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Language Acquisition and Conceptual Development
Melissa Bowerman Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Melissa Bowerman, Stephen C. Levinson
ISBN(s): 9780521593588, 0521593581
Edition: Kindle
File Details: PDF, 6.28 MB
Year: 2001
Language: english
Recent years have seen a revolution in our knowledge of how children
learn to think and speak. In this volume, leading scholars from these
rapidly evolving fields of research examine the relationship between child
language acquisition and cognitive development. At first sight recent
advances in the two areas seem to have moved in opposing directions: the
study of language acquisition has been especially concerned with diver-
sity, explaining how children learn languages of widely different types,
while the study of cognitive development has focused on uniformity, clari-
fying how children build on fundamental, presumably universal, concepts.
This book brings these two vital strands of investigation into close dia-
logue, suggesting a new synthesis in which the process of language acqui-
sition may interact with early cognitive development. It provides original
empirical contributions, based on a variety of languages, populations, and
ages, and theoretical discussions that cut across the disciplines of psychol-
ogy, linguistics, and anthropology.
melissa bowerman is Senior Scientist at the Max Planck Institute for

Psycholinguistics and Professor at the Free University of Amsterdam. Her
work focuses on first language acquisition in children. She is author of
Early syntactic development: a cross-linguistic study with special reference to
Finnish (1973), and many articles and chapters on language development.
st eph en l ev i n s o n is Director of the Max Planck Institute for

Psycholinguistics. He is editor of the Cambridge University Press series
Language, Culture and Cognition. His previous books include Pragmatics
(1983), Politeness (1987), and Presumptive meanings (2000), and he is co-
editor of Rethinking linguistic relativity (1996).
Language, culture and cognition 3
Language acquisition and conceptual development

Language, culture and cognition
Editor
ST E P H E N C. LE V I NS O N
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Nijmegen
This new series looks at the role of language in human cognition –

language in both its universal, psychological aspects and its variable,
cultural aspects. Studies will focus on the relation between semantic and
conceptual categories and processes, especially as these are illuminated
by cross-linguistic and cross-cultural studies, the study of language
acquisition and conceptual development, and the study of the relation
of speech production and comprehension to other kinds of behavior in
cultural context. Books come principally, though not exclusively, from
research associated with the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
in Nijmegen.
1. Jan Nuyts and Eric Pedersen (eds.) Language and conceptualization

2. David McNeill (ed.) Language and gesture
3. Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson (eds.) Language
acquisition and conceptual development
Language acquisition and
conceptual development
Edited by
Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson
Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo
Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521593588
© Cambridge University Press 2001
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 2001

Third printing 2003
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Language acquisition and conceptual development / edited by Melissa
Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson.
p. cm – (Language, culture and cognition: 3)
Includes index.
ISBN 0 521 59358 1 – ISBN 0 521 59659 9 (paperback)
1. Language acquisition. 2. Cognition in children. I. Bowerman,
Melissa. II. Levinson, Stephen C. III. Series.
P118.L2497 2000
401´.93 – dc21 99-42105 CIP
ISBN-13 978-0-521-59358-8 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-59358-1 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-59659-6 paperback

ISBN-10 0-521-59659-9 paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2006

Contents
Preface page xi
Introduction 1
Part 1 Foundational issues

21 The mosaic evolution of cognitive and linguistic ontogeny 19
jonas langer
22 Theories, language, and culture: Whorf without wincing 45
alison gopnik
23 Initial knowledge and conceptual change: space and number 70
elizabeth s. spelke and sanna t sivkin
Part 2 Constraints on word learning?

24 How domain-general processes may create domain-specific 101
biases
linda b. smith
25 Perceiving intentions and learning words in the second year 132
of life
michael tomasello
26 Roots of word learning 159
paul blo om
Part 3 Entities, individuation, and quantification

27 Whorf versus continuity theorists: bringing data to bear on 185
the debate
susan carey
vii
viii List of contents
28 Individuation, relativity, and early word learning 215

dedre gentner and lera borodit sky
29 Grammatical categories and the development of classification 257
preferences: a comparative approach
john a. lucy and suzanne gaskins
10 Person in the language of singletons, siblings, and twins 284
werner deut sch, angela wagner, renate burchardt,
nina schulz, and jörg nakath
11 Early representations for all, each, and their counterparts in 316
Mandarin Chinese and Portuguese
patricia j. bro oks, martin d. s. braine, gisela jia,
and maria da graca dias
12 Children’s weak interpretations of universally quantified 340
questions
kenneth f. drozd
Part 4 Relational concepts in form–function mapping

13 Emergent categories in first language acquisition 379
eve v. c lark
14 Form–function relations: how do children find out what they 406
are?
dan i. slobin
15 Cognitive–conceptual development and the acquisition of 450
grammatical morphemes: the development of time concepts and
verb tense
heike behrens
16 Shaping meanings for language: universal and language- 475
specific in the acquisition of spatial semantic categories
melissa bowerman and so onja choi
17 Learning to talk about motion up and d own in Tzeltal: is 512
there a language-specific bias for verb learning?
penelop e brown
18 Finding the richest path: language and cognition in the 544
acquisition of verticality in Tzotzil (Mayan)
lourdes de león
List of contents ix
19 Covariation between spatial language and cognition, and its 566

implications for language learning
stephen c. levinson
Author index 589

Subject index 597
Preface
This volume has grown out of a conference on the theme “Language acqui-
sition and conceptual development,” which was held at the Max Planck
Institute for Psycholinguistics in November 1995. The conference was an
unusually stimulating and exciting meeting, where intellectual positions
were on the brink of change. We hope that this volume captures some of
that excitement about theory change in the making.
The program was devised by the editors of this volume in collaboration
with Dan Slobin and Wolfgang Klein. All the papers delivered on that
occasion are reprinted here, but with substantial revisions that take account
of each other and the discussion at the conference. Part of that discussion
was provided by commentators on each session, and we thank Shanley
Allen, Martha Crago, Eve Danziger, Eric Pederson, and David Wilkins for
their probing comments, comparisons, and substantial ideas, now partly
woven into the fabric of the chapters. Differences in length between the
chapters stem in part from the different roles of the papers in the original
conference, and in part from constraints on the size of this volume.
We thank the Max Planck Society for sponsoring the conference, and the
support staff of the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics for their
help. We especially thank Edith Sjoerdsma for her invaluable help in orga-
nizing the conference and collating the volume.
One of the participants at the conference was Martin Braine, who died a
few months after the meeting. We would like to dedicate this volume to his
memory. In the fields represented in this book, Marty was one of the great
pioneers, whose intensity and enthusiasm was instrumental in making the
area as intellectually stimulating as it is today. The chapter in this book by
Marty and co-authors will give some idea of the probing questions he was
in the midst of pursuing, and thus the extent of our loss. Those who were
lucky enough to have known him will sorely miss the unique blend of
acuity, curiosity, and breadth of learning which made a conversation with
him always deeply profitable.
xi
Introduction

Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, The Netherlands
1 Background issues
1.1 Epistemology
This volume touches issues at the heart of Western thinking: how do we
know what we know, and what are the mental prerequisites that make such
knowledge possible? There is no better way to study these ancient epistemo-
logical questions than to examine carefully how children learn to think and
speak. But the careful study of children’s development dates back only to
the end of the nineteenth century (see chapter by Deutsch, Wagner,
Burchardt, Schulz, & Nakath, this volume), and indeed some of the most
interesting techniques for investigation have only been devised in the last
few years, in some cases by the contributors to this volume. Here then is a
relatively new field of investigation which is rapidly evolving, but which,
rather than being a narrow specialism like many modern branches of
science, talks directly to the fundamental questions about why we think the
way we do. It is a subject that every psychologist or cognitive scientist, every
linguist or social scientist, every historian of ideas or philosopher, should
keep an eye on. This volume should help to make accessible recent thought
in the area, and give some sense of the intellectual ferment which charac-
terizes it.
Two kinds of recent development have radically changed the way we
think about this area. Since the mid-1980s, there has been a revolution in
our knowledge of infant cognition: new techniques for exploring what
infants know within the first year of life have revealed striking early abilities
in the understanding of both the physical world and abstract concepts like
number or animacy (see e.g. Carey 1985, Keil 1989, Wynn 1992, Spelke
1993). Over a similar period there have been parallel changes in the study of
language acquisition. For example, new techniques provide increasingly
sophisticated ways of probing linguistic knowledge even before production
begins (e.g. Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Cauley, & Gorden 1987). In addition,
the study of language acquisition in non-European languages and cultures
1
2 Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson
(initiated on a comparative basis by Slobin 1967) has come at last to a point

where we have a significant range of information (Slobin 1985, 1992), and
these data have challenged many earlier theories and presumptions about
universal processes. Both areas – the study of cognitive development and
the study of language acquisition – are rich with hotly contested ideas
about what might constitute adequate new theories to cover the new
ground.
The study of both conceptual development and language acquisition in
the child have been in large part conducted by psychologists (although of
course there have been significant contributions from linguists, anthropolo-
gists, and others, especially in the field of language acquisition). But for his-
torical reasons these two strands of investigation, one focused on
nonlinguistic cognitive development and the other on the development of
language, have often grown apart. One reason perhaps is that the methods
of investigation sometimes diverge: cognitive development is now most
often explored by careful experiments on children of different ages, whereas
much language acquisition research, especially of languages other than
English, is still based on long-term observation of naturally occurring
behaviors. Another reason is that although many attempts were made
(especially in the 1970s) to relate significant stages in language acquisition
to the proposed (largely Piagetian) milestones in cognitive development, no
close correlation could be established. A third reason for divergence has
been the very success of theoretical linguistics, with rapidly changing, often
dauntingly complex, theories about the structure of language; in conse-
quence, many students of language acquisition have become linguistic spe-
cialists. Moreover, the more complex the nature of grammatical
competence is seen to be, the less likely it seems that it could be acquired by
general-purpose procedures for learning. This Chomskyan message sug-
gests that language is a special cognitive capacity, which we acquire by
virtue of special-purpose learning procedures that are part of our biologi-
cal endowment, and that have their own distinctive constraints. Although
many psychologists resist this conclusion (see e.g. Tomasello 1995), this
kind of thinking, and the very technicality of linguistics, have driven a
wedge between the study of general cognitive development and the study of
how children learn language. This is so even though the Chomskyan (or lat-
terly Fodorean) message has also come to inform the study of nonlinguistic
cognitive development, suggesting that many special-purpose learning
mechanisms may be involved there too (see Carey 1985, Keil 1989).
This volume brings these two strands of investigation, of the linguistic
and nonlinguistic aspects of cognitive development, back into close con-
nection with one another. It does so by focusing on conceptual content
rather than on the structural properties of the underlying representations
Introduction 3
for language or thought. Here in the domain of ideas about space, time,
number, logical quantifiers, physical objects, and their classification, and so
on, it is clear that the formation of the same or similar concepts is crucial to
both linguistic and nonlinguistic conceptual development. Words, and sub-
word meaning elements like plural or tense morphemes, embody sophisti-
cated concepts. How does a child master their meanings? Are such concepts
essentially independent of language, such that language merely expresses
them, or do children come to construct them through language, and under
the catalytic effect of verbal interaction with their elders? If such concepts
are at least partially independent of language, are they – or perhaps some of
them – also independent of experience? These are obvious questions, and,
together with finer-grained issues, these are the problems addressed in this
volume.
It is clear that in principle such questions can have empirical answers: if
children display knowledge of the relevant concepts long before they
display a corresponding grasp of the language that expresses them, then the
concepts would appear to be independent of language. Conversely, if lan-
guages differ and children’s early concepts also differ in line with the lan-
guage they are learning, then the concepts in question would appear to be
language-induced. In practice, finding such answers can be difficult. For
example, we would like to tap independently both the earliest understand-
ings of language and the early nonlinguistic ideas in corresponding
domains. The techniques for exploring these aspects of the infant’s world
are new and rather limited: in this volume Bowerman & Choi show how one
can investigate language-specific semantic categories in the making even
before infants can speak, and Carey, Spelke & Tsivkin, and others report on
probes of early nonlinguistic cognition. But careful parallel studies of early
semantics and early cognition across languages and cultures are yet to be
done.
For this reason, for the moment at least, many different avenues of
inquiry are necessary if we hope to get an understanding of the relevant
processes. For example, we can look over the fence at our nearest primate
relatives and get a sense of what conceptual development without language
looks like, but to do so we need tools for estimating what concepts members
of species without language can master (see the chapter by Langer in this
volume). Alternatively, we can look at the concepts that children presume
might make good meanings even though their particular language fails to
encode them (Clark, this volume; see also Deutsch et al., this volume, on
the ephemeral forms invented by twins for dual self-reference). Or we can
try to find methods for testing children’s understandings of the world when
they are only a few months old (again, see, for example, Carey, this volume).
We can look across languages and see what concepts, if any, recurrently get
encoded (see Slobin, this volume). We can try and find languages that differ
radically in semantic structure and see how children come to terms with
such different concepts (see e.g. the chapters by Brown, de León, and
Bowerman & Choi, this volume). These and many other ways of approach-
ing the issues are represented in this volume.
1.2 The child’s innate biases: native constraints, learning mechanisms

and “theories”
It will be useful to the reader to identify a number of the other themes that
run through the chapters in this volume. Inevitably one of the leading ques-
tions is: just what is the child natively endowed with? When the enormity of
the word learning task is considered, it is clear that the child must have some
kind of head-start in terms of either conceptual content or learning princi-
ples, or at the very least in terms of constraints on likely meanings given by
the nature of human predispositions and preoccupations with specific
aspects of the physical and social environment. Consider Quine’s (1960)
well-known conundrum of “radical translation”: we see a rabbit, the
natives say gavagai, but how do we know whether they mean ‘rabbit-stuff,’
‘this instant of rabbit-experience,’ or even just ‘white tail’? Only because we
presume they should have a word for rabbit, and we think they would expect
us now to want to know that and not something else. Such thought experi-
ments soon convince us that without all kinds of background assumptions,
and clues from the structure of the language itself, languages would be
unlearnable.
The question is: what exactly are these conceptual assumptions that the
child natively brings to the word and morpheme learning task? Carey (this
volume) explores the idea that there might be something as simple as a pre-
sumption of a commonsense notion of object, like that underlying our
translation of gavagai. But she shows that very small infants don’t seem to
have such a notion: they have various proto-concepts of objects, which do
not initially require even shape constancy, and even until right up towards
the end of the first year they do not require size or color constancies. Indeed
some aspects of our commonsense notion of object seem to be learnt simul-
taneously with, and thus perhaps partially through, the first words.
It appears, then, that only very primitive ontological assumptions are in
place long before language, which makes it possible that the structure of
specific languages may influence fundamental conceptual categories. These
issues are explored further in a number of the chapters. Gopnik for example
observes that in the 15–21-month period there is a very close interaction
between language learning and conceptual development, with, for example,
firm concepts of object permanence linked to the naming spurt. There is
Introduction 5
still likely to be an inevitability about certain concepts that are arrived at,
despite crosslinguistic differences. Thus Gentner & Boroditsky show that
the kind of mass-like noun semantics associated with classifier languages
does makes a difference to presumptions underlying very early word learn-
ing, but prototype complex objects like artifacts are immune to this lan-
guage-specific bias – the nouns describing them are assumed to name
objects, not substances like other nouns. Lucy & Gaskins suggest that the
language-specific bias perhaps only comes to dominate nonlinguistic
classification much later in childhood. The emerging picture is complex, but
it does suggest that language-specific patterns may have at least some
influence on fundamental ontological categories.
If ontological assumptions are perhaps not fully fixed in advance of lan-
guage learning, it could be that at least the learning mechanisms themselves
are specified from the outset. Perhaps, then, there are highly specialized
word learning mechanisms, as suggested by the sudden vocabulary spurt or
“naming explosion” that occurs around the age of two, when children may
learn up to ten new words a day (Clark 1993:13, 28). Is there a special “fast-
mapping” process (Carey 1978), perhaps involving special faculties for the
retention of words? Bloom (this volume) concludes that there is not: early
memory for words is not markedly better than for other concepts, and all the
special constraints and assumptions that have been proposed do not really
seem to distinguish the learning of word meanings from the learning of
other concepts, except in so far as they follow the grammatical distinctions
in the language (like mass vs. count nouns). Similar conclusions are reached
by Smith, who argues that the very most general processes of attentional
learning can in fact account for the apparent biases and presumptions that
have led scholars to think that there must be special-purpose word learning
abilities. From a different angle, Tomasello (this volume) takes the position
that once the interactional context, with its rich attentional and intentional
cues, is taken properly into account, the mysteries of word learning seem to
recede, and, again, no special mechanisms may need to be posited.
Ontology is fundamental to logic (Quine 1960) – for example, there can
be no quantification without individuals or count nouns (see Carey, this
volume). In fact, children have problems with quantification, and two
rather different kinds of problem are analyzed in detail in the chapters by
Brooks, Braine, Jia, & da Graca Dias and by Drozd in this volume. Braine
(1994) has taken the view that logic in language is a reflection of the “syntax
of thought.” Children between four (the earliest point at which most such
experiments have been done) and seven make well-known, repetitive logical
errors. If logical reasoning is universal, and built in, why should such errors
occur? Both Brooks & Braine and Drozd essentially argue that it is a
mapping problem: children have the right underlying representations but
map them to the wrong linguistic forms. What appears to be wonky think-
ing is just wonky speaking! The linguistic difficulties facing the child are
analyzed rather differently in the two chapters. Brooks et al. assume simple
canonical underlying forms, but with lexical quantifiers indicating or pre-
ferring certain scope distinctions; children may make the wrong associa-
tions between lexical quantifier and scope. Drozd argues that the lexical
quantifiers belong to two very different, rather complex semantic classes,
and children may assign a lexical quantifier to the wrong class. The claim
that the problems are essentially linguistic would have as a corollary the
tenet that logical structure is largely a native endowment, which might then
be assumed to drive presumptions about language, for example about the
kinds of reference that nouns may have if they are to be quantified over.
There are other kinds of conceptual bias and cognitive foundation that
might underlie children’s abilities to learn words so fast and, eventually at
least, accurately. As mentioned above, the Chomskyan way of thinking has
passed into the study of conceptual development, especially through the
medium of Fodor’s (1983) theory of the modular or compartmental nature
of human thought. This theory posits that the mind consists of many
innate specialized processing devices, interfacing with each of the sensory
and motor systems, or input/output systems. An extension of Fodor’s view
is that the central thinking capacity, which he thought of as relatively
undifferentiated, is itself composed of a collection of domain-specific theo-
ries. On this view, which is known affectionately as the “theory theory” (see
Carey 1985; Gopnik, this volume), there are specific theories governing our
ideas about such areas as naive physics (how objects behave), natural kinds,
animals, other minds and their actions, perhaps also number, space, and so
on. A “theory” in this sense is an articulated set of beliefs that allow the
deduction of expectations. A first assumption might be that such theories
have an innate basis, so that we might for example be born with these theo-
ries in some initial primitive state. Indeed, conceptual development is
thought of as a series of theory replacements or reconstructions, as over-
simple theories are replaced with ones more adequate to the data of experi-
ence (just as scientific theories are overthrown or revised). Such theory
changes appear to be especially dramatic at just the time when language
production begins to flourish (Gopnik, this volume), and these events may
be closely linked, reciprocally feeding each other. Gopnik produces some
novel comparisons across languages, which support the idea that language
may play a leading role in such theory change.
The “theory theory” is an attractive way of reconstruing what conceptual
development essentially consists of. Instead of some kind of seamless
unfolding of predispositions under experience, or instead of the Piagetian
picture of a stage-like progression across all domains, we are offered a
Introduction 7
picture of the child theorizer trying to make sense of specific domains, and
radically restructuring the domain-specific theory in the light of growing
experience (see Keil 1989 for exposition). Biases, classifications, and infer-
ences are all guided by these specialized theories, which should impinge on
language learning as assumptions about what words in specific domains
can mean. One attraction of this kind of theory is that it might offer us a
way of thinking about the transformative role of language in cognition as a
systematic series of bridges linking the conceptual islands of each domain
(as explored in this volume by Spelke & Tsivkin), a point returned to below.
But perhaps the “theory theory” overemphasizes both the amount of
innate endowment (for example, the carving out of specific domains, with
initial assumptions in each) and the degree of higher-level cognition
involved. Smith (this volume) argues that we should turn back to biological
models of development: after all, during the development of the embryo we
get elaborate differentiation of organisms from the operation of entirely
general processes, coupled with a specific history or trajectory of develop-
ment (if you surgically switch a left-hand wing-bud on a chick embryo with
a right-hand one, you still get a normal chick). She argues that, in the same
way, we should explore the possibility that the simplest associative learning,
coupled with attentional biases from initial stages of learning, can give us
all the rich domain-specific effects we observe in children’s cognitive and
linguistic development. Another dissenting line is represented by the
chapter by Tomasello. He argues that the whole line of argument for the
necessity of innate biases, from the Quinean start to the “theory theory”
finish, only arises because we underdescribe the situation of learning.
Instead of treating the child as a passive observer, trying to map labels to
objects or events, we should focus on the interactional situation in all its
richness. It is the adult’s intentions that the child is trying to decode, not
inscrutable words, and the child uses all the clues provided by the nuances
of the adult’s actions, from gesture to attention to signs of distraction, to
decide what the intentions are likely to be. By manipulating the adult’s
actions, one can test just what effect this over-arching communicative situa-
tion has on the child’s assumptions.
1.3 Comparative perspectives

To sort out issues of these kinds we desperately need comparative perspec-
tives: we need to have a sense for how variable the outcomes of learning can
be. On the one hand, we have comparisons across primate species, of the
kind that Langer offers in this volume. Such comparisons hint at the kinds of
factors that may be the foundations or preconditions for language. Langer
points out that the relative timing of certain cognitive developments may be
crucial, because only if they are simultaneous can they feed one another. In
this respect, the delay of language for a whole year or more after the begin-
ning of other cognitive development clearly suggests that a core cognitive
foundation must be in place before language production can begin. That
foundation may be the formation of hierarchical sets, and it is noteworthy
that even our nearest primate cousins, the chimpanzees, do not achieve this,
at least in childhood, and even when they are intensively trained in proto-
language they have corresponding problems with grammar. There are
almost certainly other cognitive preconditions to the learning of complex
communication systems, for example specific kinds of social learning (see
Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner 1993). But these foundations for language
found in general cognition are of course of a very much wider, less specific
kind than the sort of specific innate language-acquisition device hypothe-
sized by Chomsky (which may of course also be a precondition to lan-
guage).
On the other hand, we can compare across human languages and con-
sider what kind of cognitive endowment would be required to handle the
diversity of meaning structures in different languages. Many of the chapters
in this volume exploit language difference as a fundamental means of
obtaining insight into the relationship between linguistic development and
cognitive development. Thus for example the chapters by Gopnik and
Gentner & Boroditsky both try to assess whether the “naming explosion”
around the age of two is fundamentally associated with the naming of
objects, or whether the emphasis can be shifted by particular languages
towards the acquisition of verbs rather than nouns (they reach rather
different conclusions). Clark explores whether the kinds of categories that
get grammaticalized in languages other than the one the child is actually
learning turn up momentarily as working hypotheses about the meaning of
morphemes, and concludes that they do. Slobin, following a similar line of
reasoning, looks across languages to see whether children might come
equipped with an a priori sense of what concepts form natural grammatica-
lizable categories, but he concludes that they do not. Lucy & Gaskins
explore whether different grammatical patterns across languages might
actually influence nonlinguistic classification. They attempt to control care-
fully across two languages, doing exactly the same cognitive tasks in both
cultures with children of different ages. They do find language-specific
effects on nonlinguistic categorization, but they find them emerging years
after children have mastered the relevant syntactic structures in language.
Bowerman & Choi are likewise concerned with careful comparison across
learners of two languages, but they apply in part techniques developed for
the experimental study of pre-linguistic cognition in young infants to
explore the beginnings of language comprehension. Perhaps if one can
Introduction 9
plumb the infant’s understanding of linguistic expressions before he or she

can actually speak, one will find misconstruals that directly reflect universal
cognitive assumptions, later overridden by linguistic diversity. Although it is
difficult to push far enough back into early infancy, comprehension before
production does not so far seem to reveal universal cognitive bedrock.
Studies of early production also seem to show very early language-specific
assumptions. The cluster of chapters by Levinson, Brown, and de León are
concentrated on one phenomenon: the contrast between the familiar
European spatial concepts and descriptions, and those of Mayan speakers
of two related languages in highland Chiapas, Mexico, who utilize very
different spatial language and concepts. The study of adult language and
cognition, and child comprehension and production, shows that major
differences exist between those languages and say English- or Dutch-speak-
ing communities, and that these differences surface surprisingly early.
What is the influence of differential experience on the conceptualization
that underlies early language? Children growing up in different cultures
experience worlds that differ not only in language, but in just about every
facet of physical, social, and emotional experience. Clearly, it is difficult
here to isolate out single contrasting features. One would like to have con-
trolled experiments in which children are exposed to different experiences
and later tested, but – except in the limited way explored in this volume, for
example, in the chapter by Bloom on memory for novel words vs. informa-
tion of other kinds – such experiments are of course ethically unthinkable
(where they have accidentally occurred, as with feral children, they have
exercised both popular and scientific imagination – see Candland 1993).
However, there is at least one such natural experiment: children growing up
even in the very same family can have a radically different exposure to expe-
riences underlying the notion of person.1 Some children are first or only
children, others have older siblings, and some are born with a twin, identi-
cal or otherwise. The chapter by Deutsch and his collaborators in this
volume exploits this natural experiment in detail. They show that whereas
with first- vs. second-born children the effect may be primarily an effect on
linguistic experience, so that second children are quicker to master the
concept of shifting reference associated with pronouns, with twins one has
a glimpse of a conceptual difference at a deeper level: some twins refer first
to themselves as a dual entity – their names for themselves initially encom-
pass them both. These findings from such natural “controlled experiments”
can then help us unpick some of the tangled web of factors underlying
cross-cultural differences. In many non-Western cultures, language acquisi-
tion does seem somewhat delayed (at least in production; see e.g. Bavin
1992, or Brown, this volume), and it is observable that the “input” (directed
speech) to the children is often very different in character, infants some-
times being carried rather than interacted with, and later often being cared
for by just-older siblings.
2 The major themes of the volume

As mentioned earlier, the two strands of investigation, of the development
of language and of other aspects of cognition, have at times grown far
apart. The recent revolution in our understanding of infant cognition has
yet to have its full impact on the study of language acquisition. Similarly,
the great increase in our understanding of how children learn languages
that differ radically in structure and underlying categorization has yet to be
fully exploited as a source of information about the processes of cognitive
development. In this volume the reader will find that many of the chapters
are concerned with trying to work out how best to reconcile these two
rather different recent trends.
At first sight at least, the two trends appear to point in rather opposite
directions. On the cognitive side, the more we learn about infant cognition,
the earlier we often seem to be able to trace back quite complex cognitive
assumptions that children make. In fact, there was at one time a kind of
minor academic industry involved in showing that the benchmarks estab-
lished by Piaget as an ordered sequence with expected achievement times
are all much too conservative. The further back we can trace cognitive
assumptions, the more they look as if they were there all along. For
example, if we can show that five-month-old infants can do simple arithme-
tic (Wynn 1992), then they are unlikely to have learnt that from experience
in the world. A rich set of innate presumptions looks inescapable. On the
other hand, if we imagine the child endowed from the outset with too much
in the way of specific assumptions and knowledge, we can hardly explain
the existence of major steps in cognitive development at all. The “theory
theory,” described above (and see Gopnik, this volume), is one way to con-
ceive of how children start with a definite foundation of presumptions and
constraints but end up somewhere else under the influence of experience.
Nevertheless, the presumption in all this work has been, as it was for Piaget,
that cognitive development is essentially convergent: by and large, failing
genetic or experiential deprivation (and sometimes even despite that – see
e.g. Landau & Gleitman 1985), infants seem to arrive at a similar level of
cognitive attainment by early childhood.
Now against this background, the recent developments in the study of lan-
guage acquisition seem problematic. The central problem here is how do chil-
dren, from an initially equivalent base, end up controlling often very
differently structured languages? In other words, how do children success-
fully diverge in order to control the local language, whatever its idiosyncra-
Introduction 11
sies? The Chomskyan tradition, with its emphasis on an innate syntactic

ability, has led us to seriously underplay the extent and depth of semantic
variation across languages. The concepts that underly words and grammati-
cal morphemes can vary in fundamental ways across languages. For example,
only some languages have tense, and different systems of tense interact with
very variable notions of aspect in different languages (Behrens, this volume).
On the one hand, such complex temporal notions are surely not given to us
by the world at all, suggesting an essential role for innate predisposition, but,
on the other hand, they are so variably constructed and expressed in lan-
guages that the influence of language on cognition in this domain seems ines-
capable. But even when, from a naive realist point of view, distinctions might
seem to be just “out there” waiting to be conceived and named, we can get
surprises in the way languages treat them. One such initially surprising varia-
tion explored in this book is the reference of nouns that pick out physical
properties of the world. In some languages nouns prototypically seem to
denote individuated physical objects, in line with a naive realist view. But in
other languages nouns seem to have substances rather than individuals as
primary reference, a bit like English mass nouns like water or flour. Thus in
some Mayan languages the word for “tree” is also the word for wood, or the
bench or other article manufactured from it. The chapters by Gentner &
Boroditsky and Lucy & Gaskins debate the significance of this pattern.
Yet another area of significant variation is found in the domain of spatial
semantics (see Bowerman & Choi, Brown, de León, Levinson, this
volume), an area where variation might be least expected on the grounds
that spatial cognition is just the kind of thing that has been demonstrated to
be essentially innate in other species. Yet another kind of unexpected varia-
tion, if Slobin (this volume) is correct, is the kind of category that gets
encoded in grammatical morphemes. These had long been suspected to
have a strongly constrained universal basis, but they turn out in fact to be
much more language-specific than expected. This range of documented
semantic variation – which we can only expect to increase when we know
something about the 80–90% of languages that are still not scientifically
described – makes it clear that children cannot be armed in advance with
just the right semantic categories or dimensions for the language they will
have to learn. They will have to construct them, and in doing so they will
develop semantic concepts potentially unique to that language group.
How then is one to reconcile these two perspectives, one pointing to con-
vergence in cognitive development and the other to divergence in linguistic
development? Perhaps it is essential to step back and ask a more general
question: what exactly is the role of language in human cognition? Consider
the classical Fodorean (1983) assumption: language is a mere (albeit some-
what variable) input/output device to a central area of thinking. As Pinker
(1994:82) has put it, “knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate
mentalese into a string of words and vice versa. People without a language
would still have mentalese, and babies and many nonhuman animals presum-
ably have simpler dialects.” There has to be something essentially wrong with
this view: as any scholar knows, acquiring a new representation can radically
alter the way one thinks about a problem (the limiting effects of Roman
numerical notation on the simplest mathematical procedures are well known,
but think also of the power of diagrams, graphs, and special symbols). Being
human is partly about having one’s thoughts restructured by virtue of shared
representations, communicated by semiotic systems “which have the poten-
tial to contribute remarkable design-enhancements to the underlying machin-
ery of the brain” (Dennett 1991:208). For one thing, complex concepts can
be packaged or recoded in such a way that higher levels of thinking are pos-
sible. As Miller (1956:95) put it in a paper that is one of the foundations of
modern cognitive science: “the process of recoding is a very important one in
human psychology. . . . In particular, the kind of linguistic recoding that
people do seems to me to be the very lifeblood of the thought processes.”
What he had in mind was that a lexical package of complex semantic
material is not only a convenience for communication, but also enhances
thinking: it makes it possible to circumvent the extreme limitations of human
working memory, limitations that are specified in terms of the number of
chunks or packages, not the complexity of their content.
A number of the chapters in this volume wrestle with the implications of
this renewed realization of the power of language to transform our think-
ing. Gopnik argues that it is language that is responsible for some of the
quantum changes observable in children’s “theories” of various domains.
Carey wonders whether it is the very practice of naming that might intro-
duce the kind of assumptions about physical objects that lie behind
nominal reference. Spelke & Tsivkin argue that language may play a role
linking more primitive, specialized cognitive modules: suppose we take the
Fodorean view that the mind consists in part of specialized processing
devices – how then are these to talk to one another? For example, if the spe-
cialized spatial module tells me where I am by representing only abstract
geometric shapes and angles, and I know that what I am looking for is
under a big green tree, how can I get there? Somehow, the information has
to be shared between the colour, landmark, and spatial modules. Rats have
serious limitations here. Humans do too – but only until they begin to learn
language. Does then the cognitive advantage that language brings to think-
ing inhere in the way language allows us to represent different aspects of
experience not only to others, but also to ourselves?
These chapters mark substantial changes in perspective within develop-
mental psychology. Instead of language merely reflecting the cognitive
Introduction 13
development which permits and constrains its acquisition, language is being

thought of as potentially catalytic and transformative of cognition.
However, the chapters still do not fully bridge the gap between the differing
views, from nonlinguistic and linguistic vantage points, of convergence and
divergence in child development. If language does transform our thinking,
do specific languages transform it in different ways? This question was the
focus of the notorious Sapir–Whorf Hypothesis, or the doctrine of linguis-
tic relativity, whereby it was supposed that “users of markedly different
grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observa-
tions . . . and hence are not equivalent as observers, but must arrive at some-
what different views of the world” (Whorf 1956:221). This view, perennially
attractive to the layman, has been decidedly out of favor since the rise of the
cognitive sciences, with their emphasis on universals in cognitive structure
and processing. As Pinker (1994:58) has put it, “the discussions that assume
that language determines thought carry on only by a collective suspension
of disbelief.” But in fact they cannot be so easily dismissed. Lucy (1992, and
with Gaskins, this volume) has documented classification preferences
varying with language. Levinson (1996, and this volume) has demonstrated
correlations between different kinds of spatial description and different
kinds of spatial thinking, measured in many different ways. Indeed, quite a
bit of recent fact and theory, both inside and outside the study of human
development (Gumperz & Levinson 1996), suggests that some very moder-
ate form of “Whorfianism” may be unavoidable. The implications for
human development are potentially far-reaching: not only language but also
cognition may diverge – not so very much, perhaps, but enough to remove
the anomaly of linguistic and nonlinguistic development heading in
different directions. The conclusion could be, then, that the kinds of trans-
formation of thinking by language that Carey, Gopnik, and Spelke &
Tsivkin are entertaining may be subject to language-specific biases.
What specific evidence can we find for this in child development? On the
linguistic side, it is easy to show that languages diverge in the way they clas-
sify various domains, and it has been shown that, from their very earliest
speech, children are closer to their adult targets than to children speaking
other contrasting languages (Bowerman 1996; see also Bowerman & Choi,
and Gentner & Boroditsky, this volume). Similar early use of language-
specific semantic categories is detailed in the chapters by Brown and de
León in this volume. A problem with the analysis of children’s early lan-
guage is that we often cannot be sure that we understand their own imma-
ture semantics: perhaps the early language usage is less in line with adult
targets than it seems. The chapter by Bowerman & Choi (this volume)
attempts to address this by directly studying comprehension even before
language production. The results are in line with the findings from early
production: infants seem to have arrived at the language-specific classifica-

tions at a remarkably early age.
Now on the nonlinguistic side, we would like to know whether this very
early internalization of language-specific classifications correlates with cat-
egories formed in nonlinguistic cognition – in the classification of percep-
tions or memories for states and events, and so on. Work here has hardly
begun. The chapter by Lucy & Gaskins in this volume reports that such
correlations between language-specific and nonlinguistic categories can
definitely be found in middle childhood, but suggests that this may reflect a
later reorganization (or in Miller’s terms, “recoding’) of cognition, long
after initial language learning. But clues to earlier effects, at least on chil-
dren’s assumptions about what novel words might mean, are documented
in other chapters in this volume (see Gentner & Boroditsky, Brown, de
León).2 At this point we still have little evidence about early culture-specific
cognitive trends, since nearly all investigations in cross-cultural psychology
have been conducted on school-age children and have not been closely tied
to studies of language acquisition. The intriguing thing is that the methods
now exist for the study of early cognition, and there is little doubt that in the
next few years there will be increasing interest and evidence in this area.
In conclusion, the reader will find in this volume a range of new
approaches to, and new perspectives on, the ancient epistemological ques-
tions with which we began this introduction. Earlier attempts to relate cog-
nitive and linguistic development, for example by correlating milestones of
linguistic competence with Piagetian stages, were not successful. Since then
there have been major advances in the understanding of both linguistic and
cognitive development, with new emphases on the semantic and crosslin-
guistic aspects of language acquisition, and on the early domain-specific
cognitive abilities of infants. But for various reasons these advances have
not been brought into close relation. What is unusual about the present
volume is that it constitutes for the first time in recent years a serious, sus-
tained engagement of the study of language acquisition with the study of
cognitive development, with individual scholars currently working in both
domains, and attempting to assess the interplay between the cognitive pre-
conditions to language learning and the linguistic preconditions to
advanced conceptual development. Out of this kind of interaction will
likely emerge in the next few years a revolution in our understanding of
how we come to be ourselves.
A note on the organization of this volume

As will be clear from the introduction, there are many cross-cutting themes
linking the chapters in this volume. No linear organization can do justice to
Introduction 15
this, but we have organized the chapters into four parts. The first part
addresses foundational issues about the nature of cognition in humans vs.
other primates, and about how language might play a role in transforming
human conceptual life. The second part examines contemporary claims
about whether children come to the language-learning task with built-in
constraints guiding their hypotheses about what new words could mean.
All three authors argue “no,” but for different reasons. The last chapter in
this part introduces the importance of the concept of “an individual” for
word learning, and this provides a natural transition to the third part,
which examines questions about ontology, about what kinds of entities
infants assume there are, and about how children quantify over and reason
about them. The fourth and final part is devoted to relational concepts, e.g.
notions of time and especially space. Chapters here examine whether the
concepts encoded in relational words and grammatical markers are avail-
able to the child independently of language – either through nonlinguistic
cognitive development or as a set of innately specified semantic universals –
or must be constructed on the basis of linguistic experience. Although there
are close connections between many of the chapters, they may be read inde-
pendently. The reader will find many cross-references in the volume, and
may prefer to follow that trail according to interest.
notes
1 Another is the insight afforded by comparing the linguistic development of
sighted vs. sight-deprived children (Landau & Gleitman 1985). The language
development of deaf children of hearing parents is another revealing kind of case
(see Goldin-Meadow 1985).
2 An interesting study that builds on the distinction between spatial systems
described in Levinson, this volume, has found systematic differences between
populations by the age of four (see Wassmann & Dasen 1998).
r eferen ces
Bavin, E. 1992. The acquisition of Warlpiri. In D. I. Slobin (ed.), The crosslinguistic
study of language acquisition, vol. 3. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 309–372.
Bowerman, M. 1996. The origins of children’s spatial semantic categories: cognitive
versus linguistic determinants. In J. J. Gumperz & S. C. Levinson (eds.),
Rethinking linguistic relativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
145–176.
Braine, M. 1994. Mental logic and how to discover it. In J. Macnamara & G. E.
Reyes (eds.), The logical foundations of cognition. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 241–263.
Candland, D. G. 1993. Feral children and clever animals. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Carey, S. 1978. The child as word learner. In M. Halle, J. Bresnan, & G. A. Miller
(eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/

MIT Press, 264–293.
1985. Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press.
Clark, E. V. 1993. The lexicon in acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness explained. Boston: Little, Brown.
Fodor, J. 1983. The modularity of mind: an essay on faculty psychology. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Goldin-Meadow, S. 1985. Language development under atypical learning condi-
tions: replication and implications of a study of deaf children of hearing
parents. In K. E. Nelson (ed.), Children’s language, vol. 5. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 197–245.
Golinkoff, R., K. Hirsh-Pasek, K. M. Cauley, & L. Gorden, 1987. The eyes have it:
lexical and syntactic comprehension in a new paradigm. Journal of Child
Language 14: 23–45.
Gumperz, J. J., & S. C. Levinson (eds.). 1996. Rethinking linguistic relativity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keil, F. C. 1989. Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge, MA:
Bradford/MIT Press.
Landau, B., & L. R. Gleitman. 1985. Language and experience: evidence from the
blind child. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Levinson, S. C. 1996. Relativity in spatial conception and description. In Gumperz
& Levinson, 1996, 177–202.
Lucy, J. 1992. Grammatical categories and cognition: a case study of the linguistic rel-
ativity hypothesis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Miller, G. A. 1956. The magical number seven, plus or minus two: some limits on
our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review 63: 81–97.
Pinker, S. 1994. The language instinct. New York: William Morrow.
Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Slobin, D. I. 1967. A field manual for cross-cultural study of the acquisition of com-
municative competence. Berkeley, CA: ASUC Bookstore.
(ed.). 1985. The crosslinguistic study of language acquisition, vols. 1 & 2. Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
(ed.). 1992. The crosslinguistic study of language acquisition, vol. 3, Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Spelke, E. S. 1993. Physical knowledge in infancy: reflections of Piaget’s theory. In
S. Carey & R. Gelman (eds.), The epigenesis of mind: essays on biology and cog-
nition. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 133–170.
Tomasello, M. 1995. Language is not an instinct. Cognitive Development 10:
131–156.
Tomasello, M., A. C. Kruger, & H. H. Ratner. 1993. Cultural learning. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 16: 495–552.
Wassmann, J., & P. Dasen, 1998. Balinese spatial orientation: some empirical evi-
dence of moderate linguistic relativity. Journal of the Royal Anthropological
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Whorf, B. L. 1956. Language, thought, and reality: selected writings of Benjamin Lee
Whorf (ed. J. B. Carroll). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wynn, K. 1992. Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature 358: 749–750.
Part 1
Foundational issues
1 The mosaic evolution of cognitive and
linguistic ontogeny
Jonas Langer
University of California at Berkeley
Before we can properly consider the relations between language and cogni-
tion from the perspective of a comparative primatology, we will need to
establish some fundamental points about the similarities and differences of
cognitive development in the different species. Towards the end of the
chapter I shall then return to the central issue, and show that the compara-
tive developmental data demonstrate that there can be no very intimate
interaction between language and cognition in early ontogenesis – cogni-
tion leads.
A popular evolutionary theory of human cognition, neoteny, has it that
we are developmentally retarded, allowing a greater period of plasticity for
the acquisition of culture (e.g. Gould 1977; Montagu 1981). The compara-
tive data, we shall see, do not support the neoteny theory. If anything,
humans’ cognitive development is precocious as compared to that of other
primate species. Of course, this in no way denies that “changes in the rela-
tive time of appearances and rate of development for characters already
present in ancestors” (the modern neo-Haeckelian definition of hetero-
chrony proposed by Gould 1977:2) is a valid biogenetic law of the evolution
of cognitive development (see McKinney & McNamara 1991; Mayr 1994;
Langer & Killen 1998; and Parker, Langer, & McKinney 2000, for updated
analyses). One product of such timing changes is mosaic organizational
heterochrony of ancestral characters, whether morphological such as the
body or behavioral such as cognition. That is, the evolution of organized
characteristics is produced by a mix of changes in developmental timing of
their constituent structures (see Levinton 1988, and Shea 1989, for data on
and discussions of mosaic evolution). Organizational heterochrony, I have
proposed, characterizes primate cognitive phylogeny and, as such, is a
structural evolutionary mechanism of development (Langer 1989, 1993,
1994a, 1996, 1998, 2000; see also Parker 2000).
While Gould’s definition of heterochrony focuses on phylogenetic changes
in developmental onset ages and velocity, the present comparative analyses
extend to changes in offset ages, extent, sequencing, and organization of pri-
mates’ cognitive development. Primates’ cognitive development comprises
19
20 Jonas Langer
foundational physical cognition (e.g., knowledge about causality and

objects), logical cognition (e.g., classificatory categorizing), and arithmetic
cognition (e.g., exchange operations such as substituting to preserve a quan-
titative relation) reviewed in Langer, Rivera, Schlesinger, & Wakeley (in
press). For expository convenience I will conflate logical and arithmetic cog-
nition into logicomathematical cognition (while stipulating that the struc-
tures and processing of these two domains differ in important respects).
Since much of the relevant primate data comes from comparisons with
my findings on young human children, I will first sketch essential features of
the research methods I devised to generate them. Then I will turn to key
invariant and variant features of primates’ cognitive development, such as
its sequencing. Most attention will be paid to the comparative extent
(section 8) and organization (section 9) of the early development of
different species of primate. These key features are central to my proposal
of mosaic organizational heterochrony as an evolutionary mechanism of
cognitive ontogeny. Also, I have already provided more details on other key
features, such as the comparative developmental velocity of different
primate species, elsewhere (especially in Langer 1998, 2000). The compari-
sons of primates’ cognitive development will also provide the empirical
base for hypothesizing evolutionary and developmental relations between
primates’ cognitive and linguistic ontogenies in the concluding section.
1 Research method
The research method was developed in the study of 6- to 60-month-old
children’s spontaneous constructive interactions with four to twelve objects
(see the appendix of Langer 1980, for detailed description). The range of
objects spans geometric shapes to realistic things such as cups (as illus-
trated in Figures 1.1–1.4). Some of the object sets presented embodied class
structures (e.g., multiplicative classes that intersect form and color such as a
yellow and green cylinder and a yellow and a green triangular column,
shown in figure 1.1). However, nothing in the procedures required subjects
to do anything about the objects’ class structures. No instructions, training,
or reinforcement were given and no problems were presented. Children
played freely with the objects as they wished because my goal was to study
their developing spontaneous constructive intelligence and to develop tests
that could be applied across species.
With human children, this initial nonverbal and nondirective procedure
was followed by progressively provoked probes. To illustrate, in one condi-
tion designed to provoke classifying, children were presented with two
alignments of four objects. One alignment might comprise three rectangu-
lar rings and one circular ring while the other alignment comprised three
Evolution of cognitive and linguistic ontogeny 21
Fig. 1.1 6-month-old subject composing a set comprising a green cylinder

(GC) with a yellow triangular column (YTC) using left hand (LH).
S⫽subject.
Fig. 1.2 6-month-old subject composing a set comprising a green rectan-

gular ring (GRR) with a yellow cross ring (YCR) using right hand (RH).
22 Jonas Langer
Fig. 1.3 6-month-old subject composing a set comprising two dolls (D1
and D2) using right hand (RH). S⫽ subject.
circular rings and one rectangular ring. By age 21 months, some infants
begin to correct the classificatory “mistakes” presented to them (Langer
1986); by age 36 months all children do (Sugarman 1983; Langer, in prepar-
ation). Some subjects even rebuke the tester. Thus, one 30-month-old
(subject 30AP) remarked “No belongs this way” as she corrected the
classificatory misplacements.
Many of the findings on humans that I will review have been replicated
with 8- to 21-month-old Aymara and Quecha Indian children in Peru
(Jacobsen 1984), and 6- to 30-month-old infants exposed in utero to crack
cocaine (Ahl 1993). The Indian children were raised in impoverished condi-
tions as compared to the mainly Caucasian middle-class San Francisco Bay
Area children in my samples. Nevertheless, no differences were found in
Fig. 1.4 Second-order classifying by a 21-month-old subject.
onset age, velocity, sequence, extent, or organization of cognitive develop-

ment during infancy in these different human samples; though the crack
cocaine babies, of course, manifest many other behavioral, especially emo-
tional, dysfunctions.
Most of the comparisons of primates’ cognitive development in the next
sections are based on these studies of human children (Langer 1980, 1986,
in preparation); and on parallel studies (Antinucci 1989; Spinozzi 1993;
Poti 1996, 1997; Poti, Langer, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Brakke 1999;
Spinozzi, Natale, Langer, & Brakke 1999) on cebus (Cebus apella),
macaques (Macaca fascicularis) and common and bonobo chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes and Pan paniscus) using the nonverbal and nondirective
methods developed to study human children’s spontaneous cognitive con-
structions. We have yet to use provoked methods with nonhuman primates.
2 Invariant initial elements of cognition

Perhaps the most important foundational similarity (and difference, as we
shall see in section 7) in primate cognition is in their composition of sets. All
primates we have studied so far compose sets of objects as elements for
their cognition (such as those illustrated in figures 1.1–1.4). They compose
sets of objects by bringing two or more objects into contact or close prox-
imity with each other (i.e., no more than 5 centimeters apart).
This is a fundamental similarity since combinativity structures, including
especially composing sets, are foundational to constructing cognition and
language, as elaborated in section 8. Thus, combinativity is a central general-
purpose structure. Combinativity includes composing, decomposing, and
24 Jonas Langer
recomposing operations (Langer 1980). (Here I focus only on composing for

the sake of brevity.) These operations construct fundamental elements, such
as sets and series.
Combinativity operations are foundational and fundamental because
without them little if any cognition and language is possible (Langer 1980,
1986, 1993). To illustrate the generality of these combinativity structures,
consider an aspect of composing. At least two objects must be composed
with each other if: (a) they are to be classified as identical or different; and (b)
a tool is to be used as a causal instrument to an end (e.g., one object is used to
hit another). So, too, at least two symbols must be composed with each other
if they are to form a minimal grammatical expression. Note, however, that
the form of composing differs by domain. To illustrate, causal tool construc-
tion requires spatial composition of the objects involved (at the level of
development we are dealing with here). Classificatory construction does not.
Contemporaneous manipulation of objects suffices for human infants and
young chimpanzees to categorize them even when they do not group them
together spatially (Langer, Schlesinger, Spinozzi, & Natale 1998; Spinozzi,
Natale, Langer, & Schlesinger 1998; Spinozzi & Langer 1999).
3 Invariant elementary logicomathematical and physical cognitions

It has long been recognized that all primates develop foundational physical
cognitions such as notions of object permanence and of causal instrumen-
tality (e.g. Kohler 1926; Parker & Gibson 1979). We now have evidence that
human infants and juvenile chimpanzees and monkeys also develop: (1)
logical operations such as classifying by the identity of objects (Ricciuti
1965; Woodward & Hunt 1972; Nelson 1973; Roberts & Fischer 1979;
Spinozzi & Natale 1979; Langer 1980, 1986; Starkey 1981; Sinclair,
Stambak, Lezine, Rayna, & Verba 1982; Sugarman 1983; Spinozzi 1993;
Spinozzi et al. 1999); and (2) arithmetic operations such as substituting
objects in sets to produce quantitative equality (Langer 1980, 1986; Poti &
Antinucci 1989; Poti 1997; Poti et al. 1999). Thus, all primate species we
have studied so far develop foundational logicomathematical as well as
physical cognition.
4 Invariant onset age of physical cognition

Developing foundational logicomathematical as well as physical cognition
does not mean that the onset age is the same for both domains of knowl-
edge in all primate species. As far as we know, the onset age is the same in all
primate species for the development of physical cognition only, which I now
sketch.
Human infants begin to construct knowledge about the existence and

causal relations of objects in space and time. The earliest symptoms are
newborns’ sensorimotor activity (e.g. tracking objects and thumb sucking).
These activities maintain contact with objects, thereby constituting stage 1
of Piaget’s (1952, 1954) six-stage sequence of object permanence develop-
ment during infancy. So, too, these activities require (a) exerting effort
(“work” or energy) and (b) taking into account spatiotemporal contact in
order to maintain effective causal relations, thereby constituting the stage 1
efficacy and phenomenalism of Piaget’s (1952, 1954) six-stage sequence of
causal means–ends development during infancy.
Little attention has been given in comparative research to the onset age
of physical cognition. The most I have been able to find is that the earliest
symptoms of stage 1 object permanence begin to be manifest during their
first week by macaques (Macaca fuscata and fascicularis; Parker 1977; Poti
1989), the second week by Cebus appela (Spinozzi 1989), and the fifth week
by Gorilla gorilla (Redshaw 1978; Spinozzi & Natale 1989). While limited,
the data suggest no or very little difference between human and nonhuman
primates in the onset age for developing physical cognition. A fairly secure
estimate would put onset age in the neonatal to early infancy range in all
primates.
5 Invariant sequencing
The developmental stage sequences are universal, with one partial excep-
tion detailed below. The order of stage development is conserved, including
no stage skipping or reversal, in all primate species and in all cognitive
domains studied so far.
Universal invariance has been found for the most extensively studied
developmental stage sequence of physical cognition, Piaget’s (1954) six
stages of object permanence. Since it therefore provides the most reliable
data, it will serve as my example. Sequential invariance has been found in at
least a variety of monkey species (i.e. cebus, macaques, and squirrel), goril-
las, chimpanzees, and humans (e.g. Piaget 1954; Uzgiris & Hunt 1975;
Parker & Gibson 1979; Doré & Dumas 1987; Antinucci 1989). Indeed, the
universality of the invariant object permanence stage sequence extends to
the mammal species that have been studied so far: cats and dogs (e.g.
Gruber, Girgus, & Banuazizi 1971; Traina & Pasnak 1981; see Doré &
Goulet 1998 for a review).
Our research has begun investigating whether within-domain stage
sequences in logicomathematical cognitions are also universal in primate
species. So far we are finding universality with one partial exception,
Langer’s (1980, 1986) five-stage sequence of logical classification in infancy.
26 Jonas Langer
The sequence of classifying is invariant in humans (Langer 1980, 1986) and

chimpanzees (Spinozzi 1993; Spinozzi et al., 1999) but not monkeys
(Spinozzi & Natale 1989).
6 Variant velocity
The rate of cognitive development is accelerated in human ontogeny as
compared to that of other primates. The development of classification is
typical. For instance, cebus monkeys do not complete their development of
first-order classifying – limited to constructing single categories of objects –
until age 4 years (Spinozzi & Natale 1989). In comparison, it is already
developed by age 15 months in humans (Langer 1986). So too, while chim-
panzees develop rudimentary second-order classifying that extends to con-
structing two categories of objects, it does not originate until age 41⁄2 years
(Spinozzi 1993). In comparison, it originates at age 11⁄2 years in humans.
This pattern of relatively precocious and accelerated cognitive develop-
ment in humans supports heterochronic theories of progressive terminal
extension (peramorphosis or “overdevelopment”) in the evolution of
primate cognitive ontogeny, and not neoteny (paedomorphosis or “under-
development”), as detailed in Langer (1998, 2000). Support for theories of
progressive terminal extension is reinforced by findings of increasingly
extended cognitive development in the primate lineage that I review in the
next two sections. Fully understanding the evolutionary significance of
humans’ precocial, accelerated and extended cognitive development
requires placing it in its full developmental context. I have already endeav-
ored to do so in Langer (1998, 2000) and, therefore, will only allude to the
core components here: relatively precocial brain maturation coupled with
decelerated nonbrain physiological maturation and decelerated noncogni-
tive behavioral development in humans. Thus, the comparative model of
human development that is emerging in this proposal couples (a) nonbrain
physiological and noncognitive behavioral immaturity with (b) brain and
cognitive precocity.
7 Variant extent of developing elements of cognition

During their first three years, human infants already construct ever more
powerful elements of cognition (Langer 1980, 1986, in preparation). Two
measures permit central comparisons with the elements composed by
young nonhuman primates (Antinucci 1989; Spinozzi 1993; Poti 1996,
1997; Poti et al. 1999; Spinozzi et al. 1999). I will outline the findings in
turn.
With age, human infants include more objects in the sets they compose.
For example, 14 percent of their sets comprise eight objects at age 30
months. The number of objects composed into sets also increases with age
in chimpanzees. Up to age 5 years, the limit is about five objects. Thus, while
already breaking out of the limits of the law of small numbers (defined as
no more than three or four units), young chimpanzees seem to be restricted
to the smallest intermediate numbers. Minimal increases are found in cebus
and macaques during their first 4 years. With age, the set sizes increase from
compositions of two objects to no more than three objects. They do not
exceed the limits of small numbers.
During their first year, human infants only construct one set at a time. By
the end of their first year they begin to construct two sets at a time. By the
end of their second year they begin to construct three or four contempora-
neous sets. More than half of their compositions comprise multiple con-
temporaneous sets by age 36 months. Young chimpanzees also begin to
construct contemporaneous sets. But, up till age 5 years, they are limited to
constructing minimal contemporaneous sets, that is, no more than two sets
at a time. And their rate of production is comparatively small. Contempor-
aneous sets account for only 20 percent of their compositions. In stark con-
trast, cebus and macaques rarely if ever compose contemporaneous sets in
their first 4 years.
8 Variant extent of developing cognition

The elements of cognition primates construct constrain the level of intellec-
tual operations they can attain. Up to at least age 4 years, cebus and
macaques are limited to constructing single sets of no more than three
objects. Human infants already begin to exceed these limits by constructing
two contemporaneous sets of increasingly numerous objects in their second
year. The comparative consequence is that cebus and macaques are locked
into developing no more than relatively simple cognitions, while progressive
possibilities open up for children to map new and more advanced cogni-
tions. For instance, young cebus and macaques are limited to constructing
single-category classifying (Spinozzi & Natale 1989) while human infants
already begin to construct two-category classifying by age 18 months
(Ricciuti 1965; Woodward & Hunt 1972; Nelson 1973; Roberts & Fischer
1979; Starkey 1981; Sinclair et al. 1982; Sugarman 1983; Langer 1986;
Gopnik & Meltzoff 1992).
Young chimpanzees, like human infants and unlike young monkeys, con-
struct two contemporaneous sets as elements of their cognition. Unlike
young monkeys they are therefore not limited to developing first-order cog-
nitions, such as single-category classifying. Instead, like human infants,
young chimpanzees begin to develop second-order cognitions, such as two-
category classifying, but not until their fifth year (Spinozzi 1993; Spinozzi
et al. 1999).
28 Jonas Langer
Up to at least age 5 years and unlike human infants, we have also seen,
chimpanzees are limited to composing two contemporaneous sets. In their
second year, human infants already begin to compose multiple contempo-
raneous sets. As a consequence, only chimpanzees are constrained to con-
structing no more than two-category classifying (Spinozzi 1993; Spinozzi et
al. 1999). Humans already begin to develop three-category classifying
during early childhood (Langer, in preparation).
This is a vital difference in the cognitive development attainable by chim-
panzees and humans. The ability to construct three simultaneous sets is a
precondition to building hierarchies, although it is of course not direct evi-
dence of hierarchical ability. It determines whether hierarchically inte-
grated cognition is possible. For example, three-category classifying opens
up the possibility of hierarchization while two-category classifying does
not permit anything more than linear cognition. Minimally, hierarchic
inclusion requires two complementary subordinate classes integrated by
one superordinate class. The capability of human infants to compose three
contemporaneous sets permits hierarchization. Chimpanzees as old as age
5 years still do not compose three contemporaneous sets. As a consequence
they remain limited to linear cognition.
Another vital difference in their potential cognitive development is
that, unlike chimpanzees, human infants already begin to map their cog-
nitions recursively onto each other towards the end of the second year
(Langer 1986). Young chimpanzees only construct transitional recursive
mappings of cognitions onto cognitions (Poti 1997; Poti et al. 1999). This
is the reason why I have claimed that only the cognition of human chil-
dren among young primates becomes fully recursive; and that recursive-
ness is a key to changing the rules of cognitive development (Langer
1994a). It further opens up possibilities for transforming linear into hier-
archic cognition.
The elements of cognitive development are limited to contents such as
actual sets of objects in all young nonhuman primates we have studied.
This is never exceeded by young monkeys. It is barely exceeded by young
chimpanzees. By age five years (effectively early adolescence), chimpanzees’
cognition just begins to be extended beyond contents such as sets of objects.
In comparison, the elements of cognitive development are progressively lib-
erated from contents such as actual sets of objects in humans. By late
infancy, the elements begin to be expanded to include forms of cognition
(e.g. classifications, correspondences, and exchanges) as well as objects,
sets, series, etc. Towards the end of their second year human infants begin
to map their cognitive constructions onto each other (Langer 1986). For
example, some infants compose two sets of objects in spatial and numerical
one-to-one correspondence. Then they exchange equal numbers of objects
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
tulevaisuuteni on turvattu, olen arvossapidetty, hyvin toimeentuleva
mies, jonka sopii mennä naimisiinkin!
Ehdottomasti huudahti Colette:
— Tuon punatukkaisen tytön kanssa… arvasin sen heti!
Georges näytti peräti ällistyneeltä.
— Minkä tytön kanssa? kysyi hän.
— Tuon, jota sinä rakastat, tietystikin… minä hölmönä sinä minua

pidät?
— Se, jota rakastan, on vaaleaverinen, Colette, mumisi herra

Hamelin kirjuri.
Hän pysähtyi hiukan arastellen… Mutta nyt joutui Colette täysin

suunniltansa.
— Tämä on jo liikaa, huudahti hän. — Sinä tunnustit minulle, ettei

vaalea tukka sinua miellytä, silloin kuin… Mutta nyt on toista… Jos
sinusta vielä kuukausi sitten vaalea tukka tuntui epämiellyttävältä
siitä syystä että minä olen vaaleaverinen, niin sano se vaan suoraan,
rakkaani… sano, sano pois vaan! Se on minulle täysin
yhdentekevää!
— Epämiellyttävältä siksi että sinä olet vaaleaverinen… Mitä sinä

tarkoitat? Asianlaitahan on juuri päinvastainen…
— Päinvastainen? toisti Colette kärsimättömästi.
— Mitä tuo »päinvastainen» merkitsee?

— Se merkitsee luullakseni sitä… että vaalea tukka miellyttää
minua siksi, että sinä olet vaaleaverinen… ja siksi että rakastan
sinun tukkaasi… ja siksi että rakastan sinua… puhui Georges. — Oi
Colette, olen ollut sokea, olen ollut mieletön ja typerä… En tullut sitä
ajatelleeksikaan… taikka en käsittänyt sitä… ja kenties en olisi
käsittänyt sitä koskaan! Saadakseni silmäni auki täytyi minun saada
sinut omakseni setä Franeusen välityksellä… ja menettää sinut…
ennen kaikkea menettää sinut, omistettuani sinut ensin… Colette,
rakkaani, juuri sinä merkitset minulle rikkautta ja onnea. Rakas
tyttöseni, mehän rakastamme toisiamme… myönnä, että me
rakastamme toisiamme…
Onnellisena, turvallisena, oli Colette jo painautunut Georges'in

povelle.
—Me rakastamme toisiamme, toisti hän kuuliaisesti.
Silloin kuultiin karkean äänen lausuvan hieman ivallisesti:
— Älkää antako häiritä itseänne! Minä lähden tieheni…
Elämässä on hetkiä, jolloin ei kuule ovien aukenemista. Tuo vanha

ystävä, joka oli tullut huoneeseen ja matkalta palaten aikoi viettää
tämän illan täti Rosalien luona, oli jo poistunut suureen
vierashuoneeseen.
Työntäen Georges'in luotaan huudahti Colette tyrmistyneenä:
— Hyvä Jumala, hänhän ei tiedä ollenkaan, että me olemme

purkaneet kihlauksemme, mitähän hän sanoo tädille?…
Ja sitten hän jatkoi:

— Ja mitähän täti hänelle vastaa, kun ei hän aavistakaan, että
olemme menneet uudelleen kihloihin?
Mutta hymyillen ja mitään vastaamatta suuteli Georges Coletten

tuskaisia silmiä. Luoden katseensa maahan ja pyrkien
mahdollisimman yksinkertaisesti suoriutumaan tuosta sekavasta
tilanteesta, kuiskasi Colette:
— Minkä oivan tuuman hän olikaan keksinyt, tuo setä Franeuse!

KIRKKOHERRA CYRILLEN
RUUSUTARHA.
Auringon vaipuessa kohden taivaan rantaa ja kertoellessa valtavin,

niityillä ja kukkuloilla nähtävin piirroin Jumalan kunniasta, kirkkoherra
Cyrille asteli rauhallisesti pappilan puutarhassa, ruusujansa
kastellen.
Hän oli pienikasvuinen, hintelä ja lempeä mies, niin hintelä, että

hänen vartalonsa epämääräiset piirteet tykkänään katosivat
kauhtanan poimuihin, niin lempeä, että häntä kunnioitettiin
Fontanettes'issä, hänen seurakunnassaan, kuin pyhimystä, ja hänen
katseensa sai vihan aallot asettumaan ja vuodatti lohtua murtuneisiin
mieliin. Koko hänen olentonsa henki pelkkää rakkautta.
Hän rakasti vaatimattomia seurakuntalaisiansa, hän rakasti

pappilaansa puutarhoineen, joka palkitsi hänen rakkautensa mitä
runsaimmalla kukkeudella. Hän rakasti myöskin sirorakenteista
kirkkoansa, missä hänen mielensä täytti niin suloinen rauha, niin
ihana tyyneys, hänen kohottaessaan jumalallisen anteeksiannon
kalkin huulillensa. Luojaa palvoessaan hän liittyi luomakunnan
valtavaan kaikkeuteen, kaikkiin olentoihin, kaikkiin olioihin.
Tänä kesäkuun iltana kukkien mehevä sulotuoksu, auringonlaskun
uhkea kirkkaus herätti hänen mielessään niin valtavan
kiitollisuudentunteen, että hän, virvoittaessaan ruusujansa raikkaalla
vesisuihkeella, ikäänkuin kiitokseksi noiden monien ihmeiden
iankaikkiselle antajalle autuaallisena alkoi mumista pyhän
Fransiscus Assisilaisen ylistyslaulua:
»Kiitetty olkoon Herramme ja koko hänen luomakuntansa,

erittäinkin Aurinko, veljemme, joka antaa meille päivän ja
valkeuden. Kiitetty olkoon Herramme, joka on antanut meille
Maan, joka meitä elättää ja ruokkii, joka meille suo
monenlaisia hedelmiä, kirjavia kukkasia, yrttejä…»
Kerran, jo kauan sitten, kun Jean-Cyrille Morel ei vielä ollut

pappisuralla, hän oli kokenut kammottavia hetkiä. Ne ne olivat
sirottaneet lunta hänen tukkaansa jo ennen talven tuloa. Yhä
vieläkin, ajan vierittyä yli neljännesvuosisadan eteenpäin, hänelle
väliin kuvastui mieleen, kuinka hän silloin oli nuorena, luottoisana,
toivehikkaana hakenut itselleen Pariisissa paikkaa, joka olisi
tyydyttänyt hänen vaatimattomat pyyteensä, ja mennyt tarjoutumaan
tuon tunnetun kauppahuoneen palvelukseen, jonne hänelle oli
annettu suosituskirje. Hänen istuessaan huoneessa, jonne hänet oli
neuvottu, tuli sinne nuori mies — arvatenkin liikkeen henkilökuntaan
kuuluva — kynä korvan takana, pinkka papereita kädessä. Nöyrää
paikananojaa, joka istui syrjässä hämärässä nurkassaan, hän ei
havainnutkaan. Oi, kun kirkkoherra ajatteli tuota arkipäiväistä alkua,
silloin tunsi hän väristyksen käyvän luitansa ja ytimiänsä myöten, ja
kuva kuvalta esiintyi sitä seurannut näytelmä hänen muistissansa.
Mutta hän kiiruhti karkoittamaan tuon pahan unen… Eikö hänen

tullut siunata tuota kauheata koettelemusta taivaan välikappaleena?
Olihan se johtanut hänet kaikkien haavojen parantajan luo, hänen,
joka yksin voi vuodattaa lohtua vääryyden runtelemaan mieleen!
Viattomasti syytettynä, halveksittuna, oli Jean-Cyrille muistanut ne
pyrkimykset, jotka lapsuudenaikana olivat täyttäneet hänen, pappien
kasvattaman orvon mielen, ja tuntien vakavaa kutsumusta
pappisvirkaan hän oli antautunut Jumalalle.
Nyt olivat myrskyt vaimenneet hänen sydämessään, katkeruus oli

muuttunut lempeydeksi. Rukouksistansa, joissa hän anoi
ihmisveljillensä Herran armoa ja hänen antimiansa, hän ei sulkenut
pois ainoatakaan ihmistä, ei ainoatakaan, — ei edes tuota
rangaistuksetta jäänyttä pahantekijää, jonka nimeä hän ei tiennyt,
tuota miestä, joka rohkeasti oli jättänyt hänet häpeää kärsimään. Niin
oli hän onnellinen, sillä maallista kunnianhimoa ei hän tuntenut, eikä
hän tyydytyksen lisäksi, mitä hänen pyhä toimensa hänelle tuotti,
pyytänyt muuta kuin tilaisuutta tehdä hiukan hyvää ja saada hoidella
ruusujansa.
Puutarhan portti aukeni ja siitä tuli sisään viheliäisesti vaatetettu

talonpoika, joka katse rukoilevana jäi seisomaan parin askeleen
päähän portista. Kirkkoherra oikaisihe heti kumarasta asennostaan
ja pani pois ruiskukannunsa.
— Te se olette, Chabonneau-parka, sanoi hän. — Niin… kuulin

kaikki
Paulinelta. Kävin tänä aamuna linnassa, ystäväni, mutta herra
Minoussier ei ollut kotosalla. Menen sinne kyllä vielä uudelleen…
Nyt seurasi äänettömyys. Chabonneau pyöritteli lakkiansa

känsäisissä käsissään, katse suunnattuna tuon pienen käytävän
soraan. Herttaisesti ryhtyi kirkkoherra jälleen puhumaan:
— Mutta miksikä te metsästelettekin, Chabonneau-parkani, herra
Minoussier'in alueella? Sehän on varsin pahoin tehty, ja minusta
näyttää siltä kuin te ette täysin käsittäisi, miten tuota tekoanne on
arvosteltava… Salametsästyshän on toisen omaisuuden riistämistä.
Chabonneau painoi päänsä yhä alemmaksi.
— Voi, hyvä kirkkoherra, sanoi hän, — eihän kukaan tavoittelisi

hänen riistaansa, jos vain omistaisi hiukan enemmän rahaa tai saisi
vähän enemmän työtä.
Puiden sitten nyrkkiä epätoivoisesti kohden taivasta hän huusi:
— Voi sitä surkeata onnettomuutta! Miksikä Paulinen pitikin neuloa

minun nimeni lakkiini. Sehän minut saattoi turmioon, kirkkoherra.
Minulla on ketterät sääret, minua ei olisi tavoitettu, mutta juostessani
pakoon vetäisi puunoksa tuon kirotun lakin maahan, ja sitten oli
sama, juoksinko vai en, herra Minoussier'illä oli mitä parhain todiste
minua vastaan! Pirun Pauline!
— Pauline luuli tekevänsä hyvin, ystäväni, vastasi kirkkoherra

isällisesti, — ja hän on erinomainen vaimo, sen te kyllä tiedätte.
Chabonneaun mieli heltyi.
— On kylläkin, varsin oiva vaimo, ja niin herttaisia lapsia on hän

minulle lahjoittanut. Surullista sanoa, mutta on juuri niin, että jos ei
rakastaisi niin kovin lapsiansa ja vaimoansa, niin ei joutuisi niin
helposti kiusaukseen tehdä väärin. Ah, sen sanoinkin kyllä herra
määrille, rukoillen että hän jättäisi asian siksensä. Mutta se mies ei
ota korviinsa köyhien puheita!
— Osoititteko myöskin todellista katumusta? Lupasitteko luopua
salametsästyksestä?
— Mitä herra Minoussier välittää lupauksista! Minä puhuin hänelle

näin: »Herra määri, olen itse asiassa rehellinen mies, ja jos
kunniasanallani lupaan, etten enää koskaan metsästele teidän
alueillanne, niin pidän kyllä kaiken ikäni tuon lupaukseni.» Silloin hän
alkoi nauraa tuota hiljaista nauruansa, joka karmii nahkaa, ja vastasi
minulle: »Isä Chabonneau, kulutatte turhaan aikaanne, ja minä en
voi sietää valitusvirsiä. En ole teille ollenkaan suuttunut siitä, että te
metsästelette minun metsissäni. Miksikä ette kartuttaisi
omaisuuttanne, missä voitte! Minä taasen puolustan omaani, ja kun
nyt tällä kertaa olen saanut teidät kiinni, käytän sitä hyväkseni.
Oletteko rehellinen mies vai ette, se ei koske minua ollenkaan.
Menestys ei yleensä seuraa rehellisiä ihmisiä, jotka usein ovat
hölmöjä, vaan älykkäitä ihmisiä, jotka usein ovat konnia. Jos olisin
teidän ystävänne ja haluaisin antaa teille neuvon, niin en sanoisi:
Älkää harjoittako enää salametsästystä, se on väärin vaan minä
sanoisin: 'Älkää hukatko lakkianne, se on varomatonta!' Ja nyt
jättäkää minut rauhaan!»
Herttainen kirkkoherra oli ehdottomasti pannut kätensä ristiin,

keskeyttämättä silti Chabonneaun kertomusta.
— Näin siis, herra kirkkoherra, jatkoi talonpoika, — ettei minulla

ollut muuta neuvoa kuin lähteä tieheni, ja silloin mietin itsekseni:
»Jos tuohon tiikeriin kukaan voi vaikuttaa — enkä rukoilisikaan
armoa itseni takia, vaan pienokaisteni ja vaimoni tähden, — niin on
kirkkoherra ainoa, joka siihen pystyy!» Niin, siihen nähden ei ole
epäilemistäkään! Sellainen rakkikoira kuin herra määri onkin,
kunnioittaa hän kumminkin herra kirkkoherraa, ja vallan
erinomaisesti! Tuo kunnioitus juuri suo meille mahdollisuuden uskoa,
että hänelläkin on sielu, kuten meillä muilla kristityillä!
Kirkkoherran täytyi hymyillä. Hän oli ollut vain virka-asioitten

johdosta tekemisissä Fontanettes'in määrin kanssa, mutta hänen oli
täytynyt ihmetellä sitä suurta arvonantoa, jota hänelle oli aina
osoittanut tuo virkamies, joka muutoin oli pappien ilmetty vihollinen.
Eräänä päivänä oli herra Minoussier, lähtiessään kirkkoherra

Cyrillen luota, ojentanut hänelle kätensä ja sanonut jyrkkään
tapaansa, mutta mitä sydämellisimmällä äänellä:
— Herra kirkkoherra, tiedän kyllä, että pyhimyksiä ei ole olemassa,

mutta kaikki ihmiset toistavat, että te olette hyvä kuin pyhimys, ja
luulen kyllä, että te voisitte käydä sellaisesta… Kun olen vakuutettu,
että te väliin hoidatte minun asioitani tuolla ylhäällä, haluaisin kysyä,
sallitteko minun huolehtia asioistanne täällä alhaalla?
— Herra määri, oli kirkkoherra vastannut, kiittäen liikutettuna herra

Minoussier'iä, — joka ilta ja aamu rukoilen teidän puolestanne
taivaan Kuningasta. Jos te tahdotte hyväntahtoisesti rukoilla minun
puolestani maallisia vallanpitäjiä, niin pyytäkää että he antaisivat
minun elää ja kuolla täällä Fontanettes'issä. Siitä olisin teille perin
kiitollinen.
Tuo vähäinen tapahtuma johtui nyt kirkkoherran mieleen. Ottaen

sitten puheiksi Chabonneaun ilmaisemat epäilykset hän huudahti,
taputtaen Isäntä ystävällisesti olalle:
— Epäilemättä on herra määrillä sielu kuten meilläkin, teillä ja

minulla. Älkää luulko että Jumala häntä unohtaa tai oikeuttaa meitä
sellaisiin arvosteluihin. Ken tietää hänen tarkoitusperäänsä tuohon
sieluun nähden, jonka olemassaolon te haluaisitte kieltää! Pyhä
Paavalikin oli alkuaan vain fariseus… Mutta aluksi koetan nyt käyttää
ensi kertaa ja parhaani mukaan tuota vaikutusvaltaa, jota minulla
otaksutte olevan herra Minoussier'iin nähden. Älkää nukkuko kovin
huonosti, ystäväni, ja varokaa torumasta Paulinea! Pyytäkää
päinvastoin, että hän neuloo nimenne uuteenkin lakkiinne. Se
varoittaa teitä pudottamasta sitä muuanne kuin sinne, mistä se
vaaratta voidaan löytää. Olen lukenut jostakin tällaisen sananlaskun:
»Teko salattava jätä tekemättä!» Siinä on tosi sana. Jos ihmiset eivät
meitä näekään, lapseni, näkee meidät Jumala… ja se on paljoa
vaarallisempaa!
Chabonneau loittoni kuuluvin askelin maantietä pitkin. Hiukan

hajamielisempänä kuin ennen jatkoi kirkkoherra Cyrille ruusujen
kastelemista. Mutta kohtalo oli määrännyt, etteivät pappilan ruusut
saisi tänä iltapäivänä nauttia rauhassa tuota virvoketta. Kuului
kumeaa jyminää, ja pian pysähtyivät tomupilven ympäröimät
ajoneuvot tuon pienen portin edustalle. Ne olivat herra Léon
Minoussier'in, Fontanettes'in määrin huvivaunut.
Hän oli jo harmaantuva mies, mutta hänen kookas, kopearyhtinen

vartensa vaikutti reippaalta, hänen esiintymisensä oli perin säntillistä,
vieläpä komeaakin, ja napinlävessä hänellä oli, vielä puuttuvan
kunnialegionan nauhan asemesta, kansanvalistusosaston pieni
orvokki. Laskeutuen ajoneuvoista hän paljasti kunnioittavasti
päänsä, käydäksensä pappilan puutarhaan.
— Hyvää iltaa, herra kirkkoherra, sanoi hän, suu hymyssä ja käsi

ojennettuna. — Minulle kerrottiin teidän käyneen tänä aamuna
linnassa, ja kun käyntinne herätti mielessäni toiveita, että te
vihdoinkin sallitte minun tehdä teille jonkun palveluksen, niin
kiiruhdin tänne, vapauttaakseni teidät vaivasta tulla toistamiseen.
Ihastuneena Chabonneaun takia tästä hyvätuulisuudesta ja

suopeudesta, kirkkoherra vei herra Minoussier'in huoneeseensa. Se
oli varsin pieni, hyvin vaatimattomasti sisustettu ja vailla kaikkia
taide-esineitä. Mutta norsunluinen ristiinnaulitunkuva näytti
suojaavan sen kapeaa vuodetta, ja saviastioihin asetetut kukkavihkot
soivat juhlan sävyn noille pähkinäpuulla laudoitetuille seinille.
Määrin istuuduttua, kehoitusta noudattaen, huoneen ainoaan

nojatuoliin, ryhtyi kirkkoherra heti hyökkäykseen.
— Herra määri, sanoi hän, — olen teille sitäkin kiitollisempi

hyväntahtoisuudestanne ja vaivannäöstänne, kun todellakin
pyytäisin teiltä suurta armeliaisuudenosoitusta. Isä Chabonneau,
joka todellakin on arveluttavasti rikkonut teitä vastaan, on peräti
epätoivoissaan ja murtuneella mielellä…
Äkkiä katosi määrin ankarapiirteisiltä kasvoilta miellyttävä ilme,

joka oli ne kirkastamat. Epäävällä liikkeellä hän sai hurskaan
anomuksentekijän keskeyttämään lauseensa.
— Älkää lausuko pyyntöänne, rukoilen sitä teiltä, sanoi hän, ja tuo

rukous muistutti suuresti ehdotonta kieltoa. — Tulin tänne vakavin
toivein voida tehdä teille palveluksen, herra kirkkoherra. Mutta
nähkääs, vaikka tuo itse — ja hän viittasi töykeästi kädellään
seinäkomerossa olevaan ristiinnaulitunkuvaan — vaikka tuo itse
elpyisi eloon ja esittäisi minulle tarkoittamanne pyynnön, antaisin
täsmälleen saman vastauksen. Chabonneau on jo kyllin kauan
hävitellyt metsieni riistaa varoituksista huolimatta. Tällä kertaa
tapasin hänet verekseltä, ja nyt hän saa pitää hyvänään seuraukset.
Kirkkoherra oli tyrmistynyt tuosta puheesta ja ennen kaikkea mitä
syvimmin loukkaantunut halveksivasta tavasta, millä määri oli
puhunut hänen kalliista Vapahtajastaan, mutta hän hillitsi kumminkin
närkästyksensä.
— Tiedän yhtä hyvin kuin tekin, herra määri, että Chabonneau on

syyllinen tuohon rikokseen, vastasi hän mitä suurimmalla
lempeydellä. — Nuhtelin häntä jo ankarasti siitä ja teen sen vielä
uudelleenkin, siitä voitte olla vakuutettu. Mutta hän on luvannut
minulle ja lupaa teillekin, että hän on vastedes kunnioittava
omistusoikeuttanne. Ajatelkaa sitäkin, että hän on köyhä ja kenties
pikemmin altis kiusauksille kuin joku toinen, ottakaa huomioon, että
hänellä on vaimo ja kaksi pientä lasta…
Kuullessaan nuo sanat määri tyrskähti nauruun, tuollaiseen

hiljaiseen nauruun, joka Chabonneausta oli niin pöyristyttävää.
— Kuulkaas, herra kirkkoherra, sanoi hän, — tuo vanha virsi ei

oikein sovi teidän suullenne. Tuhat tulimmaista, minä tunnen sen
ennestään! Vaimo ja lapset… jollei sokea äiti ja raajarikko isä ja
muuta sellaista! Ei, nähkääs, kirkkoherra, minä olen liian ovela
mies… sellaista ei minulle pidä syöttää!
Kun nyt kirkkoherra vaikeni, tykkänään ymmälle joutuneena,

istuutui Minoussier mukavammin nojatuoliinsa, jatkaen puhettansa
kohteliaisuudella, johon sekaantui jonkunmoista kylmää ivaa:
— Herra kirkkoherra, niin erillänne maailman touhusta kuin te

täällä olettekin elänyt vuosikausia, on teidän kumminkin täytynyt
kuulla puhuttavan eräästä miehestä nimeltä Charles Darwin ja
kirjasta nimeltä »Lajien synty». En halua suinkaan käydä oppineesta
ja vielä vähemmän viisaustieteilijästä, ja tunnustan teille, että minulle
on kaikesta tuon englantilaisen luonnontieteilijän lorusta jäänyt
muistiin yksi ainoa lauselma, — mutta se onkin, käytännölliseen
elämään sovellettuna, arvokkaampi rikkautta. »Tapa minut, muutoin
minä surmaan sinut!» Tuo on minun mielilauselmani. Opettakaa se
Chabonneaulle, se voi kenties hyödyttää häntä. Mitä itseeni tulee…
niin näette, ettei minua ainakaan tähän saakka ole tapettu.
Tuo häikäilemätön tunnottomuus tuotti kirkkoherralle kiihkeää

tuskaa ja saattoi hänet samalla tukalaan asemaan. Kuten äsken
Chabonneaun puhuessa, hänen hennot sormensa liittyivät yhteen
äänettömään rukoukseen.
— Teitä ei ole tapettu, mutta tekään ette ole surmannut ketään! Oi,
herra määri, älkää toki kerskatko tuollaisesta mielilauseesta, joka on
niin julma, niin tykkänään epäinhimillinen! Voisin vannoa, että te
olette parempi kuin itse luulette, ja…
— Te erehtyisitte, kirkkoherra, erehtyisitte tykkänään, vastasi

määri samaan kylmän kohteliaaseen ja hieman pisteliääseen sävyyn
kuin ennenkin. — Sillä jos Chabonneaun asiaan nähden
noudatankin vain ilmeistä oikeutta, niin ei silti ole sanottu, etten voisi
soveltaa tuota Darwinin lauselmaa tapauksiin, joissa oikeuteni olisi
kysymyksenalainen…
— Kuulkaapa, kirkkoherra, jatkoi hän, vetäen tuolinsa hiukan

lähemmäksi pöytää, johon kirkkoherra Cyrille nojasi, — en voisi
selittää syytä siihen, mutta te olette aina herättänyt mielessäni
ääretöntä luottamusta, niin määrätöntä luottamusta, että jos te
sanoisitte minulle, joka kuulun epäuskoisiin, kuten tiedätte:
»Vakuutan teille kunniasanallani, että Jumala on olemassa!» niin
joutuisin melkein kiusaukseen uskoa teitä. Mutta jättäkäämme
tämä… Se, mitä tarkoitan sanoa, on että minua haluttaisi antaa teille
hiukan outo todiste tästä luottamuksestani… en voi sanoa
tunnustuksella, sillä tuohon sanaan sisältyisi katumuksen käsite, ja
sitä en tunne vähääkään… vaan uskomalla teille salaisuuden, joka
suo teille tilaisuuden nauttia paremmuudestanne minun
kustannuksellani.
Kirkkoherra pudisti päätänsä tyytymätönnä.
— Hyvä herra, sanoi hän, — kaikki nämä puheet tuntuvat minusta

tosiaankin täysin turhilta, enkä lainkaan käsitä…
— Koetan esittää asiat lyhyesti, keskeytti määri hänen lauseensa

jyrkkään tapaansa, joka ei sietänyt vastaväitteitä, alkaen samassa
kertomuksensa.
— Herra kirkkoherra, minä olin nuoruuteni päivinä varsin

vähäpätöinen henkilö ja niin köyhä, että ollessani jo naimisissa ja
kahden lapsen isä ja palvellessani vähäisestä palkasta eräässä
toimituskaupassa Pariisissa, missä toivoin edistyväni nopeammin
kuin maaseudulla, olin pakotettu jättämään vaimoni ja poikani
Yonneen, anoppini huomaan, odottaen parempia aikoja, jolloin voisin
kutsua heidät luokseni…
Työtä en pelännyt, sen saatte uskoa, ja tunsin pystyväni

vaurastumaan, kun vain siihen saisin riittävästi aikaa. Mutta eräänä
päivänä — kävisi liian pitkäksi esittää minkä seikkojen johdosta —
huomasin joutuneeni ahtaalle, olevani aineellisen perikadon partaalla
mitättömän rahamäärän takia. Minun täytyi tavalla millä hyvänsä
saada muutamia kymmeniä louisd'oreja. Hyvä Jumala… en nyt tosin
tahdo väittää, että niiden hankkimiseksi olisin ollut valmis vaikka
salamurhaan… mutta kun tulin erääseen toimistohuoneeseen, jossa
minulla tavallisesti ei toimeni takia ollut mitään tekemistä, ja
havaittuani olevani siellä yksin näin erään auki jääneen laatikon
pohjalla kaksi viidensadan frangin rahaa, joita mikään ei estänyt
minua ottamasta, niin otin ne hetkeäkään empimättä…
Tässä keskeytti määri kertomuksensa raskaasti hengittäen,

voimatta vastustaa mielen järkytystä, jonka tuon hetken
muisteleminen aiheutti. Mutta hän ei ollut huomannut että
kirkkoherra oli käynyt hyvin kalpeaksi ja silmäili häntä oudon
kiinteällä katseella.
— Sanoin jo, että tehdessäni tuon tekoni olin luullut olevani yksin,
mutta olinkin erehtynyt. Verhon tai huonekalujen varjossa oli istunut
joku — aurinko oli jo laskemaisillaan ja varjot eivät voineet olla niin
selväpiirteisiä — muuan paikananoja, joka odotti isäntääni ja joka oli
ohjattu tähän huoneeseen. Epäilemättä hän oli nähnyt tekoni, mutta
hän ei ollut puhunut mitään, ei ollenkaan tullut, esille, eikä kukaan
muu ollut nähnyt minun menevän tuohon huoneeseen tai tulevan
sieltä. Illan tultua etsittiin turhaan noita tuhatta frangia, jotka minä jo
olin toimittanut piilopaikkaan, ja niiden katoamisesta ei syytetty
minua, vaan tuota tuntematonta miestä, paikanhakijaa, jonka
kalpeus ja mielenjärkytys oli kiinnittänyt johtajan huomiota. Kaikki
kehittyi minun edukseni. Pidetyssä kuulustelussa ei kukaan
ajatellutkaan edes tiedustella minulta mitään, niin vieraaksi koko
asialle minua katsottiin. Mitä tuohon miesparkaan tulee, niin ei
hänellä ollut mitään todistetta syyttömyydestään, ei mitään
mahdollisuutta todistaa minun syyllisyyttäni, ja epäilemättä
puolustautuminen kävi hänelle tuiki vaikeaksi. Ilmeistä on, että hänet
olisi toimitettu vankilaan mitä pahimpana veijarina, jollei
liikkeenomistaja olisi katsonut edullisemmaksi jättää asiaa siksensä,
ettei siitä koituisi häpeää hänen kauppahuoneellensa. Muukalaiselle
syydettiin vasten silmiä kaikki halveksiminen, joka hänen katsottiin
ansaitsevan, ja hänet velvoitettiin lähtemään Pariisista… Minä olin
pelastettu. Siitä on nyt jo kulunut viisikolmatta vuotta, ja voisin
vannoa, etten ole näiden viidenkolmatta vuoden kuluessa tehnyt
ainoatakaan tekoa, jonka takia minun pitäisi punastua… jos nimittäin
punastuminen kuuluisi tapoihini. Olin saavuttanut mahdollisuuden
olla rehellinen ja tulin rehelliseksi. Nyt olen rikas ja olen jo aikoja
sitten lähettänyt tuolle kauppahuoneelle nimeäni ilmoittamatta
maksun muodossa nuo rahat, jotka sieltä… varastin. Nyt olen minä
suuressa arvossa pidetty henkilö, jos en olekaan liioin rakastettu.
Kaiken päälliseksi olen kuntani määri, ja on olemassa suuria
edellytyksiä, että ensi vaalien jälkeen herään jonakin aamuna
piirikuntani edustajana. Ajatelkaapas, missä olisinkaan tänään, jos
tuolla miehellä, jota syytettiin minun asemestani ja jota minä varoin
puhdistamasta noista syytöksistä, olisi ollut pienintäkään
mahdollisuutta kääntää syytökset minuun? Kohtalo ei suonut hänelle
mitään keinoa syöstä minua perikatoon… ja minä syöksin hänet.
En tiedä ollenkaan, lopetti muinoinen kauppavirkailija

kertomuksensa, tehden huolettoman kädenliikkeen, — miten tuon
onnettoman miehen sitten on käynyt.
Fontenettes'in määri ei ollut huomannut, mikä riutumuksen ilme oli

tullut kirkkoherra Cyrillen kasvoille ja kuinka kalpeaksi hän oli käynyt.
Mutta kun hän kertomuksensa päätettyään ehdottomasti kääntyi
kärsivälliseen kuuntelijaan päin, hämmästytti häntä hänen
kasvojensa ylevä tyyneys. Nähdessään papin painavan päänsä alas,
hän hetken tunsi melkein katumusta siitä, että oli levollisella
kertomuksellaan konnantyöstään omien muistojensa loalla tahrannut
tämän harvinaisen puhtaan mielen kirkkautta, — mutta tuohon
katumukseen sekaantui samalla ylpeä ja luonnoton tyydytys siitä,
että hänen oli onnistunut hämmästyttää, kauhistuttaa tuota viatonta
olentoa, joka oli vapaaehtoisesti paennut ihmiselämän
koettelemuksia ja taisteluita.
Kirkkoherra Cyrille katsoi yhä vielä sanaakaan puhumatta lattiaan,

missä auringon viime säteet leikiskelivät. Äkkiä hän suoristautui, ja
äänellä niin vakavalla, niin järkytetyllä, ettei määri ollut vielä
konsanaan sellaista kuullut, hän ryhtyi vuoroonsa puhumaan:
— Pappisvirassa tulee tuntemaan paljon ihmisiä ja saa tietoonsa

paljon asioita. Minä olen tuntenut tuon onnettoman miehen, jonka
kohtalosta teillä ei ole tietoa, ja teidän kertomuksenne tapahtumista
vastaa täsmälleen hänen suustaan kuulemaani kuvausta niistä,
lisäten siten asiaan kohdistuvia tietojani ainoastaan rikollisen
nimellä. Mutta eräs yksityiskohta on jäänyt teiltä huomaamatta. Sinä
hetkenä, jolloin te pelokkaana ja hätiköiden piilotitte nuo kaksi
viidensadan frangin rahaa salkkuunne, putosi povitaskustanne
lattialle muuan paperi, arvatenkin teidän sitä huomaamattanne. Se
oli puolen arkin paperi, johon oli kirjoitettu loppu samana aamuna
tulleesta kirjeestä… Jäätyään yksin tuo mies, joka rajattoman
kauhun herpaamana oli ollut tuon… heikkoutenne todistajana, otti
paperin, tehden itsensä syypääksi siihen epähienouteen että luki
sen. Hän jätti sen minulle, ja koska minulla nyt on siihen tilaisuus,
niin annan sen teille takaisin.
Hitaasti, vaivalloisesti, ikäänkuin vuosien taakka äkkiä olisi käynyt

raskaammaksi kantaa, nousi kirkkoherra paikaltansa, avasi lippaan,
otti siitä paperin, jossa vielä voi nähdä kevyen naiskäden
kirjoituksen, jonka aika oli haalistanut. Hän ojensi paperin määrille,
— se oli hänen mainitsemansa kirjeen loppu.
»… Hyvästi siis, rakas puolisoni», puhuivat nuo pienet, vaaleat

kirjaimet, »tai pikemminkin näkemiin! Oi kuinka ikävöin saada
syleillä sinua. Näetkös, minua kammottaa tuo suuri Pariisi,
kammottaa kaiken sen takia, mitä siitä tiedän, ja kaiken sen takia,
mitä siitä en tiedä. Ja sinä et tunne siellä ketään! Eikö siellä olla
ynseitä muukalaisille, noille maaseutulaisraukoille, joista
pariisilaiset usein tekevät pilkkaa? Oi, jospa siellä kohtaisit ystävän,
veljen, joka sinua auttaisi ja tukisi! Joka ilta, Léon'ini, annan lasten
polvistua viereeni, ja me rukoilemme Jumalaa varjelemaan sinua
kaikista vaaroista ja antamaan sinut meille jälleen, sillä me
rakastamme sinua niin kovin!
Vaimosi
Gabrielle.
Pienokaiset syleilevät sinua.
Chéroyssa, 15 p. huhtikuuta 18——»
Herra Minoussier'in kädet vapisivat kiihkeästi, lehti liiti maahan.

Silmät levällään hän harhailevin katsein näytti odottavan selvitystä
papilta.
Valkotukkainen kirkkoherra seisoi pöydän ääressä kasvot

kalmankalpeina, niin läpikuultavan kalpeina, että niistä ilmeni hänen
ääretön ruumiillinen heikkoutensa. Hänen silmänsä kohtasivat tuon
niitä hakevan, harhailevan katseen.
— Herra määri, alkoi hän jälleen puhua, — tuo köyhä

paikanhakija, jonka ihmiset tuomitsivat teidän asemestanne, ei ollut
koskaan lukenut »Lajien syntyä» eikä tiennyt mitä Darwin on
kirjoittanut. Mutta hän oli lukenut evankeliumit ja hän tiesi että muuan
Jeesus Natsarealainen on sanonut: »Rakasta lähimmäistäsi kuten
itseäsi!» Sitäpaitsi oli tuo poika epäilemättä hyvin lapsekas ja typerä,
sillä tuon vaimoparan kirje, jossa puhuttiin pienokaisista, ei
naurattanut häntä ollenkaan, vaan herätti hänessä kiihkeän halun
puhjeta kyyneliin… Ja hän ajatteli itseksensä: »Ken tietää, ehk'ei tuo
mies ole niin turmeltunut, kuin voisi luulla. Ehkä jotkut erinäiset
asianhaarat saattoivat hänet erityisen alttiiksi kiusaukselle… Ja
hänen vaimonsa on ilman pienintäkään epäilystä hyvä ja hurskas, ja
hänen lapsensa ovat pieniä, ja he rukoilevat kaikki poissaolevan isän
puolesta. Tämän kirjeen avulla minun olisi helppo vapautua kaikista
kärsimyksistä, joita tästä asiasta voi koitua. Mutta silloin joutuisi tämä
puoliso, tämä isä, vankilaan, missä hän seurustelisi huonojen
ihmisten kanssa, jotka turmelisivat hänet tykkänään… ja nuori vaimo
ja nuo pienet lapset vuodattaisivat haikeita kyyneleitä!» Näitä
seikkoja hän tosiaankin mietiskeli ja paljon muuta lisäksi, tuo
houkkioparka… ja niin hän piti kirjeen salassa… Teidän sitä
aavistamattannekaan hän koetti olla tuo ystävä, veli, jota vaimonne
rukoili teille taivaalta… Rukous pelasti teidät, teidät, joka ette usko
Jumalaa olevankaan!… Epäluulot kohdistuivat tuohon järjettömään
poikaan, häntä kohdeltiin rikollisena. Hän vakuutti viattomuuttaan,
mutta hän ei sanonut sanaakaan, ei antanut vihjaustakaan, joka olisi
johtanut tutkijat syyllisen jäljille… teidän jäljillenne… Hän muisti että
tuo itse, kuten te sanoitte, kärsi häpeällisen kuoleman, koska hän,
Jumalan poika, tahtoi kantaa koko ihmiskunnan synnit… Silloin
ajatteli hän, että kurja Aadamin poika kenties jaksaisi kantaa yhden
ainoan veljensä rikoksen ja elää siten, kuin hänen Vapahtajansa oli
kuollut… Hän kärsi tuikeita tuskia… Sitten Jumala otti korviinsa
hänen rukouksensa ja antoi hänelle rauhan… Hän rupesi papiksi.
Määri oli luonut katseensa maahan, ja vähitellen oli koko hänen

ruumiinsa noudattanut samaa tunteen kehoitusta. Hän oli
kumartunut kumartumistaan, painanut otsansa maahan, äärettömän
nöyrtymyksen vallassa.
— Anteeksi! mumisi hän.
Hän olisi halunnut puhua enemmän, tulkita tunteita, jotka

kiihkeinä, sekavina täyttivät koko hänen olentonsa, ennen
tuntematonta kaipuuta, jonka päämäärästä hän ei ollut selvillä,
haluansa vaipua olemattomiin, päästäksensä ilkeydestään, — — —
sitten rajatonta ihailuansa, joka hänestä tuntui häntä kohottavan,
samalla kuin se saattoi hänet yhä selvemmin tuntemaan oman
kurjuutensa. Ja liikutuksen vallassa, joka oli hänen tahtoansa
voimakkaampi, hän otti, ennenkuin kirkkoherra ehti sen estää, tuon
pyhän miehen käden omaansa ja pusersi sille huulensa.
— Herra kirkkoherra, sopersi hän, — en ansaitse

anteeksiantoanne. Minun on koetettava ansaita se tekemällä hyvää,
rakkaudentöillä…
Korina hänen voimakkaasta rinnastansa keskeytti hänen

puheensa.
— Minä en ole uskovainen, jatkoi hän vihdoin, — mutta kunnioitan

uskoa, joka on tehnyt teidät sellaiseksi kuin olette… Herra
kirkkoherra, tahdotteko rukoilla minun puolestani?
— Olkaa siunattu, veljeni, tuon pyyntönne tähden, vastasi

kirkkoherra Cyrille mitä suurimmalla lempeydellä. — Olen ottanut
menneisyyden puheiksi, johtaakseni teidät Jumalan luo. Johtakoon
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Speech Production And Second Language Acquisition

Development of Verb Inflection in First Language

Language Acquisition Knowledge Representation and

Advances in Language Acquisition 1st Edition Stavroula

Functional Categories in Learner Language Studies on

Sociolinguistics and Second Language Acquisition Learning

Psychology of the Language Learner Individual Differeces

Introducing Second Language Acquisition Perspectives and

melissa bowerman is Senior Scientist at the Max Planck Institute for

st eph en l ev i n s o n is Director of the Max Planck Institute for

Language acquisition and conceptual development

This new series looks at the role of language in human cognition –

1. Jan Nuyts and Eric Pedersen (eds.) Language and conceptualization

Cambridge University Press

© Cambridge University Press 2001

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 2001

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

ISBN-13 978-0-521-59358-8 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-59659-6 paperback

Transferred to digital printing 2006

Part 1 Foundational issues

Part 2 Constraints on word learning?

Part 3 Entities, individuation, and quantiﬁcation

28 Individuation, relativity, and early word learning 215

Part 4 Relational concepts in form–function mapping

19 Covariation between spatial language and cognition, and its 566

Author index 589

Melissa Bowerman and Stephen C. Levinson

(initiated on a comparative basis by Slobin 1967) has come at last to a point

1.2 The child’s innate biases: native constraints, learning mechanisms

1.3 Comparative perspectives

plumb the infant’s understanding of linguistic expressions before he or she

2 The major themes of the volume

sies? The Chomskyan tradition, with its emphasis on an innate syntactic

development which permits and constrains its acquisition, language is being

production: infants seem to have arrived at the language-speciﬁc classiﬁca-

A note on the organization of this volume

(eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/

foundational physical cognition (e.g., knowledge about causality and

Fig. 1.1 6-month-old subject composing a set comprising a green cylinder

Fig. 1.2 6-month-old subject composing a set comprising a green rectan-

Fig. 1.4 Second-order classifying by a 21-month-old subject.

onset age, velocity, sequence, extent, or organization of cognitive develop-

2 Invariant initial elements of cognition

recomposing operations (Langer 1980). (Here I focus only on composing for

3 Invariant elementary logicomathematical and physical cognitions

4 Invariant onset age of physical cognition

Human infants begin to construct knowledge about the existence and

The sequence of classifying is invariant in humans (Langer 1980, 1986) and

7 Variant extent of developing elements of cognition

8 Variant extent of developing cognition

Ehdottomasti huudahti Colette:

— Tuon punatukkaisen tytön kanssa… arvasin sen heti!

Georges näytti peräti ällistyneeltä.

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