General Introduction

With the objective of evaluating rationality of science, the epistemological debate on philosophy

of science has concerned itself with the issues of scientific methodologies used in both theoretical

as well as experimental approaches of science. For example, arguing that Hempel’s, Lauden’s,

Toulmin’s, Kuhn’s, and others’ account of the rationality of science as a failure (Siegel, 1985, p.

523), Harvey Siegel contends that scientific method constitute commitment to evidence; and it is

this commitment to evidence that makes science rational. “It makes sense of our regarding science

as “the exemplar of rationality” . . . by virtue of science’s fundamental commitment to evidence”

(ibid, p. 535). Here it should be noted that Siegel is not totally arguing against the above mentioned

philosophers about where lies the rationality of science. Though he tried to clarify some confusions

on the issue and suggested some technical way out of it, he is still focusing on the scientific method

to show that science is a rational enterprise because of its experimental method, just like the other

philosophers he tried to correct proclaim. For he argued that:

An oft-made suggestion, which I endorse, is that SM [scientific method] is best

taken not as a step-by-step procedure, but rather epistemically, as underlying

principle of evaluation of scientific hypotheses. SM avoids a trivializing plurality

not by denying a plethora of procedures for conducting inquiry, but by affirming a

common method of justification. (ibid, p. 526. Emphasis in original)

Furthermore, the debate on using induction as a scientific method, Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s

concept of incommensurability, and the debate on the underdetermination theory show how deep

epistemological arguments have been given to prove the rationality of science.

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However, I believe it is important to discuss metaphysical claims of science so that we could

understand where the rationality of science lies and provide further support to the epistemological

arguments. Of course, one might ask why is it necessary to talk about metaphysics while one could

refer to the epistemological debate, if one needs to talk about the rationality of science. But,

indulging oneself with the epistemological debate to answer the question of the rationality of

science presupposes the acceptance of the scientific method and theory choice as the center of

scientific enterprise that explains its rationality. But before we accept such presuppositions, we

have to ask questions such as: (1) why should this emphasis on the scientific method be considered

to give epistemologically valuable results? (2) Why should its results be of more than temporary

significance? (3)Why should these methods be repeated for a long period of time, sometimes for

centuries? (4) Even, is that possible to investigate a subject-matter (in the case of science, reality)

before one knows or have the understanding or conception of the real nature of what is being

investigated (reality)?

The answer to question 2 (why the results of science be of more than temporary significance? and

3 (why should these methods be repeated for a long period of time, sometimes for centuries?

apparently, is that scientists do assume that nature is, somehow, uniform. And this shows us that

there are metaphysical presuppositions, in scientific theories, which help scientists to assume and

accept that the method they use can be repeatedly used and would still work in the future. So they

do know that their method and theory would work not just temporarily but even in the future

because they assume that nature is uniform, which is a metaphysical assumption. Maxwell has

argued that:

. . . writers Mach, Duhem, Kuhn, Goodman, Scheffler, Runder have emphasized

the importance of simplicity criteria in addition to empirical criteria when it comes

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 to choosing between rival theories in science. These writers are, however, anxious

to deny that our preference for simple theories in science in any way commits us to

upholding the metaphysical thesis that the world is simple, or that the phenomena

under investigation are inherently simple. (Maxwell, 1974, p. 125)

So whether the scientist holds them implicitly or deny them entirely, metaphysical beliefs are

inevitable in scientific enterprise. And that makes me to believe and argue that rather than sticking

to the epistemological debate, we have to turn our attention to the metaphysical claims to have a

clear understanding of the rationality of science since metaphysical claims are evidently there,

although they are implicit. To defend this idea, in Chapter One, I will discuss what rationality, in

general mean, and how the rationality of science was treated coupled with its methodology.

In Chapter Two I will be discussing challenges to the rationality of science. In particular, we will

discuss Kuhn’s of incommensurability thesis. For Kuhn, because of either theory-ladenness or lack

of communication (lack of communication arise from lack of common measure in language), we

cannot choose between theories by supporting our belief with pure reason. Feyerabend adds more

nuance into the thesis. After discussing Feyerabend’s sever attack on the rationality of science,

then, we will be discussing both Duhem’s and Quine’s underdetermination theses, which

challenges the rationality of theory choice. Finally, we will discuss Hempel’s thought on the

rationality of science. For Hempel the issue of the rationality of science is not an issue of choosing

between two competing theories, as Kuhn, Quine and Duhem suggest. Rather it is related with

goals of scientific inquiry such as formulating an explanatory and predictive world view. To show

this Hempel sticks with two models of explanation by general covering laws, and I argue that this

concept of explanation by covering laws presupposes metaphysical belief such as the metaphysical

principle of uniformity.

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In Chapter Three, showing that the epistemological arguments for the rationality of science are

not sufficient, we will discuss the metaphysics of Newton, Einstein and quantum mechanics. Then,

I will argue that once we clarify the metaphysical presuppositions in scientific theories, such as

the principle of uniformity, the principle of substance and the principle of causality, we will then

see the explanatory power of scientific theories. In other words, we could see if science can achieve

correct explanation or account of nature only after we have a clear understanding of the

metaphysical presuppositions, which are universal principles, and how these principles are

developed in scientific theory. To put it crudely, I agree with Hempel’s aim of science that “science

is widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly comprehensive, systematically

organized, world view that is explanatory and predictive”. Furthermore, I will be arguing that there

are metaphysical claims behind such claims and they should be articulated explicitly to settle the

problem of the rationality of science, alongside strengthening the epistemological arguments.

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 Chapter I

The Idea of Rationality and the Rationality of Science

1.1 Introduction

Relating the rationality of science with its methodology, many philosophers argue for and against

the rationality of science. The question of the rationality of science begins (at least enters into an

explicit discussion) with Hume’s problem of induction. Hume’s successors take up that problem

and interpreted it in a variety of ways so as to argue either in support of or against him. And In this

chapter, beginning with the clarification of the concept of rationality, I will introduce the issue of

the rationality of science with respect to its methodology.

1.2 What is Rationality?

Rationality can, simply, be understood as having reasons to one’s beliefs, or the habit of acting by

reason in accordance with the facts of reality. We usually think that we have a precise idea of what

it means to be rational. Or it is generally argued that we, as human beings, have the ability to think

and act rationally. However, when we come to the philosopher’s debate on what makes a thought

or an action rational, it becomes more difficult and needs a thorough discussion. To answer the

question when do we really accept a belief or an action as rational, throughout the philosophical

literature, there are two different ways: (1) Rationality as a matter of reasons and (2) Rationality

as a matter of reliability (Nozick, 1993, p. 64). According to the former concept of rationality “a

belief’s rationality depends upon the reasons for holding that belief. These will be reasons for

thinking the belief is true (or perhaps for thinking that it has some other desirable cognitive, such

as explanatory power)” (Nozick, 1993, p. 64). This way of understanding rationality is referred as

instrumental rationality (more of this to come under 1.2.1).

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The second concept of rationality depends on the process or procedure that produce the belief. “A

rational belief is one that arises through some process that reliably produces beliefs that are true

(or that have some other desirable cognitive virtue)” (ibid); which is also conceived as epistemic

rationality (see 1.2.2 below).

1.2.1 Instrumental Rationality

Instrumental rationality is concerned with achieving goals; and it is conceived as concerned with

the effective and efficient achievement of goals and ends. In other words, it is “the rationality one

displays in taking the means to one’s ends” (Kelly, 2003, p. 612). Thus we can say that

instrumental rationality is about choosing and applying thoughts or actions that direct us toward

our goals or ends. For example, to use Kelly’s example, it would be rational for someone to raise

his hand, if he has the goal of asking the speaker a question, and knows that it is only if he raises

his hand that he would be able to ask the speaker (Kelly, 2003, p. 612). However, this does not

mean that one can act instrumentally toward his end without evaluating what the goal is because

instrumental rationality does not overlook the value of the goal.

It is only when we have good reasons that we pursue a goal or an end, and the actions or reasons

that we take to get to our goal will also depend on the reasons we have for pursuing that goal. So,

in the case of the above mentioned example, raising one’s hand is a means to ask a question and

asking a question is the goal. Before one raises his hand (which is the means), one must have good

reason to ask a question (which is the end). Therefore, taking an action or thought as a means to

an end is also supported by the reason we have to pursue the goal. In other words, if one has good

reason to ask a question, he must raise his hand (supposing that it is only when he raises his hand

that he can ask the question). Further support for my argument may come from Raz, who writes:

“[w]hen we have an undefeated reason to take an action, we have reason to perform any one (but

6
only one)of the possible (for us) alternative plans that facilitate its performance” (Raz, 2005, p. 5-

6,). Thus, instrumental reasoning consists a certain inferential relation between means and ends.

In a sense that if we have reason to our goal or end, and a certain action or thought is a necessary

means to that goal or end, then we have a strong reason to take the action or to indulge ourselves

to the thought.

However, this kind of rationality does not give us a way to evaluate the rationality of the goal or

end itself; what it, rather, shows us is the instrumental effectiveness of achieving the goal or end,

taking the goal or end for granted. So, the question here is: does having a goal provide us reasons

for taking the means to the achievement of that very goal even if the means leads us to undesired

consequences?

To answer the question affirmatively would be contradictory because if the means is faulty,

apparently the result is also faulty. Besides, it would be inconsistent to have a goal that can be

reached by a means which results, somehow, in undesired consequences; and, apparently, no

rational person would hold a means that contradict his goals. Thus, in a situation when the means

or the course of actions that we take to reach to our ends lead to undesired consequences, it would

still be rational to change that very means or the course of actions. Then we can use other

alternative ways to achieve the desired goal without contradicting it in the process of achieving it.

To argue further, we can also imagine another situation in which even changing the means or the

course of actions would amount to changing the goal or end itself. Raz, in relation to this idea,

paraphrasing Michael Bratman’s critique on instrumental rationality, writes:

While there is nothing inherently wrong in changing course, a tendency to do so

every other day shows indecisiveness, dissipation, lack of purpose or other mental

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 dispositions that make one a less effective agent, and, since they relate to one’s

response to perceive reasons, reflect on one’s rationality. (Raz, 2005, p. 22)

Replying to this critique Raz pointed out that such situation is not an important story of our

experience and argued that the means are not much far different from the goal.

For “[w]e rely on the goals we have as contributing to the reasons to choose

activities that belong with them, rather than those no less attractive activities that

do not. . . . [even] Some actions that belong within a goal have no point (unless they

happen to facilitate something worth doing) if one does not have it.” (Raz, 2005, p.

22).

Furthermore, changing a goal cannot be as easy as Bratman’s critique says, for having a goal entails

having a desire or motive to look for possible way to the achievement of that goal. Besides “[a]

person will not have a goal for which he knows that there is no feasible route, however long, from

his current situation to the achievement of that goal” (Nozick, 1993, p. 146). Therefore, if a rational

person has some goals and is motivated or has a desire to look for possible ways, he will avoid

actions that cannot reach these goals while learning actions which might reach them. “And some

of these goals will have some stability, so that they can be pursued over time with some prospect

of success” (Nozick, 1993, p. 146), thus, changing the goals would not be necessary or as frequent

as the critique suggests.

1.2.2 Epistemic Rationality

Epistemic rationality involves believing in accurate or true beliefs about the world or statements

that describe entities in the world, to be specific. It can also be defined as “a kind of rationality

which one displays when one believes propositions that are strongly supported by one’s evidence

8
and refrains from believing propositions that are improbable given one’s evidence” (Kelly, 2003,

p. 612). For example, if I have a strong evidence that the Wright brothers invented the first

successful airplane in the world, and my belief that the Wright brothers invented the first successful

airplane is based on that evidence, then my belief that they invent it is epistemically rational. Here,

there is no other purpose to my belief other than knowing the truth, in the sense that I have no any

intention to use this belief to serve me with respect to my other practical concerns.

Of course, believing the truth by itself can be taken as a goal, but it is not the same goal as we

were discussing above under the subtitle of instrumental rationality. Richard Foley, in his book the

The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, suggests that to understand epistemic rationality

. . . it is necessary to identify a distinctly epistemic goal. . . . [and that goal is] now

to believe those propositions that are true and now not to believe those propositions

that are false. . . . In any event the epistemic goal is not that is concerned with

believing propositions that will serve one well with respect to one’s practical

concerns (since it might be the case that now believing a falsehood, even a

proposition that is obviously false, would serve these practical concerns). (Foley,

1987, p. 7-8)

The point here is, since I want to know the first inventor of airplane, I have to look for the evidence

(reading history books). So the fact that I have the goal of knowing the inventor gives me a reason,

which is instrumental, to act in a certain way (reading history books); thus it is rational for me to

engage in the activity of reading history books. Furthermore, knowing the truth, nothing else, is

just the end of my activity; I even cannot pursue this truth as a goal to use it for believing other

truths in a few weeks or days. Because, apparently, I might believe a falsehood that would serve

me for my concern of the coming few weeks or days. Thus, specifically,

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 . . . the epistemic goal is concerned with now believing those propositions that true

and now not believing those propositions that are false. If a person has this goal and

in on careful reflection he would believe Y to be an effective means to this goal,

then, all else being equal, it is rational (in an epistemic sense) for him to bring about

Y. (Foley, 1987, p. 8)

Thus, according to Foley, we can say epistemic rationality is also goal oriented; and as mentioned

above that epistemic goal is now believing truths and now not believing falsehoods. And it would

be epistemically rational for me to read history books, if I think, on reflection, that reading history

books is an effective means to my epistemic goal, which is knowing the inventor of airplane. Foley

does not only argue for the rationality of the epistemic goal but also for the rationality of the means

to be used to reach that epistemic goal; and according to him, the idea that reading history books

is epistemically rational for me, if I have an uncontroversial argument for it,

an argument that [ I ] would regard as likely to be truth preserving were [I am] to

be appropriately reflective, and an argument whose premises [ I ] would uncover

no good reasons to be suspicious of were [ I am ] to be appropriately reflective.

(Foley, 1987, p. 66)

What Foley is trying to say is that, if the reason or reasons I have to believe the truth that reading

history books is the means to my epistemic goal is still based on other propositions that tend to

make my means epistemically rational, I am just pushing the problem of justification back a step.

For you will want to know what gives me a reason for thinking that these other propositions are

true (Foley, 1987, pp. 51-52). So, as we just have seen, if other propositions cannot support my

thinking that reading history books is the means to my epistemic goal, what supports it? According

to Foley, my belief that reading history books is the means to my epistemic goal is “self-justifying”,

10
i.e. there are no other propositions to support it. My belief that (it is right or correct) means to

achieve the epistemic goal is true simply because it is self-justifying, supposing that I get to such

self-justifying proposition or belief based on reflection.

So far we have been discussing rationality as instrumental and epistemic rationality as two

different kinds of rationality. We have seen that the first as a rationality concerned with achieving

goals and as concerned with the effective and efficient achievement of goals and ends. The focus

here is on the process, not on the end, in a sense that we should not emphasize on what really the

goal is. Thus, in our discussion of epistemic rationality, we define it as a looking for the truth,

nothing more. This means, there is no other purpose to my belief other than knowing the truth; that

I have no any intention, whatsoever, to use this belief to serve me with respect to my other practical

concerns. However, I want to note that both instrumental and epistemic reasons are important. For

example, the goal to know more about the first inventor of airplane gives me an instrumental reason

to improve my evidence about reading books, than leaving my belief that reading books is the self-

justifying means to my goal of knowing the first inventor of airplane. This, in turn, implies that

rationality involves in believing reasons as a means to believing the truth, considering that “reasons

are connected to the truth of what they are reasons for” (Nozick, 1993, p. 119).

Furthermore, we cannot simply associate instrumental rationality with practical concerns alone,

and epistemic rationality with thinking or abstract reasoning alone. Both the principles of practice

or decision making and the principles of reasoning are related to each other. For to make a decision

without the principles of thinking or reasoning would be based on individual whim that defies

rationality; on the other hand, to think or reason out without assuming to apply the thought into

practice would, still, be futile. To support this line of thinking I would quote Nozick, for he argued

that

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 We reason about which principles of decision to follow . . . the policy of following

a particular group of principles of reasoning is a course of action. Two such courses

involving different groups of principles of reasoning can then be evaluated by a

principle of decision to determine which course of action is best. Which principles

of reasoning are deemed best might depend upon which principles of decision is

employed. . . . [Thus] a principle of decision is established (tentatively) by a method

of reasoning, a method of reasoning by principle of decision. (Nozick, 1993, pp.

135-6)

Therefore, the conception of rationality, generally, involves both reasons and reliability. When a

particular procedure or process is reliable to arrive at a true belief, we can say an action or a belief

produced by that procedure is rational. Because, first, the procedure contains a chain of reasons

and reasoning, and second the reliable procedure makes those reasons and reasoning reliable. In

other words, if the reliable process contains kind of reasons and reasoning that makes a belief or

an action rational, this reasoning in turn is reliable.

However, rationality commits itself not simply in doing or believing something only because of

the reasons in support of it. But rather it also takes into consideration reasons against it, if there

are. Looking for reasons against an accepted rational belief involves looking for possible

objections and possible counterexamples. Looking for possible objections may help us to prepared

and reflectively respond, or (on the other hand) help us to weaken a belief and hence avoid it.

Thus, understanding of what rationality is would help us to have basic foundation to justify whether

a belief is rational or irrational. Having a clear understanding of the concept of rationality would

make it easy for us to decide rationally whether science is rational or irrational.

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1.3 Science and Its Rationality

So far we have been discussing the concept of rationality as a basis for discussing the issue of the

rationality of science, as science has been conceived as the hallmark of rationality. There are also

some writers and philosophers who challenge this representation of science. The following few

pages will consider preliminary points on the relation between science and rationality.

1.3.1 What is Science?

Answering the question ‘what is science?’ will not be as straightforward as it looks. Science is

usually defined as an attempt to understand, explain and predict the world. However, this would

not be enough for different religions, which are not science, also try to understand and explain the

world; other non-science fields such as fortunetelling try to predict the future, as well.

Nevertheless, we can say that “the distinguishing features of science lie in the particular methods

scientists use to investigate the world” (Okahsa, 2002, p. 1-2). And these scientific methods

include careful observation and experiment. In addition to these features “[a]nother important

feature of science is the construction of theories. Scientists do not simply record the results of

experiment and observation in a log book – they usually want to explain those results in terms of

a general theory” (Okahsa, 2002, p. 2).

Thus science is an intellectual and practical activity that deals with the systematic study of the

structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment. Here,

as mentioned above, observation and experimentation are key concepts to science. Observation is

important, for science requires the ability to observe the world around us by using our senses or

with the help of advanced technologies, objectively. Even though there is a philosophical debate

on the objectivity of observation, in practical science it can be understood technically. For

13
example, different people might claim to feel different temperature while put in the same room;

some of them may say the room is cold while the others warm. But science uses exact

measurements to avoid such subjective claims. Rather than using terms such as “cold” and

“warm”, science can verify the objectivity, by quantitative measurement, saying that, for example,

“the temperature of this room is 17 Degree Celsius”. Thus, science can objectively infer general

claims from observation and try to prove them by experiment.

Nevertheless, in the history of science the groundbreaking idea of motion begins with observation.

Galileo, when he was attending a sermon in a church, observed the movement of the chandelier

hanging on the ceiling of the church, and make counts of its movement, using his pulses as a clock.

Then, based on this mere observation he made crude hypothesis that no matter how far the

chandelier swung it took the same time to complete one swing, although that has to be proved by

experiment (Harriman, 2010). Galileo, then, came to work on his experiment of the pendulum.

Experimentation is a deliberate test on a group of objects or subjects in the interest of observing

the response. David Harriman defines experimentation as

the method of establishing causal relationships by means of controlling variables.

The experimenter does not merely observe nature; he manipulates it by holding

some factor(s) constant while varying others and measuring the results. (Harriman,

2010, pp. 36-37)

So, for the scientists to develop a theory mere observation is not enough; they have to validate

their hypothesis based on observations by providing valid experiment, which in turn requires

different technics and procedures. For example, we have seen that Galileo hypothesized that it

doesn’t matter how far the chandelier swung, the period remains the same. To prove this

14
hypothesis, first, he made his experiment with two pendulums that have the same length and the

same weight of bobs. Releasing both pendulums from the vertical, from different degrees of angles

but at the same time, the result shows that they maintain the same period or rate. The size of the

swing or displacement does not affect the period. Secondly, without changing the length of the

pendulum, he doubled the weight of one of the bobs and release both of them from the same angles

from the vertical or displacement. The result shows that the period still remains the same, that the

heavy bob moves at the same rate as the light bob and, apparently the weight of the bobs does not

affect the period. In the third experiment he changed the length of the pendulum, while the weight

and displacement remains the same. And the result was totally different, the shorter pendulum

swings faster and it take less time to complete a swing than the longer one. In other words, both

weight and displacement have little effect on period but changing the length of the pendulum

changes its period. Then after extensive and detail repeated experiments Galileo established

mathematical relationship between length and period which states that the length of a pendulum is

proportional to the square of the period. Here it is worth mentioning that Galileo knew that his

experiments were not sufficient and he was not satisfied with them that they may not persuade the

audience, but he used mathematics for a proof of the amplitude independence. That is why he was

described as . . . “the first truly modern physicist. . . . [and] the first to show that the language of

mathematics could be used to describe the behavior of actual objects in the material world, such

as falling bodies, projectiles, etc.” (Okahsa, 2002, p. 5).

Starting from the idea that the pendulum bob’s speed is proportional to the sine of

the amplitude – because this factor isolates the efficacious, downward component

of the motion – he attempted to prove that no matter where a bob is released along

the circular arc it reaches the bottom at the same time. (Okahsa, 2002, 39)

15
As mentioned in the above quotation and is prevalent in Galileo’s experiments, we can see that

experimentation needs careful design such as different states and conditions, repetition, controlled

and independent variables. As we also have seen starting from simple observation, hypothesis and

testing the hypothesis with a series of experiments, Galileo discovered the law of pendulum motion

that explains the relationship between length and period of pendulum. This process can be

described as inductive method in which one begins with sense experience and specific instances

and moves to general statements that may become laws; in other words it is a method that starts

from sensible experience or observation to a general truth which includes unobserved phenomena.

For example, when Galileo concludes that the length of a pendulum (of any pendulum on earth

and in any time) is proportional to the square of the period, he did not conduct an experiment on

all pendulums all over the world. Rather he just come up with that general law by conducting some

carefully designed and controlled experiments.

Thus induction involves generalizing from observed instance to general laws which include

unobserved events. To put it crudely and in logical form, Galileo’s premises contain reports of his

observation of the experiments that he conducts, while his conclusion includes unobserved events

which go beyond his conducted experiments. This way of generalization has been accepted by

scientists. Generally, they believe that accepted scientific theories are possible through inductive

reasoning. However, this line of thought was challenged by Hume’s critique of induction, later by

Duhem, and other philosophers which we will discuss in Chapter Two.

1.3.2 The Rationality of science

Drawing on Samir Okasha, I said that it has been believed that the distinct features of science lies

on the methods it uses to investigate the world. And I think that is why many philosophers of

16
science have been associating the rationality of science with its methodology. Mentioning Russell,

Siegel said that there are

. . . two traditional and related beliefs about science. The first is that there is a

particular way in which a scientist goes about validating a scientific belief; that way

which is the hallmark of scientific activity, is the scientific method. The second is

that this method is what legitimates scientific activity, and justifies the fruits of

scientific inquiry; that is, science is a rational activity, and its rationality is secured

by the scientific method. (Siegel, 1985, p. 517-8)

Of course, since scientists do many different things and do them in different ways, it is undeniable

that different disciplines of science use different ways. For example, “the astronomer, the particle

physicist, and the anthropologist utilize different techniques of observation” (Siegel, 1985, p. 526).

That is why it has been debated over the existence of a unique method of science. However, Siegel

argues that we should not confuse scientific method with scientific technique. Of course the above

mentioned sciences use different techniques of observation, but

in all of the sciences mentioned, observation plays the role of generating data, or

facts, which are used to test hypotheses, perhaps to generate them, to contribute to

the formulation of generalizations, and so on. So the variety of techniques utilized

in science does not in itself undermine the possibility of a unique SM [Scientific

Method]. (Siegel, 1985, p. 526)

Nevertheless, here I am not arguing to show the existence of a unique scientific method, rather

what I am saying is that the rationality of science has been solely associated with the scientific

method. And this line of claim has been defended by different philosophers of science. Siegel

17
himself argued that scientific method “is best taken not as a step-by-step procedure, but rather

epistemically, as an underlying principle of evaluation of scientific hypotheses or theories. SM

[scientific method] avoids a trivializing plurality not by denying a plethora of procedures for

conducting inquiry, but by affirming a common method of justification.” (Siegel, 1985, p. 526).

Runder also argued that “. . . the methodology of a scientific discipline is not a matter of its

transient techniques but its logic of justification. The method of science is, indeed, the rationale on

which it bases its acceptance or rejection of hypotheses or theories (Quoted in Siegel, 1985, p.

527). Quoting other writers such as Martin and Runder, Siegel claims that scientific method

. . . is to be understood not as the procedures of inquiry; it is rather to be understood

as criteria of evaluation of the fruits of inquiry. To say that sciences share a

distinguishing method is to say that the way in which hypotheses are assessed is

what is common to the various science. It is in the domain of justification that SM

[scientific method] reigns. . . . It is still properly labeled scientific method, science

as a knowledge-seeking enterprise manifests and explicit commitment of

evidentiary criteria. This explicit commitment of evidence . . . is no doubt the source

of science’s prestige as the preeminently rational activity. (ibid, 527-30).

Therefore, it is clear enough that the rationality of science has been related with its methods,

although it was not completely defendable, at least not easily. For example Larry Laudan argued

that

We need waste little time on this approach. Virtually all the scholarly literature on

the history of methodology shows unambiguously that such components of rational

appraisal as criteria of explanation, views about scientific testing, beliefs about the

18
 methods of inductive inference and the like have undergone enormous

transformations (Laudan, 1977, p. 129)

To sum up as what has been said so far, science as an intellectual and practical activity deals with

the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through

observation and experiment to formulate generalizations. And its rationality has been tied to the

method it uses in its investigation, although it was not easy to defend and could face many

challenges. In the next chapter we will see the challenges to the rationality of science, in detail,

especially in relation to its method.

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 Chapter II

Challenges to the Rationality of Science

2.1 Introduction

In Chapter One we have seen what rationality in general is and what science is; then, we tried to

discuss the rationality of science in general. In our discussion of the rationality of science, we have

seen that the rationality of science has been related with the method it uses to investigate and

explain the world, though it was noted that this could be legitimately challenged. In this chapter

we are going to discuss those challenges. We will begin with Hume’s challenge of induction and,

then we will discuss Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s challenge to the rationality of science. Then, in our

discussion of underdetermination, we will see Duhem’s and Quine’s challenge to the rationality of

science. Most concepts in this chapter are related with the rationality of theory choice, and the

debate between different philosophers shows that there is no pure reason or logic that can help us

to choose between theories. Finally, we will discuss Hempel’s conception of the rationality of

science.

2.2 Hume’s Challenge of Induction

The question of the rationality of science has been discussed for centuries, specifically it entered

into explicit philosophical discussion with Hume’s problem of induction. Then philosophers after

Hume borrow the problem in order to argue either in favor of or against him. Induction, as I have

said it in Chapter One, always begins with observed instances and go beyond those observed

instances to affirm a conclusion. David Hume, however, thought that we have no formal or logical

20
reason to support our belief in induction.1 According to him we understand matters of facts

according to causation or cause and effect relation. The relation between cause and effect is not

necessarily true. Causal connections are assumptions which are not subject to reason. They are just

results of frequently repeated observations. We observe that things are constantly related with one

another, but we cannot reasonably explain the real connection between those things. Therefore, we

have no rational support for believing in causation (Hume, 1967, pp. 167-169). For example,

having observed many ‘A’s to be ‘B’s may make us to believe that any new instance ‘A’ is also

‘B’. However, Hume believed that there is no necessary connection between the premises (‘A’)

and the conclusion (‘B’). In other words, all ‘A’s we have observed have been ‘B’, and ‘x’ is an

‘A’ does not necessarily imply that ‘x’ is a ‘B’. The problem here is we have no an experience

that ‘x’ is ‘B’, and what we have experienced is that ‘A’ is ‘B’ and that ‘x’ is an ‘A’. According to

Hume, to say that ‘x’ is ‘B’ only because we have the experience that ‘A’ is ‘B’ and ‘x’ is an ‘A’,

presupposes the assumption that nature is uniform. To use Hume’s words:

. . . it wou’d proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which we have had no

experience, must resemble those, of which we have had experience, and that the

course of nature continues always uniformly the same. (ibid. p. 89,)

Thus, in inductive reasoning we always jump to conclude about unobserved experience based on

past observed experiences. According to Hume’s argument, Galileo’s law of pendulum’s motion

is not justified because, as mentioned in chapter one, Galileo discovered this law only based on

observed experiments and yet the law applies to all pendulums in the universe including the

unobserved ones. Of course, many instance of pendulum’s motion have been observed and

1
Hume did not use the term induction; he was concerned with the inferences we made based on causal
connections, cause-effect relations.

21
happened to conform to Galileo’s law, but we do not have any guarantee that the unobserved cases

will equally conform to that law. Generally speaking, Hume’s challenge of induction lies in the

problem how to generalize from observed experiences and the justification of the steps that we

conduct to reach the generalization. This means that we need a justification why we move from

observed experience to a general statement or law. Carl Hempel generalizes this problem of

induction as follows:

No matter how extensively an empirical hypothesis has been tested, and no matter

how well it has been borne out by the test findings, it may yet fail in cases that have

not been examined. The supporting evidence does not suffice to verify the

hypothesis, i.e., to establish its truth with deductive certainty; it can only lend the

hypothesis more or less strong “inductive support” (Hempel, 2001, p. 331).

Taking for granted that science progresses step by step through the inductive method, many writers

respond to Hume’s challenge of induction. There are also thinkers who reformulate the problem

so that they could solve it, and others to further the challenge to the rationality of science.

2.3 Thomas Kuhn on Incommensurability

The challenge to the rationality of science continue to this day. According to Kuhn, history of

science shows that the development of science is not a simple uniform and cumulative process;

rather it has varying phases such as revolutionary and normal phases. Nevertheless, to begin with

the concept of paradigm, it provides guiding principles and general assumptions to define what

problems exist, and how they can be solved.

[By] paradigms’. . . I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual

scientific practice – examples which include law, theory, application, and

22
 instrumentation together – provide models from which spring particular coherent

traditions of scientific research (Kuhn, 1996, p. 10).

For example, a scientist who wants to make research about atoms does not have to begin from

nothing; there is a general scientific view that provides him with general assumptions and

procedures that can be undertaken. Or if he is already an atomic scientist, he will use his prior

understanding of the atom as a background for his research; for it will be difficult to work on his

research without those assumptions and procedures. In other words, “[m]en whose research is

based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice”

(Kuhn, 1996, p. 11). Generally speaking, a paradigm provides the scientist with all necessary tools

and conditions to conduct or explain his research.

Establishing a paradigm is also a prerequisite for normal science. In the above, while explaining

what paradigm is, I quoted Kuhn saying that “[m]en whose research is based on shared paradigms

are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice”. Further, he argued that “that

commitment and the apparent consensus it [paradigm] produces are prerequisites for normal

science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition” (Kuhn, 1996, p.

11). Thus, normal science is research activity based on the previously accepted practice by

particular scientific community. To put it in Kuhn’s words:

. . . ‘normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific

achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community

acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice (Kuhn,

1996, p. 10).

23
Thus, scientists do their scientific activities in normal science, in which there already is a paradigm

providing the necessarily tools such as key theory, instruments, values and metaphysical

assumptions. Normal science can also be seen as a puzzle-solving activity, in a sense that the aim

of the scientists in normal science is not wonder or excitement of exploring new problems; rather

their motivation is to test their skills by solving puzzles that are assumed to have solutions within

a paradigm or a single puzzle box.

Consider the jigsaw puzzle whose pieces are selected at random from each of two

different puzzle boxes. Since that problem is to defy (though it might not) even the

most ingenious on men, it cannot serve as a test of skill in solution. In any usual

sense it is not a puzzle at all. Though intrinsic value is no criterion for a puzzle, the

assured existence of a solution is (Kuhn, 1996, p.37).

To put it in other words, in normal science scientists do not concern themselves with wide range

of problems that go beyond their paradigms. So normal science is paradigm dependent that the

scientific community acknowledge or choose a problem because they assume that it has solutions

within that paradigm. To strengthen this idea, Kuhn argues that

. . . one of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion

for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed

to have solutions. To a great extent these are the only problems that the community

will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems . . .

are rejected . . . . (Kuhn, 1996, p.37)

The point here is that the practices of scientists within normal science are based on the established

paradigm and they are cumulative. Normal science is cumulative because scientists, restricting

24
themselves within a single puzzle box, spend most of their time looking for the complicated details

and applicability of their practices based on the tools (such as, key theory, instruments, values and

metaphysical assumptions) that the paradigm provides them (Kuhn, 1996, p. 52).

Although practices of normal science can continue for long time based on established paradigm,

paradigms change eventually. Of course, the practice of normal science can continue for long time

even though there are some amount of errors which can be absorbed by slight changes in the

paradigm. However, paradigm shift is inevitable when the fundamental principles of the paradigm

are at error and it is then that all the tools of the normal science come into question and need a

revision to provide a solution for the unresolved anomalies that challenge the normal science.

According to Kuhn, paradigm change is scientific revolution and “. . . scientific revolutions are

here taken to be those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is

replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 92). That said, the

question here is: does this paradigm shift, which is a revolutionary transition between paradigms,

imply the failure of one scientific paradigm and its replacement by a new and better paradigm?

Kuhn’s answer is no, and it is here where Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability comes into

discussion.

A philosopher with an empiricist orientation would argue that the epistemic quality of a theory can

be evaluated by applying rules of method to the theory and evidence which support that very

theory. However, Kuhn would not agree with this way of evaluation. According to Kuhn, as

indicated above, theories develop within normal science in which there is common and shared

tools that are acknowledged by a community as foundation for theories. And we have also seen

that paradigms change from time to time, although it is very rare. Therefore, according to Kuhn,

the standard rules of method that any empiricist would provide as a standard to evaluate a theory

25
are paradigm dependent. And since paradigm change from time to time, the standards that any

empiricist would provide are also subject to change. Or since there might be two rival paradigms

there would be no common measure between them. Therefore, theories are incommensurable (they

lack common measure). Hence it is difficult to choose between theories.

According to Kuhn, we cannot choose between theories because the way a subject is conceived is

totally different from one paradigm to the other.

. . . the proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about the list of

problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve. Their standards or their

definitions of science are not the same. . . . Within the new paradigm, old terms,

concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other. The

inevitable result is what we must call, though the term is not quite right, a

misunderstanding between the two competing schools. (Kuhn, 1996, pp. 148-9)

Thus, the factors that determine scientists’ choices of theory are not fixed and neutral, rather they

are different and dependent on paradigm within which scientist do their practice. In other words,

there is no clearly defined standard to tell which is better, since it is a paradigm that can provide

such standard. Furthermore Kuhn also argues that

To make the transition to Einstein’s universe, the whole conceptual web whose

strands are space, time, matter, force, and so on, had to be shifted and laid down

again on nature whole. Only men who had together undergone or failed to undergo

that transformation would be able to discover precisely what they agreed or

disagreed about. Communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably

partial. (Kuhn, 1996, p. 149)

26
Therefore, incommensurability also emerges due to standard difference or change, conceptual gap

or inconsistency. Because of perceptual or observational evidence it is impossible to provide

common basis for theory comparison or choice. To make this point Kuhn states:

In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing

paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. One contains constrained bodies

that fall slowly, the other pendulums that repeat their motions again and again. In

one, solutions are compounds, in the other mixtures. One is embedded in a flat, the

other in a curved, matrix of space. Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of

scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same

direction. Again, that is not to say that they can see anything they please. Both are

looking at the world, and what they look at has not changed. But in some areas they

see different things, and they see them in different relations one to the other. (Kuhn,

1996, p. 150)

Here Kuhn is saying that there is no paradigm independent way of observing the data or evidence

in a sense that one paradigm can say that this is the best way to see the data and that is how we

should see it. And the other paradigm can say, well, according to this paradigm that is the best way

to see the data; therefore, that is how we see the data and that is the way it is. Therefore, what we

observe is conditioned and mediated by our theories; consequently how we interpret the evidence

will also depend on our theory and this begs the question. Thus, the consequence of this theory-

ladenness of observation is that no amount of evidence can decide to choose between paradigms2.

2
This is more related to Duhem’s and Quine’s concept of underdetermination which I will discuss
later in this chapter.

27
Therefore, Kuhn’s incommensurability implies that the decision to choose between theories does

not necessarily depend on reason.

In his later works, Kuhn tried to focus on language to resolve the problem of incommensurability

and claims that to choose between theories, language is important because comparison of theories

needs the formulation of both theories in a common language. “The point-by-point comparison of

two successive theories demands a language into which at least the empirical consequences of both

can be translated without loss or change” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 266). However, he defies this possibility

by claiming that “[t]here is no neutral language into which both of the theories as well as the

relevant data may be translated to purposes of comparison” (quoted in Sankey, 1993, p. 765). The

translation between the languages of theories is impossible because “translation of one theory into

the language of another depends . . . upon compromises . . . whence incommensurability” (ibid).

Therefore, either because of theory-ladenness or lack neutral language Kuhn’s concept of

incommensurability implies that the decision to choose between theories does not necessarily

depend on reason.

2.4 Feyerabend on the ‘Irrationality’ of Science

On our discussion of Kuhn’s incommensurability we have seen that Kuhn challenges the

rationality of theory choice by mere pure reason, but he never intended to condemn science as an

irrational enterprise. For he argued, in his response to his critics, that “[w]hat I am denying then is

neither the existence of good reasons nor that these reasons are of the sort usually described”

(quoted in Bernstein, 1983, p. 53). Paul Feyerabend, however, is more extreme than Kuhn; he

denies the legitimacy of one overwhelming scientific method and the rationality of science as a

whole, and explicitly.

28
At the beginning of Chapter One of Against Method he argues that3

The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding

principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty

when confronted with the results of historical research. We find, then, that there is

not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology,

that is not violated at some time or other. (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 14)

Further, at the end of the same chapter, he goes on to argue that

It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality,

rests on too naïve a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at

the rich material provided by a history, and who are not intent on impoverishing it

in order to please their lower instincts, their crabbing for intellectual security in the

form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there is

only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of

human development. It is the Principle: anything goes. (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 18-9)

Thus, according to him, following a fixed method would never lead scientists to scientific growth.

In other words, it is not necessary for a scientist to accept a single established scientific method

such as Lakatos’ scientific research programs. Because, for Feyerabend, a scientist, being an

epistemic anarchist, can and should follow a method that is not a method at all: that is ‘anything

goes’. Furthermore, “. . . reason [by itself], at least in the form in which it is defended by logicians,

3
Perhaps there will be a lot of direct quotations from Feyerabend; and I intentionally prefer to quote him directly
because his ideas seem rhetorically convincing than logically. Thus, I believe, quoting him directly would show how
rhetorically convincing he is, though not logically.

29
philosophers and some scientists, does not fit science and could not have contributed to its growth”

(ibid, 214).

Feyerabend’s sever attack on the rationality of scientific method is based the assumption that there

are situations in which our methods and rules would never allow a point of view which are regarded

today as important for science. For example, he talks how Copernicus’ heliocentric theory was

ridiculed by his contemporaries, but, nonetheless, it is important in today’s science.

The ideas survived and they now are said to be in agreement with reason. They

survived because prejudice, passion, conceit, errors, sheer pigheadedness, in short

because all the elements that characterize the context of discovery, opposed the

dictates of reason and because these irrational elements were permitted to have

their way. To express it differently: Copernicanism and other ‘rational’ views exist

today only because reason was overruled at some time in their past. (Feyerabend,

1975, p. 116,)

His sever attack on the rationality of science are also prevalent on Chapter Fifteen. There he argued

that:

. . . wherever we look, whatever examples we consider, we see that the principles

of critical rationalism . . . and, fortiori, the principles of logical empiricism . . . give

an inadequate account of the past development of science as a whole and are liable

to hinder it in the future. They give an inadequate account of science because

science is much more ‘sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than its methodological image. And

they are liable to hinder it because the attempt to make science more ‘rational’ and

more precise is bound to wipe it out. . . . The difference between science and

30
 methodology which is such an obvious fact of history, therefore, indicates a

weakness of the latter, and perhaps of the ‘laws of reason’ as well. . . . These

‘deviation’, these ‘error’, are preconditions of progress. They permit knowledge

to survive in the complex and difficult world which we inhabit, they permit us to

remain free and happy agents. Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge. Without a frequent

dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the very basis of science

exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because

these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way.

We have to conclude, then, that even within science reason cannot and should not

be allowed to be comprehensive and that it must often be overruled, or eliminated,

in favour of other agencies. (Feyerabend, 1975, pp. 157-8)

Thus, Feyerabend’s challenge is attack on the method and rationality of science; he is arguing that

a single scientific method does not exist and would never make science rational. Rather it is the

assumption of the existence of a single method and sticking to ‘reason’ that makes science

irrational. This being said, we also have other thinkers who challenge the rationality of science in

a different way, which is more related to Kuhn’s way of challenging science than that of

Feyerabend’s.

2.5 Underdetermination of Theory Choice

Now let us see the implications of incommensurability, that the evidence we use to support

scientific theories underdetermine theory choice between two rival theories. Philosophers such as

Duhem and Quine contends that since theory choice is underdetermined by the evidence, reason

alone cannot determine our decision to choose between theories. Apparently, such a conclusion

31
questions the rationality of theory choice particularly and generally the rationality of science as a

whole.

2.5.1 Pierre Duhem on Underdetermination

In his work A “Crucial Experiment” Is Impossible in Physics, Duhem argued that there is no

experiment that can conclusively falsify one of two competing theories, and we cannot establish

the truth of one of these theories by conclusively rejecting the other. Duhem gives us two examples

of experiments regarded crucial experiments. The first one is experiment on the direction of

vibration of polarized light and the second is experiment on the measurement of the velocity of

light in air and water (Duhem, 1998, pp. 264-6). For the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the

second crucial experiment and here the experiment is about the claims of particle and wave theory

on the velocity of light in water and in air.

The particle theory declares that light travels more quickly in water than in air while the wave

theory claims that light travels more quickly in air than in water. By showing how Foucault’s

experiment show the result Duhem writes:

. . . the debate is over; light is not a body, but a vibratory wave motion propagated

by the ether; the emission [particle] hypothesis has had its day; the wave hypothesis

has been put beyond doubt, and the crucial experiment has made it a new article of

the scientific credo. (Duhem, 1998, p. 365)

However, Duhem does not take this experiment as crucial:

. . . for it is not between two hypotheses, the emission and wave hypotheses, that

Foucault’s experiment judges trenchantly; it decides rather between two sets of

32
 theories each of which has to be taken as a whole, i.e., between two entire systems,

Newton’s optics and Huygen’s optics. (Duhem, 1998, p. 365)

Thus, we can say that the decision of a scientist to choose between two theories requires

enumerating all the hypotheses within the theories; then through experiment he has to avoid all

hypotheses except one which, based on the experiment, become a certainty. But this is impossible,

Duhem contends, because

. . . experimental contradiction does not have the power to transform a physical

hypothesis into an indisputable truth; in order to confer this power on it, it would

be necessary to enumerate completely the various hypotheses which may cover a

determinate group of phenomena; but the physicist is never sure he has exhausted

all the imaginable assumptions. (Duhem, 1998, p. 266)

Therefore, there is no possible way that a physicist can be sure that he has listed all the hypotheses

needed to explain a group of phenomena. For example, let us assume that Foucault’s experiment

shows that wave theory, which claims that light travels more quickly in air than in water, is correct

and the particle theory had to be rejected. And based on our assumption that the logical conclusion

would be one of the theories will be eliminated based on the result we get from the experiment.

However, according to Duhem, it does not necessarily follow that the one that is not eliminated

(wave theory) is true. Because, for Duhem, when we decide that wave theory is the correct one we

have to think of all hypothetical assumptions and auxiliaries behind it. In a sense that even though

wave theory turned out to be true, this does not necessarily show that the particle theory should be

eliminated in favor of wave theory because, apparently, what the experiment shows is that at least

one of the auxiliary hypotheses in the whole theory is wrong.

33
Furthermore Duhem argued that even the scientist has no logical ground to decide which

hypothesis or hypotheses should be changed, does not know which one or ones are false, since the

experiment does not tell him which one is. However, Duhem suggests that the scientist to reach

his decision he should be guided by ‘good sense’. For he believes that:

Pure logic is not the only rule for our judgments; certain opinions which do not fall

under the hammer of the principle of contradiction are in any case perfectly

unreasonable. These motives which do not proceed from logic and yet direct our

choices, these ‘reasons which reason does not know’ and which speak to the ample

‘mind of finesse’ but not to the ‘geometric mind,’ constitute what is appropriately

called good sense. (ibid, p. 277-8)

Therefore, when an experiment contradicted a prediction, what the scientist can know is that at

least one of the hypotheses in the theory is faulty and needs to be modified or changed. However,

the experiment does not tell which one should be changed or modified. In this regard, it

underdetermines theory choice. According to Duhem, what a scientist needs in such cases is not

pure reason or logic, rather he needs “good sense” in order to decide which one of the hypotheses

have to be eliminated, changed or modified.

2.5.2 W. V. Quine on Underdetermination

Quine’s argument about the relationship between evidence and theory is more general than

Duhem’s, for Quine refer to the whole human knowledge, not just science. In his paper ‘Two

Dogmas of Empiricism’, he writes “The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the

most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even

34
of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the

edges” (Quine, 1951 p. 39).

Of course, this may not directly suggest his concept of the underdetermination of theory choice by

evidence, but it shows how far Quine goes to question even the rationality of our entire knowledge.

We can also see the relation of the above quotation with his main underdetermination thesis, when

we find him arguing that observable events which are used as evidence in one comprehensive

scientific theory “can all be accounted for equally in another, conflicting system of the world”

(Quine, 1975, p. 313). What Quine says here is two logically incompatible theories can be

empirically equivalent, since they can be equally supported by all possible data. Further he argued

that

Scientists invent hypotheses that talk of things beyond the reach of observation.

The hypotheses are related to observation only by a kind of one-way implication;

namely, the events we observe are what a belief in the hypotheses would have led

us to expect. These observable consequences of hypotheses do not, conversely,

imply the hypotheses. Surely there are alternative hypothetical substructures that

would surface in the same observable ways. (Quine, 1975, p. 313)

Therefore, Quine’s underdetermination implies that the evidence that we have to support one

theory can also support another rival theory. And such theories are underdetermined not only by

past observation (observations here are taken as evidence), but also by all possible observable

events. To strengthen this let us see Quine’s example:

We have on the one hand our commonsense conception of infinite space and rigid

bodies that move freely without shrinking or stretching, and on the other hand the

35
 conception of a finite spherical space in which those bodies shrink uniformly as

they move away from center. Both conceptions can be reconciled with all possible

observations; they are empirically equivalent. Yet they differ, this time, more

deeply than in the mere choice of words. The theory with the finite space makes

crucial use of a theoretical term that admits of no counterpart in the theory with the

infinite space – namely, ‘center of space’. (Quine, 1992, pp. 96-7)

Thus, according to Quine, we can reconcile any theory with any evidence by making some

adjustments in our other assumptions. For example, let us assume that there is a sentence S that

the one theory confirms and the other denies. What we can do is, since the theories are empirically

equivalent, to look for a term which is not necessarily related to observation but related to S. Then

we can take this term as two different terms in the two theories “S thus gives way to two mutually

independent sentences S and S’. Continuing thus, we can make the two theories logically

compatible.” (Quine, 1992, p. 98). Therefore, we do not have to choose between these theories,

for the evidence cannot conclusively tell us which one is better; and rather than choosing “[w]e

would simply accept the other theory and incorporate it into our own as an enrichment, answering

many theoretical questions that ours left open” (Quine, 1992, p. 97).

So did two rival theories have equal epistemological status? I mean, Quine contends that two

different rival theories are “empirically equivalent” and can be reconciled, so does this mean that

both are true? Of course, this is not a new question and Quine himself tried to answer this question

in different occasions; his answer is:

I had held that one of the two systems of the world must be deemed false even if

we know them to empirically equivalent. I shall call this the sectarian position. My

reason for it was naturalism: my disavowal of any higher tribunal than science

36
 itself. In the latter and conflicting passage, as Gibson relates, I opted for truth of

both systems, finding it offensive to my empiricist sensibilities to declare

otherwise. This I shall call the ecumenical position. (quoted in Bergstrom, 1993, p.

341)

He seems to take for granted that if we accept a system already, then we accept it as true. In his

paper ‘Relativism and Absolutism’ he affirms what I am suspecting here by stating that

We are thus left only with empirically equivalent theory formulations that are

logically reconcilable. If we subscribe to one of them as true, we can call them true

and view them as different descriptions of one and the same world. We are no

strangers, after all, to strange languages. If this be relativism, make the most of it.

(Quine, 1984, p. 295, emphasis added)

Generally speaking, Quine’s underdetermination thesis implies that every theory that has the same

degree of empirical evidence could be considered as rational or well supported, thus accepted.

However, Larry Laudan in his paper ‘Demystifying Underdetermination’ argued that Quine’s

underdetermination does not carry epistemic force, because it is not formulated in terms of the

rationality of preserving threatened theories. Further he contends that: “Absent of strong arguments

for the idea that any theory can be rationally retained in the face of any recalcitrant evidence or its

functional equivalents . . . [Quine’s underdetermination thesis] appear to pose no threat in principle

for an account of scientific methodology of rationality” (Laudan, 1998. Pp. 330-1).

Of course, in addition to Laudan’s critic there are different responses to challenge the problem, but

there are also some thinkers who support Quine’s and Duhen’s underdetermination. For example,

37
trying to reconcile Duhem’s and Quine’s concept of underdetermination, Gillies in his article ‘The

Duhem Thesis and the Quine Thesis’ argued that

The group of hypotheses under test in any given situation is in practice limited, and

does not extend to the whole of human knowledge.[4] Quine’s claim that ‘Any

statement can be held to be true come what may, if we make drastic enough

adjustments elsewhere in the system’ . . . is true from a purely logical point of view;

but scientific good sense concludes in many situations that it would be perfectly

unreasonable to hold on to particular statements. (Gillies, 1998, p. 317)

Nevertheless, Quine’s and Duhem’s underdetermination of theories cannot be overlooked for they

pose epistemological threat which in turn questions the epistemic value of scientific method.

To sum up, I have tried to discuss Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability to show that either

because of theory-ladenness or lack of communication (lack of communication raise from lack of

common measure in language), we cannot choose between theories by supporting our belief with

pure reason. After discussing Feyerabend challenging the rationality of science, we discussed the

underdetermination thesis: that both Duhem’s and Quine’s theses still challenges rationality of

theory choice. Of course, there are some characteristics, raised by Kuhn and others, considered as

desirable features of scientific theories that can help us to choose between theories, such as

accuracy, simplicity, preferably quantitative, the ability to predict novel phenomena and so on.

However, each of these desirable features lacks sufficient precision to help us know which of two

rival theories satisfies these features more fully. “Even if precise criteria for each of the individual

desiderata were available, there would remain the task of combining them all into one overall

4
However, Gillis thinks that Quine’s thesis can be applied to “any high-level . . . theoretical hypotheses, whether of
physics or of other science. . .” (Gillies, 1998, p. 317)

38
criterion of rational preferability of competing theories” (Hempel, 2001, p. 364). This said, in the

next subtitle I will discuss Hempel’s idea of the rationality of science.

2.6 Hempel: Explanation and Prediction by Covering Laws

According to C. G. Hempel the rationality of science is not an issue of whether we should choose

between two rival theories; he believes that the rationality of science lies on determining the goals

of scientific inquiry for “a given action or a mode of procedure cannot be qualified as rational or

as irrational just by itself, but only in consideration of the goal that it is aimed at” (Hempel, 2001,

p. 361). And according to Hempel, these goals depend on the rationality of the methodological

norm of scientific inquiry.

For Hempel, the rationality of science is not about to choose between two rival theories, rather it

lies on answering/explaining the question as to why something is the case. To qualify such

scientific explanation as accepted, Hempel gives us a criterion called “condition of adequacy for

scientific explanation. . . .The requirement is that any adequate scientific answer to a question of

the type ‘Why is X the case?’ must provide information which constitutes good grounds for

believing or expecting that X is the case” (Hempel, 2001, 75-6). Then, he discusses some necessary

conditions for the acceptance of the rationality of the goals of science. First, in relation to the goals

of science, he states:

a set of sentences would be rationally acceptable only if it is capable of test and has

in fact been tested with success . . . next, an acceptable set must not be known to be

logically inconsistent since otherwise its sentences could not possibly all be true. .

. . These, then, are some modes necessary conditions of scientific rationality. They

39
 do not pertain to the issue of a rational choice between compering possibly qualify

as representing scientific knowledge at some time. (Hempel, 2001, p. 363)

Therefore, rationality lies not in choosing between two rival theories, but in its goals which in turn

depends on the methods used to examine these goals. And his two general accounts of the goals

of science are:

(A) Science is widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly

comprehensive, systematically organized, world view that is explanatory and

predictive.

(B) . . . science aims at establishing a sequence of increasingly comprehensive and

accurate systems of empirical knowledge. (Quoted on Siegel, 1985, p. 520)

In the first (A) goal of science the main concepts are explanation and prediction, and according to

Hempel, there are two models of scientific explanation: Deductive nomological or the deductive

model and inductive-probabilistic or the probabilistic model. These two models are two ways of

answering the question as to the “why?” which empirical science is trying to answer (Hempel,

2001, p. 69).

Even though there are two models of scientific explanation, both of them depend on the

fundamental concept of law. Hempel thinks that scientific explanations (both of them) can be

understood by subsuming some corresponding laws, in a sense that scientific explanations explain

a single occurrence event by drawing their explanation from premises that include at least one law

or law-like sentence. “Thus, the two modes of explanation agree in accounting for a given

phenomenon by reference to what. . . I will call covering laws; I will accordingly refer to both of

40
the corresponding models as covering – law models of scientific explanation” (Hempel, 2001, p.

69)

The difference between these two types of explanation also lies in the character of the laws that

they depend. “A deductive nomological explanation is based on laws which express unexceptional

uniformities; such laws are of strictly universal form. . . .” (Hempel, 2001, p. 69), while an

inductive-probabilistic explanation has a statistical character; at least all of the laws are not strictly

universal. (Hempel, 2001, p. 71). Even Hempel himself, explicitly, writes: “Explanations by

covering laws . . . have a further feature which seems to me characteristics of all scientific

explanation, namely, they rest on general laws” (Hempel, 2001, p. 75).

The two models of Hempel’s concept of explanation by covering laws presuppose metaphysical

belief. Because whether the law behind the explanation is universal or statistical, the concept

behind the law is still the principle of uniformity which is a metaphysical belief. This means, both

the deductive model of explanation and the probabilistic model explanation presuppose that the

world is governed, somehow, by law, which implies the principle of uniformity. Therefore, the

important questions here will be: what are these principles of uniformity and other metaphysical

principles? And how are these constituted in the scientific theories? In order to answer these

questions we need to look for metaphysical discourses and clarifications, which I will discuss in

the next chapter.

Generally speaking this chapter focused on the challenge to scientific rationality. We have

discussed Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability to show that either because of theory-ladenness

or lack of communication, we cannot choose between theories by supporting our belief with pure

reason. Then, we discussed Feyerabend’s challenge to the rationality of science that science is

irrational and it is this irrationality which brings science into progress. We also have seen that the

41
underdetermination thesis (both Duhem’s and Quine’s theses) still challenges rationality of theory

choice, epistemically. Then, finally, we have discussed that according to Hempel the rationality of

science is not an issue of choosing between two competing theories. The rationality of science is

related with its goals such as formulating an explanatory and predictive world view. To show this

Hempel introduced two models of explanation by general covering laws, and I argued that this

concept of explanation by covering laws presupposes metaphysical belief such as the metaphysical

principle of uniformity.

In the next chapter, showing that the epistemological arguments for the rationality of science are

not sufficient, I will argue that once we clarify the metaphysical presuppositions in scientific

theories, such as the principle of uniformity, the principle of substance and the principle of

causality, we will then see the defendability of rationality of science and the explanatory power of

scientific theories.

42
 Chapter III

Metaphysical Defense for the Rationality of Science

3.1 Introduction

In chapter two we have seen the challenges to the rationality of science; we have seen Hume’s

challenge to the very scientific method of induction. There are also many thinkers who believe that

we cannot have pure reason to choose between two competing theories. Kuhn, Duhem and Quine,

as we have seen in chapter two, believe that pure reason alone would never help us to choose the

better theory from two rival theories. Others also think that it is not rational to claim to have only

one legitimate method for the practice of science. For example, Feyerabend argued that science

should be questioned and rejected for claiming and demanding to have one definite method to

pursue its goals. He rather insisted on the idea that there is no single method except “anything

goes”. Apparently, there are epistemological responses to the above challenges. However, since

the epistemological responses are not sufficient enough to support the rationality of science; I will

argue that we need a metaphysical argument to have strong arguments for the rationality of science.

Before I proceed to the metaphysical arguments, I will first discuss some of the epistemological

responses to the challenge of the rationality of science.

3.2 Some Responses to the Challenges of the Rationality of Science

3.2.1 Popper’s Falsification

Of course there are many responses to the above challenges and critics to the rationality of science.

For example, Popper argued that scientific theories have infinite claims about reality, but we have

only finite evidence and this finite evidence can never settle the issue. For he believed that

43
 . . . the logical problem of induction arises from (a) Hume’s discovery . . . that it is

impossible to justify a law by observation or experiment, since it ‘transcends

experience’; (b)the fact that science proposes and uses laws ‘everywhere and all the

time’. . . . To this we have to add (c) the principles of empiricism which asserts that

in science, only observation and experiment may decide upon the acceptance or

rejection of scientific statements, including laws and theories. (Popper, 1962, p.55)

Rejecting induction as a method for science, Popper introduces the concept of falsification as a

solution to the problem at hand. Falsification implies that science follows a deductive method than

inductive; of course, it would be easy to find as many confirmations as possible for one’s theory

but this does not prove anything. According to Popper a theory can still claim to know about the

unobserved future. Thus, Popper argued, under the subtitle “Deductive Testing of Theories,” that

it is logical for a scientist to use a deductive method to critically test theories and select them

according to the results of tests.

From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way – an

anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will – conclusions are

drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with

one another and with other relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations

(such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between

them (Popper, 2005, p. 9)

Having discussed four different ways of testing a scientific theory, he further argued that

It should be noticed that a positive decision can only temporarily support the theory,

for subsequent negative decisions may always overthrow it. So long as a theory

44
 withstands detailed and severe tests and is not superseded by another theory in the

course of scientific progress, we may say that it has ‘proved its mettle’ or that it is

‘corroborated’ (Popper, 2005, p. 10)

Therefore, according to Popper, the logic of science lies on pure deductive method; and the

rationality of scientific method does not depend on looking for inductive or probable theories and

try to confirm them with evidence. Rather it is about conjecturing a theory and try to refute it. For

him, scientific theory is a theory that is refutable or falsifiable; severe test of scientific theory is a

trial to falsify it and the one that survive such test is worth calling a scientific theory until it is

falsified. Genuine scientific theories make risky predictions and we can test them by deducing

these predictions from them. If the prediction turned out to be false, then they must be rejected.

But if they are verified, the theory is corroborated, not confirmed.

According to Popper, although it is rational for a scientist to rely on corroborated theories, they

should not be accepted as true or confirmed theories. For confirmed theories are based on inductive

reasoning, in a sense that a theory is confirmed as long as we can get instances that confirm it. As

mentioned above Popper totally rejected inductive method as a legitimate method for science.

According to him, corroborated theories are time dependent; they are corroborated at a given time

when they have survived severe attempts to refute them up to that time (Curd and Cover, 1998, p.

508). Eventually, when they are falsified, they will be replaced with bolder theories which are not

yet falsified or refuted. Therefore, the prediction lies not on the future but deductively within the

ability of the hypothesis to survive the tests. In other words, when the scientists try refute their

hypothesis by performing tests but failed to find negative instance, all what we can say is that the

hypothesis in question has not been refuted. As mentioned above, according to Popper, positive

45
instance do not provide inductive support for any such unrefuted generalization, for our

observation refer to past events and as a result they lack predictive content.

3.2.2 Salmon on Rational Prediction

As mentioned above prediction for Popper is all about the deductive consequences that we can

draw from the hypothesis that we conjecture to test it. However, Wesley Salmon did not agree

with Popper’s concept of prediction; and argued that it is true that “we sometimes make predictions

for the sake of testing theory” (Salmon, 1981, p. 115), but there at least two other reasons for

making prediction. We make prediction to satisfy our intellectual curiosity, wondering about what

will happen in the future. There is also a practical prediction, such as “we sometimes find ourselves

in situations in which some practical action is required, and the choice of an optimal decision

depends upon predicting future occurrences” (ibid, p. 116); and Salmon believes that scientific

theories involve such kind of prediction that they provide “sound bases for practical prediction”.

Salmon associating Popper’s concept of corroboration with respect to its ability of prediction or

its future performance, he argues that corroboration involves some elements of induction. “. . .

[F]or past performance to the theory is taken to constitute a basis for some sort of claim about

future performance” (ibid, 119). In other words, unless corroboration entails induction how could

Popper explain why do we accept current scientific theories as a better guide to the future than any

irrational and blind guesswork? The point here is that, we have seen that, unlike Popper, Salmon

argues that scientific theories involve practical predictions. So, let us say that we have to make a

decision and the choice of our decision depends on knowing the future occurrences. For example,

we want to decide whether to collect our harvest from the field today or wait for few more days.

Here our decision depends on knowing the weather condition of the coming few days. To decide

46
either way we have to rely on current accepted scientific theories that are capable of predicting the

future than relying on guess. Therefore, corroboration entails induction or involves prediction.

Rejecting Popper’s solution5 to Hume’s problem of induction, Salmon contends that pragmatic

approach would solve the problem. Hume, as mentioned above, thinks that we do not have

whatsoever rational support in accepting inductive method, that none of inductive methods can be

claimed to be either more or less rational than any other methods. However, Salmon thinks that

for the purpose of practical prediction we are justified in using induction as a method. He argued

that

. . . if every method is equally lacking in rational justification, then there is no

method which can be said to furnish a rational basis for prediction, for any

prediction will be just as unfounded rationally as any other. If the Humean skeptic

were right, we could offer the following parallel claim. A pragmatic belief in the

predictions found in Chinese fortune cookies is not irrational, for there is nothing

more rational (ibid, p. 121).

Salmon is saying that, reasoning from experience, induction is our best method to solve practical

problem than any other methods. In this respect, he is also defending Reichenbach’s pragmatic

5
Of course, Popper and Watkins responded to Salmon that he totally misunderstood Popper’s idea of
corroborated theories. However, Salomon never ceased to challenge Popper's idea; and in his 1981 article
“Rational prediction” he give a detail analysis of Popper’s and Watkins’ response to show that Popper’s
idea of corroborated theory still involves prediction. For Salmon’s detail analysis on this issue see, (Salmon,
1981, pp. 119-125).

47
solution for the problem induction. “That is, Reichenbach thinks that to justify forming our

opinions by using induction, it suffices to show that no other method can do better than induction

– even if we have not shown anything about how well induction will do” (Lange, 2011, p. 74).

So far, we have seen Salmon arguing that Popper’s falsification cannot resolve the problem; and

he, supporting Reichenbach, provides us with his own solution. But, as it is apparent in the above

discussion, his solution will take us back to the original problem of induction which is considered

as a challenge to the rationality of science. And this, in turn, makes his solution neither sufficient

nor good enough to show the rationality of science.

3.2.3 Incommensurability and Underdetermination Revisited

In Chapter Two our discussion of Kuhn’s incommensurability disclosed that factors that determine

scientists’ choices of theory are not fixed and neutral, rather they are different and dependent on

paradigm within which scientists do their practice. According to Kuhn, as the paradigm changes,

scientists see different things than they do before. Because of paradigm change, “practicing in

different worlds, the two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same

point in the same direction” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 150). However, during a paradigm change the world

does not change; what changes is the way the scientists see it. Thus, Kuhn’s incommensurability

does not affect the metaphysical arguments I will be discussing below; for Kuhn himself asserted

that the world itself does not change and this implies that he believed that the world is physically

comprehensible; that the world cannot simply be made to the kind of world scientists needs to be.

Rather it is comprehensible in a sense that the world of course can be changed, but it changes and

interacts in precise and fixed way. This in turn, therefore, makes the existence of metaphysical

48
presuppositions explicit not only in the practice of scientists, but also in the discussions and claims

of philosophers about how science works.

On the other hand, the underdetermination thesis takes us back to the problem of induction. As we

have seen both Duhem’s and Quine’s theses are related to the use of data or evidence to choose

between two theories in science; and as we have seen in chapter one the data or evidence stand on

theory by way of induction relations. In other words, when we raise the issue of

underdetermination we always talk about the role of the evidence or data to choose between two

rival theories; and what I am saying here is that the relation of the data or evidence to scientific

theories is based on induction. For example, a theory is confirmed by evidence, if the theory entails

that very evidence. And according to the underdetermination thesis, when two theories, T1 and

T2, are each able to entail the same evidence both T1 and T2 are supported or confirmed by that

very same evidence. Hence, the underdetermination theses takes us back to the problem of

induction, which we already have discussed in chapter two and in this chapter.

Beginning from Chapter One through this section of this thesis we have been discussing the

question of the rationality of science related either with its method or theory choice, except for

Hempel (see section 2.6). Regarding method, one may chose an inductive method, while the other

deductive, depending on the understanding of the aim of science. For example, as we have seen

Popper prefers the deductive method to inductive because he believes that scientific prediction lies

deductively in the ability of a hypothesis to survive tests and then proves that the conjectures made

by scientists are correct. Besides, according to him, positive illustrations never provide inductive

support for any unrefuted generalization. On the other hand we have seen Salmon arguing that

from the pragmatic point of view and reasoning from experience, induction is our best method to

49
solve practical problems than any other methods. And such controversies on scientific method are

the result of not being clear about the goal or aim of science. Concerning to the theory choice, we

have also been discussing that one might think that it is rational to accept a given theory T1, while

the other might choose the rival theory T2 in the light of evidence. Or one might accept a given

theory T1 as rational one based on a given paradigm; on the contrary the other might accept the

rival theory T2 as rational based on another given paradigm.

Of course, to avoid the problem of method and the problem of choosing between rival theories it

has been thought the goal or aim of science to be a simple attainment or improvement of knowledge

(Maxwell 1974). However, there was no specific, clear and unambiguous goal or aim of science.

For example some writers believe

. . . that in science we accept a theory as belonging to our knowledge if it is more

likely to be closer to the truth than any of its rivals, in the light of the available

evidence. Popper, however, holds that even our best corroborated theories remain

utterly improbable and conjectural. For Popper, to say that a theory “belongs to our

knowledge” is to say roughly that it is highly falsifiable, and has withstood all our

attempts to falsify it. Any trace of a justificationist or verificationist element is

expunged from the Popperian concept of knowledge. Again, conventionalists or

instrumentalists may uphold a different concept of knowledge. According to

conventionalism, to say that a theory is a part of our knowledge is to that it

systematizes established facts in a neater, more convenient, orderly fashion that

other rival theories. (Maxwell 1974, p. 136)

50
Therefore, focusing only on the methodological debate, the problem of theory choice and the

failure to formulate clear and unambiguous goal or aim of science makes the epistemological

debate insufficient to defend the rationality of science. Of course, Hempel, avoiding the problem

of theory choice, tried to formulate specific goals of science based on his two models of

explanation by covering laws. However, I strongly believe that this account is also not strong

enough to defend the rationality of science, for it presupposes a metaphysical claim but failed to

articulate it. Thus, it is because of the insufficiency of the epistemological debate to defend the

rationality of science that I am arguing that the rationality of science lies on metaphysics. And in

the next sections we will see these metaphysical arguments for the rationality of science.

3.3 Metaphysical Arguments for the Rationality of Science

What follows next is what I call metaphysical arguments for the rationality of science. But before

I engaged into the details of my arguments I would like to say little about what I mean when I use

the word metaphysical. When I say metaphysical I use it to mean that anything which refers to

reality and to the nature of things that exist. So when I claim to provide metaphysical arguments

for the rationality of science, existence is the core idea of my argument. However, this does not

mean that epistemological arguments for the rationality of science are trivial. Of course,

epistemological arguments are important; for perceiving and knowing what is there (what is

metaphysically given) is necessary for science, even it is necessary for the very existence of

science. However, as I have tried to say, they are not sufficient enough to support the rationality

of science. Hence, we need a metaphysical argument so that we could have strong arguments for

the rationality of science.

51
In the General Introduction, I have said that indulging oneself with the epistemological debate to

answer the question of the rationality of science presupposes the acceptance of the scientific

method and theory choice as the center of scientific enterprise which explains its rationality.

Furthermore, I have raised four questions to challenge these presuppositions; and these questions

lead us to the belief that there are metaphysical assumptions behind scientific theories; that

scientists assume metaphysical assumptions such as the uniformity of nature, the principle of

substance and the principle of causality. So they could know that their method and theory would

work not just temporarily but permanently, even in the future. Thus, it is apparent that metaphysical

assumptions are fundamentals for the practice of scientists and for the rationality of science as a

whole. Martin Heidegger once argued that

. . . fundamental condition for the proper possibility of knowing is the knowledge

of the fundamental presuppositions of all knowledge and the position we take based

on such knowledge. A knowledge which does not build its foundation

knowledgeably and thereby takes its limits, is not knowledge but mere opinion

(Heidegger, 1967, p. 254).

The fundamental presuppositions in science are metaphysical; that they are very general

assumptions regarding the nature of the world and the nature of what science is trying to

investigate. These fundamental metaphysical presuppositions are prevalent in the modern and

contemporary science, and to show this we will briefly discuss the metaphysics of Newton,

Einstein and quantum physics. Finally, then, we will discuss the three general metaphysical

presuppositions in detail.

52
 3.3.1 The Metaphysics of Newton, Einstein and Quantum physics

It has been believed that the characteristics of modern science compared to the ancient and

medieval sciences are different because modern science based its activities on facts, while the

ancient and medieval science were based on general abstract propositions and concepts. However,

we cannot necessarily believe that this is the case, for it is also true that the medieval and ancient

science observed and considered facts and the modern science also deals with universal

propositions and concepts (Heidegger, 1967). Their main difference rather is that the modern

science has defined philosophical (metaphysical) basis for its activities. Heidegger contends that

“the greatness and superiority of natural science during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries

rests in the fact that all the scientists were philosophers” (Heidegger, 1967, p. 247). Although what

Heidegger thinks seem questionable for the strict sense of “philosopher” might be debatable, we

cannot deny that the scientists of modern science, one way or another, hold a metaphysical

convictions. Hence we can agree with Heidegger and say that the modern scientists, somehow, are

philosophers, at least metaphysicians.

Although Newton was not a great philosopher, he was great scientist who never avoided

philosophy and forwarded his scientific theories based on philosophical (metaphysical)

convictions. According to him, physics needs the concept of absolute time and space which can be

used as frame reference to comprehend the movement of bodies. The existence of time does not

depend on any sensible and external measurements that we can provide, i.e. time is absolute. And

“[l]ike mathematical objects, absolute is not constituted by or dependent upon sensible

approximations thereto” (Craig, 2001, p. 107). Furthermore, Newton’s concept of space is also

absolute because it is totally independent of any moving spaces related with “inertial frames”.

53
Even Newton’s classical principles of motion are impossible without the assumption of absolute

space, particularly his first law of motion “requires the assumption of absolute space as a

prerequisite of its validity. The classical principle of inertia becomes meaningless apart from a

state of absolute rest relative to which bodies may be said to be in a state of motion” (Craig, 2001,

pp. 108-109). The general idea here is that Newton held a metaphysical belief that absolute time

and space have their own nature without relation to anything external; and such metaphysical

presuppositions are the driving motors of his principles of mechanics, which were fundamental

pillars of classical mechanics.

The other great scientist in the history of science is Albert Einstein who revolutionize science after

Newton. In order to reject Newton’s classical physics Einstein did not need to attack each and

every principle or law held in Newton’s physics; what he rather needed to do is to reject

metaphysical bases of classical mechanics in general. Further support may come from William

Craig:

The key in Einstein’s approach to the complete relativization of classical physics

was a daring metaphysical revision of the Newtonian worldview: he presupposed

that absolute space, both in the sense of a structure which is well-defined

independently of any reference frame[6] and in the sense of a universal, privileged

reference frame, does not exist. This bold, philosophical move allowed him to

sweep away both the aether and the rest frame of the aether as “superfluous. (Craig,

2001, p. 19)

6
Reference frame, in physical theories, is a standard relative to which motion and rest can be measured.

54
Rejecting the metaphysical assumptions of classical physics about space and time, Einstein

introduces us the general relativity theory. This means, he had to re-define the concept of space

and time in his own understanding, for he claims to know that absolute metaphysical space and

time does not exist. The question we may raise here is that what was Einstein’s justification to

make such bold claim about the metaphysical nature of space and time? Was it because he has

another metaphysical belief different from that of Newton’s? Or was he assuming another

metaphysics of science? There are writers who believe that foundations of Einstein theory are

epistemological than metaphysical, particularly they believe that he was influenced by the

epistemological convictions of Ernst Mach. William Craig writes that “. . . historians of science

have demonstrated convincingly that at the philosophical roots of Einstein’s theory lies an

epistemological positivism of Machian provenance which issues in a verificationist analysis of the

concepts of time and space (Craig, 2001, p. 122).

Of course it might be true that Einstein’s theory is based on epistemological convictions than

metaphysical, but I would still argue that one way or another Einstein never refrains from

presupposing metaphysical assumptions. As a great scientist it is apparent that Einstein was

engaged in the inquiry of important questions in the history of human being, and to investigate

such an enquiry he must have a method. Having a method by itself requires a metaphysical

presupposition. E. A. Burtt writes that “. . .[as] a man engaged in any important inquiry, he must

have a method, and he will be under a strong and constant temptation to make a metaphysics out

of his method, that is, to suppose the universe ultimately of such a sort that his method must be

appropriate and successful (Burtt, 1954, p. 229, emphasis added). And I strongly believe that it is

because Einstein has metaphysical assumption (assumed general characteristics about the universe

55
such as simplicity and coherence) that he persistently insist on the search for simplicity as an

important part of scientific investigation. To support this very claim let us see his own words:

If, then, it is true that the axiomatic foundation of theoretical physics cannot be

extracted from experience by must be freely invented, may we ever hope to find the

right way? Furthermore, does this right way exist anywhere other than in our

illusions? May we hope to be guided safely by experience at all, if there exists

theories (such as classical mechanics) which to a large extent do justice to

experience, without comprehending the matter in a deep way?

To these questions, I answer with complete confidence, that, in my opinion, the

right way exists, and that we are capable of finding it. Our experience hitherto

justifies us in trusting that nature is the realization of the simplest that is

mathematically conceivable. I am convinced that purely mathematical construction

enables us to find those concepts and those low like connection between them that

provide the key to the understanding of natural phenomena. Useful mathematical

concepts may well be suggested by experience, but in no way can they be derived

from it. Experience naturally remains the sole criterion of the usefulness of a

mathematical construction for physics. (Quoted in Howard, 2015, emphasis added)

Thus, Einstein needs simplicity to be an important part of scientific investigation or method

because he had metaphysical assumption that the universe is ultimately simple; i.e. it can be

understood mathematically, and mathematically constructed concepts would help us to understand

the natural phenomena. Furthermore, when we see Einstein’s criticism of quantum mechanics we

explicitly find his metaphysical beliefs. Quantum mechanics, particularly according to

56
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, holds that the ultimate character of nature (reality) is inherently

random (Heisenberg, 1958 p. 179-80). However, Einstein was very anxious about this because

such principles lack realism7 and it was because such worry he believes that natural laws could not

be random or probable like the throw of dice. Thus, Einstein rejects Quantum mechanics because

he held a metaphysical assumption that that the universe can be explained mathematically, and

“experience . . . justifies us in trusting that nature is the realization of the simplest that is

mathematically conceivable” (Quoted in Howard, 2015). Besides, “. . . since human nature

demands metaphysics for its full intellectual satisfaction, no great mind can wholly avoid playing

with ultimate questions, especially where they are powerfully thrust upon it by considerations

arising from its positivistic investigations . . .” (Burtt, 1954, p. 229), and no one denies that Einstein

is one of the great minds in the world.

When we come to the metaphysics of quantum theories there seems to be huge debate about where

the building blocks of everything in the universe lies. However, it never avoid the metaphysical

assumption that there really exists stuff in space-time. For example, concerning materialistic

ontology Alexandrov think:

We must therefore understand by ‘result of measurement’ in quantum theory only

the objective effect of the interaction of the electron with a suitable object. Mention

of the observer must be avoided, and we must treat objective conditions and

objective effects. A physical quantity is an objective characteristic of the

7
According to Heisenberg “pragmatic realism assumes that there are statements that can be
objectified and that in fact the largest part of our experience in daily life consists of such
statements. Dogmatic realism claims that there are no statements concerning the material world
that cannot be objectified.” (Heisenberg, 1958, p. 82). And for Heisenberg Einstein was not just a
pragmatic realist, he was rather a dogmatic realist.
57
 phenomenon, by not the result of an observation. (Quoted in Heisenberg, 1958, p.

137)

Although Heisenberg has some reservation on Alexandrov’s idea for he believes that there are

measurement problem concerning what Alexandrov says, he agrees with Alexandrov in that the

observer must not be considered as an implication of subjective features into the depiction of

nature.

The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes

in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus of

human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the “possible” to the

“actual,” is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation

of quantum theory. At this point quantum theory is intrinsically connected with

thermodynamics in so far as every act of observation is by its very nature an

irreversible process; it is only through such irreversible processes that the

formalism of quantum theory can be consistently connected with actual events in

space and time. (Heisenberg, 1958, pp. 137-8, emphasis added)

Thus, we can see that quantum theory also assumes the metaphysical existence of things and

events with inherent characteristics of randomness in space and time, according to the uncertainty

or indeterminacy principle. And the general metaphysics of quantum theory can be found on the

solution of the measurement problem and on the interpretation of the available solution to that

problem (as it is apparent in Heisenberg’s discussion of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum

theory, 1958 pp. 30-58).

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3.4 Metaphysical Presuppositions in Science

So far we have been briefly discussing the metaphysics of Newton, Einstein and quantum theory.

Of course the mere existence of metaphysics in science might not make it automatically rational.

However, the metaphysical bases can be used to be a frame of reference beyond which asking for

reason would mean absurdity. In a sense that we cannot avoid or ignore those metaphysical

principle to look for another alternative, for there is no another fact or reality without those bases.

For example, it would have been impossible for science to have scientific method and be

practically successful to this day without presupposing that nature is somehow uniform and acts

regularly based on natural laws, i.e., the metaphysical principle of the uniformity of nature. There

are also other metaphysical principles which could serve as bases for the rationality of science;

and here we will see in detail three general metaphysical presuppositions in the history of science,

how they are found in the fundamental principles of modern science, and how this metaphysical

principles could be bases for the rationality of science.

3.4.1 The Principle of the Uniformity of Nature

The principle of uniformity of nature has been used to justify both induction in general and

scientific research in particular. This principle implies that similar states of nature are followed by

similar states or the future will look like the past. It also concerns change: “. . . that natural change

is lawful, or takes place according to rules” (Craig, 2006, p. 53). This principle is not only assumed

by scientists, but also by all living human beings; without the assumption of this principle there

would be no foundation for taking any reasonable action regarding the future. Particularly, science

depends heavily on this principle for it is impossible to have scientific prediction and scientific

theories without this principle of the uniformity of nature.

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However, this principle is not simply accepted as valid metaphysical principle. Sometimes it is

confused with general scientific hypothesis, in a sense that the principle of the uniformity of nature

by itself is a general scientific hypothesis, or its validity must be determined by the conformability

of general scientific hypothesis. In other words “if there is, at least, one general scientific

hypothesis which is confirmable for all space and time positions then UP [the principle of

uniformity of nature] is also confirmable” (Sol, 1998, p. 2). If it is true that the conformability of

the principle of the uniformity of nature is determined by the existence of confirmable general

scientific hypothesis for all spaces and time, it is hard to say that there is a principle called the

uniformity of nature. For it is impossible to have confirmable general scientific hypothesis for all

spaces and time. Nevertheless, general scientific hypothesis is totally different from the principle

of the uniformity of nature. For example, historically, we have many general scientific hypotheses

such as the classical mechanics which are already disconfirmed and yet we cannot say that the

principle of the uniformity of nature is disconfirmed for other contemporary general scientific

theories, including quantum mechanics, are confirming it. Thus, “the fact that UP [the principle of

the uniformity of nature] always keeps its place in scientific theories suggests that UP [the principle

of the uniformity of nature] is a metaphysical presupposition of science” (ibid).

So far we have said that the principle of the uniformity of nature is not confirmable for it is a

metaphysical presupposition; it is also important to note that this principle cannot be falsified

because it is not a general scientific hypothesis, rather it is a metaphysical presupposition. We may

say that a general scientific hypothesis implying the uniformity of nature is falsified; but we cannot

conclude that the principle of the uniformity of nature itself is falsified, because other general

scientific hypothesis implying the principle of the uniformity of nature can be formulated.

Therefore, falsifying the principle of the uniformity of nature amounts to falsify all possible

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general scientific hypothesis in all possible worlds, which is impossible; that is also why the

principle of the uniformity of nature is a metaphysical presupposition. In addition to this, Sol

argues that

Furthermore even if we were ever to give up UP [the principle of the uniformity of

nature] it would not be as a result of the falsification of general scientific

hypotheses. Rather, we would give up UP [the principle of the uniformity of nature]

in the Kuhnian sense, i.e. as a shift from hypotheses implying UP to hypotheses

implying non-UP. However, I think this would not ever be possible because every

hypothesis must presuppose some kind of uniformity, local or universal. Otherwise

science, as we understand it would not be possible. (Sol, 1998, p. 3)

Therefore, the principle of the uniformity of nature, which states that nature is uniform, is a

metaphysical principle on which all scientific hypotheses and theories are founded. Thus, scientists

can give no reason for their belief that the future must resemble the past; they just assume that it

will and it is based on this assumption that they formulate hypothesis and then put forward a theory

to establish comprehensive explanation of the universe. Now let us see how this principle is

embodied in science.

The principle of the uniformity of nature is embodied in different scientific principles such as the

principles of spatial and temporal invariance or covariance. Within physics, this principle is

explicit in “the invariance or covariance (invariance of form) of particular physical laws with

respect to different states of motion or choice of coordinate system, for example the covariance

principles of general relativity” (Craig, 2006, p. 62). The principle of the indifference of spatial

orientation is another scientific principle directly followed from the metaphysical principle of the

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uniformity of nature. The principle of the indifference of spatial orientation is “understood to mean

that similar states are followed by similar states independently of their orientation in space” (Craig,

2006, p. 62).

The principle of the uniformity of nature is also manifested in scientific method. As we have seen

the principle states that similar states are followed by similar states or it states that natural change

is lawful, i.e., it takes place according to rules. Given this principle scientists always strive to

determine which type of states are followed by which, so that they can discover laws of nature.

For example Newton’s first law of motion, which states that “every body continues in its state of

rest, or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless compelled to change that state by forces acting

up on it” (Greenwood, 1988, p. 12), is impossible without accepting the principle of the uniformity

of nature. Quoting Galileo, Edwin Arthur Brunt in his book the Metaphysical Foundations of

Modern Physical Science writes

Nature presents herself to Galileo, even more than to Kepler, as a simple, orderly

system, whose every proceeding is thoroughly regular and inexorably necessary. .

. . Nature is “inexorable,” acts only “through immutable laws which she never

transgresses,” and cares “nothing whether her reasons and methods of operating be

or be not understandable by men.” (Brunt, 1954, p. 74-75).

Of course, discovering natural laws is not passive investigation, rather it requires active

investigative procedure, and active investigation includes controlling the conditions under which

the investigation is being conducted. To discover the laws of motion Newton had to consider the

nature of other possible unknown changes which accompany the main concepts of his laws. It is

through such a method that he was able to make sure that his laws of motion could natural laws

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and would work at different points in space and time without exception. Further support for my

argument comes from Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow for they argue that

In modern science laws of nature are usually phrased in mathematics. They can be

either exact or approximate, but they must have been observed to hold without

exception – if not universally, then at least under a stipulated set of conditions. For

example, we now know that Newton’s laws must be modified if objects are moving

at a velocities near the speed of light. Yet we still consider Newton’s laws to be

laws because they hold, at least to a very good approximation, for the conditions of

the everyday world, in which the speeds we encounter are far below the speed of

light. (Hawking and Mlodinow, 2010, p. 18, emphasis added)

Sometimes laws of nature are related to the regularity of nature and considered as simple references

to this regularity of nature. However, laws of nature in modern science are very far from being

simple regularity of nature. They are very specific and precise statements which classify observed

regularities in nature and is also assumed to signify fundamental causal connection. Therefore, the

kind of law of nature I am referring to, which is a derivation from the metaphysical principle of

the uniformity of nature, goes beyond simple regularities in nature and can be said to convey

explanatory force.

A law of nature in this sense is not simply a statement of an observed regularity but

a formalized statement of a fundamental regularity which can be shown to explain

a wide range of physical phenomena. The clearest examples of laws of nature in

this sense are found, of course, in Descartes’s Principia Philosophiae of 1644, and

Newton’s Principia mathematica of 1687. (Henry, 2004, p. 79-80)

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Therefore, the expressions of natural laws, which are the specific forms of the principle of the

uniformity of nature, “are not [simple] generalizations about what is the case at different times and

places, but specifications of what must be the case, independently of time or place” (Craig, 2006,

pp. 78-79). In other words, understanding of the metaphysical principle of the uniformity of nature,

which states that similar states are followed by similar states, helps the scientists to adopt this

principle in particular cases and then discover the natural and empirical laws in the form of

mathematical equations. This in turn provides scientific knowledge which are considered to be

knowledge of the facts. And “it is only when an expression has been shown to be that of an

empirical law that it is admitted as a scientific fact” (Craig, 2006, p. 79).

Thus, the acceptance of the uniformity of nature as a metaphysically given would make it explicit

that a scientist cannot possibly imagine a theory without a specified conceptual framework based

on metaphysically grounded principle. The rationality of scientific theory, knowledge or facts in

turn lies whether the method used to acquire them was based on metaphysically specified

conceptual framework or not. For instance, the principle of the uniformity of nature show the limits

of what is conceivable or imaginable in the world. In a sense that there is no rational way to achieve

a goal based on rational activity and avoid or ignore the principle of the uniformity of nature,

because it is what it is and what has to be. Consequently, the scientist knows that nothing will alter

the regularity of the world and becomes confident that his theory will work in the future as far as

his method stays in the realm of the metaphysical given framework, i.e., the uniformity of nature.

3.4.2 The Principle of Substance

It is apparent that there are different understanding of substance. The Pre-Socratics, Aristotle,

Descartes, Leibniz, Newton, and so on had different versions of the conception of substance. I

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shall not attempt to discuss the Pre-Socratics nor the medieval philosopher’s concept of substance.

A full and detailed discussion of the Pre-Socratics concept of substance is included in the work of

W. K. C. Guthrie, The History of Greek Philosophy: volume II, the Presocratic Tradition from

Parmenides to Democritus. Regarding to the medieval philosophers, I would take Thomas

Aquinas’ concept substance, yet his account of substance is an extension of Aristotle’s concept of

substance (Doig, 1972). For detail discussion on this issue see Part II and III of Aquinas on

Metaphysics: A Historical-Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics by James C.

Doig. Here I will discuss Aristotle’s and some modern philosophers’ concept of substance.

Aristotle describes substance in terms of form and matter. The form is concerned with the kind of

the thing or the shape of the object. While the matter is about the material composition of the

object, it is concerned with the question of what is the thing made of. However, this does not mean

that Aristotle’s understanding of substance is concerned with totally two different ideas of form

and matter. Rather, believing that the form and matter are interdependent, Aristotle relates an

object’s matter with its potentiality and the form of the object with its actuality. Thus the concept

of substance as form and matter is much related and hence has unity. “The matter stands in one

relation or another of teleological dependence on the form or actuality as goal (telos), while the

form is in one way or another teleologically dominant with respect to matter” (Lewis, 1994, pp.

239-240). In a sense that matter is potentially some sort of substance and becomes actual substance

when it achieves or maintains the form of that very substance. Aristotle also talks about primary

and secondary substance.

A substance –that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, and most of

all –is that which is neither said of [i.e. predicated of] a subject not in a subject, e.g.

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 the individual man or the individual horse. . . . All the other things are either said

of primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. (Quoted in Broackes, 2006,

p. 135)

Primary substance is a thing or object that all other things are predicated and is not predicated of

other things or objects. In other words, primary substance is something which is not predicated of

a subject. Secondary substance, on the other hand, is something that is predicated in the primary

substance. To use the example on the above quotation, when say an individual man is bi-pedal we

are saying that being bi-pedal is predicated of the individual man. But, according to Aristotle, we

cannot predicate the individual man of anything, for the individual man is primary substance.

Aristotle also contends that primary substance is capable of change qualitatively while remaining

the same numerically, i.e. it can has one quality at one time and another quality at another time.

To explain such property of the primary substance Aristotle writes “[a]n individual man –one and

the same –becomes pale at one time and dark at another, and hot and cold, and bad and good.

Nothing like this is to be seen in any other case” (quoted in Broackes, 2006, p. 136). Generally

what Aristotle is saying is that primary substance is a substance that endures through time and is

also capable of change.

The question of substance was not an interesting question to the ancient Greeks only, it was also

an interesting question to the modern philosophers. “Besides sharing an interest in the question

what substance or being is, the philosophers of the seventeenth century [ the beginning of modern

philosophy] also retain the original Aristotelian idea of metaphysics as ‘first’ of foundational

philosophy” (Woolhouse, 1993, p. 6). Descartes is considered as the father of modern philosophy

and to begin with his concept of substance. He believed that there are two kinds of substance:

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material substance (body) and the mental substance (mind). The former one is defined by extension

and the latter by thought. In other words, to think the existence of the body without the concept of

extension and the mind without thought is impossible, i.e. in order to exist a substance must be a

particular kind of thing. Therefore, the body and the mind must have a “principal attribute” of their

own: extension and thought respectively.

Thus, for example, figure cannot be understood except in an extended thing, not

can motion, except in an extended space; nor can imagination, sensation, or will,

except in a thinking substance. But on the contrary, extension can be understood

without figure or motion; and thought without imagination or sensation, and so on;

. . . (Descartes, 1982, p. 24)

Although Descartes holds that there are two different substances and referred as dualist, he also

believes that the whole idea of substance has one general definition, i.e. a substance as a thing that

does not depend on anything else for its existence. To use his own words “[b]y ‘substance’, we

can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way that it needs no other thing

in order to exist (Descartes, 1982, p. 23). This definition of substance is similar to Aristotle’s

definition of primary substance as “neither said of a subject not in a subject”, which means that a

substance does not need something to depend on for its existence. Thus, we can see that even

though we have different philosophers who argued about the metaphysical concept of substance

differently, they come to close agreement on the general and essential understanding the subject.

Leibniz also believes that the world is composite of an infinity of simple substances, which he

calls them ‘monads’. Of course, the concept of substance as monads is different from the concept

of substance of Descartes. As we have seen for Descartes there are two kinds of substances: mind

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and body. However, Leibniz conceives substance as individual monads which are not material

substances rather they are simple, non-physical and indivisible or indestructible. His concept of

substance is more or less related with mind. But this does not mean that Leibniz does not believe

in material or physical substance; he rather believes in the existence of physical substance. But

“their substantiality and individuality do not derive from their being corporeal or extended, but

[rather] from their relation to an individual substantial mind, or something like one. . . . [And this]

“mind-like ‘monads’ are not merely the only substantial realities but the only reality of any kind,

body being just a ‘well-founded phenomenon’” (Woolhouse, 1993, p. 55).

As we have discussed above when Aristotle defines primary substance as something that which is

neither said of a subject nor in a subject, he gives us an example of the individual man or the

individual horse. And here, rejecting Descartes dualistic concept of substance, Leibniz focuses on

the individual substance called monads which their individuality is not because of their extension

or being physical but in relation to mind. Thus Leibniz’s concept of individual substance can be

related to Aristotle’s concept of primary substance which is concerned with individuality, too.

Furthermore, Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz seem to share the idea that to be a substance is to be

something, to have some properties. They all also believe that, whether as an individual kind of

substance or dual substance, whether as destructible or indestructible, substance has an extended

existence in time.

Furthermore, in modern science the conception of substance is similar with Aristotle’s, Descartes’

and Leibniz’s understanding of metaphysical principle of substance. We have seen that according

to these philosophers the fundamental feature of substance is that it always endures through time.

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When we see the understanding of substance in modern science it is related with change, but never

loses its fundamental character, i.e. substance has an extended existence in time.

The conception that is of particular relevance to modern science is that according

to which substance exists perpetually and change is but an alteration of the

substance. An important corollary of this conception is that no (portion of)

substance either comes into or goes out of existence (Craig, 2006, p. 55, emphasis

added).

The notion of substance has evolved; but the principle that all change consists in the alteration of

the fundamental substance has always remained the same. For example it has been believed that a

substance cannot occupy more than one place at a time and the whole one place cannot be occupied

by more than one substance, but later it evolves to the idea of a field. It is stated that “two fields,

both being physical existents, can occupy the same place. The principle itself, however, according

to which all change consists in the alteration of the underlying substance has remained the same”

(Craig, 2006, p. 56). Furthermore, as I have tried to mention above, since there are different

understanding of substance, a substance can be conceived differently in two different disciplines.

For example matter can be conceived as a substance in the discipline of chemistry, while mass or

energy is a substance in physics; however, the metaphysical principle of substance still remains

the same. In other words, even if the concept of substance has evolved through time and even if it

can be conceived in different ways within different disciplines, the principle of substance that all

change consists in the alteration of the underlying substance has remained the same. Now let us

see how this principle is concretely embodied in science.

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The principle of substance is embodied in science in the fundamental formulas of different

conservation laws. For example, in chemistry it is found in the law of the conservation of matter,

which states that in chemical reaction matter never changes in quantity but only in form. According

to the law of conservation of matter, this means that

Matter can neither be created nor destroyed. Matter, of course, is stuff. It is any

kind of stuff –solid, liquid, or gas. The law of conservation of matter says that

whatever anyone does to an object, the matter is made of will continue to exist, in

some form or another. This law is also known as the law of conservation of mass.

Mass is the measurement of the amount of matter that any object contains. (Fleisher,

2002, pp. 11-12).

To use Fleisher’s example, grinding a rock into powder does not change the matter or substance

at all; the change we see is just physical change and it is still a rock. Even if we toss the powder

up into the wind, it may blow away, but nothing is destroyed, i.e. based on the law of conservation

of mass the same amount of rock still exists out there. “Perhaps some of our rock powder fall into

farmer’s field, a corn plant absorbs some the minerals through its roots. The rock becomes part of

the corn plant, but it still exists. If we eat the corn, the minerals become part of our body. Still

nothing has been destroyed (Fleisher, 2002, p. 12).

The fundamental law of conservation is also found in physics as a law of conservation of energy;

and it states that total energy of an isolated system remains the same despite the internal changes.

Energy comes in several different forms. It can take the form of heat, light,

electricity, kinetic energy (movement), chemical energy (like the energy in coal,

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 gasoline, or food), or nuclear energy. The law of conservation of energy tells us that

energy can be converted from any of these forms to any other forms. It is still energy,

and none of it disappears when is converted. (Fleisher, 2002, pp. 37-38)

Here we can see that metaphysical principle is embodied in science and can concern different parts

of reality when applied in different sciences and it can also evolve when applied within one

science. And yet the metaphysical principle of substance that all change consists in the alteration

of the fundamental substance (matter in the case of chemistry and energy in the case of physics)

has always remained the same and persists through time.

As the principle of the uniformity of nature specifies regularity as conceptual framework for

scientific method, the principle of substance would provide a conceptual framework about any

change happens within that regularity. A scientist conducting an experiment would rationally

integrate any change happens during his activity into the regularity framework, for the principle

of substance regularly (because the principle of the uniformity of nature) maintains that any change

which could possibly happen is a change within one and the same substance. Having such

metaphysical bases would help the scientists to guide their methodological principles rationally in

accordance with the metaphysical principles. Working within specified metaphysical conceptual

frameworks would also avoid arbitrary action based on individual whim, for to go beyond what is

metaphysically given would be chaotic and lead to futility.

3.4.3 The Principle of Causality

In the above we have seen that the metaphysical principle of substance concerns change, and states

that all change consists in the alteration of the substance. This means substance cannot be created

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out of nothing or destroyed into nothing, in other words whatsoever change may occur still there

is no change in quantity or mass, except in form. The principle of causality is also concerned with

change, and states that change is caused, and in science it is conceived as natural or physical cause.

This principle, as is the principle of the uniformity of nature, is a fundamental and rational principle

to people in their ordinary lives. Because it is through this principle that human beings attempt to

explain the things they face in reality and justify the very existence of such things by revealing

their causes. Even it is difficult to think of science without the metaphysical principle of causality.

The basic condition underlying the entire dimension of scientific research is the

firm belief in the causal inevitability of natural phenomena. . . . Accordingly we

can assert that scientific research, especially as it has developed after the

Renaissance, can be considered to be primarily the practical application of the

principle of causation based on observation, analysis, (deductive or inductive),

experiment, formation of hypothesis, and the formulation of theories and models.

(Rogopoulos, 1966, p. 135)

However, the metaphysical principle of causality we are discussing here should not be conceived

as it was conceived by Hume (see Chapter Two, section 2.1). The principle of causality is

concerned with the production of change, and apparently in the production of this change quality

disappears and another quality is brought into existence. To use the above example about grinding

a rock, when we grind the rock the quality of hardness and having a definite shape (round shape)

is changed into softness and powder respectively. The general idea of the metaphysical principle

of causality is that there is a cause for every quality which is produced at every event. There are,

of course, philosophers who believe that the principle of causality is identical with the principle of

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the uniformity of nature. For example, David Hume believes that causal connections are

assumptions which are the result of frequently repeated observations, i.e. things are constantly

related with one another. Thus, causality is nothing, but a constant conjunction which is the result

of the “habit” of the mind. However, the principle of causality is concerned only with the

production of change and cannot guarantee us that the every example of constant conjunctions are

causal relations. Because there are many examples that do not fit in Hume’s idea, for example day

and night are examples of constant conjunctions, yet there is no causal relation between them.

Nevertheless, the principle of causality is not identical with the principle of the uniformity of nature

and

. . . it is important to distinguish the two principles. Their essential difference lies

in the fact that the principle of causality does not concern lawfulness, or the

following of a rule, but cause, or the production of an effect. Where the principle

of the uniformity of nature implies a regularity . . . in natural change without

indicating the reason for that change, the present principle [which is the principle

of causality] indicates the reason without implying regularity. (Craig, 2006, p. 58)

Although these two principles are different, they fit well together. Since the principle of causality

concerned with the reason in natural change, it provides the content; and since the principle of the

uniformity of nature is concerned with regularity it provides the form. “Unified in a particular way,

these two principles state that all change is caused in a regular fashion, i.e. that causes are regular

in their effects . . .” (Craig, 2006, p.59).

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That said, now let us see how the metaphysical principle of causality is concretely found in science

as a fundamental principle. This metaphysical principle is found in science as the principle in

dynamics, particularly in most fundamental law of inertia. The law of inertia states that a body at

rest remain at rest or a body in a straight line motion remains in constant motion in a straight line

unless acted upon by outside force. In other words, an object at rest will remain at rest unless acted

on by an unbalanced external force, and an object in motion continues with the same speed and in

the same direction unless acted on by an unbalanced force. This means that objects keep moving

unless acted upon. If there is change that change is caused by external force and this in turn implies

that if there is no other external force to cause a change, anything at rest remains at rest or anything

in a straight line motion remains in constant motion. Therefore, the law of inertia implies that there

are no uncaused changes of states in the world, which is an implication of the metaphysical

principle of causality.

The principle of causality can also be found in the contemporary complex principle of physics

which is the principle of locality. According to this principle, “causal influence cannot be

propagated at a speed greater than that of light; and the refinements suggesting that effects be

proportional to their causes, and that the action of every cause be balanced by an equal and opposite

reaction” (Craig, 2006, p. 65). Thus, we can see that the metaphysical principle of causality is

embodied in this fundamental principle of locality, which is very complex. This principle is

complex because, as you can see, it creates fundamental relation between the principle of dynamics

and the principle of conservation of momentum and energy. And yet the validity of this principle

lies on the metaphysical principle of causality.

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So far we have seen three metaphysical principles on which the fundamental principles of science

depend; and when we combine these three metaphysical principles we find that change is caused

(the principle of causality) and this change acts regularly (the principle of the uniformity of nature).

Generally speaking, these two metaphysical principles imply that causality acts based on

regularity. And the third metaphysical principle (principle of substance) shows that although

causality acts regularly, the change it brings about in the substance is not quantitative rather it is

all about relocation of the substance; for the principle of substance states that all change consists

in the alteration of the underlying substance without change in the quantity. The combination of

these three metaphysical principles provide conceptually defined and metaphysically specified

reality for science, so that science can easily manipulate and investigate reality so as to explain it

comprehensively.

3.4.4 General Remarks on the Metaphysical Principles

The above mentioned three metaphysical principles help scientists to practice and argue about

science in different ways. These principles would determine what is to be conceived as possible or

necessary within the enterprise. For example, the principle of uniformity of nature would avoid

the concept of miracle for it states that similar states of nature are followed by similar states; that

natural change is not accidental or happens irregularly, rather it always is lawful and happens

according to rules. In other words, miracle is impossible in science for the reality acts based on

regularity. Furthermore, as Dilworth writes

. . . the principle of substance implies that it is impossible for substance to arise

from nothing or become nothing. In its explicit form in physics as the principle of

the conservation of energy it says the same regarding energy. Given the present

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 state of physics, physicists would consider it impossible that energy increase or

decrease in an isolated system, and significant steps have been taken to avoid such

a conclusion in their reasonings (Craig, 2006, p. 66).

Therefore, by defining what is to be conceived as possible or necessary, the metaphysical

principles define the scientist’s way of thinking. This in turn determines the extent to which is it

possible to look for reason, and in so doing it avoids arbitrary, unnecessary and groundless

questions against the rationality of science. Furthermore, in addition to defining basic concepts of

science, these metaphysical principles also provide a guideline for the practice of science. To put

it on Craig’s words

. . . ontological principles determine the methodology of science. They constitute

the presuppositions scientists have in their work, presuppositions which give that

work direction and focus. This makes it idle simply to advance methodological

principles concerning how to go about acquiring knowledge or understanding,

without giving them an ontological grounding, as has frequently been done

throughout the history of reflection on science (Craig, 2006, p. 69, emphasis in

original).

What Craig is saying in the above is prevalent throughout the research methods of both the

practical and theoretical sciences. For example, the whole experimental method is possible because

scientists presuppose the metaphysical principle of the uniformity of nature. Without this principle

it is impossible for scientists to conduct their experiment, because there would be no ground to

conduct and record experiment without expecting that similar state will follow by similar state and

that the occurrence of change during the experiment will follow rules.

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 Summary and Conclusion

In the first chapter of this paper we have been discussing the issue of rationality in general and the

relation between science and rationality. When we were discussing about rationality we talked

about two types of rationality: instrumental and epistemic rationality. The former being concerned

effective and efficient achievement of goals which is related to practice and decision making alone,

while the latter is concerned with believing true beliefs about the world or statements that explain

things in the world which is believed to be a process of abstract reasoning alone. Nevertheless, I

have argued that these two types of rationality are intertwined, in a sense that instrumental

reasoning alone would achieve nothing without the epistemic rationality. For deciding and

practicing in a definite world requires having knowledge and true belief about that world or the

statements that explain entities in that very world.

Regarding the rationality of science, in chapter one we have seen that the rationality of science has

been related with the method it uses to explain the world that it investigates. Of course, this

conception of the rationality of science, as Larry Laudan (1977) mentioned it, changed through

time. Nevertheless, one way or another, the rationality of science has been challenged to this day.

In Chapter Two we were discussing challenges to the rationality of science. In that we have seen

Hume’s challenge to the inductive method of scientific theories. According to Hume in inductive

reasoning we always predict or conclude about unobserved experience based on past observed

experiences. And yet there is no logical justification to generalize from observed experiences to

unobserved one. For, according to Hume, what we observe is that things are constantly related

with one another but we do not have logical justification to explain the real connection between

those things. On the other hand, Feyerabend challenges the rationality of science because he thinks

that science follows a single method and following single established method is not rational. He

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believes that following single established method would never allow science to grow, for it denies

practices outside the established method. Thus, according to him, science is irrational and it is this

irrationality that brings science into progress.

Changing the way of challenging the rationality of science from the rationality of science in

relation to its method into the problem of theory choice, Thomas Kuhn contends that reason alone

cannot help to choose between two rival theories. According to him, as we already discussed it in

chapter two, because of theory-ladenness and lack of communication or lack of common measure

in language there is no way to choose between theories and justify our choice. Besides Kuhn, under

the title of underdetermination of theory choice we have discussed Duhem’s and Quine’s challenge

to the rationality of theory choice. The general idea of both Duhem and Quine is that evidence

underdetermines theory, this means that the evidence we use to support scientific theories

underdetermine theory choice between two rival theories. In other words, no matter how successful

a given theory could be, another rival theory can be constructed that is equally successful and yet

make different claims about the world from its rival theory. It is in such situation that it becomes

to determine our decision to choose between theories.

However, Hempel rejected the idea that the question of the rationality of science as an issue of

choosing between two rival theories, because a single action (for example a decision to choose

between theories) or a mode of procedure (for example inductive method) cannot be judged as

rational or irrational just by itself. Then he argued that the rationality of science lies on determining

the goals of scientific inquiry. The general goal of science is not only formulating comprehensive

and organized world view (which is explanatory and predictive), but also aims at establishing

complete and accurate system of empirical knowledge and understanding. In other words the

rationality of science lies on answering and explaining the question as to why something is the

78
case. To do so, as we have seen it in Chapter Two, Hempel gave us two models of explanation by

general covering laws: deductive nomological and inductive-probabilistic.

I would, of course, agree with Hempel’s concept of the rationality of science for, I too, strongly

believe that the goals of science and methods that science uses to achieve its goals should be

considered as main framework in the debate of the rationality of science. Furthermore, I believe

that there are metaphysical basis, which should be articulated, behind the understanding and claims

of the rationality of science, as Hempel says it, in relation to its goals and methods to reach those

goals.

In Chapter Three I have raised and discussed the metaphysical basis for the rationality of science.

First we have seen the metaphysics of Newton, Einstein and quantum theory in that we realized

that metaphysics play an important role in defining and specifying their theories. Then we

proceeded to the three specific metaphysical presuppositions in modern science. We discussed

about the principle of the uniformity of nature which states that similar states of nature are followed

by similar states or the future will look like the past, we have then discuss the principle of substance

which states that substance exists perpetually and change is but an alteration of the substance. In

other words, the change in substance is nothing more than a change in its form or quality, while

the quantity always remains the same. Finally, we have talk about the third metaphysical principle

of causality, and it states that change is caused. We have also discussed the way these metaphysical

principles are assumed in science, the way they are embodied in science and how they could serve

as bases for the rationality of science.

So what are we to conclude from what has been learned so far?

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First let us be clear about where the rationality of science lies. Agreeing with Hempel’s conception

of the rationality of science, I have argued that the rationality of science lies on the goals of science

and its methods which are ways of achieving its very goals. We have also defined science as an

intellectual and practical activity that deals with the systematic study of the structure and behavior

of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment. It is after such an activities

that science achieves its goals which are formulating systematically organized world view capable

of explaining and predicting, and then establishing accurate systems of empirical knowledge and

understanding. Thus, science is goal oriented and rationality pertains to its methodological

activities used to achieve those goals.

I have already said, agreeing with Hempel, that the rationality of science lies in its goals and

methods which are means to achieve its very goals, in other words it strives to explain and answer

the question as to why something is the case. Of course writers such as Hempel believed that

scientific explanations comprehended by incorporating some correspondence laws. It is apparent

that there are corresponding laws that scientific models of explanation depends on, however this

laws are not the ultimate bases. Rather such laws in turn depend on the general metaphysical

principles: the principle of the uniformity of nature, the principle of substance and the principle of

causality.

These metaphysical principles are assumed by the scientists, and it is based on these principles that

the scientist can discover and made more specific principles and laws to explain the world so as to

establish complete empirical knowledge and understanding. For example, theories of the great

scientists such as Galileo’s pendulum motion, Newton’s optics, Einstein’s special and general

relativity and etc. were based on repeated observations and experiments. Their decision to conduct

repeated observation and experiments were based on the assumption of the principle of uniformity

80
of nature. Unless they assume and expect that similar states will follow similar states there would

be no point to repeat the experiment. Thus, the replication of experiments makes sure that the

theory would work at any time and place, and the metaphysical principle of the uniformity of

nature in turn justifies that this will be the case. Of course there would be changes during the

experiments and the second metaphysical principle of substance helps the scientist to determine

the nature of changes in his experiment. As we have been discussing it, the principle substance

maintains that substance persists and change is but an alteration of the substance or a substance

cannot be generated or destroyed. Thus, the scientist can make sure that the succeeding states being

investigated in his experiment are nothing, but changes in one and the same substance.

On the other hand, since the third principle, the principle of causality, states that change is caused,

it would explain to the scientist the change that occur during the experiment can be integrated into

the theory because that change would be according to rule. The principle of causality can be

understood as a corollary of the principle of non-contradiction or Aristotle’s principle of identity.

The principle of causality tells us that change is caused or change is an effect of a cause (usually

action) and similar cause leads to similar effect, this implies that an object cannot act in

contradiction to its nature and this is an apparent concept of the principle of non-contradiction.

Thus, the change would never evade the rules it follows so that it could be integrated to the

experiment at hand. Accordingly, the combination of these three metaphysical principles provide

defined and controlled reality for science so that science can investigate and manipulate reality to

achieve its goals.

Therefore, metaphysics can provide a rational ground for the rationality of science. Taking the

definition of science as an intellectual and practical activity that deals with the systematic study of

the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment

81
to achieve its goals, we can see that science is an activity that devotes and commits all its activities

to its goals. Thus, the devotion and commitment in its activity implies the unavoidability of

achieving the goals it seeks, and the rationality lies in its activities to realize its goals through the

metaphysical foundations which defines its reality and are consistence with its subject matter and

methodological laws. In other words, science is rational activity because its activity is based and

corroborated by the metaphysical principles and this is realized by the corresponding programs of

its accomplishment.

82
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