Right to a sound environment

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993

Facts:

This case is a class action suit seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber license agreements
which allegedly infringed the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Several minors represented by their parents filed a complaint against the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop
the issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
(Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they represented
others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitioners have legal standing for them being minors

2. Whether they have a cause of action against the defendant

3. Whether there is a valid class suit

4. Whether the issue raised by petitioners is a political question and not subject to judicial review

5. Whether the obligation of contracts would be impaired by the revocation and cancellation of
contracts

Held:

1. Whether Petitioners have Legal standing for them being minors

Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to
preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

2. Whether they have a cause of action against defendant

Respondents aver that the Secretary has not violated any legal right and that the complaint is vague
and nebulous allegations concerning an “environmental right” which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the “protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae.” They therefore assert that
the petitioners’ resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage
of a bill that would ban logging totally.

The Court ruled that cause of action exists. Petitioners’ cause of action as it is anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements under Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the
Constitution which are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases.

3. Whether there is a valid class suit

The court said yes, the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, because the petitioners are so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all parties in the case. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid
class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case
and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

4. Whether the issue raised by petitioners is a political question and not subject to
judicial review

Defendants suggest that the question is not ripe for the Supreme Court’s intervention. The court said
no; it can no longer be an obstacle to the exercise of judicial review or an impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Article VIII, Sec. 1 (2) 1987 Philippine Constitution

Thus, the court can invoke the expanded power of judicial review in which the Judicial Branch can
correct grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

5. Whether the obligation of contracts would be impaired by the revocation and

cancellation of contracts

The Court ruled that TLA’s are not contracts. These are licenses and therefore privileges granted by
the State and are subject to regulation. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is
because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare.

Rights of nature

Resident Mammals vs. Reyes G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals, which are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises,
and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañon Strait, allegedly bring their case in their personal
capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity “as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms
and as responsible stewards of God's Creations.” As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals,
the human petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the affected
residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect the environment, especially in light of the government's
failure, as primary steward, to do its duty under the doctrine of public trust. Resident Marine Mammals
and the human petitioners also assert that through this case, this court will have the opportunity to
lower the threshold for locus standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."

ISSUES:

Whether or not animals have legal standing before courts.

RULING:
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are considered as similarly
situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive
disability), are unable to bring suit for themselves. In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are
recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be
properly represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals. Animals play
an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as humans, may feel
the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests
and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts.

The use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear
legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an existing
legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the population
represented or those that are yet to be born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing
because there is a threat of catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary. Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together.

The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its potential
to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of "real party in
interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will
potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a
right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.

Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of
petition.

In comparison to that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development
Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing both as real parties in interest and as
representatives of subsistence fisherfolks of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and their families, and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly
affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly affected their source of
livelihood, primarily felt through the significant reduction of their fish harvest. The actual, direct, and
material damage they suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a
proper subject of a legal suit.

Police power

Zabal, et. al vs. Duterte, GR. No. 238467, February 12, 2019

Facts: Zabal and Jacosalem are both residents of Boracay who, at the time of the filing of the petition,
were earning a living from the tourist activities therein. Zabal claims to build sandcastles for tourists
while Jacosalem drives for tourists and workers in the island.

President Duterte first made public his plan to shut it down during a business forum held in Davao. This
was followed by several speeches and news releases stating that he would place Boracay under a
state of calamity. True to his words, President Duterte ordered the shutting down of the island in a
cabinet meeting

Petitioners claim that ever since the news of Boracay's closure came about, fewer tourists had been
engaging the services of Zabal and Jacosalem such that their earnings were barely enough to feed
their families. They fear that if the closure pushes through, they would suffer grave and irreparable
damage. Hence, despite the fact that the government was then yet to release a formal issuance on the
matter, petitioners filed the petition praying that a temporary restraining order restraining the
respondents, and all persons acting under their command, order, and responsibility from enforcing a
closure of Boracay Island or from banning the petitioners, tourists, and non-residents therefrom.

Petitioners aver that the same covers property rights and these include the right to work and earn a
living. Since the government, through Proclamation No. 475, restricted the entry of tourists and non-
residents into the island, petitioners claim that they, as well as all others who work, do business, or
earn a living in the island, were deprived of the source of their livelihood as a result thereof. To make
those innocent of environmental transgressions suffer the consequences of the Boracay closure is
tantamount to violating their right to due process.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have vested rights on their sources of income as to be entitle to due
process.

Held: No. "A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these
rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an
actionable wrong."

It must be stressed, though, that "when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by
due process, must yield to general welfare."

In any case, petitioners, particularly Zabal and Jacosalem, cannot be said to have already acquired
vested rights to their sources of income in Boracay. As heretofore mentioned, they are part of the
informal sector of the economy where earnings are not guaranteed.

Here, Zabal and Jacosalem's asserted right to whatever they may earn from tourist arrivals in Boracay
is merely an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as
one's own.

Public trust doctrine

Maynilad vs DENR, G.R. No. 202897/G.R. No. 206823/G.R. No. 207969. August 6, 2019

Doctrine

Public Trust Doctrine - speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. The doctrine further holds that certain
natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or controlled because of their inherent
importance to each individual and society as a whole. A clear declaration of public ownership, the
doctrine reaffirms the superiority of public rights over private rights for critical resources. It impresses
upon states the affirmative duties of a trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of
present and future generations and embodies key principles of environmental protection: stewardship,
communal responsibility, and sustainability. In this framework, a relationship is formed - the State is
the trustee, which manages specific natural resources -the trust principal -for the trust principal -for
the benefit of the current and future generations -the beneficiaries.

Facts of the Case

Several DENR Regional Offices filed a complaint before the DENR’s Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
charging MWSS and it concessionaires, Manila and Manila Water, with failure to provide, install,
operate, and maintain adequate Waste Water Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system
resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water leading to manila
bay. - Secretary of DENR took cognizance of the case and issued thereafter a Notice of Violation to
herein petitioners.

Arguments of the Petitioners

 MWSS – It argues that its obligation under Section 8 of Clean Water Act has YET to accrue given the
lack of required coordination and cooperation by the lead and implementing agencies particularly the
DPWH, DENR, and LGUs

Maynilad – It anchors their argument with the MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay which
ultimately ordered MWSS to construct the necessary WWTF in the areas of Manila, Rizal and Cavite
with a deadline for completion of the construction

Manila Water – Argued that they were deprived of due process of the law when the DENR imposed fine
without a valid complaint or charge.

Secretary of the DENR - Petitioners are guilty for violating such law, specifically the provisions on the
five-year period to connect the existing sewage lines, is mandatory.

Petitioners failed to provide a centralized sewerage system and connect all sewage lines is a
continuing unmitigated environmental pollution resulting in the release and discharge of untreated
water into various water areas and manila bay - Petitioners filed for MR but was dismissed; elevated
the matters to the CA.

CA did not consolidate the cases but still dismissed 3 petitioners’ cases - CA dismissed Maynilad’s
petition for violation of procedural rules; denied its MR, too. CA dismissed Manila Water’s petition
questioning the clarity of the law (sec. 8), CA stated that the law is clear and unambiguous; Denied
their MR, too - CA also dismissed MWSS’s petition for violating procedural rules

Issue/s:

WON herein petitioners violated Sec. 8 of the Clean Water Act

SC Ruling: YES. Petitioners have fully and faithfully complied with the proviso in Section 8, only in the
aspect that they are authorized under the Service Obligations under the Agreements to impose
sewerage services charges and fees for the connection of the existing sewage line to the available
sewerage system. They seem to forget, however, that receipt of these fees entailed the legal duty of
actually and completely installing the already long-delayed sewerage connections. Maynilad and
Manila Water still found space in their private contract to prolong compliance thereto for fifteen more
years. This Court cannot accept their highlighted justifications therefor. As earlier pointed out, the
completion of the septage and sewerage connections have already been lagging for fifteen years past
the effectivity of the Clean Water Act.

Petition Denied. Petitioners to pay P921,464,184.00 covering the period starting from May 7, 2009 to

the date of promulgation of this Decision

SEC. 8 of Clean Water Act. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and Disposal. - Within five (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act, the agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage facilities
and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in Republic
Act No. 7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be required to connect the existing sewage line found in
all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and recreational facilities, hospitals,
market places, public buildings, industrial complex and other similar establishments including
households to available sewerage system: Provided, That the said connection shall be subject to
sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations unless the sources
had already utilized their own sewerage system: Provided, further, That all sources of sewage and
septage shall comply with the requirements herein. In areas not considered as HUCs, the DPWH in
coordination with the Department, DOH and other concerned agencies, shall employ septage or
combined sewerage-septage management system.
For the purpose of this section, the DOH, in coordination with other government agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment and disposal of sewage including
guidelines for the establishment and operation of centralized sewage treatment system.

Regalian doctrine

La Bugal vs. Ramos (G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004)

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the
rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos.
Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA
7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares
of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.

Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and
WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like
WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII
Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.

In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole
stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by
Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before
the Court of Appeals.

EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider
and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or
agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the
President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of
the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides for the protection
of Australian investments.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-
owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract‖
that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna,
and other natural resources are owned by the State.‖ The same section also states that, ―the
exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or
utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete
control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary
rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance‖
in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance.‖
The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature
of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements‖ in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent
provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to
foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the
mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors
to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with
nothing but bare title thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the

constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged
in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional
or connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract
area.‖ Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP
beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the
benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the
vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the
contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Read also La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos | GR 127882 | January 27, 2004

Rights of indigenous peoples

Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449,1909 Cruz vs. NCIP, G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount
to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in
the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain.
They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title
that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.

Precautionary principle

ISAAA vs. Greenpeace, GR No. 209271, December 8, 2015

FACTS:In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs the regulation of
the importation or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological
materials in the Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of
Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of
the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI)
executed a Memorandum of Undertaking, in pursuance of a collaborative research and development
project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer.
Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ
of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order
(TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials (The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein CrylAc which is
toxic to target insect pests.) violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology
considering that the required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation and that there is no independent, peer-reviewed study on
the safety of Bt talong for human consumption and the environment. While the respondents contend
that all environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the affected
communities and that the Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law

ISSUES: Whether the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects

involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country

RULING: Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly
petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to
the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.
All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to
undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to prepare a
detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.
An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to have significant
adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and which “include activities that have
significant environmental consequences.”
In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential
hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through
field testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

Non-impairment clause

Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining, 2004, 426 SCRA 517

Facts: The four (4) petitioners after having been granted permission to prospect for marble deposits in
the mountains of Biak-na-Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan, succeeded in discovering marble deposits of high
quality and in commercial quantities in Mount Mabio which forms part of the Biak-na-Bato mountain
range. The petitioners applied with the Bureau of Mines, now Mines and Geosciences Bureau, for the
issuance of the corresponding license to exploit said marble deposits. License No. 33 was issued by the
Bureau of Mines in favor of the herein petitioners. Shortly after Respondent Ernesto R. Maceda was
appointed Minister of the DENR, petitioners License No. 33 was cancelled by him through his letter to
ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION dated September 6, 1986. CA Ruling:
Cancellation of respondents’ license without notice and hearing was tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. It added that under the clause in the Constitution dealing with the
non-impairment of obligations and contracts, respondents license must be respected by the State.
Petitioners Argument: The license was validly declared a nullity and consequently withdrawn or
terminated. In the said issued letter, respondents were informed by then Minister Maceda that their
license had illegally been issued, because it violated Section 69 of PD 463; and that there was no more
public interest served by the continued existence or renewal of the license. The latter reason, they
added, was confirmed by the language of Proclamation No. 84. According to this law, public interest
would be served by reverting the parcel of land that was excluded by Proclamation No. 2204 to the
former status of that land as part of the Biak-na-Bato national park. *Section 69. Maximum Area of
Quarry License Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 hereof, a quarry license shall cover an
area of not more than one hundred (100) hectares in any one province and not more than one
thousand (1,000) hectares in the entire Philippines. The license in question, QLP No. 33, is dated
August 3, 1982, and it was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation. The
terms of the license allowed the corporation to extract and dispose of marbleized limestone from a
330.3062-hectare land in San Miguel, Bulacan. The license is, however, subject to the terms and
conditions of PD 463, the governing law at the time it was granted; Issue: Held: Whether or not
Proclamation no. 84 violated the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. NO. Timber licenses,
permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and
do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview
of the due process of law clause. Proclamation No. 84 cannot be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. As pointed out earlier, respondents license is not a contract to which the protection
accorded by the non-impairment clause may extend. Even if the license were, it is settled that
provisions of existing laws and a reservation of police power are deemed read into it, because it
concerns a subject impressed with public welfare. As it is, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. In line with the foregoing jurisprudence, respondents license may be revoked
or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so requires, because it is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Continuing Mandamus Concerned Citizens vs. MMDA, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008

Facts:

On January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (with Atty. Oposa as their lawyer) filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite

against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleges that the water quality

of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. That the continued

neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);

(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

It was shown by the respondents that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50 ,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative

Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the “ SB” level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml. The RTC

held the petitioners and other agencies jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-

diving and other forms of contact recreation. And within 6 months have a concerted, consolidated and coordinated plan for the cleanup of the bay. The various agencies have

been instructed to perform their duties including defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay.

These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to

actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. The petitioners appealed to the CA contending: 1.

arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general

and 2. that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus. CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision as it did not require

petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.

Issue:
I. Is the cleaning and/or restoration of Manila Bay a ministerial act of the petitioners that can be compelled by mandamus?
II. Does sec. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 pertain only to specific cleaning of pollution and not cleaning in general?

*Note: It is the MMDA and DPWH together with the LGUs that are the primary agencies tasked to remove and demolish the nuisance structures and obstructions

along the bay

Held:
I. Yes, It is a ministerial act.
a. A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that “requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor

judgment.” It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a “simple, definite duty arising under conditions

admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.”

b. The court said that the obligation to perform their ( based on MMDA’s argument) duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such

duties, on the other, are two different concepts.

c. The MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal

systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. This is provided in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA.
d. A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform . Any suggestion that the MMDA

has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
e. The following agencies are therefore precluded from choosing not to perform these duties DENR, MWSS, LWUA, DA, DPWH, PCG, DILG, PPA, DOH,

DepEd, DBM and MMDA.

f. Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed “when persons or entities occupy danger

areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and

playgrounds.”
i. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,

constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in

Metro Manila.
 g. Furthermore it is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic

growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters.
h. Lastly the court said that said: “All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what

are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of

the Manila Bay.”

II. Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General
a. The Court finds for the respondents and their emphasis that Sec. 62(g) of RA 9275(Clean Water Act), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even

enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to

Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
i. Also Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality “has deteriorated to a degree

where its state will adversely affect its best usage.

ii. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
iii. The Court quoting the CA decision: “PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is

better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.”
b. The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality

of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase.
c. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about,

and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level.

Under what other judicial discipline describes as “continuing mandamus,” the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives

with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
d. The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along drainage

ways of the river system.

i. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures

would be on top of the list.

e. Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways.
f. Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major

rivers, and connecting waterways. They should have their waste treatment facilities or otherwise should be forced to transfer or shutdown.
g. The court then cites the ADB commissioned study on the garbage problem of Metro Manila in The Garbage Book which emphasizes on the alarming

quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.

i. The Court then calls for sufficient sanitary landfills now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste

Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA.
h. The Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their

respective official duties and obligations.

Finally they reiterate what has been said in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the

Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental

importance with intergenerational implications.

Writ of kalikasan

Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 207257, February 3, 2015

FACTS:

 In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency organized
and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration Corporation (TCC)
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing their intention to build a
power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and affordable power to Subic Bay
Industrial Park (SBIP).

 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook to build
and operate a coal-fired power plant.

 On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a subsidiary of TCC, for
the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-
Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.

 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28, 2006 to
Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
  RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in applying for
the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of 2008,
expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source
and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for Subic Bay.

 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued an ECC
for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.

 Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its proposed coal-
fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended ECC (first amendment)
allowing the inclusion of additional components, among others.

 Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC. Instead of
constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now sought to
construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.

 On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC (second
amendment).

 The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing the
establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.

 The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011,
expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.

 Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, DENR. The Casiño
Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause environmental
damage. that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the municipalities of
Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.

 While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its ECC
proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal fired power plant

CA:

Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened

- no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs. Not ultra
vires, as the express power of the Secretary of DENR, director and regional directors of the
EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend the same.

- The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan

But invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC and failure to affix the signature
in the sworn statement of full responsibility

- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and other governmental
agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain)

- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued without
the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required under
Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
 - For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature in the sworn
statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)

- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions in the ECC which
requires that any expansion of the project beyond the project description or any change in the
activity shall be subject to a new environmental impact assessment

Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy

- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as under secs
26 and 27 of the LGC

- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all departments and other
governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain

- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA and that the CNO dated October
31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the case and was issued in connection with RP Energy’s
application for a 2x300 MW Coal fired plant

ISSUE

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan; and

2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus,
constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature
of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.

2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that
transcends political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an
ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link
or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of
the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and
the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative
to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities
in the issuance of the ECC.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to substantiate its claims that the
construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the magnitude
contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented evidence to
establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage through its
environmental management plan which will ensure that the project will operate within the limits of
existing environmental laws and standars.
OTHER ISSUES:

 CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Abolitz in the ECC’s
statement of accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the CA.
The circumstance of the case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised of
the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the course of the proceedings upon
clarificatory questions from the CA.

 CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid for failure
to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. DENR
reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an ERMP and a PDR for the first and
second amendment respectively. Through these documents which the DENR
reviewed, a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed project modifications.
No showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.

 CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the IPRA Law. The ECC is
not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59. There is no necessity to
secure the Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under sec 59 before and ECC may be
issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the aforesaid
certification does not render it invalid.

 CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of the LGC (approval of
the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the subject ECC)
issuance of the ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the project. Hence,
there is no necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of the concerned
sanggunian requirement and the issuance of the subject ECC without first complying
with the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.

Segovia v. The Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017 / G.R. No. 194239, June
16, 2015

FACTS Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 171 which created
the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change. This body was reorganized through Executive Order No.
774, which designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task
Force. In 2009, Administrative Order No. 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC to formulate a national
Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy for the Philippines. Later that same year, Congress
passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate Change Commission which absorbed the
functions of the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change and became the lead policy-making body of
the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the programs and action
plans of the government relating to climate change. Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding
their pleas for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and
transportation system in the whole country within 30 days from receipt of the said letter - foremost,
through the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by
50%. Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition. Petitioners’ Arguments In gist,
petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive issuances
resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation of the
petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to
deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without due process
of law. They also decry the "unequal" protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that 98% of
Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning 2% is given almost all of the road
space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any
budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems. Respondents’
Arguments Respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to a writ of kalikasan because they
failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the
environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life,
health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non- implementation of Road
Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage. Respondents likewise assert that petitioners are
similarly not entitled to a Continuing Mandamus because: (a) there is no showing of a direct or
personal injury or a clear legal right to the thing demanded; (b) the writ will not compel a discretionary
act or anything not in a public officer's duty to do; and (c) Department of Budget Management cannot
be compelled to make an instant release of funds as the same requires an appropriation made by law
and the use of the Road Users' Tax requires prior approval of the Road Board. In any event,
respondents denied the specific violations alleged in the petition, stating that they have taken and
continue to take measures to improve the traffic situation in Philippine roads and to improve the
environment condition - through projects and programs such as: priority tagging of expenditures for
climate change adaptation and mitigation, the Integrated Transport System which is aimed to
decongest major thoroughfares, Truck Ban, Anti-Smoke Belching Campaign, Anti Colorum, Mobile Bike
Service Programs, and Urban Re-Greening Programs. These projects are individually and jointly
implemented by the public respondents to improve the traffic condition and mitigate the effects of
motorized vehicles on the environment. Contrary to petitioners' claims, public respondents assert that
they consider the impact of the transport sector on the environment, as shown in the Philippine
National Implementation Plan on Environment Improvement in the Transport Sector which targets air
pollution improvement actions, greenhouse gases emission mitigation, and updating of noise pollution
standards for the transport sector. ISSUE & RULING WHETHER OR NOT THE REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE
OF WRITS OF KALIKASAN AND CONTINUING MANDAMUS WAS MET We find that the petitioners failed to
establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed for. For a writ of kalikasan to issue, the
following requisites must concur: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or
threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. First, the
petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to
be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in environmental cases,
the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for continuing mandamus. Second, the
Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered an
absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner by
which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the
official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.
This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition - to compel the respondents
to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle - to bifurcate all roads in the country to devote
half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made transport - when there is nothing in the
aforecited issuances that require that specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their
good intentions notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion
with their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing mandamus. In
this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to perform any act
that the law specifically enjoins as a duty - there being nothing in the executive issuances relied upon
by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of roads to implement the Road Sharing
Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able to show that they were and are actively
implementing projects and programs that seek to improve air quality. At its core, what the petitioners
are seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act - the manner
of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action
to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be
considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the continuing
mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to
control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive
issuance relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to
be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive policy
relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the executive is guilty
of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority," the general rule
applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for continuing mandamus. Hence, the
continuing mandamus cannot issue.

Environmental Impact assessment

Boracay Foundation vs Aklan, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent
Province of Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay.
Thus, on May 7, 2009, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing
Governor Carlito Marquez to file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA)
to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated
on the possible expansion from its original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40)
hectares in order to maximize the utilization of its resources.

After PRA’s approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province
Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the
Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the
existing jetty port.

On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land
use development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and
other applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of
public consultation meetings.

On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some
160 businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation
project on environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.

Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the
contractor on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1,
2011, BFI filed with the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance
of the Writ of Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental
Protection Order (TEPO) and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.

The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:

a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the
Local Government Code (LGC).

The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB
RVI and PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as
well as the recent enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Malay favorably endorsing the said project, had “categorically addressed all the issues”
raised by the BFI in its Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of
action due to the failure of BFI to fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before
seeking judicial relief.

ISSUES:

WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing this case?
 WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?

RULING:

On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies

The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies
and to observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.

The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where,
among others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the
instant case. The rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy or where the protestant has no other recourse.

Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides
a relief for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may
be availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law” and which provides for
the issuance of a TEPO “as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.”

The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the
proper court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof “unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Such proper court may be
the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.

Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised that pertain to
laws and rules for environmental protection.

Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s
decision” and, in order to do this, “the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from
the respondent government agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its
decision.”

On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation
for the project

The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the
project.

The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in
the maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and
approval of local government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized
that, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that
affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior
consultation with the affected local communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of such mandatory requirements will render the
project’s implementation as illegal.

Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the
environmental and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that such
national projects mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and bring
about climate change, among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.
 Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should “initiate public consultations
early in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into
consideration in the EIA study and the formulation of the management plan”.

Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRA’s power to reclaim land in
this case, to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination
conducted months after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the
requirements under the LGC.

Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the
subsequent endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the
Sangguniang Bayan in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of
the Province.

Role of Local government

Province of Rizal vs Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012

FACTS:

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources – Environmental Management Bureau

granted the Metro Manila Authority (MMA) an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) for the
operation of a two-an-a-half-hectare garbage dump site in the municipality of San Mateo.

The Province of Rizal, Municipality of San Mateo and various concerned citizens raised serious
objections to the operation of the open dumpsite for health and ecological reasons. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Saan Mateo Rizal issued a resolution expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion
of the landfill operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the draft
Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 hectares from Marikina Watershed Reservation for the
landfill site in Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal.

The Investigation Report of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer of
DENR-IV-1 stated that the source of the domestic water supply of over one thousand families would be
adversely affected by the dumping operations. The succeeding report included the observation that
the use of areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental factors of
the community. The respondent LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY in fact informed the Metro
Manila Authority that the heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the
location of a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its program of
upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. Another Investigation report submitted by the
Regional Technical Director of DENR reported respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary school
located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant presence of large flies and
windblown debris all over the school’s playground. It further reiterated reports that leachate treatment
plant had been eroded twice already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable
water for the residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and Boso-
boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.

Despite all these objections, the President issued Proclamation No. 635 excluding from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation certain portions thereof for use as a sanitary landfill under the
Administration of the Metro Manila Development Authority.

Justifying the proclamation, the DENR pointed out that the landfill site is part of the Public
domain, and that neither the province of Rizal nor the Municipality of San Mateo has the power to
control or regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the national, and not to the local
governments.

ISSUE:
Whether Province of Rizal or Municipality of San Mateo has the power to control or regulate the
selection of landfill site?

HELD:

Yes, these concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003. Approved on 26 January 2001, "The
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000" was enacted pursuant to the declared policy of
the state "to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system
which shall ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize environmentally sound
methods that maximize the utilization of valuable resources and encourage resource conservation and
recovery." It requires the adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard
to the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting and final disposal of
solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes, education and public information, and the
funding of solid waste management projects.

The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste Management Framework, which
should include, among other things, the method and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual
closure within eighteen months from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps
and/or sanitary landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed
area. Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum requirements laid down in
Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be consistent with the overall land use plan
of the local government unit, and that the site must be located in an area where the landfill’s
operation will not detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as
aquifers, groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Tano vs. Socrates, GR. No. 110249, August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan
waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the
first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

League of Provinces v. DENR, G.R. No. 175368, April 11, 2013

FACTS OF THE CASE

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following:

1.Declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as
The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known
as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
2.Prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces
3.Declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources'
(DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan.

Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the DENR Mines and
Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares situated in the Municipalities of San
Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan which was denied April 29, 1998
for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management
Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III. Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and
Geosciences Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration.

While Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz
and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of
Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which covered the same area.
On July 16, 2004, MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and affirming
the MGB R-III's Order.

Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an Application for
Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the same area.
DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director Arnulfo V. Cabantog's
memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the MGB-Central Office's
Order became final on August 11,2004.

AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB R-III Director, respectively, that the subject
Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's) existing valid and prior Application for
Exploration Permit, and the former area of Golden Falcon was open to mining location only on August
11, 2004.
PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial Legal Officer for his legal opinion on which
date of denial of Golden Falcon's application/appeal – April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 − is to be
considered for the purpose of determining when the land subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit
could be considered open for application. The legal officer issued a legal opinion stating that the Order
dated July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the Order dated April 29, 1998; hence, the Order
dated April 29, 1998 should be the reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden Falcon.

AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid AQP on the ground that the
subject area was already covered by its AEP. MGB R-III Director endorsed to the Governor, the
aforesaid AQP that had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit which
was then approved and Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in favor of Eduardo D. Mercado,
Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez (formerly Liberato Sembrano).

AMTC appealed the grant of the aforesaid Small-Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of
Bulacan erred in giving due course to the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first
resolving its formal protest; (2) The areas covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall within the
area covered by AMTC's valid prior Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry
Permit were illegally converted to Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director
Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11,
2004 was controlling; (5) The Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered
areas that were never declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of
the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as one of the quarry
resources, as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an
Application for Quarry Permit.

DECISION OF DENR SECRETARY

DENR Secretary rendered a Decision in favor of AMTC. The DENR Secretary agreed with MGB Director
Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004. The filing by
Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29,
1998 by the Regional Director until the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central
Office. The AQP were filed when the area was still closed to mining location; hence, the Small-Scale
Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor were null and void.

On the other hand, AMTC filed its AEP when the area was already open to other mining applicants;
thus, AMTC’s Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the
questioned Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and
beyond the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the
area was never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR
Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not section 17(b)(3)(iii) of the, 1991 local government code and section 24 of the
people's small-scale mining act of 1991 are unconstitutional for providing for executive control
and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.

2. Whether or not the act of respondent [DENR] in nullifying, voiding and cancelling the small-
scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the
devolved powers of all provinces.

HELD
1.NO. Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three
statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's
Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of
1995

It doesn’t infringe local autonomy of provinces as stated in different provisions of law:

a. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the Constitution31
provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State."
b. Paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress may, by
law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
 c. Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale
Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other
concerned government agencies.
d. It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DENR is,
subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources.
e. Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the
Local Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no
more than seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within
the law.

The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X,
Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations
like following national policies or standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code.

In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the
Local Government Code provides (iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control
and review of the DENR, enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects,
pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and
mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes. Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of
1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991.

Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining
law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review
of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.

2.NO. Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR
Administrative Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of
control, but did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse,
abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining
contracts entered into by the Board.

The contention does not persuade. The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale
mining is provided for in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076:

Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − There is hereby created under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called
the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the
following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small mining area

and Sec 22 of its IRR:

SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board
created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to
review by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days
upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within
five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same
is considered final and executory; x x x
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24
of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of
judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said
act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims
based on the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.