fundamentally follows a realist perspective, wherein the
movement, change, and attributes of things have a substratum. In this sense, the Sarvāstivāda considers the
impermanence and characteristics (svabhāva) of dharmas to be attributes of the dharmas themselves. Because the
Sarvāstivāda’s definitions of existence (sat) and substance (dravya) differ from those of realism, I will elaborate
on this issue in the subsequent sections.
15
Additionally, see Xuanzang’s translation: 謂契經說：識二緣生。其二者何？謂眼及色。廣說乃至意及諸法
(Wei qijing shuo: Shi eryuan sheng. Qi er zhe he? Wei yan ji se. Guang shuo naizhi yi ji zhu fa)。 (T29, p. 104b12-
14)
16
Pinyin of citation: You eryinyuan shengshi, hedeng wei er? Wei yan se, er sheng, bi xiang, she wei, shen chu, yi fa…

7
with scriptural proof two becomes apparent. Although Vasubandhu, in the AKBh,
presents this scriptural proof to show that ‘there is past matter’ and ‘there is future matter,’
the 8th sūtra of the SĀ reveals that ‘there is past matter’ and ‘there is future matter’ are
the results of contemplation. In other words, past and future dharmas are considered to
exist because they are cognized:

SĀ: 過去、未來色無常，況現在色！聖弟子！如是觀者，不顧過去色，不
欲未來色，於現在色厭、離欲、正向滅盡。如是，過去、未來受、想、行、
識無常，況現在識！聖弟子！如是觀者，不顧過去識，不欣未來識，於現
在識厭、離欲、正向滅盡。如無常，苦、空、非我亦復如是。 17 (T02, p.
1c23-29)
The past and future matter is impermanent, let alone present matter! Noble
disciples! Those who contemplate in this way do not expect the past matter, do
not crave the future matter, and, regarding the present matter; cultivate aversion,
renunciation, and direct themselves toward cessation. Likewise, the past and the
future feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are impermanent, let alone
present consciousness! Noble disciples! Those who contemplate in this way do
not expect past consciousness, do not rejoice in future consciousness, and,
regarding present consciousness; cultivate aversion, renunciation, and direct
themselves toward cessation. The same applies to impermanence, suffering,
emptiness, and non-self.

In fact, the Ny does define ‘existence’ as ‘generating cognition as an object’

(weijing shengjue 為境生覺).18 The view that all dharmas are cognized is frequently
expressed in many early Abhidharma texts.19 This seems to be the line of reasoning for
the Sarvāstivāda school to cite scriptures in arguing for ‘the existence of three times.’
Although the two scriptural proofs quoted in the AKBh are somewhat persuasive
power for the Sarvāstivāda school, the process of argumentation still has some flaws.
Specifically, in the first scriptural proof, the main argument is intended to lead to the
direct acknowledgment of the ‘existence of the past’ and ‘the existence of the future’ by
Buddha himself in his words. Although this is indeed a common line of reasoning used
by scholars, the Buddha often uses different expressions in different situations.
Sometimes these expressions seem to amount to different teachings increasing this line

17
Pinyin of citation: Guoqu, weilai se wuchang, kuang xianzai se! Sheng dizi! Rushi guan zhe, bugu guoqu se, bu yu
weilai se, yu xianzai se yan, li yu, zheng xiang mie jin. Rushi, guoqu, weilai shou, xiang, xing, shi wuchang, kuang
xianzai shi! Sheng dizi! Rushi guan zhe, bugu guoqu shi, bu xin weilai shi, yu xianzai shi yan, li yu, zheng xiang
mie jin. Ru wuchang, ku, kong, fei wo yi fu rushi.
18
Ny: ‘為境生覺是真有相 (Wei jing shengjue shi zhen you xiang)。(T29, p. 621c21) The real definition of existence
(*sallakṣaṇa) is generating cognition as an object.’ Isshiki (2020, pp. 13-17) summarizes two interpretations of this
definition in prior research. The first is that existing objects can be known; the second is that only objects that can
be known exist. I argue that both definitions imply a dualistic separation between existence and cognition. Instead,
I propose that the term ‘existence’ (sat) means the cognized phenomenon.
19
Cf. *Prakaraṇa (T1542, 品類足論 as one of the scriptures of the Sarvāstivāda school within the Abhidharma Piṭaka,
Chinese trans. Xuanzang): ‘所知法云何？謂一切法是智所知，隨其事⋯⋯所識法云何？謂一切法是識所
識……所通達法云何？通達者，謂善慧，此以一切法為所通達……所緣法云何？謂一切法是心心所法所
緣，隨其事 (Suo zhi fa yunhe? Wei yiqiefa shi zhi suo zhi, suiqi shi…suo shi fa yunhe? Wei yiqie fa shi shi suo
shi…suo tongda fa yunhe? Tongda zhe, wei shanhui, ci yi yiqiefa wei suo tongda......suoyuan fa yunhe? Wei yiqie
fa shi xin xinsuo fa suoyuan, sui qi shi)。(T26, pp. 713c20-714a12) What are the knowable dharmas? It refers to
all dharmas being known by wisdom, according to their nature ...What are the cognizable dharmas? It refers to all
dharmas being cognized by consciousness...What are the penetrable dharmas? Penetrable refers to wholesome
wisdom, which takes all dharmas as its object of penetration...What are the object-conditioned dharmas? It refers
to all dharmas being the object of mind and mental factors, according to their nature.’

8
of reasoning’s susceptibility to criticism. In AKBh, the author Vasubandhu cites the
Paramārtha śūnyatā to refute ‘the existence of three times’ (Vasubandhu, 1975, p. 299):

AKBh: yat paramārtha-śūnyatayām uktaṃ bhagavatā ‘cakṣur utpadyamānaṃ na

kutaś cid āgacchati, nirudhyamānaṃ na kva cit sannicayaṃ gacchati.’ iti hi
bhikṣavaś cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchatīti. 20
In the Paramārtha śūnyatā, Blessed One said: ‘When the eye arises, there is no
place from which it comes; when it ceases, there is no place where it gathers.
Therefore, O monks, the eye, not having existed, comes into existence (abhūtvā
bhavati); having existed, it ceases to exist. (bhūtvā ca pratigacchati).’

The Paramārtha śūnyatā, also known as the 335th sūtra of the SĀ (Miyashita,
1986; Pāsādika, 1989, p.98) is where Vasubandhu uses the Buddha’s words ‘not having
existed, comes into existence’ and ‘having existed, ceases to exist’ to refute the scriptural
proof for ‘the existence in the three times.’ This rebuttal poses a significant challenge to
the Sarvāstivāda’s using the scriptural evidence to prove that, just as the Buddha said,
‘the past exists’ and ‘the future exists.’ Although the Sarvāstivāda’s defense for
themselves, according to Fabao’s 法寶 commentary of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Jushelun
Shu 俱舍論疏 T1822), could be that ‘not having existed, comes into existence’ and
‘having existed, ceases to exist’ both refer to the ‘present,’ meaning the past is non-
existent in the present, and the future is the present that has ceased,21 this defense seems
quite sophistically.
Does this mean that the scriptural evidence for the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of ‘the
existence of all’ is invalidated? I believe that it is not accurate to say so, because as a
treatise opposing the orthodox Sarvāstivāda teachings, the AKBh inevitably has a
suspicion of quoting for the sake of criticism. The Ny is responding within the framework
set by the AKBh, and it is inevitably limited by the issues set by the latter. When I shifted
my focus to the early Abhidharma texts, I discovered something different.

3. The Prototype of ‘the Existence of Three Times’ in the Vijñānakāya: If X

Can Be Observed, then It Can Be Said to Exist
Unlike the AKBh, which presents four complex arguments, the explanation for ‘the
existence of three times’22 in the VK is very clear, with only one point: if observing the
future, one should say the future exists and explains the three unwholesome roots (bushan
gen 不善根 *akuśalamūla) as follows:

20
Additionally, Chinese parallel, see Xuanzang’s translation: ‘以薄伽梵於《勝義空契經》中說：眼根生位無所從
來，眼根滅時無所造集 。本無今有、有已還無 (Yi baojiafan yu ‘shengyi kong qi jing’ zhong shuo: Yan gen
sheng wei wu suo conglai, yan gen mie shi wu suo zaoji. Ben wu jin you, you yi hai wu)。’ (T29, p. 105b19-22)
21
Cf. Fabao’s commentary: ‘有部通云：本無者，本無現在，今有現在；本有今無者，本有現在今無現在
(Youbu tong yun: Benwu zhe, benwu xianzai, jinyou xianzai; Benyou jinwu zhe, benyou xianzai jin wuxianzai)。
(T41, p. 705a23-25) The Sarvāstivāda school explains: What originally did not exist, now exists; what originally
existed but now does not, existed before but does not exist now.’
22
It is essential to clarify that ‘the existence in the three times’ differs from ‘all-existing’ because the latter includes
the real existence of unconditioned dharma. However, I believe that the concept of ‘the existence in the three times’
from the VK can still elucidate the issues of ‘all-existing.’ Although the proponent only refutes the nonexistence
of the past and future presented by his opponents and does not address unconditioned dharma, this might be because
Moggaliputta Tissaalso acknowledges the existence of unconditioned dharma. Refer to the VK: ‘沙門目連作如是
説：過去、未來無，現在、無為有 (Shamen mulian zuo rushi shuo: Guoqu, weilai wu, xianzai, wuwei you)。
(T26, p.531a27-28) The monk *Maudgalyāyana spoke thus: There is no past [dharma], no future [dharma]; the
present [dharma] and the unconditioned [dharma] exist.’

9
 VK: 謂契經中世尊善語善詞善說三不善根：貪不善根、瞋不善根、癡不善
根。彼答言：爾。復問彼言：汝然此不？謂有能於貪不善根已觀、今觀、
當觀是不善？彼答言：爾。23 (T26, p. 531a28-b3)
The sūtra says, ‘The Blessed One skillfully spoke of the three unwholesome roots:
the unwholesome root of greed (tan bushan gen 貪不善根 *lobho’kuśalamūla),
the unwholesome root of hatred (chen bushan gen 瞋 不 善 根
*deveṣo’kuśalamūla), and the unwholesome root of delusion (chi bushan gen 癡
不善根 *moho’kuśalamūla)’. The respondent says, ‘Yes.’ He is further asked,
‘Do you also know this? That is, can one have observed, observes, and will
observe the unwholesome root of greed [in the past, present, and future] as
unwholesome?’ The respondent says, ‘Yes.’

In this passage, the author of the VK first quotes the three unwholesome roots
from the sūtra. These three unwholesome roots include the unwholesome root of greed,
the unwholesome root of hatred, and the unwholesome root of delusion. Thus, the three
unwholesome roots are the object of observation, and the conclusion of observing the
three unwholesome roots is their being unwholesome. Subsequently, Devaśarman
generalizes from the individual cases of the three unwholesome roots and reaches the
conclusion that if one says that something can be observed, then one should say that it
‘exists’:

VK: 若言觀過去，應說有過去，不應無過去；言過去無，不應道理。若言
觀未來，應說有未來，不應無未來；言未來無，不應道理。 24 (T26, p.
531b3-6)
If [one] speaks of observing the past [dharma], [one] should say that the past
[dharma] exists and not that the past [dharma] does not exist; to say that the past
[dharma] does not exist is contrary to reason. If [one] speaks of observing the
future [dharma], [one] should say that the future [dharma] exists and not that the
future [dharma] does not exist; to say that the future [dharma] does not exist is
contrary to reason.

After explaining the past and future, the Devaśarman explains the present as
follows:

VK: 若言觀現在，應說有一補特伽羅，非前非後二心和合，一是所觀、一
是能觀，此不應理。若不說一補特伽羅，非前非後二心和合，一是所觀、
一是能觀，則不應說觀於現在；言觀現在，不應道理。25 (T26, p. 531b6-10)
If one speaks of observing the present [dharma], one should say that there is a
*pudgala, neither the previous nor the subsequent minds combined, one is being
observed, and the other is observing; it is not reasonable. If one does not say that

23
Pinyin of citation: Wei qijing zhong shizun shanyu shanci shanshuo san bushanggen: Tan bushanggen, chen
bushanggen, chi bushanggen. Bi dayan: Er. Fu wen bi yan: Ru ran ci bu? Wei you neng yu tan bushanggen yiguan,
jinguan, dangguan shi bushan? Bi dayan: Er.
24
Pinyin of citation: Ruo yan guan guoqu, ying shuo you guoqu, bu ying wu guoqu; yan guoqu wu, bu yingdaoli. Ruo
yan guan weilai, ying shuo you weilai, bu ying wu weilai; yan weilai wu, bu yingdaoli.
25
Pinyin of citation: Ruo yan guan xianzai, ying shuo you yi butejialuo, feiqian feihou erxin hehe, yi shi suoguan, yi
shi nengguan, ci bu yingli. Ruo bu shuo youyi butejialuo, feiqian feihou erxin hehe, yi shi suoguan, yi shi nengguan,
ze bu ying shuo guan yu xianzai; yan guan xianzai, bu ying daoli.

10
 there is a *pudgala, neither the previous nor the subsequent minds combined, one
being observed and the other being observing, then one should not say that one is
observing the present; to say that one is observing the present is unreasonable.

In this passage, Devaśarman uses a reductio ad absurdum argument (Tobita, 2013,

pp.87-122). For the Sarvāstivāda school, the mind and mental factors cannot be self-
cognized (Yao, 2005, pp.42-96); that is, they cannot be observed as objects within the
same moment. Therefore, if one were to directly observe the present moment, it would
inevitably lead to the problem of the two minds (observing mind and observed mind)
operating in the same moment. Due to this problem, the Sarvāstivāda school holds that
the present cannot be observed immediately. However, this does not mean that the present
cannot be observed at all; rather, it cannot be observed as an immediate phenomenon.
Since it can be observed, it can be said to exist.
From this, a general line of reasoning in the VK can be summarized as: ‘If X can
be observed, then it can be said to exist.’ The statement ‘if X can be observed, then it can
be said to exist’ appears to articulate a causal relationship, suggesting that because
something can be observed, its existence can be inferred. For instance, Tobiba (2013, pp.
50-86) conducts a thorough analysis of the relationship between observation and
existence in the VK, arguing that ‘existence is because it can be observed’ and suggesting
that the Sarvāstivāda logic involves axiomatizing individual objects to derive ‘the
existence of three times.’ Tobiba’s discussion on the relationship between observation
and existence has been highly enlightening. However, I hold reservations about his views
because axioms, as agreed-upon premises, do not require further argument or proof.
Tobiba’s approach of incorporating them into a proof framework is inherently
inconsistent with the nature of axioms. This suggests that the Sarvāstivāda argument for
‘the existence in the three times’ may carry the risk of an incomplete induction from the
particular to the general.
Furthermore, Tobita (2013, pp. 54-55) claims that the VK regards the observed
object as a substratum (dharmin), serving as the subject of statements, thereby affirming
their existence. Although Tobita emphasizes the significance of observation, the method
of inferring existence through predicate relationships fundamentally aligns with an
Aristotelian form of realism.26
I argue that the relationship between existence (object) and cognition in the VK
is not one of causality but of equivalence. That is, cognition or phenomena are not means
to infer existence; rather, existence should be understood as cognition itself.
Consequently, the VK does not demonstrate existence through phenomena but
emphasizes that phenomena are existence.27 Similarly, in the definition of ‘existence’ as
‘generating cognition as an object’ in the Ny, the Sarvāstivāda also defines ‘cognition’ as

26
Cf. Bronstein (2019, pp. 87-88) notes that Aristotle’s theory of substance aligns with its logical relationship in
sentences, distinguishing substances from non-substances through the differentiation between subject and predicate
in predicative relationships. In this relationship, the subject should support other categories, so the substance here
is the substrata (hupokeimenon, meaning ‘substratum’ or ‘underlying thing’). Etymologically, the most
fundamental meaning of the concept of substance is as a bearing substratum.
27
Subsequent Sarvāstivādin scholars have continued this line of thought. For example, as previously mentioned, Ny
uses ‘conscious arising’ to define ‘existence,’ and similarly in the MVŚ: ‘自體即相，相即自體，以一切法不可
離體別說其相 (Zi ti ji xiang, xiangji zi ti, yi yiqie fa buke li ti bie shuo qi xiang)。 (T27, p. 777a24-25) Own form
(*svarūpa) is [own] characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa); the [own] characteristic is own form, as all dharmas cannot be
separated from their own form to speak of their [own] characteristics.’ ‘自體、自相即彼自性；如說諸法自性即
是諸法自相 (Zi ti, zi xiang ji bi zi xing; ru shuo zhu fa zi xing ji shi zhu fa zi xiang)。 (T27, p. 179b4-5) Their own
form (*svarūpa) and own characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa) are their own nature (*svabhāva). It is said that the own-
beings of all dharmas are the particular characteristics of all dharmas.’

11
existence. I argue that this is not an expression of inferring an underlying ‘existence’ from
the phenomenon of cognition but rather an identification of the phenomenon itself as
existence.28
Previous research has generally recognized the importance of cognitive activity
in the Sarvāstivāda’s ontological doctrine, with scholars like Cox (2004, p.574-578)
referring to it as an epistemological ontology. According to Huang’s (2003, p.357-358)
analysis, the Sarvāstivāda school equates the concepts of cognition and existence, which
is often seen as a mistake made by realists who overlook the significant gap between
cognition and existence. However, Huang’s assertion of ‘equating’ refers to the
inferential process of moving from phenomena to substance, and these two concepts do
not hold precisely the same meaning. In his argument, existence does not refer to
cognition itself but rather to the Aristotelian substratum.
However, I believe that the Sarvāstivāda school’s stance of ‘equating’ holds a
more profound significance that transcends Huang’s critique. The terms ‘own
characteristic’ and ‘own-being’ (svabhāva) are synonymous, 29 implying that specific
dharma or real existence is not substance independent of cognitive activity in the realistic
sense but rather phenomena. The Sarvāstivāda school prefers to describe phenomena
using the terminology of realism. This means that if we define the term ‘existence’ to
mean phenomena, it implies that ‘if X can be observed, then it can be said to exist.’
However, the use of ‘existence’ in this context is entirely different from its use in a realist
context.
I believe that unlike the Yogācāra (Takahashi, 2024, pp.28-36) or Mādhyamaka
schools (Ye, 2019), which oppose representations through negativism or even nihilism,
the Sarvāstivāda school addresses realism by directly redefining the concept of ‘existence.’
However, based on the available materials, this does not imply that the Sarvāstivāda
school actively opposes realism (substratum behind phenomena).30 Instead, on this issue,
the Sarvāstivāda inherits the unanswerable (avyākṛta) approach of early Buddhism,
maintaining silence about the substratum behind phenomena while considering ‘existence’
to be identical to the phenomena (dharma) themselves. For schools that are more opposed

28
The interpretation of dharma is often understood as ‘that which has the capacity to uphold X.’ However, the part
corresponding to ‘upholding’ (dhāraṇa) is derived from the same root √dhṛ, which in Sanskrit encompasses
meanings such as holding, bearing, maintaining, and retaining in remembrance (Monier-Williams 1899, p. 515).
However, dharmin can describe as a bearer behind characteristic mark attributes (Monier-Williams, 1899, p. 512).
29
Pañcavastukavibhāṣa (Wushi Piposha Lun 五事毘婆沙論, T1555, Chinese trans. Xuanzang): ‘故毘婆沙作如是説：
自性、我、物、相、本性等，名言雖殊而義無別 (Gu piposha zuo rushi shuo: Zixing, wo, wu, xiang, benxing
deng, mingyan sui shu er yi wubie)。(T28, p.990b13-15) Thus, the *Vaibhāṣika said that own nature (svabhāva),
self (*ātman), things (*vastu), characteristics (*lakṣana), and fundamental nature (*prakṛti), although termed
differently in conventional name, have no distinction in meaning.’
30
The Sarvāstivāda school emphasizes that ‘consciousness arises necessarily have an object’ and opposes considering
nonexistence as an object (Cox, 1988, pp. 55-59). This appears to be a realist approach, presupposing the objective
existence of what is known. However, I argue that consciousness (vijñāna) and object (viṣaya) have a strong
correlation and always exist together. Cf. Ny: ‘若眼色識不俱生者，則應眼色非眼識緣 (Ruo yan se shi bu ju
sheng zhe, ze ying yanse fei yanshi yuan)。(T29, p. 420c26-28) If the eye, matter, and consciousness do not arise
together, then the eye and matter are not conditions for the eye-consciousness.’ In MVŚ, when explaining the fetter
(*saṃyojana), uses the relationship between the eye and matter in the sūtras as an analogy of black and white oxen,
stating: ‘眼不結色，色不結眼，此中欲貪説名能結 (Yan bu jie se, se bu jie yan, ci zhong yutan shuo ming
nengjie)。(T27, p.237c) The eye does not fetter the form, and the form does not fetter the eye; here, it is desire and
greed that are said to fetter.’ Therefore, the phrase ‘consciousness arises necessarily have an object’ does not imply
an essential bond, but rather indicates a frequent association. This is merely an observed fact of different phenomena
(dharmas), and from the perspective of traditional realism, these are not substances as matter or mind. Although
the Sarvāstivāda school also uses the term ‘substance’ (dravya), its definition of ‘substance’ is entirely different
from that of realism. The school is indifferent to whether there is a substratum supporting this existence or other
objects independent of cognition. This indifference does not imply either acceptance or denial.

12
to realism, this silence might be construed as tacit acceptance that existence is the
substratum behind phenomena.
Therefore, the generalization process is not an induction from specific to general
but rather an explanation of the axiom based on specific examples that is, the three
unwholesome roots are specific cases, and the existence of the past and future is a general
axiom. Through this quotation, we can see that the Sarvāstivāda school emphasizes that
the basis for existence is merely that it can be cognized as an object of cognition, i.e., if
one can observe the past, then one should say that the past exists, and it is incorrect to say
that the past does not exist when it can be observed; if one speaks of observing the future,
then one should say that the future exists, and it is not right to say that the future does not
exist; if one can observe the future and still say that the future does not exist, that is also
incorrect.
Under this logic, even if the cognition of the past, future, or even intentions
characterized by devotion to meditative concentration is unclear or not true, it cannot be
defined as nonexistent. The Sarvāstivāda school has never emphasized the clarity of an
object as a criterion for existence. For them, even if a hallucination occurs in a state of
delirium, it is entirely imaginary while still existent. We can only say that this illusion is
not real, but we cannot say that it does not exist. The same goes for past and future
dharmas. Even though we cannot have as clear cognition of them as we do of present
dharmas, since they can serve as objects of cognition, they are considered truly existent.

4. The Significance of Observation in the Path of Practice in the Vijñānakāya

In the VK, the unwholesome root of greed is considered to exist because it can be
observed. Therefore, why is observation necessary? This is because the observation here
is directly related to liberation and nirvāṇa. In the VK, after discussing the observation
of the past, present, and future, Devaśarman continues:

VK: 若言不觀過去、未來、現在，則無能於貪不善根已觀、今觀、當觀。
是不善若無能觀，則無能已厭、今厭、當厭。若無能厭，則無能已離染、
今離染、當離染。若無能離染，則無能已解脫、今解脫、當解脫。若無能
解脫，則無能已般涅槃、今般涅槃、當般涅槃。如不善，如是結，縛、隨
眠、隨煩惱、纏，所棄、所捨、所斷遍知亦爾。31 (T26, p. 531b11-17)
If [one] does not observe the past, future, and present, there will be no ability to
have not observed, does not observe, and will observe the unwholesome root of
greed [in the past, present, and future]. If the unwholesome cannot be observed,
there will be no ability to have developed aversion, develop aversion, will develop
aversion [in the past, present, or future]. If one cannot develop aversion, there is
no ability to have been, be, and will be free from defilements [in the past, present,
or future]. If one cannot be free from defilements, there is no ability to have
achieved, achieve, and will achieve liberation [in the past, present, or future].
If one cannot achieve liberation, there will be no ability to have been, be, will be
finally extinguished (boniepan 般涅槃 *parinirvāṇa) [in the past, present, or

31
Pinyin of citation: Ruo yan bu guan guoqu, weilai, xianzai, ze wuneng yu tan bushanggen yi guan, jin guan, dang
guan. Shi bushan ruo wuneng guan, ze wuneng yi yan, jin yan, dang yan. Ruo wuneng yan, ze wuneng yi li ran, jin
li ran, dang li ran. Ruo wuneng li ran, ze wuneng yi jietuo, jin jietuo, dang jietuo. Ruo wuneng jietuo, ze wuneng
yi ban niepan, jinban niepan, dang ban niepan. Ru bu shan, rushi jie, fu, sui mian, sui fannao, chan, suo qi, suo
she, suo duan bian zhi yi er.

13
 future]. For the unwholesome, it is the same for fetter (jie 結 *saṃyojana),
bondage (fu 縛 *bandhana), underlying tendency (suimian 隨眠 *anuśaya),
subsidiary affliction (suifannao 隨 煩 惱 *upakleśa), envelopment (chan 纏
*paryavasthāna) which is to be abandoned, to be relinquished, and complete
knowledge qua abandonment (duanbianzhi 斷遍知 *prahāṇa-parijñā).

According to the view of the author of VK, if one does not observe the
unwholesome root of greed in the past, future, and present, then one cannot develop
revulsion, dispassion, and liberation toward this unwholesome root, and therefore, cannot
attain the ultimate goal of liberation and nirvāṇa. As such, it is evident that in the VK,
the purpose of observation is not simply to acquire the right knowledge, but more
importantly, to foster liberation. Moreover, he further points out that it is only through
observation that one can possibly achieve final extinguishment.
This statement fully reflects the early tendency of the Sarvāstivāda school to
inherit the original Buddhism with a practice-oriented approach, which is different from
the later Sarvāstivāda’s focus on cognition in a distracted (sanluan 散亂 vikṣepa) state.32
However, this does not imply that the later Sarvāstivāda school altered the teachings of
the earlier Sarvāstivāda. The Sarvāstivāda did not regard experiences in meditation as
mystical or unique; rather, the fundamental rules of cognition remained consistent
regardless of whether one was distracted or in meditation. The early Sarvāstivāda school
simply preferred to explain these rules using terminology related to meditation, while the
later Sarvāstivāda also addressed cognition in the context of distracted states.33
The VK provides almost exclusively examples related to meditation, and an
important piece of collateral evidence is that not only are the ‘existent’ objects of
‘observation’ closely related to the practice activities but also the arguments for even
those ‘things’ considered as ‘designed existence’ are closely related to the practice
activities. Such as the discussion in the chapter *pudgala-skandha (butejialuo yun 補特
伽羅蘊). In this part, he refers to himself as the proponent of emptiness and his debate
opponent as the proponent of pudgala (*pudgalavāda). Among them, the proponent of
pudgala includes the following:

VK: 諦義勝義補特伽羅，可得、可證、現有、等有，是故定有補特伽羅。
34
(T26, p. 537b2-3)
The true object (diyi 諦 義 *satya-artha) [or] primary object (shengyi 勝 義
*parama-artha) [that is] *pudgala is obtainable (kede 可得 *upalabhamāna),
attainable (keti 可證 *adhigamanīya), existent (xianyou 現有 *vidyamāna), and
absolutely existent (dengyou 等 有 *saṃvidyamāna). 35 Therefore, *pudgala
definitely exists.

32
Here, the distracted state refers only to not being in a state of meditation.
33
As Weishan (2005, pp. 197-199) points out, the Sarvāstivāda school holds that both distracted states and states of
Samādhi share a common entity and belong to the same category of mental factors.
34
Pinyin of citation: Di yi shengyi bute jialuo, ke de, ke zheng, xianyou, deng you, shi gu ding you bute jialuo.
35
This method of reconstruction refers to Tobita (2021, p. 103). In fact, vidyamāna and saṃvidyamāna do not differ
significantly in meaning; the Sanskrit original of the VK might have simply used two synonyms for ‘existence’ to
express the existence of the pudgala. Xuanzang translated sam- as deng (absolutely 等) to indicate a distinction.
Dhammajoti (2015, p. 103) reconstructs xianyou (existent 現有) as saṃvidyate/vidyamāna/dṛśyate and dengyou
(absolutely existent 等有) as saṃdṛśyate. The former emphasizes existence, while the latter emphasizes observation.
I believe this reconstruction method differs etymologically from Xuanzang’s strategy, who translated both terms

14
 In other words, the proponent of pudgala believes that pudgala as the true object
or primary object36 can be attainable and obtainable, can currently exist, and exists in
other modes. Therefore, the pudgala must exist.
In response, Devaśarman believes that the pudgala is not obtainable or attainable,
cannot exist, and does not absolutely exist (Dhammjoti, 2015, 102-104). Therefore, the
pudgala must be impossible to ‘exist.’ In response, the proponent of pudgala refutes:

VK: 具壽！慈何所緣？37 (T26, p. 543c8)

The proponent of pudgala asks: Long-lived (jushou 具壽 *āyusmat)! What is the
object of your loving-kindness (ci 慈 *maitrī)?

Here, loving-kindness refers to the first of the four immeasurable minds

(siwuliang xin 四無量心 caturapramāṇāḥ). The proponent of pudgala believes that since
loving-kindness is meant to give rise to the intention of bringing happiness to all sentient
beings, if there is no pudgala, then this loving-kindness would have no object. To this,
Devaśarman refutes:

VK: 諸法性有、等有，由想、等想假說有情，於此義中，慈緣執受諸蘊相
續。38 (T26, p. 543c9-10)
The own being (*svabhāva) of all dharmas exists (*vidyamāna) and absolutely
exists (*saṃvidyamāna). Sentient beings are conceptually designated (*prajñapti)
based on notions (*saṃjñā) and denominations (*samajñā). In these objects
(*artha), loving-kindness is conditioned by grasping and accepting the aggregates’
continuity.

Therefore, in the VK, as particular existences, dharmas are different from sentient
beings that are constituted by the particular dharma that exists. This is because sentient
beings are formed through the function of conceptualization of mental factors (xiang
xinsuo 想心所 saṃjñā caitasika). Consequently, the object of loving-kindness is the five
aggregates, mattered by the conceptualization of sentient beings. Thus, in the
contemplation of loving-kindness, the basis of consciousness is still rooted in the five
aggregates (pañca-skandha) which consist of matter, feeling, thought, volition, and
consciousness, and through the function of the mental factor ‘conceptualization,’ the
pudgala is ultimately mattered.
Therefore, the discussions in the VK all focus on meditation and contemplation,
and only through observation can one achieve liberation and attain nirvāṇa. Similar
expressions also frequently appear in the related sūtra texts.

as you (existent 有). The prefix sam- conveys the meaning of ‘fully’ and ‘absolutely,’ hence I have translated
saṃvidyamāna as ‘absolutely existent.’
36
Firstly, here artha in the context of being observed refers to ‘object.’ A similar usage can be found in Dhammajoti
(2007, p.41). I argue that the terms satyārtha and paramārtha in this context differ from the interpretation of these
terms as the highest truth in certain Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. Here, they refer to individual dharmas, similar to
how Aristotle regards individual persons and individual horses as primary substances (Lloyd, 1970; Regis, 1976).
Although the definitions of ‘substance’ (dravya or ousia) differ between Sarvāstivāda and Aristotelian philosophy,
both traditions maintain the individuation of ‘substance.’ Similarly, the Sarvāstivāda views individual dharmas as
Paramārtha-satya (Isshiki, 2020, 28-42). However, in the Pudgalavāda school, paramārtha also includes the
Pudgala.
37
Pinyin of citation: Ju shou! Ci he suo yuan?
38
Pinyin of citation: Zhu fa xing you, deng you, you xiang, dengxiang jiashuo youqing, yuci yi zhong, ci yuan zhishou
zhuyun xiangxu.

15
5. True Right Observation in the Saṃyukta Āgama
The description of the relationship between observation and liberation in the VK is very
similar to that in the SĀ. As quoted earlier from the VK (T26, p. 531b11-17). To capture
the argument, we can find the following structure: If one does not observe, then one
cannot develop or achieve liberation, and thus it is impossible to attain liberation and
nirvāṇa. According to the descriptions of the sūtra texts, the closest statement to this
should be the first sūtra of the SĀ:

SĀ: 爾時，世尊告諸比丘：當觀色無常。如是觀者，則為正觀。正觀者，
則生厭離；厭離者，喜貪盡；喜貪盡者，說心解脫。如是觀受、想、行、
識無常。如是觀者，則為正觀。正觀者，則生厭離；厭離者，喜貪盡；喜
貪盡者，說心解脫。如是，比丘！心解脫者，若欲自證，則能自證：我生
已盡，梵行已立，所作已作，自知不受後有。如觀無常，苦、空、非我亦
復如是。39 (T02, p. 1a7-15)
One should observe that matter is impermanent. Such an observation is the right
observation (zhengguan 正觀). With the right observation, one develops aversion
and renunciation; with aversion and renunciation, rapture (xi 喜 *nadī) and greed
cease; with the cessation of rapture and greed, the mind is liberated. Similarly,
observe that feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness are impermanent.
Such an observation is the right observation. With the right observation, one
develops disgust and renunciation; with aversion and renunciation, rapture, and
greed cease; with the cessation of rapture and greed, the mind is liberated. Thus,
monks! Those whose minds are liberated, if they wish to verify for themselves,
can verify: my birth is ended, the holy life fulfilled, and the task done. There is
nothing further for this world. Observing impermanence, suffering, emptiness,
and non-self is also the same.

From the text, we can find the following structure: if one observes, then one can
develop mental liberation, leading to liberation and nirvāṇa. Here, the sūtra text
emphasizes observing the five aggregates as impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self,
because such observation is the right observation. Here, the terminology in the SĀ and
the VK is not entirely the same. The SĀ uses ‘right observation,’ while the VK simply
uses ‘observation.’ The SĀ explains that ‘right’ means it can achieve liberation and attain
nirvāṇa, a point that the VK also emphasizes. Therefore, the ‘right observation’ in the SĀ
and the ‘observation’ in the VK do not differ substantively. Following that, continuing
from the previous paragraph on observation, the sūtra 2 continues to describe:

SĀ: 於色當正思惟，觀色無常如實知。所以者何？比丘！於色正思惟，觀
色無常如實知者，於色欲貪斷；欲貪斷者，說心解脫。如是受、想、行、
識當正思惟，觀識無常如實知。所以者何？於識正思惟，觀識無常者，則
於識欲貪斷；欲貪斷者，說心解脫。40 (T02, p. 1a17-23)

39
Pinyin of citation: Er shi, shizun gao zhubiqiu: Dang guan se wuchang. Rushi guan zhe, ze wei zheng guan. Zheng
guan zhe, ze sheng yanli; yanli zhe, xi tan jin; xi tan jin zhe, shuo xin jietuo. Rushi guan shou, xiang, xing, shi
wuchang. Rushi guan zhe, ze wei zheng guan. Zheng guan zhe, ze sheng yanli; yanli zhe, xi tan jin; xi tan jin zhe,
shuo xinjietuo. Rushi, biqiu! Xinjietuo zhe, ruo yu zizheng, ze neng zizheng: Wo sheng yijin, fanxing yi li, suozuo yi
zuo, zi zhi bushou houyou. Ru guan wuchang, ku, kong, fei wo yi fu rushi.
40
Pinyin of citation: Yu se dang zhengsiwei, guan se wuchang rushi zhi. Suoyi zhe he? Biqiu! Yu se zhengsiwei, guan
se wuchang rushi zhi zhe, yu se yutan duan; yutan duan zhe, shuo xinjietuo. Rushi shou, xiang, xing, shi dang

16
 One applies appropriate attention (zheng siwei 正思惟41, yoniśomanasikāra, alt.
yoniśomanaskāra) to the matter, that is impermanent [and] observes matter
impermanent truly knows its impermanence through observation. Why? Monks!
When one appropriately attends to the matter and truly knows its impermanence,
apply appropriate attention to form and truly know its impermanence, sever their
desire and greed for the matter; when desire and greed are severed, the mind is
liberated. In the same way, one should apply appropriate attention to feeling,
perception, volition, and consciousness are impermanent and truly know them.
Why? When one observes consciousness is impermanent, then desire and greed
for consciousness are severed; when desire and greed are severed, the mind is
liberated.

The text teaches that the knowledge obtained through the appropriate attention of
the five aggregates impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, is true knowledge
because this ‘true knowledge’ is related to liberation and nirvāṇa.
The SĀ further elaborates the concept of observation here as appropriate attention
and ‘truly’ (rushi 如實). Sūtra 2 emphasizes ‘truly observe’ (rushi guan 如實觀), while
the sūtra 9 describes it as ‘true right observation’ (zhenshi zhenggua 真實正觀) true right
observation. From this, the meanings of true and right observations correspond in the
sūtra. That is, observing the five aggregates as impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-
self. It is the only way to truly understand that the five aggregates are impermanent,
suffering, and non-self. This understanding is identical to the understanding of
observation in the VK. The term zheng siwei (appropriate attention) in the SĀ is translated
from yoniśomanasikāra (alt. yoniśomanaskāra).42 The parallel text of the sūtra 2 is in the
SN (Anālayo, 2012, p.8-9):

SN 22.52: Rūpe bhikkhave yoniso manasikarotha, rūpāniccatañca yathābhūtaṃ

samanupassatha, rūpe bhikkhave bhikkhu yoniso manasikaronto rūpāniccatañca
yathābhūtaṃ samanupassanto rūpesu nibbindati.
Monks, you should attend to matter with appropriate attention (yoniso
manasikarotha) and truly (yathābhūta) observe the impermanence of matter.
Monks, when you attend to matter with wise reflection and truly observe the
impermanence of matter, you will develop dispassion toward the matter.

zhengsiwei, guan shi wuchang rushi zhi. Suoyi zhe he? Yu shi zhengsiwei, guan shi wuchang zhe, ze yu shi yutan
duan; yutan duan zhe, shuo xinjietuo.
41
Although the term zheng siwei (appropriate attention 正思惟) here shares the same translation as the zheng siwei
(right thought, samyaksaṃkalpa) in the noble eight-fold path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga), they are not derived from the
same concept. The term zheng siwei (right thought) in the noble eight-fold path is translated from samyaksaṃkalpa,
which is commonly translated into English as right thought; however, the zheng siwei (appropriate attention) in the
SĀ is translated from yoniśomanasikāra (alt. yoniśomanaskāra) (Anālayo, 2012, p.7; Wang and Jin 2014, p.5).
42
According to Nakamura (1981, p.1066), the concept of appropriate attention (yoniśomanasikāra) encompasses three
meanings in Buddhism. The first is rational thinking based on principle, which involves understanding and forming
intentions after hearing the true dharma. The second is having proper rational or virtuous motives. The third entails
examining and clarifying the meanings of teachings that emanate from the realm of truth through cognitive methods,
following their reception. This represents the mental process of experiencing truth. Buswell & Lopez (2014, p.1039)
note that yoniśomanasikāra refers to attentively and thoroughly directing one’s focus towards an object or
phenomenon, avoiding entrapment by its superficial features and secondary characteristics. Employed within
meditative practices, this term denotes deep reflection, whereby one traces an object or phenomenon to its cause or
origin, thereby understanding its conditional arising and cessation. Ultimately, yoniśomanasikāra focuses on the
four noble truths, recognizing the fundamental nature of all compounded things as impermanent, suffering, and
non-self.

17
 Hence, the concept of zhengsiwei in the SĀ corresponds to yoniso manasikarotha
in the Pāli parallel text, and its Sanskrit counterpart is yoniśomanasikarāra. This concept
has a more well-known translation in Chinese as ruli zuoyi (如理作意 appropriate
attention). The term ‘truly’ (rishi 如實) is yathābhūta, which has the same meaning in
both Pāli and Sanskrit. By comparing the recently discovered Sanskrit version of SĀ and
the translation by Guṇabhadra, it is evident that yathābhūta is translated as ‘truly’ (rushi
如實) (Monier-Williams, 1889, p.842), such as:

SĀ (Turpan Manuscript): tathā hi śrutavatāryaśrāvakeṇa prat(ī)tyasamutpādaś

ca pratītyasamutpannāś ca dharmā yathābhūtaṃ samyakprajñayā sudṛṣṭāh
sujuṣṭāh suviditāḥ supratividdhāḥ. (Tripāṭhī, 1962, p.63)
SĀ: 是名多聞聖弟子於因緣法、緣生法如實正知，善見、善覺、善修、善
入。43 (T02, p. 84c7-9)
[Translation from Turpan Manuscript] For it is thus: by the noble disciple who
has heard [the teachings], both dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and the
dependently arisen (pratītyasamutpanna) dharmas are well seen, well attended to,
well understood, and well penetrated with right wisdom (samyakprajñā), as they
truly (yathābhūta) are.

Therefore, the Sanskrit concept corresponding to ‘truly’ in the Chinese translation

of the SĀ is indeed yathābhūta, which can be understood ‘as it truly is.’ The
Dharmaskandha (T1537, Fayunzu Lun 法 蘊 足 論 as one of the scriptures of the
Sarvāstivāda school within the Abhidharma Piṭaka, Chinese trans. Xuanzang) interprets
the appropriate attention as follows:

云何名為如理作意？謂從善士聞正法已，內自慶慰，歡喜踊躍：奇哉世尊！
能說如是深妙正法。佛所說苦實為真苦，佛所說集實為真集，佛所說滅實
為真滅，佛所說道實為真道。44 (T26, p. 459c8-12)
What is meant by appropriate attention? It refers to hearing the correct Dharma
from a good person, rejoicing inwardly, and feeling delighted and elated: How
wonderful, World-Honored One! You can teach such profound and subtle right
Dharma. The suffering spoken by the Buddha is truly suffering, the origin spoken
by the Buddha is truly origin, the cessation spoken by the Buddha is truly
cessation, and the path spoken by the Buddha is truly the path.

The Dharmaskandha describes attending to things in accordance with reality as

pointing toward four noble truths, which is similar to the SĀ’s approach of directing right
observation and right contemplation toward suffering, emptiness, impermanence, and
non-self.

6. Relationship between ‘Truly Observe’ in Saṃyukta Āgama and ‘All-Existing’ of

Sarvāstivāda School

43
Pinyin of citation: Shi ming duowen shengdizhi yu yinyuan fa, yuansheng fa rushi zhengzhi, shan jian, shan jue, shan
xiu, shan ru.
44
Pinyin of citation: Yun he ming wei rulizuoyi? Wei cong shanshi wen zhengfa yi, nei zi qingwei, huanxi yongyue:
Qizai shizun! Neng shuo rushi shenmiao zhengfa. Fo suoshuo ku shiwei zhenku, fo suoshuo ji shiwei zhenji, fo
suoshuo mie shiwei zhenmie, fu suo shuodao shiwei zhendao.

18
The term ‘truly’ in the SĀ does not only pertain to the commonalities shared by all
conditioned dharmas, such as impermanence, suffering, and not-self, but also
encompasses the true knowledge and true observation of specific dharmas. For example:

SĀ: 若沙門、婆羅門於色如實知、如實見，於色生厭、離欲，不起諸漏，
心得解脫。45 (T02, p. 9c27-29)
If a monk or Brahmin truly knows and truly sees matter, [he] arises aversion and
renunciation from the desire for matter, does not give rise to various outflows, and
their mind attains liberation.

Therefore, the term ‘truly’ is used in two contexts in the above text: first, in
relation to the true knowledge of dharmas themselves, and second, in relation to the true
knowledge of commonalities such as impermanence, suffering and others of dharmas. In
the Sarvāstivāda system, this is referred to as own characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and
common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). 46 These two characteristics encompass all
objects of cognition (Dhammajoti, 2015, p.83).
The Sarvāstivāda school categorizes the ‘own characteristics’ and ‘common
characteristics’ of these dharmas within the framework of the four noble truths. 47 The
four noble truths encompass both individual dharmas and their common characteristics.
For instance, the Truth of Suffering (duḥkhasatya) includes the own characteristics of
conditioned dharma that are outflowed (sāsrava), as well as the common characteristics
of impermanence (anitya), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya), and non-self
(anātman). This explains the teaching in the SĀ that observing the five aggregates reveals
their impermanence, suffering, and non-self.
Among these, the cognition of the own characteristic typically refers to the
cognition of individual dharmas. In the MVŚ, the ability to cognize the own characteristic
and the common characteristic is attributed to the mind and mental factors, with intellect
(prajñā) being representative. 48 This ability is encapsulated as the discrimination of
dharmas (dharma-pravicaya) (Isshiki, 2017, pp. 2-3).

45
Pinyin of citation: Ruo shamen, poluomen yu se rushi zhi, rushi jian, yu se shengyan, liyu, bu qi zhulou, xinde jietuo.
46
In a narrow sense, the common characteristics refer to the observation of sixteen common characteristics of dharmas
in the system of the Sarvāstivāda school, which correlates these with the four noble truths, positing that each truth
possesses four common characteristics, making a total of sixteen. Cf. MVŚ: ‘自相者，谓此是眼界自相乃至此是
意识界自相；共相者，谓十六行相所观十八界十六种共相 (Zixiang zhe, wei ci shi yanjie zixiang naizhi ci shi
yishijie zixiang; gongxiang zhe, wei shiliu xingxiang suo guan shiba jie shiliu zhong gongxiang)。(T27, p. 34b3-
5) own characteristics refer to [those own characteristics to each realm], from the realm of the eye to the realm of
consciousness. [On the other hand,] common characteristics pertain to the sixteen types of common characteristics
observed across the eighteen realms, as examined through the sixteen aspects (*ākāra).’ In this context, the
‘eighteen realms’ are representative of all dharmas. The ‘aspect’ serves as the observing subject, associated with
the intellect (*prajñā) of mental factors (Dhammajoti, 2010, pp.254-257; Kellner, 2014, pp.284-288), while the
common characteristics of dharmas constitute the object of observation. Furthermore, although the sixteen aspects
of the four noble truths and the sixteen common characteristics of the four noble truths both refer to impermanence
(anitya), suffering (duḥkha), emptiness (śūnya), and non-self (anātman), the former pertains to the discerning mind
(prajñā) of the observer, while the latter pertains to the objects of observation.
47
Cf. Ny: ‘謂除聖道，餘有為法為果性邊皆名苦諦，為因性邊皆名集諦……擇滅無為名為滅諦。有學、無學
法皆名道諦 (Wei chu shengdao, yu youweifa wei guoxing bian jie ming kudi, wei yinxing bian jie ming jidi…ze
miewuwei ming wei miedi. Youxue, wuxue fa jie ming daodi)。(T29, p. 658a10-14) This refers to the fact that apart
from the noble path (*marga), all other conditioned dharmas that function as results are designated as the truth of
suffering (*duḥkha), and those that function as causes are designated as the truth of origination (*samudaya)…
Cessation through discrimination (*pratisaṃkhyānirodha), being unconditioned, is termed the truth of cessation
(*nirodha). Both learned and unlearned practices are identified as the truth of the path (*marga).’
48
Cf. MVŚ: ‘問:分別諸法自相、共相，餘心心所亦有此能，何故說此是慧非餘？答：慧最勝故，作如是說
(Wen: Fenbie zhufa zixiang, gongxiang, yu xin xinsuo yi you cineng, hegu shuo ci shi hui fei yu? Da: Hui zuisheng

19
 This implies that truly knowing the dharmas themselves is predicated upon
recognizing common characteristics such as impermanence, suffering, and emptiness.
The Sarvāstivāda school adopted this line of thought, as pointed out in the MVŚ:

MVŚ: 善説法者，唯説實有法我，法性實有, 如實見故，不名惡見。49 (T27,

p. 41a19-20)
An adept expounder of the dharma speaks only of the real existence of a self-
dharma (*ātman) and the real existence of the truth of dharma (*dharmatā)
because they are seen as they truly (*yathābhūta) are, and hence this is not
considered a wrong view.

Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda’s concept of ‘substance’ is considered ‘substance’ not

because it is an objective reality upon which cognition depends but because it can be truly
(yathābhūta)50 known and seen.
The Sarvāstivāda attributes truthfulness and existence to representation (that is
own characteristic), and this truthfulness is derived from the capacity of representations
to be independently and distinctly identified as objects of observation. The ultimate truth
of the four noble truths is related to individual dharmas, and its recognition is only
completed through the observation of common characteristics. The truthfulness and
existence of representations can serve as the starting point for path practice because, as
stated in the sūtras, one must first51 know the dharmas as they truly are and then develop
aversion and detachment toward them.52
Finally, The categories of ‘own characteristics’ and ‘common characteristics’ are
central in the Sarvāstivāda school’s classification,53 employed in the MVŚ definitions for
the term Abhidharma54 with their most significant meaning being to explain the ‘right

gu, zuo rushi shuo)。(T27, p. 217a8-11) Question: Besides intellect, other mind and mental factors also have the
ability to discriminate the specific characteristics and common characteristics of various dharmas. Why is it said
that this is intellect and not the others? Answer: Intellect (*prajñā) is the most superior, hence it is said so. That is
to say, the intellect is the most superior in discriminating (collecting and classifying) the specific characteristics
and common characteristics of various dharmas.’ Moreover, Anālayo (2014, pp. 55-69) thoroughly discusses the
relationship between wisdom (as cognitive ability, it is intellect) and individual dharmas based on the Āgamas and
early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma literature.
49
Pinyin of citation: Shan shuofa zhe, wei shuo shiyou fawo, faxing shiyou, rushijian gu, bu ming ejian.
50
According to Keown (2003, p.339), the term yathābhūta, referring to the actual nature of things, is used to denote
direct experience or the true nature of phenomena without the mediation of incorrect concepts such as a permanent,
inherent identity or self (ātman). Therefore, this term is employed in Mahāyāna Buddhism as a synonym for
concepts like emptiness (śūnyatā), truth (tattva), and suchness (tathatā). It is possible that the Sarvāstivāda school
used this strategy in their interpretation of the sūtras to define terms such as ‘substance’ (dravya).
51
Here, ‘first’ does not refer to temporal precedence but rather to logical precedence; that is, recognizing the own
characteristic of specific dharma is the foundation for understanding the common characteristics of dharmas.
52
In fact, for the Sarvāstivāda school, common characteristics cannot be known separately; must be accompanied by
own characteristics observation. Cf. MVŚ: ‘非如實智於諸自相，以自相觀名諦現觀，而如實智於諸自相，以
共相觀名諦現觀 (Fei rushi zhi yu zhu zixiang, yi zixiang guan ming dixianguan, er rushi zhi yu zhu zixiang, yi
gongxiang guan ming dixianguan)。(T27, p. 406a13-16) Using the wisdom that knows truly (rushi zhi 如實智
*yathābhūta-jñāna) to observe the four noble truths through own characteristics is not directly comprehending the
truths, but using the wisdom that knows truly in own characteristics to observe them through common
characteristics is called directly comprehending the truths.’
53
In a broader sense, common characteristics refer to similarities. the seventy-five dharmas such as matter, which is
characterized by the common characteristic of matter momentary arising and ceasing. Conditioned dharmas have
the common characteristics of impermanence and suffering as attributes of matter, while all dharmas, including
both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, have the common characteristics of emptiness and not-self. Thus,
based on the relationship between own characteristics and common characteristics, a sequence is formed from
momentary dharmas to all dharmas (cf. Dhammajoti, 2015, pp.22-24).
54
MVŚ: ‘分別諸法自相、共相是阿毘達磨 (Fenbie zhu fa zixiang, gongxiang shi apidamo)。(T27, p. 1c28-29) The
differentiation of the own characteristic and common characteristics of dharmas is Abhidharma.’ ‘阿毘達磨亦復

20
observation’ in the sūtras.55 Therefore, the sūtra that the Sarvāstivāda school truly relies
on should be the numerous sūtras that describe the right observation, represented by the
first sūtra of the SĀ. 56

7. Conclusion
The doctrine of ‘all-existing’ is the most fundamental view of the Sarvāstivāda school,
which refers to the real existence of conditioned dharma in the past, present, and future,
as well as the real existence of the three types of unconditioned dharma: space, cessation
through deliberation, and cessation not due to discrimination. This article first sorts out
the two scriptural proofs for the doctrine of ‘all-existing’ found in the familiar AKBh and
argues that these scriptural proofs are insufficient to support ‘all-existing’ doctrine as the
most fundamental theory of the Sarvāstivāda school.
By examining the VK, I discover that several scriptures, notably the first scripture
of the SĀ, which describes ‘true and right observation,’ should also be incorporated to a
full examination of scriptural proofs in the Sarvāstivāda school. On this premise, the first
scriptural proof in the AKBh is only the tip of the iceberg in this series of scriptural proofs.
In this example, the sūtra that the Sarvāstivāda truly relies on should be the
numerous sūtras that describe the right observation, represented by the first sūtra of the
SĀ. The significance of scriptural proof in relation to the Sarvāstivāda School lies in its
ability to demonstrate that ‘all-existing’ serves as the axiom for the school’s
argumentation on other views, serving as the starting point rather than a proposition
requiring logical illation.
It is precisely because of the importance of right observation that the SĀ passed
down by the Sarvāstivāda school arranges it at the beginning. This is because it
concentrates on the fundamental doctrines of the Sarvāstivāda school and serves as the
root of the Sarvāstivāda theoretical system. It is precisely because the doctrine of ‘all-
existing’ has such an important root in the sūtra that it can be said that all Abhidharma is
for explaining the meaning in the sūtra. It is precisely due to the axiomatic status of ‘all-
existing’ that the Sarvāstivāda school adopted it as their most important doctrine and
named their school after it.

如是，分別諸法自相、共相，令無我像分明顯現 (Apidamo yi fu rushi, fenbie zhufa zixiang, gongxiang, ling

wuwo xiang fenming xianxian)。(T27, p. 2b20-22) The Abhidharma functions similarly by distinguishing the own
characteristic and common characteristics of dharmas, thereby making the image of non-self (*anātman) clearly
manifest.’
55
Although the ‘existence of the three times’ in the VK is not equivalent to ‘all-existing,’ this approach cannot be
regarded as incomplete induction. This is because both the existence of conditioned dharmas and the existence of
unconditioned dharmas serve as the basis of existence in the same way, as both can be cognized. Refer to Isshiki
(2009, pp. 39-50) for further details. This basis is also consistent with the Ny definition of existence.
56
Although the content of sūtras across different schools may not significantly differ, their arrangement can vary
greatly. Lyu (1924) observed that the sequence of mātṛkās mentioned in the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī of Yogācārabhūmi-
śāstra corresponds with that found in Guṇabhadra’s translation of the SĀ (T99), suggesting that this order is a
consensus within the Sarvāstivāda school. In contrast, the Theravāda school’s SN begins with the Devatā-saṃyutta,
and the Oghataraṇa Sutta is the first sutta.

21
Acknowledgment

First and foremost, I would like to thank Indira Carr, the editor of Asian Philosophy, for
her patient and kind communication throughout the submission process, as well as the
anonymous reviewers for their professional feedback, which significantly contributed to
the revisions of this paper. I also thank Professor Xutong Qu (瞿旭彤) from Tsinghua
University for his valuable suggestions during my presentation in his seminar.
Additionally, I am grateful to my friends Tianren Jiang ( 蔣 天 任 ) from Waseda
University, Yuchen Li (李裕晨) from the University of California (Santa Barbara),
Changjie Yang (楊昌傑) from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Zhaoyuan Wei
(魏兆源) from Peking University for their feedback on the literature and arguments
presented in this paper. Lastly, I am thankful to the solitary genius Linsen Miao (苗林森)
for our discussions on Sarvāstivāda doctrines. Although not in academia, he is very
familiar with Sarvāstivāda literature and deeply understands its teachings.

Disclosure statemen

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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