G.R. No.

67035 January 29, 1993

PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE PORTS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER DANIEL M.
LUCAS, JR., and PERFECTO JARDIN, respondents.

Zamora, Soller, Baluyut & Mendoza Law Offices for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:

This petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks to
reverse and set aside: (a) the May 29, 1981 Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) dismissing the appeal of the Philippine-Singapore Ports
Corporation (PSPC) from the Decision the Labor Arbiter dated January 3, 1980 ordering
PSPC to pay Perfecto Jardin the sum of $3,800.00 or its peso equivalent at the current
rate of exchange representing the latter's wages for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract, and (b) the February 9, 1984 Resolution of the NLRC en
banc denying PSPC's motion for the reconsideration of its earlier Resolution.

The facts of the case are as follows:

PSPC is a corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. On September 5,

1977, PSPC and Jardin entered into a contract of employment wherein the latter was
employed by the former as a winchman/signalman at the Commercial Islamic Port of
Jeddah in Saudi Arabia for a two-year period commencing in January, 1978. On or
about October 18, 1978, the PSPC Medical Director recommended that Jardin be given
priority in the schedule for rest and recreation (R and R) leave as he was diagnosed to
be in need of a fistulectomy due to "fistula in anu."

Jardin was sent back to the Philippines at PSPC's expense for medical treatment. At the
GSIS Hospital, Quezon City where he was treated and confined, his ailment was
diagnosed as "pruritis ani due to ancylostomiasis." On November 4, 1978, Jardin was
certified as fit to work by his attending physician at the said hospital. When he reported
to the PSPC on the same day, however, he was advised to file his resignation papers.

Thus, on January 31, 1979, Jardin filed with the then Ministry of Labor, Region IV,
Manila, a complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages (R4-STF-1-787-79).
In its position paper, the PSPC prayed for the dismissal of the complaint principally on
the ground that under Art. 15 of the Labor Code (P.D. No. 442), the Bureau of
Employment Services and not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case because
it involved the overseas employment of a Filipino worker.
In his decision of January 3, 1980, Labor Arbiter Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. did not pass upon
the issue of jurisdiction. He resolved the case on its merits and disposed of it as follows:

WHEREFORE, respondent corporation is hereby ordered to pay

complainant the sum of $3,800.00 or, its equivalent in Peso, Philippine
Currency, at the current rate of exchange, representing the latter's wages
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 29).

In its appeal filed with the NLRC on February 19, 1980, PSPC reiterated its contention
that it is the Bureau of Employment Services that has jurisdiction over the case and that,
assuming that the Labor Arbiter had such jurisdiction, he gravely abused his discretion
in finding that Jardin had been illegally dismissed even in the absence of evidentiary
support thereon.

In the Resolution of May 21, 1981, the NLRC 1 dismissed the appeal on the sole ground
that since Jardin had not been furnished with a copy of the appeal within the
reglementary period of ten days, no appeal had been duly perfected by the PSPC.

PSPC filed a motion for reconsideration of said Resolution alleging that it had furnished
Jardin with a copy of its memorandum of appeal which was attached to its opposition to
Jardin's motion for issuance of a writ of execution. The PSPC also stressed that the
Bureau of Employment Services and not the arbitration section of the Ministry of Labor,
had jurisdiction over the case. In the Resolution of February 9, 1984, the NLRC en
banc 2 denied the motion for reconsideration and lifted the injunction it had issued in
the case. Mentioning the fact that PSPC had repeatedly raised the issue of jurisdiction
in all its previous cases without success, the NLRC held that the case fell "within the
ambit of compulsory arbitration." The NLRC also ruled that PSPC's "belated service" of
the appeal memorandum "did not cure the infirmity of the appeal" and therefore the
PSPC failed to comply within the reglementary period with the mandatory requirements
of an appeal (Rollo, pp. 59-60).

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by PSPC asserting that the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the case and therefore the decision he had rendered is null and
void, that the NLRC abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal on the technical
ground of failure to furnish the adverse party with a copy of the appeal memorandum,
and that, granting that the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case, he erred in
finding that Jardin had been illegally dismissed.

The petition is impressed with merit.

When Jardin filed the complaint for illegal dismissal on January 31, 1979, Art. 217 (5) of
the Labor Code provided that Labor Arbiters and he NLRC shall have "exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide" all cases arising from employer-employee relations
"unless expressly excluded by this Code." At that time, Art. 15 of the same Code had
been amended by P.D. No. 1412 which took effect on June 9, 1978. The pertinent
provision of the said presidential decree states:

Art. 15. Bureau of Employment Services. —

(a) . . . . . .

(b) The Bureau shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
matters or cases involving employer-employee relations including money
claims, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contracts involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment, except seamen. The decisions of the
Bureau shall be final and executory subject to appeal to the Secretary of
Labor whose decisions shall be final and inappealable.

Considering that private respondent Jardin's claims undeniably arose out of an

employer-employee relationship with petitioner PSPC and that private respondent
worked overseas or in Saudi Arabia, the Bureau of Employment Services and not the
Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case. "Overseas employment" is defined by Art.
13(h) of the Labor Code as "employment of a worker outside the Philippines." Since the
definition does not make a distinction regarding the nationality of the employer, Filipino
employers who deploy their employees abroad should be deemed covered by the
definition (See: Philippine National Construction Corporation v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 401
[1991]).

Art. 15 was further amended by P.D. No. 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1990. Such
amendment qualified the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Employment Services as follows:

(b) The regional offices of the Ministry of Labor shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases involving employer-
employee relations including money claims, arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas employment
except seamen; Provided, That the Bureau of Employment Services may,
in the case of the National Capital Region, exercise such power, whenever
the Minister of Labor deems it appropriate. The decisions of the regional
offices or the Bureau of Employment Services if so authorized by the
Minister of Labor as provided in this Article, shall be appealable to the
National Labor Relations Commission upon the same grounds provided in
Article 223 hereof. The decisions of the National Labor Relations
Commission shall be final and inappealable.

Hence, as further amended, Art. 15 provided for concurrent jurisdiction between the
regional offices of the then Ministry of Labor and the Bureau of Employment Services "in
the case of the National Capital Region." It is noteworthy that P.D. No. 1691, while
likewise amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code, did not alter the provision that Labor
Arbiters shall have jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations
"unless expressly excluded by this Code."
The functions of the Bureau of Employment Services were subsequently assumed by
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on May 1, 1982 by virtue
of Executive Order No. 797 by granting the POEA "original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising
out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including seamen" (Sec. 4(a); Eastern Shipping Lines v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration [POEA], 200 SCRA 663 [1991]). This
development showed the legislative authority's continuing intent to exclude from the
Labor Arbiter's jurisdiction claims arising from overseas employment.

These amendments notwithstanding, when the complaint for illegal dismissal was filed
on January 31, 1979, under Art. 15, as amended by P.D. No. 1412, it was the Bureau of
Employment Services which had jurisdiction over the case and not the Labor Arbiters. It
is a settled rule that jurisdiction is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action (Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal, 201 SCRA 632, 637
[1991]). P.D. No. 1691 which gave the regional offices of the Ministry of Labor
concurrent jurisdiction with the Bureau of Employment Services, was promulgated more
than a year after the complaint was filed.

It is indubitable that at the time the Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint for
illegal dismissal, he was devoid of jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision promulgated
by him is null and void having been rendered without jurisdiction and may be struck
down any time — even on appeal to the Supreme Court (Suarez v. Court of Appeals,
186 SCRA 339 [1990]).

On the issue of whether or not the NLRC abused its discretion in dismissing the appeal
on the technical ground of failure to furnish the adverse party with a copy of the appeal
memorandum, the ruling of the Court in Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister
of Labor and Employment (135 SCRA 167, 178 [1985]) is squarely in point. The Court
said therein:

. . . The mere failure to furnish copy of the appeal memorandum to

adverse party is not a fatal defect. We have consistently adhered to the
principle clearly held in Alonso vs. Villamor that "technicality when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and become its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from court." In a
more forceful language, Mr. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking
for the Court, in Meracap vs. International Ceramics Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. stated that "from the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too
strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary
Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment
rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their
due weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann,
should be not only secundum retionem but also secundum caritatem."
More recently, we held that in appeals in labor cases, non-service of the
copy of appeal or appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a
 jurisdictional defect, and does not justify dismissal of the appeal. Likewise,
it was held that dismissal of an employee's appeal on a purely technical
ground is inconsistent with the constitutional mandate on protection to
labor.

The NLRC therefore arbitrarily and despotically exercised its power by evading its
positive duty to entertain the appeal on a purely technical ground. As the Court said
in Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC 190 SCRA 747, 752 [1990]),
"(t)echnicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely
resolving the rights and obligations of the parties." In view of the clear lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Labor Arbiter over the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by private
respondent, and the apparent abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in refusing to
resolve petitioner's appeal, there is no reason to discuss the merits of the case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the proceedings
below NULLIFIED but without prejudice to the right of private respondent Perfecto
Jardin to refile with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration his claim
against the petitioner Philippine-Singapore Ports Authority.

SO ORDERED.