India-U.S.

Relations

The end of the Cold War freed India-U.S. relations from the constraints of global bipo-larity, but
New Delhi-Washington relations continued for a decade to be affected by the
burden of history, most notably the longstand- ing India-Pakistan rivalry. Recent years,
however, have witnessed a sea change in bilateral relations, with more positive interac-
tions becoming the norm. India’s swift offer of full support for U.S.-led counterterrorism
operations after September 2001 was widely viewed as reflective of such change. Continuing
U.S. interest in South Asia focuses on tension and conflict between India and Pakistan

Relations between the world’s largest democracy, India, and the oldest, the United States, have
never been better. The preeminent sign of this improved state of relations is, of course, the recent
concord between the governments of both countries that proposes bilateral cooperation on a
variety of fronts, from space to agriculture, but especially in relation to civilian nuclear
cooperation. Bilateral agreements signed in July 2005 in Washington, D.C., and following
President Bush’s visit to India in March 2006,1 were hailed as historic, seemingly marking the
end of “estrangement,”

The Early Years

Early U.S. support, and civil society admiration, for India’s struggle for political independence
soon gave way to policies shaped by the exigencies of the Cold War. As a result, India’s relations
with the United States in the early postcolonial period were largely shaped within a multilateral
frame. Starting with the Korean crisis in 1950, and continuing into the Indochina conflict and
peace negotiations a few years later, a diplomatically hyperactive India promoted multilateral
efforts to help mediate these crises, often alienating U.S. policy makers in the process. From the
Indian point of view, its involvement in these regional crises was driven by both self-interest and
an effort to democratize international relations. Fearing that the United States would resort to the
use of nuclear weapons in both Korea and
Indochina if faced with military defeat, India justified its own involvement as necessary to help
avert that possibility. But also, as seen from the Indian viewpoint, these crises were in no small
part driven by the absence of Asian powers in the inner circles of world politics. Highly sensitive
to the racially exclusive politics of the period, and outraged by the efforts of European states to
continue colonial rule in Asia and Africa after World War II, India sought to get the United States
and other major powers to accept that Asian powers had the right to be involved in matters
concerning them directly. Over time, these principles would converge into a policy of
non-alignment, a foreign policy stance that
was read by Washington policy makers in the 1950s as an immoral policy of neutralism. From
the U.S. standpoint through the 1950s, a geopolitical perspective dominated U.S. strategy,
leading to a policy of “containment” of Communist influence through treaty arrangements with
countries bordering China and U.S.S.R. India would have been a vital link in that chain, as many
had hoped and encouraged, but nonalignment and effective diplomacy by Pakistan’s military
rulers prevented that from coming about. India’s efforts to maintain an independent foreign
policy, its postcolonial sensitivities about national sovereignty, and troubled regional relations
were set against asingle-minded U.S. focus on the Cold War struggle; the net effect made it very
difficult for bilateral relations to achieve a steady state.
In 1965, multilateral negotiations towards a non-proliferation treaty (NPT) began at the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. India had entered negotiations in the expectation
that the NPT would be a step towards general disarmament, a foreign policy objective it had long
been in favor of. Although the NPT’s Article VI contains a weak promise by states possessing
nuclear weapons (NWS) “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty
on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,” even at
the time of its coming into force, it was understood by the superpowers that this commitment
was only a sop to the non-nuclear world, more likely to be honoured in the breach. NPT
effectively froze the nuclear status quo while doing little to reduce the value of nuclear weapons
as prime instruments of policy and prestige. In May 1974, India detonated a plutonium device
under the Rajasthan desert, becoming the sixth country to test a nuclear explosive. The explosion
was termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE), not a bomb, echoing India’s reservations
during the NPT negotiations. United States reacted angrily and vehemently to the 1974 test. This
adverse reaction to India’s 1974 test was to shape relations between the two countries until the
end of the Cold War. Sanctions were imposed on the Indian nuclear program, India had been
tilting towards the Soviet Union for some time, formalized by the
signing of a 20-year “peace and friendship” agreement in 1971. Events taking place later that
decade would only strengthen that relationship. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan,
and while India was hardly in favor of a superpower practically on its borders, American reaction
to this invasion
would ensure that U.S.-India relations remained in cold storage. Pakistan, blessed by its location
once again, would become the beneficiary of billions of dollars of U.S. aid, as President Reagan
would begin a covert policy of supporting the Afghan freedom fighters or mujahideen. Massive
U.S. military and economic support for Pakistan could only be seen in negative terms in New
Delhi, though some efforts were made to improve regional relations once General Zia’s regime
had ended. By the end of the 1980s, these two factors, the 1974 test (by its legislative outcome),
and the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan (by its geopolitical outcome), ensured that relations between the U.S. and India
remained cool.

The End of the Cold War

Starting in the early 1990s, however, a new factor would enter bilateral calculations—
commerce. Indian economic planners adopted neo-liberal economic policies that have produced
a transformation in India’s economic performance. since the early 1990s, India has had high rates
of economic growth, and, if these trends continue, is in the process of becoming a major global
economic force. This development has affected U.S. perceptions at the policy-making and elite
levels considerably. rapid economic growth provided an entirely new and positive backdrop
against which India’s image was slowly changing for the better, and closer military-to-military
ties produced new U.S. supporters for improved relations with India, including the possibility of
arms sales to a large and growing market.
At various points during the decade, India and Pakistan came close to armed military conflict,
confounding the predictions of deterrence optimists who expected that the presence of nuclear
weapons on both sides would promote a more stable relationship. Fearing the outbreak of nuclear
war, the U.S. kept close watch on this region. In spite of constant US pressures for
non-proliferation, India finally declared itself a nuclear weapons state after the 1998 nuclear
tests. The US was furious and imposed economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan. After
this initial fury, however rounds of discussion took place between Jaswant Singh and President
Clinton’s designee, Strobe Talbott, on the condition of and possibilities for better relations
between the two countries.
While no practical breakthrough emerged as a result of these talks, their impact was felt in
important symbolic terms for both sides.

For India, the talks helped assuage Indian anxieties about their place in the world by signaling
that it was a worthy bilateral interlocutor for the sole superpower. For the United States, the talks
helped establish, in Washington, the “common sense” of the idea that India was an important
country that had for too long been left outside the U.S. orbit, and that its leaders were trustworthy
and could be relied upon. The talks helped set a baseline for interaction between the two states,
helped clarify some of the differences in the positions held by both states, and created
considerable goodwill which would become a resource for the future. That India’s gamble to test
nuclear weapons had paid off was confirmed when, in spite of his initial angry reaction,
President Clinton visited India in 2000, in a visit that was widely touted as being path-breaking
The first public hint of the Bush Administration’s thinking about India was flagged in an essay
by presidential advisor Condoleeza Rice in Foreign Affairs in January 2000.
China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region… [It] would like to alter
Asia’s balance of power in its own favor… China’s success in controlling the balance of power
depends in large part on America’s reaction to the challenge. The United States must deepen its
cooperation with Japan and South Korea and maintain its commitment to a robust military
presence in the region. It should pay close attention to India’s role in the regional balance. There
is a strong tendency conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of
Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states. But India is an element in China’s
calculation, and it should be in America’s too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the
potential to emerge as one… It is important to promote China’s internal transition through
economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions. Cooperation
should be pursued, but we should never be afraid to confront Beijing when our interests collide
Seen in that light, states bordering China, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and India, had a
special role to play in assisting China’s containment. India, in addition, was seen as a country
that had the potential to emerge as a great power. Its nuclear program and its unsettled
relationship with Pakistan were being marginalized in favor of its potential within a new
American containment plan. U.S. actions were quickly responded to by India. When the U.S.
announced its interest in abrogating the longstanding Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and developing
theater missile defense systems,
India was among the first (and few) countries to welcome the move.
These fast moving developments were brought to a sudden halt in September 2001, with the
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Suddenly Pakistan was back on center-stage,
and South
Asia had become a major front in a new war, this time on global terrorism. Although India was
tactically sidelined in relation to Pakistan once the war on terror began, it had the unintended
consequence of elevating the issue of terrorism to prominence at the highest levels of U.S.
decision-making. What was confirmed in U.S. eyes was the possibility of a terrorist attack
becoming a trigger for escalation to all out conflict. India’s position as a victim of radical Islamic
terror worked to reinforce its position as a natural ally of the U.S., a country faced with the same
problems if on a different geographic scale.
The first breakthrough in the relationship came in early 2004, the two governments announced
the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), a wide-ranging initiative focusing on Indian
access to once-restricted high technologies: space, nuclear energy, dual-use high technology
trade and missile defense. Its intent, according to the Indian government is to “expand
engagement,” “enhance cooperation,” and is a “step to create the appropriate environment”—a
series of cautious steps towards better relations, especially in strategic and defense industries.
Further in 2005, U.S. decided to sideline its non-proliferation concerns in favor of helping India
to meet its energy needs, and agreed to create a legal exception for India.
March 2006 agreement, committed the U.S. and India to making radical changes in their
relationship, foregrounding the once most contentious issue, civilian nuclear relations. In a few
short years, U.S.-India relations had been turned around, with nuclear energy no longer an issue
of dispute, but one of possibility. Non-proliferation concerns had been sidelined, replaced by
India as a strategic partner of the United States, producing a new geopolitical map of Asia. In
this scheme, putting constraints on India’s ability to acquire and project military power was no
longer in U.S. interests; hence, that fissile material could be diverted to India’s military program
was no longer a problem, indeed it was required if India was to fulfill this new role.
Making Sense of the Transformation
The early 1990s onward were marked by the convergence of two structural factors working in
favor of better relations. The first was the product of a changing geo-political strategy: due to
China’s emergence as a long term “strategic rival” to the United States, India’s growing military
muscle and regional dominance made it more attractive to the U.S. in its search for allies and
partners to balance
China. India, in this case, took the place of Pakistan as the regional partner in the familiar pattern
of U.S.-South Asia relations.
The second structural factor, which is still being played out, is entirely new in the history of
U.S.-India relations. There is now an independent reason for India to be taken seriously, namely,
the rate of India’s economic growth for the last fifteen years. Although India’s GNP is still
relatively small in absolute terms, India’s fast pace of growth, taking place in an institutional
setting which is less politically risky than China, makes it an important and attractive site for
U.S. overseas investment, and increases by many times the stakeholders interested in
maintaining closer ties between the two countries. India’s economic globalization, in other
words, is the new structural factor helping transform relations between the two countries. This
condition is what makes possible the further transformation of India-U.S. relations by bringing
the power of U.S. business lobbies into the debate on the side of better relations with India. For
the first time, the United States has an interest in better ties with India without the mediation of a
global struggle or a local crisis, as has always been the case in the past. Even without the China
factor, the possibility of major economic interests in India transforms the profile of the country
for the U.S.