Manoj Sharma Court No. - 45 Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL U/S 374 CR.P.C. No.

- 3962 of 2011 Petitioner :- Manoj Kumar Sharma Respondent :- State Of U.P. Petitioner Counsel :- Rajiv Gupta,Dileep Kumar,Rajrshi Gupta Respondent Counsel :- Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Naheed Ara Moonis,J. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned A.G.A. for the State. Admit. Summon the lower court record. A prayer for bail has been made in this criminal appeal, which has been filed against the judgment and order dated 7.7.2011, passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Bulandshahar, in Session Trial No.861 of 2003, State Vs. Manoj, arising out of case crime no.486 of 2000, under Sections 498-A, IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S. Sikandrabad, District Bulandshahar, convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 498-A IPC for two years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5,000/- and under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act for one year rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,000/-, with default stipulation. According to the prosecution case the appellant is the husband of the deceased, Anuradha. In respect of the incident dated 21.7.2000 a first information report was lodged by the complainant on 25.7.2000 that his daughter was set on fire by her husband and her in-laws on account of non fulfillment of demand of dowry. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that, initially charge sheet was submitted and charge was framed under Sections 498-A, 304-B IPC, Section Dowry Prohibition Act and alternate charge under Section 302/34 IPC, but has only been convicted under Section 498-A IPC for two years and under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act for one year. The appellant is absolutely innocent and his conviction is against the evidence on record. The appellant was on bail during trial. Now he is on interim bail since the date of conviction i.e. 7.7.2011. The appellant is an officer in the Border Security Force. In case, he is enlarged on bail he will not misuse the liberty of bail. Per contra, the learned AGA has argued that the victim was done to death within two years of marriage and there is specific allegations with regard to the demand of dowry made by her husband and his other family members. The appellant has rightly been convicted by the trial court.

10:01pm Jan 8

Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned AGA and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, the prayer for bail of the appellant is allowed. Let the appellant, Manoj Kumar Sharma, convicted and sentenced in Session Trial No.861 of 2003, State Vs. Manoj, arising out of case crime no.486 of 2000, under Sections 498-A, IPC and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, P.S. Sikandrabad, District Bulandshahar, be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned. The execution of sentence shall be kept in abeyance during the pendency of appeal. However, it is open to the complainant to move an application for cancellation of bail in case the appellant misuses the liberty of bail. Order Date :- 13.7.2011 Mustaqeem.

Judgment: Arising Out Of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 2857/2008 Arijit Pasayat, J.- Leave granted This appeal has been filed by the accused who stands convicted for offences punishable under Section 306 of Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 and sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years and 6 months R.I. 2 respectively both sentences to run concurrently. The facts are as under: 3. Karuna, deceased and the appellant Anand Kumar were married in the year 1981 while she was yet a child. The gauna of the deceased, however, took place on 13th May 1986 and a month thereafter she visited her parents home to attend a family wedding and on 18th June 1986, returned to her matrimonial home accompanied by her brother-in-law. She, however, consumed aluminium phosphide (Sulphas) tablets on 28th June 1986 and in a precarious condition was removed to Kothi hospital from where she was referred to the Civil Hospital, Satna for further management. The Naib Tehsildar- cum-Executive Magistrate concerned was called by the doctor who recorded her dying declaration. Karuna, however, died soon thereafter, on which information was sent to Police Station City Kotwali, Satna on 29th June 1986 and a case under Section 498 A and 306 of

the IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was registered. On the completion of the investigation, the four accused i.e. the appellant, his father Manmohan Gautam, mother Ramdulari and brother 3 Anoop Kumar Gautam were committed to face trial and duly charged for the offences, as above mentioned. The trial court after recording the evidence of 20 witnesses and taking into account, in particular the ocular evidence, acquitted the parents and brother of the appellant but placing reliance on a letter dated 27th February 1986 Exhibit P-20 allegedly written by the appellant to his father-in-law held the case against the appellant proved and accordingly convicted and sentenced him, as already indicated above. In appeal the High Court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence. It is in these circumstances that the matter is before us by special leave. 5. Mr. Tankha, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has, at the very outset, pointed out that as per the findings recorded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, the evidence adduced by the Prosecution was unreliable so as to involve the three accused who had been acquitted although the ocular evidence if at all pointed directly towards Karuna's in-laws rather than at the appellant as being the guilty party. He has submitted that in the fact that the State had not chosen to challenge the acquittal of the three, it had to be held 4 that the evidence with regard to the present appellant too was ambivalent and insufficient to bring home the charge against him. He has further emphasized that the courts below too were conscious of this fact and had accordingly chosen to rely on the letter Exhibit P-20 in support of the ocular evidence against the appellant although the said letter was inadmissible in evidence as it had not been proved, and had on the other hand ignored the dying declaration recorded by the Naib Tehsildar which exonerated all the accused of any wrongdoing. Ms. Makhija, the learned State Counsel has, however, pointed out that in the light of the presumption raised under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act, 1872 and the ocular evidence in the case there was other unimpeachable evidence against the appellant, even assuming that the letter Exhibit P-20 could not be looked into. She has relied on State of Punjab Vs. Iqbal Singh and Others (1991) 3 SCC 1 to support her plea that a presumption had advisedly been raised against an accused in an offence relating to abetment of suicide in view of the malaise of dowry which had afflicted 5 Indian society and if this gross social evil had to be curbed, the court must also lend a helping hand. 6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. The fact that three of the accused have been acquitted and that no appeal against their acquittal has been filed is admitted on record. It is also clear from the impugned judgments that the courts have relied heavily on the letter Exhibit P-20 to support the finding of conviction against the appellant. This letter was sought to be proved in evidence by PW-11 Ram Prasad, the father of the deceased, to whom it had been addressed. This is what he had to say in his examination in chief by way of its proof : "I had received letter of threat from accused Anand Kumar on 27.02.86 through Peon Achchhe Lal and that letter is exhibit P20. He had raised the demand for radio, watch, cycle and fan through that letter, at the time of gauna, I had given him watch, radio, cycle and fan as demanded in the letter." 7. We are of the opinion that this excerpt from his evidence cannot be said to be proof of the document as no statement was made that he recognized the handwriting or the signature of the appellant. Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for Dowry. 8. Faced with this situation, Ms. Makhija has pointed out that even if this letter was ignored, the other evidence against the appellant was sufficient to maintain his conviction. She has, in particular, relied on the evidence of Arun Kumar Mishra, the brother of the deceased PW-1, a friend of the deceased Sudha Tripathi PW-8, her father Ram Prasad PW-11, and Brij Kumari PW-

17 Karuna's Sister-in-law to submit that their evidence conclusively spelt out the prosecution's case. 7 We, however, find from a reading of the testimonies of these witnesses that the problem, if any, lay with Karuna's mother- in-law Ramdulari and she and nobody else was the villain and general allegations with regard to the other accused find mention only in the statement of Ram Prasad. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in this background and keeping in view of the fact that Ramdulari has been acquitted, it would not be possible to maintain the conviction of the appellant on the basis of this evidence. 9. Ms. Makhija has then placed reliance on the presumption raised in a case of abetment of suicide by a married woman, as envisaged under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act to contend that the onus lay on the accused to prove his innocence. She has in this connection referred us to Iqbal Singh's case (Supra) to emphasize that the legislative intent in the introduction of Sections 113-A and 113-B of the Evidence Act was to strengthen "the Prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are established and the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of marriage." She has accordingly 8 submitted that in the light of this presumption it was for the accused to prove that nothing amiss had happened at their instance. 10. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid provisions do raise a presumption but the facts of the case cannot be ignored. The different terminology of Sections 113-A and 113-B itself brings out the real purpose behind the two provisions and whereas Section 113-B places a heavier onus on an accused, the onus placed under Section 113-A is far lighter. We reproduce the two Sections hereunder to focus on this distinction: "113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetment by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. 113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. " 11. A comparative reading of the two provisions (particularly the underlined portions) would highlight that under Section 113-A the Court `may presume', having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, an abetment of suicide as visualized by Section 306 of the IPC but in Section 113-B which is relatable to Section 304-B the word `may' has been substituted by `shall' and there is no reference to the circumstances of the case. Admittedly, the conviction of the appellant has been recorded under Section 306 which is relatable to Section 113-A and though the presumption against an accused has to be raised therein as well, the onus is not as heavy as in the case of a dowry death. In this background, Ms. Makhija's arguments that the onus shifts 10 exclusively and heavily on an accused in such cases is not entirely correct and in the background of sketchy ocular evidence and the additional fact that the dying declaration recorded by the Naib Tehsildar completely exonerates all the accused of any misconduct, clearly dispels any suspicion with regard to their involvement in this unfortunate incident. 12. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgments and direct that the Appellant be released forthwith, if not already on bail.

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probat section 21 disqualification corruption act probation of offender section 18 section 404 surety bond

Central Government Act

The Probation Of Offenders Act, 1958
THE PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT, 1958 ACT NO. 20 OF 1958AAN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RELEASE OF OFFENDERS ON PROBATION OR AFTERDUE ADMONIT [ 16th May, 1958.]

1. Short title extent and commencement. (1) This Act may be called the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 . (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. (3) It shall come into force in a State on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different parts of the State. 2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a) " Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898 ); (b) " probation officer" means an officer appointed to be a probation officer or recognised as such under section 13; (c) " prescribed" means prescribed by rules made under this Act; (d) words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898 ). shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. 3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition. When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section 380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 .) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then. notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release him after due admonition.
1. Madras (1. 12. 62) Vide Home Dept. No. G. O. MS No. 3698, dt. 2. 11. 62. Amended in Maharashtra by Mah. Act 31 of 1969. Extended to and brought into force in Dadra and Nagar Haveli (w. e. f. 1. 7. 65) by Reg. 6 of 1963, s. 2 and Sch. I. Extended to the Union territory of Pondicherry by Act 26 of 1968, S. 3 and Schedule. Extended to Goa, Daman and Diu by Reg. 11 of 1973, s. 3 and Sch.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this section or section 4. 4. Power of court to release certain officers on probation of good conduct.

(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under sub- section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3) When an order under sub- section (1) is made, the court may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems necessary for the due supervision of the offender. (4) The court making a supervision order under sub- section (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified in such order and such additional conditions with respect to residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider fit to impose for preventing a

repetition of the same offence or a commission of other offences by the offender. (5) The court making a supervision order under sub- section (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation officer concerned. 5. Power of court to require released offenders to pay compensation and costs. (1) The Court directing the release of an offender under section 3 or section 4, may, if it thinks fit, make at the same time a further order directing him to pay(a) such compensation as the court thinks reasonable for loss or injury caused to any person by the commission of the offence; and (b) such costs of the proceedings as the court thinks reasonable. (2) The amount ordered to be paid under sub- section (1) may be recovered as a fine in accordance with the provisions of sections 386 and 387 of the Code. (3) A civil court trying any suit, arising out of the same matter for which the offender is prosecuted, shall take into account any amount paid or recovered as compensation under sub- section (1) in awarding damages. 6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty- one years of age. (1) When any person under twenty- one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprison- ment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the court passes any

sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so. (2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in subsection (1), the court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender. 7. Report of probation officer to be confidential. The report of a probation officer referred to in sub- section (2) of section 4 or subsection (2) of section 6 shall be treated as confidential: Provided that the court may, if it so thinks fit, communicate the substance thereof to the offender and may give him an opportunity of producing such evidence as may be relevant to the matter stated in the report. 8. Variation of conditions of probation. (1) If, on the application of a probation officer, any court which passes an order under section 4 in respect of an offender is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and the public it is expedient or necessary to vary the conditions of any bond entered into by the offender, it may, at any time during the period when the bond is effective, vary the bond by extending or diminishing the duration thereof so, however, that it shall not exceed three years from the date of the original order or by altering the conditions thereof or by inserting additional conditions therein: Provided that no such variation shall be made without giving the offender and the surety or sureties mentioned in the bond an opportunity of being heard. (2) If any surety refuses to consent to any variation proposed to be made under sub- section (1), the court may require the offender to enter into a fresh bond and if the offender refuses or fails to do so, the court may sentence him for the offence of which he was found guilty.

(3) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, the court which passes an order under section 4 in respect of an offender may, if it is satisfied on an application made by the probation officer, that the conduct of the offender has been such as to make it unnecessary that he should be kept any longer under supervision, discharge the bond or bonds entered into by him. 9. Procedure in case of offender failing to observe conditions of bond. (1) If the court which passes an order under section 4 in res- pect of an offender or any court which could have dealt with the offender in respect of his original offence has reason to believe, on the report of a probation officer or otherwise, that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of the bond or bonds entered into by him, it may issue a warrant for his arrest or may, if it thinks fit, issue a summons to him and his sureties, if any, requiring him or them to attend before it at such time as may be specified in the summons. (2) The court before which an offender is so brought or appears may either remand him to custody until the case is concluded or it may grant him bail, with or without surety, to appear on the date which it may fix for hearing. (3) If the court, after hearing the case, is satisfied that the offender has failed to observe any of the conditions of the bond or bonds entered into by him, it may forthwith(a) sentence him for the original offence; or (b) where the failure is for the first time, then, without prejudice to the continuance in force of the bond, impose upon him a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees. (4) If a penalty imposed under clause (b) of sub- section (3) is not paid within such period as the court may fix, the court may sentence the offender for the original offence.

10. Provision as to sureties. The provisions of sections 122, 126, 126A, 406A, 514, 514A, 514B and 515 of the Code shall, so far as may be, apply in the case of bonds and sureties given under this Act. 11. Courts competent to make order under the Act, appeal and revision and powers of courts in appeal and revision. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, an order under this Act may be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender to imprisonment and also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, where an order under section 3 or section 4 is made by any court trying the offender (other than a High Court), an appeal shall lie to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court. (3) In any case where any person under twenty- one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence and the court by which he is found guilty declines to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and passes against him any sentence of imprisonment with or without fine from which no appeal lies or is preferred, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law, the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the sentences of the former court may, either of its own motion or on an application made to it by the convicted person or the probation officer, call for and examine the record of the case and pass such order thereon as it thinks fit. (4) When an order has been made under section 3 or section 4 in respect of an offender, the Appellate Court or the High Court in the exercise of its power of revision may set aside such order and in lieu thereof pass sentence on such offender according to law: Provided that the Appellate Court or the High Court in revision shall not inflict a greater punishment than might have been inflicted by the court by which the offender was found guilty.

12. Removal of disqualification attaching to conviction. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, a person found guilty of an offence and dealt with under the provisions of section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence under such law: Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a person who, after his release under section 4, is subsequently sentenced for the original offence. 13. Probation officers. (1) A probation officer under this Act shall be(a) a person appointed to be a probation officer by the State Government or recognised as such by the State. Govern- ment; or (b) a person provided for this purpose by a society recognised in this behalf by the State Government; or (c) in any exceptional case, any other person who, in the opinion of the court, is fit to act as a probation officer in the special circumstances of the case. (2) A court which passes an order under section 4 or the district magistrate of the district in which the offender for the time being resides may, at any time, appoint any probation officer in the place of the person named in the supervision order. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, a presidency town shall be deemed to be a district and chief presidency magistrate shall be deemed to be the district magistrate of that district. (3) A probation officer, in the exercise of his duties under this Act, shall be subject to the control of the district magistrate of the district in which the offender for the time being resides. 14. Duties of probation officers. A probation officer shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions, as may be prescribed,-

(a) inquire, in accordance with any directions of a court, into the circumstances or home surroundings of any person accused of an offence with a view to assist the court in determining the most suitable method of dealing with him and submit reports to the court; (b) supervise probationers and other persons placed under his supervision and, where necessary, endeavour to find them suitable employment; (c) advise and assist offenders in the payment of compensa- tion or costs ordered by the court; (d) advise and assist, in such cases and in such manner as may be prescribed, persons who have been released under sec- tion 4; and (e) perform such other duties as may be prescribed. 15. Probation officers to be public servants. Every probation officer and every other officer appointed in pursuance of this Act shall, be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860 ). 16. Protection of action taken in good faith. No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the State Government or any probation officer or any other officer appointed under this Act in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder. 17. Power to make rules. (1) The State Government may, with the approval of the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:-

(a) appointment of probation officers, the terms and conditions of their service and the area within which they are to exercise jurisdiction; (b) duties of probation officers under this Act and the submission of reports by them; (c) the conditions on which societies may be recognised for the purposes of clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 13; (d) the payment of remuneration and expenses to probation officers or of a subsidy to any society which provides probation officers; and (e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed. (3) All rules made under this section shall be subject to the condition of previous publication and shall, as soon as may be after they are made, be laid before the State Legislature. 18. Saving of operation of certain enactments. Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of section 31 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897 (8 of 1897 ), or sub- section (2) of section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947 ), 1[ , or of any law in force in any State relating to juvenile offenders or borstal schools. 19. Section 562 of the Code not to apply in certain areas. Subject to the provisions of section 18, section 562 of the Code shall cease to apply to the States or parts thereof in which this Act is brought into force.
1. Omitted by Act 46 of 1978, s. 2O (w. e. f. 2. 10. 1979 ).

Hi, One of my friend working in Central Government was booked by CBI under Anti corruption Act and convicted in a criminal court. On the basis of criminal conviction, he was dismissed from the government service. On Appeal, Hon'ble High Court acquitted him on merit. Since the conviction order of lower court was set aside, Government Servant approached the Head of the Department for re-instatement. The Head of the Department, instead of reinstating him, issued Show Cause Notice to reject his request of reinstatement on the grounds that CBI is going to file an SLP before Supreme Court. As on date, the appeal period against HC order is over. There is no stay agaisnt HC order. The Coviction is set aside and the officer is innocent before law. Merely prefering appeal with Higher forum will not stop reinstatement. In this regard, I would like to know whether the action of Head of Department is amounting to Contempt of Court? Whether the action of Head of the Department is against the provisions of Article 311(2)(a)? Can anyone refer any relvant SC/HC ruling to claim reinstatement with backwages immediately. Krishnamoorthy.

Answer bu Harbhajan singh thukral when there is a criminal case filed on a set of circumstances and adomestic inquiry/ disciplinary proceedings are also initiated on exactly same set of circumstances, it is prudent that the disciplinary proceedings should be stayed but once a deliquent employee is acquitted in court of law it is not binding upon the department to absolve the employee of the charges. It can still hold a departmental inquiry but the factor of discharge in criminal case will be a point to consider in the proceedings. In your case there was no discilinary proceedigns conducted and your friend was dismissed on the basis of conviction in the criminal court which has been set aside . The department is bound to reinstate him in the job with full back wages and continuity of service. However if the department desires so it can initiate another departmental proceedings. But earlier order of dismissal san inquiry has been vitiated. You can file a writ petition in the High Court with an appropriate prayer . I will suggest further reading of judgment of SC Capt. M Paul Anthony vs . Bharat Gold Mines and Other 1999(1) LLJ 1094 In the cirucmstances explained above, I am of the opinion that it is not a contempt of court.

Supreme Court Judgments on IPC-498a

1 Satyajit Banerjee and others v. State of West Bengal and others (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 23/11/2004 Indian Penal Code, ss. 498A, 306 - Trial Court acquitted accused but High Court set aside acquittal and directed a de novo trial - Whether High Court right in directing examination of additional witnesses under s. 311 in revision?; whether direction of High Court to trial court to record further evidence and take a 'fresh decision from stage one' is without jurisdiction? - Held, direction for retrial should not be made in all or every case where acquittal of accused is for want of adequate or reliable evidence - Even if a retrial is directed in exercise of revisional powers by High Court, evidence already recorded at initial trial cannot be erased or wiped out from record of case - Trial Judge has to decide case on basis of evidence already on record and additional evidence which would be recorded on retrial - Clarified and reiterate that trial Judge, after retrial, shall take a decision on basis of entire evidence on record and strictly in accordance with law....

2 Ruchi Agarwal v. Amit Kumar Agrawal and Others (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 5/11/2004 Quashing of criminal complaint - Alleging offences under ss. 498A, 323 and 506 IPC, and ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act - Quashing on ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction - Whether quashing of criminal complaint sustainable? - Held, that appellant having received relief she wanted without contest on basis of terms of compromise, cannot now accept argument of appellant - Conduct of appellant indicates that criminal complaint from which this appeal arises was filed by wife only to harass respondents - It would be an abuse of process of court if criminal proceedings from which this appeal arises is allowed to continue....

3 Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 14/9/2004 Indian Penal Code. 1860, s.302 - duty of the prosecution to establish that the accused had or necessarily would have remained at the house around the time when the attack took place barring the evidence of PW8 who claimed to have seen the accused at 9.00 a.m. at his house, there is no other evidence to establish the presence of the accused in the house proximate to the time of occurrence - vital link in this behalf is missing in the case - no motive has been proved or seriously suggested for inflicting fatal injuries on the pregnant wife whom the accused married a year back - in a case based on circumstantial evidence, this factor also should be kept in view no reason to set aside findings of trial court - appeal allowed....

4 Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 17/8/2004 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 482 - Prayer for quashing proceedings - Single Judge of

the Madras High Court rejected prayer - Whether judgment of Single Judge sustainable? - Held, in factual scenario disclosed by complainant in complaint petition, inevitable conclusion is that no part of cause of action arose in Chennai and, therefore, concerned magistrate had no jurisdiction to deal with matter - Proceedings are quashed....

5 Sushil Kumar v. State of Haryana (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 10/8/2004 Indian Penal Code, ss. 304B, 498A - Conviction - Appeal against conviction - Whether conviction sustainable? - Held in absence of any evidence to show that victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before death, no offence under s. 304B is made out - Absolutely no evidence of coercion, conviction under s. 498A becomes unwarranted - Convictions and sentences of appellant set aside...

6 Sakatar Singh and Others v. State of Haryana (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 13/4/2004 IPC, ss.306, 498A r/w s.34 - Prosecution has not established allegation of demand - Based on erroneous inferences drawn on unproved facts and placing reliance on statements of interested witnesses trial court came to a wrong conclusion as to guilt of accused persons - High Court failed to notice its legal responsibility of discussing evidence independently and recording its findings on basis of such independent assessment of its own, because it is first court of appeal on facts - Appeal allowed...

7 The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa and Another (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 17/3/2004 IPC, 1860, ss. 304 B and 498 A and IEA, 1872, s. 113 B - conjoint reading shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment - prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the 'death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances' - _expression 'soon before' is very relevant - prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates -'Soon before' is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no strait-jacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence - hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act - held on facts that in view of the death occurring within the very few months of the marriage, and the evidence of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 6 that shortly before the deceased committed suicide, demand of dowry was made, the plea in untenable. The accusations clearly stand established so far as A-1, respondent no.1 is concerned. So far as accused A-3 is concerned, there is no evidence that he ever made any demand of dowry -- custodial sentence of 7 years would meet the end of justice for respondent no.1 - appeal partly allowed....

8 Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 26/2/2004 [A] Advocates & Judges - judgments of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court - constrained to observe that the High Court while disposing of the appeal did not even apply its mind to the facts of the case - disturbing feature noticed by us is that the High Court merely repeated paragraphs after paragraphs from the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge as if those conclusions were its own, reached on an appreciation of the evidence on record - many of the paragraphs are word from word borrowed from the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge without acknowledging that fact - practice deprecated. [B] Deceased committing suicide within seven years of marriage - held, under Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act - prosecution has first to establish that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband (in this case) had subjected her to cruelty - even if these facts are established the Court is not bound to presume that the suicide had been abetted by her husband - section gives a discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case - allegation is of cruelty, nature of cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the meaning of word cruelty in Section 498-A I.P.C. to be considered - no automatic presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband - held on facts, offence under s.306 not made out conviction under s.498A ordered....

9 Nallam Veera Stayanandam and Others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 24/2/2004 Two dying declarations - if the first is accepted all other evidence led by the prosecution would not help the prosecution to establish a case under section 304B IPC because of the fact that even a married woman harassed by demand for dowry may meet with an accident and suffer a death which is unrelated to such harassment - it is for the defence to satisfy the court that irrespective of the prosecution case in regard to the dowry demand and harassment, the death of the deceased has not occurred because of that and the same resulted from a cause totally alien to such dowry demand or harassment - deceased died within 3 years of her marriage - presumption under section 113B of the Evidence Act is available to the prosecution, - first dying declaration accepted - presumption stands rebutted - unless the prosecution is able to establish that the cause of death was not accidental by evidence other than the dying declarations, the prosecution case under section 304B IPC as against the appellants must fail - on facts convicted under s.498A, IPC....

10 Rishi Anand and another v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi and others (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 20/3/2002 The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellant as there were no allegations, much less of specific nature, even to remotely connect the appellant with the alleged offence under Section 406 IPC.

11 Baburam v. State of Madhya Pradesh (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 29/1/2002 It is extremely dangerous to rely upon the prosecution evidence to base a conviction against the appellant when the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and when there is no motive whatsoever for the appellant to have caused the death or abetted the suicide of the deceased because she failed to bring in sufficient dowry....

12 Satvir Singh and otherswith Tejinder Pal Kaur v. State of Punjab and another (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 27/9/2001 Under Section 304 B, it is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, but it should have happened .

13 G. Raj Mallaiah and Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) Date of Judgment : 27/4/1995 JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T S. Rajendra Babu, J. Leave granted. The appellants were chargesheeted for offences arising under Section 304 I.P.C. and Sect ion 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act read with section 498A, I.P.C. The allegation made in ... 14 CASE NO.:Appeal (civil) 877 of 2007 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/02/2007 PETITIONER:Smt. Mayadevi Vs. RESPONDENT:Jagdish Prasad JUDGMENT:J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) NO. 3686 OF 2006) Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short the 'Act'). Respondent filed an application for divorce on the ground of cruelty alleging that because of the acts of cruelty on several occasions perpetuated by the appellant, the respondent-husband was under apprehension that it would not be desirable and safe to stay with the appellant and to continue their marital relationships. [quote] the appellant used to make demands for money frequently and used to quarrel when money was not paid. She did not even provide food to her husband or the children and used to threaten the husband to falsely implicate him in a case of dowry demand and to kill the children and to put the blame on the respondent-husband and his family members.[quote]