Scott v Cricket Communications LLC

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Scott v. Cricket Communications, LLC, 865 F.3d 189 (2017)
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Escalante v. Tobar Construction, Inc.
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,
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D.Md.,
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January 3, 2019
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865 F.3d 189
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United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
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Michael A. SCOTT, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff\u8211\'3fAppellee,
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v.
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CRICKET COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
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, f/k/a Cricket Communications, Inc., Defendant\u8211\'3fAppellant.
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Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Amicus Supporting Appellant.
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No. 16-2300
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|
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Argued: May 11, 2017
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Decided: July 28, 2017
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Background:
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Purchaser of cellular phone locked to seller\rquote s code division multiple
access (CDMA) network brought putative class action against seller, which was
shutting down its CDMA network, alleging violations of Maryland\rquote s express
warranties and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular
purpose, which in turn was violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA).
Following removal, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
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George L. Russell, III
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, J.,
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2016 WL 4415047
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, granted purchaser\rquote s motion to remand. Seller appealed.
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\u160\'3f
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Holdings:
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The Court of Appeals,
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Duncan
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, Circuit Judge, held that:
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\u160\'3f
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seller\rquote s statement in notice of removal was sufficient to establish that
amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000, but
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district court committed legal error in disregarding seller\rquote s evidence
regarding amount in controversy as overinclusive.
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Vacated and remanded.
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Procedural Posture(s):
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On Appeal.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at
Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:15-cv-03330-GLR; 1:15-cv-
03759-GLR)
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ARGUED:
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Charles Alan Rothfeld
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, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
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Benjamin Howard Carney
}}}
, GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY, CHTD, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
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Archis A. Parasharami
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,
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Matthew A. Waring
}}}
, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
}
Martin E. Wolf
}}}
, GORDON, WOLF & CARNEY, CHTD, Towson, Maryland, for Appellee.
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Kate Comerford Todd
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,
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Warren Postman
}}}
, UNITED STATES CHAMBER LITIGATION CENTER, INC., Washington, D.C.;
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Ryan L. Bangert
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, BAKER BOTTS L.L.P., Dallas, Texas, for Amicus Curiae.
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Before
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GREGORY
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, Chief Judge, and
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DUNCAN
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and
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DIAZ
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, Circuit Judges.
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Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge
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Duncan
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wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
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Gregory
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\sb260
and Judge
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joined.
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DUNCAN
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, Circuit Judge:
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This appeal concerns the degree of evidentiary specificity with which a removing
defendant must prove jurisdiction to defeat a motion to remand under the Class
Action Fairness Act (\u8220\'3fCAFA\u8221\'3f),
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89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1332(d)
}}}
. Defendant-Appellant Cricket
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*192
}
}
Communications, LLC (\u8220\'3fCricket\u8221\'3f) removed this class action from
state court, invoking CAFA jurisdiction. The district court granted Plaintiff-
Appellee Michael Scott\rquote s motion to remand. Because the district court\rquote
s decision was based on a legal error, we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ib868672117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_Ib868672117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
I.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
A.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
1.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Sometime between July 2013 and March 2014, Scott purchased two Samsung Galaxy S4
cellular phones from Cricket for \u8220\'3fhundreds of dollars each.\u8221\'3f J.A.
28. The phones are only operable on a network using Code Division Multiple Access
(\u8220\'3fCDMA\u8221\'3f) technology. Known to Cricket, but not to Scott, at the
time Scott purchased his phone Cricket had begun to shut down its CDMA network.
When Cricket completed that process in 2015, Scott alleges that his phones\
u8212\'3fwhich were \u8220\'3flocked\u8221\'3f to Cricket\rquote s CDMA network\
u8212\'3fwere rendered \u8220\'3fuseless and worthless.\u8221\'3f J.A. 25.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
On September 24, 2015, Scott filed a putative class action in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City, Maryland. Scott, the sole named plaintiff, alleged Cricket\rquote s
actions violated Maryland\rquote s express warranties and implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, which in turn was a violation
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (\u8220\'3fMMWA\u8221\'3f),
}
dca6c9c6&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=Do
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)" }{\fldrslt
15 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2301
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
et seq
}
}
.
}}}
Under the MMWA, a consumer may bring a class action in state or federal court
alleging a breach of warranty under state law if there are more than 100 named
plaintiffs.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}
\u167\'3f 2310(d). Seeking to bring a class action on behalf of himself and
similarly situated individuals, Scott defined the class as: \u8220\'3fAll Maryland
citizens who, between July 12, 2013 and March 13, 2014, purchased a CDMA mobile
telephone from Cricket which was locked for use only on Cricket\rquote s CDMA
network.\u8221\'3f J.A. 34.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
On October 30, 2015, Cricket removed the case to the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. Cricket invoked CAFA, which grants district courts
jurisdiction over putative class actions with (1) more than 100 class members, (2)
an aggregate amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000, and (3) minimal diversity
between the parties.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00012042259178_ID0E23AG_1}{\*\bkmkend
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}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_4be3000003be5" }{\fldrslt
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f\u167\'3f 1332(d)(2), (5)
}}}
. In support of its notice of removal, Cricket attached the declaration of former
Cricket employee Chad Walker. Based on his personal familiarity with Cricket\rquote
s records, Walker attested that during the relevant period \u8220\'3fCricket
customers purchased at least 50,000 CDMA handsets that were shipped to and
activated in Maryland.\u8221\'3f J.A. 63. Cricket thus asserted that the class
consists of more than 100 persons. Because Scott stated in his complaint that each
phone cost \u8220\'3fhundreds of dollars,\u8221\'3f J.A. 28, Cricket applied a
conservative estimate of $200 per phone and asserted that \u8220\'3fthe total
amount in controversy is, at a minimum, $10,000,000.\u8221\'3f J.A. 58.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\clbrdrt \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \clwWidth600 \cellx600
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\par
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}\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \li0 \fs26 \intbl \cell \intbl
{\ri0 \li0
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{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
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There is no dispute that the parties are minimally diverse. Cricket is a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Georgia and Scott is a Maryland
citizen.
\par
}
}
}
}
}\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \ul0 \strike0 \i0 \qj \li0 \fs26 \sa0 \sb0 \intbl \cell \
row }}\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ib86a8a0117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_Ib86a8a0117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
2.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
On November 23, 2015, Scott moved to remand the case to state court. He argued that
Cricket did not satisfy its burden to allege jurisdiction under CAFA because the
class Cricket described in its notice of removal is broader than Scott\rquote s
defined class. According to Scott, Cricket\rquote s assertion that it sold 50,000
handsets that were shipped to and activated in Maryland fails to meet CAFA\rquote s
requirements because the
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*193
}
}
class only consists of Maryland
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
citizens
}
}
who purchased a CDMA phone.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Cricket opposed remand, attaching another declaration from Cricket employee Rick
Cochran (\u8220\'3fCochran Declaration\u8221\'3f). The Cochran Declaration stated
that \u8220\'3fCricket\rquote s records indicate that between July 12, 2013 and
March 13, 2014, Cricket customers who listed addresses located in Maryland on their
Cricket accounts ... purchased at least 47,760 CDMA handsets that were \
u8216\'3flocked\u8217\'3f to Cricket\rquote s CDMA network.\u8221\'3f J.A. 77.
Again, using the conservative estimate of $200 per phone, Cricket alleged that the
revised amount in controversy was $9,552,000, still well above the CAFA threshold.
Cricket argued that it need not, and could not, provide the exact number of
handsets Maryland citizens purchased. However, Cricket reasoned that the district
court could infer that putative class members purchased enough phones to invoke
CAFA jurisdiction because to meet CAFA\rquote s required $5,000,000 amount in
controversy class members need to only have purchased 25,000 of the 47,760 phones.
Cricket thus urged the district court to make the \u8220\'3f \u8216\'3freasonable
inference[ ]\u8217\'3f that the vast majority of Cricket\rquote s Maryland
customers are Maryland citizens.\u8221\'3f ECF No. 18, at 12 (alteration in
original).
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
The district court declined to do so and granted Scott\rquote s motion to remand.
In explaining its decision, the district court found that, although Cricket
sufficiently alleged federal jurisdiction under CAFA, it had not proven
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court held that
Cricket\rquote s proffered evidence\u8212\'3fthe Cochran Declaration asserting that
Cricket sold 47,760 locked phones during the relevant time period to customers who
listed a Maryland address\u8212\'3fwas \u8220\'3fover-inclusive\u8221\'3f because
}
\u8220\'3fthe Class includes only Maryland citizens, but Cricket\rquote s evidence
pertains to all consumers who provided Maryland addresses.\u8221\'3f J.A. 92.
Relying on this court\rquote s precedent that \u8220\'3f[r]esidency is not
tantamount to citizenship,\u8221\'3f J.A. 92, the district court rejected Cricket\
rquote s proffered evidence as not sufficiently \u8220\'3ftailor[ed] ... to Scott\
rquote s narrowly defined Class.\u8221\'3f J.A. 95. According to the district
court, the Cochran Declaration required the court to \u8220\'3fspeculate to
determine the number of class members that purchased CDMA cellphones and the amount
in controversy.\u8221\'3f J.A. 93. Although the district court concluded that
Cricket failed to prove federal jurisdiction it did not make any finding of fact as
to the amount in controversy. Cricket timely appealed.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00022042259178_ID0ECEBG_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_fnRef_B00022042259178_ID0ECEBG_1}
2
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\intbl
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
co_footnote_B00022042259178_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_fnRef_B00022042259178_ID0ECEBG_1" }{\fldrslt
2
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Generally, \u8220\'3f[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it
was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=ND6F78B30149711E1A7F78D1F2D4D2473&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1447(d)
}\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ul1 \strike0 \i0 \fs26 \sa0 \sb0 }}
. CAFA, however, creates an exception and permits a court of appeals to \
u8220\'3faccept\u8221\'3f an appeal from a remand order of a class action.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}
\u167\'3f 1453(c)(1). \u8220\'3fIf the court of appeals accepts\u8221\'3f such an
appeal, it must render judgment within 60 days.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}
\u167\'3f 1453(c)(2).
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li260
Scott argues that we must deny Cricket\rquote s appeal because 60 days have elapsed
since Cricket filed its petition for permission to appeal. However, the 60-day
clock does not begin until we grant Cricket\rquote s petition and accept the
appeal.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See, e.g.
}
}
,
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I3480f08027b911db80c2e56cac103088&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
9dca6c9c6&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_506_678&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_506_678" }{\
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Hart v. FedEx Ground Package Sys. Inc.
}
}
, 457 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 2006)
. Consistent with this court\rquote s practice, we deferred action on the petition
pending full merits briefing.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See, e.g.
}
}
,
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Quicken Loans Inc. v. Alig
}
}
, 737 F.3d 960, 962 (4th Cir. 2013)
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
cf.
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I129affce845d11e4a795ac035416da91&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee Basin Op. Co. v. Owens
}
}
, \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f U.S. \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, 135
S.Ct. 547, 556 n.6, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014)
(\u8220\'3fSection 1453(c)\u8217\'3fs timing provision ... was designed to promote
expedition, not to discourage Courts of Appeals from acting on petitions for
appeal.\u8221\'3f). Therefore, the appeal is timely.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
row }}\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ib86e338117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_Ib86e338117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
II.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
A.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
On appeal, Cricket maintains that the Cochran Declaration shows it is
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*194
}
}
more likely than not that the putative class includes more than 100 members and
the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. Scott counters that Cricket failed to
tailor its evidence to the defined class of Maryland citizens.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00032042259178_ID0EXKBG_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_fnRef_B00032042259178_ID0EXKBG_1}
3
}}}
}
Whether remand is appropriate turns on whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction under CAFA, a question we review de novo.
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina
}
}
, 699 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2012)
}}}
. \u8220\'3fWe review the district court\rquote s factual findings with respect to
jurisdiction for clear error and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
de novo
}
}
.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ibb729df08b9111d99dcc8cc3e68b51e9&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Velasco v. Gov\rquote t of Indonesia
}
}
, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)
}}}
. When a district court fails to make findings of fact \u8220\'3fbecause of an
erroneous view of the law, the usual rule is that there should be a remand for
further proceedings to permit the trial court to make the missing findings.\
u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I178ebd239c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Pullman-Standard v. Swint
}
}
, 456 U.S. 273, 291, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982)
}}}
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
see also
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ie129a57e7c6e11d98c82a53fc8ac8757&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Cty. Sch. Bd. of Henrico Cty., VA v. Z.P. ex rel. R.P.
}
}
, 399 F.3d 298, 310\u8211\'3f11 (4th Cir. 2005)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\intbl
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
co_footnote_B00032042259178_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_fnRef_B00032042259178_ID0EXKBG_1" }{\fldrslt
3
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Scott also argues that the MMWA, which prohibits district courts from exercising
authority over class actions with fewer than 100 named plaintiffs, presents an
additional bar to federal jurisdiction because Scott is the sole named plaintiff.
}
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_ac3900009ce97" }{\fldrslt
15 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 2310(d)(3)(C)
. Cricket counters that CAFA provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction
irrespective of the number of named plaintiffs. Because we remand on the issue of
CAFA\rquote s jurisdictional requirements, we decline to address the interaction
between the MMWA and CAFA.
\par
}
}
}
}
row }}\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ib8702f5117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_Ib8702f5117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
B.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the
authority granted by the Constitution and Congress.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I37445aab478211ddbc7bf97f340af743&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Strawn v. AT & T Mobility LLC
}
}
, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008)
}}}
. In 2005, Congress enacted CAFA in response to perceived misuse of the class-
action device.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I11f7f259c89411ddb5cbad29a280d47c&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Johnson v. Advance Am.
}
}
, 549 F.3d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 2008)
}}}
. As relevant here, CAFA relaxes diversity jurisdiction requirements and provides
district courts authority over class actions with (1) more than 100 class members,
(2) an amount in controversy exceeding $5,000,000 and (3) minimally diverse
parties.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1332(d)(2), (5)
}}}
. A defendant invoking CAFA to remove a class action from state court must file a
notice of removal in the proper district court \u8220\'3fcontaining a short and
plain statement of the grounds for removal.\u8221\'3f
}
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_8b3b0000958a4" }{\fldrslt
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1446(a)
}}}
. The defendant bears the burden of alleging that CAFA jurisdiction exists,
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Strawn
}
}
, 530 F.3d at 296
}}}
, and must file the notice of removal within 30 days from receipt of the initial
pleading.
}
cumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_a83b000018c76" }{\fldrslt
28 U.S.C. \u167\'3f 1446(b)
}}}
. Because \u8220\'3fno antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA ... a
defendant\rquote s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that
the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee Basin Op. Co. v. Owens
}
}
, \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f U.S. \u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f\u8211\'3f, 135
S.Ct. 547, 554, 190 L.Ed.2d 495 (2014)
}}}
(citations omitted).
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
If the plaintiff challenges removal, however, the defendant \u8220\'3fbears the
burden of
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
demonstrating
}
}
that removal jurisdiction is proper.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Strawn
}
}
, 530 F.3d at 297
}}}
. When a plaintiff\rquote s complaint leaves the amount of damages unspecified, the
defendant must provide evidence to \u8220\'3fshow ... what the stakes of litigation
... are given the plaintiff\rquote s actual demands.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Icbe4a3da40dd11dab072a248d584787d&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
}
}
, 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005)
}}}
(emphasis omitted). To resolve doubts regarding a defendant\rquote s asserted
amount in controversy, \u8220\'3fboth sides submit proof and the court decides, by
a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy requirement has
been satisfied.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee
}
}
, 135 S.Ct. at 554
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*195
}
}
Because Scott\rquote s complaint limited the putative class to Maryland citizens,
jurisdiction exists only if at least 100 Maryland citizens purchased more than
$5,000,000 worth of locked phones from Cricket. A person is a citizen of a state
only if she is a citizen of the United States and a domiciliary of that state.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ie9653ff4b5c211d9bc61beebb95be672&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Brown v. Keene
}
}
, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112, 115, 8 L.Ed. 885 (1834)
}}}
. Whether a person is a domiciliary turns on the individual\rquote s intent. Not
all those physically present within a state are residents.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See
}
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Ecker v. Atl. Refining Co.
}
}
, 222 F.2d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1955)
}}}
. A resident intends to live in the place for the time being and a citizen has an
intention to remain in the state indefinitely.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}}}
Therefore, \u8220\'3f[f]or purposes of diversity jurisdiction, residency is not
sufficient to establish citizenship.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I11f7f259c89411ddb5cbad29a280d47c&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Johnson
}
}
, 549 F.3d at 937 n.2
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
When the amount in controversy hinges on the citizenship of class members, a
removing defendant need not conclusively establish domicile, but the record must
show more than \u8220\'3fnaked averment[s]\u8221\'3f of citizenship.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I1dadb8e6b65511d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Robertson v. Cease
}
}
, 97 U.S. 646, 648, 24 L.Ed. 1057 (1878)
}}}
. As courts of limited jurisdiction, we are constitutionally prohibited from \
u8220\'3finferr[ing] argumentatively\u8221\'3f that a person\rquote s residency is
her domicile.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ie9653ff4b5c211d9bc61beebb95be672&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Brown
}
}
, 33 U.S. at 115
}}}
. When citizenship is questioned, a court must make an individualized inquiry
relying on certain factors such as voter registration; current residence; the
location of real and personal property; location of bank and brokerage accounts;
membership in clubs, churches, or other associations; place of employment or
business; driver\rquote s license and automobile registration; and the state to
which a person pays taxes.
}
9dca6c9c6&refType=TS&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=D
13 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. \u167\'3f 3612 (3d ed. 2009)
}}}
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
see also
}
}
9dca6c9c6&refType=RP&fi=co_pp_sp_350_1051&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cbl
t1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Default)#co_pp_sp_350_1051" }{\
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Webb v. Nolan
}
}
, 484 F.2d 1049, 1051 (4th Cir. 1973)
}}}
. No single factor is dispositive.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
With this background in mind, we turn to the district court\rquote s decision here.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_Ib8749c2117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}{\*\bkmkend
co_anchor_Ib8749c2117a411efa8d8c60c9a3ce}
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
C.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
1.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
First, we agree with the district court that Cricket\rquote s initial statement
that it sold \u8220\'3fat least 50,000 CDMA mobile telephones that were shipped to
and activated in Maryland,\u8221\'3f J.A. 17, during the relevant time period
suffices to allege jurisdiction under CAFA. While Cricket\rquote s assertion is
broader than the proposed class, that does not, as Scott argues, make the notice of
removal \u8220\'3fincurably defective.\u8221\'3f ECF No. 15-1, at 3. The Supreme
Court was clear in
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee
}
}}}
: the liberal rules of pleading apply to removal allegations.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
135 S.Ct. at 553
}}}
. Cricket\rquote s short and plain statement contains enough \u8220\'3ffactual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference\u8221\'3f that the
amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00042042259178_ID0E4DAI_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_fnRef_B00042042259178_ID0E4DAI_1}
4
}}}
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I90623386439011de8bf6cd8525c41437&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
}
}
, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
}}}
(citation omitted);
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
see also
}
}
J.A. 56\u8211\'3f58 (alleging that the number of putative class members is greater
than 100 and that the amount in controversy is $10,000,000).
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\intbl
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
co_footnote_B00042042259178_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_fnRef_B00042042259178_ID0E4DAI_1" }{\fldrslt
4
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Scott also argues that Cricket did not sufficiently allege or prove more than 100
class members. We focus our discussion on the amount-in-controversy, but the
district court on remand should use the same principles outlined here to assess
whether Cricket has proven that the class includes more than 100 members.
\par
}
}
}
}
row }}\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
\par
{\b0 \qc \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \fs26 \li0
2.
\par
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Once Scott challenged Cricket\rquote s allegations through a motion to remand,
Cricket was required to prove CAFA jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the
evidence.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee
}
}
, 135 S.Ct. at 554
}}}
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Strawn
}
}
, 530 F.3d at 297
}}}
. Because the district court committed legal
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*196
}
}
error in disregarding Cricket\rquote s evidence as overinclusive, we are unable to
engage in appellate review to determine whether Cricket met its burden to prove
jurisdiction. However, because the sufficiency of Cricket\rquote s evidence will
undoubtedly arise again on remand, we discuss it below.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See
}
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
United States v. Oyegoke-Eniola
}
}
, 734 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2013)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
\u8220\'3fEstimating the amount in controversy is not nuclear science,\u8221\'3f as
a removing defendant is somewhat constrained by the plaintiff.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I2519624796be11e39ac8bab74931929c&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
S. Fla. Wellness, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.
}
}
, 745 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2014)
}}}
. After all, as \u8220\'3fmasters of their complaint\u8221\'3f plaintiffs are free
to purposely omit information that would allow a defendant to allege the amount in
controversy with pinpoint precision.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Idb12c98e60cb11da8cc9b4c14e983401&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche
}
}
, 546 U.S. 81, 94, 126 S.Ct. 606, 163 L.Ed.2d 415 (2005)
}}}
. In many removal cases, a defendant\rquote s allegations rely to some extent on
reasonable estimates, inferences, and deductions. Thus, that Cricket\rquote s
evidence is overinclusive is not, as the district court reasoned, dispositive. The
key inquiry in determining whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met is
not what the plaintiff will actually recover but \u8220\'3fan estimate of the
amount that will be put at issue in the course of the litigation.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
See
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ib22fc25542ae11ddb7e583ba170699a5&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
McPhail v. Deere & Co.
}
}
, 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008)
}}}
.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00052042259178_ID0ETMAI_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_fnRef_B00052042259178_ID0ETMAI_1}
5
}}}
}
A removing defendant can use overinclusive evidence to establish the amount in
controversy so long as the evidence shows it is more likely than not that \
u8220\'3fa fact finder might legally conclude that\u8221\'3f damages will exceed
the jurisdictional amount.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I08e1a2e579ca11d99c4dbb2f0352441d&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Kopp v. Kopp
}
}
, 280 F.3d 883, 885 (8th Cir. 2002)
}}}
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
see also
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I8d250438de6611e2a555d241dae65084&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Raskas v. Johnson & Johnson
}
}
, 719 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2013)
}}}
;
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I575b6914f33c11df9d9cae30585baa87&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Lewis v. Verizon Commc\rquote ns, Inc.
}
}
, 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010)
}}}
.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\intbl
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
co_footnote_B00052042259178_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_fnRef_B00052042259178_ID0ETMAI_1" }{\fldrslt
5
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
To the extent Cricket argues that its evidence categorically proves jurisdiction
because Scott did not provide any rebuttal evidence, we reject that contention.
Although
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee
}
states that \u8220\'3fboth sides submit proof\u8221\'3f when a plaintiff
challenges removal,
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
135 S.Ct. at 554
, we do not read that to mean that if only one party submits proof it automatically
carries the day. Rather,
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Dart Cherokee
}
clarifies that a motion to remand challenging the amount in controversy reopens
the record
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
allowing
}
}
both parties to submit evidence. When only one party submits evidence, we accept
it as uncontroverted but must still test whether the responsible party has met its
burden.
\par
}
}
}
}
row }}\par
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
Because Scott chose to limit the class to Maryland citizens Cricket must show it is
more likely than not that enough Maryland citizens purchased locked phones to meet
the $5,000,000 threshold. Using the conservative estimate of $200 per phone based
on the complaint\rquote s allegation that each phone cost \u8220\'3fhundreds of
dollars,\u8221\'3f J.A. 28, Cricket must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that at least 100 Maryland citizens purchased 25,000 locked phones.
Cricket contends that it cannot acquire information narrowly tailored to the
proposed class because it is \u8220\'3fan impossible task given that definitive
determination of domicile requires consideration of numerous\u8221\'3f factors
including the location where someone votes, pays taxes, and works. Appellant\rquote
s Br. at 2. However, Cricket does not need to make a \u8220\'3fdefinitive
determination of domicile.\u8221\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}
Further, many factors relevant to the domicile inquiry are publicly available,
including business and professional licensures, property ownership, property taxes,
and voter registration.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs20
{\*\bkmkstart co_fnRef_B00062042259178_ID0EKTAI_1}{\*\bkmkend
co_fnRef_B00062042259178_ID0EKTAI_1}
6
}}}
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
}{
\intbl
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \ql \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
co_footnote_B00062042259178_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_fnRef_B00062042259178_ID0EKTAI_1" }{\fldrslt
6
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
We note that CAFA-exception cases holding that \u8220\'3fa rebuttable presumption
that a person\rquote s residence is his domicile\u8221\'3f are inapplicable to the
determination of whether the amount in controversy is met here.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I7f5b3ee0ac7b11e6b27be1b44e7e7e5b&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C.
}
}
, 842 F.3d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 2016)
. In CAFA-exception cases, the court has necessarily determined that jurisdiction
exists and is only considering whether the exceptions impose a limit. The Sixth
Circuit in
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Mason
}
explained as much.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Id.
}
}
, 842 F.3d at 392
(noting that because \u8220\'3fthe local controversy exception is not
jurisdictional ... a party asserting the exception does not encounter\u8221\'3f
presumptions against federal jurisdiction);
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
see also
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=Ia75a4351c73b11dbb3d2dfbaa098fb72&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
fldrslt
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc.
}
}
, 478 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that CAFA exceptions are nonjurisdictional because they \u8220\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
require
}
}
federal courts\u8212\'3falthough they
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
have
}
}
jurisdiction ... to \u8216\'3f
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
decline to exercise jurisdiction
}
}
\u8217\'3f when\u8221\'3f CAFA\rquote s threshold requirements are met) (citation
omitted);
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
cf.
}
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i0 \fs26
documentGuid=I86efc820a3aa11da97faf3f66e4b6844&transitionType=InlineKeyCiteFlags&or
89504e470d0a1a0a0000000d49484452000000100000001008060000001ff3ff6100000009704859730
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.
}
}
, 546 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006)
(holding that jurisdictional terms are those that Congress \u8220\'3fclearly
states [as]
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
threshold
}
}
limitation[s] on a statute\rquote s scope\u8221\'3f) (emphasis added).
\par
}
}
}
}
row }}\par
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
}
{\b1 \cf1 \f2 \i0 \fs26
*197
}
}
To meet its burden, Cricket must provide enough facts to allow a court to
determine\u8212\'3fnot speculate\u8212\'3fthat it is more likely than not that the
class action belongs in federal court.
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \i1 \fs26
Cf.
}
}
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Iqbal
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, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937
}}}
. While Cricket need not tailor its evidence to exactly match Scott\rquote s
proposed class, it must provide enough factual detail for the district court to
discharge its constitutional duty and assess whether jurisdiction exists.
\par
}
}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
}
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
{\b0 \cf19 \f2 \ri0 \i0 \qj \fs26 \li0
In making such a determination, the district court \u8220\'3fmay consider which
party has better access to the relevant information.\u8221\'3f
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Amoche v. Guar. Trust Life Ins. Co.
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, 556 F.3d 41, 51 (1st Cir. 2009)
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. Cricket \u8220\'3fneed not concede liability\u8221\'3f to win jurisdiction,
}
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, 627 F.3d at 400
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, but as the party invoking jurisdiction Cricket ultimately bears the burden of
proof. Scott is the master of his complaint, but Cricket is the master of its
notice of removal.
\par
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}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
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\par
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III.
\par
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Because we conclude that the district court applied the wrong legal standard to
Cricket\rquote s evidence, we vacate the district court\rquote s judgment and
remand for reconsideration consistent with the principles set forth in this
opinion.
\par
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}
}
\u160\'3f
\par
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VACATED AND REMANDED
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\u160\'3f
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865 F.3d 189
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