CHAPTER NO 3

Language and definitions

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 Language and Definitions

Language Functions
Language, a system of conventional spoken, manual, or written symbol by means of
which, human beings as members of social group and participants in its culture express
themselves. The functions of language include communication, expressions of identity,
imaginative expression and emotion release.
Many definitions of language have been proposed. Henry Sweet, an English phonetician
and language scholar, stated that “Language is the expressing ideas by means of speech, sound,
combined into words, words are combined into sentences. The American linguists, Bernoad
Bloch and George I. Trager formulated the following definition; “A language is a system of
arbitrary vocal symbols by means of which a social group cooperates.”
Language is used in a great variety of ways, only some of which are informative. Without
the intention to inform, we may express ourselves using language: “That’s really great!”
Moreover, some discourse is directive, with or without expressive or informative elements. It
seeks to guide or to command. “Step on the scale, please,” we may be told, or we may receive
this good advice. When people reason, they typically do so by using language, to manipulating
propositions in a logical or informative spirit. However,
We may say that language has three major functions:
1. Informative:
The first function of language is informative. It provide useful and interesting
information.
2. Expressive
In this function of language, we effectively convey thought or feelings.
3. Directive (imperative)

Third and the last function of language is directive. In this function, higher
authority gives instructions and guideline that indicates how to perform an action.
Authoritative decision is made from official body, which may not have binding force.

To these we may add less common types of use: Logicians are chiefly concerned with
language used informatively affirming or denying propositions, formulating or evaluating

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arguments, and so on. In reasoning, informative function of language is the principal concern. In
this informative mode, we can distinguish between facts a sentence formulates and facts about
the speaker who formulates them. If someone says, “War is always the wrong solution to
international conflict,” that may indeed be true, but it is also evidence of the beliefs of the person
who utters that remark. When someone says, “I strongly oppose our involvement in this war on
moral grounds,” that is a statement (very probably true) about the speaker, but it also serves to
express a judgment about the morality of the war under discussion. To open an argument with a
statement of one’s own views is by no means deceptive; it is one of the common ways in which
judgment and biographical report are appropriately integrated.
The uses of language must be distinguished from the forms of language. The several uses
of language (informative, expressive, etc.) are implemented using different forms. Sentences (the
units of our language that express complete thoughts) may be declarative in form, or
exclamatory, or imperative, or interrogative or negative.
When we are reasoning our sentences are usually declarative. When we are expressing
emotion our sentences (e.g., “That’s fantastic!”) are often exclamatory. When we are seeking to
direct conduct our sentences (e.g., “Take off your shirt!”) are likely to be imperative in form—
but there is no strict correlation between function and form.
For example, we noted earlier that a premise might be affirmed by asking a rhetorical
question. The devout believer asks in prayer, “Who is like unto Thee?”—but it is plain that this
interrogative expresses a religious belief. When one responds in a conversation, “What can you
possibly mean by that?” a skeptical attitude is very plainly being expressed. Similarly, a directive
function may be served by reporting a fact in apparently declarative mode, as when we urge a
companion to move more quickly by saying, “It is very late; we are running short of time.”
Moreover, the exclamation, “What lovely flowers!” uttered by a young woman to her gentleman
friend as they pass a florist’s window, may be intended to function more directive than
expressively.
In summary, the principal uses of language are three: informative, expressive, and
directive. The grammatical forms of language are essentially five: declarative, interrogative,
imperative, negative, and exclamatory. There is no sure connection between the grammatical
form of a passage and the use or uses its author intends. Language that serves any one of the
three principal functions may take any one of the four grammatical forms.

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Ambiguity
Ambiguity is a type of meaning in which a phrase, statement or resolution is not
explicitly defined, making several interpretations plausible. A common aspect of ambiguity
is uncertainty. It is thus an attribute of any idea or statement whose intended meaning cannot
be definitively resolved according to a rule or process with a finite number of steps.
In ambiguity, specific and distinct interpretations are permitted (although some may not
be immediately obvious). A phrase can be ambiguous by corresponding to distinct syntactic
structures.
The classic example:
1. “The chicken is ready to eat” ,
It can mean that the chicken is ready to be fed or to be fed to
someone depending on the thematic assignment. In a popular
semantic framework, this is because ‘the chicken’ is assigned agent
on one reading and patient on another.
2. “He got drunk and fired or divorced”.
We teach our students in propositional logic to disambiguate
these with brackets but we are not so lucky when it comes to the
orthographic and phonetic groupings in natural language. An
interesting case is the semantics of modals.
At least some modal auxiliaries and adverbs seem to allow for
distinct senses such as metaphysical, deontic, doxastic and perhaps
practical. Consider
3. “John ought to be at home by now”
It can mean that John’s presence at home is, given everything
we know, guaranteed. It might mean that, though we have no idea
where he is, he is under the obligation to be at home. Similarly:
4. “The coin might come up heads”
Means that there is an open metaphysical possibility in which
the coin comes up heads. It also means that everything we know
doesn’t tell us that the coin won’t come up heads.
Vagueness
In speech or writing, vagueness is the imprecise or unclear use of language. As an
adjective, the word becomes vague. Although vagueness often occurs unintentionally, it may
also be employed as a deliberate rhetorical strategy to avoid dealing with an issue or responding
directly to a question.
Etymology the word Vagueness comes from the Latin word which means "wandering".
When a word or phrase is lacking precision or unclear is being called vague.
Types of Vagueness:

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Vagueness has the following different types;
1) No precision between the applicability and non-applicability :
It means that in a particular situation a word or phrase has clearly
applicable and in another situation a word or phrase is not applicable.
Therefore there is imprecision between applicability and non-applicability.
For Example, suppose to drive a car at 70 km/h will be fast and at 35
km/h it will not be fast. Now in this situation, there will not be any vagueness
because it is clearly mentioned the limit, but there will problem between fast
and not fast.
If a car is driving at 50 km/h, then 50 km/h will be vague because we
do not know whether we can put it in the category of fast or to put it in the
category of not fast.
Again there is another problem, even 35 km/h could not be clearly
categories as a fast or not fast. Because the word fast is a relative term, which
can be change according to the situation. To run at 35 km/h will be considered
as fast, but to drive a car at the same speed at "Motorway” or “Highway” will
be considered as not fast. Same case will be for 70 km/h. for car it can be
considered as fast but the same speed for aircrafts will be considered as not
fast.
In this sense all the polar words are lacking of precisions.
Polar words:
Polar words are those words which could be understand by the
help of comparative degree like, fast, slow, hot, cold, short, tall, small, large
etc.
In one situation the word is clearly applicable and another situation it is
not applicable, and also in between situation the term will be vague.
2) The set of condition is vague and imprecise:
When we define a word, we have no set of conditions to define a term or a
word. The set of conditions is vague and imprecise.
For example, to define a word “Dog”, we have to define the term in the
form of characteristics. Like we define “Dog” as it is mammal, having long

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 ears, long nose, it also wag its tail when pleased, four legs, it also barks. Now
if a dog dose not wags its long tail or even if it has no tail, if it does not have
long ear, or in the absence of all the characteristics except mammal, still it will
be dog.
Only mammal is a necessary characteristic, but another problem is that
there are other mammalian animals like cow, goat, cat etc. which are not dogs.
So the set of characteristics is vague and imprecision. The set of conditions
and characteristics is vague. How much characteristics are necessary to define
a term? If someone answers that we should need a bunch of characteristics,
still the word bunch is vague. Because it does not clarify the actual
conditions.
Similarly another situation, like if someone asked for some or little
money. Still the word does not have any definite meaning, because the word
little or some is not precise and vague. What is the range of the word little or
some?
The word “Liberal” has also no definite meaning. One do not know from
where it starts and where it ends? Even if both the limits i.e. start and end are
defined, still we do not know between the two situations, so it is also a vague
term.
3) We often define a vague term by another vague term:
We often define a term by another vague term. For example when we
define a term “inhabitant”, or what do you mean by inhabitant?
One may be define the term inhabitant as a person who has a house in a
community. But now there is a problem, what one mean by this answer. There
are two conditions for this. Firstly, if a person has a house in a community, but
he lives there only in summer, so can we call him inhabitant? Secondly, a
person has house in a community but he lives elsewhere, can we call him
inhabitant?
How to remove vagueness?
To remove vagueness, we have to make an artificial language, to abolish and to discard
this vagueness. How to make an artificial language?

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 We can make an artificial language in the following way.
To begin with the few precise and defined words which are called as primitive terms?
Then to make a fruitful discussion and to explain all other words, we go through these primitive
words. To take few primitive words that are like axioms (a statement which need not to be
proved, but we prove all other statements through it) and every precise and on the basis of these
words, we have to make an artificial language. To define all other words on the basis of few
precise and clear words.
Now all these words which cannot be explained through these primitive terms should be
discarded. For example, mathematical and geometry figures are precise and definite. All other
words are vague. If a word id defined by the artificial language will be included in our language,
if it is not then we have to abolished and discard it.
Ambiguity Versus Vagueness
"The difference between ambiguity and vagueness is a matter of whether two or more
meanings associated with a given phonological form are distinct (ambiguous), or united as non-
distinguished subcases of a single, more general meaning (vague). A standard example of
ambiguity is bank 'financial institution' vs. bank 'land at river's edge,' where the meanings are
intuitively quite separate; in aunt 'father's sister' vs. aunt 'mother's sister,' however, the meanings
are intuitively united into one, 'parent's sister.' Thus ambiguity corresponds to separation, and
vagueness to unity, of different meanings."
Disputes:
A dispute/disagreement is a continuing disagreement carried on between two or
more parties. The parties may be people, or they may be organizations or countries. Disputes can
last a long time, and they can have serious results. Dispute may happen from controversy.
Disputes may become conflicts. Disputes between individual people may lead to violence.
Disputes between organizations may lead to legal action. Disputes between countries may lead
to war.
Many disputes, whether about beliefs or about attitudes, are genuine (factual). However,
some disputes are merely verbal, arising only because of linguistic misunderstanding. The terms
used by the disputing parties may have more than one meaning—they may be ambiguous—but
such ambiguity may be unrecognized by the disputing parties. To uncover and to resolve verbal

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disagreements, ambiguities must be identified, and the alternative meanings of the critical terms
in the dispute must be distinguished and clarified.
Disputes fall into three categories.
The first is the obviously genuine (factual) dispute. If A roots for the Yankees, and B for
the Red Sox, they are in genuine disagreement, although they disagree mainly in attitude. If C
believes that Miami is south of Honolulu, and D denies this, they too are in genuine
disagreement, but in this dispute about geographic facts a good map can settle the matter.
A second category is disputes in which the apparent conflict is not genuine and can be
resolved by coming to agreement about how some word or phrase is to be understood. These
may be called merely verbal disputes. F may hold that a tree falling in the wilderness with no
person to hear it creates no sound, while G insists that the falling tree really produces a sound. If
a “sound” is the outcome of a human auditory sensation, then F and G may agree that there was
none; or if a “sound” is simply what do vibrations in the air produce, then they may agree that a
sound was indeed produced. Getting clear about what is meant by “sound” will resolve the
disagreement, which was no more than verbal.
A third category, more slippery, is disputes that are apparently verbal but genuine. A
misunderstanding about the use of terms may be involved in such cases, but when that
misunderstanding has been cleared up there remains a disagreement that goes beyond the
meanings of the words. For example, should a film in which explicit sexual activity is depicted
be considered “pornography”? J holds that its explicitness makes it pornographic and offensive;
K holds that its beauty and sensitivity make it art and not pornography. Plainly, they disagree
about what “pornography” means—but after that ambiguity has been exposed, it is likely that the
parties will still disagree in their judgment of that film. Whether the film is “pornographic” may
be settled by a definition of that term, but a deeper disagreement is then likely to be exposed. The
word “pornographic” plainly carries pejorative associations. J, who finds the film objectionable,
understands the word “pornographic” in one way, while K, who approves of the film, uses the
word “pornographic” differently. Does the sexually explicit content of the film make it
objectionable and thus “pornographic”? J and K differ in their uses of the word, but for both of
them the emotional meaning of the word is very negative; and they also differ about the criteria
for the application of that negative word, “pornography.”

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 In summary, when confronting a dispute that arises in discourse, we must first ask
whether there is some ambiguity that can be eliminated, by clarifying the alternative meanings in
play. If there is, then we must ask whether clearing up that linguistic issue will resolve the
matter. If it does, the dispute was indeed merely verbal. If it does not, the dispute was genuine,
although it may have appeared to be merely verbal.
EMOTIVE LANGUAGE:
The main purpose of language is to report facts, but often we express feelings while
reporting facts. This form of language can be deceptive or manipulative and even careless use of
language can lead to needless misunderstanding and disputes.
The words we use to convey beliefs may be neutral and exact, but they may be also have
an impact on the attitudes of listeners. “Seven dirty words” may not be used on the broadcast
media in the United States because they have unaccepted emotive meanings that are sharply
distinguishable from their literal meaning. The medical vocabulary dealing with human
reproduction and elimination is neutral and not offensive, but the four-letter words that are
vulgar synonyms of those medical terms are shocking to many because of the attitudes they
evoke.
Emotionally colored language is appropriate in some contexts—in poetry for example—
but it is highly inappropriate in other contexts, for example, in survey research. The responses to
a survey will certainly depend in good measure on the words used in asking the questions.
Whether we should avoid emotive language, or rely on it, depends on the purpose language is
intended to serve in the context. If we aim to provide an unbiased report of facts, we undermine
that objective if we use words that are heavily charged with emotional meaning. Sometimes,
however, it is nearly impossible to avoid some emotive content—such as when those in conflict
about the morality of abortion call themselves either “pro-life,” or “pro-choice.” In logic, we
generally strive for language that is, so far as possible, free of the distortion that emotive
meanings introduce.
Playing on the emotions of readers and listeners is a central technique in the advertising
industry. When the overriding aims are to persuade and sell, manipulating attitudes becomes a
sophisticated professional art. Rhetorical tricks are also common in political campaigns, and the
choice of words is critical. The best defense against trickery, for voters as for consumers, is an
awareness of the real uses to which the language before us is being put. We must be on guard

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against those who use words to make the worse appear the better cause. “With words,” said
Benjamin Disraeli, “we govern men.”
Definition by Genus and Difference
Definition by genus and difference relies directly on the intension of the terms defined,
and it does so in the most helpful way. In view of their exceedingly common use, we look very
closely at definitions of this type. Definitions by genus and difference are also called analytical
definitions, or by their Latin name, definitions per genus et differentia.
The attributes mostly define a class. Normally these attributes are complex—that is, they
can be analyzed into two or more other attributes. This complexity and analyzability can be
understood in terms of classes. Any class of things having members may have its membership
divided into subclasses. For example, the class of all triangles can be divided into three
nonempty subclasses: equilateral triangles, isosceles triangles, and scalene triangles.
The class whose membership is thus divided into subclasses is called the genus, and the
various subclasses are its species. As used here, the terms “genus” and “species” are relative
terms, like “parent” and “offspring.” The same persons may be parents in relation to their
children, but also offspring in relation to their parents. Likewise, a class may be a genus with
respect to its own subclasses, but also a species with respect to some larger class of which it is a
subclass. Thus, the class of all triangles is a genus relative to the species scalene triangle and a
species relative to the genus polygon. The logician’s use of the words “genus” and “species” as
relative terms is different from the biologist’s use of them as fixed or absolute terms, and the two
uses should not be confused.
Constructing good definitions by genus and difference is by no means a simple
task; it requires thoughtful selection of the most appropriate genus for the term in question, as
well as identification of the most helpful specific difference for that term. In appraising proposed
definitions by genus and difference, especially when they are intended as lexical, there are five
good rules that have been traditionally laid down.
Rule 1: A definition should state the essential attributes of the species.
There is difference between the conventional intension of a term from the
subjective intension and the objective intension. To define a term using, as its
specific difference, some attribute that is not normally recognized as its attribute,
even though it may be a part of that term’s objective intension, would be a

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 violation of the spirit of this rule. The rule itself might best be expressed, using
our terminology, by saying that a definition should state the conventional
intension of the term being defined.
Rule 2: A definition must not be circular.
If the definiendum itself appears in the defines, the definition can explain
the meaning of the term being defined only to those who already understand it. So
if a definition is circular it must fail in its purpose, which is to explain the
meaning of the definiendum.
Rule 3: A definition must be neither too broad nor too narrow.
This is an easy rule to understand, but it is often difficult to respect. We do
not want the defines to denote more things than are denoted by the definiendum,
or fewer things either, of course, but mistakes are often made. When Plato’s
successors in the Academy at Athens settled on the definition of “man” as
“featherless biped,” their critic, Diogenes, plucked a chicken and threw it over the
wall into the Academy. There was a featherless biped—but no man! The defines
was too broad. Legend has it that to narrow the definition of “man,” the attribute
“having broad nails” was added to the defined.
Rule 4: Ambiguous, obscure, or figurative language must not be used in a definition.
Ambiguous terms in the defined obviously prevent the definition from
performing its function of explaining the definiendum. Obscure terms also defeat
that purpose, but obscurity is a relative matter. What is obscure to amateurs may
be perfectly familiar to professionals. A “dynatron oscillator” does truly mean “a
circuit that employs a negative-resistance volt-ampere curve to produce an
alternating current.” Although it may be obscure to the ordinary person, the
language of this defines is wholly intelligible to the students of electrical
engineering for whom the definition was written; its technical nature is
unavoidable. Obscure language in nontechnical definitions may result in an effort
to explain the unknown using what is even more unknown. Dr. Samuel Johnson,
in his great Dictionary of the English Language (1755), defined net as meaning
“anything reticulated or decussated at equal distances with interstices between the
intersections”— a good example of obscurity in definition.

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 Rule 5: A definition should not be negative when it can be affirmative.
What a term does mean, rather than what it does not mean, is what the
definition seeks to provide. There are far too many things that the vast majority of
terms do not mean; we are unlikely to cover them all in a definition. “A piece of
furniture that is not a bed or a chair or a stool or a bench” does not define a couch;
neither does it define a dresser. We need to identify the attributes that the
definiendum has, rather than those it does not have.
In summary, intentional definitions, and among them definitions by genus and difference
especially, can serve any of the purposes for which definitions are sought. They may help to
eliminate ambiguity, to reduce vagueness, to give theoretical explanation, and even to influence
attitudes. They are also commonly used to increase and enrich the vocabulary of those to whom
they are provided. For most purposes, intentional definitions are much superior to extensional
definitions, and of all definitions that rely on intensions, those constructed by genus and
difference are usually the most effective and most helpful.

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