UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN, ILORIN, KWARA STATE

DEPARTMENT OF
HISTORY AND
INTERNTIONAL STUDIES
COURSE TITLE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE
1945
COURSE CODE: HIS 327
LECTURER-IN-CHARGE: DR. SOLOMON
GROUP 19
TOPIC: EUROPHOBIA AND RUSSOPHOBIA.
1. OGIRIKI EMMANUEL CHISOM - 21/15CA209
2. Awoyeye olubukola Mary - 22/15ca284
3. Abiodun Jumoke Oluwaseun - 22/15CA275
4. ONODJIANE OGHENECHAVWUKO JENNIFER - 21/15ca278
5. Habeeb Abdullahi Temitope - 21/15ca008
6. Salifu Comfort Mame - 21/15CA307
7. Ogunleye Ayobami Timilehin - 21/15CA382
8. Oketa Naomi onyaigo - 21/15CA230
9. Fasahun Tabitha Aanuoluwakiitan - 21/15CA145
10. Adetunji Omotolani Ayomide - 21/15CA043
11. Abdullateef Fausat oluwasheyi - 22/15CA274
12. Fasanya Segun Oluwaseyi - 22/15CA289
13. Titus Raphael Aboi - 21/15CA335
14. Sehidu Abdulazeez Abiodun - 21/15CA316
15. Oyerinde Abdulmalik Akinfolawe - 21/15CA291
16. Olokoba Abdulsamad olamilekan - 21/15 ca260
17. Ajiboye Oluwatomisin Emmanuella - 21/15CA065
18. Olayinka Covenant Olamide - 22/15CA295
What is Europophobia?

Europophobia refers to a fear, dislike, or prejudice against Europe or European culture. This
phenomenon encompasses a range of negative attitudes and emotions towards Europe, its people,
and its cultural practices. Europophobia can manifest in various forms, from mild skepticism to
intense hostility, and can be driven by a complex array of historical, cultural, and socio-
economic factors.

Historical Context of Europophobia

Europophobia has its roots in the colonial and imperial past of Europe. For centuries, European
powers imposed their dominance over other cultures and societies, often through violent means.
This legacy of colonialism and imperialism has contributed to ongoing tensions and prejudices
between Europe and other regions.

The historical context of Europophobia can be traced back to the Enlightenment period, when
European thinkers began to promote the idea of Western cultural superiority. This ideology was
used to justify colonialism and the imposition of European values and practices on non-European
societies.

Euroscepticism and Europhobia: what does it mean?

The idea of euroscepticism emerged in the 1980's to describe British mistrust of the project to
deepen European integration; the term then spread to all of those who were reluctant to further
integration. Developments in public opinion regarding European issues can be characterised by
three main stages.

Firstly, a structural change occurred starting from the 1990's by the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty. The significant increase in the European Union's competences, together with greater
consultation of people via referendum led to the end of what was called the "permissive
consensus" of opinion regarding European integration, i.e. the end of the tacit consent of citizens
to community integration since the beginning of the 1950's which underpinned "functionalist"
approach to the Union's legitimisation.

Then the French and Dutch "no" to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, followed by the Irish "no"
to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 challenged the foundations of the permissive consensus theory. It
was from this standpoint that Hooghe and Marks developed the theory of "constraining
dissensus", marked by an increase in the divisive nature of European questions and of their use
by political players to partisan ends. This theory relates the emergence of a political division over
European issues and a politicisation of public opinion regarding European affairs.
Thirdly, the crisis affecting the European Union has led to a decline in citizen support and
confidence to the Union and its institutions, thereby confirming this observation. Only one third
of Europeans say they trust the community's institutions, i.e. the lowest level ever reached. The
majority of citizens believe that their voice is not being heard by them. However, there is a
linkage between confidence and the support to the political system that forms the base of the
legitimacy of the system in question. Unsurprisingly those who are most mistrustful of Europe's
institutions are from the Member States that have been the most affected by the crisis (Greece
and Spain notably), as well as from countries in which euroscepticism is traditionally strong
(UK). The decline in confidence is strong and widespread in all 28 Member States (except for in
Finland and Sweden), independent of the size of the country (large" or "small"), of the length of
EU membership and even of the benefits enjoyed by this membership. Last but not least, the
most recent research shows that euroscepticism tends to develop under the effects of the crisis,
not only in countries that have been severely affected, but also in countries in which economic
results have been good. This is the case, for example, in Germany where public opinion fears
that a downturn in economic and budgetary conditions (high levels of unemployment and public
debt) in other Member States (for example in Greece) may have a spill over effect and a negative
impact on their domestic economy and on the Union's ability to achieve positive economic
results. Beyond this, whilst economic and social indicators are improving, political indicators
(confidence in the European Union and in the EU institutions) are stagnating. This shows the fact
that how the Union's democracy functions has become a decisive factor in explaining the
continuation of political mistrust. In 2015, less than half of Europe's citizens (46%) have said
that they are happy with the way democracy functions in the European Union. There is,
therefore, a political rift within the EU, as highlighted by other evidence, notably by electoral
outcomes (rise of populism and extremes etc...). By not taking the issue of democracy seriously
and by not responding to it, there is a danger of deep and long lasting divorce between the Union
and its citizens.

Although the analysis of developments in public opinion highlights a decline in citizens' support
to Europe and its institutions, in other words, an increase in euroscepticism, this idea, however,
encompasses extremely different political trends On the one hand, the sovereigntists, with
nationalist leanings, believe that the national State should not be questioned and focus on the
identity and the migration issues. On the other, the anti-liberals believe that European integration
is dictated by a neo-liberal economic rationale, which is unravelling national social systems and
must therefore be countered. Finally, some trends combine the two mentioned above, which
might be called "leftwing sovereignism". Academic works at the end of the 2000's, particularly
those of Szczerbiak and Taggart, separated "soft" and "hard" euroscepticism in a bid to
distinguish contestation from total rejection or europhobia. As for the former case,
euroscepticism accepts the principle of European integration while criticising certain public
policies, the proponents of the latter campaign for a total rejection of belonging to the Union and
express their desire to leave it (this is the case for example with the FN (Front National) in
France, UKIP in the UK and the PVV in the Netherlands). Even though one should not
overestimate the impact of the electoral rise of populism, just like far right nationalists, on
political balances at European Union level, it remains that the spread of the discourse carried by
these political groups and the erosion of the fundamental principles that form the heart of the
European idea, constitute a real danger of national withdrawal amongst the 28 Member States

In the 20th century, Europophobia gained momentum in response to European powers' role in
World War II and the Cold War. The rise of nationalist and anti-colonial movements in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America also contributed to growing skepticism towards Europe and its cultural
practices.

How Does Europophobia Manifest Today?

In contemporary times, Europophobia may manifest in various forms, including:

1. Skepticism towards European Union policies: Some individuals and nations may view the
European Union (EU) as a symbol of European dominance and imperialism. They may be
skeptical of EU policies, such as economic integration and migration policies.
2. Anti-immigrant sentiment: The influx of immigrants from non-European countries has led
to growing anti-immigrant sentiment in some European nations. This sentiment can manifest as
hostility towards immigrants, Muslims, or other minority groups.
3. Criticism of Western values: Some individuals and groups may criticize Western values,
such as democracy, human rights, and individualism, as being imposed on non-Western
societies. They may view these values as a form of cultural imperialism.
4. Nationalist and populist movements: The rise of nationalist and populist movements in
Europe and other regions has contributed to growing skepticism towards Europe and its cultural
practices. These movements often promote anti-immigrant and anti-EU sentiments.

Overcoming Europophobia

Overcoming Europophobia requires a multifaceted approach that involves:

1. Promoting cross-cultural understanding: Encourage dialogue and exchange between

individuals from different cultural backgrounds.
2. Addressing historical grievances: Acknowledge and address the historical legacy of
colonialism, imperialism, and cultural superiority.
3. Fostering critical thinking: Encourage critical thinking and media literacy to distinguish
between legitimate concerns and unfounded prejudices.
4. Promoting inclusive and nuanced language: Use precise language to avoid perpetuating
harmful stereotypes or biases.
5. Encouraging empathy and respect: Promote empathy and respect for different cultures and
viewpoints.

By adopting these strategies, we can work towards a more inclusive and nuanced understanding
of European cultures and their place in the world.

Colonialism and imperialism helped create Europhobia by causing anger and distrust towards
European countries. When Europeans took control of other lands, they often took resources and
forced their culture on local people.

This led to feelings of hurt and resistance among those affected. Because of the negative effects
of colonial rule, some people started to fear or dislike Europe, seeing it as a threat to their own
culture and identity. This history has influenced how some people feel about Europe today.

World War I and World War II contributed to Europhobia by causing a lot of destruction and
suffering in Europe. Many countries were involved, and the wars led to millions of deaths and
widespread damage.

After the wars, some people in different parts of the world began to see Europe as a source of
conflict and violence. The actions of European countries during the wars, including colonization
and aggression, created negative feelings and distrust. This history made some people wary of
European influence and culture, leading to Europhobia.

Key events surrounding the rise of Europhobia.

European issues can be characterised by three main stages.

Firstly, a structural change occurred starting from the 1990's by the ratification of the Maastricht
Treaty. The significant increase in the European Union's competences, together with greater
consultation of people via referendum led to the end of what was called the "permissive
consensus" of opinion regarding European integration, i.e. the end of the tacit consent of citizens
to community integration since the beginning of the 1950's which underpinned "functionality"
approach to the Union's legitimation.

Then the French and Dutch "no" to the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, followed by the Irish "no"
to the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 challenged the foundations of the permissive consensus theory. It
was from this standpoint that Hooghe and Marks developed the theory of "constraining
dissensus", marked by an increase in the divisive nature of European questions and of their use
by political players to partisan ends. This theory relates the emergence of a political division over
European issues and a politicization of public opinion regarding European affairs.
Thirdly, the crisis affecting the European Union has led to a decline in citizen support and
confidence to the Union and its institutions, thereby confirming this observation. Only one third
of Europeans say they trust the community's institutions, i.e. the lowest level ever reached. The
majority of citizens believe that their voice is not being heard by them. However, there is a
linkage between confidence and the support to the political system that forms the base of the
legitimacy of the system in question. Unsurprisingly those who are most mistrustful of Europe's
institutions are from the Member States that have been the most affected by the crisis (Greece
and Spain notably), as well as from countries in which europhobia is traditionally strong (UK).
The decline in confidence is strong and widespread in all 28 Member States (except for in
Finland and Sweden), independent of the size of the country (large" or "small"), of the length of
EU membership and even of the benefits enjoyed by this membership. Last but not least, the
most recent research shows that europhobia tends to develop under the effects of the crisis, not
only in countries that have been severely affected, but also in countries in which economic
results have been good. This is the case, for example, in Germany where public opinion fears
that a downturn in economic and budgetary conditions (high levels of unemployment and public
debt) in other Member States (for example in Greece) may have a spill over effect and a negative
impact on their domestic economy and on the Union's ability to achieve positive economic
results. Beyond this, whilst economic and social indicators are improving, political indicators
(confidence in the European Union and in the EU institutions) are stagnating. This shows the fact
that how the Union's democracy functions has become a decisive factor in explaining the
continuation of political mistrust. In 2015, less than half of Europe's citizens (46%) have said
that they are happy with the way democracy functions in the European Union. There is,
therefore, a political rift within the EU, as highlighted by the other evidence, notably by electoral
outcomes (rise of populism and extremes etc...). By not taking the issue of democracy seriously
and by not responding to it, there is a danger of deep and long lasting divorce between the Union
and its citizens.

Although the analysis of developments in public opinion highlights a decline in citizens' support
to Europe and its institutions, in other words, an increase in euroscepticism, this idea, however,
encompasses extremely different political trends On the one hand, the sovereigntists, with
nationalist leanings, believe that the national State should not be questioned and focus on the
identity and the migration issues. On the other, the anti-liberals believe that European integration
is dictated by a neo-liberal economic rationale, which is unravelling national social systems and
must therefore be countered. Finally, some trends combine the two mentioned above, which
might be called "leftwing sovereignism". Academic works at the end of the 2000's, particularly
those of Szczerbiak and Taggart, separated "soft" and "hard" euroscepticism in a bid to
distinguish contestation from total rejection or europhobia. As for the former case,
euroscepticism accepts the principle of European integration while criticising certain public
policies, the proponents of the latter campaign for a total rejection of belonging to the Union and
express their desire to leave it (this is the case for example with the FN (Front National) in
France, UKIP in the UK and the PVV in the Netherlands). Even though one should not
overestimate the impact of the electoral rise of populism, just like far right nationalists, on
political balances at European Union level, it remains that the spread of the discourse carried by
these political groups and the erosion of the fundamental principles that form the heart of the
European idea, constitute a real danger of national withdrawal amongst the 28 Member States.
The way the European Union (EU) has handled various crises has contributed to Europhobia in
several ways. When the EU faced issues like the financial crisis, migration crisis, and Brexit,
many people felt that the EU was not doing enough to help.
For example, during the migration crisis, some countries felt overwhelmed by the number of
refugees and migrants. The EU's response was seen as slow and uncoordinated, which made
people frustrated. This led to negative feelings towards the EU and its influence.

Additionally, the financial crisis caused economic problems in many European countries, leading
to high unemployment and hardship. People blamed the EU for these issues, which increased
resentment. Overall, the EU's handling of these crises made some people feel distrustful and
critical of Europe, contributing to Europhobia.

DEFINITION OF RUSSOPHOBIA

Russophobia is a deep dislike, fear, or prejudice against Russia, its people, culture, or
government. It can be based on historical events, political conflicts, or cultural stereotypes. Over
time, Russophobia has developed due to tensions between Russia and other countries, such as
during wars, rivalries, or ideological clashes like the Cold War. People with Russophobic
attitudes might view Russia as aggressive, backward, or a threat to the world, often judging the
entire nation or its people negatively based on the actions of its government.

Russophobia can appear in different ways, such as unfair treatment of Russians living in other
countries, negative stereotypes in movies or media, or policies isolating Russia politically or
economically. It is also sometimes used as a political tool, where any criticism of the Russian
government is labeled as Russophobia, even when it’s valid criticism. Russophobia is when
people judge or dislike all of Russia and its people because of stereotypes, fear, or disagreements
with the Russian government, rather than understanding the country’s complexity or separating
individuals from political actions.

History of Russophobia

Early Beginnings

Russophobia began in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries when Russia was expanding its
empire. Many European countries, especially Britain and France, saw Russia as a threat to their
power. They viewed Russia as a large, mysterious country with a different culture and political
system, ruled by powerful monarchs (tsars). Western nations, which were moving toward
democracy, saw Russia’s autocratic rule as backward and oppressive.

Medieval Period (10th-15th centuries)

1. Teutonic Knights' Crusades (13th century): The Teutonic Knights, a German military order,
waged a series of crusades against the Orthodox Christian states of Kievan Rus' (modern-day
Ukraine and Belarus) and Novgorod (modern-day Russia).
2. Hanseatic League's Trade Wars (13th-15th centuries): The Hanseatic League, a powerful
trading federation of Northern European cities, clashed with the Novgorod Republic over trade
routes and resources.

Early Modern Period (16th-18th centuries)

1. Polish-Russian Wars (16th-17th centuries): A series of conflicts between the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Tsardom of Russia led to increased tensions and anti-Russian
sentiment in Poland.
2. Great Northern War (1700-1721): Russia's expansion under Peter the Great led to conflicts
with Sweden, Poland, and other European powers, fostering anti-Russian attitudes.

19th Century

In the 19th century, Russophobia grew stronger as Russia positioned itself as a protector of
Orthodox Christianity and Slavic peoples. This clashed with the interests of Western Catholic
and Protestant countries. Many European leaders and thinkers began to see Russia as an outsider
that didn’t fit into Western ideas of progress and freedom. Writers and politicians often described
Russia as a "dangerous other"—a large, unpredictable, and uncivilized nation that could not be
trusted.
20th Century: The Soviet Union and the Cold War

Russophobia reached new heights in the 20th century during the Russian Revolution (1917) and
the rise of the Soviet Union. When the communists took over and created a new system based on
socialism, Western countries, especially the United States, became alarmed. They feared that the
Soviet Union would spread communism around the world and challenge capitalism and
democracy.

During the Cold War (1947–1991), Russophobia was tied to anti-communism. The U.S. and its
allies saw the Soviet Union as their main enemy. This led to propaganda, movies, and media that
often portrayed Russians as villains, spies, or dangerous people.

Events like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the arms race
between the U.S. and the USSR deepened this fear.

Western countries associated Russia with dictatorship, censorship, and human rights abuses, and
these perceptions were reflected in policies, education, and culture. The fear wasn’t just about
the Soviet government but extended to the Russian people, who were often stereotyped as cold,
untrustworthy, or overly loyal to their leaders.

After the Cold War: Post-Soviet Russophobia

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, tensions between Russia and the West eased for a
while. Many hoped that Russia would become more democratic and integrate into the global
community. However, disagreements over Russia’s actions and policies soon reignited
Russophobia.

Under Vladimir Putin’s leadership, Russia’s involvement in wars, such as in Chechnya and
Georgia, and its more assertive foreign policies brought back fears of Russian aggression. Events
like:

The annexation of Crimea in 2014, and

The war in Ukraine starting in 2022, increased these fears.

In the modern era, Russophobia has focused on concerns about Russia’s influence on global
politics. Allegations of election interference, cyberattacks, and support for authoritarian regimes
have added to negative views of Russia. Western countries often see Russia as a disruptor of
international peace and stability.

Cultural and Social Stereotypes

Russophobia has also been shaped by stereotypes in media and culture. For centuries, Russian
characters in Western literature, films, and TV shows have often been portrayed as villains,
spies, or ruthless leaders. These images have reinforced the idea of Russia as an enemy or a
mysterious, untrustworthy country.

Sometimes, Russophobia is used as a political term by Russian leaders to dismiss criticism. For
example, when other countries criticize Russia’s human rights abuses or military actions, the
Russian government may call it Russophobia to deflect blame and suggest it’s based on prejudice
rather than facts.

Summary

Cultural and religious differences between Europe and other regions have played a significant
role in contributing to Europhobia. These differences can lead to misunderstandings and a sense
of division. For instance, in many regions outside Europe, there are different customs, beliefs,
and ways of life that may not align with European values. One example is the perception of
secularism in Europe, where religion plays a lesser role in public life compared to places where
religion is central to daily activities and governance. This difference can create tension, as people
may feel that European nations do not respect their religious practices.

Additionally, the portrayal of certain cultures in European media can lead to stereotypes and
negative perceptions. For example, when conflicts arise, such as in Syria or Afghanistan, the
media may focus on violence and extremism without highlighting the rich cultural aspects of
those regions. This can foster fear and resentment towards Europe, as people from other regions
may feel misrepresented and marginalized.

The history of Russophobia is about how fear and prejudice toward Russia developed over time,
influenced by wars, political conflicts, and cultural differences. While it started as fear of
Russia’s power and political system, it has evolved into a broader mistrust of the country’s
government and influence. Russophobia shows how misunderstandings and stereotypes can
shape international relations and cultural attitudes for generations.

References:

- Mudde, C. (2018). The Populist Radical Right: A Reader. Routledge.

- Said, E. W. (1978). Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. Routledge.
- Habermas, J. (2012). The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Polity Press.
- Mudde, C. (2013). The Relationship Between Immigration and Nativism in Europe and North
America. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 39(5), 741-762.
- Hall, S. (1997). Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. Sage
Publications.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Simon
& Schuster.
Cf. for example P. Norris (ed.), Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999; J. S. Nye, P. H. Zelikow, D. C. King (eds.), Why People
Don't Trust Government, Cambridge / London, Harvard University Press, 1997 ; P. Perrineau
(dir.), Le désenchantement démocratique, La Tour d'Aigues, Les Editions de l'Aube, 2003.
B. Cautrès, Les Européens aiment-ils (toujours) l'Europe ?, Paris, La documentation française,
2014.
S. Vasilopoulou, "Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism", Journal of Common
Market Studies, vol. 51, n°1, 2013, pp. 153-168.
R.C. Eichenberg and R.J. Dalton, "Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen
Support for European Integration, 1973-2004", Acta Politica, vol. 42, n° 2-3, 2007, pp. 128-152.
The expression "permissive consensus" was invented by V. O. Jr. Key, Public Opinion and
American Democracy. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1961 and was taken up again for the first
time regarding European integration by Lindberg and Steingold in assessment of the support of
public opinion to European integration in L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold, Europe's Would
Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the European Community, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1970.
L. Hogge and G. Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus", British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39 Issue 01,
January 2008, pp. 1-23.
Cf. C. Belot, B. Cautrès and S. Strudel, "L'Europe comme enjeu clivant", Revue française de
science politique, 63(6), 2013, pp. 1081-1112.
B. Cautrès, "Un effondrement de la confiance dans l'UE ? Les attitudes des Européens vis-à-vis
de l'Europe au cours de la Grande Récession", in C. Blot, O. Rozenberg, F. Saraceno et I. Streho
(dir.) Réformer l'Europe, Revue de l'OFCE, Débats et politiques, n° 134, Sciences Po, 2014, pp.
19-27.
On this point see for example, C. Belot, "Support (by the citizens of the EU) is the cornerstone
to this citizenship since it represents an initial form of recognition of the legitimacy of the
European political system", "Les logiques sociologiques de soutien au processus d'intégration
européenne: éléments d'interprétation", Revue internationale de politique comparée, 9 (1), 2002,
p. 12.
Cf. K. Armigeon and B. Ceka "The Loss of Trust in the European Union during the Great
Recession since 2008: the Role of Huristics from the National System", European Union Politics,
15(1), 2014, pp. 82-107.
 D. Ioannou, J.-F. Jamet and J. Kleibl, "Spillovers and Euroscepticism", ECB Working Paper,
European Central Bank, n° 1818, June 2015.
P. Perrineau, "Public Opinion in Europe : an early end to the crisis" in Schuman Report on
Europe. State of the Union 2015, Paris, Lignes de repères, 2015, pp.167-172. See also Emmanuel
Rivière, "Opinions et démocratie. Les terreaux du populisme", in Commentaire, n°152, hiver
2015-2016
Eurobarometer standard 83, Spring 2015.
T. Chopin, La fracture politique de l'Europe. Crise de légitimité et déficit politique, Bruxelles,
Editions Larcier, 2015.
ECPS; European center for populism studies.
Schuman papers and interviews: Eurosceptism and Europhobia: a threat of populism.

"The Genesis of Russophobia in Great Britain" by John Howes Gleason, Harvard University
Press, 1950, 314 pages.
"Russophobia: Propaganda in International Politics" by Glenn Diesen, Palgrave Macmillan,
2022.
"Russophobia: Anti-Russian Lobby and American Foreign Policy" by Andrei P. Tsygankov,
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 240 pages.
"Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir" by Anton Shekhovtsov, Routledge, 2017.
"The Paradox of American Russophobia" in Problems of Post-Communism by Gilbert
Doctorow, 2015.