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CON F IDE T I A L
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
AFO 235
28 July 1945
SUBJECT: Action Report - 96th Infantry Division.
TO See Distribution.
1. Enclosed Operation Report, 96th Division, gives a factual picture
of the Division's operations in the RYUKYUS Campaign.
2. In general the comments and recolmnendations of the Division Com
mander are considered sound. The following comments are made in clarification
or expansion:
a. Officer reclassification procedure throughout the entire current
emergency has left much to be desired. There is no questi0n but that in
combat the word of the commander must be final and procedure should be de
signed to get the officer out of the command immediately.,
b. The degree of success attained by l!'ar dogs in u:li ts of this
Corps through two caIT'.paie;ns has been extremely di sa1Jpointinr-; insofar as their
use for scouting is concernec", It is whether or not this is inherent
in the dog or i:1 the trainmg cf t
1
'e dog ::md his handler in those units
attached to the C:>rps.
c. T
l
18 cfmcly as saul t ration used by units of th is command in two
campaigns has proved of alnost YlO value. It is recoITU--r;.ended that it be dis
continued. Current rations throughout any active cam;:>aign should be supple
mented by additional allowancE's of larri, flower. salt, baking powder, milk
and yeast. 'Jih2re they are available in ample quantity experience shows that
the soldiers arG w2ll satisfied with what they get to eat.
d. The matter of ordrwnce maintenance within the division has be
come critical. The light ordnance maintenance company is not capable of meet
ing even a percentage of needs in the modern division. The lack of
backinG up ordnance support is a factor in this need. It is urgently recom
mended thl},t e division ordnance com:nany be increased to the approximate
capaci ty of' 8. l'1ndi"'lm maintenance company. This headquarters has previously
rec::lluJ11ended aoo.ptai. ion of ti'le Cavalry Division Ordnance Yaintenance Company
fOj: the Infantry Division.
e. The eatter of the superiority of Japanese smokeless powders
over that to our OVin units is believed to be a fallacy. although the
bdie!' of t
'
1C so Idier in that superiority is extcClsivc. This is a r.orals
fp,ctor to thl: that definite educational mco.sures are being t8.kon in
thls comrcand to counteract the alleged defiCiency of our ovm powders.
1

l
c
------------
------------
CON F IDE N T I A L
3. Vany recommendations made in this report including proposed changes
in tables of organization and equipment are now under study in this head
quarters. Recommendations will be submitted by separate letter.
FOR THE C01Vl,u,}.J"DING GENERAL:
DIS THIBn TI ON:
"X"
2
CON F IDE N T I A L
CONTENTS


THE MISSION
Mission

THE TASK FORCTi; ORG,JHZ:.TION
Overall Comme.nd
96th Inf Div Tusk Force
Rcccrd of Attached Units
PRELnUNll.RY PLlJ'lNING
Plannin!3 Mcmor ..mdct
OPERJ'.TIONS, G-J
Tho T::lCticnl Plo.n
Artillery
Nwnl Gunfire
Air
Il.mphibiolls Tanks
Lnnd Tanks
4.2" Chcmicctl I',ortnrs
Tho Lc1.nding DiQ.grc.'Jn
LST LOQ.ding Plnn
NLUnbcrs
Fin8.l Order Issued
Corrununicaticns
Information and Educntion
PERSONNEL, G-l
IN'IELLIGENCE, G-2
The Vinr Room
ADMINISTRATIVE PL;\NNING, G-4
ShippinC j. ssi01Incnt
Lnndinc Ships
Logbtics
Prc-Low.led Supply DUK1Ns
Trnnsport Quc\rtormi1.stor
TQM School
WhDING AND EilffiARKilTION
Cnrgo i.:nd Equipment Loading
Po.llctizinc
Loo.dine Fncilities
Time Required for "Over Beach"
I
II
III.
IV
Londing
Pnge
1
2
1
2
5
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
6
7
B
8
8
9
9
9
10
10
10
1.
2
2
3
Difficulties nnd Suggested Remedies
-i
3
m
v
l'
I
Page I
[
TRAINING AND REI!E,\RSAL
Training 1
Comments
Schouls
1
Training Period Short
1
Rehearsal 2
Exorcise No.1 2
Exercise No.2
3
3
VI
MOVEMENT TO AND MillIVII.L I.T
Target Information Program 1
Comments 2
VII

NARR.'.l'IVE OF THE ASSAULT

PART I - THE L'I.NDING i,ND I.DVANCE TO KJ,K>\ZU RIDGE, 1-16 APRIL
3
Storm Ashore Without Opposition
3
Advance RnpicUy Scatterod Japs
5
Corps Beachhead Line Secure 6
Begin New Drive South
7
Resistance Stiffens
7
Enemy Stronp;points Crumble 8
Main Defcnsos Reached
9
Advances Hesult in High Casualties 10
J aps Repulse Ki.KAZU RIDGE Attack 10
Strong Assault Launched on KAKAZU 11
Assaults Continue 13
Jap Positions Softenod by Fire
13
Japs Launch Night Offensive 14

ReorGl..I.nize For Further ;l.ttack 14

Summnry
15
P;.RT II - 1I.SS.:I.ULT OF T;I.W,B;,RU fi.ND IiL'.ED;. 17-30 ;,pril 17
Attack Plans Completed 18
Corps Launches Attack 18
Japs Defond Bitterly
19
Advances Were Slow 20
J ap Defenses Weaken 21
Defensivo Line Srokon 22
Sumunry 22
The Enemy Vlithdrnwn
23
Attack Plnns Propnrcd
24
The Atto.ck
24
Enemy Resistance Stiffens
25
Japs Fight 26
307th Inf Relieves 3i3lst Inf
27
77th Inf Div Tnkes Over
27
Summary 28
-ii
be ....
29
,
VII - Continued
Page
Pl,RT III - ASSAULT OF CONIC;,L-OBOE HILL !',HE:" 1-311v=;,Y

From FiGhtinG to Tro.ining
Bo.ck in the Line
Division Prepares for Offensive
Drive for CONICAL HILL
Japs Repulse Our DICK HILL Attnck
North Slopes of CONIC;,L Secured
Japs Reinforce DICK HILL
DICK HILL Fino.11y Reached
Rain Delays l.dvo.nce
381st Committed
Pntrols R03ch YONABARU
The Rains Came
J o.ps Resist Bitterly
Division Renows Attack
Heo.vy =1ains Halt Advances
SHURI Defenses Broken
Jo.p Resistance Vanishes
Summo.ry
P,\HT IV - PURSUIT OF A RETREATING ENEMY,
Divisicn J',ssiCnod New Zone
Enemy llesistnnce
DouC;hboys :,dvClnco Despito Rnins
Eneny Rcsisto.nce Increases
Japs Finol Position Re['.ched
Po.tro1s Probo Final Dcfenses
Enemy Positions Pounded
Swnmary
29
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
35
36
37
38
38
39
40
41
42
43
1-9 JUNE 44
44
44
45
45
46
47
47
47
PAitT V - I1EDUCTION OF LAST ENELY DEFENffii; LINE, 10-22 JUNE 49
Division ,"tto.cks Its Third Escarpment
49
Terrain .:md J aps Ho.1t Advonccs 50
DvuChboys Sco.le Escarpment 51
Bitter Fighting Ensues 52
Esc['.rpnent Defenses Crumble 52
Reach Last Enemy Penk
53
382d Inf J\.clievos 383d Inf
54
Final Dofense Line Shattered
55
Larce-Sca10 Mop Up Underway
56
382d Inf C1eo.ns Out Aragachi 56
381st Inf Cleans Out Medoera
56
305th Inf Mnke3 Final Attack
57
Smnmary
57
PJ,TIT VI - MOP-UP OPERATIONS, 23-30 JUNE
59
-iii
r
THE ENEHY ON OKINAWA
PJ.RT I - 1-16 APRIL
Jnp :ttesistancc Reaches Peak
"Launch All Out Attack Tonight"
II - 17-30 APRIL
First Defense Line Relinquished
J nps lq;r'.in Take to Offensive
P;,RT III - 1-31'1IAY
CONICAL HILL, Key To Defenses
P,'cRT IV - 1-,30 JUNE
Final Nensures Fail
Summary
EEPlDTIIiENT OF ENEI.:.Y :,ltTll,LERY
ENEMY TACTICS
IX
OfERATIONAL DURING THE ASSAULT
SHOflE fARTY
Cloarnnce of Boaches and Dump Control
Conmunication and Control
Careo Eovement Inland
Losses and DamaGe
Adequacy of UnloadinG Fncilities
Use of Slin[:s
Nl.VAL GUNFIllE SUPPORT
Control
and Harassing Fire
NGF Support for 96th Div
Comments and ltccomncndations
AIR SUPPOrtT
Pre-Inv3.sion Support
Close Support
MarkinG Tarcets
Bonb Loads
Coordination with i"rtillery IJnv(:l Gunfire
hccof.lIncndations
ARTILlERY SUPfORT
orgl1nizc:.t ion
rreini'orcinc i"rtillory
Tanks and AM, as Artillery
-iv-
VIII
Page
1
1
2
2
.3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
9
1
1
1
2
2

2
,3
.3
.3
4
4
4
5
-5
6
6
7
7
8
8
8
8
9
IX - Continued
Page
OFERI.TION",L FEi.TURES DUllING THE l'.SSl.ULT - Continued
AI1TIUERY SUPPORT - Continued
iunphibious Tnnk Bnttorios 9
Coordination of I.rtillery Fires 9
Night Firos
10
Adjustments
10
Linison PInnas
10
Fatrolling
10
Difficulties II
Comments
11
L.NKS
II
Operntions
11
Liaison
12
Supply
12
Comment s 13
INFi.NTRY CClvU3i.T 13
Destruction of CClves 13
Vhw Difficult 14
Recoilless WeClpons 15
CHf.PLiiIN ACTIVIT:IES 15
COlvlMUNIClSIONS
16
Radio
16
Friendly Interference Severo 16
Wire 16
Sigrwl Supply 17
Signnl Mclintenanco 17
ENGllJEE.1l. OPER.'.TIONS 18
By-Pnssos Constructod 18
Japs Scnttered Mines 18
MEDICi.L 19
Supply [end Equipmont 19
Evacuation and Treatment 20
i1apid Evacuation 20
11'Ihole Blood Used 21
PERSOHNEL, G-l 21
Strongth 21
Rop1ucor.lcnt s 22
Prior Duty Desirable
23
TDR&lI. 23
Emer,r:ency Furloughs
23
Reclassification 25
Promotions 25
Awards [\nd Docorations
25
Courts I.Iartial 25
Recreation and Morale 26
-v
IX - Cont.1.nucd
Page
OPEil.i"TIONAL FEJ.'ruRES DURING THE ASSAULT - Continued
GRAVES REGISTRATION
26
INTELLIGENCE
26
l40th PI Tenm
26
38th JOB Tcrun
27
3l4th Intelligencc Detachment
27
96th CIC Detachment
27
Map Supply
28
SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS
28
Class I
28
Class II
28
Class III
29
Class IV
29
Class V
29
Reloaded DUKTlls Useful
29
Division Guards Organizational Equipment
30
Rains Require Emercency 1.feasures
30
Salvar,e Drive Successful
30
PUBLI C nEllTIONS
31
War Correspondents
31
Coverage of Correspondents
31
Home-town Coverage
32
lliI.NDLING OF CIVILIANS
32
Collection
32
Evacuation
33
Control
33
Supply
33
Use of Civilians
33
INFOill.f.ATION-EDUC;.TION IN COHBAT
33
Division Newspaper
33
I & E for Reserve Units
34
Orientation of Replacements
34
Comments
35
SPECIAL SERVICE
35
Music[1l Entertainment
35
Motion Pictures
35
Reading Matter
36
Athletics
36
Miscellaneous Activities
36
RED CROSS ACTIVITlES
36
Coffee and Doughnuts Daily
37
-vi
x
ESTllEATED HESULTS OF OPERJl.TIONS
Area Secured 1
Enemy Casualties 1
DamaGo to the 1
Ovm Losses 2
XI
COMMENTS AND HECOMJlENDh.TIGN3 OF THE DIVISION COl'MM;r)ER
PERSONNEL, G-l
1
Replacements 1
Evacuation Reports 1
Promotions 1
Officer Reclassification 2
Death Notification 2
Awnrds and Decorntions 2
Physically Unfit 2
Combat Fatigue 2
Postal Service 2
INTELLIGENCE, G-2 2
Screening Civilians 2
Division Needs Pictures
3
Public Relations
3
OPERi,TIONS, G-3
3
Coordim.tion of Supporting Fi.;.:'os
3
Air
3
Marking Air Tnrgets
3
Naval Gunfire
4
Artillery
4
TMks
5
tiop-Up ,\ctivities
5
Time of ll.tt['.ck 6
Rolief of ;.ssault Troops 6
Attack uf Fortified Rid[es 6
Destroying Cavos 6
Night J,ttacks Fensible
6
Enemy 'l.ttacks
7
4.2" Chemical Nortars
7
7
Conmunication
We'..r Doc;s
8
SUFPIX, G-4 8
Ro.tions
8
Clothing
8
8
Equipping Replacements
Boor
9
Typewriter Repair
9
Ordnance MC'.intenance
9
Chemical Supply
10
Smokeless Powdor
10
-vii
)q - Continuod
Page
COMlvrENTS AND RECOMNIEND".l'IONS OF THE DIVISION CC:VlliIlh.NmB, ... Continued
SUPPLY, G-4 - ContinueQ
Engineer Equipment
10
More Personnul Needed
10
Wnter Supply
11
Signnl Equipment
11
Medicnl
11
ShippinG
12
GENERL.L
12
Periodic Reports
12
Publicity
12
Facing
Map No. Page Chapte;:
1. Preferred an Alternate Plans 2 III
2
2. Narrative VII
3. Situation Map, PART I 6 Von
4. Assault on KARAZU Ridge 10 Von
5. Approaches Ridge 12 VII
6. Situation Map, PART II 18 VII
7. Breaking Defenses 20 VII
8. Action Against MAEDA 'Sscarpment 24 VII
9. Situation Map, PART III 30 VII
10. Relief of 7th Inf Div Between 30 & 31 VII
11. Capture of CONICAL-DICK Hills 32 VII
12 Assault J1Gainst SUGAR-OBOE Hills 33 VII
13. SHURI Defenses Broken 40 VII
14. Situation Map, PART N
45
VII
15. Situation Map, PART V 50 VII
16. Operaticns 58 VII
17. J2nd General Defense Plan
1 VIII
18. Disposition of 63rd Brigade Prior to
Attack by XXN Corps
3
VIII
19. Artillery Plan 7 VIII
FIGURES
Facing
Fig. No. _Page Chapter
1. Beach Plan of Supply Dumps On 4 T!I
2. The Seawall 4 VII
3. Troops storm Ashore 4 VII
4. KAKt.ZU Ridge 10 VII
5. TANABARU-IHSH1J3iffiU Ridge 22 VII
6. MAED11 Escarpment 22 VII
7. Approaches to CONICAL Hill Between 32 & 33 VII
8. West Slopes of CONICAL Hill Between 32 & 33 VII
9. South Slopes of CHARLIE Hill Between 32 &33 VII
10. SHURI Defense Area 34 VII
11. The Farlous CONICAL Hill 34 VII
12. Approaches to LOVE Hill 34 VII
13. Looking Forward to DICK Hill 36 VII
14. Looking Back on DICK Hill )6 VII
15. Last SHURI Defense Line 36 VII
16. The YUZ,A-UEJU Escarpment 52 VII
17. Tank-Inf Action !lTear YUZA 54 VII
18. lP.st Defensive Line Taken 56 VII
19. Recoilless Weapons 56 VII
20. 47mm AT--Oun'Empiacement.. FollOWing 10 VIII
21.. 47mm Gun Emplacement Following 10 VIII
22. 47mm AT Gun Emplacement Following 10 VIII
23. 47mm AT Gun Emplacement Following 10 VIII
24. 47mm AT Gun Emplacement Following 10 VI!I
25. Pillbox Following 10 VIII
26. Pillbox Following 10 VIII
27. HNG Position Following 10 VIII
28. MG Position Following 10 VIII
-ix
FIGtIRES - C ont inued
. Paning
Fig . 1 i . o ~
Page Chapter
29. ' MG Position
30. The Reef
31.
~ i t e Beach 1 Transfer Point
32.
Constructing a Causeway
33.
The 4.2 Mortar
34.
Liquid Lite
35.
},merlcan & Japanese Cas
1
1alties
36.
Casualties by Type
37. Casualties by Branch
38. Battle Losses
Following 10
2
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
Following 2
Following 2.
Following 2.
VIII
II
IX
IX
IX
IX
X
X
X
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MISSION
PURPOSE

It vn:s on Easter morning, 1 April 1945, that veteran "Deadeyes" of
the 96th Inf Div entered into their second 2.ction against the enemy after
8n unopposed landing on the western shores of Ol(INATfjA. The "unopposed"
2dvances came to a quick end, however, and for the balance of the 91-day
operation doughboys of the "96th" met some of the strongest enemy oppo
sition and engc:tged in the heaviest and most prolonged fighting yet
encountered in the Pacific then.ter.
The Div's first action agc:\inst the J:::panese CClr.1e on 20 October 1944
when it stormed ashore across the sandy beaches of LEYTE, near DULAG, as
a part of the first attack force to land in the Philippin'3 Islands.
Considerable experience, fortitude, morale and fighting spirit,
such as com only come from actual combat, were instilled in the soldiers
of the 96th Inf Div during the 115 deWS of combat on LEYTE. They had
met the Jap soldier, they had seen how he fought and what he had to
fight with, and they had overcome him quite easily in every engagenent.
VJhile still engaged in cleaning out and mopping up pockets of the
enemy on LEYTE, orders were received and planning began for the RYUKYUS
campaign. Again the 96th Inf Div was assigned a mission involving nn
asscmlt l(1.nding on Japanese-held beaches, and almost before the infcmtry
mnn had cle.:med the LEYT"S. mud from his rifle, he was rushed aboard ship
bound for OEINA' ,1\
Yission
All prep2rations for the RYULYUS campaign begcm in earnest on
8 February 1945 when the 96th Inf Div, as a part of XXIV CORPS and
TEKTH h.ffi,:Y, was assigned the mission to:
a. Land at 0830, 1 April 1945, on Beaches VJhite and Brown (near
SUNhBE) OKIFj.",A - See Map No.1), and defeat and destroy all
eneLW forces encountered in its zone of action.
b. Advance rapidly inland, capture the commanding hills along the
line SUl"ABE-SUKUGAWj, -HILL 102 (Til 8486-A, F) and seiz e the
western and northern crests of the hill mass south of the line
Sm:hBE-FUENZAN-KOZ!.:,. (TA 8786-T) in its zone of action.
c. Secure the objective line marh:ed L f 10 in its zone of action
at the earliest prilcticable time (See Map No.1), ilnd be pre
PQred to continue the attack to the south on Corps order.
D.. Promptly seize the river crossings imrnediately north and south
of CH1,TJ',N (Tl:\,s 8383-R, X and 8381-G, respectively).
e. Protoct the Corps right (south) flank.
f. Establish and Tll2.intain contact with 7th Inf Div on its left
(north) flank, coordinating with 7th Inf Div along progress
lines. (See FO 45, Hq XXIV Corps, 8 February 1945).
plans were completed and the loading of supplies 2nd equipment
began on 3 l:arch. By 14 IJarch, all troops were embarked and assault
units, in conjunction with the Navy, conducted two IMding rehearsals.
- 1

ncar VJ1TCAY, LEYTE bn 17 end 19 March. Last-minute loading was completed
on 24 Hnrch and on 25 March, 1STI s sailod for the target. The balance of
tho task force sailed from LEYTE on 27 March.
Purpose
The following report is a story of the events leading to the landings
on OKTIU::U, and of the drivo inland and south to the end of the island when
the encr.lY wns finC1.11y defeC1.ted "nel completely wiped out on 30 June 1945.
Tho human elements of the battle and stories of tho numerous heroic and
courngoous actions by snall units can only be told in much larger volume
thnn this. It is left to other pUblications to give these word pictures.
Tho facts from the official records are presented hero net only as an
officinl report, but also as C1. basis for such works.

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OVErUl.LL COLu :AND
96TH DIV TASK FORCE
RECORD 0:' ATTACHED mJITS
-
OVERALL COMMAND - RYUKYU CAMPAIGN
_ ......... -.-....... .
1
Cin PaA I
Fleet Adm Nimitz
'-_. I -
_"'_' ..... _...J___.__ ..._-_..... ,
Officer Comdg

(Com Fifth Fleet)
Adm Spruance
r----__ ._ ..
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Officer Comdg r Off icer Comdg
,
Joint Exped Force Exped Troops
_ J
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(Com Phib Pac) (Com Gen Ten)
Vice Adr.! Turner Lt Gen Buckner
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CTF 51 CTF 56
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Southern Attack Force
XXIV Corps
Rear Adm Hall
Lt Gen Hodge
TF 55
CTG 56.3
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'-----,--.---_. ...._.._.;
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96 Tnf Div
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Ma j Gen Bradley
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Trans I
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I 382 .
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........ ..
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Corps Res
-1
,22TH INF Dr!
TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION
RYUKYUS CM@AIGN
ReT 331 - Col M. E. Halloran
Commanding Officer
J31st Inf Co1 M. E. Halloran
1st Bn Lt Col J. C. Cassidy (until 2 June)
Maj V. N. Thompson
2d Bn .. Lt Col R. Graybill (unt il 8 May)
Maj L. C. Addy (until 20 June)
Mij H. H. Hewett Jr.
Jd Bn ..........................Lt Col D. A. Nolan Jr. (until 16 June)
Iviaj H. R. Miles
Co A, J2lst Med En
2d Plat, Co D, 32lst Med Bn w/
51st Port Surg Hosp atchd .Maj G. S.,Ortman (until
, Maj M.
W. Hillman
Co A, 32lst Engr En w/
:rTater Sect icn
Det 96th Sig Co
Det 96th CIC Team
36lst FA En VT/ ................. , Lt Col A. '!! . r.!aste-rs
1st Plat, 827th 'Amph Trk Co atchd
Co C, 519th MP Bn .................Lt J. Vi'. Stetzer
3try B, 435th AAA (AIT) Bn w/
Det Btry C, 294th f/L En atchd
(2 S/L Sec 14 EM, including 1
detector)
Btry A, 435th AAA (AW) Bn (T1)*
Am:ph Trac En . Lt Col F. B. Mann '
Det 59Jd JASCO
l70th Engr Bn ... Lt Col R. K. Barton Jr.
Co C, 83th :-;ml Wpns Bn w/ .
l/J Am Sec, 88th Cml Wpns Bn Hq .
.... 78Oth Amph Tk Bn (less Cos C, D) Lt Col T. r. Turner Jr.
vOos Band D, 76Jd Tk Bn
29Jd Port Co (For Ships Plat, re-.Capt F. F. Green
',.verted to 1122d Gp Hq on
landing)
P:'ov GR. Sect ion (J EM - 3008th
GR Plat; 12 EM - 3240th QM
Serv Co)
Photo Assignment Team, 32J5th Sig
Serv Dot
2d Sound Locator Team
3S2d Inf - Col rll. L. Dill
J32d Inf Col M. L. Dill
1st En . Lt Col C. '" Johnson
2d 'En ...... Lt Col C. D. Sterner
-2
Commanding Officer

Inf (Reinf) (Cont 'd)
3d Bn Lt Col J. R. Lewis (until 18 April)
Lt Col F. H. Hartline (until 30 April)
Maj J. H. stell
Co B, 321st Bn
Det 96thSig Co
Det 59Jd JASCO
Prov GR Sec (J EM - 3003th GR Plat;
12 EM - 3240th QM Serv Co)
Photo Assignment Team, J235th Sig
Serv Det
383 - Qo!-E. T. May
)83d Inf Regt ..........Col E. or. May (until 5 June)
Lt Col D. Ballard (until 14 June)
Lt Col J. M. Williams
1st Bn ....... Lt Col B. F. King (until 9 April)
. Maj K. w. Erickson (until 16 May)
Capt H. I. Young (until 18 May)
Lt Col G. A. Nelson (until 13 June)
Lt Col P. E. Clark
2d Bn ....Lt Col P. E. Clark (unti18 April)
Maj A. T. Thorsen (until 26 April)
Maj G. r'. Bucklin (until 9 May)
Capt J. A. McCaffrey (until 10 May)
Maj 1. Morris (until 18 May)
VB j G. E. Bucklin
3d Bn ........... Lt Col E. stare
Co C, J21st Med Bn
1st Plat, Co D, 321st Bn, wi
67th Port Surg Hasp atchd I,1aj N. Block (until 18
Capt E. l"eseott (until 21 l'Iay)
Maj f,. B. Goldstein
Co C, 321st Engr Bn, wi

Det 96th Sig Co
Det 96th eIC Team
921st FA Bn w/ ..............Lt Col P... R. Glenn
2d Plat, 827th Trk Co atchd
%th Div MP Plat .........Capt J. A. Kins ler
Btry D, 485th AAA (AV,') Bn, wi
Det Btry C, 294th S/L En, atchd
(2 S/L Sec 14 EM)
788th Amph Trae Bn ....... ? G. Hufford
Det 593d JASCO
174th Engr Bn ........Lt Col A. 1. Sweetland
Co B, 88th em1 Bn, wi
1/3 Am Sec 88th Oml Bn
Co C and D, 780th Amph Tk Bn, wi
Prov Bn Hq
Co C, 763d Tk Bn
204th Port Co (atchd for Plat: .
reverted to control of l122d r'ngr
Gp upon landing)
-3
Unit Comma.ndipg Officer
RCT 383 (Cont td
?rov GR Section (3 EM - 3008th GR
Plat; 12 EM - 3240th QM Serv Co)
Photo Assignment Team, 3235th Sig
Serv tet
Division Troops
Hq 96th Inf Div .Maj Gen J. L. Bradley
Hq &Hq Btry, 96th Div Arty Brig Gen R. G. Gard
362d FA Bn, atchd: ................Lt Col F. "'-. Jenkins
827th Amph Trk Co (-1st & 3d Lt M. Z. Brown
Plats)
363d FA Bn . Lt Col J. G. Hlavac
Hq Trs . Lt Co1 H. -q. Damisch
Hq Co, 96th Inf Div ..Capt J. P. Hecimovich
96th CO, atchd: ................Capt E. F. Mitchell
3240th QM Serv Co (less GR Capt J. M. Klaus
Secs) .
41st QM rog Plat . Lt H. H. Bucklin Jr.
1:'". Div GR Sec (less P..CT Dets) Lt B. Kline
3d Pl.D.t, 3008th QM GR Co Lt C. S. !\aeling
(less RCT Dets)
2d Sec, 2d r lat, 4342d QM Sup Co
796th Ord Co, atchd: ..............Capt "". A. Carlson (until 7 May)
Capt B. C. Boesser
632d Ord 1m Co ..Capt Allan - Lt Heidt
Det 196th Ord Depot Co .. Lt A. A. Meril
206th Bomb Disposal ':qd .... Lt O. B. Greenman
96th Sig Co, atchd: ................Capt A. Carpenter 1'1'.
Det lOlst Sig Bn (Radio Team)
3235th Sig Serve Dot (-RCT Lt F.. K. ,Tones
atchmts)
96th Div Band ..CWO O. ;r". Shetney
96th Ren Tr ....... ".Capt R. B. O'Neill
321st Engr Bn'(less Cos .A, C),atchd: Lt Col S. R. Kolloy (until 17 April)
'. MajE.J.. ,Martell
2d Plat, Depot .Co ;;Lt Slack
321st Med Bn (less Cos A,B,C,Djatchd:Lt Col G. B. Salter
31st Fld Hosp.......'......... '. ' Lt Col H. A. Rogan
l122d Engr Gp Hq f..: Hq Co (Shore' 'Col C. J. Douglas
Party), atchd:
170th (C) En (Al)*.......... Lt Col R. K. Barton .Tr.
174th Engr (C) Bn (A3)* Lt Col A. L. SVleet1and
173d Engr (C) Bn ..................Lt ColO. P. Gokay
474th Amph Trk Co .Capt D. P. Hill
204th Fort Co (A3)*
293d Port Co (Al)*Capt F. F. Green
504th AAA (Gun) Bn wi ................Lt Col J. B. McCumber
Tm 3, MAWS #8 atchd
-4
.!l!lll.
Comrnnnding O f f i c ~
12ivision Troops (Cont Cd)
485th AAA (AT,r) Bn (less Btrys B, D) Lt Col A. Garvey
atchd:
Btry C, 294th S/L En (-1 Plat, Capt H. S. HarleY
4 Secs &ROT atchmts)
33th Cml Wpns Bn (Mtz) (less Cos Maj G. A. Cain
A, B, C and J Aj',1 Sees)
593d JASCO (less CT atchmts) .. Maj F. 1. Duggan
763d Tk Bn (less Cos B, C, D) . Lt Col H. L. Edmonson (until 11 Yay)
Maj A. E. Lancaster
96th CIC (less CT atchmts) ..Capt F. L. Fernandez
222,d Censorship Det .... Lt J. P. Stevens
38th Order of Battle Team. Lt A. Marcus
l40th PI Team......Capt J. Krueger
3l4th Hq Intel Det 1'1/ Lt (jg) D. L. Keene (until 30 May)
Lt .A. 'F.. Beach
344th Interrogator Team
372d Interpreter Tearr
389th Translator Team
News Team B, 1st Info & Hist Unit .Capt L. K. Soth
Civilian Correspondents Gp
2212th POA TQM Tm ..................... Lt Col R. H. Billingsley
3d Plat, 3754th QM Trk Co (T7)*..... Lt R. Y!adlund
2d Plat, 244th Qr.! Depot Sup Co (T7)* Lt R. M. Heximer
2d Plat, 19lst QH Gas Sup Co (T7)* Lt R. H. Arnold
~ K i 1 Govt B.. 5 .. Lt Col 1". E. Anderson
8th G-IO Disp
~ 1 i 1 Govt A...6 .......................... Lt C omdr E. R. Mos sman
9th G-IO Disp
REcopn OF ATTACHED UNITS
units Permanently Attached
Date Atchd
763d Tk Bn 30 Nov 44
51st Port S'..:rg Hosp 30 Nov 44
CIC Det 30 Nov 44
140th PI Team 30 Nov 44
JOOSth QM GR Co (3d Plat) 7 Jan 45
67th Port Surg Hasp 28 Jan 45
1st Info and Hist SV (News Tm B) 12 Feb 45
41st QM War Log Plat 16 Feb 45
206th Ord Bomb r isp Squad 16 Feb 45
2212th POA TQM Team 27 Feb 45
314th Hq Intel Det 27 Feb 45
389th Translator Tm 27 Feb 45
372d Interpreter Tm 27 Feb 45
344th Interrogator Tm 27 Feb 45
3255th Sig Serv Det 1 Mar 45
38th Order of Battle Tm 9 Mar 45
2223d Censorship Det 2) Mar 45
-5..
Units Temporarily Prior to the Landing
Unit
-.
Hq & Hq Co, 1122d Engr Gp
170th EngI' Bn \
173d Engr Bn
174th Engr Bn
504th AM (Gun) En
485th AM (AW) Bn
Btry C, 294th SL Bn (-1 Plat)
Co C, 519th NIP Bn
6)2d Ord Am Co
Det 196tb Ord Depot Co
474th Amph Trk Co
204th Port Co
293d Port Co
3240th QM Serv Co
31st FId Hosp .
593d JASCO .
827th Amph Trk Co
88th Cml Bn (-Co A and 1 Am Sse,
En Hq Co)
Co B
Remainder of Bn
Co C, 88th ::;ml Bn, rua,tached on
1088th Engr Depot Co (2d Plat)
2d Plat, 191st QM Gas Sup Co
2d Plat, 244th QM Dep Sup Co
3d Plat, 3754th QM Trk Co
:.780th !mph Tk Bn
728th Amph True Bn
788th Jimph Tree Bn
Mi11,ary Affairs (Unit A-6)
Mod Dlsp for Unit 11-6 (Unit G-lO) #8
Mil Govt (Unit B-5)
Med Disp for Unit B-5 (Unit G-IO) #9
2d Sound Locator Team
Date Atchd
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
23 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
28 Jan 45
4 Feb 45
16 Feb 45
16 Feb 45
16 Feb 45
7 May 45
16 Feb 45
25 Feb 45
25 Feb 45
25 Feb 45
27 Feb 45
27 Feb 45
27 Feb 45
9 :nar 45
9 Mar 45
9 Mar 45
9 Mar 45
20 Mar 45
Units Attached Subsequent to Landing
i-CO C, 713th Tk Bn (Flame-thrower)
2d Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt
3d Bn, 11th Mar Arty Regt
1st Bn, 11th Mar FA Bn (77mm rack How)
106th Int Regt, 27th Div
, 776th .Llmph Tk Bn (-A, D Cos)
Co D
Co A
1st Plat, Co A, 519th rw Bn
. Co A, 713th Tk Bn
593d JASCO (NGF - AL)
S-L Team #1
-6..
J2ate Atchd
9 Apr 45
9 Apr 45
9 Apr 45
10 J\pr 45
12 Apr 45
? May 45
17 May 45
20 May 45
? May 45
7 May 45
7 May 45
7 May 45
Reld
5 April 45
5 April 45
5 April 45
5 Ppri1 45
5 .4pri1 4.5
April 45
8 April 45
30 April 45
7 April 45
6 April 45
4 April 45
7 April 45
7 April 45
12 April 45
12 April 45
8 45
4 l\pril 45
14 April 45
29 April 45
27 Jlme 45
8 Apr 45
8 Apr 45
9 Apr 45
9 Apr 45
3 Apr 45
3 J,pr 45
3 }pr 45
29 Apr 45
25 Apr 45
29 Apr 45
29 Apr 45
30 Apr 45
Rsld
29 1.pr 45
16 Apr 45
15 Apr 45
29 Apr 45
15 P.pr 45
28 May 45
22 May 45
22 May 45
26 May 45
Not Reld
26 June 45
20 June 45
Units atteched Subsequent to Landing (Cont'd)
Date Atchd 12ate ReId
S-L Team #4
S-L Team #5
7 May 45
7 May 45
20 June 45
20 June 45
Det Mil Govt 7 May 45 30 June 45
Det B-4 Mil Govt 7 May 45 30 June 45
4th G-10 Disp
71Sth Amph Trae En
7 May 45
17 May 45
30 June 45
2S May 45

(AI) - Atchd to RCT 381 until landed.
(A2) - Atchd to RCT )82 until landed.
(A) - Atchd to RCT 38) landed.
(T1) - Assigned to ReT 381 for transportation only.
(T2) - Assigned to RCT 382 for transportation only.
(TJ) - Assigned to RCT 38) for transportation only.
(T7) - Transported by 7th Inf Div, reverted to 96th
Div control upon landing.
-7
(' ~ - - I ; \ ~ -- E-R -ill
M
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It: .
PHELIHINARY PLANNING
The prelimino.ry plans were, of course, based upon the mission as
siC!;ned the Div and nere formulated to assure: the accomplishment of thilt
mission in the most successful cmd simplified manner. On 8 Feb 1945,
XXIV Corps FO # 45 Gave the ?6th Inf Div (less 382nd Inf) the mission
of lo.ndinc; on the west shores of OKINAIIA near SUN11.BE :md destroyinG
0.11 enemy forces encountered in its zone of action (see Chapter I).
Plo.nninp; HGmor;mdo.
The Div issued sixteen plo.nninr, the prelimino.ry
plo.nninr; phils8 for thD OKINlI.ID\. operation. These plo.nninr; memorilnda"
v{cre published by all Gencrill Sto.ff Sections to keup loner and o.tto.ched
lmi ts informed o.t an e:1.rly dc,.te on the plo.ns and decisions no.de o.s
th,-,y occurred o.nd before they li':..:re included in the fino.l Div field order
.oPERATIONS, G-3
The To.ctico.l Plo.n
In c;eneral, the to.ctico.l pJo.n of the 96th Inf Div for the RYUKYUS
cD.mp':-,ir;n Vio.S no different th2Il for o.ny othc..r amphibious opurc.tion.
After a thorough study of aori':,l photos, terrain milps, rubbc;r relief
maps emu ::tll D.vailo.blc, inforuation of the enemy expected to be C)Yl
countered on OK:UJA'ofA, each ass::tult R:.:cst wc,s 0ssisncd lanclinc; be::tches,
boundary ::md zones of (1.ction QS SilOvID in bl::tck on H3p No. 1. The Div
vms to land with hyo He; r'ts .'lbrc[!s t, 8::tch with two Bns in the ,'lS s QuI t.
il.ssaul t Rcr;ts were roquirod to cil?termine which of its two
BY13 ,[QuId be in t.he ::tsSQult, Mel of these;, which one would be on the
which on,; on the left. This pe;rwittecl further c:etCliled plan
nin:3 in conncct:.i.on with the loadinr, ::tnel with the; ship-to-shoro movoncnt
plan. Thu two Rer>;ts, 3i)lst mnf ::tnd 383d.lnf, wore to push
rQpi(lly inland and socuro the area vri thin the Div Z0210 north of tho L
plus 10 line.
The 382<1 Tnf \lo.s as XXIV Corps reserve, but YTi th the
[Jrior pcrl.lisGion of the Corps Com.:nnndGr it vms plmm;d thClt this Rer:,t,
lC3[; tho 3d Bn, be Jan':ed on BHOUJ BEACHES inncdi:l.toly behind t.ho 383d
proceod inland to po:-dtions just VTest of :lOj;OBARU.
Thi;' p1 r::.cc,: the rU:.r"t in thcbcst possiblc Dosi tion to pr0t,?ct the; ri,,:ht
fLmk of the Div and, cdnul t:'.n;ou31y, the rir;ht. flQnk of tho Corps.
Considt..:r::tblc ::tttention durin:)" tho plnnninr; ph'l.se vms clir(;ct
..;cl pr0t,..;ction of rio;ht fi:cnk, since e:-.rly
reports ShOW,.:d Glnt the bull: of enomy strenr:V1 Y!:lS concentrated in
th,:,: 00uth lmel of OY11']'\\;:,. The 3d Bn nuv(;ci to positicns lJehind 381 Inf.
On 12 l:<\;b Uk; Div CODlr.1';,ncier ,'1nd c.'.ttendlJd the, first
coni'er,mcr; vrith tho C.wps concGrnin--: cnr:iw' IJpor:'.tion.
13y 18 l\,b th...: first dr:,ft of till: Div fit-;ld oru.;r tc,m '!rcpnrou :md
lm.S for l)l:::nniw" Thb field ore;,>, prescribed
to.ctic'ol ;11nn ablJ'!c, rlJ ,. bas cd on thL: plon C:.lL sto.ff offi,>:rs
,1nd lovvur unit b,);,;c'.I1 thc..ir prcLir:linary rlnnnino: for tl1()
-1
RYUKYUS j';n nl turnnte plnn for n on the; Go.st shoru0
of OKINXvL'c (Shor:n in ned on E'1.p Ho. 1) w['..'; later prcp,'1.rec.', but this
plD.n ,\rns n'..!VlCr (;XGcutC('.
Artillery
HornCll".rtill(;ry nttClchmcnts of li;,;ht artillery Bn to U[lch
t 'dns m2clo for this op;;rc1tion. The artillc,ry Bn r;nich
IwrY'l:-"lly th,; rc;survc; (362d FII,) vrClS to b,;hind -Ghu
383<.1 Inf ::md reinforce th...: firl;s of the. 921st F:, 383d Inf)
::clone tho south fl:mk of tho Div. ;.11 thrc)c li:ht Bns \'[(;rc to
bo ;)rc-loadccl in DUl:1!s nnd these; lOClue;c\ d)OClrd onu LST for {.;nch artil
lery Bn so that the nrtillcry ',JOuld be Clblu to l::md promptly across the
I';ick C .JrD.l rl)of Qt tho tQrn;.Jt. N0 c:c,i'inito plQns could be fornul,'1.tClc:
fIJr the !lrtilL;ry Bn FA) except thQt it YIOuld bG
fror'l tr.:o.nsports b;y LCl':s Q;:I soon as lcmllinc; concli tions permi ttod, and
thnt it "v'rould be c;mpl,'1.curj from lJEITE BEACH 1 in support
of tho Div if b,'2Ch con:..:itions tho t'ectical
Nav:ll Gunfire
The; HGF plan u::.s by r3 <"'.net submit to
the CG, 96th Div, for stue:;; ::.mcl comment; conscqucntl,y., little prior
n:.-ccsso.ry or 'osc:il)lu. ,[,hI")'; inport'>.l't ch,,-rv;os roc
h01 r,;vor, nhich vi imrlrovocl the plDn of t!1(J Div.
Th7':;50 ch".n which '.[,]rc subso'1uentl:/ ',;".T::: as 1'0110'.13:
1. T110 lJGF -- 3 line (the lino short of ',:hich th!; If.:1vy
not fire; "ftcr tht; time ;)lus fivo no.s
moved in Duch closer to Div t fl'lnJc in m',l()r to offer
bc;ttcr jlrotcction for Lh:'.t cX"os(1
2. B''1ttlcships IF_r,-, to bIOI[ hiO haL.s in UHc :'L'1. ',:;0.11
on '--'''.ch .:o.330.u1t '(')c2.ch.
3. Fir", support to Jc,..;(:p obs,;r
v:ltion, fir'..; 0n the, :ACEIlU.TO ;',,1 n:SU1JA just off the
ri)1t fl:'nk of th.::: DivIs L'Yl,Jill': No.1).
Air
No pr,;lirn.in::.ry :)1 'Clinin; for :>.ir 1';:LG ;!ossibL;, since
h,:,,,,(lqutlrt,--;rc:; pn;;:l.r()c; :l.ir Yli thout consul
the: 'Div. Ho ch-:.n'cL3 in this :,1:n 'r_'jJvrmitt0ll.
Shiii-to-SJ lor,: ;!wc;ment Plcm
The ship-to-shore mOV'(;",1..--mt ., ,1 n.n 'c):,,,u; on the: bl):'..ch "nd rc(:f
concli tions 2.t the. t".r-;,;t 'end on :., S on::; lc,"1rne:l :'.3 re;:o;ul t
of th0 on LE:{TE. As L'r th,: conL1i tions on the
tar (;t, thrc;,; iF('ort:'.nt :JOinGf3 \;,r, c:'lrefnlly stu,lied. 1"irst, t'l(;
OUQch...:s CN,;r 1ibich this Div to }-:;.n(: ;",r", b:1Clk
l
u:' :o.n 85.. 'ht to
h'riJlv(; foot [,:['" y{"ll, nnJ nJ kn01,n ,.xits this [Jet'. 11:'.11
(8[>:; 2, P::;."c: h, Cho.[J-'-,L,!' VIne frin::iw: r,.:cf extun<lcd
j
-2

DEMONSTRATION
0/(')\ L.f.3 OR L+4.

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1- U KIBARU-SHIMA
80

(L-2)

j
u N
w A
G
G
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000
L DAV
MAP No. !
PLA
45' 50' 55' 128'00'
LEGEND
SCALE :::""0 ____ ENGR TOP 5N USAFCP8C NO. .JJ
_ &.OCl'l
i- o L..... HOrhr, 5lI'I0I1,... HEAVY 'lEGE TAT ION _________________ HHH ........1, ..... '0.,
= '.,.. -HIM 1110=_=
5EA WAlL __________________________ ... -,...... ..,..
-....
,
-0<' ,.......
.. ....
POLY CONIC .PflOJECTION WITH 10,000 YARD WOAlD POL.YCONIC G"'D "'-. ,..,0
8ANO lit ".ZONE "c"
CONTOUR REUABILlfV OIAGRAa.!
CONTOUR INTERVAL 40 METERS
A-MULTlPLE)( STUDIES
8-1'1.0 CHART NOS 11557 ANO
c- A.M.S. SERIES Legl
CON F DEN T Al
T "A IF ATI N WIlJ Ef<At[ ET
'" A A A
HEIGHTS IN I.IETERS-{)EPTHS IN FA?HOMS
31 60
000
. ~
, \P No.. 1
- ~ - . . . - ~ - - . . - - -.
III
to the from this scOc Y;'all from three to six hunc
1
.ruc1 yare:,:-.
Third, no title table'S or other inform."'.tion Tlas immecii;:.t;:.!ly Clvo.ilnblo
tu inclicat..; tho hci';hth of the wnt3r over this reef o.t oithcr or
low tide.
To O'lercomu tIl,:; sen Hall, totems wcrQ to bn 1.:U1l1ccl in the
early ,:lssault [",nd lbv:r IT.1.S to conc(,n';:,r.:ttc its fire
Cllon[,: this ':mll, both ' ri th thu i,1c::l of blorrin:: . thl; ob
stQclc. Altho1l';h of the 1'mll 1':::'..5 nnt knclTm it vms
bdiuvec1 tho. t LVTs could Jrivo hco..cl-on up n:-;:1inst th(; ,;.'211 nnll th,".t
Qsswlt t::-O()::'s '.-rnulcl be ."'.blc: to (.nsily SC.':'.10 th() -tT'.ll fr'-)nl tho front of
the LVT. la.lclcrs ,:"rero c0Ilstructoci, h"TTcv(!r, Mc1 on thc
fonmrcl \.;nd of "''''.ch LVT tel be: in t:limbinc: over thi.: sen l;.'1.11 if
n,cccssnry. (Soo Fi';. "T(I. 3, Pee-:..; 1-1-, ChCl:,t,;r vn). No LVTs carryinc;
Qssaul t troops w,jrc tr) pr:;cI.JL.l.' inland.
The prosence of :'l frin;;in;-: ruof made it nccess:lry LVTs .md
DUlG'is be used to cnrry oll essential o.as::tul t personnel ::md uquipmcnt
ashore. 1Jith this in mind, the lour nss3.ul t Bns '[SO to be
landed by LVT:.:; from LSTs. The li;ht :lrtilL;ry, ::tttr'.ched chemic.:'.l mor
tClrS nnd hi priority supply were to bo lc-.ndud in DUK1'!s. It pl::tn
ned thD.t tho ruscrve infcmtry Rvt, and the roscrvu Bns of the ::lssault
RU[';ts, would have; to trtmsfor from LCVPs to LVTs to the semmrd of tho
reef cll1d be l::tndrxl by LVTs tide conditions m)ro such th.1t
the LCVP could proceed directly the reef up to the SOCt rloll.
Amphibio1J.s T;;.n!(s
The prim.:'.ry mission .cssir;n,;d the att,1ched nnphibious trmk Bn Y.Tns
to pruccde tho first troop l.T,eve n,shorc C'J1d pl:1ce dir,Jct firo on the
bOD.ch,;s uurinrc; the time whcm LVTs T;ould be too close to thu
b02.ch to mQI:c ITGF Ilnd oombQrdmcmt SD.fo. After the as s nul t Ui:.vuS hnd
It
1
J1dod, it r[[lS pl::U1nud th;lt the :::.r"T)hibioulJ t.:'.nk:, Huuld utilized to
furnish clirc:ct or indir\;ct:crtill.::;ry supDort to t troops 1.ll1til
the normnl sU:;Jportiw,; .'1.I'tillery could bo lC.nded. lJrior
in-' hQd been to :<.ssist in tho 2ccom:;:)lisi1m8nt 'Jf this l,".ttor
mission. After th.o 383d Inf (on tho rir.;ht) h::td l::tndod'lnd hCld bor;un
its south thi..; 1[(;S(. it w'as plonnod th[lt cl\!monts of
the.; t'.m:)hibious t;cnk En novu south the rS8f of 0r in front
(If the ri-:ht "f the 3B3d Inf to rcnu8r closo fir,; [)uv)nrt.
Land T.:>...l1ks
Pr(]limin:::.ry pl'--:'.rmjr1"-: concerninr: the; omploymcnt of the ".tt".chcd
mLdium tank Bn (763d Tank B;;) U'lS b[1.s,;d primnrily on the shirmiw;
'lVai1.'lblc'l.nd tht; lJossibHit? of "o,'ih0n r>.nd vihcrc t.cnks l':1i b,_
Zlt th(; kIT ;ct. Only tuo LSD:=:; i'F.;r,; to the Div, :md c;incu it
vms desired !TI<_,diuln t21lk c!Jmp,:ll1Y land 'Ij,ith o..nd l.:l.ch
nss;ml t t'l\,,;sc:. Cos were each cmt:lrh:d 0n em LSD. The third
mcdiUI:' CO lJ:.ts ombnrkcd on an LST. Sincl; it 1':,.'1S possible to lo.....d
li::ht tcmks:m trc.l1sp\)rts, :mel tho l.lrobabili ty :,f oein'::.- ablo t) Lmd
lir;ht t"nks :::.t thL tr!.rr;Lt by LCh, s(;cm0d very ::;"od, this Co (Co D)
H::'.S ;Jr) s;)vc1'0.1 tr,'lfts:'),)rts anel attached to tho 38lct Inf
to bl,; c,)mploycxl:m the left flank of the Div Trhorc terrain
-3
the: cr,1pl c;ymen t of li :ht t:::.nl<s. By this C" on sever:::.l
trC'.nSI:Jorts, the numbGr uf t:'nlc8 oo;.oC'.l\c:d in r:ny ::me hold 1:n3
r_!cucu1 so th'lt the timl3 r()quireu f)r b.2.tin< tho entire Cil ,'l.t the
to.r3,-t '::n8 kept to 0. minimUD, purnittin:: the tcmks to be l:::.ndod {rith
the J.ss:::.ult waves.
II-hour y;,'J.C t,mtntivcly S(jt for 0830, cend tide ,)n th\.) of
l::mdinC rm.s o.;Jj)r')xim:ttcly 0900. This nlc3J1t th:::.t tho blst
chonce ()f flc.::>.tinr; t2.nks the reef in LCIfs would bo riithin (me
hJur aftor H-hour. For this ruas'n it '.;;',_8 Tll.::>mncc\ to schodulc tho
IJ.ndin'3,f the two m;diun Cos cnk'.rkcd in en LSD, and the li:ht t:mk
Co onL.-::rk,xl in s') 'n".s possible behind the o.ssault Bns.
This sch0clul,.d tiue; of It:nJin:,: wcrioct 0'lch bor1.ch, but r;on
or:::.lly, throe Cos llc:rc tJ limclcd by H -:-ilus 60 l'linutcs. Demo
lition t.;;=>].1S r!c;rc in the third :::.ssO-ul t ';,;eve vri th the print'.ry
mission f blowinr:::aI's in the S,JCl 1{c(11 oncl e:xi ts fr:JLl tIl(;
bl3ccchc:s )ri r t) II 60 ci.:rllt.::s so the t,r'.nlcs -'-fluld be ::'cbIc to
after
h.2" Chcnic:ll
A 4.2" Chcnicnl ILortO.r Bn (le:3;3111' GI)) eiGS ::"tto.chcd to t>, Div
for 2nd, in turn, 'ID,; C' 0.tt;--,ched t,) ench ,-'ss,\ul t
It ',T'.c I)ri:-'inally )l::,nncd th;et theSe) 21' rtt".rs 1rulcl be) 1):;:'0-'
IJo.d,)cl in DU1e Is (12 Du-r'.[s :)cr rnrtnr C,)) o..nrJ th,.sc DUK':s, in turn,
lonclcd un the: sun deck ,:>f cl;rt[,in LSTs :rhicll ':;,;rc cqui;'i.lUd
vri th rJ.m:,. P:...:rnissin '.',ns l.,.,.tcr rGcei vcd 1""17r, h '1;r8vcr, to
land thl.;';c DUK',;s into Lens abnrcl the tr:::'llsll rL. This 'f
loudin' l,r)vid,;Ll c"nsid"rt1.bl,..o l)"CCCi: 'n th0 LSTs f:)r cs
s;;nti::,l i tues)f tr.".ns:lurtnti n Hl-',ic'i',;ul t : (,then,is,; hO.ve h".d to be
b(;hind. U:>m .1.rri v0..1 'It the :cr",n th<..se) :',ri:-1ondccl JUl\"Js
H",rc inll'1(.cli".toly h,.istcd int) th" vr1.t,--,r, 'uidL:d tc the line) "f
ture '1-nu 1 ,"nc.hxl 2.S i.lircctcc: by V'H': H.Le;tl conno..nckr concerned.
In E)(;ctin; c.f infi;.ntry Bn cene1 H.etl S-J I S on nb;ut 5 '(]b
ru::cry 0.. l.miforn l:,.ndinr; ,:.i:'1.;ro.n nas ,liscussc:c1, ccnd)n
10 0. f Jrn".ti,lD '.[(,2 ,:,t,;c' .
This :l"n :)ruscribccl the; nunbur )1' crccft >-T cr;1.VO, the :,;cn
l:::.ncin; fc)rn:'.ti,ID)f \.]".cll Bn, to be
cnb:::.rh.', in C'wh \.2.VC nur.1b'jin .: ,.f b",,t t.Cl1"1S within thL
fC)rLl:ltirlD. Til,; inn'JVo..tirn Dr z, lU1if,rn ,'iJ.:'r1.r.1 thrrm-'h,ut
thu Div TO.J.t1y sinp1ificcl the: s;,ip-to-sh ire n "renont It 1',0.3
Wit th,".t f 11)'.!'" in:ut"--'.il :-.n(l unit con
:)cI:.1i t 1 'ir'}c,; ;.1in 1" ti...-rr
1
.ti(.T10 t') C inf'.'!-Yi to
s:)cci:::.l tClctical i)r c-nsi" .::r,"ti ns. the :'Y'l:=-,,".r
:ltiJn cf this tlk ,'''11uui::'' ints nere c:
l<c;,t in nind:
1. Tho nunbc:r I,VT:, in L,".ch \,';,'{O ':,':,:,S br;Cj'.l' w,t nly m tho
but :::.12,) "n t"h1o f bc.'''.cns tr.:, hI,
l:'.Dl:,;L1 uJ;,m.
2. [:lin: Jlicity in tho icrnati,n 'f VT:WCS :::.t linu (' f ,1c.n:--T
-1+
turc is;f vib.l in the ri -;ht b'l:),t tl:on int) the ri --:ht
ti 'In in tho lcmdinr; fornCl.tion. Tr; this it H2,S ,1ocilloc'..
th1.t onc 1T:cve 1'lould be l()r',cleu 0n 1ST rnthc:r thCl.n
ho.vo"ne viCl.VC.: cono fron tVT'> or th:cce different 1STs ."\8 Ti.:1S in tho
12YTE operaticYJ..
3. rJo.VCS 'I'!cru.)rg:.mizeu to fit n.s Yl,)t"l,rl? c..s l,'>ssiblc thl; ..
or:;:mizations of the trQctrr Bn. The tine
int,.;rv:,l to be G1ployod bet'.mon the fir:3t nix OS Gf'1.ul t ',:".VO.S YiQS :iro
scribm-: by tho C.r:s :"t n l:'rith Div C 22
Fubru.:-cry. Thesu tinu intGrvc..ls T! TO :'r0scribecl in 'rder t, obtQin Q
uniL,rn tinG cf l:.mdinr, thr the;
LST Plon
th the 1.111iforn l:.mclinS noll in nin.:1, :,lannin[;
c t) dotcrninl.: tho 1ST :il::m bust sui tell t this lan,:
in:; t.li(!.r;r:1.!J. l,s 3. rusul t)f nur:.cr':us cunfercnces Cl unif:lrn 1CT lG1.U
in:: ;)1 '. "lS 3.10:)".(1 Thruo LSTs i!ere r.ltldo avail.cble each
:lsSQul t Bn. Since n--,t '!Illy clSsault tro,;)s <'.TId 1VTs I"[er(; t) be
un these assault LGT:; but :1..150 Division [',nd
:-jriority vohicllls, it ,\;:13 nec,]ssary tL:lt n :-)lan of
(1.s[),"',ul t rtrhl 2.Dphibious vohicl';s be ::,ro:,r\red ot'!rl;), S) th['.t tho
rOL12.inin,: s:)ilCUm these LSTs nir;ht be f',jr GU: and low
vohiclos.
In the of this,L-,n it T[etS thrd.. the t
rifle C
r
J3 -:f t B1'l' TfJU1(l bo luc.d.ccl '1n LST. This iil:m
nittcll Bn Cr)],1JJ!mciors t': ho the sane shi:, Fith br)th 01' their
t C"s until the h"ur 'f This lr'.st-!"linutc:
briGfin:,: (if t,ll t cler:wntr. by the Bn hinsslf :nJ IF'ulcl
:'ornit lc.st-ninuV:l ch....,n -;dS in nttf1ck :'1.:::',n8 ::::h:ulcl the nvcd f:)r such
ch::m:;c c.risu. Lnto inf'rMn.tir,r. 'Cnd last-ninuto
rC;::0rts frCJ;.1 unc'ol'wilturlon 1iti:m tLetl1S wur,) :'1'1,1(; ;1(\1' ;:,v".il
[',ble; to :1.ssnul t tr"c)s. S no ..." '83 tr, l"..n thr'.t rrrc
trO('i)S i:, bl.,) or n tllis LST th;:m 'n the,; ,'th(;rs,
.-,;v'Tl';ldini3 th<:: bcrthinr: and uossin" f,-,cilitius.'n nne LST, YThiL ,th,,;r
1STs '.'fLru I.,)qur\lly unlurlxd.:;cluith ... nni...:l; :'nJ sh ul' this "nrti
cu1",r 1ST b" sunk tho hro asso,ult C.)s )fn(; Bn w h,'w,) b00n lost.
LifTs lJ.)at tc),",ns were :)) l),'l'.:IJJ cn 1STs that W;hm th.:: LV1's 1-fOrG
behind the at the t;lr;;ut n. ronclevJUS or
fJrn:'.tLm .)f Y,:1.VCS vr:JUl
l
be nc;cus:3:ry. 1STs weru t') bL.! f;rnw' in the
'cr t the f3c"'xrar': .;1' th,; linG at the tar:3ut,
vdth ,_ffic(:;rs unbrLrku(: thcr(;:n, s':; that the LVTs,
2ftcr .f'cll'mu,' i!'J. c',lunn bcl1in.: th'Jir wave ;':uL1c
,:ffic<.Jrs t:) the line .f :L.!;J''.rturl:. J,t tho line 'f!cl',,,-rture unch r.rave
execute,; r, c"lur:n L;VUJOnt, t.hu b,"at tOn.DS int-h(; :T:):X,T f'r
B2tLm fir thc lD,nc'inr:.
Sorinl Nunbors
A Serial Nunb,_r Yrc..s durin: the :,lrLnnin:: for tho
,:;'crntir'lD tr; flrjxibili ty tho shi,'-to-shorc U-
'
VO)1cnt to
-5
7
C;)UI.;:mC:ors t. ash .T(; c,;rto.in units',r r;quipJ:lent in
with tho tncticnl situ".ti ')n. nUI.1'bGrs were
[lssir:n:Jd tv ::.11 such oll..Y1l-nts which be call 8(1 ashrc; ,luri
nr
" the
vo this list: ublishcl o..s a .;1' tho
.'rlcr tJ <::.11 r-r"'.vrJ.l (>ntro1 Officers. 'Jith
this suricl list, unit c .r cJntr.;l ::fficcrs n,,8ck': ncroly
tc scn,J the IICSsnrYl "k:.nJ Scrinl 164 ':;n Brmm 3" cmel tho :lrolJ0r tr,jJ:,)s
I'TJulc: bu on thG :,r,j;':,r bl..);:'.ch.
'Fi::v.l Ordc;r Issuod
The cOr.lp18tccl fielel order ;:01' the OrIITA',iA l[lnding' '. as issu,-,c1 on
;) at 3. of "II unit cOBT1a.n:krs. j, t 1400 on 25 U3.rch,
r'.ftcr tho cQI;1p1.;tion of the; lc1nclin';;xcrcisos, tho Div COmT12.nclcr hole'
."l fino..l conf....ronco Trith ;:tll unit cOIIT;nanl()rs to caVler nIl
cht'n 'os, ;md to i.0 ov;;r once rt'::->in tho of thG opor:ctionnl pIon.
ConnunientiO!U3
Bl..)causl.O of thJ l.".ck of an u'.rly Si';m:J. Pl:m fron huv1
qU'1.rtcI's, little: plonnin: 1TD.S possible. Accur;lte :::rltD.
llrriveJ 30 L,tc: that thl..! Div SOl couh'. not be eompld,od until o.ftur tho
troops hJ.Q st:'.l"tO: to 0r.lbr.rk. Infornt".ti'm that the co:lo,
llslJcl for nurn,jr:11s ....n, 1 Cor h,'1d b8en
thl..: r:.t 1100 thIJ ,lr'.:J" b,..;i'oT'l..! the..: ;l.ss::mlt troGPs so.i16d o.nd it
1"as to YJoku C:istribution of the new co,Jc.
Infor8.2tion D...'1J Education
Upon receipt of J:now1uJ.;;L' of orJors of th,_ inpondinro: opc;ro.tion tho
Of.l'ic,; iLlT1C1ui.:ltul:r be .,nn to c::.sscmblc: r.;CltGri:lls
cmrl pl,ms for shipboard ori,mt['tion proC':r::lm. of thu
['c.m,r;:,1 typG of n:,te;ric.1s to bd ,.listributc:cl from echelons Vias
"',',incJ fron thosl- ,.::chulons .'lnC ::;uppIolJcnt:'.J'Y T,l::t,.:;ri1.1s w::rl: prC,po.rcl'. onc".
to ouch (;xtent as y,;w possibll1 in tho tinl..) yen. Infor
nere <lFi)ointcJ for ,meh ship which to
C,'1rry 'Lroops of th\... unit ,"n...:' c.o.ch offic0r s,)ll.cte(: 1'1.".S brici"c' on the
nission of the Inforl1ation-Bduc....t.Lnn PrO':rClTI in trro !1E;ctin,-;s 'ri th the
Division tion CfC.i.crJr. 'Tine nas :o.llo.....c thc.c(. officors
to fiwJ :n,: prop"r p(Tsorm,;l to str.ff nU'Tspap(Jrs ships.
Among tlJcrJUblic.:,tions HGre :i1:,.d..:; and furnishud to
the.) comrn:md, l'ith of the source other than those from Ba:JC!
Commcmds, follorr:
1. NAHSEI SEOTOJ distributod un b(:.sis of 1 Dor 10 men.
2. :1111', mimeographed reforence n,1.torial.
3. oun. PO'.'!lCJ., this l p8r 5 mono
4. 1Ef.DEIE i)ISP,\TCH PHOTOnn.:J1IIC SUPPLE: ;;:ZUT, this he::ldquart",rs,
lithogr2.pb,;d nl3'\IS photos, 2 iS311CG, 6000 copios.
-6
5. FEATURES OF THE DEADEYE DISPATCH, this hendquarters, regular
'.[Ooldy publication, 2 issues, 6000 copies.
6. THE JAP SOLDIER.
7 Jl.PAlP StIlLITARY MASTERS
B. GUIDE TO THE \lv'ESTERN PJ,CIFIC.
9. FIGHTING FI,eTS: The HOBo Front, Divided We Fnll, Our Soviet
Ally, PostMar Jobs, Whnt do know ahout the rJnv"'J?, Our
Future in Asia, and Air Force.
10, C!,::JTAWAY'S R'Ji:DEKER TO THE SOUTH SE1.S.
11. Philippine Target Tokyo, Gernany, the Far
the Ryukyu::; (tnctical maps).
12. BOOKLET 01) DISE;,SES OF T/JLGET ;,rn:,\, this b:nG.q'wrtors, 1
10 Llon.
These.: J1rtteri.1.ls r"cr(; broken dmvn and distrihuted on tho basis of
the number of ships in the: Gcmvoy (forty-six) rather than by units, and
distributed to ship's cO:1Llnnclers to ono:::rkntion.
PERSONN:CL, G-I
During tho proliLlinary pl:mning for thu OEINAW,'\. opc]r'1tion, G-I CtC
tivitic;s included (1 crmcontr,ctr)d in the follovinG fields:
1. Procurement and return to appropriate) units '.If all hospital
cnslCS c2.;x'.bllC of rc.:turn to duty.
2. Collection and delivery to ",pprupriate units )f ,'111 casu,::,l::;.
3, Froquent concm1tQtions with thl.; n()l'ily TttQcl:c.:d Hi1it,ry
Govcrnncnt t(;ons "1no tbo Div Civil hff'lirs Officer cr',nccrning the
revised ;'li1itary Q'JVi)rnnCn t Plan.
4. (, l)l."illii th the; Div Dnse Ech.::lon Cr;rlTlQJlding
Officur tnt) rccc;pti(m, : ,r('ce:)sinr:, ,".nc. s;:1in;jj,ng cut ,If C,'lS
uetlc returninG to LEYTE aftur the dcprrturc ('1 the; Div.
5, VL:3it::; t) n,,',:ly att.::.cLud units :md tho ncc(;ssQr:r rrir:.::1
t.'1tiuI1 c .nc(;rnir,c the pr':;p,l.ratiGn ,",nd subnission of
personnel .".nd ::.;t,'ltisticnl ;"{' ..3.
L
-7
INTELLIGENCE G-2
- . -_...- ....--.. - "-
ThiJ l'f:1r Room
During the; intill stages of planning for tho OKIN1\.:JA opcr[ltion tho
G-2 Soction sot up and maintained a i'lar Roor:1 where file copies of
all orders <U1.d intelligence inforn2.tion pertaining to the
were; availablo to the stc.ff heads nnd cOJlll!landors of the 1;1rgor units.
No.ps ncr,; posted spovring the pl<U1.s of the hisher echelons to facili
tate the vrork of the Division. St.J.ff in formulating thoir plnns.
Information conccriling the CYll:r:J.Y ordor of bnttle nnd tho reof
.:'...'1d bO[1.ch conditions yrero J'!1Clde aV2.ilo.blc to the low0r units through
the: Wnr R.oom and 1. :'.tor incorporCl.tod in the. intdligonco nnnc:x to tho
Div fidel ordor for the oporation.
Tho G-2's prime concern in the proliminary planning stage "as
the deternination of the disposition of the forces on the target
:1nd thu type of terrain that would be found in the Div zone of
action, the reef and the boach conditions.
The Photo Tl;aT1 wr>..s }rr_pt constantly o.t ';rork
determining the type: and loc,".tion of the defenses in the Di v zone
and drmving a sketch fron the cdr photos of the be:cch [lTC,':'.. Tho
sketch included the t<.;rr1.in features (lnd the: doff.mscf, th::.t tho J'"'.ps
had ccnstruck.d, ..1ith the; reof and bL.;['.ch conditions. The Rhoto
Intcrpr(;t".tion TI..-am 2.1so drav, panoramic slwtchcs of the bc.'lch,.;s \ihich
tho UDT used to r.1D.ke; ClotCS ,)!1 during th<Jir r(;connaissanco. Photo cov
crngo of the beachhead :.;,d0quatc though no good lOTi obliques
vmrc received by the Div s';on enough to be beneficial.
Onc i;J.D.n per D.ssnult Bn, one pLr t Rugt and one fron tho
Div EngirlCGrS w,..;re sent with the Nav"l UDT on i ts
of the Div's landing boache:s. These officers woro returm:d to thoir
units one d,.,.y prior to the landing ..,ith .'ll1d in
formation on the r,-,ef conditions, depth of rrator wer the reef,
ch:::.nnols through the: reef, the condition of the s";2.1,'[':11l, lmeny
defons,:Js encountered. This proved very v.J.lun.blo in
determining \There it was possible to land timl;:s and nrtillcry.
AdministratiV(; for the ')peration early
in i'lpproxirv:.tdy ninety dnys priQr to the rlss::1.111 t, :md '-laoS
continuou8 until thc; Division lr.nclad nn tho be.'lchcs ,".ssilVJod to it.
Both pr L:f,;rre:d (l.nd .....l tcl'nnto pln.ns for tile RYUKYUS camprl.ign conteT.1
pl ;ted Uk ;:-V'ViJT'1cmt of :>nncl, ,_quipmmt Ctnd sUDDlics c.crOGS ..... c;)r.1.l
r.c.:f 'mryj.ng in dUDth frnr.J 300 1200 .'"'.s in our
plans for STl".LEl':LTE II, it vms pl.'1.nnc;d t '!l()unt ,.....11 f0ur ,'1SSrl.ul t b:-tt
',lith cGrt".in suprYJrtinp: ?(Jrsl'nnd, in LVTs .1.nd DUI\'-.'s abn..... rd
1STs. R0I.laindc:r ,:f 3Upp :rt eldKmts, rc.;;E.:rve b(l.tt'"'lions, rtcsurvo RCT
2.nd Di vision Wl;re: nounted in ;,PAs .:md ;,!\As, LSDs and LSHs and
landed by bo)ats nnd LVTs op0rnting from (l Transfur Line. The reserve
ReT nas n:t to bu c,xlnittcd l.XC,-,pt 'n C,rps order, but c;'uld be ltmded
by the Division. This sir:J.p1ifiiJd th') prcbllOf1 A :3pren.d lqading
Division Tr'x)ps which c(,uld nut be nt_tlhtGd in
j
-8
Division Shipping. All troops exceI,t certain 3.dministro.tive elements
vmrc embarked by 14 Ilarch, and those administrativo elements were
embarked by 2h }.larch.
ShippinG Assienmcnt
Transport Squadrom 14 was assigned to the Division. This,squad
ron consisted of Tr::msport Divir.:lons 40, 41, 42. A flotillr>. of twonty
three 1STs, 5 LS1:1s, and 2 1SDs were att3.chcd. TrnnsDj.v ho contained
four ;,Pl,s :md two l'"KAs; TransDiv 41, four j,pI\.s C1.nd two /,1'll.s; TransDiv
42, four J.P1'.s tlYld one AKA. This provided a total of 17 tr::msports,
twclViC; and fi vo AK:,s. BCCC'.US8 of the difficulties ex
:")cricnccd in mounting for tho L:8'ITE operation, c...,usod by the necessity
of spn;;-'.d loo.din;:; DivisioYl Troops over tho three l1CTs , it ,'ras p12.nncd
that a d<3finito a11ocCltion of ships for these traoDs should bo Inc-de.
;",ccarciingly, one ;,1-'" .'lnd on\:) .L, ye.".s withdr.'l1'Jn from . ach of TransDivs
cmd 41 e.nd cmu 1.K:. from v 42. This resulted in throe IJ?As.'
cmd on" :.K:. for L:2.ch HCT and thruiJ :,1'118 ::md tyrO LK:,s for Division troops.
TransRon 14
TransDiv 40
TransDiv 41 --
,TransDiv 42 Division Shipping
APA 100 API, 188 APi, 216 APA 100
204 151 189 151
117 166 152 216
AYJ,
57
58
60
59 j,Kii
164
67
AKA 58
59
oe
This o.lloc :::.tion provided ,m ["PI, for each BLT, with RCT troops spread
throughout, an ;,KA for h0.:lVY \.-quipmcnt in each RCT. The ship:Jing
for Division Troops proved
Landing Ships
Of thl; 23 L8'1's, 3 worc (lssign:Jd to e::tch BLT, ::t total of 12.
TllreL) vVGre .:'.ssiCI1cd to Division l,rtillery for tho light 1J:ltta1ions,
).j. to the; ar!lphibian Bn, the tyro nss.1.ul t shore p,:.rtt Bns, one
to the lcll."'t Gun Battalion, and one to n nediur.1 Tank Company (in lieu of <:m
LSD). One 1SH IV.'1.'" aGsi@1l "d to the tank battalion hC:.::tdqu::trters, two to
the reserve party Bn, and tyro to the Division Enginc.:cr for he:L':.vy
equipment. ECLch of thu two LSDs war; to a I.tedium Tmk Com
pO,ny. The rOnlnining Eodium m; stated ttbovo, YTas loa.dcd in
c-n 1ST to tho l;lCk of third LSD.

l"..ny p12"ns for ,'"n op8rO,tion of this mo..gni tude l'1USt be both fJ.')X
iblc'lnd function'1. It is ri.la.tivdy Lo.SY to c;onceiv8 .;., work.::tblJ supply
plc-n brtsc:cl unon knm,TI tl.;rrain studhs:.:nd knovm tncticP1 concopt, but
tho i;xJcution of such plo.ns m'W ()0 r8nc.tJrud difi'icul t .0 tIl", 'Joint of
impoflsibility by conditions".s thtJy cLvclop on tho grormd. It vms
tlt'..;rSorc p1nnncd th.:'.t thu initin1 supply syst'Jm be floxible until
gL;m!I'il"l unlor1.c.ling could str'rtcd. The typ\, ('.nd quantity of :<.11 supply
-9
1iaS proscribod by highc:r hiCQdquQrters o.dministrntivo orders, but
dcvitltions from oper!1.tinG procodure proved.of interost.
It Ims pl8.nnc;d to bring Clshorc 0..11 Qutlrtormtlstc:r, Ordntlnco nnd
Chumico.l 1hrf:->.ro pcrsonnel innnodintoly Q.ftor the Qsso.ul t .r:tvus to oc
cupy th;Jir Clssignud dump Clrc]'s prj.or to thl; nrriVQl of supplius on
tho bC;Qch. By arrnngcm\?nt with tho Engincc)r Shore P2Tty Bdtolions,
Division Supply pors()nnnl ',lOuld oporate the dumps from the begining,
lCtlving the shore party personnel tlvail".blu to devolop the bc;ach r03.d
not D.nd to :l.ssist in tho tr"nsfor of supplies over the reef.
Pro-Lotldod Supply DUKWs
. It '[2.S 2.nticipatcd thd the initio,l unlotlding would be slovred dovm
mCltoriCllly by the) reef and thcl.t :1 quick source of critiC:1I i toms should
bo mClde 3.vailabl0. lJineteen DlrKVis vrere lon,dod vrith rtltions, vrCltor,
smtlll 2cms tllTlTIlUni tion, sm:1ll ttrms parts ropltlcemcnts Lmd motor
vehicle p2rts '-end ropl:l.cements. Th:; r::ctions, wrtter r'.nd Q);m1unition
comprised almost :0, d;-q' c, supply for the combClt olc;ments Qshore.
Tr:1nsport Qutlrtormtlstcr
During the sc;cond week of Jnnu,:l.ry 1945, tl provision.'l.l T0.H team
was formed within tho Division for the purpose of mounting tho op
ortltion. This organiz:ltion provided the Division Tr:}11 nnd :,ssist['_nt
TQII, St::cffs for un.eh ReT p.nd Enb-'.rlcation Group, ,".nd Tro':p TQHs for
13tlch ship. Cont::cct vri th Ule] N::.vy :::mcl Hi th Group vro.s
cst::cb1ishcl.l oncc. No int2rrupti 'ns during p1nnn:i.nr; bl;t\re.;on the
thr..:;o s inv()l V,,:;c1:.'C curr.;d. Th,; C ".rl;:T c'.rri",,1 ()f the Tr[!.ns
port Squr.. clron T(ll'I,".nd fr.;quon t conL;r<.mc ".ri th Tr:o.nsport Squtlc1
ron'1nd Tr,:vwDort Division Comrn[;.ndcr:, enabled tho Fill O:'ficc) to
preVijIlt difficulties fr,Jm 2risinrs. The c)ntirij ,.)1' the TnJ1
s,)ctL'n sm:'oth and, in spit,; .If thu rclnti v,.. ly sh'rt tim,; tll1owcxl
0.ncl the, lr'.t',".rri K.ldf seme ships, lu'luine; H2.S :O.cc ;rdine
to p1".n.
On 15 Fobru:.ry, the POl, 'J'Qli '['cel.m 1{-\:3 tlttClchcd to the; Div
ision fc)r TQE functiuns. Sincr.; Cl pr)visiontll tlJo_m T[,').S in ()pcr:'.ti0n,
the; Jrk.ml) -rs of this orgtlnizati;n "ore ;Jup(;rimposc)d .. m th" pruvisiono.l
to::1m,'l.l1:1, up.ID cc)mplction CJf the loc'.cling, t)(',k the TClJj duticE;.
This includcc1 (',lJbr'.rlc,ti,n plans chu"'!.ng ['.ne) supe.;rvisi'.,n of the
unl'J,:'l:ing ,l.t tllC tOTL;et.
TOJi School
Of 'Ji'luc 1;-:,[5 the.:; T(Jr Sch',l r;onc:luct(;d from 28 J:m
uClry to 3 Fi.:bruc'l.ry f)r ck,t".illcd :c,j unit 'rqus. EC!st
pcrs:mnol inv')l vcd h:ld bC()D -f)i,] ' '".;c:ll "DO or illjrC schools Mel hred ::l.Cted
:l.S T0115 in P::1st ')pcr:".tiom3. This Sch:Jol rr".s in t.he.; n:.ture ,)f :l. rc
fr"shcr c;)urse. ltc) C[CD b,; measured by the fact th:'.t numurous
qucsti br:mcht up by ()p..::r:ltiJm; .:cnsTTurccl, Hi th the
"f tlksc difficultilJs, the lo,1.cling for this opcr.'ltion
;
pro!t,l'lJ::is<.:a vith:'mt interruptinn.
Our (!Jcporin!lco in thifi opH'C'..tion proved th[tt l).l.rly ,:.nd cnntinuod
-10
li2.ison with hiGher I.rmy Hq and vii th the N:wo.l Hq conc0rncd is
It is recommended that TRMJSRON, TRMJSDIV, ::'..nd
Ships t TOM I S from th'; N1.vy rcpurt to Division TQl'l at o.n oarly elate
m:::.intain do.ily c,mtact in order tr) fJrestr,ll (lifficul tics in the
IJLLc!ing.
I.s in SODe? difficulties l.'TCrO encountered
in prcp:J.ratL,n "f UP8cT Tablus. Units nust bi:; impressed lNi th the nec
cssity fJr concise and Qccur::>,te UP&T Tables. The only difficulty
enc::runtercd t},t the Gnbarkation point nhon it ',Tas eliscoverccl tho.t
0. fmr unit,; cncl(;o.voring tn [;hip Hrc cnr(,;o, by bulk ,'1nd weiGht,
th'ln they bid f'Jr on their T,''..ul,?s.
In this insto.ncc l::.st minute; adjustments were possible, but
,'bvi'iusl;r this situ",tion shnuld DO ;!revcnted.
It is rec'wlLlondcd th,:lt TqIt officers be usocl in lieu of officors
from G-L. s,ection as G-L. C'mtrcil Officers on lbv:,'.l C 'ntrol V"ssols
=1urine; lkbo.rkati(m. They arc TI1Y,-- familio.r with IOGds ;-mel CDn cC'n
duct,imloQding mure: uxpudi ticlUsly.
-11
CHAP l=R:N

A
N
D
EMBARKATION
LOADlliG AND EMBARKATION
Loading for the RYUKYUS camraign was, of course, accomplished with tl.e
aim of achieving rapid orderly unloading at the target in accordance
with the carefully prepared tactical plans. Special consideration was
given to the loading of essential troops, supplies and equipment so that
some selective discharge would be possible at the target area to meet any
unusual tactical condition which might arise ashore. It was known early
in the planning phase that the unloading would have to be accomplished ov':?r
a wide coral reef, and that adverse reef and tide conditions, as well as
enemy opposition, might restrict the unloading to only those items or units
absolutely necessary to the conduct of the operations ashore. With all
plans carefully prepared, with shipping assignments made (See Chapter III),
and with the arrival of some of the assigned shipping on 3 March 1945, the
Div began its loading for the RYUKYUS campaign.
Cargo and EguiRment Loading
Because of reef landing conditions, certain precautions were taken to
insure a definite landward flow of supplies at H-Hour. Approximately two
days' supply of rations, fuel and ammunition and items of Engineer
demolition and bridging materials were spread-loaded throughout the IST
Flotilla, omitting Hospital LST's. After debarking the assault troops, it
was planned to move tbese ships shoreward, off the reef, where they would
be available for DUKWts and LVT's to draw emergency requirements, for
direct to units. Within t."o days, it was felt the beach would
be sufficiently well organized to permit general at a normal rate.
The remainder of the Div supply was apportioned to each
Transport Div inclUding the ships assigned for Div Troops. This was done
on a basis approximately prorata to the total tonnage capacity of each
ship. The assignment of Div maintenance supplies by tonnage and ,
follows:
Tons Percent
IST ts (Understowed on Tank Deck and certain
Sun Deck space)* 5,250 28.0
Transport Div 40 (minus Div ships) (ReT 381) 3,135 16.5
Transport Div 41 (minus Div ships) (RCT 382) 3,135 16.5
Transport Div 42 (minus Div ships) (ReT 383) 3,135 16.5
Div ships

22.5
18,879 100.0
* other landing ships are beluded with RCT 's.
Two Amphibian Truck Cots of 50 DUKWts each were attached to the Div
for use in the assault landing. They were assigned and loaded as follows:
a. 827th Amphibian Truck Co: No. DUKW's Loaded On
361st FA Bn (105mm) 16 1 1ST
362d FA Bn (105mm) 16 1 IST
92lst FA Bn (105mm) 16 1 IST
Under eo control 2 Transport
-l
b. 474th Amphibian Truck Co: No. DUKW's Jpaded On
-
Co B, 88th Chemical Weapons Bn 12 Transport
Co C, 88th Chemical Weapons Bn 12 Transport
796th Ordnance Co for high priority
spare parts
3
Transport
For high priority rations and ammunition 16 Transport
Held under Co control 7
roo
The DUKW's assigned to the two Chemical Weapons Cots, the 796th Ord
nance Co, those for rations and ammunition and three empty DU!(fN's of 474th
Amphibian Truck Co were loaded in ICM's aboard transports and from
davits on the transports to facilitate unloading. 37 were loaded in ICM's,
three slung fl"om davits and three loaded in the hold of one AKA. This method
of loading was highly successful not only from the viewpoint of space saved,
but in expediting rapid unloading of the vehicles. The 24 DUKW's into which
the 4.2" chemical mortars had been loaded landed with the ninth assault wave.
Palletizing
Higher headquarters authorized not to exceed 30% palletization of
supplies and equipment for the RYUKYUS operation. Palletization was subject
to approval by the next higher Because of the reef condition and
the difficulties expected in handling pallets across the reef, palletization
waS held to a min1.mum. Limitations on shipping space also dictated a minimum
of palletization. Only l55mm howitzer ammunition, medical maintenance kits,
hospital rations and chemical flame-thrower fuel were palletized. This was
a total of 815.6 tons or 4.3% of the tonnage of supplies lifted.
An area convenient to all loading areas waS established by the Div
Engineer for palletization. At this point all pallets were constructed and
the services concerned transported the supplies to it. Engineer troops
loaded, banded, and stored them for call by the TQM to the beach.
Loading Facilities
Only open beaches vrere available for loading, organized in separate
slots for and staging equipment. There were no docking or pier
facilities. Such cranes, hoists, roller conveyors and similar eqUipment
used in loading had to be supplied by the Div from the allocation of such
eqUipment for the operation.
The beaches were located close to the biv service areas and those
beaches assigned to IST loading were capable of receiving the ships at about
three feet of water at the bow at high tide. At low water the bow doors
were dry or barely awash. Lighterage was required to load transports and
in addition to ICM's and ICVP's from each ship, six ICT's and five ISM's
were secured from a navy bOat pool for this purpose.
It was necessary to Use two bulldozers per ship to maintain sand ramps
to bow doors during high water and to hold the bow steady during loading.
Both IST and Transport beaches were divided into numbered and lettered
II s l ots" easi1:" accessible to the main highway on which were located the Div
service dump areas and the palletizing area. The arrangement was excellent

providing only a .two mile average haul from dumps to beach slot (See Fig. 1).
Because of the accessibility of supply, a Regulating Office waS not used.
Time and space factors permitted prior staging at the beach of each ship's
load as called for by the TQM, making the regulating function unnecessary.
To accomplish this, a Manifest Requisition Form was prepared in
quintuplicate by each Troop TQM listing the total supplies for his ship.
One copy was retained for checking in supplies at the beach, two sent to
Div TQM for consolidated UP&T Tables and two to G-4 as a requisition on the
services for the supplies listed. The Transportation Officer, using Div
transportation, moved the supplies and equipment to the slots at the time
called for by the TQM. Organizational equipment was staged separately in
the vicinity of each unit loading point. Labor details did not exceed 600
at any time which compares favorably with the maximum figure of 2800 used
in loading out for the LEYTE operation at OAHU.
Time Required for II OVer Beach" Loading
The time required for mounting this operation was greater than for th
last operation due to the lack of docking and pier facilities. Supplies
were staged in the loading slots by2 March for the first Transport Div and
available 1ST's. 1ST's were loaded over open beaches and, in the initial
days of loading, required an average of 72 hours to complete. This was
cut to )6 to 48 hours after sand ramps had been installed to permit loading
during high as well as low water periods. Transport loading time was
directly dependent on lighterage available and tide conditions at the
beaches. The average time for APA's was two and one-half days, and for
AKA fS from four to five days. It was not possible for Navy to beach
lightering craft at all times and weather conditions frequently interrupted
loading from lighters to ships.
;Q,ifficulties and Suggested Remedie,
Cargo loading of 1ST's waS hampered by the fact that there was no
definite date set by Navy for their arrival nor were characteristics,
including list of ships, top-mounted LCT's, available until arrival date.
This made assignment of BDr's and supporting units impossible until the
last minute.
Six of the assigned 1ST's did not arrive until a few days before
sailing date and three of them had to be used for rehearsal, requiring them
to be understowed later. Of these three ships, two beached at 0900 and
one at 1500 on 20 All three had to be retracted to sail at 1300
on 21 March. Cutting short the required loading time of .36-48 hours re
sulted leaving over one hundred tons of maintenance supplies on the beach.
This included rations, gas, Engineer Class IV and
Temporary sand ramps for 1ST's were required to be maintained to
facilitate loading during high water hours on beaches which had insuffi
cient slope to permit the continuous loading of ships.
-)
Slot 1 Beach
I
I
l
Slot 2 Ord Class II & V
i
Slot 3
\
Slot 4
I
)
SAN ROQUE
Slot 5 C. w. S.
I
j
SLars Slot 6 --
I
oj Slot 7
2i I
Slot 8
t4 \
'\ lot 9 GR Co,QM Mtr Pool
I
ASP 12 1-',
Slot 10 ODQM /'DiV QM 1
r
f
QM CO Dump .
!
Class I
II & IIIJ
Stork Club ' ______
..... --........
,
_----
Libernan
\
Slot A S-4 Engr________
lot B 'Co B Engr __
PCAU 24 (I
C Engr
JOSE Med Supply Slot D
SLOTS
W-P #3 Slot E
Slot F.
{Fallet i;;-g-'A-r-e-a_.' i
Slot
- ,
Palm St . ____ St "17Oth Engr__
W-P #4 I
Slot H
3240th QM SerV1c9 I
ASP 11
i

CEM
Supply and \
Const Material!
.r--:-. """1 N
,- \ gna 1 . I t
r ---- S J It,
. / upp ,y.-/' :1
\ __ --._ __ j\
! Reserve / " f
\. C1. III '. I
(Drums / .
- " 7 C 1 II \\ Slot 18 I
17 (
BEACH PLAN OF
16 )
SUPPLY Dmps,
\
SUB 15 '\
BASE 14 \
INSTALLAT IONS
AND LOADThrG
13 I
SLOTS, 96th Inf Div J
\
12 J
NO Scale. " C1. I
11 j
Bakery
\
I
\ 8 \
7 !
( DULAG StarS
6 j
5
"
\
DULAG
4
)
II
\ 3
\ 2
Fig. 1 \
\
1
-4
-r-- f\\ I 1"'\ 1',1 'i

r!
p\
t
RE SAL5
TRAINING AND REHEARSAL
Training
The If)land of LEYTE, r. I., 1.'/au declared secure 25 December 1944,
and on 28 Deceraber the 96th 1nf Div vras ordered to conduct Gxtensive
patrolling and Dopping--up activities 'wi thin its zone of action. Dur
ing thi:.; mop-up phase, the Div recoiv,;d many replacements and inten
sive; training started iHHodiatcly. They took active part in conbat
and rccoI1..1'1aissancc patrols" valuable battle indoctrination
through physical contact and skirnishes 'with snaIl isolated groups of
J2.pS as did all other: J")ersonnol of the Div. This tr::1.ining was sup
plemented by range firing including small arms, heavy v;c;apons and
Clrtillery for both and other members of the Div. All
1mits trnine:d personnel for work other than their T/O jobs in order
to insure suitable rep1nconents for anticipated casualties.
Schools
From 18 to 23 an Air Observers School was conducted by the
Div for six infantry and four nrtillory officers. rhoto intc)rpretation,
thl: rucogni tion of nilitary objectives fron the air ,md practical cxper
i,'ncc at 3.')ri,:-:.1 obsc:rv2.ti on fron 2l'ti11cry liaison plClncs were str(,;sscd
during' tho school. Thrl)c ob[3crvers were Inter put ::tboo.rd Navy carriers
to obsi';rve enony .. lcl inst2.11ations frOB Ibvnl high perform-
2.!1CC aircraft during thl) initi.al stages of tho OKllTAVIA operation.
An Underwater DC[101ition Te3JJ School vras conductod at Div Hq 25-27
J::'.nu'lry for one offie"r nnd two enlisted nen fron each Inf Bn, o3.ch
Ini' lkgtl Hq, onginuor Bn cmd 96th Rcn Tr. During this school,
spccinl eT:lphasis given to an orientation on the opor'1tion of under
11m.L;r dOLlo1i tion toans :md to thu propo..ration of sketches. Seven of-
1'icers fron this group (ono por <13:3LllLlt En, ono p8r assault Regt and'
ono fron Div Hq) f.Jailed to tho target with tho Naval under'l'mter dor.loli
tion tee1J'ls on 18 FCU'ch. After a thorough reconnaissance of the Div
these officers rejoined their orgimiz:.ti'ms 3.t :...03. on
31 Liareh, tho dJ.y prior to the l,:mding.
A TQl.I School w.'lS 'wlc1 for all unit TQI:s fron 28 to 3 Fobru
CU'y. Sinc,; DJSt of personnol had buon through onc or more achools
olld QCGud 25 TQUs in pC".st opr]!''1tions, this school llQS in the.; nature
of 3 refresher coursu.
Durin::; the latter l)3.rt of 19h5, tho Div rcceivc)d snooper,
sniper 2nd netClscOpljs. A course of training li[.'lS iJ1'lf"ledintoly plnnn0d,
l:cstinp; fron 4 to 17 An officur and sevcro.l NCO's fron POA.
c(jnducted the and tho:x 11ho vrore later used to trClin
their rGspcctivc; units in t.he op,.rati'n and n3.intcmnnce ,,:,f these scopes.
Tr:.ining Period Sh0rt
Detailed tr:cining specifically in propar.:-.tion for the OKINAVJA oporn
tion lim.S very linited. It wns not until 10 February th:lt 1nf units TWrG
roliov,:;d of no:p-up cmd pntrol duti0s on LEYTE" and in th() [1onth that fol
lowed, the noed for luadinc details, unloadine: details for inconing ships
-1
\
arriviTI:; at LEYTE, and equj.pmont ins1Joctions, prc.Nontod any
Indi'l'idual and sr.1all-unit training was conducted,
hmmver, whenever time l)er1.1i t ted. All three Inf Reets hold extensivo
trainin for their Inf assault teams in usc of tho flar.J.e-thrower
and denolitions.
Tho 780th Aoph Tank Bn, attached to the Div for the o,eration,
conducted extensive training with Div Artillury in the uso of its
wea?ons for artillery support of assault units. Cornlunication systons
ymre worked out so that the artillery forward observer normally ac
con:xmying tho assault Inf could adjust the firo of the Anph tanks
until the artillery had landed and vms ready to fire.

Tw"O rehc;1rsals were schedulod in preparation for the land
ing, one on 17 rIm-ch' nnd tho on 19Tarch. Fron the Div vievfiJoint
it was desired to stress as nuch as tho ship-to-shore :-JOvU!:lOnt
during th.... landing, the and envelo:ment of the
initial beachhead. The lack of suitable terro.in inland fron the beaches
available for the reho.1.rs:u' linitcd both of the landing exercises to:
1. A to'st of the execution of tho ship-to-shore novenent plnn.
2. The est:lblishrlent of neCOSfF',ry precision tiDinG and coordin:l
tion between Arr:ry o.nd Navy Glcnents.
3. A rchcars.'ll of the sequenco in conbnt tanks
and priority su:)plies.
4. A tGst of conmunicr'tion facilities L'.nd l.1.ndinC; ;Jroccduro.
5. An exorcisc to orient the trooi!S in their ;lart of tho ship-to
shore movonont with on:'hasis on .1.mressivo whon
hittinG the bench o.nd control of the boat tOllr1s. Prior to the
lQnding exercises, ;ill Qsso.ult Bns had boen org.2nizod into
boat ten.ns cmd hnd conducted t.2ctic.1.l trQininG by bont tenn.
Exurcise No. 1
LEX-l lims conducted on 17 iIarch 'lnd includ8d n. rehoo.rs.1.1 of tho
novenent of tho o:1oration. Tho rchearsL'.l included
the lo..ndinC; of tho four L'.ssD.ul t Bns and the oobQrkrltion 2nd novcncnt
to tho Line of Departure of the rcnnininc; five Bns.
This rehearsal proceeded 'iIi. th nuch bnttor results th.1.ll bcJen
e:X:-,ccted, baine conpletLJd by 1500 (Nen thou::h a delay of 30 ninutes
hnd occurred due to the l.1.to o..rrivo.l of the LST's behind the Line of
Depnrturo. However, deficienci<Js vwre found in tho o=,or3.tion of the
. r::tdio nets o.nd in tinoly re1Jortinr; of Clssinulnted Ol)cration
Lesser deficiencies in tho J;),echnnics of the ship-to-shoro Llovencmt
such [lS coordination betwoen the LVT conmandcrs and control officer,
inaccurnoy in tine rmd lJcCltbn of Navy :=;uido boats, and
schedulos of W.1.ves to cie?art fron thoir ships to arrive at
the Lino of D.t tho nODont, wore n'-lted o.nd discussed
-2
at a critique held th8 follavvin[3 day between Arny and Navy i)erSonnol con
cerninG the shi:i:')-to-shore novemmt.
Exercise No, 2
LEX-2 held on 19 March called for all scheduled waves to be landed
and for the tr,qusfer and landing of the reservo Bns and reserve Regt.
stress W.3.S to be nadlJ and correction of deficiencies noted on LEX-I,
The rehearsal went CtS scheduled Ui.J to and. includinr: the landinG of
tho first six waves. The transfer and lo.ndinG of the waves llrRS
irI;')oded, first by tho fact thnt ::ell elements of thoso snp;;ort waves were
not present (Chor.'iical Uortar Bn) :'.nd socond, tlwt tho r11sorve Bns of tho
assnul t ReGts Qrrivcd at the Lino of De:)arturo prior to the tine the
supIJort wnVGS hnd boon dis;')atchod, causing traffic con:-;cstion. A third
eler.Kmt of confusion vms added in the lack of understnndinc; as to whethor
the Lino of Departure or tho line of trnffic control tho novc
nent of to shore. C!)!Jsiderable delay vms thon cnused as it vms
1200 before tho assnult and supportin[3 waves had boen conplotol
J
r
landed.
The trnnsfar and lnnding of the reserve wns conducted in an
excellent :-;anner nnd betwot.;n 1200 and 1330. However, initinlly
thero wns a cortnin amount of bobwen Arny nnd Navy control
LVT coru:1D.nders) ns to who was supposed to Give
the necessary orders for transfer nnd landinG of the vmves of the ro
serve ROfit. This confusion vms quickly elimnated by the establishnent
of Arny liaison with the Navy conLrol officer a.t the Line of Control and
thu LV'l' cOL1J1anders naintainins ('ithGr ;)hysical or radio liaison nith tho
beach control
The l)oints of error on this rehearsal yvere noted and discussed for
corroctive action by critique with assenbled control personnel aboard
the USS Bandocino tho follorr.i.nc; day.
Connents
The two rehearsals held for tho OKINN."JA can:'aisn were definitely of
utnost to tho Naval personnel' concerned in the
novoI'lont. For tho Amy it Wil.S of little benofit to the troops then
selves. Howover, for troo:; connanders and staff officers it "\Tas vital
in denonst,ratine the necessity for close, continuous and intolligent
liaison fron the highest connander on dovm. It denonstratcd further,
thc) nocossity for a certain anount of docontrnlization to
cormanders then n frocdon of action as as tho tining and
schedulinc: of other units was not interfered ,vi.tho Another :'oint demon
strated vms tho necessity of subordinate cor:rrJanders to report chnn",;es in
tho shiI)-to-shoro novenont plan as those chan'3Gs occurrod so that hi.r;hcr
cor.lnandc;rs could effect the necessary rondjustnent and cO"Jrdinntion vri th
oth(;r units.
It is rocoIJrJendod that Ct shii:;-to-shore novenent officer (Arny) bo
dosi[,1flatL;d vrhencver arrt:Jhibious operatbns are contem::lntod. This of
ficer should bG detailed in the Di v staff in tho ; ,lanninf' staeos so
that he DCLy not only work the ,lans for the ship-to-shore novenent fron
tho bO[;inninr:; but be nb1e to suprjrvise the execution in conjunction with
-3
tho control officer. He should bo ::,rovidod ,vith radio
tion with the Cc,nno.ndinc Gonoro.l or his he should fur
thor l'1nint.':lin ;)hysicnl lio.ison vri th tho c,mtr01 officor con
tinually durinf3 tho shij.J-to-shorc I1ovonont.
'.
-4

MOV F-M F- N -T
-TO
AN [)
A.. P,L
AT

L
NOVEUENT TO AND ARRIVAL AT OKINAWA
The bulk of the Div embarked on 13 Barch prior to the rehearsal, and
the remainder of the Div embarked 24 L1arch for the OKINAWA operation.
The convoy of LSTs sailed fron LEYTE GULF on 25 }[arch and the convoy of
transports and comrnand ships sailed 27 11arch, all bound for OKINAWA.
Tho voyage vras particularly uneventful v;ith the absence of any enemy
interference, and at daylight on Easter morning, 1 April, the assault
forcos sailed up to the landing beaches without a single mishap. The
voyngc vms a relatively short one, C8ven dnys for LSTs and five days for
APAs, but a detailed truini.nr; and orientation program wns put into effect
during this period. Dnily physical training vms conducted. A complete
orientation as to the tactical plan, the terrain" and habits of t};lG
people to be Gncounter.:.;d on OKINAWA, was presented to every nan.
TarGct Infurnaticn Program
When the Div sailed fror:! LEYTE the tnrget information program was in
stituted, with an introduction being made by the broadcast of the tran
scribed address by Lt Gem Cir'lon B. Buckner, Tenth ll.rmy Commnnder. Such
broadcasting was done ovor available public address systens" intra-ship
cor.nnunications syster,1s and, vlhen the former were nnt available, over
phonographs. The orientation program was clinaxed on the eve
of the landing, 31 Barch, by a final briefing at which tirJ.e a nessage
fron the Division Comr:lander, Hajor General J. L. Bradley" was read to
all troops.
The newspnper uf the Div was coordinated with Navy news sheets and
since there is no cJrresponding officer to the InforI7l:ttbn-Education
Officer in the Navy, nrranger.18nts were r.lade by the ship's troop con
nanders either for joint publiciltion of newspapers or for the publica
U"'n of a paper vJhere the ship did not normally do so. In most cases it
,;ns necessary for supplies of paper" ink, staples, ::md s-l:.encils to be
carried ab()ard ship for the use of personnel designated to produce the
work. the rehearsnl period editorial matter and Informntim
Education releases were r.lade to the vnrius ships in order to provide
continuity in the thour,ht of the cl)I:mnnd on pertinent subjects.
IKethods uf preDentat.Lon of orientation conferences aboard the ships
varied in accurdance v;ith the] facilities aboard and the nttitudes of the
ships' captains on the use 01' j)ublic address systens. In situatLms
vrhcre space 'das available on dock, training programs were published and
conferl!nccs\wro hGld in th)se Ships' troop nesses vwre used in
SOr:le instances and libraries or recreation spaces were r:lade available
to troops for this purpose on othl's. In addition to tho organized con
ferences ,end discussims, sane of the nateric:i.ls which were designated for
individunl readinG were distributed for such purpose over the period of
the rehearsal and voyage.
The chaplains of the Div wore spread arlOng the vari'ius Div ships as
conpletcly as possibln, IJarticlllarly on those ships without Navy chap
lains, so that religbus ,wrvices would be available to all personnel
during the voyage. reading natcrinl ::md g3l1es wore
-1
procured prior to cnbarkati")n and to tho TQU 'Jf oach ship,
Cor:ll10nts
Haps provided for genoral orientnticm as to the area of the RYUKYUS,
their rolntbnshi:) to tho Jnpanose nninlnnd, China nnd to the Philippines
and Fornosn were for conplctc visual aids 'sots f0r cach ship
in tho novonont to tho tarGot.
Difficuities of coordination 'with Navy authorities in
Vii th tho uso of fncili tics nnd )lies could be r:rcntly dir.1inished if
Infornnti'm-Educnti-on r.1issi,lns wore discussed with nuth0ritics of the
Navy nnd sone directive included in Ihvn.l orders concerning tho no.tter.
Specifically the itens nhich nould be holpful concern:
1. Usc of address or intra-ship cOr:1nunications syster.1s.
2. Usc of reproduction equiI)Inent o.nd orr,anization of joint i,rn:y-
Navy newsp2.})or staff.
3. Need for avnilability of r.1ineograph paper, stencil nnd ink

C HA,PTt R-ill]
NARRATIVE
A SSAlJ LT
NAlt."ttATIVE OF THE ASSAULT
From its initial assault landing near SUNABE, OKINAWA, 1 April 1945, to
the final destruction of all enemy resistance at the southern end of OKINAWJ.
near on )0 June, the 96th In! Div engaged in the heaviest and most
prolonged fighting and against probably the best-prepared and trained
troops to be encountered so far in the Pacific Theater. A story of the
Divis action during this period logically falls into six distinct phases.
To permit further study, the action which took place in each of these
phases is described separately in the six PARTS of this Chapter, each with
accompanying maps and photographs. For a more comprehensive study of the
OKINAWA action it is suggested that the parts of this narrative be studied
in eonjunction with corresponding parts of the IlNarrative of Japanese
Action", Chapter VI!I.
PART I, "The Landing and Advance to KAKAZU RIDGE", 1-16 April, de
scribes the action of the Div from its initial landing near SUNABE,
through several days of relatively unopposed advances, then against stead
ily increaSing resistance until its advance was finally stopped by
the superior defensive position on KAKAZU RIDGE.
PART II, "Assault of TANABARU and MAEDA ESCARPMENTS", 17-)0 April,
narrates the operations necessary to overcome two successive rock escarp
ments which the enemy had cleverly defended. The TANABARU ESCARPMENT was
an extension to the east of KAKAZU RIDGE and was the central strongpoint
to the enemy's first defense line. When this line WaS finally broken, the
Div pushed on to assault the MAEDA ESCARPMENT, a part of the enemy's
expertly-prepared SHURI defenses. The Div reached the top of this escarp
ment, but before all enemy resistance waS reduced along the south slopes,
it waS relieved by the 77th In! Div.
PART III, II Assault of the CONICAL-OBOE HILL Area", 1-31 May, describes
the repeated heavy assaults, hand-grenade battles, and the frequent enemy
counterattacks which occurred during the slow but eventual destruction of
the enemwls SHURI defense line northwest of YONABARU. The Div was removed
from the line on )0 April and until 9 May engaged in the reception and
training of replacements. On 9 May the Div began the relief of the 7th Inf
D1v in the line near KOOHI. During the twenty days which followed, assault
elements steadily pounded away at the CONICAL HILL-OBOE HILL defenses until
)0 May when these defenses were finally broken.
PART rv, "Pursuit of a Retreating Enemyll, 1-9 June, depiets the brief
period of rapid advances against only delaying enemy opposition until the
Japs' final defensive line along the YUZA-YAEJU ESCARPMENT had been un
covered. Heavy rains continued throughout this period and
nearly all roads were out, supply difficulties were prevalent and tanks and
other supporting weapons could not be moved forward with the rapidly
advanc ing Inf.
PART V, "Reduction of Last Enemy Defense Line", 10-22 June, includes
the operations of the Div in its third precipitous escarpment, in
breaking through the Japs' final line of defense on OKINAWA, and the drive
on south to MAKABE to eliminate the last organized pockets of enemy resis
tance. During this brief period more Japs were killed than during any
other phase of the operation, and as many as 1823 Japs were killed in one
24-hour period.
PART VI, "Mop-Up Operations", 23-30 June, covers the final phase of the
Div's action against the enemy on OKINAWA. After all organized resistance
had been overcome in the MEDEERA area, assault units were turned around and
a coordinated sweep made back to the north toward YONABARU to seek out and
destroy all enemy stragglers who had succeeded in infiltrating into the
rear areas.
-2
KINAWA SHIMA
ARRATIVE:
PART- I
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PART I
THE LANDING AHD ADVANCE TO I\AKAZU RIDGE.
1-16 APRIL
1 APRIL
Storm Ashore I'lithout Opposition
The Still climbed lazily over the rim of the ocean on Easter morning,
1 April 1945 (L-Day) and disclosed the target under a cloudless sl<y". All
plans had been completed to the last detail, all troops had been briefed,
and H-Hour vras set at 08301 for the second aosault landing by veteran
"Deadeyes" of the 96th Inf Div. This time the target was OKINAWA, an
ener.r;r fortress only 350 miles from the Japanese home island of KYUSHU. The
rumble of supT)orting Naval Gunfire and Air bombardment grffi"l' more distinct
as our naval Task Group arrived, without inCident, in the Transport Area.
All LST's arrived in their respective areas at 0705 and proceeded to launch
LVT1s according to plan. By 0759 the first wave had been discharged at the
line of departure for White and Broi'm Beaches follow-ed by succeeding waves
on schedule. LCI rocket, 40mm and 4.2 mortar boats, close-in shore, gave
maximum fire suppi:!>rt for the assault troops until the first wave. was well
up on the reef, which extended some 500 yards out from the seawall. Am
phibious tanks then opened fire on the landing beaches and proceeded inland
providing direct fire support for the infantry.
At 0830, four assault Bn Landing Teams stormed ashore across the 96th
lnf Div beaches and scaled the ten-foot seawall against no enemy opposition
(See Figs. 2 and 3). Amphibious tanks, land tanks and 4.2" chemical mortarr
preloaded in DLTKW' s, rolled inland closely follo'wing the assault waves
through holes previously blasted in the seawall by Naval Gunfire, Addition
al gaps were blasted in the seavrall by demolition teams which landed with
the first v,raves, and by 1800 the as sault Bns (3/38,3, 1/383, 1/381 and 3/381
from right to left) had advanced inland some 3000 yards to easily secure the
landing beaches.
The rapidity and ease with vrhich the beaches were secured was the urti
thesis of 'uhat had been expected. Full advantage vms taken of the light
opposition, however, and by 1400 all three Inf Regts and the bulk of the
tanks, artillery (except for 363d FA Bn, 155rnn How) and Engineers vrere ashore
Practically no diffic"uJ. ty was oncountered in landing across the wide reef.
Brovm beaches, however, proved unsuitr>ble initially for the landing of small
boats and tanks due to the depth of the water over the reef and its high
outer rim.
The 3S1st lnf advanced inland against neElir;ible opposition,
and by 0937 the two assault Bns had contacted each other anproximately 300
yards from the beach. Both Bns then drove rapidly inland very light
enemy resistahce. 3/301, on the left, maintained contact with 2/32 (7th Inf
Div) on its left, and by the end of the day had advanced east apnroximately
3000 yards. 1/381, on the right, advanced unopposed and at 1700 had seizel.
tho high ground 'at 8485-XSOJ (See liap No.3). 2/381, in Regtl reserve, land
ed on Vfhite Beach 3 at 1120 proceeded to an assembly area at 8385-BC.
On the Div right, 3/383 pushed rapidly south dovm the coastal highway
meeting very little enemy resistance. The Bn paSSed through KUE and by 0935
-3
l
was 200 yards south of this toym. At 1220 they crossed the river just
north of CIIATAH sectIT'ing the bridge (8383-S) intact. The Bn dug in for
the night rrhcm it reached the second bridge (8381-G2) (See nap No.3) at
1730. This bridge had been destroyed; ho"wever, the railroad bridge near
by was passable to foot troops. 1/383 landed on Brovm Beach 3 at 0834
and moved svriftly southeast to the high ground the western
coastal road. After moving through the eastern edge of KUE, they turned
east and by 1745 had advanced to 8484-XY - 8584-pL. 2/383 initially in
Regtl reserve, landed on Brovm Beach }..j. and was committed to cover the in
terval between the 1st and 3d Bns. This Bn seized the tovm of SllGRAN
and finally took up a position astride the road at 8482-SX and 8hBI-DllJ
by 1730 (See 1:ap Ho. 3).
The 382d Inf (in Corps Reserve) landed on Brown Beaches 2 alld 3 at
1345, except for tho 3d Bn, and moved inland to assembly area at
8483-C, 8383-E. The 3d Bn landed onrillite Beach 2 and proceeded to an
assembly area at 8286-Y. At 1800, this Bn was released to Div control
and designated as Div reserve.
1600, the three light FA Bns (361, 362 and 921) were ashore and
in position to fire. The 363d FA En (155mm Hovr) and Div Artillery Hq re
mained afloat. Div Artillery air observers, in Navy planes based on car
riers, flew search nissions and supported the advancing Inf, reporting
any activity.
The 780th Amphibious Tank En led the assault i":aves ashore on all
beaches. A and B Cos landed on Ylhite Beaches at 0830 and C and D Cos
landed on Eronn Beaches at 0834. After securing beach exits for the
Inf, they operated as supporting artillery nith the normal artillery
forv;ard observers adjusting their fire. At 1700, 6 LVT's and 6 LVTA1s
established an offshore patrol on the reef, as directed by Commanding
General, XXIV Cor:r)s, to vrarn of and delay any counterlanding the Japs
might attempt.
Land tanks of the 763d Tank En were attached to a'1d landed l"rith the
assault waves of the Ini. Co D (lir;ht) and Co I3 (;ledium), attached to
381st lnf, landed on Vihite Beaches 1. and 2 at 1010; Md Co C (:Iediur.J.),
attached to 383d Inf, landed on Bro1"m Beach 3 at 1230. All of these Cos
"were landed from LCli' s and experienced no ty in crossing the "wide
reef. Because of the light resistance encountered, hovrever, Co B vvas the
only Co committed to action on L-Day. Co A did not land until 3 April
since it vvas embarked on an LST and could not be landed until beaching
areas were found and prepared for LST's.
Prearranged and general support combat air missions were flmm.
thoughout the day. At 1).>30, .3/383 requested an air strike on entrenched
enemy south along the west coast This r:J.ission VvaS immediately
flolm and the ener:J.Y vras successfully bonbed and strafed.
The beachhead of an averaGe depth of 3000 yards hlld been established
by 1800 vrhen both assault Regts dug in for the night. The 383d Inf had
pushed two Bns to the "Lf3 line" and secured two vital river crOSSings
along the west coast highway. The gaps betl'rGcn front line units were
coverc,d by patrols.
Despite the diffic1uties inherent in a reef crossing, the ship-to
shore movement v.'"as carried out rapidly in an extremely satisfactory
-4
Fig. 2. THE ALL.
The second "'fave of the ;d. En. ;8;d. Infantry
climb over the seawall on Brolin Beach north of KUE,
Oldnawa, on 1 April 1945.
Note height of seawall ebove LVT's.
Fig. 3. TROOPS STORM ASHORE.
Closeup of first troop wave, ;d. Bn, ;8;d
Infantry storming ashore on Beach Brown 4. Note
wooden ladder against seawall. These ladders were
ashore across the front of the leading
LVT's.
manner. The moveMent of troops and supplies ,"ras materially aided by the
fact that not a single casualty had to be evacuated from the beaches. The
Assistant Division Commander and advance Div CP was set up on shore at
8285-0 by 1230. Although early indications were that unloading would have
to be speeded up considerably due to the threat of bad "\'feather, the beach
and shore party units vrere ordered to secure for the night at 2000. Enemy
ground activity during the niGht "vras neglibible but ships in the Transport
Area vrere attacked by planes of the Jap Kamikaze Special Attack Force &t
dusk and again at davm on Lfl Day. No daMage was inflicted on any of the
Div shipping.
2 APRIL
Advance Rapidly Against Scattered Japs
Both the 38lst aIld 383d Infs rusUTlled their advance inland at 0800.
The beachhead of 3000 yards established on L-Day was extended to 6000.yards
except for the salient at 8684 (Sec lIap No.3). Terrain proved to be the
Ylorst obstaclo; honever, nine fields along the road har;1}lered vehicular I1ove
Dent and increased enemy resistance was encountered.
3/381 advanced rapidly on Div left flank for hooo yards (See ::ap No. ?
1/381 Moved slowly forrrard Moderate resistance throughout the day.
At 1600 this 13n encountered a ctrong, vrell-prepared eneny position in the
Vicinity of :iOlrOBARU (8504-0T) (Sec Hap No.3). The fire fight which en
sued lasted until darkness and the Bn I" etlained in contact vlith the enemy
in front of its position. 2/381, in TIegtl reserve during the day, was !:loveel
to YAILAJI (8684) prior to darkness when it vms discovered that 1/381 would
be unable to reach the Lf3 line. 2/383, supported by a platoon of medium
tanks frOM Co C, 763d Tank Bn, met strong enemy resistance during their ad
vance to the Road Junction at 858l-l'J. An enemy road block at 8h81-E was
broken bv 1100 1rith the sUp',ort of tanks. The Bn continued to advance slow
ly cast and then swung southwest taking up a position just north of FT:'T'EZill
at 1600. 2/383 killed 2l}.j. Japs in this action. 3/363 moved forvmrd approx
iI'lately 200 yards where they vmre ordered to consolidate Bn positions south
of the river crossed on the previous day. The Bn conducted vigorous patrol
ling across the LflO line to the vicinity of CHIYUIJNA (8380). The advance
of 1/383 was hanpered by a precipii:.ous draw at Attempting to
skirt this obstacle by moving to the eClst, assault elemcmts encountered a
relatively small but vmll-prcpared 0nemy position tbthe northeast at 8584-T,
after an advdl1ce of 400 yards, which had also sto;Jped 1/381
At 1740 the 382d Inf Rcgt (-3d Bn) '.'raG released to 96th Inf Div and
the 3d Bn then reverted to Corps reserve. Tho 780th Amph Tank Bn continued
to render close support to the Inf in conjunction v[ith the three light
Bns. At 1200 the Div CP opened ashore and the Conmanding General,
96th Inf Div, '.ri th his [f'. rty c arne ashore and assUtled command at 1500. One
1-5 liaison plane operated ':roEl KElSE SHIlIA. cub strip and two crated L-4' s
'fere landed and being assembled. Cos Band C of the 88th Chemic.::tl 1'[eapons
-.
Bn 0+.2 I:1ortars) which landed on L-Day closcl:! supported tho 382d and 383d
Infc respectively.
L--_
-5
3 APHIL
Corps Ee2.chhead Line Secure
3/381 on Regtl left flank raoved south 3500 yards to' HILL 165 (8880)
(See l.i'J[ N:1. 3) in conjunction l.li_t:: 1/3: on its left. 1/381 moved east
then south through raSHABA to UlJJO (8781) (See lIap No.3), against no
organized resistance. The 2d En moved doym the YAIJAJI (G685)-KISAALA.
(8782)Hoad va thout opposition to the hill mass south of ATAWUYA where
the relic.:f by 184th In! began (Sec Eap No.3). The 382d Inf novGd south
at 0800 lJith 1st and 2d Bns ,,-breast, passing through YAJI (8683),
SUKIRAN (8582) and the western part of ATANlJIYA (8681). At the end of
tho day, they dug in on a line 200 yards north of NODAKE (8580) in
contact yrith a snall enemy force (See lIap No.3). 3/382 was released
to Div control and moved to an asser.lbly area at SUKIRAH. The 2d and
3d Bns, 383d Inf, noved south 1000 yards seizing ISA (8280), CHIYUlITIA
(13380) and FUTElIA (8481) by noon. Tho 1st Bn achranccd at 0730 to the
high ground southwest of YAJI and y;as relioved by elencnts of 382d Inf
at 1500. The Bn then moved to an assembly area 400 yards northeast of
CHIYUlnTA in Regtl reserve. One platoon of 96th Cavalry Ren Tr passed
through tho front lines of 383d Inf during the afternoon and reconnoi
tered the '.rest coastal road (Route 1) as far south as : :ASHI;::I (8l7G-G)
TTithout any enomy resistance.
The Div, advancing 2000 yards on the left, 4000 yards in the center
nnd 3000 yards on t:Je right flank, firmly..:;stablished its beachhead and
seized tbe rcr..aining commanding terrain north of the LllO line. In con
junction lrith 7th Ini Div on its left flank, the 96t11 Inf Div completed
tho 1/,hee1 to the right, puttinG its uni.t3 in position for a coordinated
drive directly south. At 1400, tho IIJ!-l-th lnf started moving in bebind
the 301st Inf and yrere in the process of passing through their front
lines at tho closo of tho day. Div Artillery now had four L-4's and
one L-5 liaison plane opel'2.tinrc: from the cub strip north of FUl1JZElJ at
8286-ST.
FO CHq XXIV Corps, 3 AjJril) ordored the Div to:
a. Continue its attack to tho south in its new zone of action
(Soc lIap No.3),
b. Seizo tho ::1)[(11. (807S) hill nass vrithin its zone,
c. Hole1 ono Inf Bn in Div r'"servc to be.; comnittcd only on
authority of Corps Conn:mder, and
d. l:ainto.ip cont::wt y;ith 7t:, Inf Div on its left (oast) fl2.nk.
e. Tin(; of att,1.ck: L ATlril LS, 0000r.
f. Line of Dc;,arturc: Front 1iw;s as of 1800, 3 April 45.
FO }14 CEq 96th Inf Div) ordered the 3B3d lnf on tho riGht to rlove
southnest in its nO"\; zone and seize its portion of the Div objective;
the 3tJ2d lnf on the left to seize thClt portion of Div objective and
mo.intnin contact "ritb the 7th lnf Vi v on tho east flank, and the 38lst
lnf in Div rcscrvu, after being relievsd coast of the noy; Div boundary
by elonents of the 7th Inf Div, to as emble, report loc2tion and bo
prepared to nove to assentl;; position j.11 vicinity of FUTlI:A.
-6
,*_Amlb
Begin Ne'V" Drive South
At 0300, the Div renewed its attack south with the 383d Inf on the
ril;ht a!'"1d Inf on thp; left in new zones of action. At 0900, a patrol
. fro:!! 1/134 contacted 1/382 southeast of NODAKE -at 8680-tJ. At 1030, the 1st
and 2d BnS, 382d Inf, were held up 8479-C to 8579-KM by flanking
gun fire from the east and from an estimated Co of Japs dug in at 8378-r..
By 1430 the position at 8378-E was reduced and the remaining enemy with,
drew to the south. 148 Japs were killed in this act ion. The advance
continued until 1600 when the Regt again ran into a reinforced Jap Co. At
this time, 1/382 was in position at e377-HS approximately 700 yards east
along the road from GTIWVlAN. 2/382 had cleaned up KAMIYAMA (8378-C) and
were astride the road 200 yards south of this town (See Map No. J). Three
tanks of Co A, 763d Tank Bn, were at 1445 in this action.
A platoon of 96th Cavalry Rcn Tr made a reconnaissance of Highway 1
south of 333d Inf advance. Two half-tracks and one jeep were destroyed
and one armored car isolated at 8078-K. 3/383 advanced rapidly south
astride Highway 1 through OYAMA (S179-W) and MASHIKI toward UCHrrmlJARI
(7978-T). They were stopped 400 yards north of UCHITOIf1A.1i.I at 1030 by
strong heavy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire from enemy
pOSitions on the high ground south of MACHINATO (7877-7977-7976) and from
positions north of KAKAZU (8077-8177). At 1400, two tanks from Co C, 76'}."
Tank Bn, were hit by 75mm fire at 9078-P. 3/383 was still in this po
sition under fire at 1600 although our artillery and Naval Gunfire pounded
the enemy positions throughout the remainder of the day (See Map No.3).
By evening this Bn had knocked out three 37mm guns, two 75mm howitzers,
six machine guns, ten pillboxes and had killed 135 Japs. 2/383 advanced
initially against light opposition until 0930 when it was held up east of
CHIYUNNA by heavy machine gun fire from enemy pil+boxes at 8479-0. At
1155 this Bn was again held up by two machine guns in caves On the south
s ide of the tank ditch east of OYAl'l'lA. They remained there until 2/382 waS
able to draw abreast and then continued south toward the enemy positions
holding up 3/383 (See Map No. 3).
The J81st Inf remained in their 3 April pOSitions until the 184th' Inf
had passed through. When the situation permitted, the 381st Inf assembled
as Div reserve at 8481-W southeast of FurEr,fA. The Regt closed in this
area at 1420. J21st Engineer Bn up to this time had conducted road con
struction and improvement on Highway #1 as far south as 8381-G and by
4 April 45 had completed a Bailey bridge over the river
at this point. Water points were in operation at 8383-5 and 8280-0.
2_APRIL
Resistance Stiffens
Both 382d and 383d Inf advances during the day ",rere made against well
prepared positions. The terrain through which these Ret:ts were fighting
entirely favored the enemy. 1/382 on the left advanced 400 yards and
2/382 advanced 900 yards on Regtl right against well-prepared posi
tions on a ridge to the southwestern edge of GINOWAN. This ridge was
covered by barbed v'ire, enemy machine guns, pillboxes and Single-horn anti
boat mines. 1/382 moved forward 400 yards on the Regtl left against rein
forced enemy pillboxes, and shortly after noon, broke up a counterattack
supported by tanks and artillery fire. Contact was maintained between
-7
1/302 and 1/184 by Means of liaison officers with radio. 3/3132 was
moved to a position at 8978-VI to the rcar of 1/382 to protect tho latter's
left flank. Intcrnittont artillery and nortar fire covered the Regtl
area throughout tho day and 174 Japs Here killed by the Regt during .,
this day's action.
3/383 consolidatod its previous day's positions and probed bard,
into the J2p defenses to the south. 2/383 on Regtl cast flank moved
forrrard Loo yards (See :iap No.3). It gained this ground through hard
fOUGht sf.)o.ll unit engagcments o.cainst Japs 'who were in groups of well
plannec: dGfensive pOSitions on the north-south ridgo on their east
flank. The encny defended these positions by .reverse slope morto.r fire.
At 142;; indications nere that a counterattack nas forr.ring botTfCen 382d
Inf o.nd 3J3d Inf. IIonover, intense mortar and artillery fire prevented
the counterattack fran no.terializing. The 763d Tank Bn, in support of
382d and 383d Infs, lost three nodiun o.nd one liGht tonk in the do.y's
bo.ttle.Jnc nediur:l tank \[0.0 lost to an enomy nine; tho others nore
lr.11ockod out by eneny AT guns. 96th Div CP noved to nen loco.tion at
85Gl-V (FUTEJ.;A) during the norning.
6 APRIL
Enony Strongpoints Crumble
Aftcr tyro air strikes o.t o.p::-:>roxinately 0800, the Div continued its
2dvance. The two interior assault Bns (2/3132 a'1d 2/383) pushed forrmrd
ago.inst very strong resisto.nce from extremcly well-prepared enemy posi
tions southwest of GINOrIl"lT while the tYro flank ass:lult Bns (1/382 and
3/383) afforded the Div advance support by fire and inproved tteir pre
sent positions to protect the exposod flanks of the Div.
1/382 maintained their previous front line during the day and
SUPlJOrted the Div I s advance by fire, protecting the e:A'Posed left flank
of the Di This Bn lcillcd I:'lo.ny J nps along the cn.st-'west ridge 200
yards e"st of KA1JIIW clue to Troll-observed fire of all types including
two air strikes (Sec Lo.p Ho. 3). The attack of 2/382 rcsulted in a:
r;ain of 500 yards (Sec Hap No.3). This advance ,InS opposed by uxccp
tionally heavy nachinc gun, nortar and artillery rire, regularly placed
Elines 1 anti-tank d.Ltc11cs, barbed nire and :pillboxes vrhich protected the
entr3.nces of deep C2.vcs. The enerny occupied good OP I S and were able to
deliver accurate fire fron strong <md well-organized positions on a hill
at 8277-L. By 1600 this hill had been taken and front lines consolidated
although the Bn was still receivine; heavy mortar and artillery fire.
3/3G2 rcmilined :"n their previous }Josition on the left flank of the Div
covering the Cnp between 1/3El2 and 1/184.
At O[lOO, after an air strilw on the ridge at S178-m:,[, 2/303 lo.unched
an attack and moved slfriftly forward tovm.rd this ridge. It Vias not until
0900 that the cmcDY our advance bat fron this tille on the Bn
was under alnost continuous artillery and mortar fire. By 1330, F Co ho'1.d
gained tho west sloj:Cs of this hill and E Co was imr:1ediatcly to the north
of it. The position covered an estiDated 1500 yards frontc.ge Trith an
anti-tank ditch approxinately 12 feet ,vide and 10 feet deep running across
its entire front and with a low vrire cmtanglonent 1 foot high running
parallel to the ditch on thc; enemy side. Both Cos then began. their slov;
advance toward ".:.his. position !mel by 1600 had cut off the and
wern. rnnppi ne; 1l;[J (See No. .3).. Approximatoly 170 <Taps were killed in
-8
taking the hill. 3/3S3 in their previous day's position began to receive
machine gun fire at 1000 from a small ridge to their reO,l' L'.long the seawall. '
I Co was sent out and had knocked out this resistance by 1150. 1/383 moved
into the gap just to the rear of and between 2/383 'and 3/383. Former gaps
in the front line vlere consolidated for a strong continuous defense line
across the entire Div zone.
7 APRIL
Main Defenses Reached
During the night of April 6-7, infiltration attempts were made
along the entire Div front. 24 Japs were killed by the 3GJd Inf. The 383d
Inf repulsed six attempts at infiltration, resultinG in 67 Japs killed. The
Artillery furnished heL'.vy and effective support for the Inf as well as many
harassing fires throughout the night. On 7 April, Ground resistance was not
as stiff as previously encountered but mortar, artillery and long-range
machine gun fire was quite heavy.
l./382 jumped off at 1000 and by 1400 had moved fornL'.rd 300 yards. Due
to an exposed left flank and enemy artillery and mort2.r fire, this Bn was
forced to remain in a position approximately 400 yards eL'.st of KANlKU (see
Map No.3). By 1500, 3/184 was abreast of and tied in Tlith 1/3S2 Inf:
2/382 jumped off at 1015 and advanced approximately 200 ynrds on the right
and 100 yards on the left encountering a great number of nunes and heavy
enemy artillery fire. This advance was made across very open ground which
was swept by enemy machine gun fire from both flanks of the Bn. By 1300 the
Bn had advanced to positions 300 yards north of KANlKU (See No.3) whore
it was ordered to rem:un in order to coordinate its atkck vlith that of
1/383 and also to permit mopping up of large numbers of co,ves and pillboxes
previously by-passed. 3/382 maintained contact with Inf by means of
small patrols.
From 1120 to ll30, a Naval Gunfire and artillery prcfSaration was placod
on the area to the irrnnediate front of 1/383 which had'passed through 2/383,
the latter remaining in its position as Regtl reserve. At 1200 the 1st Bn,
supported by 361st,'92lst, 363d and 198th FA Bns (tho lL'.ttor in general
support of tho Div), bogan its advance meeting strong resistance. Three
air strikes were flovm in coordinntion with this attack Tlith excellent re
sults, knocking out three enemy weapons emplacements o.nd clan-aging defensive
positions. Throughout tho afternoon the Bn receivod supporting fire from
the bnttloship "NE"J YORK" and by 1600 had advanced 1000 ynrds to n position
500 yards north of KAKAZU (Seo Map NO.3). 3/383 remaiaod in the vicinity
of DCHITOM,ARI to prevent any possible enemy flanking movonent in the
vicinity of MACHINATO.
Tho use of armor I)ecame extremely limited duo to tho nC1..turo of the
terrain, tho presenco of mnny onemy lMd mines and extrol;lely well emplaced
75mm dual-purpose guns 47mm anti-tank guns. A Co, 76Jd Tank Bn, in
support of the 382d In!, hnd one, tank disabled by an etlOlJY Innd mine
andnnother by enemy gunfire. One assault gun of B Co, in support of 383d
Inf, was completoly' destroyed by enemy gunfiro. Co B ,"'.nel Co C, 88th
Chemicnl Wenpons Bn,' g::wo excellent support and firod 1'TP for air strikes,
shelled enerrw troops, cnused incendiary fires in tho villages, firod numor
ous concentrations on onemy mortar pi..llboxos ['.nd tronchos ,an:!
screened tho of troops.
- 9
L
8 AP?JL
\
Advnl1ces Result in High Casualties
During tho night 7-8 April the 382d In! sustained nunorou3 cnsualties
from hcnvy enemy artillery firo ranging from 75mm to 150mm.. At. 0700, the
Re:;t jumped off continuinr; systematic destruction of mutually supporting
enemy pillboxes nnd ontrench.ments. 1/382 advanced 100 yards heforo en
countering enfilrtde firo from.- their left exposed fb,nk which pi_nned the Bn
dawn. !':rhile in this position, the Bn received intense artillery Md cmti
t,'lnk fire from ('.. ridGo 500 y;:-xds south of NISHIBARU. An air strike was
to neutrclizc tho fira from this ridge. After the strike, the Bn
reswlied the ndvc..nce takinG high casunlties from fire cominG from the ridges
to their loft flnnk. At 1500, the Bn had advanced a totnl of 300 yards
,'aininrf n key position on the hiGh ground 400 ynrds east of K..'JUh.1J (See lfup
No.5)': The Bn consolidnted in this position so thc.t eneTil;,?'fire from the
oxposed loft flnnk would not continuo to inflict cnsunlties, until the unit
on their left conld come nbrec::.st. 2/382 jumped off in the ilttc::.ck nt 0700
:'l1d coordinated its c::.dvnnce Vi i th 1/383 throughout tho dny Gcined 800
:,rnrds to positions approxirnu:t.oly 200 yards north of NISHIBARU. During its
entire advance the Bn roceived honvy artillery and mort0.r ooribnrdrrent.
3/382 jumped off at 0730 tenet by 1030 hc::.d occupied a ridgo nt. Gh77-Kl on
t.he Regtl loft flank. Tho Bn maintained visual and pntrol contnct with
3/184.
At OGOO, 1/383, with 2/382, ng,'lin resudod i-GS nttnck to tho
south. The c::.dvnnco of th::"s Dn vms held up by heavy C1.utom::'..tic Tle[tpons,
lilort'lr nnd o..rtillery fire fr0111 strong Jap emplacements on ridge which
continued throughout tho dc::.y preventing nuy movement by this ::3n. 2/383
subjected to nrtillery firo durinG the night 7-8 April [IJ1d throughout
tho dC1.Y. During tho deW, in nddition to the artillery fire, this Bn also
rocoived 320Il1I:l spigot morto.r firo. 3/383 was relieved by 3/)81 from a
position 'V'Jhich it held tho provious night south of MASHIICI. After being
relieved, 3/383 swung in on tho right flC1.nk of tho Regtl front, ndvat1 ced
.south throUGh the eastern po.rt of UCHITOMARI somo 1200 Y2..rcls C1.nd tied in
Ylitb 1/383 on its left flC'.n!c and 1/381 on its right fl2..n..l( (Seo 1.k1.p No.4).
Tho onomy were dug in in cavos nnd pillboxes which rondo this ndvnnco costly
to our forcos.
3/381 roliovod 3/383 .:1.nd bognn its ndvnnce on UCHITOnAJ:'U ll30. Tho
to-wn was tt1.kon :'.t 1400 2.ftor overcoming stubborn enem;y resistMce. Tho Bn
ndvnnced npproxiITutoly 1200 ynrds. 1/381 rem'lined in its )rovious position
while 2/381 moved to C'....'l nssombly nrca on the enstern edge of Ii..{SHIKI.
9 APRI.b
Jnl)s llepulse KAY,AZU RIDGE Atwck
He,wy enomy nrtillor:;r :fire foll in nll Rogtl zonos throu;)lOut the night
8-9 April. No n.rtillory prop<-1.rntion W'lS fired for tho 9 dtnck in or
der to on.:1.ble the Ro[;ts to c.:'.})itC1lizo on tho element of surpriso and cover
of di1..rknoss. 1/383 boc;.1.n its [tttClck on KAKAZU RIDGE 2.t 0500 ,"l:.d wns on its
objoctive (8077-Xl - [S076-E2) by 0615. At this time tho J.:'.')S up with
C'. ht'.il of nrtillory Md ho:'.vy mortnr fire which swept the ontire Rogtl front.
HC<1r units woro pinned d mm by this fire preventing full tlltion and
integrCltion of tho Bn
l
s loosely-held forwnrd position. 3/CC:3' ['cIs 0 jumped
off nt {)500 0.1'3 Co L promptly roache9- its objective. This Co, v;ith bnyonets
J
-10-

I
II
"
tI
\t
\,
\\



S:

f

\\
\\ E
\\
MAP No.4
F1g. 4. K\KAZU RIOOE.
Looking south toward the strong
ly aetended KAKAZU RIDGE. The 96th.
Div. as saulted th1s r1dge repeatedly
for 9 days and was able to :secure only
the west (r1ght ) end by 16 april. The
27th. Div. then took over this zone
and cont.1nued the assault until the
night ot 23 April when the Jape execut
ed a remarkable withdrawal.
LEGEND
FRONT AS
OF 1800

APR 7
383 *'2'****
16I +++**+ APR a
"i Ii i I Ii APR 10
APR II
SCALE
t) n (> Q b APR 14
:t. 400 500
ASSAU T
ON KAK ZU RIDGE
r
fL'Ced, had boldly charged the :lCavily defended position on KAKAZU RIDGE and
nOH occupied the high ground (8077-13, Q2) overlool:ing the main eneray stron)
points along the \Thole ridge. The occupation of this ground Yfas of the ut
r.lost importance to the entire Regt. HovTever, other clements of 3/383 were
pinned dovm vlhen the Japs finally realized that Co 1 llas on the ridge. The
enemy fire VlaS directed from OP's atop the jagged crags which looked down or
them. A large enemy force, supported by heavy mortar and T'lassecl
fire made at least threc vicious counterattacks againot elements of the 1st
and . 3d Bns. Although both Bns were vreakened by numerous casualties, they
tenaciously and stubbornly defended the bitterly-contested ground repulsing
each attack. One counterattack was repulsed dtITing the morning, and during
the afternoon the Japs launched cO'lmterattacks almost continuously lNi th an
estimated Co in deoperate attempts to regain the position they had lost.
The remaining units of both the 1st and 3d Bns, 383d Inf, which were still
on KAKAZU RIDGE, finally ran out of ammunition. Casualties had been ex
tremely high (23 Ka, 156 UIA and 47 EIA). The constant Jap fire and fre
quent counterattacks made it impossible to reinforce those front line units.
By 1630 it T:aS obvious that furthor assault that day was futile and all
units nere moved back to positions occupied the previous night. Co 1
had killed 160 Japs. 3/381 sl.lpportcd by fire the assault of 383d Inf on
tho latter's right flank.
1/382 had been ordered to advance, improve and consolidate on more
favorable terrain to their front and remain in this position lLTJ.til 3/184
could come abreast of them. Ih.rever, fire from the front and left flank
continued to be extrcr.lely hea\'Y and any mOVCf.1ent by this Bn was imnediatoly
observed and brought under fire by Japs on the ridge to the front and left
flanl:. Thc'! 2d Bn on the Ylogtl right flank coordinated its attack with
The flanlc protection that this :3n could offer tiw 303d Inf proved to be of
no avail bec.::mse of the 1,-rell prepared inner positions to the imr.1ediato front
of the latter. As a result, the 2d Bn consolidated in a position that
physically joined with the 1/383. "1/3(32 moved up at 0800 to protect the
left fianl\: of the 1st Dn. At 1300, tho remainder of the 3d Bn jumped off
fror.l a rear and succeeded in taking out a pocket of resistance on
a ridge sliGhtly to the rear left of this Rcgt' s front lines (Soc liap No.5).
From 7 April to this date, the Inf units of the Div suffered heavy
casualties from eneny artill'Jry and mortar fire. Based on rifle and heavy
weapons..:Co strength, the effectiveness of the 3[llst Inf Tras 82%; 382d Inf,
6::r;;, and the 383d Inf only 45%. Casual ties in 1/383 were particularly
heavy. At thi time the Bn had only 10 officers and 190 enlisted men re
r.laining in its four rifle and heavy vreapons Cos. The 363d FA Bn (155mm
:Iovr) received heavy counterbattery fire throughout the morning. One Gun
was dar.JaGed. During the day, the Jiv Artillery was rein.forced by the 2d and
3d IIarino Artillery Bns of the 11th Earine Artillery Regt.
10 APRI1
Strong Assault 1aunched on KAKAZU
On 9 April 45, FO l/16 (lIe: 96th Inf Div) directed an attaclc against
the cncray' s KAI:AZU RIJGE position with 301st Inf on the right, Inf
in the center and 3D2d In1 on the left. This attack nas preceded by in
tense bombardmont by all Div Artillery and attached artillery Bns from 0630
until 0700 on previously located enemy positions. Naval Gunfire and suppor
from the 420th FA Group WQS placed on enemy rear positions from 0530 to
- 11
1130. Three squadrons of Navy fighters '.Tere to be on call for missions
of opportunity but due to bad weather, these squadrons I'fere not a vail
able. As a result of this attack, an average gain of 300 yards had been
made along the entire Div front (See Eaps No.3, 4 and 5).
At 064), 3/382 jumped off and at 0700 the 1st and 2d Bns jumped off.
Subsequently the Rogt met the bitterest resistance they had yet encoU11'
tered. 3/3132, supported by tanks, inched its ,Jay forvTard approxir:12,tely
200 yards up a ridge at 8377-XY (Sec l1ap No 3). At 1315 the Bn's advance
nas held up by svreeping machine gun fire from their left flank. As a
resul t of recent rains, the supporting tanks bec2.L1e bogs;ed dmm in the
mud and it was necessary to pull them back befure they bec3T.1o stuck.
1/382 noved southvlCst, approximately 400 yards east of along the
'western tip of a ridge. As approached the south edge of t.his ridge,
the Jars counterattaclcod in force from caves on their left flank. This
counterattack "Tas supported by a tC:T:dfic borabarcir:lcmt of 320mn spiGot
mortars and intense inachine gunfire. Although the Bn made a'
desperate effort to hold on to this ground, they received extremely heavy
ties and nere forced to take up a nore favorable position at 3277-XY
in defilade from the heaVlJ enemy fire (Sec ; iaps Hos. 3 and :)). 2/382
also encountered hc)avy enemy opposition but succeeded in s;aining and
holding cc position midway between and facinrr a formidable
escarpment to the south (See Ha-;J ITo.r:;). They also received heavy 320mm
spigot mortar fire and a c01L.'1terattack supported hy nachine r,uns which
raked their position. Sone of the Bn positions "vere overrun by the
fierce assault, honever, the Bn YfilS still in its advanced position that
eveninG although the Bn Comdr was .-rounded in the preceding action.
At 0630, 2/383 passed through 1/383 and following a 30-minute
artillery prcparCltion, tho 2d Bn ,jlunpod off to'irard KAYAZU The
Bn ..taS stopped as soon as it jumped off at 1200 vrere able to make
an adv2nco of 300 yards before they yrerc a,-;ain stopped by fire from the
front and flanks (See Liap No. h). Concentrated enomy artillery fire
from tho south and southuast harassed tho troops throughout the day and
many casualtics. The Jar nrtillery covr.:;red not only the front
lines but also tho positions of tho reserve Bns and installations around
the Regtl CPo 2/3[l1 which had noved fornard to the right flank of 3/383,
jumped off in a coordinated Clttack with the latter. By 0930, 2/3i31 had
reached the Hest end of KAICfi.ZU RIDGE northvTest of the tOlm. During the
first phase of this attaclc th:;re 'rras a noticeable absence of eneny artil
lery fire. Honever, upon the high r;round at 1l077-ICQ, they nere
pinned dOTm by intense mortar and nachinc Gun :'_Lro. At 1350 the En
received :l. counter2.ttack rrhich nas successfull:
r
repulsed and by 1600
17ere well dug in on those forno.rd posHions (Sec Hap Ho. 4). 3/383 noved
forrmrd i::1 contact, r:ith 2/yn and at tl1e end of the day had t,'lkon up a
position ','!ithin the ncr; Regtl zono 2.t 3077-S. After the attilck had
jumped off'lt 0700, 1/381 HilS ordered to move up and close the gap be
tween 3/](33 and 2/301 (Sec :li"1P ITo. 4). 1Juring their move fornard they
VTero engaged in a fire fight but nore finally o.blc to reach
a position betnecn the tiro previously-mentioned Bns.
Supporting units lliltorially assisted the lnf in thdr 2d'12.DCO. Div
Artiller=r, nith 2d ilnd 3d FA Bns 0:' -':,1.:e 11th )jarine Artillr;ry Rer;t and
reinforced the 19Bth and 419th fA Dns (XXIV Corps Artillery), ;:::rouncd
fires in pruparation for the; Di v attack fron 0630 to 0700. Haval Gunfire
gave deep sUilport. 763d Tcmk Bn nas tillable to fully utilize their tanks
- 12
PPROACHES TO
TOMBSTONE RIDGE
LEGEND
C:>-3S1 .,-383
FRONT LINtS AS OF 1800
Xx:::xg:::::::l&CXii - 4 APR.IL * * * * - 8 APRIL
-0-'6-0""""""'0 - 5 APRIL i ( iii - <?> APRIL
- G APRIL c::x::::r:::J - I0 APRIL
t .... t
.. _ l' APRIL 0 0 0 0 - 14.APRIL
SCA\.E

100 !SQ 0
.,,:.
' .: .. :', ..
MAP No.5 .... , ' ..,:". . . '

due to inclement weather and the extremely bog[3Y condition of the tcrrnin.
Co's Band C, D8th Chemical FOCl.pons En, fired scrocminn; Sr.1ob; bn.rragos
nhich assisted the Inf ',"Thilo digging in in their nOIT positions. An averago
gain of 300 yards vras nade all along the Div front and 2/3131 reached the
west end of nVCAZU RIDG:0 as a result of tho dav
l
s attack.
11 APRIL
Assaults Continue
At 0700 1/381 jumped off from the north slope of the ridge 300 ynrds
north of KAKAZU and advanced 100 yards to the top of this ridGe yrith both
Co's A and C. At 01330 the front lines of the En received intense artillery
and mortClr fire TThich continuod throughout the day causing some 95 casual
ties. After roaching tho top of the ridge, the En turned its attack to the
southeast. In dcsporate nttempts to stop this advance, the enemy came out
of his caves and entrenchr;vmts under the covor of thoir oym mortar fire to
throu hand grenades and satchel charges dOTm the hill into our front lines.
The fighting involved hand-to-hand combat, making progress very slow and
at 1600 the Bn haJ finally inched itself forrrdJ'd approxinatcly 300 yards
(Sec lIap No.4). 2/3131 reYaainod in its provious positions and cloMed out
caves and pillboxes by-passed during the previous day. The 2d and 3d Bns
fired on enemy dcfcmsivo positions in support of the advance of the 1st Dn.
3/30 novcd abre3.st and on the left flank of 1/381 and advanced 100
y.:lrds Trhen the 13.ttor turned to the southeast. The 1st .:lnd 2d Bns of 303d
Ini .:lnd all Bns of the 3li2d Inf consolidatod their Tlrevious gains and
mopped up the remainin[3 pockots of resistance to their rear. Patrols were
sent out to locate and reDort enemy positions to the front, and sniper and
ohservation posts vrore established. The: 106th Inf Regt of the 27th Inf
Div ITas nttachcd to tho 96th Inf Divas of 1200, and moved to a0sembly
areas :10rth of KAliIYAI JI. as Di v reserve.
12 APRIL
Jap Positions Softened by Fire
1/3[11 attacked EAKAZU IUJGE 300 yards to the north of KAKAZU three
times during the day but nore unable to make any advance aGainst the in
t ~ n s e mortar, machine gun and riDe fire, grenades and satchel charges.
The position Has d.efended by vrell-constructed concrete pillboxes, some
'I-'ri th steel sliding door" for their embrasures. Tho Japs had the hill
covered by pr0arrllnGcd mortar and machine gun fire 1'lhic11 nas brought dovm
vrhcncver the arGo. 1."[3.S smoked rmd durinG the hours of darlmoss. An air
strilce preceded the IGt Bn I s attack and tho resulting d.:lnage included two
enemy art.illery pieces <lnd one J<lP truc}< destroyed. Tho 2d and 3d Bns,
301st Inf, supported tho 1st Dn's attack nith 37rnm cannon, machine gun :md
mort<lr fire.
2/106 relieved 3/3[\1 Trost of UCIIITOllARI at 1600 and tho latter moved
to the northeastern edge: of OYAIIA. The 3i32d Inf improved and consolidated
positions and contimwd nith thoir moppinG up in the re<lr llroas. Patrols
were Gent out to contact adjacent units. 1/383 relieved 3/303 at Ihoo and
the 3d Bn, after having been relieved, took p03itions in o.n cxtunsion of
the left flo.nk of the 1st Bn.
- 13
The ammunition supply problem, particularly artillery ammunition,
W:1S becoming serious due to the adverse Yreathc;r and beach conditions.
It nas necessary that action ngo.inst the ener.lybe confined to the G3.ining
of limited objectives vhile this shortaGe existed. The general attack
YTClS to be reSur.Jcd liThon o.mnlmi tion stocks had been replenished and an
adequate reservc established. Ibval air strib.::s becW}c intcmse.
The nere able to knock out linth bonbs, rockets ::md enemy
weapons emr)lo.clcments on. reverse slopes vThich could no
J
-=- to reo.chod by
artillery.
13 APRI1
Japs 1,::::.unch HiGht Offensive
During the niGht 12-13 April) increased ene'T1! activit:;r in th(3 form
of em eno:1Y countcrFLttack ol'cl rc:conr:2.issance in LOrc(; nas cDcountcred
along the entirc) Di v front. j '.tensity of the: enemy artillery and
mortar fire nas gre2.ter than an;,/ rccGived befol'Cj the hours of darkness.
At 0300 this fire 1.TLl.S shifted to Div rear areas C:.Dd the Japs launched a
heavy counterattack dong RIDGE against the JOlst and 3B3d 1nfs.
The attac1: was stopped by o.rti.llery and snall arms fire while TIaval
Gunfire; illuninatcd the entire 2rea. The eneny force; was estimated to
be one battalion reinforced. 40 Japs succeeded in infiltrating into the
38lst Inf lines but VTere killod ;'lfter daylight. 317 Japs were killed as
a result of this action and a total of 850 the 24-hour period.
Durinf, the day 3/381 pa,ssc:c1 th.rouC;h ;'lnd rc1icye;d 2/383 in the front
lines (Soc Ear no. L). D1W:'O :J.ccchine gtm aD,] firo , it Vias
necessary to I'lakc the ch!Cngo by infiltrat:_on. I/3t2, 1[hich had been
c10sinrr tho iJ"O,P behrcc;l 1st 2nd 3d 3m', 3G2d Inf, returned to their
OTm to strengthen tho 10ft fl:mlc of the Rest. Co B, 33Jd
Inf, in conjunction l.-,-ith 1/381, continued to nork donolitio,l teams up the
slopes of KAKAZU RIDC3 JY2\renin,':i the 331st and 382d Infs ,Jere firmly en
trenched in good posrcjons to Fith:l-::'and
1[+-16 AP2I
T
,
lettad::
During tho pe;rj_od 1ll-16 unit::.; of the Div were r02.rranr:;cd
and rcorg;-:.nized in prc}!il.rc.b_oll for :)Liollsive ,::\ction if" +,he
south. 2/;.131 rcpuh;od cneY'lY r:01:ntcr;,,,, '1(: 1c." J ooth estin0,tecl cOI'1nemy
strength, dU!'in;-; the Anr:Ll, 116 ,bp3. 3S1st 1nf
comnletcd the; relief of 3riJcl Inf acljnstcx' front line position".
3/381 ;:ldvcmccd 200 to base of nrjGE at 13177-V3. 3[:2d
1nf also rearranged and front lino positions. The 3(l3d
Inf moved by motor to nun pO[3i tions in service area in Corps
reservo lTit'l 1/303 2t CG87-Y, 2/3
1
3 ;It 878!.J.-E, 3/383 at 8SG7-C and
Regtl CP at 2/106 rCnail1(;d in it3 former position and the
balance ej' the movecl to 11.;[' on the east of 01IcIif....
DurinG 15 April) <:ell lmits contir:ucd mopping up 3.nd
patrol acti-rit:r, Fl ySi8 r,.1 ('ontClct ','ms maintain.:::1 2,10n3 the: rontirc
front line, of J/-; relieved 2/361 ilt U?30 ilnd tho ]:1 t"r
L'.:wc.d to the; 110rt:krn of GINU,,jllI.
On 16 l\.pril, elcncnts of the l05th Inf roJ..ioved 1/381 1'rbo moved
- 14

north to a position about yards southwest of FUTEHA. Other clements
of 10Sth Inf relieved 3/381 ,Thich su'oscquently relieved 2/3132 (See Hap
No.5)
Durine this entire three-day period, Naval Gunfire and Air Support
continued to soften up enemy positions on l\AKAZU RIDGE and the precipitous
escarpment to the south of I\AKAZU running east and nest across the island.
500/1 bombs 'with an G-second delayed fuze were used in attempts to penetrate
into some of the deep caves in this escarpment. Repeated atter.lpts 'Here
made by the Japs to infiltrate small groups carrying satchel charges and
grenades behind our lines but nithout much success. All positions in tho
Div zone wero materially strengthened to vJithstand eneny counterattacks
until the general offensive could be
SULIllARY
For the first three days, the Div's advance 1'[as pr':lCtical1y uncontestc
By 3 April 45 the Div had completely secured its portion of tho Corps bo,:l.C:
head (LfIO 1ino). Tho rapidity of this accomplishment placed the Div on
the L f 10 line almost soven days in advance of the tine anticipated to
reach it. Subsequently the 96th Inf Div ran into some of tho bitterest
fir;hting of the entire Caml)aign. Beginning 4 April, resistanco began
to stiffen until April 7 vrhen ti1e Div ran into the first nain position on
KAY\AZU RIDGE occupied by clements of the 63d Brigade of tho 62d Division.
From this day through 16 April the battle raged for this position. The
ridge vms finally taken 2h April and 600 Japs vmre found dead in and arounc
the position. The Japs used more artillery and heavy 110rtar fire than had
ever been encountered in any previous Pacific campaign. The eneny defendcc:
every inch of ground by vrell-coordinated machine gun, mortar and artillery
fire and systematic Coul1tcrattacks. Pillboxes, cunnini;ly concealed, of
reinforced concrete (European variety) nere organized in great depth on
each hill mass and strategic point. They vmre mutually supporting and all
fire nas interlocking. Sone of these fortific8tions were two or three
stories in depth with tunnels connecting them.
tho fight for KAKAZU RIDGE the 96th Inf Div completely oblit
erated part of tho J2p 63d Brigade and othc;r elements of the 62d Div,
killing h663 of tho (mcmy. Hovrevcr, in so doing the Div suff'.)red extremely
severe casui11tics, a ratio or approximately 2 Japs to 1 American as follo1'rs:
Our Ovrn C8.sual ties: KJ.A WIiI. IlIA
3iJlst 1nf 68)02 :3
3i32d Inf
97 548 19
3D3d Inf 102 551 314
Total: 2004
(Japs killed h663)
Our T,'1.nk Lassos: IS
Damar;e to thu Enell,Y:
Japs killed,
mIs,
4663
6
Ilachine Guns
lIartars
39
15
Tanks
Pillboxes
1
51
Field Pieces, 9 320nm Hortars 1 Caves 131
5" Gun 1
-15
L Co, 383d Inf, for its outstanding performance of duty in action
against the enemy in the vicinity of KAKAZU RIDGE "Vms awardod the
Prosidential Unit Citation. The Citation road as follows:
llThis conpany Tms assigned the mission of assaultinG a heavily
fortified l1T11 shapod ridge spur in tho mv extremity of tho
tmm of Kakazu, uhich gave tho enemy complete observation and
flanking fire on the entiro reginent. The occupation of this
spur rrhich provided observation of the nain eneny strong point
along the entire ridge Tras of vital importance to the entire
command. Company L gained complete surprise, and, ..lith fixed
bayonets, boldly and fearlessly charged the heavily defended
position and attained the assigned objective. Company G, 3B3d
Inf, on the loft and Company I, 383d Inf, on the right encoun
tered withering machino gun crossfire and intense mortar and
artillery barre.ges and Trcre unable to take the ridge in their
sectors, thus imperiling conpany L's security. Superior enemy
forces supported by heavy mortars and nassed artillery launched
four po....rerful and deternined counterattacks. Company L, although
weakened by severe lossos, displayed unexcelled courage and
prowess in arms by gallantly holding its ob jectivo through the
grimly raging battlo until ultimatoly the eneny was repulsed.
Company L held this strategic all day until forced to
withdravr at 1630 because of severe flanking fire and a critical
shortago of This Conpcny killed 160 of the enemy
including one colonel and one major, and destroyed a 320mm
mort::lr YTllich had been harnssing the Regt. Company L's losses
includod ten killed in action, fivo miSSing in action and thirty
wounded. 11
The eXaJ:lple of this Co 1 s was typical of tho intense fighting that
took placo during this part of the opor::ltion.
- 16
OKINAWA SHIMA
r ARRATIVE:
PART- II
1
PART II
ASSAULT OF TANi.BARU AND MAEDj.. ESCi.RPlI:ENTS
17 - 30 APRIL
The period 17-30 April was ['. distinct ph9.se of the 96th Div's cC'm
paign on OKINAVJA." Initially the Div hnd estnblished its benchhead and
then turned south, driving nlong the west coast of the island with the
7th Div on its left. Beginning 15 April the XXIV Corps committed the
27th Div on the Corps I right flnnk and employed a three-division front in
G.ttcmpt to break the strong enemy defenses which hG.d halted our initial
rC'.pid n.dvC1.nce to tho south. This shifted the 96th Div to a zone running
generally north G.nd south through the middle of the islG.nd, in the center
of the line, with tr.e 27th Div on its right ond the 7th Div on its left.
'.Iithin this new zone tho Div continued its drive to the south until re
lieved by the 77th Div on the 30th of J.pril.
During this offensive two successive enemy lines of defense were
encountered. These lines, composed of intricate ccwe nnd pillbox defenses,
centered chiefly on two successive hill r,!asses: the TANABARU-NISHABARU
RIDGE (SeG No.7 and Fig. 5), and tho HILL 196 nren or UAEDA ESCARP
MENT' (See lliClp No.8 Ci.nd Fig. 6). The Div's action during Part II, there
fore, cC'.n be divided genercT!_y into tVJO periods, cC'..ch involving the at
tack on onG of theso defensive positions.
BREAKING THE T;.N;,BilRU-NISl-U,BARU DEFEiJSES
16 - 23 ;,pril
From 16 to 18 j,pril the Div concentrRtod on rearrnnging front line
nnd reserve units nnd completing prepnrations for the Corps nttnck of
19 ",pril. The 381st Inf, nfter being relieved by the 27th Div in tho
IG,KAZU RIDGE area, shifted to the left nnd relieved elcmcmts of the 382d
Inf in the aren. The 382d Inf, in turn, with throe Bns in the
line prior to this time, n.lso shifted to tho left to occupy a narrower
zone for the coming I:'..tto.ck. 1/382 moved to nssembly nren (8378-Y) east
of GINCnMJ on the 17th.
Conferc;ncc:s ,;ere held vlith tho n.dj,:',cent Divs to determine ('.ccurntcly
tho boundaries bctvJCen Divs on the ground; reconn:ciss:o.nco p;'1.trols probed
the enomy-hold torritory; comb2.t .'1vintion, i!.rtillory, chemic:cl mortars,
.....nd n:.',v,u gt:nfire lNCro employed Qxtensively to softon up ()Demy positions
to the Div front. Div ;,rtillery, in addition to firing normnl support
nissions, "shot in" plt'.nnod conccntr:,tions for' the impending:cttnck.
Enemy <:cctivity during theso two drys w<:cs enemy artillery
h<:crL'.ssed tho front lino Bros night nnd some MG fire wns
received during the
-17
*
1$ l.PRIL
PIC'Jl.s Completed
Tho gcnor2..1 plt.n of the Div for the r>.tt.:'..ck s:iJnple but complete.
(FO 1;1 17, Hq 96th Inf Div). The Div (less 383d Inf minus 3/383) VJr>.s to
:ltt('.ck with four Bns in the nssc.ult at 0640, 19 April, except for the
right flc...'1k Bn whoso time of nttL'.ck was 0730, with the line of dopo.rturo
desiGnated as front line positions as of 0640. 3/381, the right fl<,.nk
Bn, vms to hold for the first 50 minutes of the attack due to its <'.d
vc.nced position in compCU'ison with the other Ci.ssaul t Bns (Soo Map No.7)
The 3$lst Inf zono of attack V:Ci.S on the Div right C'Jl.d the 382d Ini zone
on the left. 3/3$3 vms in Div reserve locded at $478-L. The Div inter
mediate objective w[tS the hill mass centered on the HILL 196 <'.ren. The
Corps objective '.'m.s tho gonernl NiJil.-5HURI-YONil.B1JW. Loc.::.tion of
c\ssnult Bns, nnd boundnrics botween Divs and Regts arc shown on Mc.p
No.6.
Intensivo c.rtillory preparC'.tions were carefully coordinntod with' tho
infFtntry attClck. Div 2..rtillery, ylith 1st FA Bn, 11th fu':'.r Regt . .".tchd:;
reinforced by XXIV Corps artillery, nitval gunfire, 50hth .i.'-u:l.J\ (Gun) Bn,
Ci.nd Co B, 763d Tk Bn, vms to fire [" preparation beginning i'.t 0600.
0620, fires VlcrU to be lifted 500 Y2.rds to the rear and continuod at Ci.
reduced rate. il.t this timB front line units wore to SimulCltc a... tack
but not Ci.dv<'nce. t 0630 time fire w.<'\.s to be brought down in fror..t of
our Inf in <'.n <lttelnpt to c["tch tho enclny in tho open as they returned to
their firing positions. The c..rtillory prepClrCltion vms thon to continue
till 0640, tt which time tho ntt,<'.ck would begin and artillery fir;] would
be; lifted to pre-terre.nsed points. Tho artillery prcpCi.ration was to con
tinue Clt n reduced in front of tho right flnnk Bn of the 381st Inf
from 0640 to 0730.
The )8)d Inf (minus 3/38.3) W:1.S placed in Corps reserve, locQted
generally in tho vicinity of 1-:0Z;' (87%-T) (See Map No.3), rend \\IQS
responsible for tho defense of the Corps Service ;lrcn.
19 j,PRIL
Corps Lnunches 1;1:. tack
i,fter n eomp<lrdively quiet night, following the intense, pre
viously-pl:.-.n.rwd pr0pC'-ration, the ;)iv Clttacked <'.t 0640 nceording
to schedule. Only slight vms encountered initiclly nnd .:111
four assault Bns cdve.need r(.'.pid1y until ClpprOxinlo.tcly 0730. From this
timo on throughout tho d['.y, enomy machine gun r>.nd riflo fire coming from
the high ground to tho Div front rmd flmlks slowed down the Cldv''.DCC to
creeping ,md crawling i'.ction.
In tho 381st Inf zono, 1/381, on tho Regtl left, reC'..chcQ
(8276-C) by 0700 Qnd pns3cd r:--iJidly through the town. Fifteen minutes
.1nter 1/)81 cC'me ::cbro:.. ,st of 3/381 end tho l:'.tter Bn begnn their ".'..ttack,
rapidly ndvrmcing 300 yards until pinned daVID by he".vy crossfire from
enomy m,::cchino guns. 1/381, "ft..;r !"!J.1 cdv:'.ncc ccpproxi1"rtoly 700 ynrds
during tho morning, "Iso encounterod tho s \lIlO type of m,'chinc gun fire.
enemy fire of :'.n intense, gr<:.zing n:-.turo, s"Wcepin,; the entire
nl'f!n to the front of the Regt, .".nd cc::.r:1.0 from positions loccctcd on
IL:"Y.l',.%fJ RTDGE j n t.ho 27th Div zor..e, which 6ord.natocl. tho Div right. f'lnnk,
-18
and from.other positions to the Rcgtl front and leftflcnk on the north
slopes of the TANABARU-NISPJI.Bl.RU RIDGE. Medium tanks and the reserve /--
Cos of the two Bns were corrunitted in the gap between-ihe Bns, but
nlso pinned down by Ilk'lchine 'gun fire and were unnble to assist in the
advance. Further advances in the face of this withering crossfire were
negligible for the rest of'the day. Lnte in the afternoon 3/381, after
suffering henvy casualties, withdrew its advance clements from their ex
posed position and consolidated its line, for the night in npproximately
the same 10cC\tion as on the previous niglt. 2/381 moved to assembly
pOSitions (8277-IJ) north of Ki,NlKU.
In the 382d Inf zone the S'1J1le detc::mined type of enemy rasistnnce
was encountered after rc.pid initial gails.' Following closely behind
artillery concentrations, the 1st and 2 i Bns had both advanced 500 yards
by 0730. From this time on throughout day, the advance vms extremely
slow, being restricted mainly to indivilual rushes and small-unit ad
vances of n few yards r,t 2. t:ilne. Deadl r machine gun i'.nd rifle fire coming
from the northorn tip of TOMBSTONE continued to sweep over the
lines of both Bns . These enemy positio1S were exportly ci'.rnouflagcd,
mutually supporting, 2nd So woll emplnc;c thi'.t they were able to continue
firing oven during artillery concentrr,t '.ons. This 1I1DI-:1BSTONE RIDGE"
(See Map No.7) W::l.S so norned by the trO')pS which assaulted it because of
the b.rge number of l1:ctive tombs on the ridge. Although'inconspicuous
fror,l a disti'.nce, i'.nd nGt even shown on official 1/25,000 operations
map, this ridge harbored one of the positions en
countered during the By 1125, 1/382, on the Regtl right, had
finally succeeded in grLining a footholc on the northern tip of the ridge,
and by the combined use of inf'lntry anc' @rect fire of tc'.l1k, M-7' sand
37rnm j,T guns, was' able to push ahe r.d sJ )wly, de stroYlii.-g-tEc enemy posi
tions encountered, <'.nd finally secnri.l1t the northern tip of the ridge.
2/382 to 2dvc'.nco slowly, keel ing generally abre.1.st of 1/382 on
its right and a Bn of the 7th Div on its left. 3/382 moved up through the
center of the Regtl zono and coverod thJ gap between tho two assault Bns.
As .1. result of the di'.Y's attack, therofore, the 381st Inf advanced
some 700 yards on its left and front lines were located just north of the
TAIJAB1.RU-1JISHl,B;,RU RIDGE. The 382d Inf ['cdvanced from 800 to 1000 yards
and secured the northern tip of TGl,IBSTONE RIDGE, with final front lines
somo 400 yards behind tho 381st Inf.
20 j',PRIL
Japs Defend Bitterly
On 20 J',pril tho i'.ttack was renewed at 0730 follovling C!. half hour
artillery prepari'.tion. The srune determined enemy resistcmce was encoun
tered. The 381st Inf initially supported by fire the of 3/382
which had passed through the interval between 1/382 and 2/382 to attack
south astride TOMBS'IDNE RIDGE. When the right flank of 3/382 crune abreast
of 1/381, this Bn lnunched its main attnck nnd by 1130 h,:d pushed two Cos
to the top of the TANi,B/.RU-NISHlI.BJ.RU RIDGE:. 3/381 supported this advnnce
by fire but was un,-ble to move forward due to continuod he('.vy enomy fire
from KAKAZU RIDGE, which had been by-passed by the 27th Div. J,t 1320,
2/381 vws committed on the right flank of 1/381, ['.nd in spite of heavy
enemy m,-lchine gun, mortar cmd rifle fire from their right flctIlk wns nble
to push two Cos to the top of the TMJi'l.Bj,RU-NISHABARU RIDGE abreast or
-19
1/381. This TANABhRU-NISHABfI.RU RIDGE (Sec Hap No. 7 and Fig. 5) was called
NISHl.BiillU RIDGE in the 381st Inf zone. HILL 165 (8275-N), a part of the
snme ridge in the 382d In! zone, was often cp.lled the IITANABARU T,'.BLETOP"
or IIESC],RPMENTII. The IIGA:rE
II
, so called because of two rocks jutting up
wnrd resembling grcteposts, was also located on this ridge.
In the 382d Inf zono, 3/382 wns comr:lit ted on the Regtl right as
described nbove. 1/382, from its positions on the north tip of TOl.1BS'IDNE
RIDGE, supported the attack of both 3/382 and 2/382. 3/382 by the end of
the dC'.y hnd succeeded in elimino.ting all enemy resistcmce on TOMBS'IDNE
RIDGE. The left flank of 2/382 VI2,S unECble to moke any r>.ppreciablc gr>.ins
due. to intense mrtchine gun 2.no. rifle fire coming from a rocky crag on its
left flank in tho 7th Div zone However, tho right f1<mk of this Bn nd
v('cnced approximntcly 300 yC',rds.
hlthough the flcmks of the Div were une.ble to mnkc ,':'.ny substnntinl
advances during the day the 382d Inf completed the seizure of TOMBSTO!JE
RIDGE ,:md two Bns of the 38lst Inf wore entrenched on the T;,NJ"R'.lLU
NISHhR\RU RIDGE.
21 J.PRIL
;.dvC'.ncos 'ilere Slow
On 21 jl,pril the Div contim.'0d its nttack to the south. The 38lst
Inf jumped off nt 0630 v,ith the 1st ?,nd 2d Bns c:'.breast, over
the TANi,R.RU-NISfbBJ.RU RIDGE. Stiff resistance was imrnodio.tely encoun
tered, particularly on the left flo.nk from a large number of enemy en
trenchments within the town of lJISI:Ul,Bil,RU (8l76-QR.ST). The two Bns were
\ forced to operate LJitho'4 t2.nks or other direct fire wenpons ns the stoep
slopes 0f tho ridge prevented any tC'nks or vehicles from reaching its
top, rend it was impos!3ible to circlo around the west edge of tho ridge
because of her',vy firo from KLKi.ZU RIDGE. (It is to be noted that this
enomy pocket en Kl,K.i,ZU RIDGE, by-pc\sseo. initially by the 27th Div, was
still hindering the ?dvances of the 96th Div right flc,nk). hppro2,ches
on other parts of the ridge were ellso covered by fire. 2/381, on the
right flo.nk. mn.'1Clged to slo'wly approximdely 200 y:crds to Cl
smClll finger of high ground jutting out just southwest of tho town.
enemy mClchinc Bun crossfire con:ing from tho south slopes of the
Ti.I'LB:.aU-NIS1-L.Bi,IW RIDGE from Kl,Kl.ZU RIDGE thoroughly covered 2/381
in its o.dv2.nced position. 1/381 :'.180 e!1countered ho('\vy mnchine gun fire
from the S2ffie enomy positions r.nd. Vic.S uwble to C',dv?nco ['.pprecinbly. At
1300 Cl he2.vy mortrcr in C'.ddition to the 2.bove mentioned mrechinc
gun firo, forced 2/381 to' vJithdrClw to the Ti,W.B:.RU-FISHi,B:,RU RIDGE
r'brenst of 1/:381, Vlhere front lines of both Dns were consolidreted for
tho night.
In tho 382d Inf zone 1/382 mO'F;d forv;C\rd to the position Of' the
south ond of TOMBSTONE RIDGE th".t 3/382 br'.d occupied the previous day.
3/382 then withdrew rend moved through thu 381st Inf zono in order to ns
snult from the wost thd portion of the Tl,lL.Bi,RU-InsHtB;,RU R.IDGE in the
382d Inf zono. The Bn nttr.ckcd at 0815, supported by firo from 1/382
r.md 2/382, rend progressed slowly ago.inst strong mrcchinc gLm fire coming
from (memy positions :'.11 r'long the ric.gc. By 1100 the Dn hnd c'.dvC'.nced
up tho ('sco.rpment !'.nd secured :'. foothold on the ridge to tho left of
1/381. BetwGen 1300 Clnd 1515 tho enemy launched throe counteratt2.cks
-20
l
..
LEG END ' " ,>

:,: ..:....... ( -...... INF .
... / .. .... '.: . . ., "'.:,) \
BREAKING
. , FRONT LINES AT '-500 " .
TANAMAU-NISHAaARU
- 18 APRIL
u..u." (9 APRIL
D FE 5
c::ID 20 APRIL
APRIL .94&
u.....x 21 APRiL

x::x=x 22 APRI L
23 APRIL
agdnst this Bn in n vain effort to retake the ridge. Lpproximately
150 Jnps wore killed during one of t.hese counternttacks. 3/383, pre
viously in Div reserve, was attached to the 382d Inf and ccrmnitted in the
center of this Rogt' s zaneta attnck the TJ.NI,B:.RU-NISH:.KRU RIDGE on the
left of 3/382. 3/383 jumped off at 1300 from the southeast slopes of
TOHBS'IONE RIDGE. Tho ct-tnck proceeded fairly woll for th.:: first 150 yr.rds
but from tk.t point on, enemy mnchine guns expc.;rtly emplaced in the
steep sides of the ridge to their front held r.dv;mces to a minimum. The
Bn W[1.S forced to dig in for the night on the loft of 3/382 approximately
200 yards north of tho ridge. The 382d Inf killed r. totnl of 332 Japs
during the an indicdion of the fierce fighting engp.ged in and the
strength of the enemy counterattacks.
22 i,PRIL
Jap Defenses We-:"',ken
On 22 ;.pril, action {llong the Div front, oxcept on the right fln.nk of
the 383d Inf, WC"1.S less intense them during the previous dn.ys, although a
total of 200 J wore killed ;:cnd by the end of the period three Bns
occupied strong positions on the Tl.Nl,Bl',RU-EISH:,Bi.RU RIDGE.
The 381st Inf did not ;,cttempt to their front lines during
the dny. The; plnl1 for this Regt vms to hold lAp tho :;dv.::nce of tho two
le,'cding Bns until 1\::.Kl.ZU RIDGE hnd been clot'.nod up r.nd clements of the
27th Div hnd gdned contr.ct with 3/381 on the Div right flank. 3/381,
however, assisted the 27th Div in its attack on the ridge by direct fire
from t,mks, M-7' s nnd i,T guns into tho enemy positions.
On the Div left, the 383d Inf (with 2/382 attr.ched) relieved the
382d Inf in their zone of nction begin:ling at 0600. By 1000, 2/38.3 had
completed tho relicf of 3/382 on the right. (2/382 during the night hnd
received continuous mortar and small arms fire and occasional attacks by
small groups of J nps) i.t the complotion' of the relief, front line Bns
in the 383d zone wore, frot: right to'left, 2/383, 3/38:3, and 2/382 (Sec
Mn.p No.7). 1/383, in Rcgtl reservo, moved to positions on the north
tip of RIDGE at 8276-J. At 1100 the Rcgt jumped off in a co
ordinated on tho TJ,l\T,\R.RU-NISH!.BI,RU RIDGE. Tho ?dv2.nce wns ex
tremely slow due to continuous m2.chine firo coming from concealed am
pl2.cements all "-long tho high ground to the front C'.nd left fl.:-cnk. By
1600 after bitter fighting, 2/383, on the Regtl right, had ndvn.nced to
the southe[1.st 200 yC'.rds to secure definitely th2t portion
of the ridge in tho Bn zone. 3/383 C'.pproximatcly 150 yn.rds
during the r'ay rend consolidnted positions with its left fl.::mk within 200
ynrds of the escl".q:mont d tho 'IT;.rC,BI.RU THBLETOplI (HILL 165) . Final
front lines 2.ro shown on ticcp No.7, with 2/381, 1/381 ('.nd 2/383, from
right to left, clug in on tho T;,I:.,B..RU-NISHl".R.RU RIDGE.
Tho 382d Inf (loss 2/382 nnd with 96th Rcn Tr nttr.ched), !">,fter its
relicf, moved to nuw positions in the Corps Sorvice l,ren to replace
383d Inf ns Corps reserve. .
-21
23 APRIL
Defensive Line Broken
Age.in on 23 li.pril, ndvC'.nces in yards in the Div z.one vJCre slight. By
the end of the day, however, four Bns were in position on the Tj'.Nl.B.:,RU
EISHJ,Bl.RU RIDGE, occupying the entire ridge excopt for the extreme eastern
tip.
The 381st Inf continued to strengthen nnd their positions,
Rnd ph.ced direct firo of iJ.ll weD-pons on K.,fuI.ZU RIDGE. 383d
Inf continued its pressure against the Ti,Ni.Bi.R,U-NISRt.RJW RIDGE. By 1600
3/383, excellently sUEE?rtod by mediwn 763d and one
fJ-af!1<:lthrower had come up-on the left of 2/383 nnd c,,-ptured
a saddle in the ridge approximately in the center of the RGgtl zone.
2/383, on tho Regtl right, continued to mop up tho high ground secured
yesterdp.y and pushed elements to within 400 yards of HILL 143. 2/382, on
the Regtl left, adviJ.nced up to 200 but failed to t.::tke tho romaining
enemy-hold portion of the ridge just north of T1JJ;,R'.RU on the Div left
flank. This remaining portion was composed of tho IISSC.',R1'1IENT" and .
"T;,N:.Bj.RU Tj,BLETOP" (HILL 165) (See Fig. 5).
By the ovening of 23 jl.pril the strong enemy defensive line in tho
TmmSTONE RIDGE - TJ,NriB"RU-}:ISHIB,.RU fUDGE aroa had boon broken. .\s a re
sult the whole enemy defense lino ["cross the Corps front centered general
lyon Ki.KAZU RIDGE in the 27th Div zone, TOI\:SJTONE and the
R'tRU RIDGES in the 96th Div zono, and HIlL 178 (D. dominating hill mass in
the 7th Div zono at 8374-:B on line viith the T.. RIDGE) be
camo unten2.ble for the enemy (See Enp No. 18, Enemy Defenses). During the
night of 23-24 :.pril the enomy \-Jithdrow from his, positions on
this'ridge line. On the 24th, C'. "tC'.sk force" . composed of clements of the
27th, 96th, 2.nd 7th Divs, onco'.mtered little' in mopping
up the Ki,Ki2U D.roa.i the' 7th Div secured HILL 178 e::-'.riy iri the morning;
o.nd the romClining portion of tho Tl,N;.BI.RU-I.:ISHi,B"\RU RIDGE in enemy hClnds
was occupied by 2/382 without opposition.
SUa'!.RY
During this period, 17 to 23 April, enemy artillery showod D.' genoral
decrease in intensity. liowover, front lines, inf;cntry rco.r are:1.s, D.nd
t:rtillory pOSitions recoivod int;:;nnittcnt tlrtillery firo cu.ch nico;ht.
Enemy mort2r fire also !'lD.rassed front line positions each night. Infil
tration attornpts vwrc negligible during tho period. Tho weather Vl3.S
generally cloctr to cloudy, with light r;,dns on only ono d'S, the 19th of
april. i.viatior. continued to supply deep c:.ir support cmd observation
missions.
The following figuros givQ Ul indication of the heC'.vy fighting
which took place:
Our casuC'.lties: KL WE 1:L',
381st Inf 25 281+ 4
382d Inf 52 246 11
383d Inf 22 130 l.
Tot2.1: 778
(JilpS killed: 1346)
-22
Tcrna baru Escarpm (Hi If 165)
Ishrbaru Ri7
Fig. 5 (above) TA.l\f ABARU-NISHIBARU RIDGE. Fig. 6. (below) MAEDA SSCARPMENT.
This ridge composed the terrain feature on This hill mass was often referred to 'as Hill
whiCh the enemy based hie defense line in 196 area. The enemy second line of defense
Part II. encountered during Part II was centered on this
hill.
Needle Rock
Our tank losses (from 1.T and artillery fire, satchel charges
and mines): 12.
Damage to the enemy:
KL'.., -1346 320rnm mo,rtars, 2
FIN's, 2 fuortars, 30
Field pioces, 13 Pillboxes, 76
MGts, 68 Caves, ert
j.CTION l.G;.INST TIlE
With the breaking of the enemy's TOMBSTONE RIDGE - TI.Ni.BI.RU
NISH1:.Bi.R,U RIDGE defensive line, tho Div :immediately bumped into the
second enomy defensive line centered i'cner:iLly on the HILL 196 area
which includod the },ilEDii ESG.,RPI\lEHT'.:'.:1d tho ;.lthough this
hill m<'-ss '"inS referred to in FO: s as HILLS 196 and 187, it was actually
0. ridge compoE"od of three hills (155 at 8075-L, 150 at B075-S, 152 nt
8074-:2) ruru'1.ing across the Div zone, cmd high ground oxtending south
from tho ond of this merging eventut:'lly into the high ground
of tho SHURI aroa. HILL 155 was named tho 1fM,.E!)i." or "BIG" ESCt.RPMEl!T
(Sec Fige 6 and Map No.8). Tho action against this next defensive line
comprises tho second period of Part II of tho Div's operations.
24 I.PRIL
Tho Enemy H:ld HithdrnWl1
.
On tho re,pid nG.vcmces of o.pproxiI1lately 1100 yards wore made
by the Div ngr,inst nlmost noglig2.blo rosisk.nce. 3/381, on tho Div
right, under commr..r..d of Gon Brchiford, nttackod at 0830, and by 0845
had adv".ncod vcrj ligh:-- rosistance to positions alrnost abreast
of the ether two Dns of tho 381st Inf, and by 0950 had advcmcod approxi
mately 500 yards boyond them, rc,".ching the IItr..sk forco" objective line.
As it bocDme evident that tho Ki,':-::.;.L:.U pocket would shortly bo entirely
cloanod up, tho 381st <'-nd 383d 1c.fs wore ordered to attack at 1Cl30 to
seize HILL 143 (Shown as HILL 137 (8175-N) on 3d revision, 1/25,000 map)
and tho high ground rtmning west from HILL 143 immediately north of the
HII.J. 196 aren. 2/381 and 1/381 C0mc abreast of 3/381, and all three Bns
rapidly light or no onemy opposition, and by 1200 had
ro.::tched the dey's objoctive. The Regt consolidated its lines nt thnt
position. During tho bc..lancc of the day pntrols operated towsu-ds the
base of the ESC;.RPI:EHT.
Tho 3tS3d Inf resumod its ".dv".ncc nt 0800. By 1000, 2/382 on the
Regtl loft, hnd secured tho "Escnrpncnt" nnd T:.BIETOP"
(HUL 165) without opposition. 3/383, at 0800, ndvnncod unopposed and
occupied n smnll hill just S of the ridge line. At 1030-thc Regt began
its nttack with 2/383 and 3/383 in the assault. By 1200, 2/38'.3, on tho
Regtl right, had secured HILL 143 without enemy opposition. Tho Bn corr
tinued to advance dO\Vll the south slopes of the hill and came Df
-23
1/381 where they.were ordered to' consolidate defensive positions'for the
night. 3/383, on the Regtl left, moved rapidly through Tl'.N;l.B:.RU, took
HILL" (8275-QV), and had advanced some 400 yards south of the
town by 1400. During the remainder of the day, strong combat patrols
reconnoitered enemy defensive positions on the high ground to the Regtl
front. 1/383 relieved 2/382 and took up reserve positions in vicinity
of HIlL 165. 2/382 moved to nssembly aroas north of at 8276-Y.
96th Rcn Tr was released Corps reserve and to 382d Inf,
Lmd moved to defensive positions at 8277-A just south of GTIJOVJi,N.
1',s [" result of tho da2d s HILL 143, HILL 165, and T;JJ/.Bi..RU
HILL had been taken by tho 383d Inf,'1nd tho 381st Inf was within approx
l1:1ntoly 600 Yds of the base of the Mi.EDi. ESC.:.RPMENT. Flank units were
in physical contact with froi1t line units of both tho 7th Md 27th Div
isions.
25 APRIL
Attack Plans Prepared
On tho 25th, no advnnces were nttemptod by the Div. Front lines
did notchClnge materially although both Rogts mGde minor readjustments.
381st Clnd 383rd Infs perfected plans for a Corps attack ordered for the
following dny. Direct fire from all supporting weapons, including pre
cision c(djustment by artillery, was plClccd on definitely locnted enemy
positions on the high ground to the Div front. In the 381st zone, nt
least 20 occupied enemy emplaccr:.cnts were destroyed. 383d Inf pushed
aggressiv.e pC'.trels 400' to 500 Yds in front of their positions without
encountering Clny strong ene!:',y opposition or fortified positions. l.n air
strike at 1500 against the hill mnss was vary successful. 24-500 lb
bombs [md 24-100 lb bombs were dropped. 2/382 was rolievod from attach
lnent to 383d Inf and placed in Div reserve in positions (8277-L) just
north of Kt'.NlKU.
96th Div FO # 18, 25 ll.pril 45 (Soo "\nnex A) prescribod the details
for the attack of the 26th. This attack was to bo made along the entire
Corps front by the 27th, 96th and 7th Divs. Tho 96th Div vms to attack
tho hill mass imrrL':;diately to its front, with the Div objective designated
as the SHURI area. BoundC'.rios betwoon Divs Clnd Rogts vlere <:'.s shown on
Mnp Ho. 8. Once ngain extensive L.rtillery preparr.:tions were to bo fired
precoeding the attack. Div ordered to fire a "false"
prepClration at maximum r2j:,e on tho HILL 196 area from 0535 to 0600. JUi
air strike employing n2.palm bOl'1bs thon to bo delivered on the sruno
genor2.1 c..rea, following which Div ll.rtillcry >/Ould firo<:'.nothcr
preparntion. The tirne for WetS set tent2.tively at 0700, immed
iately following the artillery preparation. .
26 j,PRIL
The ;,ttack
On tho 26th, Div :.rtillcry fired the false prepccrl',tion ::ccording
to schedule and then tho L\.Ctunl prop[lr:,tion from 0650 to 0710. The'
Gchedulcd nLlpalm strike was cancelled due to poor visibility. 3/381,
2/381., 2/383 and 3/383, fror:1 right to left (see Hap No.8), jumped off
in, tho 2.ttn,ck at 0710 supported by two companies of medium tt'.Dks.
-24
ACTION AGAINST
ESCARPMENT
24-30 APRIL
LEGEND
383Q INF RELIEVED BY
FRONT LINES AT 1800 ELMTS AT
=t> 38lU INF ..
383 D INF 30 1200 I
$ 382Q INF xu
APRIL
-
23 APRIL XX! 27 APRIL
u..u
24 APRIL
Q..Q..t
28 APRIL
a::c
25 APRIL Dll Z9 APRIL
ScalE>
'10 0 100 'Zoo 400
, 5oo'tbS MAP No.8
Initie.llY, resistance was light along the entir.e Div front. By 0800 the
381st Inf had roached the escarpnent with front lines generally on the
north slopes of HILL 155 just short of the crest. In the. 2/381 sector
one enemy strongpoint continued to hold out. An attempt to flank this
position to the left was unsuccessful due to intense fire from the south
slopes of the ridge and the left flank. Although tho north slopes of the
escarpment had been gained against light opposition, except for the one
onory strongpoint in the 2/381 zone, further advances by the Regt were
slight due to the intense mortar and machine gun fire sweeping the top
and south slopes of tho ridge. It should bo,notod the.t the terrain in
tho 381st Inf zone ,Nas extremely difficult. The MAED,:\ ESCl..RPMENT to the
west of nlffiEDlE ROCKII was a sheer cliff, making the uso of imp()ssi1:>:J..o ,
(Soe Fig. 6.) The "NEEDIE ROCK" was an oblong-shnped rock formation jut
ting into the air nt tho oast tip of HILL 155. It wns evontually neces
so.ry to cut roads v;ith dozers in .order to support the advance of the
Regtl left flank. . ,
In the 383d Inf zone, initial resistance was nlso light. By 0845
the Regt had re[',ched the high ground, with 2/383 oxtencUng from HIlL 150
through the cast edgo of Ivf1lliDA (8075-PQVIX) and 3/383 on the high ground
along tho Div left boundnry. The Regt wns unable to e.dvance further
during the dny due to heavy machine gun and rifle fire sweeping the
fOl"Vmrd slopes of the hills.
The bnlCltlce of tho day vms spent in locating nnd des troying enemy
artillery, AT, nnd machine gun emplacements intho zone of both Regts.
1/383 closed into an assembly nrea on HILL 143. The 96th Rcn Tr moved
forward and cstC:lblishod n defensive position on Tl.ITJ\Bl.RU HILL to cover
the gap which had developed betwoen the 96th Div loft flank ['.nd the
right flnnIe of the 7th Div.
During the night 26-27 j.pril, thoro was n docided incroase in enemy
activity along the Div front. Heavy of artillery, scat
tered 50mm and 8lmm mort[',r fire, and harassing mnchine gun fire covered
the entire front. Numerous infiltration attempts were made by t.he Japs
on all front line Bns, with the heaviest attacks in the zone of the
381st Inf. This Regt killed 64 Japs during the night.
27 APRIL
Enemy Resistance Stiffens
I.fter 8. 20-minute C',rtillery the Div iumped off at 073Q
on the sJ?earhoclded by medium and flC\ffiethrQwer and <tdvanced
approxim['ctely 400 Yds during tho deW except on the extreme right flank.
Enemy opposition during the period was
In tho 381st Inf the right'flank of tho Regt immediately en
countered intense mort.1.r, J:.:'.chine gun, and small <:',rms fire ;:>.S they at
tempted to cross the ridge. The top of the cscarprrrent was untenable due'
to this enemy fire. During tho dny 3/381, on the Regtl right, WC1.S un
able to m2.Ke cmy advC'.nces in .front lines. HOYleVer, demolition patrols
searched out ;:\nd destroyed num(;rous enemy cO.ves, pillboxes and machine
gun eITlplncoments nlong the steep south slopes of HILL 155. 2/381 con
tinued to mop up cr.vcs ['.nd pillboxes in tho center of their zone, aided,
by one pl,lt 1/381, committed on tho Rogtl left,
-25
advanced its left flank some 200 yards against extremely intense machine
gun and small arms fire. Although the 'Regt made but slight advances dur
ing the day they engaged in. the most bitter close-in fighting encountered
for some time.
In the 333d zone, 2/333, on the right, advanced 200 Yds during the
morning through the east portion of filAEDA and over HILL 152. At 1400 this
Bn encountered an extremely well-prepared enemy position to their front
and right front which limited further advances during the day to a few
yards. Throughout the afternoon the right flank of this Bn, on the' high
ground just south of MAEDA, received heavy machine gun and mortar fire
coming generally from their right front. -3/333, on the left, advanced
against moderate resistance gained some 400 yards. 1/333 moved up to
the vicinity of HILL 150 to close the gap between 1/331 and 2/383.
During the night 27-28 April, heavy enemy artillery continued to
fallon all front line Ens, and numerous enemy infiltration attempts by
Plat groups were repulsed. It should be noted that the weather from the
24th through the 27th had been rainy, ,,'lith the resultant road and supply
difficult For the ba lance of the per iod the weather 1'a8 clear.
28 APRIL
Japs Fight Desperately
On the 23th, strong resistance again prevented any gains on
the Div right flank. The 383<1 Inf on the left, however, waS ab2.e to
gain up to 300 yards. Follm'ring an intense artillery preparation, main
ly in the 3813t Inf zone, the two Regts resumed the attack. In the 381st
Inf zon8, eneIDlf resistance in front of 3/381 had become centralized in
an extremely v!ell-prepared strongpoint to the Bn right flank. This
strongpoint waS centered on a group of Jap barracks located at 797":'-0
just south of the ridge and immediately to the northWest of MAEDA.
Fire from this position and from the south slopes of HILL 155 was so
intense that, no more than minor ad'Tances ""tire possible. Co K attempted
to make a flanking attack throuGh the town of AVIACHA (7975) on the Jap
barracks but was driven back after 30 minutes of hand-to-hand fighting.
Personnel.of K and ICos were eventually combined into' one Co due to
heavy casualties. In the 2/381 zone enemy resistance had become center
ed in a concrete pillbox defense just over the crest of the escarpment.
The Bn continued tho reduction of this strongpoint during the day. Cans
of gasoline and napalm were used extensively in the assault.
In the 383d Inf zone, 2/383 and 3/383 continued to push forward
slowly along the high ground running generally ::lOuthv"Jest from the east
edge of the MAEDA ESCARPMENT. These two Dns made advances up to 300
yards during the day in the face of heavy enemy fire from their exposed
right flank. They destroyeq many enemy positions during this advance,
employing direct fire of tanks and close-in support by flamethrower
tanks . A very Successful air on an enemy pocket "'directly-to the
front of 2/383, which had held up the Bn the pre-vious day, materially
assisted this advance.
The 96th Rcn Tr moved forward into the valley just north of KOCHI
(8174-W) to cover the still existing gap betl'Jeen the 96th and 7th Divs.
It is interesting to note that any vehicular movement in this valley
brought down accurate enemy artillery fire.
-26
In o.ccordo.nce 'with FO If19, 96th Inf Div (Seo ;\.nnox A), which spec
ified deto.ils the relicf of the 96th Div by tho 77th Div, the
307th Inf (77th Div) movud to forward assembly nreas in the vicinity of
K..IUKU (8277) and propared to relieve the 38lst Inf on the following day.
During the night of 28-29 April, enemy artillery wc'.s lighter but
ground o.ctivity vms greo.tly In addition to numerous infil
trdion attempts, the J<'.ps launched tIJO counterattacks of estimated
company size during the early morning, one hitting 2/383 and tho other
occurring in the 38lst Inf zone. Tho two Regts killed approximately
280 Japs in repulsing those counterattacks and infiltrCltion attempts.
29' I.PRIL
307th Inf Relieves 38lst Inf
On the 29th, the 'Div ngain ndvanced on tho left flnnk, with gnins of
some 600 Yds by 3/383. 38lst'Inf continued mopping-up operations until
relieved by 307th Inf <'.t 1020. The Regt, after its relief, moved to nn
<'.ssembly area in the vicinity of YOGI (8983). The 307th Inf was unable
to mclkc nny ",dditional gC'.ins during the' day. 2/383, after repulsing the
counterattack during the previous night, destroyed by close-in fighting
the remainder of the enemy attack force which had dug in on the south
slopes of the hill. "'.iter 1000 the En attempted no further advances due
to intense mortar, machine 'gun and small nrms firo from enomy positions
on its exposed right flank. During the remainder of the day, this En
cleaned out lnrge numbers of enemy to their front vlith flrunethrowors_
and to,nks. 3/383 C1.dvanced r?pidly forward during the morning against
moderate enemy opposition and consolidated their finnl front lines on
HILL 138 (80731). One plat of Co B, 763d Tk Bn, supporting the 383d
Inf, renched positlOns near the tip o1'1[[LL delivered direct
fire on enemy positions in the town of SHURI (7971).
Enemy activity during the night of 29-30 Aprilwns once Qgdn cx
tremely heavy, particul<:\rly in the zone of the 383d Inf. Two' heavy
artillery bo.rrages foIl in tho area of 1/383 during tho night, plus
intermittent mortnr fire throughout the Regtl zone. Nine spigot
mortar rounds o.lso foll in vicinity of 2/383. All front line Bns
repulsed nill1erous Jap infiltration attempts. 383d Inf repulsod two
enemy counterattacks of 100-150 men size. Approximately 265
were killed during these counterattacks.
30 APRIL
77th Inf Div Takes Over
On tho 30th, tho 383d Inf maintained stcQdy pressure Clgainst the
enemy until rolieved by tho 306tt Inf (77th Div). t. close-in air
strike 2.t 1015 for 3/383 ago.inst onomy positions to their immediate
front produced ex.celL.:nt results. 383d Inf moved to a,n assembly area
in the vicinity of (8682) upon relicf. 96th Rcn Tr withdrew
cmd closed into nO'w o.rea vicinity of FU'IEMic (8481). Command of the
96th Div zone passed to CG, 77th Inf Div, at 1200.
-27
v
SillJMARY
;,t tpc tir;le of the relief of tho Div, onemy resistGnce still re
mClined 'enough to prevent any adv?ncos on the Div right flank in
the nroa of the ESCIJlFMENT wost of tho NEEDIERDCK. On the Div
loft, however, the 383d Inf had pushed a considorablo distance to the
south against less intense enemy The Div had climbed its
socond esc2.rpment with the following box score:
Our own casuC'.lties: KIf, WIA MIA
381st Inf 32 194 0
382d Inf
9
21 1
383d Inf
45 231
J
TotC'.l:
536
(Japs tillod: 2507)
Our tank lossos (due to mines, srtillcr'y, nnd 1.T firo): 8
Damage to the enemy:
Japs'killed, 2507 320mm mortars, 1
MG's, 48 Pillboxcs , 5
Mortctrs, 20 - Caves,' 75
Field pieces, 15 Trucks, 11
-28
OKINAWA SHIMA
ARRATIV
PART- :nI
Noisuku
I,
PART III
ASSAULT OF CONICAL-OBOE HILL AREA
1 TO 31 MAY
1 TO 9 MAY
From FightingtOTraining
The names of KAKAZU RIDGE, TOMBSTONE RIDGE, THE GATE, nEEDLE ROOK, HILl
153 and the BIG ESCARPMENT had now become a legend as the battle-weary
doughboys came out of the lines for a much needed and deserved rest. For JC
days these men had fought and defeated a stubborn and smart enemy in some of
the bloodiest fighting yet encountered in Pacific warfare. Battle casualti
had been high -- during the month, of April, the division had" suffered 565
KIA, 2771 WIA and now the infantry regiments were only 52% combat efficient
based on Tlo strength. '
During the first nine days of May, the divis ion entered into a reorgan
ization and training period. By 8 May oVer 4000 infantry replacements had
joined the division and began intensiVe training in and patrolling,
marksmanship and known distance firing. 'As part of this training program,
the replacements patrolled by-passed pockets of enenw resistance within the
rear areas. As these patrols combed the area, numerous Japs 'were killed
and US and enemy equipment recovered'. The maintenance of vehicles, guns,
personal arms snd equipment was stressed and Ordnance inspe<!tions held
by all units of the diviSion. '
Much time was devoted to rest and recreation for the troops as they
came out of the line. Red Cross and Special Service Officers initiated the
preparation of recreation camps for all types of sports such as baseball,
football and volley ball. The 96th Inf Div Band provided musical entertain
ment and extensive use was made of PA systems bringing radio and transcribeC:
programs to the troops. The Red Cross made available tons of supplies such
as magazines, books, games, vrriting materials and toilet articles. The
DiviSion Special Service Office provided many late movies. The movie'
"Wilson" waS shov'n for the first time on the island to the men ,of the )8)d
Inf. APproximatcly nine enemy air-raid alerts took place during the showin'
of the picture and ',e'Bch time the men would head for their holes and when
the all clear was sounded they would return. It took most of the night to
complete the movie but every man stayed to the end.
The )8)d Inf was in "paper" reserve for the 77th Inf Div during this
reorganization and training period, but were not committed. However, the
96th Division Artillery remained in position and continued to reinforce the
fires of the 77th Inf Div Artillery under XXIV Corps Artillery control.
9 TO 10 MAY
Back in the Line
On, 6 May, FO #20, (Hq 96th Inf Div), was issued ordering all units to
maka plans for the relief of the 7th Inf Div in the line, by ec,helon. The
)82d Inf was directed to move to assembly areas in the rear of the 17th Inl
on 8 May and to relieve them on 9 May under control of the 7th' Inf D'iv. The
-29
l
383d Inf was directed to move to an assembly area in tho rear of the l84th
Inf on 9 May and to relieve them on 10 May. The 381st Inf was directed to
make a reconnaissance and to move to reserve positions on 10 May in relief
of the 32d Inf.
On 8 May, J82d Inf moved 2 Bns forward to assembly areas and on 9 May
began the relief of the 17th Inf (7th Inf Div control) at 1300. By 1700
the relief was completed and the 382d Inf occupied front lines as shown in
red on Map No.9. The 96th Inf Div CP moved from FUTEMA to 8577-A at 1330,
8 May.
From positions previously occupied by the l7th'1rif, the 382d Inf jumped
off in the attack south at 1000 on 10 May under control of the 7th Inf Div
until 1420, when the Commanding General, 96th Inf Div, assumed command of
the new zone of action. During this attack, with 1/382 on the right and
3/382 on the left, the Regtadvanced initially against light resistance on
the right flank and extremely heavy resistance in the center and on the
left flank. As 1/382 approached ZEBRA HILL (8173-Q) they encountered heavy
mortar, machine gun and rifle fire coming from the draw between ZEBRA and
HOW HILLS at At 1500 a coordinated assault began on the draw ...
v using tanks. flame-throwers and pole charges. This strongpoint was finally ..
reduced after numerous casu8l."tTes-nad-been
p
received, and ZEBRA and ITEM
HILIS finally secured (see Map No. 10).
On 9 May the 383d Inf moved to fOM-vard assembly areas in preparation

for relief of the l84th Inf. On 10 1/383 completed relief of 1/184
at 1200 and 2/383 completed relief of 3/184 at 0930. By 13)0 the assault
elements of 383d Inf were in'position (see Map No.9) and had assumed all
responsibilities of the IB4th Inf zone. After this relief 1/383 sent out
4 strong reconnaissance patrols. to. tho front in the vicinity of EASY HILL
(8172-03) and by 1700 had advanced elements forward to occupy this hill.
(See Fig. 7).
38lst Inf (Div Reserve) closed into forward assembly pas it ions by
1300 and assumed all responsibilities of the.32d Inf zone. 96th Rcn Tr
relieved the 7th Rcn at 1300 and occupied positions 100 yards north
east of YONABARU AIRFIELD (see Map No.9).
. .,
As a result of these activities, the Div completed the relief of the
7th Inf Div and continued to attack south in new, zone of action securing
4 i'mpo'rtant hills' in preparation for the coordinated attack south by
Tenth 0700 11 to envelope and reduce SHURr position.
10 MAY
DiviSion Prepares for Offensive
On 9 May, FO #50 (Hq XXIV Corps) ordered the 96th Inf Div (Reinf) to
attack with its main effort initially on the right; seize the high ground
East of SHURr within its zone of action; then move from the northwest and
west to capture CONICAL HILL northwest of YONABARU and continue the attack
to capture that portion of the Corps objective within its zone of action.
On 10 May, FO #21 (Hq 96th Inf Div) was issued ordering the 382d Inf
from 'pOSitions held 10-11 May.to attack in its assigned zone ma'ing the
'llIain effort on the right, to seize the hill mass at 8072-RW and QUEEN
H!LL (817l-P) and continue the attack to the Corps objective. The 383d
Inf !"rom positions held 10-11 May was ordered to attack in its assigned
-30
RELIEVEO
AELIEF OF
INF. DIV.
.10
\
))
#
{{
\\
MAP No. 10
:-...
I
o
*

SCAL.e
31
75
. L . ~ - - ~ : ~ + - - - - - - T - - - - -
31
74
31
73
31
72
31
71

zone; making the main effort from the northwest (right), seize CONICAL HILL
(8271-KLM) and continue the attack to the Corps objective. The 381st Inf
(Div Reserve) was ordered to be prepared to support the p.dvance of either
Regt and patrol from rear of reserve Bns of assault Regts to a line 8777-Q
8578-G within Div zone of action.
11 MAX
Drive for CONICAL HILL
.
On 11 May, after a 30-minute artillery preparation by all Bns
.
of Div
Artillery, the 96th Inf Div began the attack at 0700 toward the Corps objec
tive and immediately met stubborn resistanc& across the entire front.
1/3B2 on the Div right was engaged in a fire fight with the enemy
beginning at daylight. This fire fight was a continuation of a counter
attack which had taken place at 102200 May, as an estimated Co of Japs
assaulted the crest of ZEBRA HILL. The attack was repulsed after heavy
close-in fighting .. At 0730 the Bn was still engaged in the fire n.ght with
the Japs who v/ere defending the south slopes of the hill making it impossi
ble for the Bn to advance over the crest . Artillery was placed on the soutt
slopes of the hill and by 0930 elements of the Bn,reinforced by tanks" were
advancing slowly around the right flank. By 1050 tEese elements had ad- .
vanced 400 yards to reach the saddle at 8073-Yl-2. At 1200 the remainder of
the En made a coordinated attack down the exposed south slopes of ZEBRA
HILL and by 1600 leading elements had pushed forward as far as the- base of
DICK HILL (B072-D) against murderous machine gun cross fire. coming from tl:le.
front and bc,:>th flanks of their position. At 16]0 these elements were still .
tenaCiously hanging on, but the Japs kept continuous intense mortar fire on
their position making further advances up the hill impossible. The position
slowly became untenable as supply of ammunition and evacuation of wounded
became critical. It was necessary to put the eriously wounded in tan s 0 V/'
evacuate them across the valley floor as these e emen s were orced to
withdraw and consolidate back in the Bn lines for the niGht on the south
slopes of ZEBRA HILL at B173-U5, V5 (see YBp No.9)
3/382 on Regtl left flank advanced slowly forward against heavy fl:re
from their front and both flanks. Numerous caves and pillboxes were en
countered on the south and west slopes of ITEM HILL necessitating reductioL
one by one. Tanks Vlere .brought up, but were unable to operate effectively
because of swampy ground and numerous mine fields. Throughout the day enemy
fire was received from the west slopes of Hills EASY and WILLIAM (8172-E4) .
At the close of the period this En had made only slight and occupied'"
positions on the south slopes of ITEM HILL at 8l7.3-R.3 to B173-X2, and were
in physical contact with 1/382. , . .;1
The 383d Tnf began their attack v.dth 1st En on the right and the '2'd En
on the left. The advance of 1/38] ".'as opposed by extremely stuQ'oorn res.ist.
ance throughout the day. Little proJress was made during the hut at
1200 this Bn renewed their attack on CHARLIE (B172-X2) and FOX (8172-R4)
HILLS, and by 1715 had succeeded in reaching these tV!O hills. where positions
were consolidated for the night (see Fig. 7). Meetingqnly'moqerate resist
ance, advance elements of 2/383 moved into the town c;>f (B272-X)
at OBOO. From this point on heavy enemy gun fire from
the front along north slopes; of HILL, ea?t,slopes of CHARLIE HILL,
and the south edge of the to;'11 of RIBARA (8272-'P$J, , limited further ad
vances. 2/3B3 then side,..slipped to the right ,to occupy the east slopes of
-31
KING HILL (8171-E) at 1800.
As a result of these activities, the 3B2d Inf gained 200 yards on the
Div right flank while in the center of the
7
Div zone, the 383d Inf pushed
forward over 600 yards and occupied two key hills (FOX and CHARLIE) and the
east slopes of KING HILL.
12 MAY
Japs Repulse Our DICK HILL Attack

The Div continued the attack at 0800 on 12 May. 'The 382d Inf made
its main effort in the center of the Regtl zone in order to outflank enemy
positions deeply entrenched along the south slopes of rrEM HILL. During
the morning 1/382, on the Regt1 right, employed tank-iptantry teams to mop
up the enemy pillboxes on the northwest slopes of ZEBRA HILL while 3/382
moved one Co around the right into 1/382 zone, advancing ,down the southeast
slopes of ZEBRA HILL closely supported by tanks, and by- f-ire from 1/3S2.
By 1200 this Co had succeeded in-advancing to the draw at 8l73-W3 and was
in physical contact with 1/382 and the remainder of the Bn. 3/382 had
cleaned out the enemy positions and pillboxes in the draw the south
slopes of ITEM HILL by 1230 and had advanced their front lines. 400 yards'
to 8173-V5 - 8l72-C2. At 1330 the Regt reorganized and launched a second
attack against DICK HILL with the main effort by 1/3'02.. This
Bn foUght bitterly throughout the afternoon struggling, forward through'
intense rifle and machine gun fire, employing smoke, and managed to advance
to the lower slopes of DICK HILL. However, by 1800 the fighting became so
fierce it was evident that DICK HILL could not be taken before dark and the
Bn consolidated in positions previously occupied. While 1/382 was battling
the stubborn res istance to their front, one Co of 3/382 advanced, and secured
BAKER HILL (8172-G2) and at the close of the period 3/382 consolidated
their lines on the north slopes of BAKER HILL with their right flank tied
in with 1/)82 on the south slopes of ZEBRA HILL.
The 383d Inf in its attack toward CONICAL HILL concentrated the main
effort on the Regt1 left flank making only small gains. 1/383 on Regtl right
flank spent the day in mopping up by-passed enemy positions on FOX and
CHARLIE HILIS making slight, advances to the west and up to the northwest
slopes of CONICAL HILL. Tanks were moved forward in the vicinity of GAJA
HILL and by 1130 bad cleaned out many enemy positions on the north edge of
the town of YONAGUSUKU (sometimes called GAJA 8272-Y) but despite this tank
support, Co F fought bitterly throughout the day on the north edge of the
town and by 1800 were still unable to overcome the resistance to their front.
The remainder of 2/383 moved forward yery slowly up the north slopes of
CONICAL HILL. . .
As a result of t,heseact1Vities, the j82d Inf on the D,iv right advanced
elements of l/J82 against extremely hea'rJ enemy opposition to the northern
slope of DICK HILL 'but were forced to 'withdraw against this bitter enemy
mortar fire and machine gun cross fire to the south slopes of ZEBRA HILL.
An advance of 400 yards made by succeeded in'seizing BARER HILL, while
the 383d Inf, having cleaned out the enemy positions alc;>ng FOX and CHARLIE
HILLS, reorganized and their lines in preParation for the
attack on CONICAL HILL. '
-32
CAPTURE OF
I,. ......,..

I
FRONr LINES AS OF liOO .
- 10 HAY
SCALE ' -II MAY
CONICAL-DICK HILLS
IOC) 1.00 'Sdt1 c,::X:::Cl:J' - I'2. MAY
IO-16MAV

MAP No. ll
II
Fig. 7. APPROACHES TO C<NICAL HILL:
EASY, FOX, and CEARLIE HILLS were taken by the 1st Bn ;8,rd Inf' during their
advance on CONICAL HILL. Light resistance was met initially, but steadily
increased as the enemy fought bitterly to hold FOX and CHARLIE HILLS.
Fig. a. WEsr SLOPES OF' CONICAL HILL:
Pig. 9.
SOUTH SLOPES OF CHARLIE HILLa
The enemy strongly defended this terrain A successful air-etrike- on these slopee
making advances down these elopee 20 May ended the 9 day battle of the
impossible until thoroughly pounded by 1st Bn 38;rd Inf in the taldng of
Air, NGP I and Arty. CHARLIE HILL.
charlie
Love
10'. SHURT DEFENSE AREA:
This terrain that the enemy had chosen to defend, not only gave him observation,
but alao provided a series of natural defenses on the top and slopes of each
hill. It took 20 Qays of bitter fighting before the DIVISION reduced this area.
Fig. 11. TPE FAMOUS CONICAL HILL: Fig. 12. APPROACHES TO LOVE RILL:
Rising to a height of 145 An estimated 50 enemy }'fG
1
s opened up on
stands Conical Hill-- Key to the East these slopes as 1st platoon of nCR Co ;85rd Inf
flank of the SHURI defense. attempted to advance up the hill.
13 MAY
, North Slopes of CONICAL Secured
The attack south jumped off at 0800 on 13 May and immediately strong
resistance was met on the Div right flank. 1/382 initially supported' the
advance of 3/382 by neutralizing and softening up heavily fortified enemy
positions on DICK HILL with AT guns, medium tanks and artillerl. Many
direct hits on enemy positions were observed by elements of 1/382 while
destroying numerous occupied caves and pillboxes on the valley floor at
8l72-Al, 2. After spending the morning softening up the enemy positions to
their front, 1/382 moved forward at 1230 taking EMILY HILL (8073-Xl, 2) and
at 1400 jumped off in a coordinated attack with 2/306 on the right and
3/382 on the left. By 1630, 1/)82 had advanced 400 to 500 yards against
heavy resistance, fighting all the way with the e'l1emy looking down on their
positions. Numerous caves and pillboxes encountered were completely de
stroyed, and 1/)82 consolidated and dug in for the night on the base of
DICK HILL at 827)-S3, Xl, J, 4-Yl, 2. During the morning )/382 had pushed
strong patrols 200 yards south of BAKER HILL while the remainder of the Bn
was moving forward to occupy the ridge at 8l72-F. At 1400, the Bn jumped
off in a coordinated attack "'ith 1/382 and .2/306, and 'by 16)0 this Bn had
advanced 600 yards to the base of OBOE HILL (8072 ....R) at 8072;..N2-03 over
difficult terrain against heavy resistance. Most of the fighting was dovm
at close range and the Bn engaged in hand-to-hand combat all the way. It
is estimated that these two Bns killed 500 to 550 Japs a's a result of this
action.
During the day, 1/38] rr,ace slov! progress against determined enemy
resistance coming from KING and LOVE (8171-Ml) HILLS. Against this resis
tance, the Bn had, at the close of the period, advanced 100 yards along the
southeast spur of CHARLIE HILL and the left flank was extended to the cut
between CHARLIE and KING HILLS. 2/38) began the attack on CONICAL HILL
','!ith el"ements on both sides of RAZORBACK RIDGE (See Figs. 10 and 11), run
ning north and south' from the base of the hill to the peak (827l-BG). The
right flank immediately pushed forward 200 yards to a point forward of the
base of the ridge, but the left flank (Co F) was held up by machine gun
fire coming from the vicinity of YONAGUSUKU. By 1100 F/383, supported by
tanks, had cleaned out the resistance in this area and the remainder of the
Bn moved rapidly up to the crest of the ridge running northeast from the
peak of CONICAL HILL. At 1330, L/383 was committed on the right flank of
2/)8) with the mission of securing the west slopes of KThTG HILL. At 1420
this Co was pushing slowly up the east slopes of KING HILL but was unable
to reach the high ground bet:ween KTIm and CONICAL HILLS prior to darkness.
At 1525 an estimated enemy Co launched a counterattack against the advapce
positions of 2/38) on CONICAL HILL but prompt artillery barrages and 4.2
Chemical Mortar fire directed by an observer in a liaison plane stopped
this attack. At 1600 the left flank of this Bn was on the skyline just 50
yards east of the highest peak on CONICAL HILL (see Fig. 11) and front
lines at the close of the period extended along the east
and west.
At 1100, 2/381 was attached to the 38)d Inf for operational control.
This Bn moved to new pOSitions on GAJA RIDGE during the afternoon to protect
the Div left flank, and to send strong patrols to the vicinity of the tovm
at 8372-X.
As a result of these activities the Div advanced approximately 800
yards on the left and 600 yards on the right. The 382d Inf fought bitterly
-33
over extremely contested ground in the face of heavy enemy opposition, v,rhile
the 383d Inf overcame all resistance ,in 'YONAGUSijKU and advanced to within 50
yards of the highest point on 'CONICAL HILL and to a point half way up the
northeast slopes of KDrG HILL. 2/381 moved to new positions on the Div left
flank abreast of the J8Jd Inf on CONICAL HILL.
14 MAY
Japs Reinforce DICK HILL,
There was a considerable increase in activity during the night
13-14 May with numerous attempts of irifiltration being repulsed by all front
line Bns. It was believed that the enemy reinforced DICKHILL during the .
night,as beginning at dawn on'14 May and lasting throughout.the day, 1/382
received intense machine gun and rifle fire from the vicinity of DICK HILL.
All available supporting weapons were used 'to neutralize and destroy these
enel'l\9' positions, and tanks were employed to supply ammunition to our front
lines. At 1400, l/J82 and J/382 jumped off in a coordinated attack and
fought bitterly throughout ti1e period in an all out effort to secure the
strongpoint 'on DIOK HILL. Elements of the 1st Bn advanced as far as
the draw between DICK and F,UT-TOP (8073-W5) HILIS at 807J-W4, but enemy
fire became so strong it was imposs ible to maintain this pas it ion At the
close of the period front lines df 1/382 were the same as positions of the'
previous night. 3/J82 during the coordine.ted attack had in ad
vancing one Co 400 yards to seize MARY HILL (8072-Il) southeast of DICK
HILL. Although advances of this Regt were generally smal1, the fighting
in their zone was the heaviest encountered for sometime.
In the J83d Inf' zone 1/383 engaged in a heavy fire fight throughout
the day against enemy pOSitions located on LOVE and MIKE HILIS.
Elements of 1/383 on Regtl right advanced 200 yards to secure the high ground
southwest of CHARLIE HILL, approximately 200 yards north of LOVE HILL. The
left flank elements of this Bn were advanced 200 yards and succeeded in
knocking out the enemy resistance on the northeast slopes of KING HILL which
had been holding up' advances in the center of the Regtl zone. 1/383 in the
center of the Regtl zone advanced 200 yards and by 1800 had secured the high
ground just west of CONICAL PEAK (8271-K) and was abreast of 2/383. Ele
ments 'of the 763d Tank Bn rendered excellent fire support during the advance
of this Co.
,'2/383 during the day received heavy enemy machine gun and mortar fire
coming from the southeast slopes of CONICAL HILL. This Bn, by
tanks, concentrated on knocking out enemy pillboxes and softening up
strongpoints to the front and flanks. At the close of the period 2/383
had maintained its right flank just east of the highest peak on CONICAL
HILL, and had advanced its left flank 200 yards to 827l-N. During the
period 2/381 moveq. to new dispositions with G Co abreast of and protecting
the left flank of 2/383.
As a result of these activities the 382d Inf captured the high ground
southeast of DICK HILL, while the 383d Inf captured the southwest slopes of
CHARLIE HILL and high ground, 200 yards northwest of CONICAL PEAK.
-34
15 MAY
DICK HILL Finally Reached
, "
Continued enemy infiltration attempts ,were promine!ltl31l ,along the
front during the night 14-15 May. Heavy rains dUring the, night which
lasted until noon of 15 May resulted in little progress initially in the
attack by the Div due to poor footing. However, at 0900 the 382d 'Inf
attacked in conjunction with 3/307 to capture DICK HILL (see Fig. 13) and
supported 3/307 in the capture of CHOCOLATE DROP HILL on the boundary .
between the 77th and 96th Inf Divs. At 1430 3/382 began fo' advance up the
steep slopes of DICK HILL by infiltratiop. In order to conceal this
advance, fires from Division Artillery were placed on the enemy position
by numerous heavy artillery concentrations before the all-out assault was
made. By 1600, one Co had reached the skyline on DICK HILL and by 1700
the remaining elements of 3/382 and one Co of 1/382 were on top of the hill.
As these four Co fS attempted t.o cross the skyline, intense machine gun and
rifle fire opened up raking the ridge line from end to end, making further
advance impossible. At 1300 these four Co fS were digging in on the north
slopes of DICK HILL just short of the skyline within 50 yards of the' Japs
dug in on the south slopes.
The 383d Inf (with 2/)81) on the Di'l left made little advances during
the day. Extremely heavy enemy fire from LOVE and MIKE HILLS prevented,.
any advance of 1/383 on the Regtl right. ThisBn, however, employed all
supporting \'Jeapons, knocked out considerable enemy emplacements and defin
itely killed 105 Japs. 2/383 advanced G Co approximately 200 yards to the
top of CONICAL HILL and adjusted their position to tie in with 1/383 on
their right. During t.he day strong feeler patrols \"ere sent 200 yards
forward of the front. lines to probe enemy positions while 2/381 continued
to patrol the YONAGUSUKU-GAJA area with negative results.
In spite of the day's rain, the 382d Inf advanced four reinforced
rifle CO IS just short of the skyline on DICK HILL against strong enemy
resistance and poor footing while the 383d Inf continued to knock out
strong Gremy positions and to consolidate and reinforce their position on
CONICAL HILL.
CO'1tact was maintained '.'IJith the enemy during the night 15-16 Mayas
troops were engaged in hand grenade duels with the Japs dug in on the south
slopes of DICK and CONICAL HILLS. The Regtl Commanding Officer of the 382d
Ihf stated that the reason the troops had taken DICK HILL and had held it
was due to the fact that they were able to get a larger supply of grenades
up the hill than the Japs before dark.
16 MAY
Rain Delays Advance
On the morning of 16 r.1ay, 2/382 passed through and relieved 1/382 and
at 0930, 2/382 and 3/382 attacked the peak of DICK HILL (See. Fig. 13). The
enemy met this attack vdth heavy knee-nortar fire, grenades, satchel
charges, making the ground untenable. Heavy fire was placed on these
positions on the south slope of the hill, and by 1100 one Co of each Bn had
succeeded in getting advance elements over the skyline. By 1200, one Co of
2/382 had crossed the peak of the hill and was working down the southwest
slopes, engaged in bitter hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets and grenades
(see Fig. 14). By 1400,' 2/382 had been successful in gaining slightly more
-35
than 100 yards down the south slope of the hill. At 1430 the remainder of
3/382 renewed their attack and attempted to cross the skyline southeast of
the hill but made little progress. Heavy machine gun and rifle fire from
the enemy positions on OBOE HILL completely covered the exposed terrain just
fOT\vard of the crest of DICK HILL making any further advance during the day
impossible. 1/382 after being relieved, supported by fire the assault of
the 307th Inf on FLAT-TOP HILL.
During the day extremely heavy fighting throughout the Regtl zone re
sulted in only slight advances for the 383d Inf. 1/383 continued mopping
up during the morning and attempted to bring up tanks to support their ad
vance. The roads were impassable due to previoUs rainy conditions, but at
1430 this Bn resumed their attack against KING and LOVE HILLS without the
aid of tanks. The right flank of this attack was stopped almost immediate
ly by the intense machine gun fire from LOVE HILL, and from the vicinity of
VICTOR HILL (8071-D2). However, Co C on the Bn left flank succeeded in by
passing KING HILL and by 1700 had pushed one platoon up the northeast slope
of LOVE HILL (see Fig. J2). At this time an estimated 50 enemy machine
opened up from the enemy fortified position on LOVE HILL to their
front, from the vicinity of VICTOR HILL on their right, from the southeast
slopes of CONICAL HILL on their left and from the south slopes of KING
HILL to their rear. Extremely heavy casualties were inflicted on our own
forces as no elements of this platoon which had reached LOVE HILL were
able to return to our front lines.
Only slight gains were nadc by 2/383 during the day as they attemp
ted to advance down the southeast slopes of CO:nCAL HILL against heavy
machine gun and small arms fire. Hm'lever, one platoon of Co B, 763d Tank
Bn, had pushed forward to reach the northwest corner of YONABARU and immed
iately began bombardine the town with 75mm and machine gun fire. The
heavy enemy fire covering the south slopes of CONICAL HILL (see Fig. 10)
prevented the infantry from exploiting the tanks' rapid advance and at
the close of the period, after exhausting their ammunition supply, the
tanks withdrew to positions held previously.
As a result of these activities, 2/382 on the Div right flank gained
slightly more than 100 yards down the south slopes of DICK HILL. On the Div
left, 2/333 made only slight gaiLs 2long the southeast slopes of CONICAL
HILL, as medium tanks penetrated the enemy right flank 1000 yards in a
reconnaissance in :force along the coastal. road to the outskirts of YONABARU.
17 MAY
381st Infantry Committed
FO #22 (Hq 96th Inf Div) issued on 16 May, ordered the 381st Inf
(-1st Bn) into the line on the left flank of the Div. New Regtl boun
daries were established as shown in solid lines on Map No. 12, and broken
red li1le on Map No.9. The 381st Inf was ordered to relieve elements of
the .38Jd Inf in its zone of action on 17 May and to attack with the main
effort: on its right. The 382d Inf was to continue the attack in its. as
signed,z,one and seize the OBOE, PETER, VICTOR HILL mass (see Fig. 15); the
}83d Inf was to continue the attack in its assigned zone .making the main
effort Oll its
The attack jumped off at 0630 on 17 Wey as teams and
demolit ion teams from the 382d Inf covered the west, southwest and south
-36
Oontact was main.teined throughout the
night 15-16 May a9 troops were engaged in
Fig. 14. LOOKING BACK ON DICK HILLa
hand greande duels with the enemy entrennh
ad only 50 yards acrose the top of the hi lL
As the troops down these slopes they were constantly
engaged in bitter hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets and hand
grenades. Pole Charges and flame-throwers were used to reduce
numerous fortified posi tiona encountered on this hill.
Fi g. 15. LAST fIIURI DEFENSE LINEa
The enemy thrust a strong cotmter-attack against the l .st En
,a2nd Inf during the night 2-'-24 May inflicting heavy casual.
ties. The Bn was then re-organized into one Co of 198 men
din.$t. the hill.

r
slopes of DICK HILL cleaning ,out a number of enemy fortified positions
these slopes (see Fig. '14). A net advance of yards was made by
2/Je:;. on the Div right flank as this Bn worked sloV!lydown the southwest
slope destroying numerous caves and pillboxes with pole charges and flame
throwers. Extremely heavy fire coming from the high groUnd to their front
made further progres.:; slow. 3/332 spent the day sending out mop-tip patrols
to work along the high at 8072-(L cleaning out the numerous 'enemy
positions and' fortifications bet-veen the right flank of 3/382 and 2/3E!2.
Two strong tank-infantry teams were employed by 1/383 'on the Regtl
right flank along the south slopes of CHARLIE HILL and t!1e west slopes of
KING HILL. One tank-infantry team patrolled out as far as 8l71-E to the
foot of LOVE HILL, while the other tank-infantry team, operating under
direct enemy machine gun fire throughout the day, managed to clean out the
west slopes of KING HILL as far forward as 8173-D3. 2/383, after being
relieved by 3/381 at 0945, maintained strong pressure against the enemy
positions throwing hand grenades, satchel charges and mortar shells over
the CONICAL HILL SPUR to their front. Several termite patrols were sent
to operate along the KING-CONICAL HILL RIDGE to destroy numerous enemy
pos it ions which had fired on C Co, 383d Inf" from the rear the day before.
3/381 after relieving 2/383 spent the remainder of the day in bringing
forward all available supporting weapons, registering in of artillery,
chemical mortars and Regt1and 'En weapons on key points in preparation for
the attack the following day..During the afternoon a small patrol from
2/381 advanced south along coastal road to the north edge of ymTABARU
and returned without receiving any enemy fire.
As a result of these activities 3/381 relieved 2/383 and prepared for
the futUre attack while the 382d Inf advanced approximately 100 yards on
its right down the southwest slopes of DICK HILL.
During the night 17-18 May enemy activity along the Div front was
generally light with the usual intermittent artillery and mortar fire and
infiltration attempts, except in the zone of 2/382. Throughout the night,
this Bn received extremely heavy artillery and mortar fire and engaged in
numerous hand grenade duels killing an estimated 52 Japs.
18 MAY
Patrols Reach YONABARU
On 18 May the 382d Inf was engaged in mopping up aLd eliminating close
in enemy positions without any change in previous front lines. An enemy
mine field at 8072-C5 was cleared during the day using Bangalore torpedoes
and tanks were then able to advance into the valley behind DICK HILL. 3/382
received heavy machine gun and mortar fire throughout the day from both
OBOE and FIAT-TOP HILIS which prevented any advance dovm the south slopes
of the ridge southeast of DICK HILL. Strong patrols were sent forward by
1/382 to scour the area between BAKER and VICTOR HILlS. These patrols
received only light sniper fire and machine gun fire and some enemy artil
lery from positions in the vicinity of VICTOR HILL.
In the 383d Inf zone there was no change in front lines as termite
patrols and tank-infantry teams from both 1st and 2d Bns operated along thE
south slopes of CHARLIE HILL (See Figs. 8 and 9) and the west slopes of
KmG HILL destroying enemy positions in this area. During the afternoon
these patrols received heavy fire from the vicinity of LOVE HILL. OUr
-37
tanks returned the fire and it is believed that several guns were destroyed.
The only sUbstantial gain made by the Div waS on the left flank in the
zone of the 381st Inf. 3/381 advanced approximately 400 yards across the
fingers extending toward the sea from the high ridge extending south from
CONICAL HILL,. Medl:1im'tanks operating CONICAL HI'LL 'and the coastal
road rendered excellent direct fire support against machine gun positions
in'the"827i-'trPQ' area' . Despite this support, advances were very slow against
the heavy machine gun and mortar fire opposing this Bn. Patrols from 3/381
advanced as far as S270-B2 without fire from SIDAR HILL (8270-F2),
but enemy machine gun fire from HOOBACK RIDGE (8271-P2, 4) prevented further
advance and it was necessary for this patrol to return under the cover of a
srr:oke screen.
19 MAY
The Rains Came
Heavy rain set in during the night 18-19 May resulting in very little
enel'l\Y' activity along the Div front. However, 2/382 on the Div right flank
engaged in hand grenade battles the night killing an estimated
sixty Japs. Little progress was made by the Div on 19 May, except on 'the
left flank. .
. In the 382d,Inf zone heavy fire from both OBOE and PETER
(80n-Wl) HILLS prevented any material advance during the day (See Fig. IS).
TheRegt employed medium tanks, flame-thrower tanks, assault and inf
demolition teams throughout the day in mopping up enemy emplacements to
their front. Despite heavy AT fire, the tanks destroyed at least fifteen
ca.es and other emplacements.
The 333d Inf also its mop-up activities throughout the day in
the KNG-CHARLIE HILL area employing tanks and Inf demolition teams. Many
machine gun emplacements were destroyed a!ld numerous caves sealed. Due to
this intensive mopping-up within their zone and the heavy enemy fire coming
from their front 1 there was no change in the front lines of this Regt.
After heavy neutralization fire by two platoons. of medium tanks, six
platoons of Amph Tanks and the fires of artillery and Tnf support weapons,
the 38lst Inf resumed their attack against SUGA.1t HILL at noo with 3/381 .
in the strong assault demolition teams were pushed forward to
destroy machine guns previously located in the vicinity of their ad
vance. Numerous enemy positions were destroyed although front lines were
practically unchanged. Several strong hand grenade battles ensued across
the top of HOGBACi( RIDGE during the day's battle. During the night 19-20
numerous hand grenade battles characterized the action along the Div
front, despite intermittent showers throughout the period.
20 MAY
Japs Resist Bitterly
The attack on 20 I';!ay jumped off at 07]0. Twice during the day 3/382
to advance to"\'rard OBOE HILL (See Fig 15). In both attempts
elements succeeded in adva"1cing one hundred yards, 'but in both cases enemy
mortar fire and grazing machine gun fire made this ground untenable and
they v!ere forced to withdrav!. The Regt spent the remainder of the day in
reducing the newly located enemy positions.
-38

..- ;8;
FRONT LINE')
OF ISoo

r-r-""T""""r",--r' - I'7 MAY
.. ..' .. " . .... ..
' 7
'" ." C::Z::::J::I:::I0 r - AY
. . : :.' ., '
#,'. \ :
, :.':,:.'
,. -,' '-, "
:-":" , I .
",: ... '-- .
,'" :... '. _' .I.. ... ; t : . .' : :.-
ACSSAULT AGAINST :.:.: ....
_. - -'2.0
-OaOE HillS ,:.,."
SCALE
Iflt-2g MAV
r
The )a)d Inf began their advance at 1045 after moving their front linec
slightly back to permit a close-in air strike on south slope of CHARLIE HIL.
(See Figs. 8 and 9). This air strike ''Jas very successful and 1/333 attackc'
do"'n the south slope of CEARLIE HILL and by 1400 this Bn had cleaned out a]
enemy positions vrithin their zone and had advanced their lines two hundred
yards. The Bn spent the rest of the day consolidating their and
supporting the attack of 2/333 against KING HILL. 2/383, using medium tankt
worked their way to the top of the hill against extremely heavy mortar fire
and by 1800 were able to consolidate their front lines along the top of the
KING-CONICAL HILL RIDGE.
3/381 resumed the attack in the direction of SUGAR HILL and advanced
slowly along the east slope of HOGBACK, and 1200 left elements of this En
had advanced two hundred and were engaged in bitter grenade battles
along the ridge. One unit in this advance threw two hundred seventy five
hand grenades in a tro-hour period. During the afternoon the hand grenade
battles continued incessantly v!ith the enemy fighting desperately to hold
every inch of ground. Hovrever, by 1800 this Bn had advanced three hundred
yards and v'ere still fighting for the last ground short of SUGAR HILL.
As a result of these activities, the 381st Inf on the Div left ad
vanced three hundred yards south along the CONICAL-SUGAR HILL RIDGE. The
382d Inf reduced all enemy resistance on the south and cast slopes of DICK
HILL, while the 383d Inf advanced tvro hundred yards on their right down
the south slope of HILL. On the left this Regt pushed forward and
consolidated their lines along the top of KING-CONICAL HILL RIDGE.
21 MAY
Divisio'1 Renews Attack
FO #51 CHq XXIV Corps) dated 20 May, ordered the 96th Inf Div to con
tinue the attack to capture the high ground east of ShlffiI in its zor.e of
action, making the main effort initially on the left. The Div boundary
was changed with the 7th Inf Div coming in on the left flank. Upon re
ceiving this order, FO #23 (Hq 96th Inf Div) was issued ordering a Div
attack at 0730 on 21 May with all three Regts abreast. The 382d Inf waS
ordered to attack within a ne\'! zone of actio'1 to seize OBOE, PETER and
VICTOR HILLS (See Fig. 15). The 383d Inf was ordered to attack ,"lithin its
new zone to clear out all enemy resistance from west slopes of
PEAK and to seize LOVE, MIKE and QUEEN HILLS. 381st Inf, within its new
zone, was ordered to attack and seize SUGAR and ROGER (8170-Gl) HILLS.
The boundaries and Z01"18S of action are shm"n by "dot-dash" lines on
Maps No.9 and 12.
After a heavy artillery preparation, the Div jumped off at 0730 on
21 r;1ay amid i!"termittent shopers. The 382d Inf on the Div right advanced
steadily throughout the morning and by 0925 2/382 had advancod its right
flank tVTo hundred yards to 8072-G3 against moderate machine gun and mortar
fire coming from the vicinity of HARRY HILL (8072-U2). 1/382 after passing
through left elements of 3/382 pushed their forward elements seven hundred
yards to 8072-X2, 4. This Bn received small arms fire from the top of OBOE
HILL, and machine gun fire from the south slopes of LOVE and MIKE HILLS.
At 1050, 2/382 had tv'o Cos on the high ground at 8072-L and "\'jere receiving
heavy machine gun and mortar fire from HARRY HILL, and the high gr01l!1d to
their front. At 1130 elements of the enemy began pulling out from in front
of this Bn, and 1/332 then advanced to reach the top of OBOE HILL where
-39
they fired on these retreating Japs. However, isolated groups of Japs made
counterattacks, supported by extremely heavy machine gun and mortar
fire, all along the Regtl front lines preventing any further advance during
the day.
'The 383d Inf with 1st and 2d Bns in the assault made the main effort on
the Regtl left, and by 0900 2/383 had secured the west slopes of HOGBACK
RIDGE. 1/383 advanced forward one hundred yards and immediately ran into
heavy Illichine gun fire from the vicinity of LOVE HILL. However, ''lith tanks
to provide close fire support, the Regt renewed the attack at 1200 and by
1415 elements of 1/383 were at the foot of LOVE HILL. The enemy laid heavy
aL:lleryconcentrations all along the Regtl front lines, and the fire be
so intense that at 1630 all elements in the center of the Regtl zone
forced to withdraw to the north slopes of KING HILL.
The 38lst Inf making the main effort along the left flank of the Div
zone of action advanced four hundred yards during the morning and by 1150
elements of 3/381 were assaulting the top of SUGAR HILL. During the after
noo!] the Regt advanced an additional four hundred yards securing SUGAR HILL,
- and by 1600 had elements two hundred yards north of the YONABARU-SHURI-NAHA
highway. The enemy strong position on CUTAWAY HILL (827l-U) (See Fig. 10)
continued to pour heavy machine gun and rifle fire on all assault troops of
both the 381st and 383d Infs, and it was not until after SUGAR HILL been
taken that this strongpoint was reduced . Heavy enemy fire from the pos i
tions in the vicinity of ROGER HILL halted any further advance by this Regt
during the day. During this action the 38lst Inf was engaged in some of
the most fierce hand-to-hand combat they had yet experienced on
As a rssult of the day's attack, the 33lst Inf on the Div left flank
advanced eight hundred yards, securing HILL and breaking the right
flank of the enemy SHURI defenses by advances to within two hundred yards
of the road. The 382d Inf advanced eight hundred yards
[,Dd secured OBOE HILL. The 333d Inf moved for":ard one hundred yards but
were unable to make further advances due to the heavy enemy fire from LOVE
HILL, the west slopes of CO!lTICAL HILL, and the east slopes of VICTOR HILL.
?g.:-:.29 MAY
Heavy Rains Halt Advances
During the period22-29 Aiay extremely heavy rains prevented the Div
from making any progress other than local gains. Supply and evacuation be
caille critical, and front line elements had to hand carryall re-supply of
arr.ITn.mitioTl, food and water up tho steep slippery slopes. Roads became im
p&sf;able and in many instances front line troops had to be supplied by
However, during the period the enemy continued his bitter fight to
hold his ground. Numerous attempts of infiltration and counterattacks 'I'!ere
repulsed, and the enemy continually harassed our front lines ,.lith inter
mittent artillery and mortar fire.
During the night 23-24 May the enemy thrust a strong counterattack
against 1/382 on OBOE HILL. These attacks v!ere repulsed but some of the
cnc,ny had succeeded i'1 penetrating through our lines inflicting heavy
casualties upon our troops. On the 24th of May 1/382 reorganized into one
Co of One hundred ninety eight men, al'ld despite heavy enemy OPPOSition
these men succeeded in holding OBOE HILL (See Fig. 15).
-40
5HURI DEFENSES
BROKEN
MAV
C==>-381 --'l<3MAY

c:c::ct::) I MA'(
. , -
BGUNOAR.IES
_._.- -'2oMl\'fTo3QMAV

'SGAI...5
During the entire rainy period all three Regts sent strong patrols to
their front to keep contact with the enemy, and all front line Bns con
tinued to mop up enemy positions within their zone. Visibility w ~ s ex
tremely poor during this eight day period and the majority of artillery
fire consisted of harassing missions on known enemy targets. In one in
stance, a forward observer from the 361st FA Bn burrowed through the,
slopes of SUGAR HILL in order to establish observation on ROGER HILL. All
flc.t trajectory and supporting weapons and ammunition were brought forward
as condit ions permitted. In numerous eases tunnels were dug through the
tops of hills and these guns were placed to fire directly into enemy em
placements and pillboxes.
;0 MAY
SHURI Defenses Broken
A Div attack "'as la'w"lched at 01300 on 30 Hay in an all out effort to
destroy the enemy's excellent SHURI defenses. During the morning the 382d
Inf supported the advance of the 383d Inf b r fire and sent strong patrols
to probe to their front. At 1230, with 1st and 2d Bns in the assault, the
Regt began their attack in conjunctiori' with the 307th Inf attack on their
right. Both of these Bns were temporarily held up at 1245 by a strong
enemy force along the south slopes of HEN HILL (g072-Rl). Heavy fires
were placed dOvTn on this force and at 1400 the group opposing 2/382 at
tempted to withdraw across the front of 1/382. It is estimated that ap
proximately fifty to sixty of these retreat Lng Jups were killed by the
1st Bn. Immediately 2/382 renewed their nt.tack down the south slopes of
HEN HILL, and. by 1715 had reached the top of PETER HILL (See Fig. 15.) and
were engaged in mopping' up and aestroyLng Japs still in this area. For
ward olements of this Bn continued the advance and by 1800 had secured
the top of BART HILL (8071-C3) and were engaged in a hot fire fight with
tho eremy still entrenched on the hill (See Map No. 13).
The 383d Inf began their attack at 01300 with the main effort on the
10ft, and by 1030 the 2d Bn had cleared out the enemy pockets along the
WGst slopes of HOGBACK RIDGE and had secured the CONICAL-LOVE HILL RIDGE
(g171-M2, 02). The attack of the 1st Bn, delayed until the enemy resis
tance at 8171-1 was overcome, began at 1100 to securo LOVE and MIKE HILlS.
By 1200, one Co had taken LOVE HILL, \"lhile 2/383 continued thoir ad
vance to QUEE'1 HILL against moderate resistance. Advances continued dur
ing the afternoon,. meeting very little resistance on the,left and heavy
resistance on the -right. At 1300 3/333 jumped off in the attack to seize
VICTOR HILL and by 1400 elements were reported on top of this hill 'where
they immediately ancounterod heavy resistance from an estimated platoon,
and at 11300 they were still engaged in close-in fighting between VICTOR
and BART HILLS. Left elements of this Bn continued their advance to join
up ,"ith 2/382 at 8071-M. Aft<:!!"' securing QUEEN HILL, 2/3133 continued their
advance to the south and by 1400 one Co had reached LITTLE QUEEN (g171-U4)
with no enemy opposition. These hills were all secured by 1600, and 2/3133
moved on to the high ground at g071:..X where they dug in for the night.
The 331st Inf, with 1st and 2d Bns in the assault, advanced quite
rapidly during the morning against moderate enemy resistance in the form
of machine gun and rifle fire. By noo 2/381, after" considerable hand
to-hand combat in the t01"!)" of MIYAGUSUKU, secured jtOGER HILL. llyn
securod the onenw stror1gpoint on CUTAWAY HILL. Reserve elements were
-41
committed to contain and mop up this while the balance of the Bn pushed
rapidly on to capture DON (8l70-D2) and SPARROW (8l70-C5) HILIS meeting
relatively light resistance. By 1200 this Regt secured the ROGER-SPARROW
HILL mass, 'and during the afternoon concentrated on mopping up enemy caves
and installations which had previously been by-passed.
V','ith the new change in the Corps boundary between 96th, 77th and 7th
In: Divs effective 1200 (TT 30 May Hq XXIV Corps) ,one Cq of 1/381 moved
fc::ward to occupy ZEB HILL (8070-H2) and at 1800 this ,Co was in defensive
poaitions and tied in with 2/382 on the right and F/32 Qn the left.
As a result of these activities, the Div advanced approximately one
trllJusand tl"'O hundred yards during the day to clean out all enemy resist
ance north of the YONABARU-SHURI-NAHA road within the Div zone, except
in the PEARL-PAULINE HILL area (807l-KLPQ). Enemy resistance encoun
tered was surprisingly, light throughout the day except on the extreme
right of the Div zone, where the 382d I1'1f fought against a fairly strong
enemy position until latc in the afternoon when this enemy began to with
dra\"!'.
31 MAY
Jap Resistance Vanishes
On the 31st of May advances of six hundred yards on the Div left
and up to one thousand eight hundred yards on the Div right were made
against light enemy resistance, except on the extreme left of the Div
zone of action. By 1200 ali objectives within the Div zone v:ere reached
and the front lines were up against tho Corps boundary, except on tho
left flank southwest of JOHN HILL (7970-01, 2, 3).
The 382d Inf began their advance at 0900 with 2/382 in the assault,
and by 0940' had secured TOM HILL (807l-A4) in conjunction with elements
of 3/383. This vIes the final objective for the 3S2d Inf in its as
signed and the balance of the day was spent in sealing caves aTId
cleaning up scattered remnants in the OBOE-PETER HILL area.
The 383d their advance at 0900 and by 0940 3/383 in con
junct ion' with 2/382 had secured TOU HILL and one Co had reached PEARL
HILL (8071-L3). ' By 1245, 2/383 at'ld elements of 3/333 had taken JOE, HILL
(797l-W)C)'. In a coordinated attack with elements of the 1st Marine Div
at 1200 the 383d Inf pushed across the Corps boundary qnd secured CLAIRE
!:ILL (7971-IG). By 1800 all enemy groups were chased off of CLAIRE
HILL, and 3/333 had established physical contact with the left flank of,
the 5th Narine Regt at 7.g71-D.
The 331st Inf resumed their advance r:.t 0830 with 1/381 in the as
sault. By 0930, elements of this Bn secured the top of .JOHN HILL and
wore engaged in a stiff fire fight 1dth the enemy alo]Jg the south slopes
of this hill and on RACCOON HILL (7970-Wl) throughout the rest of the
day. By onc Co of 1/381 secured LOUISE HILL (7970-D4), et'lcounter
ing but little enemw resistance. The Regt spent the remainder of the
day mopping up and sealing caves in the SUGAR-ROGER HILL area.
As a result of these activities the Div secured all of, its objec
tives, and reduced all organized enemy resistance i,n its assigned zone,
of action. Elements of the Div right flank advanced one thousand eight
-42
r
hundred yards to gain physical conte.ct with the 5th Marine Regt south of
SHURI.
SUMMARY
During the month of May the tiv hf:ld continued to grind through the
series of well-prepared and defended enemy positions in its zone of action.
Much of the fighting had been close-in and the Inf had engaged in hand-to...
hand combat using bayonets and grenades to annihilate the Japs as they
continued to bitterly contest every inch of ground. Heavy rains during
the period made the problem of supply and evacuation critical as the Div
continued to move forward seizing one hill after another over the most
difficult terrain yet encountered. (See Fig. 10).
At the close of this in the battle for southern OKINAWA the fol
lowing message was received by the General, 96th Tnf Div from
the Commanding General, Tenth Army, Lt Gen Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr:
"I wish to congratulate you and all the members of your command
for your part in driving the enemy from his SHURr line and
forcing him to the present area for final destruction. Vllhile
all divisions in the line have contributed toward this end, I
regard the capture of CONICAL HILL by the 96th Tnf fliv as the
most important Single factor in the collapse of the SHURr
pOSition since it opened the way for an envelopment of the
hostile right and forced the enemy's immediate withdrawal.
My confidence and best 1."'ishes accompany you in the final as
sault."
The following figures show our losses as compared to those of the
e'1emy for the period 1-31 May:
OUr casua Ities : MIA
lli rn
38lst Tnf 29 236 0
382d Inf 103 929 74
38Jd Inf 113 526 64
Total: 2074
(Japs killed: 8483)
OUr tank 105ses:
Mines 10
Artillery :2
AT fire 5
Burned 2
Stuck :2
TotDl 21
Damage to the enemy:
KIA, 8483 320mm Mortars, 3
PWls, 13 Tanks, 4
Field pieces, 36 Pillboxes, 39
MG IS, 170 Caves, 1210
Mortars, 71
-43
K I N A W A ~ SH'MA
ARRATIV
PART -12:
Noisuku
PART N
PURSUIT OF 11 RETREATmG ENEMY
" After the Div had secured all of its objectives and reduced all organ
ized enemy resistance in its assigned zone of action, and with the break
ing of the SHURI line, FO #52 (Hq XXIV Corps) dated 31 May was issued giving
the Diva ne'!I" zone of action (See Map No. 14) and the mission of pursuing
the enemy to uncover his final defensive position.

Division Assigned Now Zone
On 1 June the Div moved into this new zone of action, relieved all
elements of the 32d Inf (7th Tnf Div), and inmediately prepared to continue
the attack south. Front lines of the 32d Inf, v'hen relieved by the 96th
Inf Div, on 1 June, are shown in ned on Map No. 14. The 77th Inf :Civ re
lieved elements of the 383d and 381st Infs in the area along the Gorps
boundary north of the YOf\lABARU-NAHA road and assumed r"esponsibilities of
that sector. FO #25 (Hq 96th Tnf Div dated 1 ,Tune) ordered the 38lst and
383d Tnfs to attack to the south in their 9ssigned zones and seize the hill
mass in the a:!:'ea. The 382d Tnf Vias to be in reserve
until released by the Corps Gommander.
2 JUNE
Enemy Resistance Light
Heavy rains fell during the night 1-2 June a"d continued the next day.
Despite this bad weather the Div began the attack -so"..lth at 0730 with the
383d Inf on the right and tho 381st Inf on the left. By 1000, 2/383 had
completeq mopping up all enemy in the vicinity of HILL
(8068-G3) aJ'"ld had cleaned out the town of CHAN (7968-T) after a stiff fire
fight with the anemy which was characterized by much sm311 arms and grenade
fighting at close range. At 1120, 2/383 and 3/383 advanced abreast moving
forward to seize GOQSE HILL (7968-Y5), and by -1400 these tVIO Ens had ad
vanced 500 yards south of the hill against sporadic, yet effective resist
ance of a delaying nature. By 1800 this Regt had secured HILL 37 (g067P2)
and v;ere occupying tho east and west slopes of ROSE HILL (7967-Ql). Numer
ous delaying groups of enemy were encountered by this Regt during the day'li
advances and when these groups were attacked in force they fled to the rear
in disorder offering targets for our automatic weapons.
In the 381st Tnf zono, 1/381 had renched the top of HILL -'4-7 (8067-R4)
by 1000 against machi!1e gun and rifle fire coming from their right flank.
The Bn then launched an attack against HILL 49 (8067-W3) but mot bitter
and stiff resistance. However, after two strong attacks were launched
1/381 finally seized HILL 49 at 1645. Upon receiving information that the
7th Inf Div had secured HILL 117-A ,(8265B2) with no enemy opposition,
2/381 immediately moved through the 7th Inf Div zone and att&cked HELEN
HILL (3166-X1) from positions in the vicinity of. HILL 75 (8266-L1), and by
1500 had sccured and occupied it.
-44
As a result of these activities, the Div front lines advanced 800 to
1200 yards securing HELEN HILL, HILLS 47, 49 and 37, and the east and west
slopes of ROSE HILL. During the day elements of 2/305 moved forward to pro
tect the Div right flank.
'3 JUNE
Doughboys Advance Dospito Rains
, '
.. Rainy Vlellther conti,nued on 3 June as the Div resumed the attack south. '
The 383d Inf on the Div right advanced against light 'resistance to secUre'
HILL 37, ROSE HILL and the towns of.TERA and KAMIZATO by 1200. During the
aftornoon they continued tqeir push south, and by 1400 had secured FRANCIS
(7966-Kl) HILL and HILL 53-A (7966-G4) only light opposition. Dur
ing the remainder of the day, however, enemy resistance grew steadily
stronger. As they moved forward of the north slopes of MOLE (7965-F2) and
HILIS a hastily preparede'1emy position was encountered
along this high ground. This resistance was broken in an assault at close
range by bayonetsapd hand grenades and at-the close of the period the 383d
Inf was able to secure their final front lines on' the tops of
(7965-Ll) and (7965-N4) HILIS. '
. .
The 38lst Inf a'ssisted the 333d Inf in the capture of KAMIZATO by
1130. 2/381 advanced 700 yards against moderate resistance, and by 1100
had secured TAMARACK (8lS6-U5) and WILLOW (8165-S1) HILIS. Pushing on
rapidly against light yet delaying opposition and extreMely difficult .
supply conditions, 1/381 seized OLIVIA }lILL (8065-M4) and 2/381 captured
BIRCH (8165-P) I?nd CHE.TtRY (S165-V4) HlLLS. During the day fS advances the
Div vlras opposed by the stiffest enemy opposition yet encounterGc within the
new zone of action. HO,\,Tcver, of 1400 yards v'ere made despite bad
weather and extremely difficult supply conditilns. The )05th Inf (77th
Inf Div) continued to cover the Div right flank by occupying MABEL, SUSIE
(7962-T2), JOE (797l-WX), and JOHN (7970-03) HILLS during the day.
4 JUNE
Enemy Resistance Increases
The boundary change between the 7th and 96th Inf Divs, previously
ordered by TT message from Hq XXIV Corps dated 2 June, became effective at
0730 0l'1 4 June, (See Map No. 14). Suhstantial' gains were made by 8.11
front. line units on 4 June despite extreme difficulty encountered with the
terrain, weather and transportntion of supporting
The 3S3d Inf advance was opposed by isolated, yet strong delaying
groups of and by particularly heavy gun fire coming from
the high ground on the Div right flank (78S4). It was not until 1/383
,'lTith supportj..ng weapons had moved to HILIS al"'d
placed neutrnlizing fire on the enemy along this high ground (7864) that
2/383 on tho Regt.1 right 1"8S able to push on and secure the north edge of
the town of D1A. '3/383 advanced steadily during the day, but by l8001J'lere
unable to secure the high groUnd at'8064-U due to heavy enemy fire from
their front and left f18nk.
The 38lst Jnf encountered increased enemy resistance in its push to
the south,' particularly on the right flank. 1/381 encountered consider
able machine gun and rifle fire from an enemy position at 3064-U. -HILL 89
(8064-54) was secured c:t 1100. 3/)81 after passing through 2/381 advanced
-45
59
~ 8
N.
0'
127
0
37' 30" 169000ydS. E. 40' 1073
A.M.S. L091
against increasing enemy resistance throughout the day corning from the eS
carpment at 8062-J - 8163-N and UILL79 (8063-S2). This opposition pre
vented the En from securing HILL 79, but at the close of the period front
lines were consolidated on the north slopes of HILL 79 and TRIXIE HILL
(8163-F4)
" .
As a result of those activities the Div advanced 1400 to 2000 yerds tc
capture c'ertain key terrain features necessary in continuing the attack
soutl'].ri3st ip:the ne,,'I"iv z01"leof action (TT Hq XXIV Corps dated 4 June).
During the day 2/305 '{77th Div) moved south to occupy GOOSE HILL.
5 JUNE
Japs Final Position Reached
Rainy weather continued, rands remained impassable, supplies were
hnna carried, supporting weapons (including AT weapons), were manhandled'
forward through the mud, and the enemy resistance" steadily increased.
Howc;ver, despite.these conditions on 5 . June the Div advanced 1800 yards'
on the,right flank
. The 383d Infjumped off at 0700 with the 2d and 3d Bns in the assault,
and by 0930 had completely secured the tovm of TWA on the right and oc
cupied PHYLLIS HILL (S064-U) on the left. 3/333 after taking PHYLLIS HILL
continued to push rapidly south1I'1Gst to secure HILL 59 (7863-Q) against
strong and determined enemy resistance from +,ho high ground near
YUNAGUSUKU. In additicn to the determined enemy resistance encountered
along the front of the Regt during the advance, constant flanking
fire from the high ground west and northv'est of TWA (7864) rained dovm on
the right flank and rear of 2/38). .At 1700, despite this flnnking fire,
the Bn advanced up the northwGst slopes of HILL 79-F (776,3-N) against ad
ditional enemy fire to the front. Due to the heavy ene.1Y fire falling
across the Regt1 front their no further advance and at the close of
the period front 1ineswere established on HILLS 79-F and 59 (See Map No.
14)
The 3Slst Inf co"tinued to .3,dvance slowly yet stead ily throughout the.,
day against isolA.ted pockets of enemy resistance. Ccnsiderab1e enemy
machine gun fire was received during the morn::'ng fro!.1 an enemy- st:rong
point at 8063-F, but by 1220 1/)81 had overcome this resistance and con
tinued their advance to the southwest. By 1600, this En had moved for
Y'0rd to seize LOTTA (796,3-R), ESTHER (7863-Y) and MELBA (786,3-x) HILLS.
3/331,' after mopping up HTLL 79, moved forvmrd against moderate :resist
ance and seized EILL 39-A (7962-J).
liS 3 result of theso activltit;s the Div front lines 1000
to 1300 s8curing the last Gominating terrain feature short of the
enemy's last defense lino, the YUZA-DAKE escarpment. 2/)05 continued to
protect the right fhmk and rear of the 96th Inf tiv and advanced one Co
as far south ns HILL. Enemy activity vms noticeably increased
during the night 5-6 June as all front line Ens receivod sporadic artil
lery, mortar, and machine gun fire. Heavy infiltration attempts were re
pulsoo lJy 1/)81 1/,hich killed 50 Japs
."
-46
1
6 JUNE
Patrols 'Probe Final Defenses
The 383d Inf was unable to advance except on the right flank due to
the heavy enemw fire coming from their front and left flank. sent
out patrols as far as MARVEL (7762-B2) and ELEANOR (7762-A5) HILLS with
negative results, but all patrols received heavy fires coming from the eS
cnrpment. 3/383 sent patrols to LmBY (7762-Nl) and BLONDIE (7762-82)
HILLS where they also received heavy fire from the escarpment. 2/383
out the southeast edge of the village of SHINDAWAKU and advanced
right flank 700 yards against heavy machine gun and rifle fire com
i!',g from the vic inity of 7763-C.
On the Div left flank 3/381 advanced against moderate enemy resist
ance seeuring VERONICA (7962-N3) and (7962-W2) HILLS at 1030. By
1100 a strong patrol from 3/381 had moved into the town of TOMUI meeting
light resistance, and by 1500 the remainder of the Bn had succeeded in
seizing the t9v.rn. 1/381 seized HILL 67 (7862-C5) and INGA HILL (7862G5)
by 1100 meeting very little enemw resistance, and then pushed forward to
capture the town of YONAGUSUKU against moderate resistance by 1200. DUr
ing the afternoon a strong patrol succeeded in advancing up the escarp
ment to 7861 -B3, where they immediately received heavy mortar, machine
gun, and small arms fire and had to return under the cover of smoke
.As a result of these activities the Div left flank advanc 3d approx
imately 1200 yards to seize th8 to?ms of YONAGUSUKU and TOMUI while ele
ments of 2/383 on the Div right advanced approximately 700 yards.

Enemy Pos it ions Pounded
During the period 7-9 June the Div was unable to make any gC!ins due
to the stubborn resistance of the enemy to their front and to the con
tinued rainy which had daoaged roads and prevented the rapid
forward movement of supplies and supporting weapons so necessary after
the Div had advanced 8000 yards in six days.
During this three-day period the Div made elaborate preparations
for the attack against the escarpment by sending out strong feeler
patrols to locate and destroy enemy installations. Tanks and supporting
weapons were moved forward and the Div artillery displaced for-ward to
new positions in order to soften up.the enemy. Large quantities of sup
plies and ammunition were moved tc forward areas and intensive ,:"ark on
811 roads was continued. With the Rid of clear weather and excellent
observation on 9 June, the Div gave a final pounding to the enemy posi
tions along the escarpment with Inf weapons, supporting artillery, air
and naval gunfire, and by direct tank fire support in preparation for
the final assault on 10 June. The 96th Inf Div CP moved from 8577-A
to 8l69-D at 0830, 7 June.
SUMMAR!
During the period 1-9 June, the Div chased a retreating enemy
8000 yards and uncovered the Japs r final defensive line on OKINAWA
along the YUZA-YAEJU escarpment. Rainy V1eather, mud, bpassable roads,
extremely difficult s u p p ~ conditions and an effective delaying action
by tho enemy, characterized the difficulties encountered during this
period. Despite these obstacles, assault units advanced an average of
1300 yards a day and killed over 1400 Japs during the brief nine-day
period. The following figures are a comparison of our losses to the
damage inflicted on the enel'l\Y during the period 1-9 June.
Our casualties: ill WIA MIA
38lst Inf
332d Inf
383d Inf
Total: 253
17
1
21
113
3
98
0
0
0
(Japs killed: 1417)
Our tank losses: None.
Damage to the enemy:
KIA, 1417 320mm Mortars, none
?VPs, 16 Tanks, 3
Fiold pieces, 10 Pillboxes, 4
M} IS, 31 Caves, 226
Mortnrs, 0
-48
OKINAWA SHIMA
A RATIV
PART- J[
Noisultu
PART V
REDUCTION OF LAST ENEI.IY DEFENSE LllJE
10 - 22 JUlIE
This phase of the Division's operations on OKINLWA involved the
assault and destruction of the encqy's last remaining defensive line,
YUZA-DAKE, YAEJU-DLKE hill mass. The enemy, compressed into a
spall pocket on the south tip of the island, continued to fight des
perately to the last, taking every advantage of the strong
feature reraaining in their posession. The Jap defense was based pri
nari1y on rm , rifle, a..'1d morta.r fire during this period, since the
bulk of his artillery and AT guns had been destroye4 earlier during the
course of the campaign. Sporadic artillery fire continued to harass
front line units at night, and tanks often drev! artillery and AT fire
during the day, but generally 8DCElJr fire encountered by our troops was
mainly from small caliber weapons. Although lacking in the heavier
weapons, the enemy was able to build a strong defense due primarily
to the domi.'1ating terrain fcat1J.re of the YTJZA-DAKE, YAEJU-DlI.KE hill
mass.
This hill prcscnt(!c: 2. otctaclc to eLil as:.12-'J.l force
(Sc;c II2.p !Io. 15 and Fig. 16). 'l'herc '.-;e1'o steep cscarp':cnts along the
northern Glopes. 'rhe tno highest hills remaining in enemy hands, LIHJRl'.
HILL (7961-K) and HILL 167 (7760-B) 110r8 in the division zone. The
terrain in many pl(1.cc;s Tras a jU;'lblc of rocks and coral, providing ex
cellent canoufiage for the extensive cave systems.
10 .rUNE
Division Attacks Its Third Escarpment
Following a three-day period of intense bombardment. of the hill mass,
the division attacked at 0700 on the 10th June from positions as shovm
on lIap J'io. 15. Troops locations, not shovm on map, at start of period:
1/333 (-A Co), in Regtl reservc, vicinity IWA at 7964-L: 1/382 at 8067-1,.
2/302 at 7966-H; at 8066-L.
In the 3tJd Inf zone, resistance was light initially. 2/383, on the
rif(ht, and 3/383, on the left, ,junped off at 0700. 2/383 secured ORA
EILL (7662-3)', and 3/383 advanced approximately 200 yds before being held
up by JIG fire. The Dns continued to advc'.llce slowly, however, and by 1215
had reached the railroad tracks running east and west through the Regt1
zone:' approxinatcly 700 yds north of the escarp;.1cnt. Here the advance was
stopped by hcavJ IIG fire coming g,-:;ne:c'ally from BEP.TRICE HILL (7661-B)
on the right flank in the 1st lIST Div zone and. the escarpment on the
left flank. This J::G crossfire ST;ept the nat open terrain N and E of
YUZJ\, (7661-DE) and nade advances up to the base of the im
possible. Hea V'J firC! fir,hting continued throughout" the afternoon with
nediun tanks, II-HI's, recoilless 57r:u":l and 75mm guns, and the AT and
Cn Cos' TTeapons firing directly into encr;w positions. By the end of
the day, hO":rover, tho UG positions were still holding out. Front
-49
lines of the Regt wero consolidated for the night just south of the RR
tracks north and east of
The 38lst Inf, vrith 2 Bns in tho assault, also encountered light re
sistance initially and both Bns advanced rapidly toward the escarpment.
1/381, on the right, 1;10ved across the open terrain to its front and 3/381,
on the left, advanced through the tOi'm of TOUUI (7961). As "the Bns neared
tho hiGh ground, hOi"lCver, heaV:T fire froLl. numerous enemy positions on the
escarpment made further advances difficult. Elements of 1/381, supported
by fire from tanks, AT and Cn Co ,.,eapons, Ylere finally able to push to the
top of tho lower escarpMcnt in tho center of" the Regtl zone, and by 1500
had consolidated their positions "Ghereon (7861-DE) l'"d.th the aid of a heavy
smoke screen. 3/381 attacked vdth Co I on the right and Co L on the left.
After passing through TOBUI this Bn employed all supporting weapons to de
stroy the enemy positions along the to their front. By the
end of the day, hcrrlevor, numerous positions still remained active and the
Bn was forced to consolidate its lines for the night vdth Co I on HILL 99
(7961-B) and Co L on the south edge of the town some 400 yds frOM the
esearpnent.
The 382d Inf, in Division reserve, patrolled the IrU. (7864)-KII.HIZATO
(8066) area with negative results. 2/302 closed into a new area at 7965JJ.
During the day, Div Arty pl.J.ced time fire on large concentrations of Japs
on the hill mass. Throughout the attacks over this YUZf.-DAKE, YAEJU
DAKE ESCLRPLiENT, Div Arty, in e.ddition to firing normal support missions,
placed numerous TOT fire on the escarpment and the ARAGfi.CHI (7659)
liEDEERA. (7759) areas, killing many enemy groups' caught in the open.
As a rosult of the day's attack, front line5were advanced approx
imately 800 Yds and all assault u.l1its were in contact "with the enemy.
The 38lst Inf had ma11C'.ged to push two companies to the top of the lower
escarpment within its zone.
11 JUNE
Terrain and Japs Halt Advances
}i'olloi'Jing an intense artillery preparation, tho division continued
working slo\"rly forward against strong enemy resistance and the terrain
problem presented the steep escarpment to its front.
Tho 383d Inf jumpod off at 0730. Hea--;.ry enemy !:IG and rifle fire was
received throughout the day from both fl,ml:s of the Rogtl zono. Tank
infantry teams of 2/383 170rked slowly fOr\'rard along the division right
flank in close coordination with 1/1 Ear -:lCT, destroying enemy emplace
ments along the bounda..';r. By 1200, the Un had secured tho tOTffi of YUZA.
Heavy l:tG fire from the high ground south of the tovm, hm"TCver, made it
impossible for front line'clemeni;.s to dig in and consolidate positions
on the south edgo of the tovi11, and the Bn vms forced to vrithdrmv for the
night to its previous positions. 3/3831 on the Regtl left,
slowly forward in tho open flat valley east of YUZA despite intense EG
fire from tho left front. By 1800, elements of this Bn had adva.'1ced.
some 200 Yds and reached tho ledge at the bottom of the escarpment. "
1/383, in Regtl reserve, moved forward to the following Co A,
OWL HILL (7662-S ); Band' C Cos, ELEANOR: HILL (7762-A)
-50
In the 381st Ini zone, 1/381 continued its movement up the oscarpment
during the early morning. By 0400, tho groater part of the Bn less Co A
was in position on top of tho lower escarpment. Strong combat demolition
patrols worked wost along the top and north slopos of the escarpment,
blmving up enomy fortifications previously bypassed. Final front lines
remained unchanged. 1\/381 to movo up the escarpment on tho
right of the Rogtl zone but rocoived heaV'J fire upon rcnching 7861-1\ and
was fino.ll:r forced to nithdrmr to the SE edge of the unnuned t01:n at
7762-Y. 3/3131 attacked at 0730, ,'lith tank-infantry teams working through
out the area between HILL 99 and the base of the escarpment, knocking
out enemy positions and closing numerous caves. AT and Cn Co weapons con
tinued to destroy enemy emplacements along the slopes of the escarpment.
Front line!] of the Bn were not advanced !'1aterially.
During the day, advances of 300-400 Yds were !'1ade on the right, but
final front lines showed only minor gains. Enemy activity during the
nights of 9th and 10th Ju.n.e had ooen extremely , with front line
units recei'.-:ing only sporadic mortar and artillery fire. Beginning with
tho night of 11-12 JU....lO, however, the enemy began to employ extensive in
filtration tactics, as 2/383 killed 30 infiltrators. These infiltration
attempts became increasingly stronger, reaching a point where
between 200 and hoo Japs were being killed each night.
12 l.;'1J1JE
Doughboys Scale Escarpment
The 383d Inf its attack at 0730. 2/383, on the right, ad
'Wclllced sloYlly through the t01m of YUZA, again encountering heavy I:IG and
rifle fire from the l1iU;h gro-md to the south of the toym. By 1110,
this Bn had managed to advanco to the high ground ir:rrnediately south of
the tmm (766l-lJ). The bclance of tho do.y vms spent in mopping up and
closing caves in this area. 3/383, on -the Rcgtl loft, was lmablo to make
any substantial advances during the morning due to intense I.lG fire from
enemy positions on the high ground on the right of the 3Glst lnf zone.
With the assista.'1ce of 2/381 working on these eneny positions during the
3/303 Gained some hoo Yds in the face of continuous rifle and
UG fire and had moved abreast of 2/381 by 1800.
The 38lst lnf jumped off at 0730 lrith all three Dns in the assault.
2/381, committed on the Roe;tl right, passed throur;h A/3[\1 and advanced
up tho cscarpnent slopes in conjunction vrith- 3/383 a.'1d Trith close support
of medium and light tanks. By 1200, this En had pnshod rapidly forvlard
to positions. just shcrt of th(" top of the lower escC'...Tnment to the right
of 1/301. Durine; the aftornx.n, the Bn i3earched out and destroyed active
enemy emplacements which vwro holding up the advance of 3/383. 1/381 on
the lower was unable to make any advances during the day due
to accurate enemy sf!l2.l1 arns fire. A/3Gl joined the balance of the Bn on
tho lower csc2rpment. 3/381, s-apportcd by medium and flamethrower tanks,
continued to push fOrYlard, cleaning up the; remaining cnany pockets betvroen
TOnUI and the base of tho csco.rpnont. During the afternoon, K Co, on tho
Bn right, passed through I and L Cos and reached the base; of the escarp
ment where it consolido.ted line.s for the night. L Co, on tho left,
passod through the 7th Div zone and by 1800 Vias in defensive positions
along the top of the main esco.rpmcnt. (The 7th Div hD-d attC1.ckcd at 0400
and go.ined the top of the escarpment y,-:i thin its zono).
-51
As a result of the day's operations, the Div had advanced 300-500 Yds
against continued strong enemy resistance. Elements of two Bns of 381st
Inf were on top of the escarpLlent, and the left flanl{ of 383d Inf had ad\Tan
ced. to positions well up on the escarpment. During the night 12-13 June,
enemy activity was centered in the 381st Inf zone. B/381 engaged in a hand
grenade battle with an unknmm number of Japs. The Regt killed 48 infiltra:
tors .
13 .ruNE
Bitter Fighting Ensues
The 383d Inf resumed its advance at 0730 vnth all three Bns in the
assault. 1/383, comcitted on the Regtl right, passed through the west edge
ofY1JZA and advanced to the outskirts of OZll.TO (7661) during tl-:.,.; morning.
The Bn then moved on to securc.: the tovm, but just at darkness encountered
numerous enemy mines. Several casualtics, including two company CO r s, were
sustained from mine explosions, Qnd the Bn vvithdrew and consolidated front
lines for the night on the high ground Nfl of OZ.'\.TO. 2/383, ,nth the closo
support of medium tanks, continued to blow up and destroy numerous active
enemy caves on the high ground just south of YUZ). (7661-IJ). BY'1800, this
Bn had secured two small hills to t"lCir front (not shovm on nap), vn. th no
material change in front lines. 3/383 advcmced 200-300 Yds during the day
under cover of smolcc scroens cmd against heavy enemy UG and rifle fire.
l.t 1800, the Bn front lines Vlere still receiving heaV'J enemy fire d.I1d i"Tere
located along a coral ridge makinc; it inpoc)sible to dig in for the night
in that 3.rea. The Bn was forced to y;ithdr[sr to positions occupied the
previous night. 2/382, under operational control of the 3G3d Inf, moved
forward to HILL 79 (7763-11) and ELK\lmn HILL (7762-A).
In the 38lst Inf zone, 2/381, on the right, jumped off at 0730 with
two plats of light tcm1cs in su?port. AT fire from skillfully con
cealed positions on the north slopes of H1LL 167 halted the td.I1ks at
the road bend at 7761-14. The Bn made three attempts to reach the top
of the escarpment to their front but heavy and accurate IIG and rifle fire
and light mortar fire prevented any advance. 1/381 continued to mop up
caves and emplacements in its area. 3/381, on the Regtl left, vras more
successful in its attack. Employing flamothroYlGrs, satchel charges,
bazookas, and other supportinG VlG2pOnS, K and I Cos mopped up along the
base of the escarpment, and, a.ftor eliminating one particularly strong
enemy posi tioD on their rir,ht flank, began to ascend the escarpmcmt. By
1800, all of I Co and clements of K Co had consolidated front lines on top
of tho oscarpment to the; right of L Co.
On the 13th, adv2ncos were m,".dc on both flanks of the divi"ion. On
the right, l/183 rU!1cl1cd. OZl\TO; on tho Div left fln.nk, tho greater portion
of the as sault clements of 3/381 gained the top of the oscarpr!10nt. During
tho night 13-14 J1..1Ile, cmemy acth'ity Vf!lS again centerod in tho 38lst Inf
zone. 1/381 ongClged in a llClnd-grcnado battle lasting until davm.
14 JUlIE
Escarpment Defenses Crumble
383d Inf continued to work agn.inst onlJ..'1lY positions along tho es
r.:lrpnont Trith tanks and dOPlolition toams throughnut tho day. 1/383 rOrloved
-52
Fie_ 16 -THE 11'ZII.-YAEJU
'::'his escarpment (above) was the
Ja!1' s final dsfense line in Div
zone. Its slopes were
strongly defended from caves and
roc]:y pillboxes. The LAURA :-:I1L
(YAEJU) escar[,n,ent (left) .'1 as
attacked frontally by 581 1n;
the (oel0\1) by
585 1nf illitially, then 582 Inf_
Fig.17-TANK-lJiF ACTION NEAR YUZA.
Tank-infantry teams played
the major role in reducing
enemy cavee and pillboxes,
not only in the YUZA-DAKE
area but throughout the
OKnrA;'!A Campaign wherever
strongly held emplacements
,.,ere encountered.
mines from the roads in tho tovm of OZATO and fired tank and AT weapons
on enomy caves and emplacements Jocatcd along the escarpment. The Bn then
moved back into the Div zone, 1vith front lines tied in vrith 2/38) on the
loft and 1/1 Ear on the right. 2/303 continued to YlOrk on enemy positions
to its front. 3/383, on the Regt1 10ft, pushed forward in conjunction
..,-dth 2/381 on its left and ,lith thu aid of direct fire from medium tanks
succp.8ded in capturing tho ground just beloYl the HILL 167 escarpment.
The 3[llst Inf made [?;9ins of up to 500 Yds in their zono during the day
and secured the doninating IAURA HILL. The advnnce was assisted
by the close-in support of medium, light and fiamethroVlcr tanks which had
finally managed to Ylork up to tho top of the escarpment. 2/3131, on the
Regt1 right, although pinned clOYffi at one time by heavy I.IG and mortar fire,
pushed foryrard somo 500 Yds during the day and 'by 2020 yms tied in
with 1/361 on its loft and 3/383 on its right. 1/381, unable to movo
during the morning due to LIG and mortar fire froD. its front, resumed the
attack at 1330, pushed rapidly fonmrd against continuous IIG and mortar
fire, and by the end of tho day ',[(1S tied in ,:ri th 2/381 on its richt.
3/381 attacked at 1030. , By 1125 the Bn had securod tho pinnacle of the
escnrpmunt on LJdJR1\. HILL. After mopping up the hill top area, the Bn
continued dovm the south slopes of the hill and at 1800 'lims tied in with
the 7th Div on its loft and up,s on line vn.th 1/3<31 on its right.
Tho 96th Hcn Tr moved to vicinity of lIAZIE HILIJ C7962-rr) and for the
balanco of the period mopped up behind the infantry, closing caves along
the Yil.EJU-DJ,KE escarpment.
,'r< the Ihth, tho en en:" escarpment defense on the Div left YTaS definite
ly broken vri th the seizure of the peak of IJAT.lTI.!\ HILL by the 381st Inf.
Enemy resistance on the riGht, honever, continued unabated and prevented
arJ.Y rapid advancos. During the night lIt-15 June enem:r infi1tration attempt::
showed an increase, nith front-line units killing a total of 102.
15 JTmE
Reach Last Peak
The 3GJd Inf continuecl the attaclc during the clay, pushing its left
flank approximately yards forward. 1/333, on the right, jumped off at
0730 after cleanin[; nines in OZATO, but the attack was
stopped ahlOst imnediatc-;1y by intense nachine gun fire fran the HILL 167
escarpnont and tYrO jutting out fron the HILL 167 area. (The norther;
ridgo, actnally an at 7661-ENT e:ctends t01"rards YUZA. The
southern ridse at 7560-E - 7660-FL rlL.'1S towards OZA'1'O). and AT fire
l!aS placed on these ridGes, but v[as not sufficient to the enemy
positions. Final front of the Bn Here consolidated on the south and
east edGes of OZATO. 2/302 (att0.ched to 3G3d Inf) rclie'v'"od 2/383 in the
center of the TIogtl zone durinG tL:' morning and attacked at 1100 to secure
the escarpment and rid>;;o (76f)1-IIHT) running fron HILL 167 to YTJZA (soc
above). By 1800 this fresh Jjn had sccl)rcd the north slop(;s of tho ob jectiv(
and closed tho gap betY,;eL itself and 3/303 on tho left. 3/383
pushed forvrard in a very successful coordinated attacl: vii th 2/301 on its
loft and n.dvancc:d approxinate1y 1.(:0 yards durine; the clay. fly 1000, e1e
Dents of tho Bn had succeeded in reaching the ton of the HII,L 167 escarp
nent and additional troops were pushed up under cover of darkness. 2/383,
after its relief, noved to assenbly area at HILL 89 (7962-J).
-53
In the 3B1st Inf zone, the left fla.l1k of tho Rogt advanced rapidly dur
ing tho morning against moderate resistance. 3/381, tho left flank Bn,
supported by raodium and flamo-thro1'ler tanks and working in conjunction
"rith tho 7th Div on its loft, had gained some 1000 yards by 1300 and had
completed the mopping up of the sonth slopes of LAURA HILL. Small pockets
of enony resistance to its front made advances very slow in the afternoon,
but the En made additional gains of 200 yards. The other tvro Dns (2/3Gl
on the right and 1/301 in the center) also advanced during the day,
svringing on the right flank of 2/301 al1d advancing the left flank of 1/301
sone 500 yards to keep on line ,.lith 3/301. Eneny resistance lTaS strong in
front of both these Bns.
On the 15th, enemy resistance continued to prevent any appreciable
gains on the Div right flank. Advances of some 1200 yards, hoyrever, vrcre
made on the loft flank "'There the bal,ance of LAURA HILL Tras secured. 3/383,
in the center of the lino, pushed elenents to the top of the escarpment on
HILL 167. 3/382 moved to 7763-lITI.TI:l. During the night 15-16 June, heavy
Blmm mortar fire Has reported 2/382 a"1d 3/383, in addition to the usual
artillery and mortar fire along the entire Div front. Theenor.lJr continuod
thoir strong night infiltration attempts; the three Inf Regts killed a
total of 106 infiltrators.
16 JUNE
382d Inf 383d Inf
3/302 beGan tho relir)f of 1/303 in OZ1I.TO at 0700, and at nGL;5 1/383
was completely relieved and COl:1!llandinG Officer, 382d Inf, aC3u.r:lcd cOI:1!lland
of the-previOUS 333d Inf zone of action. This 3/302 in
2/382 on the north slo)8s of the ridge south o.f and 3/303 (attached
to 3G2d Ini) on the north slopes of HILL 167. After the relief; 3/382
launched an attack to the south and engaged in a heavy all-day fire fight
with the eneny. available supporting ,Teapons nerc trained on enemy
positions along the oscarpment at 7660-c to 7661-X vrhich held up the ad
vance of tho En throughout the day. 2/382 and 3/3G3 ,jumped off in"a co
ordinated attack at 0730 against strong enemy resistance. By 1000,-ad
ditiona1 clements of 3/383 had reached the highest peak of HILL 167, and
by 1300 the Bn was in complete control of this high ground. 2/3iJ2 ad
vanced yards to secure completely the sElall escarpment and ridge
south of YUZA and to tie in th 3 aS3 on 167. Elements of 273132
had reached this ridge the previous dilY, but on the 16th the Bn vrorked
dovm the forvrard slopes of the ridge, cleaning out all enenw resistance
in the area. 1/382 -vras con,"1itted during tho afternoon in the gap botween
2/382 and 3/302 to out remaining enGmy resistance in that area
south of Final front lines of the Dn 'VTere on line and tied in
with 2/3U2 on the loft.
The 3Glst Inf advanced SOL1C 600 Y2.rds along the entire front to posi
tions on the fOrlrard slopes of the saddle botvreen HILL 167 and HILL IS3
(7859-G). Tho Regt began its atacl: at 0730 "\,'ith all three Bns in tho
as sault. 3/3u1 :ldvancod 200 yards until squ(J("zod out by 1/381 and during
the afternoon moppod up ;::2 on;: the lc,ft of the Ror:;t1 zono. 1/381 and 2/3131
met light resistance initi0-11y, but by 1100 thl3ir advance; 1':8.S temporarily'
held up by. hOClV'J machine gun cmd snaIl arms firo frOI:.l HILL 1j3. (HILL
153, locr,tcd in the 7th Diy zone, dorainatcd tho left flank of tho 96th Div.
The 7th Div fought throughout the day to secure the hill and by the end of
the period hild pushuc::. ulencmts to the to:) Clgainst heavy resistance. Enony
-54
positions on the y:(;st and south slopes of the hill, hm;ever, continued to
hinder the advanc':; of our left flanl::). A. t lJOO, 1/381 rencrrod its attack.
After only short advances nero nade, heaV'J nachine gun fire fron positions
on the vrest slopes of HILL 153 forced the front-line Cos to withdraw.
j\fter a quick reorganization, the Bn attacked again at 1600 and pushed its
yray fornard over the saddle at 7760-NT betnoen HILLS 167 and 153. At l80r
the Dn yras still receiving intense nortar, ,machine r;un, and rifle fire ire
its left front and the Trest slopes of HILL 153. 2/381 advanced yrith and
abreast of 1/331 during th(.: afternoon. Trro Cos of tan]:s rendered very
effective support during the day's advances.
After its relief by t!lC 3G2d Inf, 1/3133 closed into a nevT area in the
vicirlity of 7963-D. The 305th Inf (77th Div) Y[(lS attached to the 96th Div
for o'}erational control as oT 1200. This Rer:rt closed in at 006(j-II during
D
the norning.
On the 16th, the Div secured t:1C top of HILL 167, the highest pc ale on
the isl(JJld renaining in Jar possession. The Di v left flank advanced approx
inatuly 600 yards. Once aGain tLn right fl<mk softened up enemy positions
to thl; front nith no naterial chanGes in fr:mt lines. The 382d Inf (nith
3/383 attRchod) replo,ced the 3G3d Inf on the Div right. PreVious to this
tine, the; .3C2d Inf had patrolled rear areas. During the night
16-17 June, front-line units repulsed nunerous infiltration attenpts,
killing 117 Japs.
17 JUlIE
Defense-Line Shattered
Follo-vd.rig an artillery preparation, tho J(l2d InI resUDod the attack
yrith Bns :i,.n the assault (3/383 attached), utilizinG nediun and flame
thrower ta...'1.ks to great n.dvantr>.go. Durin,.; the day, tho :1oc:t advn.nced over
600 yards in the niddle of its ZO!le and 200-300 yard" 0:_ both flanks.
HCln.vy nachine glill and rifle fire from nell-concealod positions n.nd camou
flaeod cav(;s and rock pillboxes on the south and nest slopes of' HILL 167
l'JCre encountered throughout the day. 3/382, on the Regtl right, war,ked
forv-rard sloyrly, advancj_np, a.bout 200 yards and cleanine out nunerous enomy
cavos a..'1d pillboxes. advanced over 600 yards. Er.lploying tank-Inf
denoli tion teams tho Pn broke up all organized enor.ry resistance in the
YUL',ic-O/,J\.TO - 167 areo.. 2/382 movod two reinforced Coe up on the high
ground southwest of HILI; 167 during the morning and pushed its attack to th
-.-{c)ct in an effort to T!l2intC1.in contact nith the advancing left fl<lnlc of
1/382. 3/3,;3, from positions previously gainted on tELL 167, Forkod down
tho south slo:/,.:;s of th,,) hill, gaining n.pproY.inatoly 200 yards.
The; ]:3lst Inf n:lS un2blc; to nakc r>.ny appreciable g2.ins durinii day
cxcupt on the \,xtrcr.1o right. Here, tho right flank of 2/301 r:J.ovod forrrard
SQY;1,e 200 y['.rds to l'Jith 3/383. 7he left flan1: of
2/301 Clnu front lines of 1/301 y;(;rc pinned down durinG tho dCly by grazinG,
fl:mldnG l1achinu l;lJn fi_re frOl.l UC yrust slop()s of HILL 153. Eneny rcsist
2.nce to the front of this itoGt strcmg, ,:',l-ld it '.,as evident that, o.s
soon as the 7th IlLv held completely cleaned out the HILL 153 area, the Regt
l';Ol"ld be ,-,ble to continue its [,clvance. 3/301, in J1eGtl reservo, located :'_t
7860-CDIII on LA1JIt\ HILL, continUdd to l-:J.OP up ClTld soal caveD ir'. rear arcas.
;\.s a result of thc aclvnncos nade on t;,c 17th in the JG2d Inf zone of
action, orGanized enemy resistance in the 167 area lias
overcome. The Div heLd Gainod cOI'lpleto control of tlw lLJZI.-DAI(E, YAEJU-DAKE
-55
hill mass.
18 - 22 JUNE
Largc-Scaic-ffopUpUndcr1rTaY
Wi th the of the YUZ!i-DAKE, YJ\.SJU-DAKE hill mass on tho 17th
of June, the Div had completely broken the last actual enemy defensivo
position within its zone. From 18 to 22 June, the nction VIi thin the Div
zone consisted mainly of vriping out scattered strongpoints of enemy resist
:mcc. This nction, hOT/ever, Ims more than a nere mopping-up opurntion.
The isolated enemy groups continued to fight dospcratelYI aided by the
jumbled coral rock ;mel. hilly of the area. The enemy continued to
employ nachinc gun, riflo nnd mortar fi!'O during the day. The Div yms
forced to .1.ttack nnd dGstroy each enemy individually. IIediun,
light and flamo-throlTer tanks nere employed extensively; artillery preparn""
tions "\Tere fired prior to each na.jor ndvnnce. During this five-dny period,
the Div killed 0153 Jnps. On 21 o.1one, the Div killed 1823 Jnps.
Each night the onorlY attempted Gxtensive infiltration. For eXal-aple, on the
night 20-21 June, a to;to.1 of 414 infiltrators VTere ldl1ed nnd 12 captured.
Front-lino positions at tho c10so of each day are sho'.7n on LInp lYo. 15.
20 JUNE
382d 1nf Clo<l...Tls Out
On 18 nnd 19 June, tho 3B2d 1n1 (1,"rith 3/303 attached) conp'.otod the
mopping up of enomy forces north of tho town of AR.,\GJ\.CH1 (7659). On the
18th, 3/382, on the Hogtl right, ndvnncod npproximately 600 yards, re
ducing nn eneny cnvc nnd pillbox defense ;liong tho base of a rocky ridge
at By 1800 on thl.] 19th, 2/332 and 3/383 on tho left had pushed
from HILL 167 to tho high ground north of Ml.:"GACHI to como abreast of
3/382.' During this ndvnnce, the two Bns encountered munerous caV8S and
pillboxes, ench of which hnd to be; dostroYl;d or flushed out \'rith flame
throwers. 1/302 remainod in position at 7660-FG and moppod up behind tho
other Dns. On the 20th, 3/382, 2/3132 and 3/303, from right to loft, pushed
forward in tho face of stiffening enomy resistance in tlclo forn of ITw.chino
gun tind rifle firo coming fror,l cornl enpl.').coments in the ridge just north
of AR!l.GACHI. Dy 1800, the R8gt had seized the ridgo and passed through tho
tOl'm, with front lines 10C!ltr;d gonernlly ;liong the road just south of tho
town. For th,:; balance of the period, the TIogt carried out largo scale
mopping-up nctivitios within its zone. On the 21st, 3/333 moved bacl<:to
7660-KLII. 2/YJ2:md 3/3D2 established a dofcmsivo porinoter just south
of ARAG}I.CIU.
21 Jtrrm.
3iJlst 1nf Clcan's-C>,lt Ledcera
The 381st 1r:f, rrith 2/301. on and 1/381 on tho left, advanced
rapidly on the 18th, gaininG some 1000 yards Trith final front lines located
on the hiGh ground npproxino.tcly 1100 yords north of EZDTillil.;1. (775:;). :9uring
th;is advance, oneny resistance encountored was in the form of sf.mll delay
ing forces and canouflagod snipers concealed throughout the rocky terrain.
At the end of the; day, 1/381 Has rc.!cciving rifle, nClchine gun and mortar
firo. On the 19th, advanc(.)s '."[Ure slow as both Bns worked throur;h tho
rocky terrnin on tho high ground north of 1 cleaning out riflemen
-56-
8 - LAST DEFEiIJSIVE LTIlE TAKEN.
Front linea of the 96th Inf Div reach top of LAURA
HILL-HILL 167 after scaling the third precipitioua
escarpment encountered on OKINA\tfA. The China Sea may
be seen in the horizon, upper right.
Fig. 19 - RECOILLESS WEAPONS.
The 75mm and 57mm recoilless weapons, used for the
first time during this operation, were ver.y effective
in destroying enemy caves and by direct
fire the at tack on the 1YUZA-YAEJU escarpnent.
and machine gunners concealed in the rocky ~ a w s and crags. 2/381 received
an intense barrage of 5anm mortar firo during the afternoon of the 19th.
On the 20th, the Regt again encolmtered strong eneny machine gun and rine
fire'fron numerous Japs scattered throughout the rocky crags in the area.
Both Bns made extensive use of T!lcdiun and f1ame-throTTur tanks in the de
struction of oneny C:WGS nnd r,lachine gun positions. During the afternoon
1/381, on the left, advanced to the north edge of U:illEERA after c:mcaging in
hoavy fighting, including soveral hand-grenade bnttles. An eneny strong
point at 7759-rr, on the northeast edGe of ti1e tovm, held up the; advance of
the Bn and remained active despite an attenpt to flank the positions to tho
cast. On the 21st, 3/381 Has connittcd'on the Regtl 10ft, and cleaned out
this renaining enemy pocket in a flanking movenent. 1500 civilians and
141 PrJ's were collected as a result of surrender appeals broadcasted durL.
the nornin[. Lt the close of the day, all three Bns established a defensivt
perimeter just north of t;1C: tovm. On the 22d, 3/381 cleaned out the re
maining eneny pockets along the south edge of the torm. A larr;e portion of
the encny killed during the day were officers, probably remnants of the
Jnp 2lJ.th Div IIeadquCll'ters which TTas later deternined to be located in this
area. On the 2lst and 22d, 2/381 continued to patrol the area west of
:r:WEERf. and 1/3131 patrolled rear areas back to HILLS 167 and 153.
During tho period 18-22 June, 383d Inf (-3/383) patrolled rear areas
(7961-7962-7963-71361-7862-8163), killing isolated Jap groups and sealing
numerous caves.
22 JUNE
305th Inf Llalcos Final fl. t tack
The 305th Inf (77th Div), under opor.'ltional control of the 96th Div,
continued to nap up rear areas froLl 18-20 Juno. 2/305; attached to 382d
Inf, novcd to 7761-E'I', just south of YUZA, on the leth, and on the 19th
nopped up in the YUZ:.-DAKE area east of OZATO, cleaning out tiro by-passed
eneny pockets at 7661-SXY and 7660-BC. The balance of the Rcgt patrolled
area vicinity of K1JiIZ;\70 (13066). On the 20th, the Regt (-2/305) moved to
neY[ assembly areas in the vicinity of TOiillI.
On the 21st, the 305th Inf "'-laS cotlnitted to soize EUL 79 (7658-1) nnd
:11LL 85 (765'8-11). Tho l[wt rcmaining'enony strongpoint -.-.rithin the Div zone
TlaS located on these hro hills, uhich, to:.;ether with HILL 131 (75'59-Y) in
t:,e Larine zone, formed tho "I :J\JC,\BE RIDGE". (Tho 1st Larine Div had
seclU'cd HILL 31 the previous dC'W).
The Regt pass:.;d through the 7th Div zone and noved to an assenbly
positioD at nSll-II, encoc;ntering nunerous scattered ?oclwts of eneny rifle
nen durinG the approach narch. :.t 1200, 1/305 junped off for HILL 79
supported by nediun and fl?r:1e-thro'.'wr tanks. Iloderatc resistance was e:-1
cOlmtered. By 1000, frGnt lines 1;wre consolidated just short of the crost
of HILL 79. On the 22d, 3/305 po.ssed thrOUGh 1/305, and'against scattered
eneny rifle and nachinc gun fire secured HILL 85 by 1400, at Trhich tine
the island nas declared secure.
During the pe;riod 10-17 June, the 96th Div assaUlted its third es
carpl1cnt and broke the enemy's final defense system based on tho formidable
-57
yuz...'\.-J1\KE, hill mass. Durin[3 the In.st five dnys of the cnrnpaign,
frqm 18 to 22 Juno, the Div cleaned out the remaining olements of tho Jap
force which had been compressed into the ijAKA.BE-AR1\.GACHI-1IEDEEIL\ area,
this mopping-up phase, oxtren.ely large nur!lbers of the eneny '\Vore
killed, \"iith totnl eneIT'J dead reaching 6153 Jnps for the five-day period,
Tho following shoYling our losses as cOLlpn.red to those of the
enemy, cover the pot:iod 10-22 June:
Our ca.sualties: KIA ELl.
38lst Inf 60 389 10
382d Inf 36
258 10
383d Inf 35 195 14
Total: 1007
(JCi.P$. killed: 9838)
Our tank lassos (from ninGs and sa.tchol chnrgcs):
9
Danage to tho cncn.y:
KIA,' 9838 liortars, 37
Pill s, 206 Caves, 114
Field pieces, 23 Tanks, 2
liG I s, 104
-58
~ ~ . : .
27 JUN
*** C 28 JVNE
*6
29 JUN
30
"v

Sc. VIOO1OOO
16
PART VI
MOP-UP OPERATIONS
"
23-30 JUNE
FO #26, (Hq 96th Inf Div) dated 22 June 45, was to become effective
when O-Day was announced, this day to mark the termination of organized Jap
resistance. The 96th Inf Div was to start on 011 Day, mop up Jap units and
personnel south of Phase Line 1 in its zone of action (See Map No. 16),
bury all dead Japs and salvage all US and Jap equipment. Starting on 0/2
Day at 0730, the Div was to sweep fro'm Phase Line 1, in ":,he vicinity of
KOMFSU and within its zone of action, to Phase Line 3 north of Highway 44
and be prepared to assemble by 0110 Day in assigned areas of rehabilitation'.
The 96th Inf Div with th:ree Regts abreast was to be the guiding unit for
the 7th Inf Div on its east flank and the III Phib on its west flank
during the sweep north. On 24 June, daily phase lines and limiting points
were incorporated in this plan to facilitate the coordination of all units
(See Map No. 16 Y.
O-Day was announced by Tenth Arm,v as 22 June and FO #26 went into
effect immediately. On 23 June the mopping up operations Viere officially
begun although the Div had been continually mopping up enemy pockets in
the A.t:tAGACHI-MEDEERA area since 20 June. Resistance in the town of MEDEERA
was cleaned out at 1000, 23 June, by 38lst Inf and during the afternoon
assault operatiqns were continued with the use of flame-thrower tanks
against small enemy pockets south of MEIJSERA. 1/381 relie7ed 1/305 on HILL
75 during the morning and patrolled south to KJMESU duri"1,'S the afternoon.
2/381 moved to HILL 85 and relieved 3/305 at }430. D1l!'inC the day the 38lst
Inf killed 492 Japs plus an additional 160 estimated s'32l:.;ri in caves. }S2d
and 383d Inf Regts conducted extensive patrolling, ferreting out individual
Japs and sealing many caves. As a result of the day's activities, the Div
killed 1408 Japs and captured 83 POW.
During 24 June, patrol activities were again concentrated around the
MEDEERA-ARAGACHI area. Bulldozers were used to bury Japs and seal caves.
795 Japs were killed during this period and 52 taken prisoner.
On 25 June the Div jumped 'off from Phase Line 1 at 0730 in its sweep
ing and mopping up action within assigned zone with 382d Inf on the left
(west) and 381st Inf on the right (east). By the end of the day, all three
Regts were in position on an anti-infiltration defense line in the
MEDEERA area in preparation for a further sweep to the north' (See YJp 'Jo.
16)
On the following day, 26 June, trw Div moved north 1000-1500 yarc.3.
thoroughly mopping up in the process. By 1800 the line had renched a pd'
1000 yards south of Phase Line 2 as shown on Map 16. On 2'7 J'.ID8;
six Bns abreast, the Div thoroughly swept the north slopes cf the YUZA
YAEJU ESCARPMENT. By 1800, all Bns were on Phase Line 2 (yr2.<\-':'O:,IDI ROdd)
and were phYSically tied in with the 184th Inf on the right and the 1st
Marine Divan the left 1/381 VIas left to guard the _remaining exits of a
deep cave approximately 300 yards south of MEDEERA conta ining the CP of Hq
24th Division.
-59
1st platoon, Co A, 32lst Engineer Bn, had been assigned to the 38lst
Inf to help close the 24th Division CP cave. For several days. extensive
demolition destruction had been inflicted on the existing exits. However,
due to the tunneling and numerous entrances., new openings appeared as a re
sult of blowing existing entrances. During 27 June, approximately 1700
gallons of gasoline and 300 pounds of dynamite were used in this operation.
When this waS set off, smoke and flame belched from every hole in the side
of the hill. Although gas fumes were so bad it was impossible to enter any
of the openings and at least two known.levelshad been thoroughly burned
and dynamited, mOans were heard in what must have .been yet a third level.
At 1400 on 28 June, after many determined efforts on the part of both
and Inf, this caVe was finally sealed.
Originally the 77th Inf Div had been designated to establish a block
ing line generally along Highway 44 to prevent any Japsfrom escaping to
the north. On 28 June, the 96t.h Inf Div was ordered by XXIV Corps to take
over this blockade line effective at 1300 (See Jl.1ap no. 16).
By 29 June, all units had mopped up to the intermediate phase line
from CHAN to OGUSUKU. By 1200, 30 June 45, with eight Bns abreast, units
of the Div reached Phase Line 3 and left one Co from each Bn "to remain on
the Phase Line for the night. The remainder of the troops closed into new
assembly areaS in the vic inity of KAMlZATO (8066-B).
SUMMARY
During the first part of the mop-up phase, the large number of civil
ians which appeared from every direction, hampered the troops' efforts to
hasten the destruction of small pockets of Jap res istance. However, Mili
tary Government units wor.king with CIC and Div MPrs were able to establish
enough POW enclosures and straggler lines to eliminate this obstacle. Since
all caves lFere being blown and sealed, the Japs began to hide in cane fields,
tall and buildings. Flame-thrower tanks Viere extensively used in
clearing out those Japs who attempted to use this kind of concealment. All
elements of the Div, including service units and the Div CP, killed infil
trators repeatedly as far back as the YONABARU-NAHA highway (Highway 44).
The cumulative damage to ourselves and the enemy during the mop-up phase,
2.3-30 June, is shown below.
Our Casualties: KIA WIA MIA
.38lst Inf 2 59 o
.382d Inf
.3
25 o
.38.3d Inf 2 25 o
Total: 116
(Japs killed .3400)
Our Tank Losses: Hone.
Damage to the Enemy:
Japs killed, 3400 Mortars, 4
PVPs, 233 320mm Mortars, None
Field Pieces, 16 Pillboxes, None
Machine Guns, 8 Caves, 75
-60
....
CONCLUSICN
The action of the 96th Inf Div against the enemy on OKIN/\WA can no
better be summarized than by the followirig letter from the CORPS Commander,
now Lieutenant General JOHN R. HODGE.
HEADQJARTERS XXIV CORPS
Office of the Commanding General
APO 235
29 June 1945
SUBJECT: Fnd of Battle of Okinawa.
TO Major General James L. Bradley, Commanding
96th Infantry Division.
1. Now that organized resistance on Okinawa has ended and we
are 'well along on mopping up the romnants of the enemy garrison, I
take the opryortunity to express to you my personal and
thanks and for the splendid work done throughout the
'entire campaign by the 96th Division, so ably led by you.

2. Those in position to make comparisons consider this to be
by far the bitterest bnttle of the Pacific to date, as well as having
highest strategic irr.portance. The 96th Infantry Division, a highly
intGgrnted battle teaftl, performed its full share in winning this
battle in a manner th3.t le.lves nothing to be desired, and with a con
tinuing aggressive spirit' that marks the unit as second to none among
similar Uhits of th,,;' Armed Forces. In its 3.ccomplishment of its
assigned missions the division has Rdded anothar and outstanding chap
ter to its illustrious performance on Leyte Island
3. The 96th Infantry Division, loading out of Leyte after the
long debilitating Battle of Leyte vii th only a v0ry brief period,
landed on Okinawa I April on the s')uth flank of the Tenth r\rmy landing
force. The divisiJn rapidly eastward and southward ag-:>.inst
enemy resist::mce, pr')tecting the Army flank, and S8ized important high
ground in its zone of action north ()f Futema, driving in the enemy out
post and devel'Jping the h0stile first main position in less the-ill a week.
Continuing its driving, aggressive attack s:)Uthward the division broke
thrc)ugh the strong hostile first )nain position and inflicted hea'tty
da:na.ge the sec)nd, advancing continually against str"mg odds of
terrain and ':;nemy fire fc)r a peri')d of one ,";l.onth. Depleted by casual
ties, the division was then withdrawn to Corps Resurve for a brief ten
day rest, aftar which it relieved 'In;)ther division in a new z)ne
emb ldying 8)1:le ;f the most difficult terrain and strr)ng defenses en
countered:m Okinawa, and ccmtinued its aggressive attack. Despite
adverse conditims of terrain, weather and enelJY resistance the division
captured Yonabaru Airfield, Yonab'.lru, several key terrain features and
that ioportant eastern bastion of the strong Shuri position, Conical Hill,
- I
.....
I
thus Jpening the path to turn the eneI.1Y out of his defenses and force
his withdrawal to the south tip of the island. Following the captll!8
of Cr)nical Hill the division br0ke the eastern part of the Shuri posi
ti')n acid advanced rapidly against enemy resistance to the south in its
zone throuBh weather and mud would hav stopoed less determined
troops, d'3veloping the new enemy posi tbn on the Yuza-Dake-Yaeju-Dake
hill mass. As weather improved, the division made its final drive
against and 0ver formidable escarpments and rugged coral studded terrain
to capture the northwestern portion of Yaeju-Dake and the Yuza-Dake
playing a major role in the '.)f the last enemy stronghold on
Okinawa and tqe end of his organizea resistance, During its 76 days of
active cOllbat on Okinawa, the 96th Infantry Division kil:.cd a rep0rted
31,034 and captured 869 of the eneny with the low casualties in its own
ranks of one American killed or Qissing to approximately 22 Japs killed
or captured.
4. Higher c')mr.... 'Jnders receive congratulations based upon the success
;)f their COIIll!lands. In my opinion the congratulations and praise should
all go to the troops and troop commanders who co tl.eir job on that high
plane of fortitude, sense of cuty and teamwork that insures our success
in battle. No high commander can be better than the troops he commands.
I have been extremely fortunate in having your division under my command.
It is my desire that every officer and man of your fine COli.1ffiand including
yourself accept the content of this letter as applying to him as an indi
vidual as well as to the division as a unit.
JOHN R. HODGE
Ma.j0r Gen<;::rdl, United states
Commanding
- 2
KINAWA SHIMA
_____,tJ
DIVISIO
C ~ H PTE- R '7ill
A - ~ ~ -
ON
OKINAW/\
HAR'1ATr.'E
ENEHY .ART ILLERY
E:'TE:/1Y TACT rcs
r
NAR.1i.ATI'JE OF ACTIClH
The Japanese organized the southern end of OKINA",[A in such a vray as to
defend against a landing from any direction. The 32d Army Headquarters set
up in SHURI, the center of the defenses, and disposed its major u!1its
around this city, with the 62d Division on the north, the 24th Division on
the southvlest and the Dill on the southeast (See l.iap 17). The bulk of
the artillery under the 5th Artillery Comma...'1d had positions in the vicinity
of SHURI (See Hap 19). Havinr, decided to defend the southern end of the
island, the Japs followed plan to the end.
The major tactical units that faced the 96th Div the OlaHA'iIA
campaign, the 24th and 62d Divisions, had the normal Japanese organization
for a triangular and brigaded division respectively. The 62d Division con
sisting of eight battalions, the 11th, 12th 13th and 14th in thfc; 63d Bri
gade; and the 15th, 21st, 22d and 23d in the 64th Brigade, had their nor
mal strength of 350 augr.18nted by 300 OKINAWAns. This division also had
the following attachments: 272d and 273d II Bns, the 4th and Ihth Ind l1G
Bns, the 22d Ind Anti-tank Bn, eleraents of the 79th and GIst AAA "EnG, the
224th Special Established Comuany and the; l49th Naval AA. The nen in
this division had received excellent training and had good equipment. The
24th Division contained the 22d, 32d and 89th Inf Regiments and the 42d
FA Regiment, and the normal units. Its attachments consisted
of the 26th, Z7th, 28th and 29th Ind Bns, all converted frol'l sea. raiding
base battalions, the 3d and 17th Ind llG "Sns and the 3d Ind Anti-tank Bn.
The other major combat unit, the 4hth ]]3, did not operate in the 96th
Div zone of action.
For a comprehensive study of the action, it is sugr,ested
that the 1!PARTS1! of this nar!'ative be in conjunction with corre
sponding of the Narr2.tive in the ;)receding chapter.
?A;rL' I
1 TO 16 APRIL
Since thc.; 62d Di the northern defensive zone (See
Hap 18), it bore tho brlmt the; initial fir;htint;. The Japs disregard
ed their elaborate defenses -uehind the i'Tld marle no attempt to
fight on the beach hc['.d. 62d;)ivision m:t out the 12th II Bn as a
delayine; force. 'llle unit fell back rapidly, offering little resistance.
By the 4th A;Jril it llilcl frtllen ': <1c1: to the first defense line extend
ing Generally eilC',t ::-lcross tbc island fron UC'UTOE./I.RI. The 12th II En
then took up l)ositLms with the 13LJ1 :md lLith II Bns disposed in that
order from west to east, lloldinc; t c' fh's-!-, lino of defense.
On the hth of April the 96th iJiv nade its first inroads on the
eneny Llain positions. nhcreas prior to this tine the JaTls had resist
ed with only scattered machine [;Un and rnortilr fire and sporadic
artillery, whole defense noy; stiffened. lIachinc r,un fire became
intense. b J.rrar,es of two hundrod rcmnds fell frequentljr.
tJtil i7.=--nc; the excellent observatic:1, the Jap artillery commoncod firing
-1
larger concentrations, shooting from one to two thousand rounds of 75rnm,
10em and 15 em shells into the division zone in a day. On the night 6-7
April, the Japs fired their first eounterbatterv, 150 rounds of l5em,
against the 96th Div ArtilleI"'J. The Japs conncmcud using 32em mortars.
on tile 7th, firing fivc; rounds in the 30nc of _the 383d Ini'.
The first enemy offensive action against the division took place on
the 5th of April rrhen an estimated company reinforced with three tanks
attempted to attack the 3d Bn, 382d Inf, but dispersed when brought under
artillery fire.
10 APRIL
Jap Resistance ?.eaches Peak
,The Japanese resistance reac;led a high pr:1.k on the 10th of April. In
the 382d Inf zone in the vicinity of KAlIIIm they occupied a ridge running
east and west witlj, fingers extending to the north. As our troops apy.>roach
ed the ridge the maneuvered the ridge and out on the fingers,
skillfully making use of the natural advantages of the terrain to bring
nanking machine gun fire on the attaclcers. Fin&lly, after a mortar and
artillery barrage which included twenty-five rounds of 32cm spigot mortar,
the Japs boxed off elements of the left company of the 1st Bn with machine
gun fire and attacked it with an estimated using grenades, bayonets
and flame-throwers. This attacking force emerged from caves where they had
escaped our artillery and attacked through a hail of their ovm mortar fire.
The enemy in the right half of the division zone of action resisted with th
same fury. The 381st Inf secured the west end of KAKAZU RIDGE in spite of
heaV'.f resistance. However, when the troops of the 3133d Inf got on the east
end of tho ridGe, tho Japs put dOlJlm a terrific mortar and artillery barrage
and then swarmed fron the cover of their caves wherc they had remained pro
tected fron not only the Auerican artillery preparation but from their arm
which came dovm on the positioT's that they held. They raked our troops w"
withering machine gun fire and hand grenades, forcing then back fron thei:
exposed positions.
HavinG prevented any appreciable advance for a period of five days,
for the loss of the ,Test end of KAKAZU RIDGE, the ,Taps launched five
counterattacks on the niGht 12-13 April at different poj.nts across the di
vision front. Just after dusk the Japs put up several red flares w!lich,
according to a SOl, rmant either "coT:lT:lence artillery fire" or "an
all out attac1: will be made tonight". Ir.rrnediately tho Jap artillery fire
bec,ane ver:, active throuchout the division area. A short 1.',hile later a
white dragon nare went up. AccordinG to the captured Jap SOl this also
meant "an all out attack will be nade tonir,ht".
12 AFRIL
"Launch All Out Attack Tonight"
The Japs kept up a continuous artillery barraGe all night, firing both
on tho front lino troops and on the artillery in the rear areas. At 122730
April the first of the series of counterattacks that came progressively fror
the east to the west Got underway when a platoon of Japs attacked the 3d Bn
382d Inf. At 130100 an ostimated comflG.ny attacked the 2d Bn. Approximatol;
two platoons attacked the 1st Bn, )t33d Inf, at 130030 and a company attach"
-2
r
the 2d Bn at 130045. .The 12th and 23d II Bns made these attacks. J"ppnrontly
the Japs used 81emcmts of theso two units to carr.r out local counterattaclm
and left tho cmits 'who originally defended th,e line in a purely passive
role. The c1]lmination of thb activity ca"!l.e at 130030 vrhen an enen.'! bat
talion, the 272d II Dn, attacl:od the 2d En, 3S1st Inf on tho Vlest end of
Y.AY.AZU RI:JGE. The heavy American artillery barrage and the deternined
stand of the 2d 381st Inf caused this forco at least 600 cas"lalties.
None of these attadks had allY semblance to a banzai. Followinr; the lift,...
ing of the artillery barrage, the Jap troops in good order,
utilizing their supporting weapons ,.rell. Thoy had on nm'; clothinG, car
ried full fiold and of and food to last a
week.
Again on tho night ] 4-:1..5 J\.pril the J aps attompted to regaln tho
west ond of Y..AIU.ZU RIDGE whr;n they launched tHO separate company
strength att2.cks aGainst the 2d Bn, 301st Inf at 142300 and 150300.
Artillery fire broke up both of these attacks.
The Japs successfully defended tho eastern end of KAYJ,ZU rUDGE
against all attacks by the ?6tll Diy. They finally '.'1.1. thdrcrr from this
position "Thon it loolwd as though tho Trould encircle and iso
late it. Docunents 8.nd identifications secured sho'.led that in addition
to the 13th II Bn lfhich had the mission of defending this sector origin
ally, tho Japs reinforced tIle position nith clements of t):1C 23d II Bn, 27.3d
II Bn and some of tho remnants of the 12til II Bn. The enemy also otl.ployed
the cOP.lplete 272d II Bn and elonents, l)robably tyro cOr:l}lanies, of tho 23d
II Bn in the cOlmtcrattacl(s in the ClttCl!lpts to regain the positionl3 on
tho west end of tile ridro;e.
PART II
17 TO 30 APR:L
On the l[',th of AiJril, a reGrouping of t:lO Corps that
put tho 96th Div botween the 7th and 27th Divs, tho division started an
advance that penetrated the centor of the Jap first clefense line. 'There
as TO;;:SSTONE and tho west ene', of the TAiILDA.FW-I;ISHIBJaU did not
doninatc tho terrain as NUC!' ':.3 tho nearby TMTA3ARU and lULL
143, tho Japs had org,:miz(xl them Trith a large of machine guns in
well concealod Tho eno:;y coordinat'cd tho locations of these
caves well 3'0 that t1ll;y r:mtua1ly supported onu another, and had defilade
from tl!o airLction v;hic':1 tIll] divisicm at.t2.ctcd. Anti-te.nk weapons had
oxcclll:'nt fields of fire fror'. t hoir 1'[011 concoalud concreto faced caves.
Taking advanta:;c of' the excellent observation from HILL IhJ, thc; TAiJA
BARU ESCARP? ;==:"l', and the LAEDA ESCARl':.::lJ'l', the J.:::ps continued their
ht3avy- and accurn.te artillery fire. On the 20th of April, rhile soi:3ing
TOEDSTClJE rUDGE, tho 3G2d Inf ;moclccd out seventoen J:l.Clchinc Guns emplaced
in caves on that rid;:;e. On the 21st of A:Jrj_l,. fol101rinc the loss of
TOLBSTu}!E RE1G2 2J-:.d the Y;C3t end of tl:o RIDGE, the
J?ps launched thrce fror.l IIr,r, lh3 at 1230, 1330 ond 1515,
of from a 9latoon to corlpany stnmgth in an unsuccessful attunp-t to re
gain -rOi raDGE. On tho of the 2Jd of April, tho cTa:;s
abandoned their posi-;:'ion on HILL 143 anc. the T1\.JArAHU ESCAnp;:EIIT and
Tli thrlrcH to the EJ\:;:';DA l?.SCAnPI"EIIT
-3
72..
lGL"AlD
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OF &R'CiADE
PR.OR TO ATTACK.Y XXIV CORPS
(fROM A. CAPTURD jAP MAP)
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23 APR11
First Defer.se Line Relinquished
The loss of TANABARU ESCARPMENT, HILL 143 and the TANABARU-NISHIBARJ
RIDGE broke the Japs first defense line. The lost all
of the elements of the 14th and 13th!! Bns in the 96th Div zone. Since
these units had already suffered considerable depletion, undoubtedly other
units occupied front line positions. Identifications of the 22d II Bn
indicated its presence though a prisoner at a later date stated that this
En had seen no action.. Since elements of the 23d II Bn had made counter
attacks in an attempt to preserve the positions on KAKAZU RIDGE and docu
ments showed that the 273d II Bn reinforced KAKAZU RIDGE, these two units
must have had some troops on the positions the 96th Div had. taken.
Jap resistance on the MAEDA. ESCARPMENT line to the east of the
"NEEDLE crumbled before the assault of the )8)d Inf tank-infantry
teams. However, on the escarpment itself, vrhere the perpendicular rock
cliffs made the use of tanks impossible, the Japs covered the flat top
of the escarpment with intense machine gun fire, forcing the 38lst Inf
to cling to the edge. The enemy still had the bulk of his artillery
which, in addition to continuous mortar fire, he used promiscuously in
an attempt to beat the troops on the north side of the. escarpment back
into the flat from which they had come. By this time they had lost their
32cm spigot mortar positions. The Japs met attempts to outflank the
position with intense machine gun fire from the reverse slopes and from
the hills to the south. Finally, having worked tanks up behind the east
flank after cutt ing passages tank dozers, the 38lst Inf began to
eliminate pillboxes one by one in a slow and laborious process, involv
ing the cutting of a trail to enable tanks to get into position to cover
the work of the Inf. The escarpment contained a large number of Jap
troops, estimated as high as a battalion. The number of deep tunnels
and caves in the rock mace it possible for the Japs to remain in posi
tion in spite of intense artillery fire and demolitions.
28 APRIL
Japs Again-Take to Offensive
On the night of 28-29 April the Japs undertook the first offensive
action since their attempt to regain RIDGE. At 0030, B Co 38lst
Inf killed 21 infiltrators. At 0300 the 3d Bn, 38lst Inf killed 27. At
0630, in a series of counterattacks of platoon strength, B Co, 381st Inf
killed 22; the 2d Bn, 381st Inf killed 15 and the 3d Bn,38lst Inf killed
17. At 0550 an estimated enemY Co attacked the 2d Bn, 383d Inf. This
attack, in conjunction with some infiltrations which preceded it cost
the Japs 152 soldiers. A pay book taken from a Jap killed in this
action identified the 2d Co of the 32d Inf.
At 300415 an enemy force estimated as at least two Cots attacked
all along the front of the 383d Inf. The attackers wore full field
eqUipment and carried satchel charges, grenades and rations. This
attack lasted until 0830 and cost the Japs 233 men.
The identity of the troops on the ESCARPtmNT never really came
to light. Various prisoners taken stated that they believed that the 22d,
23d and 27Jd Bns occupied this position. It would seem logical that the
remnants of the troops that withdrew from KAKAZU RIDGE would take up posi
tions on the escarpment. If so, this put the elements of the
-4
12th, 23d II Dns and the 273d II En that had survived on KAKAZU RIDGE as
the defonders of the lIAEDA ESCARPllEHT.'
PART III
1-31 liAY
YThcn the 96th 'Di v returned .tp the line it cnme in contact T:i tll the
89th Inf to the direct front 'mid on the right flank with olomen:ts of tho
32d Inf and a few scattered rermants of the 22d Inf. The latter had de
cimated itself in the attack laU:.'1ched the 24th Di'; before the :96th Div
relieved the 7th These units huld positi'Onson the finallinc .to tile
north of SmmI. i\':-;ain the eneny hall t.:ho;cn terrain that .not only ':gav0
him the obscrvation, but lent itsdf to the deternined defense of reverse
slop] s that the Japs had adopted on the ESCARPIIENT and continued
to e,mr)loy on this line. On tho riGht 'of the Div, in tho general area of'
OBOE, HILL, the J,aps defended on the top of a high ridge and fell' a1'ray
steep+y to the east givinG leis riGht flank a local resting place. The'
top of this ridze consisted of a series of SillL"_l barren hills rur.:dng
east and west' and rising stee9ly fro;u the IiLle that la:r be
tween: them. To t he northeast of this area, t
1
1C Japs orr;anized. a strong
point on ZEBRA HILL. After o'lercmning the st:-ong rDsistcL'1ce on ZEBI',J\'
HILL, tho 3C2d Inf ran into oxtrenol:' f:'...re from DICK HILL; The'
Japs made a deternined stand in arc.:" fiGhting for every of
the ground and launching frequent platoon and co:npany strength counter
attq.cJcs prcc eded by heavy Imee Dortar barrages. Whon tho J aps lost
DICK HILL they to tenaciouply from its revorse t31ope .
Attempts to dislodGe thon fron these positions came ,mcler I-,eavy fire
from tho adjacent FLAT TOP EI11 and J;30E lULL to the'south.
Finally, tank-infantry tOi,Lr:lS out the reverse slopes of DICI:
HILL and securod OBOE HPJ,. ThrouG::;ut the fighting in this <lrea the
Japs ahrays maintainodcloso contact. Hr,nd grenade duels wImt on con
tinuously every ,
9 TO 20 !.IAY
corneAL HILL'-;-Key rlo Defenses
On tho oast end of thc::i_r SFJnI dcf\lsc line tho cTaps had strongly
fortified the COrJIeAL 'nEL In this torrci:i:n foaturo t;lC
Div had to advance over tHO t
1
:ous:md y:>'Y' ',s of flat 'Ground, above rrhi'ch
CONICAL I-EILL rose to a hoiCht of HI) meters. J ,J,ps louCht sti.lbborn-
Iv to maint:-in thomsclves on '\he slope::: of COiJICAL and CTIfl'll,ill
HILLS. Ho-::ovor, the att2_ck the 3tl)J Ircf supported by )1eDv'J artillery ",
fire and tllO direct fire fron ami anti-tank weapons drove the Japs .
sto2.dily back until tho 3G]d Ini' hold the north of C!L'.RLIE HILL
and CONICl,L HILL and the 3['ilst Inf had the eastern slopes of the long
finger connecting CmrrCl,L mUJ and SUGI\.Il HILL. J,ny movement forvrard
of this line brbur;ht d01'ffi ::1;tc:line 8
'
_ill fire fron the reverse
slopes of CEARIJIE and KING EEL, intL and from the' LOVE HILL
aroa. In this area, as in the' OBOE HILL area,' hand Grenade battles'
continued throug:lOut nic,;ht. On ono occasion eloments of the 1st
Bn, 383d Inf advanced do'Vm the s':mth slopes of CHARLIE HILL and part
way up :LO\i"E BILL Yfit:'1Out encounto:cing any enemy firo . when suddclly an
estimatod fifty machine guns up on thoso units from fo:ur
cilllsinr: h0.?VY casualtics to these units. The fact hcav;{
-5
80
OKINAWA SHI
rains made the ground a quagmire aided the Japs in that tanks could not at
tack their positions.
According to prisoners and captured documents the Japs with
drawing from the SHURI LDrE on about the 20th of Hay when the loss of
CONICAL HILL threatened the whole position with encirclement. Artillery
fire during this period fGIl off noticeably due to a amount of it
havin; boon Imocked eut or captured and also the displacement to the rear.
During the withdrawal a conglomerate !"lass of second-rate and service troops
armed with a high proportion of automatic weapons formed the covering force
while the remnants of the 24th Di v withdreYI to new positions in the
SHIIiAJIRA. This covering force consisted of the 27th Ind Bn, possibly the
28th Ind Bn, one or tyro Cos of the 29th Ind Bn, tho 27th Ind AAA Bn, the
3d Ind AT Bn, elements of tho 32d Army Field Freight and Field Ordnance
Depots and elements of the naval unit, IViAO BUTAI. .
PART rJ
1 to 30 June
The Japs set up their next defense line on the Y!l.EJU-DAKE-YUl'J\. DAKS
hill mass. ':lith an estimated ten thousand troops left, they still had an
adequate force to defend this short frontage. In addition the YAEJU-DAKE
and 11JZP. DAKE escarpments with tho smaller connectinp, escarpments gave the
enemy in the 96th Div zone of action an ideal position from which to de
fend.
Even though they had a fair amount of troops at their disposal, tho
Japs had a tremendous problem in trying to organize them into a cohesive
force. They attempted'to do this by putting the service troops into thc
tactical units as replacements. In spite of the .: of communications
and organization, the 32d Army put up a stubborn.l::i'c'rlse. On the whole,
the Japs continued to fight th all their fanaticism. The
small groups fought in place until killod. In addition to this doggedness
on the part of the individual Jap soldier the enemy had well-concealed
positions with excellent fields of fire. Each night replacements were sent
to the front to take tho place of those killed by artillery and t3.l1k fire
during the day. Often they had to pick up arms on the L-.ttlcfield. The
Jap artillery at this time consisted of a few l.5cn pieces aGd a fe'V! 7.5mm.
21 JUNE
Final Defenso"lloasurcs Fail
On reachinr; the top of the hill mass, the 30lst In! opera
tinG over fairly snooth terrain Yd. th tank-infantry teams slaUGhtered the
Japs in nurabers. On thc Di v riGht the 3C2d Inf, having pushed over
the YUZA DAL2 and operating over rocky terrain that made the advance
slower, crushed the last defense line. The orr,anized resistance coased
on 21 .Jellie.
'Olhen it becai11c apparent that they could not hold out as an organized
force 2.ny longer, the 32d Army instructed the remaining personnel to at
tempt to reach the northern end of the island and to carry on guerrilla
warfare. Conseque!1tly, the attem:,ts. to do this resulted in additional
large numbers of Japs being killed at night throughout the Div area.
During the last ten days of the operation small groups of Japs roamed
around carrying only a couple of hand grenades. They hid in caves and
-6
ccme fields during the day <Ll1d TIovcd at night. By the 1st of July only a
fCl"r scattered Japs remnined at large.
SUl.:l:ARY
Attenpting to !lake the OKIlTflrTA cD.tl.paign costly to the invading fl.r:lcri
cans and as dravm out as possible, the Japanese defended OI:IYA"!fI. in a
systematic and detcrminod manner. They clung to evc-:r,;{ bit 0 f terrain
tenaciously in spitc of povrerful American attacks. Hovrevcr, vrhen the
position of their troops became tactically unsound, they vrithdrevv' thc]m
to save them for future action. The Japs also attempted to conserve their
artillery pieces by not firing then when Lt'lerican airplanes appeared and
keeping the picces in camouflaged C2Vc;;S w>en not in usc. They fine>.lly
even gave up their night attacks vrhen proved costly in manpower and
unproductive; in rcsults. Employing these tactics on naturnlly advan
taguous turrain, the 32d Army succeeded in making the American conquest
of OKIlJfMA a slO"r;, dr2vm out 2.nd laborious process.
OF Y
The 32d Army !lad D. large aD.ount of artillery at its dis:::>osal for the
defense of OJCTITN.-JA. ':ihile the usc of their artillery :'.';:;11 far
below the standards of AnoricD.n u.rtillcr:r, it ,ras used Bore effcctively
and abundantly on th:l.n in any other opera,tion.
The ener1Y enplD.ced the oullc of his artillery in the vicinity of SHURI
facing to the nortll Trhore it could cover t:le 'whole Tridth of the island
(Sec Lap Ho. 19). Large c::wcs concealed ,;"'1d protected the Tre;1pons. Al
though SOi:J.e of the pieces actuu.lly :::"!'cd fran insidlJ the cavo, generally
the crC':r pushed the piuco out Oel a fill to shoot it and then draGged
it back into the ce-;e Clt tho conclusion of he firing. All the Jap posi
tinns had [';ood defilade.
The Japanese set up a good system of ok:ervation posts fron I"rhich
t::cy had complete surveillance; over all the ,:lovaments of tho American
troops. An elaborate telophone cOI'Luuniccctinns s;rste::J. linked the OF r s,
ep1s and positions together. All in ;:1:'., the Japs had a good setup
with v!hich to unplo;r thdr artillery uffectivdy aGainst the invading
Amoricans.
In the: initi",l staGes of till; c3.mpaign, c;xccpt for t:1C first three
days v,hen thoy clidn 1 t curloy it:'. tall, the Jnps employed their artillery
wi th fairly good results. D<)caus( of th0ir GOod OP , s and cOl'"cnmications
they brot'gllt do','m artill'Jry fire q:'lic]:ly and accurately agatnst any
profitable targets. HO'..'8vcr, tlKY ".:u.stecl op]'ortun",.ties in that
they did not bring do';m any n:::.ss conccmtrr"'<tions, never more
than one b"ttery at a time. Lost of tLc firinr; that tl'.c oncy!y did came
during the night. The J ecpS fired [ts Ducll [tsSJO r01mds into i1J1 Inf Un
position durinG D. night of continuous firing, apparently by only one bD.t
tery. Enploying the, 1st Artillery Intell:l.Gl.;;-).co Ecgt they loc:ltcd ,md
fired on the Americ[tn artillery. This Cot<.ntc:"AbattGry fire did not cause
-7
damage since the Japs tried to COver too Many targets and did not concentrnt
enough fire in onc spot. It did, hanover, forco one American battalion to
give up an exposed forward position. The Japs also employed some harassing
fire in the CIIIYTllJHl',...:.FUTa;'\aroa.
As.tho campaign progressed the fire'of the Jap artillery became loss
and less effectiye. The coritinual pounding of tho American artillery, naval
Gunfire and air not 0:11y' destroyed Dany of the cncny pieces, but Knoclwd:,-o1
tho naking' it inpossil)le for the Jnps to fires.
Furthernore, tne Qt..:S t..J. .:,ion of their horses made i air'ficult for the Japs
to displace to the rear resulted in the loss of many pieces vThen the
Americans overran the positions. liMY of tho guns vrere emplaced in such
inaccessible positions that it vms impossible to move them. By the 1st 6f
June counterbattery fire, naval gunfire, air strikes c:nd loss by capture
had cost the Japs a large proportion of his artillery.
The constant air observation maintained by aircraft caused
the Japanese artillm-Y1.len considerable apprc;.ension. They nade no attenpt
to fire their ::..rtillory whon American plnnos nere in the air and then they
protected the pieces TTith anti-o.ircraft nrtillery.
In addition to the usual typos of artillery the ,Japs also had three
Cos of tho 1st ilortar Regiment armed rith fo1..11' 32cm spigot mo::-'
tars and 90mm mortars per Co. The clumsy 32cm spigot mortar proved com
parntively ineffective. Tho trel!lcmdous projectile exploded ,',rith
no fragmentation. It buried itself too doep for the concusSion to'be ef-,
fective at any dist::mcd. H01"Tevor, it threw' a lar:;e nLL":1ber of rocks intJ
the air. Lost of +,he casualtics inflictcd by tl:is l'J(;.:'.pon rrr::re either tho
result of a direct hit or a rock throvm into tlw air ;--,ittinc; someone.
On the whole it can be stated that the JD.p arti11cry causod the Am(,T
ican forces considerable delay il.'.1d some casualtics '. . H01Tcver, their emp)_'Y"
mcnt of the artillery docs not take full advantage of itscmpabiJ,ities.
The following is a list of the artillery the Jap had in his 32d !Irmy:
5th J\rtillcry Command
1st hrtillory Intelli8cnce Regt
2d Dn, 1st Hod Artillery Rcgt (12-15cm How)
23d lIod Al'tillcry Rc,':;t (24-1$cm HOVT)
7th Hvy Artillery Rugt (h Btrys, 8-2hcm How
100th Hvy Artillcry Bn (6-15cm H'ow)
T!.i 1'. 1966 Ind FA Bn (12-7Smm G'JJ1s)
1st Artillery lIortar Rcgt (1st, hth and Sth Cos .only nith h-32cTI
and 2-9Omm mortars per Co)
1st LiGht 1;ortar Dn (3d to 6t:1 Ind :Iortar Cos, 9---ulmn or 90nm
mortars per Co) ..
2d Light Eortar En (7th to 10th Ind !IortD.r Cos, 9-81run or 90mm
mort,crs per Co)
3d and 22d Incl, .\T Bns (12-h7:rrnn J\T gunspcr battalion)
7th Ind f.T En (Hl--h7mm :.T Guns)
22d, 23d and 32d Ind 1l1' Cos (12-h7nnn AT glillS 1j(;r Co)
27th Ind Bn (c:xact TIE unlmO\m. 1". capturod document sho,.,rod then
having 10-7cm M. gUns on 12 April 1945)
'.
-8
2l::3t fJ1. Hq ho.d the folloHing units:
79th, 80th and 8lst Bns Type 88, per
103d, 10hth and 105th Uachine Cannon Bns (18-2Ormn cannons per
battalion)
armament of this unit is obscure 'with a PrJ reporting the
3d Btry having 1-12cm naval gun and l2-75mm. guns. A 'flO found
on 8 Eay 194) showed 4-75mm, Type 38, gun, 2-12cm IIOV1, o.nd 1
12cn naval gun.'
The artillery with the throe major line units was as fol1u,1s:
24th Division - 42d FA Rcgt C3 Bns 12-105mm HOYT per 'battalion)
Regiml:ntc::.l Gun Cos (2-7Omm or T;l.lil :;'Jl',- ;<':1d 2
AT gans per b:1ttalion)
Battalion Gun Cos (2-70rilln Ho'" pur CO)
62d Division - Batt81ion Gun Cos (2-7Ornm How per Co)
44th ll.IB - 44th Artiller;r Unit. This unit yms idcntiFcd only
once by one prJ ',mo st::l.tcd the' tm'it t':10 batter;j..es,
4 each, oither 10)r.1r'. 01' l50r;lr.l How#
ElJ:::i ,Y TACTICS
The enemy's tact.ical emplo;ymcnt of troops on OKllV,17!l Tr:lS purely de
fensive in nature ,md accompanied by freq'. ent counterattacks to regain
defensivo positions lost. The 32d Army's defense of OKIN.:,\'!.:'. showed C3.I'C
ful planning in every respect. a general dofense to neet
an assault from any direction and organized it in depth.
The Japs based their defense: on a series of mutually supporting
strong points cloverly located and concea.led ar:J.ong the ideal defensive
terrain characteristic of OI\TI-lL'I'If,. 'rIithin these strongpoints wore placed
machine guns, battalion guns, anti-tank guns and supporting mortars.
All the vTeapons ho.d cave emplacemonts viith an embrasuru constructed from
oither logs or concrete and coral (Scc iigs. 20 and 27). Tho embrasure:s
wero small 2nd pith the SI:l.okelcss ponder tho Japs usc, it nas
impossible to det8ct these positions from even a few f::::et nvm.y (See Figs.
25 and 26). They withdrc;w their nortnrs into co..ves or tombs rrhen they
VToren I t in o.ction. The troops within the strongpoint stayed in cnves to
oscnpe artillery fire and ccme out nnd mnnncd t:'leir positions vrhen the
Americnns nss:lult,)d the position. These nlso held supplies and
::unr:1Uni tion naking ec'J.ch strongpoint self sl.lst.:lining.
This extensive usc; of C;Lves undoubtedly S"ved the J:lPS cnsunl ties
from Americ.:m il.rtillcry fire. On ti1c othc)r mnny times irhcn they
got. in their c:cvos to escnpe the o.rtillery fire, they nere pinned insic1c.
1\11 C<1.ves rrore not equipped y;ith sufficient apcrt"t,l.I'es or firing points,
\:><')J1soquently some of the :lvenues of nppronch nere left uncovored, ennbling
American troops to close in on tl1C Co.vos o..nd blor! then 'wi. th sCltchcl
charges. This cost the Japs mnny r.lo.chine Guns nnti-t:l11k they
CouJ.rl no+, CV1J."ll:ltn. J ti1C c;tves Here d<lnp 11nil ",,,rrri n inf."O.c:;tod,
-9
yrhich :r.1Ust have had an adverse effect on both health and morale. I of
the caves had more than one entrance, and the Japs would escape through an
entrance free from assault and attack our troops with hand grenades and Im(
mortars. Sometimes before this assault the Japs 'would cover their ovm pos:
tions with artillery and mortar fire while they remained protected inside
the entrenclunents.
The outstanding feature of the Jap' s defensive scheme \las their tena.-;,
cous defense of reverse slopes. These positions, supported by fires from
the rear and inaccessible to arti:lery fire and direct weapon fire from the
front, proved extremely difficult to eliminate.
The enemy's counterattacks against the 96th Div ineffective mainly
dUE to the fact that they did not employ sufficient strength. They did, hOT
over, attack in good order after artillery and mortar preparations, never
attempting anything th!".t could be called a "banzai" charge. According to a
captured document the Jap doctrine 'was to send out infiltration parties to
disrupt communications and knock out CPls, machine guns, mortars and arti1
lery p:i:eces before attacki."1g. These infiltration attenpts caused very litt:l
damage. The Japs frequently up badly bofore making an attack, glvlr
our artillery the opporttmity to inflict trenendous casuaJGies on them D..'1d
generally disrupt the attack before it could get well unrlcr way.
The Japanese took considerable measures to comba.t the American tnnks G
On their first line of defense they constructed a conplote system of arlG:J
defenses. This consisted of anti-tank ditches and nino fielC:s covered by'
47r.un anti-tank guns. The anti-tank ditches connected inpa2sable tcrra:iJ"
features and in general proved to be effective barriers. Line fields of
from 15-30 nines, usually placed in fields or on the shoulccrs of roads."
folloy/ed no detonninable The Japs scatt'::;recl their nines in tllO
fields, hiding them under the vegetation. They also frCfluently nined t,;:;
shoulders Gf the roads leading into their positions. Lftor losing tho
initial defensive positions, they relied on ninos, guns and
natural terrain features for tank defense.
The Japs omployed their 47mm anti-tank gun very effectively. They
enplaced the weapon vvi th great care in well cone ':.;aled caves Trhich provilci
good fields of fire. 1.1though they generally employed the 47mm at fron
three to six hundred yards, this weapon Imocked 01lt Il-4 tm1ks at tangos 0:
eight hundred yards. Enony suicide troops made sc.'ET8.l attempts to knock
out tLmks. Since supporting inf:::mtry oasily stopped those attacks, they di_
not cause nuch dannge.
-10
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\ CLrAJe FILD 0;-rlrlE
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\ /OOOYDS
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rOXHOLE ap.
47111th A-T GUN
'MPLACEM NT
SOUTH ~ A 5 T Of TOM!>STOlJt I<II)Gt
SCAl.E J*.: 10:'0"
CD"TOVI( INTEIlVAJ.: 5 ~ 0 '
Fig. 21
Photo of empl., ..cen:Bnt in Fig. 20 showing
general in hill. Rear entrance is
invisible off to the right.
Fig. 22 47iJi: AT GUN :s1.!PLACE}. ZJlTT
Photo of embrasure showing its construction of
coral, cement, and logs. ge removed
sure lies t t he right.
FiG . 23 47MM AT GUN EMPLACEMENT
View through embrasure showing main direction
of fire.
Fig . 24 47YM AT Gl1N EMPLACEMENT
Re r entrunce to position. Tunnel is about
4b feet high.
i
Fig. 25 ILLBOX
~ ell \,;iicnouflt:.ged pillbox just north of KAKAZU
RIDGE.
Fig. 26 fILLBOX
Close-up of one of the two embrasures of position
shown in Fig. 25.
/
/
TuNNEL TNIlU CORAL AND
lJ16. 21t3'UN/JRACED
J.I MG -POSITION
Ar 8178D
5CALE:II.'.[O'
CONTbVR INrE2VAl.:S'
F16.27
Fig. 28 LG FCSITICH
A view of the embr:.asures :in Fig. 27.
of cave are six f eet thick.
Fig. 29 1=G l{;SITION
Looking north from the in the right
side of t ll e picture Fig. 28.
.. .
CHAPTER-IX .
o PERAT'ONAL
T H ~
AS;SAUL T

1
gPERATIONA.L FEATURES THE ASSAULT
SHORE PARTY
Shore Party plans for this operation contemplated early reconnaissance
of the beaches, direct emergency resupply from IST's until beach facilities
were availab1o, and selective discharge of all cargo until general unload
ing was ordered by the Land ing Force Commander. The Shore Party Group
(1122d Engineer Gp) was organized and assigned as follows:
1122 Engineer Gp
170th Engineer Bn (initially attached to RCT 381)
293d Port Co
474th DUKW Co (when released by Cm1 Mortar Bn)
788th Amph Trac Bn (after landing assault troops)
174th Engin88r Bn (initially attached to RCT 383)
204th Port Co
327th DUKW Co (after landing artillery)
728th Amph Trac Bn (after landing assault troops)
173d Engineer Bn
Shore Party Teams, 593d JASeO
The first shore party troops landed in the eighth assault WDve on
'l
1 April, breached 0xits through the se['wall and beean preparing the

beaches to Nceiv) supplies. The ')iv ShoN '?arty CP was established
ashore on Brown 1 1215, 1 April, Dnd shore party operations were
immediately tBkGn under Div control. Gener::.l unloading was ordered at
1700, but little unlo8ding wes accomplished prior to darkness when the
Nnvy ord'3red complete blackout of the beaches. At 0600, 3 April, XXIV
Corps t.ook over all ShON party operations.
of Beaches Dump Control
To prepare be&Ch exits &nd insur0 G&r1;y' traffic control, shore party
reconnAissance parties from each shor...; party Bn supporting nn ElSS8Ult RCT
accomp8nied the assault waves ashore. The Div and a representative of
()Bch Div Supply Service went &3hore 3t H/60 to reconnoiter and establish
dump nre.qs, und service troops vrer0. ashore by H/240, the
reservo Bns.
Dump control waS pbcGd under the Div Services immed i9tely to
,,1
relieve tho Shore of this additional task and to provide
,
supply service by Div personnel at the earliest hour. The success vms
o.ppnrent at once. By noon of L-Da::', selective dischArge of cargo \'!8S
proceeding over'thU bt.:r:ch by 1700, on order of the Division Commander,

general unloading bogan.
and control
The maintenance of clear beaches facilitated'by an effective
communication system. In addition to the Shoro Party Lateral Net es
tablished by JASCO, Terth Army established a G-4 control net with stations
-1
aboard the command ship, and the beach control vessels. G-4 Control Officers,
working with Naval Control Officers, withhald all but essential supply until
the beach was ready. As a result, at no time there any congestion of
supplies on the beach even though most of the traffic was routed over White
Beaches after L-Day because of poor reef conditions on Brown Beaches.
Cargo Movement Inland
Movement of LVT's and DURN's direc\ to inland dumps was executed until
sufficient land vehicles could be landed and emptied to handle the traffic.
This was accomplished by 3 April Thereafter, transfer of loads at
the beach was effected to save wear on amphibian vehicles (See Fig. 31).
Traffic control was facilitated by careful briefing of all drivers and by
the use of Military Police at the dump location. All drivers and Military
Police carried a copy of the Beach showing routes and dump layout plan.
This map was prepared and widely distributed during the planning for the
operation
. By 1000, 5 April (L/4), when assault Beachmasters and control officers
were relieved by Garrison Beach Parties, the bulk of the and
ment was ashore and stocked in dumps and only eight LST's and four AKA's
required completion of unloading.
The movement of supplies across the reef was delayed on J April (L/2)
by the loss of the two Amphibian Tractor Bns which had been used to haul
from floating barges to dumps. From this time on, only 12 LVT's and 100
DUKVPs \'lere available for over-the-reef and unloading was slowed
almost to a stop for 36 hours due to rough sea conditions. Troops
suffered only minor inconveniences, however, since the bulk of equipment
was ashore by this time.
Losses and Damage
Damage resulting from double handling by cranes over the reef was
negligible, but the traffic jam at the reef caused many boats (up to 300
at one time) to II lay tot! for several hourE awaiting unloading. During
this period, idle coxswains and boat cre\'l's broke open numerous cases of
combat boots, ration accessory packs and ration crates. From none of the
boxes v'ere more than one or two items removed, but this vandalism caused
the damage of 30% of the items concerned. Looting on the beach was held
to a minimum by stringent rlP guard regulations and the close proximity
of dumps to beach. Military Police were ordered to shoot on sight anyone
caught looting supplies and equipment.
Adequacy of Unloading Facilities
The tactical plan provided that the two Bns of Amphibian Tractors
and two Co's of DURW's would revert to control of Shore Party Commander
upon landin3 of all assault troops. Navy established six cranes on
pontoon barges at the reef line and control officers directed all craft
to these barges vrhere tran:::fer of loads was effected to amphibian
vehicles.
IST beaching facilities were poor but White Beach #1 was found
adequate at low water, and, accordingly, all bow-loaded ships were dis
-2
Fig. ;;. THE 4.2 HORTAR
An excellent weapon for
shelling the reverse slopes
which the Jape defended so
bitterly.
;0. THE REEF
Yiew of the 96th. Inf. Div. Beaches
shoHing the 600 to 1200 foot wide reef
over whi eh troops, vehicles, and
had to be landed.
Fig. ;1. ','lHITE BEACE 1 TRANSFER POmT.
Supplies brought inland by LVT's were
transferred to trucks for transportation
to inland dumps.
;4. LIQUID LIFE Fig. ;2. CCHSTRUCTnm A CAUSE'flAY
Whole blood was extensive Coral and sand cauaeways were quickly
ly used for the first time constructed from beach to outer reef's
in the OKmA':IAN Campaign. edge. This causeway is 450 ft. long.
patched there for unloading. Unloading over Brown Beaches was stopped'
after 23 LCM's had broached-to at that point. Five days were required to
clear these boats and float the craft.
The hard, irregular coral formation of the reef made unloading of
1ST's, LSM's and other smaller craft extremely difficult in spite of the
utmost effort on the part of Navy to "beach high". One IST, one LSM and
two LCT IS rl:ptured their hulls and had to be salvaged. To offset this
difficulty, Shore Party constructed "finger rampsll of coral rock and sand
to the outermost edge of the reef to enable traffic ashore to begin at .'
that point (See Fig. 32). Because of severe reef conditions, complete
unloading of all assault cargo and equipment of this Div was not effected
until 1114. This was five days longer than the estimate of L!9. .
General unloading began at H/5l0 and was cleared principally over
White Beaches. Navy control called up the boats and directed them to
proper Beach Control vessel, in priority, for unloading. Only the lack
of additional cranes and the loss of Bns on J April caused interrup
tion of the landward flow. This situation became critical on L/3 and all
unloading ceased until the jammed barges could be cleared.
Use of Slings
Because of the large perce"tag'e of bulk cargo, the shore party placed
with each RCT 200 additional cargo nets to be fully loaded and used in,
bringing cargo ashore. addition, each Shore Party Bn carried 50 nets.
These nets were taken direct to dumps, emptied and returned to ships.
Second loads were brought ashore Navy nets which were replaced by
the ori
5
inal lot. This even of cargo nets faciJitated the flow
of supply shoreward and prevented undue loss of Navy gear.
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT
Gunfire Support operated under the control of Div Artillery Hq
throughout the operation. The Div NGF liaison officer worked with the
art illery off ieer on nu,'1ber of ships to request, who should rece ive
priority of support, tactical plan, assignment of targets, coordination
of fires during a preparation, and notification of a ir strikes. The Navy
gave excellent cooperation, furnishing invaluable support to ground troops.
Control
A rnlnlmllm of 3 and a maximum of 6 fire support ships were assigned
daily to the Div throughout the operation. Except during the initial
phases of the landing, or during an intensive attack phase, each Regt was
assigned one ship, and Div ArtillOl y had one support ship on call. These
ships were controlled as follows:
a. ships normally assigned to assault Bns and their fire
controlled by the NGF spotter vlith that Bn. The observation plane assigned
to work >'Irith this spotter and fire support ship proved quite vo.luablu
it was often impossible to get satisfactory ground observation. Fire
support ships were used to destroy caves, pillboxes, guns, and as an anti
pel"soJ'l."1el in the Bn IS zone of action.
-3
b. Regtl liaison officers took Bn ships under control with air spot
when Bn could not secure observation and used them in general support through
the Regtl zone of action. The Regt1 NGF officer's main sources of informa
tion about targets in his zone were sound-flash intersect, photo inter
pretation, artillery liaison officer, naval gunfire control net and his own
spotting plane's reconnaissance.
c. Ships assiened to Div Naval Gunfire Officer each day were
from Div by radio. The mission of the Div ship was deep support. Informa
tion about targets in Div zone of action was obtained from Div Artillery
S-2 and S-3, Photo Interpretation, naval gunfire control net, Air Liaison
Officer. sound and flash intersection, and Div Naval Liaison ,Officer's
observation pla,ne reconnaissance. The Div Naval Gunfire Officer used an
in the Naval Gunfire Control and used SCR-694's and 284's to
monitor the nets of Fire Support Ships assigned to Regts. This monitoring
of Regt1 ships was merely for supervision and information. These ships were
placed on deep support missions by Div NGF Officer vJhen not in use by Regts.
Illumination Harassing Fire
One ship was usually assi1n.ed to each front-line Regt for illumination
purposes each night. illumination support was coordinated by liaison
officers and spotted by the designated spotter of.Bn Naval liaison officer.
It proved' impractical for Bn officers to use own radio in spotting illum
ination much of the time due to security reasons and other
difficulties, so spots were relayed by wire to the Regt1 officer to be
sent out over his radio to the support ship.
Request from Regts for night harassing missions were to Div
Artillery Hq to be coordinated with artillery harassing missions. Div
harassing missions vlere then sent to the Corps Naval Gunfire Officer for
his approval and coordination who in turn submitted the request to the
Task Force Commander.
NGF Support for 96th Div
Enemy Guns Destroyed 75
Enemy Guns Neutralized 106
Pillboxes and Emplacements Destroyed 317
Neutralizing Missions for Infantry 1511
Call Fire MiSsions for Infantry S30
Air Spot Missions 1067
Caves Closed 273
Comments and Recommendations
Fire Support Ships should be more familiar with organization of Shore
Fire Control parties and their mission. For example, some ships thought
the Div NGF liaison officer was a spotter, and requested that he spot the
salvo; other ships would refUse to take missions from the Div liaison
offioer, !lot realizing that he was giving orders from Div.
A reserve should be set up in order to facilitate immediate replace
ment of shore fire personnel and equipment during operations.
-4
The Navy.should set up a nightly allowance of star shells in the
beginning of the operation so that there will be a amount for
all emergencies. Allowance should not be exceeded except in emergency.
Spotting of fires from LVT's prior: to landing is impractical due to
lack of visibility.
It is suggested that more attention be given by authorities to tho
assignment of support ship to suitable stations so that the most desirable
line of fire to probable target areas may be obtained for the unit it is
assigned to.
Best shell fOr destruction of caves was 6" high capacity with base
detonating fuze.
The Div should be consulted in the preparation of the L-Day bombard
ment schedule in the initial phases of the preparation of the schedule.
Recommendations on equipment and number of personnel that should be
in Div, Regtl and Bn Parties:
The Div NGF Party should include: 1 Naval Officer and 1
Artillery Officer iE ; 7 radio operators; 1 Driver-Lineman; 1
SCR 19.3; 5-694's or 284'8; 1 Blackout OJ-erations Tent; 2 i-ton
trucks with trailers.
Regtl Parties should consist of: 2 Navy Officers* or 1 Artillery
Officer* and 1 Naval Officer; 4 Radiomen; 1 Driver-Lineman; 1
SCR 193; 1 SCR 694; 1 Blackout Operations Tent; ton truck
trailer; 2 SCR 536's.
Bn Parties worked very satisfactorily with: 1 JL.my NGF spotter;
2 Radiomen; 2 Linemen; 1 Driver; 1 SCR 694; l ...r ton truck ...:ith
trailer; 2 SCR 536's.
* Was not avaHable for this operation.
It is believed that two officers (Navy a'1d .Army) and 2 tcruJ.S nt
a Bn as used on this operation makes an unnecessary duplication
of personnel and equipment.
SUPPORT
The air support provided this Div during the RYUKYU Campaign
was consistently superior. No closer support or cooperation could be
asked for. The Navy policy of keeping close support aircraft on station
provided for speedy action on request and permitted strikes to be delivered
quickly against enemy pockets holding up the Inf's advance; consequently
holding to a minimum the necessity for front-line advances to be halted
'while waiting for air strikes.
Pre-Invasion Support
The Div was not consulted during the preparation of the Air Support
Plan for strikes a3ainst OKINAWA prior to the hour of landing. The Air
..5
."
Plan provided and the missions resulting therefrom, however, very
satisfactory. It is believed that air support prior to the landing hour
could be made more effective if coordinated more closely with Divs con
cerned. Ground troop commanders should be allowed to choose some targets
for air strikes prior to the landing day. In tho OlCU1AWA landing, b6ach
strafing just before H-Hour was not properly coordinated and the strafing
continued until LVT fS had hit tho beach. Strafing should be moved inland
before the first boats hit the beach, as all boats do not arrive at the
same time, and, consequently, friendly troops would be endaneered. Smoke
planes should be briefed more thoroughly and more closely controlled on
L-Day as they sometimes place smoke on the wrong ares.
Close Support
The Div landed on OKINAWA with ALP1s in the four assault Bns, one in
each assault Regt and one in Div Artillery. Three days after landing, due
to casualties and the commitment of the reserve Regt, the setup was changed
and for the remainder of the operation the ALP1s were with the three Regts
and Div Artillery. During the course of the operation a total of 203
missions of all types were for the Div by support aircraft. The
breakdown for these is as foll01'ls: 141 strikes with bombs, rockets and
machine guns; 7 with Napalm; 40 observation; 10 supply drops and 5 missions
flown as a cover for troop movements. In addition to the above there were
a great many missions run by higher echelons in deeper areas which bene
fited the Div. Gun pOSitions, supply dumps, troop concentrations, motor
vehicles, etc., Vlere repeatedly hit. An observer in a high performance
airplane was constantly in the air from dayliGht to dusk. These observers
",ere very useful and gave much valuable information. Their performance
during the entire operation was excellent. On occasions they also adjusted
fire for artillery and aided in spotting of air missions.
Marking Targets
Vlliite phosphorus smoke was the most widely used means of designating
t targets, but by no means the most effective for the following reasons:
(1) It is hard to pick out a WP marking round on a battlefield from other
white smoke, which is always in the vicinity; (2) It is the hardest color
to spot from the air through dust and haze; (3) The Jap very quickly began
to use T:Thite smoke to confuse the target area. If WP Vlere used, it was
found necessary to use different numbers of rounds fired at different inter
vals to avoid confusion. The best method of marking air targets was found
to be the colored smoke which is available to the mortars and artillery.
This caused some confusion at times, but only because red smoke (grenades)
were also the signal to call off a strike. However, if an SOP could be
set up on the usc of colors, it p.ould be most effective. Purple or green
are desirable colors from the standpoint of the air. Red smoke could be
eliminated.
The air and artillery in all echelons worked very closely together to
the mutual advantage of both. several occasions very effective adjust
ment of air missions were made by the artillery spot plane, who vlould mark
the air target with a round of smoke. The simplest means of communication
for this method of marking was to place the Artillery liaison officer with
the Air liaison officer at Regt and relay the sensings to the planes. A
ground officer who had been 0'1"1 the spot \'las also found to be a uscful:nctID&t
of accurately locating the target. This officer rode with the air coord
inator and led the strike group in. A full and accurate description of
the target area proved very helpful to the pilots. In adjusting a mission
on the target the marking weapon was adjusted before the planes arrived.
When the pilots were ready to make the run, a round was fired and the
pilots were told it was on the way. After a target had been marked or a
bomb dropped, corrections Vlere made on each run. A runni"'lg commentary on
the progress of the strike ,,;as alv::ays maintained to keep the planes from
wandering from the target. Any strikes that could not be observed ?!ere
far enough to the front so as not to endanger troops. Panels were also
displayed both in front of troops near the strike and troops in adjacent
areas if they v'ere close enough to warrant it. It was often found ad
visable to request the direction that the strike approach from for safety
reasons and for better coverage of the target.
Bomb Loads
All sizes of bombs from 1000 pounds to 100 pounds were used on close
support missions. Napalm, rockets, and rrachine gun ammunition were also
used. Against the heavily fortified and positions on the island,
the 1000 pound and 500 pound bombs with delayed action fuze were found to
be the most effective. Since the caves were in the side of almost
vertical cliffs, bombs Vlere necessarily placed on top of the position to
effect cave-in. Some duds were dropped, the reason being possibly that
the planes attacked from such low level that the bombs did not have time
to arm. Excellent effect was obteined j.n most cases, hO\'1ever. Rockets
were very effective on cave positions if a direct hit 17as obtained, but
this was very hard to due to the small size of the opening.
Machine gun ammunition v:as relatively ineffective unless troops
caught in the open. Good results were obtained from Napalm ""hen used on
proper targets. Large concentrations of Napalm are necessary to com
pletely saturate an area. When CRveB are on steep revarse slopes ,. it is
believed that bombing vdth large bombs is the only way that these caves
may be damaged.
Coordination with Artillery and Naval Gunfire
Coordination of air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire was arranged
through Div Artillery. Coordination was effected by the Div Artillery
Officer ,..ho gave approvf.ll to all strikes. This approval was always given
unless SOile factor such as a large and intensive preparation was to be
fired. When the strike vias set up and ready to go in, Div Artillery Hq
was informed, the a;.>propriate Artillery Bn firing i" the sector was
notified, together vJith the proper Naval Gunfire Officer. All batteries
and OP's posted sentries whose duty it was to watch for planes in their
zone of fire. No plan VICTOR or NEGAT was placed in effect except by
of higher echelons for photo and large attack groupS.
Very seldom "\I.'aS all the artillery Or Naval G.mfire in the Div required
to cease firing. This method of coordination does away with one of the
chief disadvantages of the use of support aircraft -- restriction .of
artillery and Naval Gunfire over large areas. Neither the Inf or the
Artillery like to have these restrictions in effect.
-7
RecOlllI!lendat ions
Five ALP's per Div is considered adequate. This Div operated satis
factorily throughout the campaign with four ALP's. All strikes must be
coordinated at Regt, and Regtl ALP's were always apIa to get to the Bn OP
to direct strikes. Five enlisted personnel should be assigned to the
ALP to efficiently equipment. Div ALP's, since they are oper
ating two nets, should be made up of seven enlisted men.
The equipment for the Div ALP is very satisfactory. Its mobility would
be improved if it were mounted in a six-by-six truck instead of the pNsent
half-track. It is recommended that, an additional t.ransmitter, a
SCR-193, be authorized so that the Div ALP could transmit on, as VTel! as
monitor, the SAO frequency. A i-ton truck should be authorized also for
transportation for the Div ALP. An additional receiver should be TIE
for the Re",tl teams to enable them to monitor constantly the SAO net.
J..RT ILLERY SUPPORT
Organization
The usual organization for combat was to give each general support
light Bn the mission of reinforcing a direct support Bn. The Div Artillery
medium Bn was held in general support and given a dual reinforcing mission
with a priority to one direct support Bn. One Corps Artillery medium Bn
(usually 198th FA Bn) ,vas normally placed directly on call to the Div
Artillery. This Corps Bn was usually held in general support and t;iven
a reinforcing mission to the direct support En that did not have priority
on the Div Artillery medium En. Additional support atove this organization
could be obtained by request through Div Artillery Hq. If the situation
demanded it, the full weight of all general support Bns plus Corps Artillery
could be placed in front of one Regt. In addition to this, Div Artillery
usually operated a Tar group of all general supnort Bns when these Bns were
not being used by the direct support Ens. This group massed fire on targets
requested by the Inf or obtained through the Div Artillery Target Informa
t ion Center.
Reinforcing Artillery
Field Artillery under centralized control gave maximum support to the
Inf in this operation. The smallness of the Div sector coupled \Jith the
large number of available artillery Bns allowed large concentrations of
artillery to be placed on one front. In addition to Corps Artillery, part
of the artillery of the 1st Marine Div, the 7th or the 77th Divs was
normally available to reinforce the organic Div Artillery. From 30 April
to 9 W.ay, when the 96th Div was pulled out of the line for a rest, the Div
Artillery remained in action to reinforce the 7th and 77th Div Artillery.
From 10 April to 29 April (Seo NE.rrative, Parts I & II), prior to the
commitment of the 1st P/!arine Div, three of its Bns (11th Marine Artillery)
reinforced the 96th Div Artillery. From 11 May to 21 May (See Narrative,
Part III), the 7th Div Artillery reinforced the 96th Div Artillery with
three Bns. During the last phases of thG operation, fror.J 31 May to 22 June
(See Narrative, Parts N & V), the 77th Div Artillery reinforced the 96th
Div Artillery with four Bns. The extensive use of Naval Gunfire on deep
-8
support missions also released the artillery for more close-in fires.
Tanks and AAA as Artillery
Amphibious Tanks, medium tanks and 90mm AA guns were used success
fully to reinforce the fires of the Div Artillery. Fortunately the units
and time was available on LEYTE to train these units as artillery before
starting on the operation. The 763d Tank Bn was controlled through
Artillery Bn .Fire Direction Centers. The 504th AAA Gm} Hatteries vrere
assigned missions by coordinates, the Gun Battery Hq running its own
fire direction center. The 780th Amphibious Tank Bn was divided into four
l2-gun Bns (Amphibious Tank Cots). Each Co organized a fire direction
center that operated directly with artillery forward observers under
supervision of direct support artillery Ens. Two amphibious tank COIS
were assigned the mission of reinforcing each of the two direct support
Bns on the landing. These Co's were able to furnish artillery support
until the artillery Bns f,'ere ashore and in position. When artillery Bns
were ashore, the amphibious tanks acted as additional reinforcing
artillery. The communication system used is illustrated below:
.SCR 609
6
A
lirty FO
1/'".
\I
SCR 609 (3 o :aelay of commands Amph Tk In Party
0
\ when nec';ssary (1 NCO, 3 EM)
,
Arty In 0
,
0
SCR 510
Tk
SCR
609 \ 0' [tiiG] SCR 510 0---:,
....-
..---
,"-"--...L-_,I l I I I L,,....-..A._
Amphibious Tank Betteries
One of the greatest obstacles to overcome in the use of amphibious
tanks as artillery was the procuring of equipment such as aiming circles,
600 ser ies radios and fire direct ion equipment (range d0 flect ion fans,
graphical firing tables, plotting equioment). The equipment necessary
for an Amphibious Tank Bn to act as artillery should be part of Amphibious
Tank TIE.
Coordination of Artillery Fires
Coordination of fir'':;s routine. Artillery liaison officers 1,'.rith
Inf Bns controlled the fires of direct support Bns for the Inf Bn. Fires
for a Regtl plan ,were coordinated by the direct support Bn Commander.
Fires for a Div plan were coordinated by Div Artillery. The method of
coordination ,by Div i1rtillery vms normally to decide ,',here to place the
weight of the general support artillery, allocate ammunition, and then
to coordinate general support fires with direct support fires. Coordin
ation of geneFal support Bn fires included tho fires of 90mm kA Gun Bns,
Tank Bns,.Amphibious Tank Bns, Naval Gunfire and Air Support.
-9..
Div Artillery Hq furnished a liaison officer to each of the adjacent
Div Artillery Hq for coordination and clearance of fires. These two offi
cers were furnished despite the fact that T/O make no provision for D1v
Artillery Liaison Officers. Direct support Bns also established wire com
munication with the adjllCent direct support Artillery En of the Div on their
flank in order to cloar fires more rapidly. A liaison officer 'Pith a radio
was also sent by the direct support Bns to the Inf En of the adjacent Div
that was operating 'along the Divboundary. This officer proved very helpful
in adjusting and clearing fires near the '
N,1ght Firas
In order to provent movement, regrouping, construction of new positions
and formation for counterattacks, night fires were employed heavily. About
15% of the daily ammunition allowance was used in night harassing and inter
diction missions. when bad weather prevented observation by day, general
support Ens were used for harassing and interdiction fires at night.
Adjustments
The accurate map (Scale 1/25,000) made observed fires easy to adjust
and provided for the extensive use of unobserved fires. Accurate surprise
fire could be quickly placed on targets located by flash base and photo
interpretation. Precision adjustments on caves, enemy artillery and Inf
weapons were frequent. Light Bn forward observers adjusted 155mrn Howitzers,
l55mm guns and the Corps Howitzer Bn on precision missions where destruc
tion could not be obtained using the I05mm HOVlit-z;er. All the Corps Gun
Bns and the Howitzer En had radios in their Fire Direction Centers with
Div Artillery Bn tI K" channels pre-set. Upon request these Corps Bns Vlould
come up on the channel of the forward observer who had located the target.
Concrete piercing (T-I05) fUze proved very effective in destruction missions.
Liaison Planes
After the first enem.y defense line had been penetrated, there was
usually adequate ground observation for Forward Observer purposes and flash
bases. The liaison plane, however, was the most effective observation
agency used. 12% of all observed missions were adjusted by air observers.
The planes of the Div operated from a central base all-weather field built
by the Div Engineers. This field was surfaced \'rith metal-pierced plank
brought from LEYTE by the Artillery,and overlaid with coral. A radio in
the command net at the air strip was used to dispatch planes. An SOP was
developed which placed the direct support Bn planes on call to -:Jhelr Bns,
while all general support Bns (on Div Artillery Control Channel) took turns
on a to dusk patrol under supervision of the Div Artillery Air Officer.
When not on Div patrol, general support Bn planes were availaple on call
to their Bns. The Artillery cub plane, in conjunction with the Navy high
performance observation plane, was the dominant factor i, destroying the
enemy artillery and preventing any daylight movement by the Japs. As a
result the enemy artillery was forced to do the majority of its firing at
night.
Patrolling
When all organizad resistance on the island had ceased, Artillery Bn
personnel were used as Inf to conduct mopping up patrolling and salvage
-10
operations from 21 June to 30 June. During this period the Div Arty
killed 319 Japs, captured 33 Prisoners of war and salvaged considerable
US and Jap equipment.
Statistical Data of Organic Divisional Artillery Only
Number of missions fired during operation 7978
Observed 5102
Unobserved 2876
Destruction of enemy weapons and emplacements:
No. of enemy guns destroyed (47mm and above) 137
No. of pillboxes and emplacements destroyed 134
No. of Caves Sealed 195
No. of Infantry weapons destroyed 421
Amount of ammunition expended 306,000 Rds
Difficulties
Radio communication and liaison v;ith adjacent units and the Tnf
was easy to maintain. The two outstanding handicaps to artillery
support were ammunition supply and an inadequate road net that was
virtually impassable wet "eather. It v!asnecessary to displace tvo;
light Bns via water in an tcT during the worst rainy spell. Of the
above tv'o handicaps, ammunition resupply Vlorked the greatest hardship
on the conduct of the operation. With 1500 rounds for light Bns and
540 rounds for medium Bns as the usual daily allora'1ce, it waS not
possible to fire the long preparations, nor expend the amount of ammuni
tion on call fires felt necessary to reduce the highly fortified enemy
position.
Comments
It is highly that tank, tank destroyer, and 'amphibious
tanks units which v.'ill be attached to a Div for an operation be attached
11Tell prior to the operation so that an operating procedure' for using
this fire power to reinforce the artillery can be vlorked out.
The assignment of three bulldozers to each Bn was invaluable.
The assignment of eight M-5 tractors to each light Bn facilitated
reconnaissance, displacement and supply dUring rainy
It is imperative that all artillery ammunition brought in assault
shipping be left under the control of. the artillery for and
handling.
Operations
Initially three tank Cots attached to the assault RCT's for
-11
the landing, and the Bn, minus these three Co IS, '\Pas held undel' Dlv control.
After the third day's operation ashore, the entire tank Bn operated under
Div control and the tank Bn Commander made Co assignments to assault Regts
as directed by Div. Throughout the operation medium tank Co's '.:Jere rotated
between the assault Inf Regts so that one medium tank Co was generally out
of the line where it could better perform the necessary on its
tanks. This mothod of operation proved very satisfactory in keeping tank
losses to a minimum, but it prevented the same tank Co from operating with
the same Inf Regt throughout the campaign. It was discovered that tank Co's
should not stay in the assault as long as Inf Regts, therefore, the rotation
method of attachment proved very satisfactory,
The normal tank attachments to an Inf Regt were one medium tank Co,
one medium flame..thrower platoon, and additional light tanks 't"here their
use proved advantageous. All Regts, except in extreme difficult operations,
held one tank platoon in reserve and attached one tank platoon to each of
the assault Inf Bns. Flame-throv:,'er tanks usually operated by section (2 or
3 flame-thrower tanks) '.'lith one sectio""! supporting each Inf Bn.
Throughout the operation tanks were used extensively to destroy dug-in
installations such as caves and pil1boxos, gun positions, and to neutralize
hills and escarpments by direct fire at ranges. The Tank-Inf team
became the most important and most effective single combat element in re
dUcing the well-prepared and coordinated pillbox defensive system encountered
on OKmAWA (See Fig. 17, Page 54, Chapter VII). Some difficulty was initial
ly encountered in effecting close cooperation betwe.en the Inf and tanks.
Before the reduction of the SHURr defense line, the enemy constantly
directed its artillery against our advancing tanks. This prevented Inf
units f'rom w:l.thin 100 ya""ds of the tanks 11'Jithout receiving exces
sive casualties. During this situation tanks normally operated a short
distance in front of the Inf lines and tank-Inf liaison was eshblished
by radio.
Uaison
The Tank Bn furnished eacn assault Inf Bn a liaison officer with SCR
509 radio and operator to coordinate the tnnk.. lnf action and transmit the
orders of the Inf Bn ComMander to the proper tanks. One tank officer
(usually tank Co Commander) with vehicle, SCR-509 radio, radio operator
and driver, acted as liais.on officer. to the Inf Regt. This liaison
officer would usually go to the assault Bn area which would fur"1ish him
the best observation of his Tank Co in action. A liaison officer T.ith
radio was a 1so maintained at the Div CP. A sound-power telephone mounted
on the back ofesch tank was utilized by Tnf leaders on the ground in
directing the fire of the tank.
Supply
Due to the poor condition of roeds, particularly during the rainy
season, supplying the medium tank Bn became a difficult problem. A tre
mendous volume of ammunition and gasoline was used by the tanks and it
was necessary to keep supply dumps and refueling points as far forward
as possible.
-12
Comments
Tank units require tiwe for daily maintenance. Combat must be termin
ated sufficiently prior to darkness to permit the tanta to perform this
rna intenance. It waS found that Regts should keep one tank platoon in re
serve and the Div should keep one Tank Co in reserve whenever the tactical
situation permits.
The light tank Co was very seldom employed in this operation because
enemy AT guns were practically always present and the medium tal1ks were
able to negotiate the terrain much better than the light tanks.
Replacements in personnel and tanks, especially the latter, should be
made available Shipping space should be provided for the tank Bna
full Tlo of 42 trucks, and these should be brought ashore as soon as
possible. The LSD has proved to be the moat useful all-around landing
craft for landing medium tanks. The IST is particularly undesirable in
that it cannot be beached in a reef operation or even in a sand-beach
landing until the beachhead is fairly SGcure from mortar or artillery
fire, and tanks are needod ashore long before this time.
r-lFANTRY COMBAT
Infantry combat during the operations on OKINAWA involved mainly the
slow, systematic destruction of the numerous mutually-supporting, dug-in
caves and pillboxes 1!lhich composed the enemy fa expertly-prepared defen
siv.e positions. It was generally impossible to maneuver the Japs out of
their underground defensive pOSitions making necessary the complete des
truction of each individual cave, pillbox or other underground emplacement
encountered. These underground pos itlons cannot be out by tre
mendous artillery concentrations or air bombing. Often they are so well
constructed:and well-located in defiladed positions that it is even
impossible to neutralize the ef(lplacements ,",'ith heavy caliber supporting
fires. The only feasible method of reducing these emplacements waS by
the use of direct-fire weapons, tanks and flame-throwers, and by the Inf
doughboy heavily laden with satchel charges and other explosives.
Destruction of Caves
Numerous types of caves and underground emplacements were encountered
on OKINAWA and practically everyone required a different method of reduc
tion. Usually, however, direct fire weapons r.ere first employed against
the cave openings and embrasures to permit demolition units and flame
throwers to work up to vrithin close range of the cave. Machine guns and
riflemen, from supporting pOSitions near the cave being assaulted, were
always employed to cover the operations of the demolition team. After
the demolition crew had cautiously worked its way to the cave
entrance or embrasure, a smoke grenade VJaS throl'"n through the opening
to blind the Japs '"hile the satchel charges were being emplaced, and to
permit the location of additional cleverly-camouflaged embrasures or
openings to the same cave. In many instances when smoke grenades were
tossed into cave openings, smoke could be seen coming from several
other openings along the hillside. Each of these openings lA'as then
spotted and additional demolition crews sent forward with satchel charges
to destroy the emplacements. It was usually foun.d that a 20-pound
-13
satchel charge with 30 to 45-second fuse v.'ould effectively seal most caves
and emplacements.
The incident of the 3d Platoon, Co K, 33lst Inf, in reducing an
enormous cave in the YAEJU-DAKE hill area on 13-14 June is typical of
much of the Inf combat engaged in during this operation. This cave was
located along the cliff of the YAEJU-DAKE ESCARPMENT. At the base of the
cliff were two entrances 50 feet apart and banked with coral to form a
parapit. Ten feet above the two bottom entrances and further apart were
two more holes, much smaller and about the size of firing ports, in the
sheer wall of the cliff. On the top of the escarpment, about 100 feet
from the bottom entrance, were two pillboxes and three holes of entrance
or exit 20 to 60 feet from the edge of the cliff. The cave was extensive,
being dug into the solid coral wall of the escarpment. To get to the dif
ferent floors, of which there three that were actually seen, the enemy
used ladders and platforms of 20 foot intervals. The terrain in front of
the cave was a maze of large coral knobs, and tne left edge of the cave
was covered with brush.
Assault Was Difficult
The cave was assaulted from below and from the right side 'dthout
knowing its full size. Word vras received from the Bn OP that there was an
exit on the ,top as they could see the Japs out. By a physical
count, 9 Japs were killed in the dave and 5 outside in their sniping posi
tions on the coral knob. Ir. the preparatory concentrations on the escarp
ment the high port on the right hit either by a direct-fire weapon or
artillery and it \'Tas enlarzed Over 3 in diameter, but it was sti1l
tenable and was occu!,ied. The enertrJ employed continuous rifle fire and
made extensive use of the hand grenade, throwing them out of the top en
trance and off of the top of the escarpment. Supporting riflemen put
covering fire on the top edge of the escarpment keeping the enemy back
from the edge to limit their use of hand gr-enades. The BAR was used to
neutralize the two high ports and grenades were used along the bottom
entrances.
AT rockets fired from the bazooka were employed at 20 yards to
blowout the parapits of the bottom entrances. Ei-:;ht fragmentation grenades
were then fired into the different ports from the grenade launcher by
using the adapter. This grenade firing successful because the grenades
"'ent deep into the caves. By us ing WP grenades it was determined there
"'ere no '!lore el1trances. Due to the draft in the cave, hO"'8vcr, the smoke
was drawn out the top and several of the enemy smoked out. One squad of
8 men was left to hold tho ground we had taken and keep the Japs busy while
the other went around to flank the cave from the left and eliminate a sniper
firing from deep in the cave. Working a man in under cover of smoke, a
satchel charge was nlaced in t,he bottom entranco. On detonatiol"! it did
very little physical damase to the cave and raised a large cloud of dust.
The charge didn't. stop the sniping so 'the portable flame-thrower was
employed. Each ent:::-ance VIas given a two to three second burst and a heavy
machine gun section 600 yards to the rear of HILL 99 had a field day shoot
ing Japs as they came out the top. It \7aS estimated that more than 30 Japs
ran out.
The 3d platoon, consisting of one 8-man squad and one 7-man squad plus
-14
j
a runner, medical aid man and Lt platoon leader, worked on toward the
cave. The a-man squad organizod into two BAR teaMS of two men each,
and the remaining four men carried a satchel charge per man. The 7-rnan
squad was organized into one BAR team of tVTO men, one rocket launcher
team of two men carrying 9 rounds, one man carrying the flame-thrower
and the t\'.'o remaining men carrying satchel charges. Each man carried four
fragmentation and one WP grenade and two bandoleers of ammunition. The
squad leader carried the rifle grenade launcher and a adapters. Smoke
was used very effectively to screen -che enemy's vision so that the platoon
could work right on the enemy position after it had been held up twice
by enemy rifle fire.
Even after this thorough assault, the cave was not completely
reduced. It was sufficiently neutralized, however, so that further
advances in this area were possible as long as the cave was offensively
guarded. When the top of the escarpment had finally been secured, organic
Engineers employed to finally and completely reduce this position.
Recoilless Weapons
During the assaults against enemy positions along the YAEJU-YUZA
area, the 57mm and 75mm recoilless weapon proved to be very effective as
a mobile direct-fire v,'eapon which is so necessary in the reduction of
caves and pillboxes (See Fig. 19, facing Page 56, Chapter VII). A total
of 275 rounds per weapon was expended in actual combat during this
period. This is all the amr.nmition that was available.
It is believed recoilless weapons should be issued in addition to
present T/E weapons and not substituted for them. These weapons could be
brought up for special missions where the use of standard 1J'.'eapons is
prohibited by terrain or when the rapid use of alternate firing pOSitions
is demanded. Recommend the follov.'ing issue of recoillesc weapons in the
Inf Div:
57r.lM - 6 each Hvy Wpns Co; 6 per Bn AT plat; 3 per Div Hq Co
Defense Plat.
75mm 12 per Regtl AT Co.
4.2mm: 6 per Cannon Co.
CHAPLA nr ACT IV IT IES
The Div landed v.ith 14 Chaplains. Regtl Chaplains worked from the
medical collecting Co supporting their respective Regt. At'these collect
ing stations the ChaplainS had an opportunity to contact the wounded of
their unit and minister to them according to the individual's faith. From
these medical installations it was easy for the Chaplains to get forwa:rd
to the different Bns in the line.
The assistant Div Chaplain, stationed at the Div CeMetery, took care
of religious activities there and compiled the necessary for
the letters of condolence. The Div Chaplain was statio!led at the Clearing
Station so as to be close to the Regtl Chaplains and give them a hand
vlhen heeded.
-15
I
COMMUNICAT IONS
" Radio
,
Radio was used as orimary means of co:mrunication during early phases
of the landing. The voice command net, utilizing SCR- 300 radios,
to be the to the problem of securing prompt reports from Regts .
ashore. It is capable of continuous operation, and can b.:. taken ashore
regardless of beach conditions. In contrast, the SCR-193 go
ashore until vehicles can be unloaded, and even then it is to
keep near the front where it would drav' considerable fire. The SCR-284
portable, places a tremendous weight load on the radio team and, in
addition, is not capable of continuous operation on.the move. The SCR
300 net was flooded at times, and two channels are needed to handle
traffic with the greatest speed.
Enem,y radio interference was sporadic and never appeared to be follow
ing any coordinated plan. Deliberate jarn."1ing was rarely encountered.
Interference was most often caused by enemy tactical nets operating on the
same frequency with friendly nets.
Friendly Interference Severe
Friendly radio interference was severe, especially with the FM
radios (SCR-300, 500 and 600 series). This was due to excellent radio
conditions encountered on OKINAWA, and the large number of frequency
duplications necessary with the troops present. It is believed, hov:ever,
that an improvement would result if all SCR-300 frequencies were allotted
to each Div. Adjacent Signal Officers could then adjust assignments to
or reduce local interference between units. Tank and Chemical
Mortar Bns were not assigned AM frequencies for their SCR-l93 and SCR
284 radio sets. These frequencies are needed for the proper control of
the units. .
Wire
Slowness in vehicles initially delayed wire construction
and necessitated the use of foot messengers from the Advance Message
Center ashore to the units ashore. Wire laid by hand to the assault
units during the first day.
Telephone service was excellent t.hroughout the campaign. The use of
existing poles enabled \'!ire to be kept off the grolL'1d. Heavy enem,y shell
ing during the early part of the campaign cut many lines but these were
quickly repaired. Heavy rair.s at one tirde necessitated layil'!s wire 'on
foot for a period of one week.
Carrier was installed L f 3 by a Corps team and functioned in an
excellent throughout the campaign. VHF radio link was available
in emergencies, and operated perfectly every time it was used.
The follOWing is a tabulation of the traffic handled by Div Message
Center during tbe operation.
-16
AGENCY
APRIL MAY JUNE TarAt
m our IN our IN OUI' IN our
Magr 1573
3005 1930 3916 188,4 4225 5387 11246
Red 227 131
2 11 2 240 133
TP 52 5 3 3
13
26 68
34
TT
351
178 500 128
336
167 1187 473
,
TG

In Planes


!tL
47
41
GRAJID TOTAIS 6929 11927
The above tabulation does not include several tOl1S of TMts, FM's and
other printed publicatic:l1s delivered by messengers. Also an additional
3100 messages were handled on Div Voice radio net and were not recorded
in Message Center.
Sigtlal Supply
This Div embarked short many items of Signal Supply. Theoretically
we were supposed to carry a 30-day maintenance supply, in addition to Tlo
and T/E plus authorized excel:!ses. Actually, a bare 10-day supply of many
items '\'Tas embarked. ?-Jon-receipt of rehabilitation supplies on IEYTE vIas
the rr8in reeson for this shortage. Critical shortages were Field mire,
W-1IO and Wire, W-130. The Div embarked \"lith a bare TIE of W-llO, and nv
W-130 except that issued on Reel Equipment CE-ll. Thirteen of the TIE
SCR-284 radios were short hand generators. Vie were informed that some
rehabilitaticn supplies would proc3ed direct to target area, should
be available within 10 days after the landing.
slov! and it was L f 7 before the first Signal Supplies arrived in the
Div Signal Dump. Wire became critical by L t 8, and \Va were able to keep
minimum wire communication operative only by borrowing wire from Corps and
This shortp.go eased off around L t 20, and from then on critical
shortages in the spare parts category.
Signal Maintenance
Telephone repair persol1.nel were adequate and radio repair personnel
were adequate to perform 3d echelon maintenance on tactical eouipment.
However, the added load of some 450 recreational radio public
address systems, and 15 motion picture projectors is too I!lUchfor the
present Tlo radio repair personnel. The result is that 3d echelon work
or recreational equipment cannot be handled by competent personnel, and
unqualified personnel attempt to repairs thereby causing more damage.
It is recommended that the Div Sigl1al Company be increased by three radio
repairmen, SSN 648, to handle this added load.
Spare parts have never been adequate. Never have the available spare
parts even approached the figures in Signal Catalogues Sig 7 and
Sig 8 for 2d and 3d echelon l118intena-1ce. Early in the campaign, Tenth
repair units did an excellent job of cur overflow of repair
work, but their spare parts were soon exhausted end, during the latter
part of campaign, they were unable to sUiply the needed parts. As a
result too Imlch equipment dead-lined. Furthermore, recreational eQuip
ment is received vdthout Spare parts. Recreational receivers, such as the
R-lOO, are not as durable as tactical equipment, and they are handled and
used by inexperienced personnel. This results in added failures in the
e1"uipment ;,rhich !!lust be anticipated in spare parts oode available.
ENGINE]R
Preliminary terrain and intelligence studies road and bridee
construction Vlould be the chiof en.gineer problem on OKINAWA, consequently
three units of Bailey Brid:-se, a large quantity of bridge timber, and engi
neer heavy equipment great ly in excess of TIE were inc luded in the assault
echelon. The remove 1 of e!'lemy mines and obstacles, water supply, and engi
neer supply would always be of primary concern.
The existing road net proved to be e,,.,tirely inadequate. The roads
were narrow, thinly surfaced with coral, and marked by numerous weak cul
verts, high fills masonry arch bridges across streams ravines,
and narrow cuts. All important bridges 1:1 the Div zones of operEl.tions were
skillfully demolished by the enemy and many sections of road were mined,
obstructed by rock or effectively torn-up by bomb and shell
craters. To sustain the heavy concentrations of Div traffic it neces
sary to l"iden, surface, and provide drainage for all roads, to replace
most culverts, and to construct many bridges. Some stretches of road,
subject to observed enemy fire, had to be re-routed and numerous addition
al supply roads and laterals constructed. Fortunately coral rock and rub
ble'were available in largo for surfacing. Extended rains and
heavy traffic during May rendered impassable all roads immediately north
of the SHURI Defense Line and movement was restricted to tracked
vehicles or those towed by dozer. During the rapid advance to the YAEJU
DARE Escarpment road construction ",ras Y1ecessarily limited to patching and
the construction of by-passes and bridges.
By-Passes Quickly Constructed
In every case it v!as possible to construct temporary earth-fill by
passes arowd demolished bridges a"d across ravines aYld srr.all streams for
use until new bridges could be Consequently forv.r.rd moveMent
suffered no delay for bridging operations. The 32lst Engr Bn constructed
a total of eight Bailey Bridges and seven timber trestle bridges during
the campaign.
Dozers with armored cabs used to excellent advant.age in the
fror:t line support of tank and infantry units on many occasions. These
dozers worked under concentrated e1'cmy fire to assist tanks across ditches,
embankments, and other barriers, thus them to advance to provide
close supporting fire for our infantry.
Japs Scattered Mines
Eng ineer troops were exten,s ively employed in the removal of mines.
A total of 2,268 Jap mires of all types were removed or destroyed by
engineer and infantry elements of the Div during the OKINAWA operation.
These ranged from fuzed 500 lb. bombs and artillery shells of all sizes
(used in combination 1,\Tith various srllall mines) to the common Terra-Cotta
-18
) ,.'
,
Measure, Most n1,1J!lerous were the single-horn
and wood QOx ,mines,. 8.Qme Yardstick mines were found and near
OZATO TOWN a new type black, .serrFlted, anti-personnel mine was discovered.
In only two cas were ther.eevena semblance of minefield
Most mines found were 'buried ah!1 ex.cellently camouflaged, severely harass
ing and restricting our movements in mined areas.
. . .
supply proved to' be no probtem. . Water sources limited in
number but their capacity was more than ample to satisfy all troop require
ments.
An artillery liaison plane strip constructed by Div Engineers on the
flats south of CHATAN TOWN, proved inva luable to the operation. ThiB 850
feet all-weather strip, built up with coral sand and pierced plank mat
ting, \':ell compacted and drained,,','8s the only strip in the southern part
of the island that remained operational throughout the extended heavy
rains in May end during that period served artillery liaison planes of all
units of both Corps.
Supplynnd.Equipment
The Div Medical Supply 8 combat supply of essential iter.ls
loaded on two 21 ton trucks, and a thirty day medical maintenance unit.
Losses during ship-to-shore movement were negligible. Of the .3,000
pital rations carried, a small amount were lost in the ship-to-shore move
ment and some VIere pilfered. The losses sustained did not present a
critical probler.l. The failure in execution of property exchange resulted
in a criti reI shortage of litters and blankets during the first ten days
of evacuation. Other shortaees in medical items were. experienced, notably
sheet \"adding, talc, first aid dressings, and ,wire ladder. splints.
Equipment carried by the Bn aid stations wa:s modified to .the essen
tials; i.e. dreSSings, splints, plasma, sulfa, morphi.ne, blankets and
litters. These were carried on P8ckboards and were routinely used
throughout the campaign. Medical department chests were used only d
urin
6
rest periods. Resupply 'was effected by informal reclU8st upon the collect
ing Co's. During the assault, collecting Co's carried essentiallJ
the saMe equipnent as the Bn aid stations. The chests and heavier equip
ment were loaded on vohicles landed in later phases. The equip
ment used by the oollecting Co's subsequent to the initial assault fol
lowed the TIE allowances closely.
The clearing Co was loaded as two separate platoons Essential
equipment was loaded on vehicles and the heavier equipMent shinped
as loose cargo. Considerable difficulty was encountered in the unload
ing, due pril'lDrily to the fact tl:at the equipment was scattered on
several ships and could not be controlled by the Co The
of vehicles and loose cargo seriously handicapped the.
establishment of the clearing station. Experience Ln this operation has
shown that the equipment and personnel of the clearing platoons mpst be
loaded on the same ships.
-19
Evacuaticn and Treatment
The medical plan provided that the casualties occurring in landing
craft during the assault would remain on the craft to be returned to ships
for medical care. The 728th and the 783th Amph Trac Ens designated one
LVT in each lettered Co to function as medical vehicles. LVT's thus des
ignated landed in the first four assault waves and available to
evacuate casualties from the beach, and were charged with the responsi
bility of removing casualties from landing craft disabled in the water
or Olt the reef.
Bn aid stations were routinely established in the 3n CF 's.
use of. Bn cornrnunicatior..s utilized by the line Cos in requesting medi
cal aid and also by the Bn aid station in requesting support from the
Collecting Cos. Jeeps and '!Teasels were used by all of the Regts forward
of the Bn aid station, either to advanced litter relay posts or to the Co
CPs when feasible. The terrain offered excellent defilade which made this
praetice highly desirable.
It is generally felt that three litter squads are inadequate for a Bn
secticn. Casualties normally sustained further reduced their effective
ness. The persO!'1'1el of the En sections Vlere augmented to provide four
litter squads from the personnel of the Regtl Hq section and the Bn sec
tions were augmented with addltiunal technicians from the Regtl Hq sec
tion as needed. Tv.'o of t'he B.egts modified the T/O leaving two clerks,
a supply sergeant, the detachment first sergeant and aid men to Regtl
special troops. The remaining men were used in Bn sections.
During the first few days af the assault, collecting Cos ,,'ere divided
into three provisional platoons composed of sections from the station
platoon, litter platoon and ambulance platoon. One platoon was attached
to each BLT and landed with the Bill hq. The mission of the collecting
platoon was to collect casualties on the beach, treat and evacuate them
from the beach. The collecting Cos were consolidated as soon as the
tactical situation permitted. vehicles \"ere landed with the collect
ing Cos during the assault. Tho first collecting Co vehicles landed at
about Ht4 hours and all collecting Co vehicles were ashore by tf5 days.
Rapid Evacuation
The terrain and road nets lent themselves well to the needs of rapid
evacuation. The speed of eV5cuaticn was notably successful and increased
the chances of sur,rival. The time lag rerely exceeded twenty-five min..
utes from the aid stations to the collecting stations. The time neces
sary to travel the distances the collecting Cos to the clearing Co
was generally within forty minutE-s. Under the !:lost adverse cO'1ditions
during the entire campaign the time lag froI:l aid station to clearing
seldom exceeded six hours. During the excessive rains, 2!-ton
trucks and M5 IS were borrowed from service Cos and used to evacuate cas
ualties froffl the aid stations to thG collecting stations, these being
the only vehicles capable of negotiating the mud .Long litter hauls
v:'ero also necessitated because of the impasssbility of the roads in the
t"ol""Grd areas.
The clearing Co per:.>ol:ne1 [tJ"1d a part of one platoon's equipment
were landoo on '- Apri 1 The stntlntl e,.c;tablished and cons istoo of
-20
the of one platoon, one portable surgical hospital and the entire
clearing Co's personnel. During the first three days the clearing station
conducted evacuation to the beach. ; Subsequent to 6 bpri1, one platoon of
the station was set up and two portable surgical hospitals were
established. The portable surgical hospitals operRted surgeries and one
post-opcrativo Y'ard per. hospital. ':'he clearing station operated a minor
surgery, shock and three general wards. A psycho ward v:as established
under the supervision of the Div Psychiatrist. Personnel of the second
platoon used to augment the clearing station. The normal bed ca
pacity varied from 200 to 225 beds with proviSions for extension to 300
beds
..
A double squad tent was set up and was used a.s a shock tent. This
innovation eliminated congestion in the admission tent and in the pre
operative tents. It also allowed expeditious treatment of minor surgery
caSes. Emergency major surgery was performed by the portable surgical
hospitals. Only such definitive treatment as VI'as necessary for prepara
tion for further evacuation was performed at the clearing
Whole Blood used
blood v:as supplied throughout the operation and was routinely
used as far forv'ard as the collecting stations. It was considered a
vitally important factor of the medical treatment given within Div
installations (See Fig. 33). presented a "erious prob
lem. Ice WEtS initinlly procured from ships and later frol'!\ engineer
units, but amounts ':Orere often and resulted in the loss of
who10 blood. Serum, albUl'T!sn \"a8 procured from Navy and was a definite
asset particularly during the assau.lt. It is more compact than plasm: and
a larger quantity may be carried. It also conserves time in administra
tion.
The Div roadicsl instAllations treated a total of ll,9S4 casualties
during the period 1 April 1945 to 21 June 1945. Of the above figure
were battle casualties; 1,269 ,,'ere injuries, 122 died of wounds,
and 3,224 Viere dise'ases. Included In the disease figure are SS3 battle
fatigue cases. _These figures were, compiled from the blotters of the Div
medical installations snd include approximately 200 casualties from ad
jacent organizations.
Strength
This r,iv embarked at LEITE with an over-all strength of 1,256 of
ficers and warrant officers and 19,701 enlisted nen. The Div organic
was 770 officers and warrant officers and 12,067 enlisted men
which reflects an under-strength of 39 officers and warrant officers and
1,167 enlisted' men, of 1.'.'hich 35 officers and warrant officers and 1,045
eJl1isted men were infantry. 1l:eekly l.:verages of assigned, and present for
duty strengths of an Tnt'Regt during the OKINAWA operation:'are shown in
the Table on page .24.
Comparative high and low Present for Duty strengths of the Regts '.
during the period of the operation wers:
OFF & 1'I!0 Date ' :Men
D:ito
..
J31st Infant!7
T/O 158 3049
High 136 1 f.pr 45 2998 15 May 45
Low 102
;
7 June 45 1601 29 .Apr 45
-
'l82d Infantrl
T/O 158
3049
High 150 1 Apr 45 2893 11 May 45
Low 92 27 May 45 1676 24 Apr 45
1 Infantrl
I
T/O 153
3049
High
145
1 ,l.pr 45 2983 11 foftay 45
I
100
I
12 i,pr 45 1826 12 .Apr 45
Low
--
I
In addition to the existing under-strength due to lack of replacements,
the strength of the command, particularly tho Regts, was further depleted by
a sharp increase in the sick rate subsequent to the cessation of the LEYTE
eampaign.
Replacements
A total of 196 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 4464 enlisted men were
received. The great bulk of these replacements were assigned to the Divas
but contained conversions from 16 other Lrms and Services. Although it
was planned that replacements would arrivG with the invasion convoy, no re
plaeements received until 15 .April 1945 when the first of the following
bulk groups of replacements arrived:
April 16 -- 667
Lpril 27 -- 1060
May 2 2017
May 8 600
Pursuant to the Commanding Generalts policy, replacements as
signed to the reserve Regt. assigned to more than one Regt equali
zation of effective strengths was the basis of the breakdown. lilthough
the enlisted replacements were green and wholly inexperienced, unit com
manders were Vlell pleased with their attitude, age, and general quality.
191 officers and 2 warrant officers v.rere received as replacements during
the campaign as follows:
-22

ARM Lt Co!
f'la jor Capt 1st Lt 2d Lt WO TarAL_
Inf 2 1 9 51 86 1 150
FA 2
5
11 18
Y.C
"
, 8 11
MAC 1
4 5
CE
3 3
Ord 1 1
Cav 2 2
AC 1 1
Ct,C 1 1 2
4
Ch 1
1

TarAL 2 1 17 69
1
2
1
197
Prior Duty
Many of tho officer rep1acel-:lents were assigned direct to the Div upon
graduation from OCS or upon conversion from other or Services and
vlithout prior duty assignments. There were 10 officers in the second
category. Of the 10 Inf Capts rec:::ived, only one, a CAC converted officer,
had any prior 3xperience. Only one OCS graduate had had prior
combat experience; this as an enlisted rrsn.
It is believed that prior duty assignments before being assigned to
a Div in combat rould afford a v,'e1l-d.Jserved background and r.1eans of
orieritation for ne1', offiC0Jrs. Over all, enlisted replac8tT'ents vrere more
expeditiously pl"ocur8d end assig!1ed by the Replacement Command thtm '.'leN
offic8r roplncoments.
In connection '''ith strength and r0plDcene'1ts, it '."ill be noted that
throughout tho cc;t:1p8ign a great variation existed betv'8en assigned
strengthsnd present for duty fightin5 strength. It appoars thct an
initial landing over-strength would compel"\sate for tho otherwise Undue
loss in combnt efficiency Gue to t'!!1sualties.
The subr.1ission of requisitions for wes delayed during
combnt for a period of two to three weeks pending receipt of ev:cuntion
orders. A repl'1cemnt pool, set up simultaneously with the landing,
v:ould supply rcplccer.ents to depleted units during the critical phase
v.rhen the effective strergth of the front-line units is of the utmost
ir;lportaDce.
TDR&R
J.. single TDR&R quat':' of 12 w':',3 received. One offic:.:;r and 11 enlisted
rJen selected throu'Shout Diy and 0 units cOr:lposcd this quota. A
det.') i1 of O!'le offic'Jr "nd six en] isted men, ell Inf, vrero returned to
the States on a 95-day TD Bond SElle Campaign.
Emergency Furloughs
A total of three emergency furloughs and no energency leaves were
grantod during the car.1paicsn. There were no discharges.
-2.3
INERJ1GE REGIMENTAL STRENGTH
By Week
Average l.ssiooned Average Present Average Absent
Strength for Duty Strength (All Causes)
Orf WO EM Off "!:G Off
1liL
EM
2400 ? April 1945 153 5 2818 137 4 2482 16 1
336
2400 14 April 1945 153 5 2978 115 4
2264 38 1 714
2400 22 Ilpril 1945 153 5 2945 103 4
1790 50 1 1155
2400 28 1945 148 5 3043
107
4 2113 41 1 9.30
2400 5
2400 12
2400 19 Yay
2400 26 May
2400 2 June
1945
1945
1945
1945
1945
135
132
126
124
129
5
5
5
5
5
3336
3471
3335
3280
3208
112
110
105
98
104
4
4
4
4
/,
2776
2849
2618
2370
2281
23
22
21
26
25
1
1
1
1
1
560
622
717
910
927
2400 9 June 1945 137 5 117
2242 20 0 837
2400 16 June 1945 141 4
2976 123 4
2128 18 0 848
2400 23 June 1945 142 5 2880 113 5
2077 29 0 803
2400 30 June 1945 140 5 2767 118 5 2135
22 0 632
-
-24

Reclassificat ion
There were 42 enlisted men transferred from the Div because of
battle fatigue. Strict complianco with the Commanding GeneralIs policy
for "Utilization of Manpower" kept this figure at a mininum. An addi
tiunal 27 enlisted men, cases, were reassigned with the Div.
Reclassification proceedings were instituted in the case of five officers.
Two officers tendered resignations.
Promotions
No recoMmendations for direct appointment as 2d Lts submitted on
OKINAWA had been returned approved by the close of the operation. 150
officer promotions were processed. Promotion orders have been received
in 97 of these cases, and 55 recommendations were still pendIng on ,30
June 1945. 31 2d Lts were promot0d on the basis of outstanding perforn
ance in combat while 38 more '.',ere promoted with over 18 months in grade
and excellent cOlTlbat performance. 81 recommendations. were routine.
Both officer and NCO promotions were considerably delayed due to
the period of time that elapsed between the date of loss to the 'unit and
the receipt of hospital transfer orders whereby a promotion vacancy
was created.
Awards and Decorations
Particular emphasis was plac8d On the expeditious award of decora
tions during the actual combat phuse. Inf units made a special effort
to award the Combat Infantryman IS Badge [,nd Medical Badge as they were
earned.
Docorntions wore av:c.rded as follows:
Recommended
a
Medl" 1 of Honor 2 o
D S C 9
o
Legion of Merit o o
Silver Star 122 84
Soldier IS Medal 14
4
Bronze StAr Medal 944 805
Air Medal 8 o
Purple He2.rt 41,31 4131
Courts :Ilartial
Statistics of Courts Mnrtia1:
time between
No. Tried r8straint &
----------
Convictions
General C f.r
Special C M
5
2
44 days
4 days
5
2
Summary C M 7 8 days 7
-25
Recreation and Morale
The tact.ical situation limited recrention to motion pictures and musi
cal concerts. These programs were presented throughout the Div v;ith the
booming attendance figure of 176,000
A special ensemble appeared in 72 concerts prir:J8rily for the benefit
of hospitalized personnel. The concerts rrera presented in the hospital
wards. Hospital com2:anders reported them as especially beneficial for the
morale of their patients.
Mail vms collocted and delivered daily whenever possible. Mail con
tinued to be the One I?,reatest morale factor for all personnel.
First-class !"'.:.1il was received with only 7 or 8 days elapsing betvreen
airrwalling in the States and receirt on OKINAWA.
Pnrcel post mailed after it WDS knovm thnt the Div was on OKINAWA
WAS received after c time intervc 1 of from 4 to 7 weeks. These porcols
[\ppo
G1
red to be in compnr&tively good condition. Purcel post, PQPcrs and
F.'.agazires were received after having bes!1 routed through LEYTE and after
a transit period from 6 to S months. ~ ~ e n received they were commonly
crushed, water-soaked, mildewed :md rotton.
~ E S REGISTRATION
An exceptionally v:ell-pbnned and executed procedure was utilized
by the Div GR personnel 11'1 locnting and ovacU<ltin
s
casualties from the
battlefield~ As a result, identificntion was fncil1toted and the pro
cessing of pcrso!1al effects wns accelernt.:;d accordingly. The prompt
removal of the dend and the conscientious uttention to duty of nIl GR
personnel was distinctly reflected in the mor.sle 9f the front-line troops.
TVIO cemeteries i,7erO ostcblished; 96th Div Temporory Cemetery No. 1
and the 96th Div Tempornry Comotery No.2.
No. 1 No.2
Burials: Arny
Navy
Marine
8.32
21
14
740
o
5
Unidentified Army 7 22
Unidentified Navy 1 1
875 763
l40th PI Toam
The Photo Interpreter Te8M studied r.!'d kept t:l file copy of Clll photos
received. 1-111 requests for photographs fro""; the lovrer u"its ~ r e n t throueh
this office and a cO!"1plete record of roquGsts waS maintained to avoid rep
etition and confusion on whet requests had been fulfilled. After annota
ting the copies 0:( photo missions th1'Ct came in, the teClm disseminated the
..;26
pictures to the units in whose zone the pictures were taken. The team
maintained a situation map showing all enemy installations obtained from
photo Special emphasis was placed on quickly e:;etting
the location of new installations to Div Artillery. The team received
ample photo coverage of good nuality for intorpretation, and copies of
the photos distributed to the front line Co's aided them greatly as a
supplement to the map. A 9'1 x 18
11
picture to a scale of 1/10,000 proved
the most s&tisfa ctory for use of the troops and general use. One of the
most useful types of picture received was a low oblique taken a thousand
yards behind the enemy lines lookin:z toward the front.
38th .JOB Toam
The JOB Teal'J kept a card file on the officers of the 32d Army show
ing name, rank and the source of the information. It also maintained an
organizational card file, a separate card for each unit showing the unit
CO, its code name and number, and its T/O strength and operational
strength with the major sub-units. One member of the JOB Team worked
with the translators, facilitating the getting of all Order of Battle
information from tho documents. For the same reason a man from the
team sat in on1all PW interrogations. As an aid to determining the
Japanese dispositions, th8 s8ction kept a map showing the location,
source and dcte of all identificatinns secured. A daily OB report list
ing identifications and discussing thoir significance was attached as
an annex to the G-2 Periodic Report.
314th Intelligence Detachment
To enable the Regts to m8ke use of any tactical information avail
able from PW's or documents with tha least possible delay, each Regt had
an interrogator and a translator attached, leaving four men from the
detachment at Div Hq. However, about the middle of May, the burden of
large numbers of documents necessit8ted the recalling of one mun from
each Rogt. During th'J first part of June the number of prisoners being
taken sharply increased. Therofore each Regt got its man back 8g'Din.
To handle the large influx of prisoners and to aid in segregating the
Jap soldier mingling with the civilians, XXIV Corps sent two additional
men and one officer to the detachment. Finally during the latter part
of June, large numbers of civiliano a.nd prisoners came in ahd'the de
tachment moved to the civilian and PW collecting point where it worked
with the CIC screening the civilians and segregating and interrogating
the soldiors. One officer and two enlisted men remained at the Div CP
to turn out the reports.
Surrender broadcasts hl}d meager results. The first attempted during
the latter part of rky had no positive results. Near the end of the
campaign c:; fow s-ave up in responSe to broadcast appeals to
surrender.
96th C IC Detachment
Throughout the operation, the detachm3nt, less tha commanding
officer and the clerk who remained at Div Hq, operated from the Div
Military Government Camp. All civilians 'picked up in the Div zone
came through this camp. During the opere.tion the detachment screened
out 38 Jflpanese soldiers, 114 BOETAI and 119 GilllZ0KU who vlere turned
, -27
over to the and PW's.
In addition to the screening of civilians the detachMt::nt carried on
its other normal funct ions of searching tmms lmd caves. All populated
p1D.ces in the Div zone were searched as soon US the tactical situation
perrr:itted, resulting in tho finding of [i fey: docuLlcnts and considerable
quantities of civilian goods, food, clothing and Lledica1 suppl:es, which
were turned over to the Government. The detachment also searched
over 50 caves suspected of being Japanese Comr.;and Posts. A cO)'lsiderable
nUMber of documents fOUl1d in theso instnllat ions were immedIately 'Siven
to the Div G ..2.
Map Supply
The Div received a more than ample supply of maps of scale 1/25,000
operations map, anu 1/10,000 map of the beachhead area before embarking
on the OKINAWA operation. The horizontal control on these maps proved
accurate. H01"9ver, the vertical contro] on the original issue was in
complete and inaccurate. The final copy of the 1/25,000 map issued during
the op8ration portrayed the conformation of tha ground sufficiently well
to determine the location of troops by hin masses. Co size and smaller
units found the 1/10,000 maps of the beachhead area very usoful. The
troops on the ground found that they could operate best on a reproduced
captured map 1/25,000 v.rhich also blovm up and reproduced at ;.1 seu1e
of 1/10,000. These reproductions of the Jap JIlGP were useless for artillery
firing due to the inaccurate horizontal control.
SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS
The quantity type of supplies embarked for ICEBERG operation were
prescribed by Higher Hq subject to availnbility. In 211 cases, except
Signal maintenance stock, all prescribed lev(;ls were obtained.
Class I -_
Under the heading Class I Supplie:;, rations Vlere carrier at the
following levels:
10-in-1 11 days Accessories 25 dnys
"BII Rations 14 days Bread Components 30 days
"K" Rations 3 days Hospital Rations 15 days
"D" Rations 2 d8ys Civilian Rations 70,000
Spec l..'11 Assault ] dny Water 10 gal per man
10 gal per Hasp bed
".
Water W8S carried only in 5-gallon cans and the quantity available
ashore initially was always adequoto. Two water points were established
and operating by 3 April (LI2) and '\Vater supply was never a difficult
problem.
II
Maintonance items of clothing, equipment and general supplies were
carried at a level of )0 days for all blanches, except Signal lI1Clinten
ance of ,:hieh only 20 days waS available. Both clothing and individual
..28
equipment was carried as Div supply under control of the Div Quartermast0J
and was available to the troops within three days of the landing. The
impregnated protective clothing issued in bulk at LEYTE was found to be
completely rotted and disintegrated into powder when handled. No re
placement supply of this item was available. Special issues of Class II
maintenance were (1) QM and Ordnance cleaning and preserving
kits, equivalent to 15 days supply were issued for shipboard use, and
(2) 1,000 suits of underwear and 1000 pair of socks were issued to the
Field Hospital for discharged
Class III
These supplies were also carried at the 30 day level and were packed
in 5-gal containers and in 50-pound pails for heavy gear lubricants.
Class N
Class N supplies vrere mainly limited to Engineer construction
material and included (3) three units of double double Bailey Bridge,
a total of 450 feet and approximately 50 tons of Pierce Planking, the
latter used in the construction of 8n air strip for Artillery Liaison
planes. A total of 840 tons of this Class supply was carried in the
assault.
Class V
These were loaded at the level of 5 CINCPOA U/F for all types, 10
U/F of flame-thrower fuel. The initial supply proved to be adequate,
but resupply became critical due to ship losses. The Artillery ammuni
tion becam6 particularly critical in the early stages of the campaign.
The magnitude of the ammunition supply problem is clearly seen in the
oxponditure figures for the Div during the operation:
l55mm Howitzer 41,997 Rds Carbine, Ca 1. .30 1,164,876 Rd,.,
105mm Howitzer 307,262 Rds r.rr, Cal. .30 4,393,301 Rl..:3
Rifle, Cal 30 2,285,162 Rds MG, Cal. .50 215,545 Rds
Reloaded DUKWs Useful
The initial resupply available to the tfoops fOr Lf1 waS secured
from the 19 preloadcd DUrow's th&t landed immediately after the assault
waves and formed the dump supplies for the Div. These DUKW's
were loaded with rations, small arms ammunition, water and hiGh priority
ordnance replacements consisting of small arms, machine mortars,
replacement parts and motor vehicle parts and assemblies. It is signif
icant that out of the first eighteen requests received by the Ordnance
Officer, seventeen were from the stocks of the preloaded DUKW's.
A sincere attempt was rnade to relieve the assault troops of tho
numerous and excessiVE: items of clothing and equipment normally worn or
carried and the results were very satisfactory. Standard and inter
changeable rolls were IIL..'1de up for all assault troops and were carried
in assault vehicles. These rolls wore available to the troops the night
of L-Day. The individual was further relieved of clothbg and eo,uipment
not needed in the assault by limiting the items and quantity to be .
-29
carried on his person r-md in cCr.1bst packs. J\ll personnel were limited to
four men per duffle:: the. balance shipped with the c;arrison
shippin;::-. No hnrcship was experiencec:. by this prooedure and a great
suving in clothing und equipment rcsultell.
Divisicn Guards Organizati0nal Equipment
In additiln to the normel supply dumps estnblishec by Div Supply Ser
vices, Div dur.1p was est"blished for or:;nnlz&ticnal anu niiscellaneous im
pediments. This dump vws operated by a p,,.ovisional plotoon cOl"1posed of one
and 34 enlisted men; two from each Divisional unit and attachment.
The function of this c.urnp was to receive, se:;regate and Guard organization
al property not immccUately needed by the troops to relieve the tacti
cal unit of this responsibility. Through this plan, loss and damage to
unit equipment and property v:as neglizible.
Rains Require Emrgency Measures
All supply and service activities were performed in a normal manner
until 2. June when emerzency supply proce:'ures were resorted to. All
ronds in the Corps sector became impassable after henvy rains and
supply fro!:l Div clUr.lDS ceased. Temnorary r.umps and service installations
were establisher, by all special staff sections in the vicinity of
Suprlies , equipment and personnel flere mover. south,lOrd by 511 types of
craft and H::;hteraGc procured b3
r
highar On 3 June, the as
sistant G-4 and one man of the section set up an advance G-4 sec
tion 3t YONAB;.RU Beach with ratiio communications to Div CP. Six o.irc.rops
were the assault from 2 June to 9 June. A total of 22 tons
of amnrunition, rations and were cropped; 5 drops Viere mo.G.e to the
38Jd Inf J.e.:;t and O'1e to the 33lst Inf' Rec;t.
Hi!;her heac1qunrters 8stc,bllshec Corps distributing point at MINATffiA
Bay on 8 June This !",oint wos esti.lblishec'! primarily to supply the os
sault Rezts :md sU:;Jporting Qrtillery over shorter suprly routes. By 14
June, roae'. conditions were finully improved, and all service supply
installations by water into position near YWABIJW for normal opera
tion. .All shipments to distributinz point "lero to
YON.ABARU and [oint Vias. closed out on 17 Juno.
SalvQze Drive S:'lccessful
Salvage 'oporat'ions began on Lf2 2ncl were continuous thrOUGhout the
campaiGn. Cloth:in.'.:, equipment, artiller:r brass l3'1d met.'!l containers
were s&zrocated Qt operutec. by the L iv Quartermastor and evacuated
to the rear. Iloac si;:rns and COr.lment3 in the Div I & E publication ,')'ore
used to the fullest extent tc r.J<1 ke ell "salvaGe conscious".
The success of these offort;J cOon '.Je by the quantity of r.1ajor
cl'1sses of '"1roperty rocover0' :mc"
( . .
Artillery brass & 503 Tons
Shoes & clothinz 147 Tons
170b Bquipmont 123 Tons
63 Tons
In aedit icn, 'cI:r:>rroximately 100% of al] po.rochutes contain ers used in
air supply missions \"!ere reccvereJ :mc. so.lv.:::zed.
-JO
PUBLIC RELATIONS
The Public Relations mission in this operaticn was a joint responsi
bility of the Div Public Rebtions Office and News Team ItBtI, 1st Informa..
tion. and Historical Service which had been attached for the oper3tion.
Facilities and personnel were pooled and the two sections functioned as
one coordinated team. The term, "Public Relations Office
ll
, as used here
after in this report ""ill apply to both sections.
War Correspondents
The attractiveness of u Div to correspondents hinges primarily on
two factors; the availability of faciliti.es both to transport correspond
ents about the Div and to move the copy to a point, and the
ability of tho Div to pr011ido adeqw'l.te worki1"!g and living facilities and
to keep correspondents infcrl!1ed of current developments and day to day
tactical plans. r'Tith these facilities , the Div was at all times host to
a great number of correspondents. amount of the correspond
ents copy v:ns sent to Corp and Army by teletype and air pick-up when road
conditirr-s r.JOde motor transportation difficult. A peak of 18 correspond
ents were attached to tha Div at one time. Throughout the operation 18
writers, six photographers, and two radio broadcasters were billeted at
the Div CP exclusive of assigned Army personnel.
Coverage of Correspondents
An important function of ;.elntions personnel is supplying
IIIP.terial to correspc.ndents, T"lho, obviously, can"1ot personally cover an
entire campaign. This is particularly noc8ssary in the case of cor
respondents not working directly frol!l our own CP. In the early days of
the campaign, excellent covarage was obtained by this means in such news
papers 3S the Chicago Daily News and the Ghristian Science Monitor. Par
ticular attention VlSS placed on arranginz interviews between individUBls
outstanding in combat and newspaper correspondents and representatives
of the four radio networks.
Covernge for c0rrespondents became the major function of the Public
Relations Office during the second phasa of the operaticn when the major
ity of correspondents still em the island \'Jorked out of Tenth llrmy Hend
quarters. Starting on 10 May, of this office made daily trips
to Inf observation posts and from information thus gathered, plus of
ficial reports, prepared a daily news release. From this summary, cor
respondents briefed at Tenth ;,rmy by an officer cf this section end
the Same further surnmariz6d, was transmitted by radio for the
use of correspondents at CrT?1i,C Headquarters, Guam. A substantial propor
ticn of coverage given the Div by v.ire services and the NElw York papers f:.
frcm this material.
A eonsidercble number of neticn pictUres (not home-town) v'ere taken
by the 1st InforME:tir:" and Historiccl Sorv ice's photographers in the
opening phases of the campaign. l.fter 20 .t,pril, only one photographer
being avnill;ble, emphAsis vmS placed en home-town pictures si!lce ex
tensive front ... line acticn coverage was provided by the .32.35 Signal Ser
vice Detachment, attached to the Div.
-31
Home-town Coverago
Between 115 April and '30 'June relea.ses v:ere made to' an estimated 4,50(
horne-tovlI'l: newspaper and radio outlets.' Approximately half of these re
leases were pictorial. Unit reporters within each organizntir.n are a
necessity in obtaining adequate publicity for individuQls, units, and
tho Div. Theso reporters should work under the supervisic'n of the Public
Rulctic!1s Office in tho preparGticT' of releases for hOr.le-town newspapers
and radios.
HANDLING OF CIV I1IAI:m
Colloctbn
Four Military Government Detachr.lents were attached to the Div for
the operatirn, designatdd cs I-6, B-5, onC G-IO Dispensaries. De
tachment i.-6 with one G.. IO Ii ispensary came ashore on L .;. 1 d'1Y, at 1200,
at which tir;]o tho Div Prevost Marshal had about 180 civilians impounded
at the Prisoner of l"ar inclosure which had established on the beach
within the Div' s zone of ccti,:n. The oivilians v'ere released to M} De
tachment A-6 and impounded within a barbed wire inclcsure. Detachment
B-5, v:ith one G-IO Dispensary came ashore on L f''j days and took over the
operation of the inclosure.
Civilians were moved to the rear through prisoner of v'ar channels and
delivered at the compound, whore they Vlere fed and given medical attention.
Thos0 able to "lalk were marched tu the compound, while the injured, crip
pled, sick, and children were transported on trucks furnished by the Div
Provost' and. by units returninr:; from the front lines to the rear
I!l.reas for'supp1ies. This means of evacusti<..n to the inclosures VJas fol
lowed throughout the campaign. Camps nnd inclosures were guarded by
military police personnel. Civilian inclosures and camps v:ere located at
the following points during the campaign (See Maps No.3 and 14).
(1) Suns. be (8l86-N)
(2 ) Chatan (8382-M)
(3 ) Nodake (8580)
(4) Tsui (8777-p).
(5 ) Yonabnru (8270).
(6 ) Crossroads, 13 and 48 (8166-P).
l.s the front lines forward, the Military Goverument Detach-'
ments norffi:i.lly were "leap froegod" in order to provide c'1mps tinct in...
closures nearer the frent. Thi.3 procedure permitted shorter hauls fron:
the forward are'lS and e:-::pec:ited the se>:,regetion of civilians.
Total civilians collecteC: peried 1 J.pril to 21 June 1945:
17,398.
..32...
,
..
. EV8-eUa t ien .
By L t 4, the civilian pophlati0h under Div control. W3S a'pproximately
2,000. Upon cOr.1pletion of fncilities further to the rear, 'evacuation be'
ge.n. to poil"ts designated by XXIV Corps, thus clearing the inclosures vdth
in the I'iv sector. Meenwhile, [mother borbed w1re inclosure wnS established
!'loar Cbatm (8382-M). On L f 8, a semi-permanent camp W8S established at
Nodake (3580), provid in:; aClequnte water supply and shelter which thereto
fore had been inadequate. The latter C3mp grew toa population of 6,216,
nt \'Jhich time evacuation to camps established-by XXDl Corps was begun.
Evacuation "'.lS assisted by trtmsportatinn and personnel furnished by XXIV
Corps.
Dur ing the last phDse of the operat ion, civilians vJere evacuated from
the fort':ard I1rerts to a borbed wire inc losure, where they were screened by
the CIC and Viera 'Siven necessary medical treatment. Those able to walk
then rerched to areas providod by tha 1slnnd Comm&nd on Chinen Poninsula.
The injured, infirm, and slTl311 children rere evacuated in trucks. This
process continued daily in order the civilians interned within the
Div zone of operstinns might be kept to 8 minimum.
Control
After once havine; been interned, the civilians were easy "Ito control.
All camps \':ere surrounded by barbed wire fences, al"d adequate guard
maintained to prevent escapes durin'S the ni-shts. Only two instances of
force vere necessary to prevent escapes.
Supply
70,000 rations for civilian use were mounted by the Div at
the staging area, their expenditure was not necessary. No government
rations of any description pere issued to civilians under the control of
the Div during the campaign. This also VJas true of clothing. Not only
was sufficient food and salvaged material uncovered on the tar?,et to
provide for the needs of civilians under Div control, but in addition
thereto surplus food and supplies in large quantities wet'e transferred
to camps in the areas.
Us e of Civilians
In this connoction civilians vere not used by the Div for labor de
tails sources under Div control. At one of the canps E small amount
of laundry sorvice was established. This 3ervice Vias for SMall amounts
brief periods.
lNFOREAT I'JN IN COMBAT
Division Nm"spnper
A daily newspaper proved itself invnluable in maintaininz a hi(5h
spirit during 011 of the RYUKYUS ,Campai;J'rl. The 96th Div
THE DEADEYE DISPATCH circulated 128,000 copies during the c'ampaign
to front-line troops usually beine able. to rench thorn less than
twenty-four hour time lapse from pUblication to finnl readin/;;. The
..... ' ..,),1
-3;3-'
newspaper was published on aboard ship and every day thereafter
r;hile troops were cOrnr:Jitted. Distribution was accomplished during the
by signal channels by special runners in addition to air
drops by artillery liaison pIanos. Locally-taken horses were used when
mud and rain made roads inpasshble for light vehicles and long distances
difficult for foot runners.
The effect of the nevispapcr was appElrent especially in relationship
to the control of rumors '.C'hen thero were news breaks over some radio .
sources about V-E Day. On 1 May while the organization was COMmitted to
the line the first widespread rUMor concerning V-E Day passed throughout
the Div. By thorough checkinG the daily newspaper was able to clarify
the situation by announcement of the proper informnticn. The newspaper
then, on the proper date, announ,ced V-E Day and forthwith began to pub
lish orientation material the many phases of the resultant
and redeployment problems of prime importance to
the mental health of the individual soldier. ANS and CNS materials were
on file and were most helpful in cov9ring the necessary SUbjects.
A contest WI1.S established to aid in adjustMent to V-E Day and to
preclude the unrest which could hQve developed had no action been taken.
In this regard, some organizod orientation conferences were held to counter
negative reactions. However, Most orientation in the matter wnS through
unit newspupers. Use waS made of FIGHTING FACTS and other background
materials which Information-Educaticn officers carried in their offices.
I & E for Rosene- Units
Inf units brought in reserve V!8re promptly supplied with Adequate
materials for a review of the world situaticn rQlative to the news for
the period during which they had been engaged and were supplied. with
adequate application blanks for educaticn materials through the United
states Armed Forces Institute to enable them to rest their minds, by
contrast, from the of actunl combat with the .The Div
InforIl18.tion-Educaticn Office slone counseled 150 officers and enlisted
men durin,s the period of reserve from 30 :pril 45, to 11 May 45 and con
tinued on the avera:-;e of 3 per day throuchout the operation, not only for
organic units but fer those in the proximity of or within telephone reach
of the office. 11 list of courses was reproduced and distributed
to all service units anc reserve units.
of Replacements
The Div WI:!S plftced in reserve en 30 April 45, and had received 1,727
replacements prior to that time. On 2 MAy 45 an additional 2017 arrived.
During the ten-day reriod befr,rc r,-.;coml'1i,tment, an: InforlIk'ltie'n ProO'ram for
Replacements Vias instituted and I] booklet containing historical back
[;round material especinlly for its factoral content was originated
and distributed. In an effort to r.ake mental adjustments to the new unit
and develop the necessary to reform the battle-scarred Inf, the
program was GiVen full emphasis. Some of the replacements were not car
ried forward directly into the battle when the Regt to which assigned
v'as recommitted,.but remained in a rear area long enough to have intro
ductiPn to their now unit. Only those who arrived just prior to recom
mitment of the unit were so treated. It is recommendod that enou;,:sh
matorials of a nature which can be used for a Replacement Orientation
-34
Program be carried "dth Div assault shippinG on amphibious operations.
Comments
It is believed that regular issues of "Fighting Facts" or like printJi
material should be distributed to service troops and artillery troops re--i.-
larly and that such materials be issued to Inf units only when they are
into reserve or rest periods.
It was found that a distribution of "Nel'lsmap" in double the normal
quantities would be beneficial during a campaign.
Sets of waterproofed maps of the active theater with blowups of the
particular area of the operation are desirable for use on-the sides of
trucks in service areas, CP areas, bivouac areas for situation dis
plays. It is suggested that azimuthal eqUidistant projections,
with diagramatic maps scales, and orthographic projections be
used for these maps.
The operation of the Information-Education office during this am
phibious operation was materially improved by transporting and landing
some personnel and equipment with elements of the command groups where
information from the Commander can be readily available. When the oper
ation assumes the aspects of land mass operation, an Information-Educa
tion office can operate satisfactorily from rear and service areas, or
from forward echelon CP's when adeQuate facilities are available for the
production of the Div newspaper. '.
3PECIAL SERVICE
Musical Entertainment
The Div Band presented numerous concerts on OKINAWA. Itsfirst
presentation was on 30 April before the 38lst Inf Regt, then in a rest
area. In aadition to its musical entertainment, the Band elso presents
dramatic skits which were very entertaining to all troops. A group of
four musicians (violinist, accordionist, guitarist and vocalist) who
call .themselves the "G. I. Gypsies", have serviced the hospitals where
the Div had patients. Their talent has brought them two written com- .
mennations by the Officers of field hospitals.
Total Band Concerts: 14
Total Performances for "G. I. Gypsies": 72
Hotion Pictures
pictures were shown almost daily from 15 April through the
conclusion of the operation. The 15 April movie, shown for the 38,3d
. Int, was the first movie shown on the island. This entertainment com
peted with sniper fire, air raids and cloudbursts for the attention of
the audiences. A portable motion picture unit complete with screen,
projector and amplifier was installed in a 2!-ton truck by two of the
Regts. This unit made small group movies practical near the !r.ont
lines. For each projector within the Div, the Special Service Office
was able to serve it with a different film each night. The following
-35
if a list of number of and total attendance f'or movies presented
this opuration:
M2!!ih
. Attendance
.
April
'1
66 38,000
May 125 ,; 75,000
June 117
. -6-:: 000
=' 1
Total J08 176,000'
The Div received its films from the Island Command 'Speciel Service Of.
fice. SUfficient films ,rere !!iac.e available but the newest films did
not receive a wide onoueh distribution. Most of the films shown within
the Div: over six months old. '
Readi!1g Matter
Pr.ior to shipping out from LEYTE, each TQM was providea with maga
zines anc. small :;ames for his troops on board his ship and on board ship,
ship's libraries were used to their fullest to supplement the need for
reacing mutter. Readint; rnateriGI obtained from ISCOf.4, the Red Cross and
from additicnal sources immediately distributed to the troops. Dur
ing the first rest period tV;"O 40'4 0ook J)C1rtable libraries were made avail
to the 38lst Inf. A similar 40-book library was set up at the 32lst
Bn's clearin0 station frnrn which their patients might obtain
reading matter. Small pAper-bound books were provided by ISCOM and the
ReG! Cross.
The need for seading is so greFt that each operation should
be supplied with twice the Jiormal issue of CBW ("Council Books for '!'Jar
fare", a kit of approximately 30 paper bound-books), and current maga
zines for the month that precedes tho mounting for tho operntion.
Athletics
Only sMell-unit athletics able to be carried on during the
oporation. Troops hove p}ayed volleY-ball and softball to some dEgree,
and volley-ba11 tournaments have been hold. in the Ipv?cr echelons.
Hiscelbneous 11ctivities
Post Exchanges were ostDbli2hed within all units of the Div prior
to the conclusicn of the operaticn. No beer r:ns cvallable, however.
The Special Sorvice Officer nnd the Red Cross Field Director to
zether established recreaticnnl centers in each Tnf Bn area when they
were pulle0 out of tha line for a rest period. Special reading p.nc.
recrentional Materials-wore provicec for these assault units.
RED CROSS i.CT NIT IES
- ;
Supplies totalling forty tons, pufficient for the first 30 days of
OKINAWA operations, were obtained on LEITE. ThroG to four tons of
emer50ncy supplies were combat loaded by each Combat Tenm. The balance
was combat loaded by Div HeaC:quorters. An assistant field director
-36-.,

sa ileG with an [lssault element of cf1ch combat tear.! and camc ashore on
oIaNA":'!. by "L" plus onc. The c!irector came in with Rear Echelon
of Div Headquarters anG assumed directicn of American Red Cross activi
ties in the Divisicnal Area at that time.
Coffee and Doughnuts Daily
In each cOMbat team the assigned assistant field director concen
trated his activities for the first 15 dcys on preparing and delivering
to Inf in the Mest fomare positions coffee ane. cl.ou:shnuts doily. SOrle
1000 to 1500 gallons uf hot coffee and 9000 to 15000 coughnuts daily
were delivered to all forvlard units gettinJ rations and water. After
15 days doughnut components were nc:' available and this activity
,reyerted entirely to each unit fs regular supply agencies.
A resupply of toilet articles, writinJ p::lper, books anc. other com
fort articles WGS nade to all units of the Div and attached troops
Red Cross supply dump at Div Heac.quarters. Tenth Army American .
Ree. Cross provic1.8c, much better resupply than was obtnined on LEYTE.
-:31- .

ESTIMATED
OF
OPE:RATION

bSTDlATED RESULT&...2.E OPERATIONS
Secured
It is difficult to determine nccurate1y the secured by the 96th
Inf Div during its operations on OKINAWA. The Div advanced'throueh the
southern p&rt of the is12nd, init i..cllly a10r.g the west coast, then in the
center, then Gonth along the east const, and fin3.11y in the center of the
island again with the 1st Marine Div on its right c:.nd the 7th Inf Div on
its left. The red c1rrows sbown on Map No.2, facing page 16 of Chapter VII,
cover generally thd portion of OKINhViA. secured by the 96th Inf Div and
indicate the direction of attack against each of the enOfil.ftS main defensive
positions.
A. more detailed ..nd 2.ccurate account of the area secured between
1 il.pril cmd 22 June 45, when all organized resistance ceased, may be ob
tained from tho successive study of Maps No.3, facing page 6; No.6,
facing page 18; No.9, facing pC.ge 30; No. 14, facing page 45; and No. 15,
facing pace 50; all in Chapter VII.
Enemy Casualties
A total of 31,763 J::'.ps were killed and an additional 476 POW captured
by the '96th Inf Div during the RYUKYUS Cempaign. In addition to the
512 Okinawan Labor Troops were captured. This is an average of nearly
Japs killed or taken prisonor for overy battle casualty of our own (Sec
Fig. 35), and an aver;'.ge of over 23 <Taps killed for overy American death.
Materinl Darrw.r,o to the Enemy
The following items of enemy equipment was either cnptured or destroye,
during the period from 1 j,pril to 30 June 1945:
ITEM DIV TOTAL rIEM DIV TOTAL
i.RTILLERY ANTI-TANK GUNS
70mm gun
75mm gun
6
26
37v.ITt
47mm
8
42
75mlL hvw
1.3
l05r.liu how 6
],;QRTriRS
150mm gun 18 32Qmn Spigot 2
150mm hoVi
9
90mm
3
5"CD gun
3
50rrm 1':17
81um 26
ANTI-.IRCR.,FT GUNS 70mm 1
75mrn DP 11
20run
13 AD.:MUNITION
88MM DP 1 S;:lal1 Arms 1::' tons
Mortar
5
tons
lL\CHINE GUNS .,\.rtil1ery
99
tons
Lewis type
4
Grenades
:3
tons
Heavy
87 Dynarnite 1 t.on
Light
379
Bombs 6 tons
-1
r
ITEM DIV TOTbL
ITEM
DIV TOT;.L
ORDN;"NCE SIGNhL
Trnctors
3
Radio 14
Tanks 16 Telephone 12
Trucks 114 Generators 10
Motorcycles 2 Transmitter 1
Prime Eovers 8
j.mbulance . 1 MISCELLANEOUS
hutomobile, staff c ~ r 1 RanGe finder 2
Tires 222
Gasolino & Oil 1483 drums
Dumps destroyed 25
Pack Saddles 20
Own Lassos
Our own battle losses during the operations were relatively high.
i. total of 701,0 battle casualties were suffered by thu throe Inf Regts,
or an averc.ge of 2347 casualties per Rogt. The avcrc.ge llresent for duty
strength of an Inf Regt dill'ing the 91-day operc.tion was )'434 officers
and men. 93.2% of the Div casualties were in the Inf (SC!0 Fig. 37). A
tabulation of nll the Div battle casualties (S00 Figs. 3u and 38) fol
lows:
Battle Casualties:
Killed 1,196
Woundod' 5,566
Injured 224
Missing 12
Died
, 296'
Total: 7,294

Non-Battle Casualties: 2,989

10,283
-2
32
3 1
3001
)0
<;)
28
?7
.
6
2.5
2.4
AMERICAN $. JAPANESE
'2 3
CASUALTIES
2
OKINAWA CAMPAIGN
I Fig.35
I
0,0'"
/
/
19
7
~
18
~ /
/
7
/ ~
/
16
17
J
IS
,
I
14
I
I
3
l
I
2.
I
I
I
"
II
0.00
11 ~
//
9
.,
V
~ .....r
8
/
/
7
/
V
6 /
Total No. ci JAPS KI.A.
~
c
/
~ ....
A
...... 11
~
S ./ /'
5
u V V
A
I
~
4
3
l.
/ ~ ITotal No. of AMERI( AN CO uoltie'
T
/ /
2
I
I /
E.
1/
/
.
. ~ s/
./
i/
~
V
DATE
7 14 21 5 1'2
3 J u t-I ~ o
19
3t.
763
7
I
~ /
1
I
I
I
J
I
!
I
I
I
!
I
II
/
L.---"'
l,...--""
-- --
17 14 31
A P RI L MAY
'.,....
WlA
5566
........,
"" ;... ....... ....
tNF

Casualties by type
Fig. 36
.. -
'\
Casualties by branch
Fig. 37
BATTLE LOSSES
-
OKll,JAI;;:" CALPJi.IGN
--- ----.- .---------------. I ---- ....--- -.. ..--..---'-.. ---or ---- --r--
I K I J\. I I 1\ .; I, A ; ,n .I._A t D OJ,! . TOTAL !
, Hq 96th Inf Div i "g I Eliaig El; I g!'Ig- ,
Hq C,) 96th Inf Jiv . 0 O! 0' 0 !0 I 3 l 0 i 0: 0 O! 01 0 I' 0 I O! 0 i 3
, Hq Tr ! 0 0 2 0 I o 2 i 0 I 0; 0 0 i OJ 0 O! OJ 0 4
I 96th Di-: D:mcl : 0 O! 0 0', 0' 1: o 0 0 O! 01 0 ,o! 0 0 1
;IP hut, 96th Div i 0 0 1 0 0 O! O. 0' 0 0: 0' 0 0 i oj 0 1 i'
796th Ord (LL) Co I 0 0 0 I0 I0 3 I O! o 0 0 i 0 0 0 i 0; 0 3 I
Ii.', 96th (;'1,; c;) 0 0 0 I 0 \. 0, 0 I 0; 0: 1 0
0
1' 0 J 0 0' 0 1
96th Si71D.1 Co I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 2 0 0 0 Oi 0 2
96th RCl1 '0 0 2 2 I 0' 9 i 0) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 O! 1 14
321st En:;r Bn 1 0 e Z o. 14 i 0 I 0 4 0 0 0 0 01 0 29 i
321st ',cd Bn 0 0 3 2 o! 14 \ o! 0 2 0 O! 0 0 2 23 I oj
Hq & fig, BtrJ Div ;I.rty 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 I 1 I 01 0 0 0 0 0 0, 0 0 1
361st Fil. Bn 3 0 I, 3 I 2 i 0; 30 j o 0 1 0 0 0 0 0/' 5 44
362d FA Bn 0 0 9 I 6 : o! 17 ! 0 I 0 2! 0, 0 0 1 0 3 38
921st FA Dn 2 0 3 I 6! 0 36 I 1)' 0: 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 2 50
363cl Bn 3 1 3 jl 1 0 24 0 4 0/ 0 0 I 0 0 0 36 1\
381st Inf:mtry 17 0 307 63 0: 1493 ! 1 ') 0, 113 I 0 2 I 2 01 74 2072
382d 26 1 I 353 IS5d' 0 11819 i 4 0; 89 0 0; 1 4 I n 101
3G)d Il1f-:ntry 23 1!24 0 ' lr124 0 _ 0' () ! () n, 9 7;) 73 2}!85
TOTI.LS :;292 '{61 4----4
- -

CHAPT[R-XI
C{:)f\/l ME-NTS
Aim
RECOMME:NDA I IONS
OF' 7I-S
DIVISION
COMMANDER
PERS::NNEL, G-l
Replacements
It is recommended that units entering combat be authorized an
initial 10% overstrength, especiall:;r in Inf and lIedical branches, to be
assigned to the unit prior to its combat loading to cover initial battle
losses. A 2% overstrength ,'[ould cover officers and enlisted men left
behind in base echelon, on DS and TD. This overstrength could be util
ized by and shore party installations until needed in the line,
or orGanized into a special replacement Bn to patrol and mop-up in Div
rear areas. /\. constant floi'r of replaceuent.s should be assured.
Officer replace!i1ents should be assigned to tactical units of their
appropriate branch and train 1vith them prior to assignment to
actually in combat. This assienment to a tactical unit would orient
and familiarize the officers ",ith basic cOTillIland problems. Officers re
cently converted to Inf without this e:;c;:perience are unsatisfactory for
immediate combat and suffer hoavy casualties.
Replac8I.1onts assigned to a Div during cOl:Jbat should include a
hif,her percentage of Department li:edical detachments
VV83:'e habitually understrenzth th..rou[3hout the campaign and Tnf-trained
replacements wore necessarj.ly assigned to liedical detachr;mts during
the combat phase. This was done despite tlw fact that the Div was never
up to T/O in Inf strength.
A pro rata p8!'centace of cA,;)crienced squad and platoon non-commis
sioned officers is desired among rcplacements.
Tho practice of throwin6 a great number of green replacements into
battle at one time, as was necessary during this operation, resulted in
many early c[;sualties anonr, these men. To overcome this difficulty it
is recomncmd.ed tha.t a replac8nent pool be established and that they
deliver or availa.ble replaccneClts to combat units on a daily basis.
This small number of replacements be easily absorbed as losses
were incurrocl and the replacements could be better trained in combat
problems by battle-experienced personnel.
Evacuation neports
00n.J.e s tens should be t;;J:en to elirainate delay between actual loss
of persoll!1el to the unit and recei")t of evacuation notice. Delays of
2 to vreelm in receipt of notice that a man had been evacuated were
not uncommon on OKDJAWA. The excess lapse of time between hospitaliza
tion of casualties a'1Q receipt of transfer orders caused an unnecessary
delay in the promotion of rorthy officors and enlisted men.
Promotions
Battlefio1d COinmissions provided the best officers. The process
of cOJllr.1issionir,g then sho1Lld be expedited.
-1
Standardized G-l forms are desirable. Each higher headquarters this
Div has served under has required a slightly different form. The forms are
basically the same, but are not interchangeably acceptable.
Officer Reclassification
A more streamlined reclassification procedure should be set up to
1
handle cases of officers iTho fail in combat and, necossarily, are moved
to rear areas with duties of little or no importance. Officers who are
performing satisfactorily in cOllib,1.t know of the safety and easo of such
new duty and their norale is consequently lowered. For example., a 2d Lt
was relieved on 9 nov LEITE, and no decision as to disposition was re
ceivcd until 11 June 45 on OKDJATTA. A Dn CO was relieved from command on
9 April 45. He lTaS placed on TD with Hq Commandant that date, anc. remained
on Div rolls without a primary duty until 3 July 45.
Death Notification
In many instances over five .reeks elapsed from the date a man was ldll:i..
in action and the notification by the War Department of his death. This

should be expedited.
Awards and Decorations
It is felt that a more cxpeditiNtS processing of awards and decorations
forwarded to higher headquarters for approval is desired. Every effort to
present combat awards durinz the ongager:lent VTas made by this Div. An ample
supply of meclals should be assured. Awarding the same nedal, Bronze Star,
for both heroic action and neritorious service is not satisfactory.
Physically Unfit
Personnel found physically unfit for full combat duty should not be
returned to conbat Divs for processinG but nhould be processed t:lrough
Eedical channels. Uounded should not be returned until they are fit for
fall combat duty.
Combat Fatigue
Combat fatigue cases can 11e reduced in nU1:J.ber if they are largely
hancUed by command channels. Often a talk by the commander or a short rest
,nIl save the man. It is contagious an'd will spread rapidly 1illless promptly
checked. The best corama.'1ders have the fewest cases.
Postal Service
A more expeditious supply of papers, parcel post and from home
is desired. Parcels were received on OKII;nJA after a transit period of from
six to eight months. First-class mail service yras excellent and beneficial
to morale.
ll-JTBLLIGEHCE, G-2
Screening Civilians
The attachment of tllO interpreters perLlanently to the eIC -,'lOuld greatly
facilitate their "lOrk in screening civilians.
-2
i
JICPOA Teams operate a point too far in the rear. The collect
ing teams should operate out of a Div Headquarters or from a11 establish
ment of thoir own set up the same distance fron the front as the Div
Headquarters.
Division Heeds Pictures
DurinG operaticn the Photo Assignment attached to the
Division did excellent work in tal:ine pictures. Hoyrever" since the pic
tures were sent back to POA to be developed and printed, the Div did
not have the opportunity to use the pictures. Either facilities should
be set up on the tarGet to develop and print the pictures taken or one
print of each picture should 'oe sent to the Div for its use.
Public Relations
It is necossary, in fact ordered, that a Div have a Public Relations
Section. One should be authcrized by T/O.
OPEHATIONS, G-3
Coordination of Supporting Fires
Coordination of air artillcr"J and naval GtUlfire 1AfaS effec
ted by the Div Artillery officer, v{he Gave approval to all strikes. l'Then
an air TraG sot up Rnd re3.(l.y to in, the Div Artillery Hq 1ms
informed ancl the artillury Bns firinG in this sector were
notified together with Haval Gunfire. All batteries and oPts posted
sentries nhose duty it vras to 'Vmtch for planes in their zone of fire.
Very seldom was all the artillery and naval GtUlfire in the Div zone
requireu to cease firinG_ This nethod of coordination does away with
one of the chief disadvantaceo of t::cuse of support aircraftj that is,
restriction of artillery and naval Gunfire over a large area.
Air
The close air support received by the Div this was
superior thrOUGhout. In many cases a ground officer was permitted to
ride with the strike groups to aid in identifying and narking obscure
targets. On the coral-studded terrain and against the fortified caves
and positions found on the lOO-pound GP bomb is ineffective.
bombs in quantity and 1000-pound and 2000-pound bombs
could have been More effectively eml11oyccl. Napalm is perhaps most effec
tive in burninG the eneI!:y out of dug-in positior). s and the foliage
used for camo'.lfl2.ge; however, this bOMb requires priorities that neces
sitate 24-hour adv8...'1ce notice. Also this bomb, when enployed, is the
most effective and should be used in large quantities. S".pply by air
was effectively used.
Ioiarldng Air Targets
It was found in this operation that white phosphorus smoke was not
.the aost effective Eleans of desir,nClting targets for supporting aircraft.
l7hito smolce is the color to spot from tho air through dust and
haze and cannot be from other white snoke on the battle
-J
,4
field and is frequently used by the Japs to confuse the target area. It is
recommended that a colored smoke, available to both mortars and artillery,
be used to desiVlatc targets to support air. Purple and green are desira
ble colors from the standpoint of the air. Since red smoke grenades arc
used as a sisnal to call off an air strike, red smoke should not be employed
to desienate targets.
Naval Gunfire
Naval Gunfire during the OKTIJAVTA canpaign ca'1 be rated as superior.
This was due to the close cooperation of the Navy, Inf and Artillery. The
employment of main batteries on deep targets, supply points and important
roads have been of definite advantage in support of the Ini. Each Regt
in the line could always effectively use one ship, ~ n d Div Artillery was
always able to find targets for an additional firing ship. Night illumin
ation and harassing missions were fired during hours of darlmess.
lIore attention should be given by authorities making assignment of
support ships to suitable stations so thctt the most desirable line of fire
to probable target areas nay be obtained. Best shell for destruction of
caves was the 6" high capacity vath base detonating fuze.
The Div should be consulted in the preparation of the L-Day bombard
ment schedule and be pcrrai tted to make recommendations for changes or
additional fires.
Artillery
Lluch time and nany rounds of artillery amr.1unition w"ere expended in the
effort to close caves and lmock out enem:r strongpoints vd. th indirect artil
lery fire. This indirect fire, even I'd.th preciSion methods, is unsatis
factory for destroyLng caves. Time and anmunition would have been saved
had there been self-propelled artillery of a meditun or heavy caliber which
could have been moved forward to mock out caves and strongpoints with
direct fire. In some instances lSSrmn guns were used for this purpose,
but because of its lack of mobility, this gun was not very satisfactory. ~
Artillery fires close to the boundary between Divs or in t;-.8 zone of
adjacent D:.ti:s require considerable coordination. To facilitate this
coordination Artillery Liaison officers were exchanged with the adjacent
Div Artillery Hq, and it was the mission of these Liaison Officers to
arrange or coorc1inatesupporting fires along tho boundary. The H-S tractor,
used as a prime mover and a::nnunition vehicle, again proved indispensable.
Except forprovidinz a l2-volt vehicle for radios, the 11-29c Cargo Carrier
(Weasel) '-laS of little use. .
The cub plane ras frequently used to adjust artillery on an area prior
to an air strike. The area was them marked with WP to guide in the support
ing aircraft. On many occasions Cub planes "would observe and correct an
air strike v,hile it was actually 30ing on by calling the artillery liaison
radio at the Inf Regtl CP or OPe There the air liaison officer relayed
the information to aircraft in the air. Cub planes vrere valuable in adjust
ing mortar fire.
It was often found necessary that positive action be t a l ~ e n by Inf
Commanders during close-in preparation fires to l:oep men from bunching and
-4
to keep them in Short rounds do and it is not only
inadvisable but often impossible to stop a preparation t.o check on short
rounds.
Artillory of the Div was in constant action through the campaign
Yd. th no relief. To accornplish this and to provide the necessary secur
ity against infiltrators, a 20% increase in personnel is desirable.
Tanks
During this opel"'().tion medium tanks y;ere found to be the JOOst useful
available weapon in destroying caves and dug-in enemy installations. It
was found that the best Iaethod of reducing the enemy's extensive cave
pillbox defensive system. was the combined usc of closely coordinated
tank and Inf units. It was f01md necessary to have covering Inf a short
distance behind the t2.nks for the latter's protection during advances
into eneT\V territory.
iJorking in the close, hilly terrain of OKllJAWA, it was found time
could be saved by havinG a ta'1k dozer go forrrard in the morning with each
Tank Co to help the tanks th.rough defiles, cuts and over difficult slopes.
Every effort should be made to recover da.r.laged or bogged dOllm tanks the
day of the accident as the Japs nill invariably send out suicide patrols
with satchel charges to destroy the cripples at night.
It uas found the best method of operation for the Tank Bi1 was to
have one Co in reserve at all times. Also one platoon of each Co com
mi t ted vras held LT1 res erve for eI'1/:rgencies. Tanks cannot brealc off a
fight at an:
r
set time. They :frequently fi;sht lmtil dark and leave
ea:cly in the morning to be in position for the TIinute plans for
servicing and maintaininG these ta'1KS close to the front lines must be
Iaado and constantly revised to keep the tanks in oporatton at the time
and place needed.
It is recor:nnended tha.t one :nediura tcmk flame-throuer Co be attached
to t:le medium tank r:l sufficiently prior to embarkation for an operation
to p errni t detailed and coordinated trB.inine between these two 1ll1i ts and
the supporting L'1f. medium. tank Bns per Div are desirable in attack
inG positions such as were f0lll1d on OKUJAYfA.
Lop-Up Activities
,lap-up activities should be delegated to reserve units allowing
front-linG troops to continue the advance. However, while fiGhting the
Japs on OEIHAfvA, all ground within the .assicnod zone often had to be
thorOUGhly cleaned out by the assault units to avoid being fired on from
the rear ,1hen further advances were attumpted. After each hill or ridge
line ,ras talcen, there rer:lained the task of destro:Jring the large
force of Japs remaining in the underGround cave system vd.thin the hill.
It was necessary to reduce a.ll caves before advances to the next
objective could be made. In every case when assault units attempted an
advance to the next objective before the reverse slopes of the hill taken
preViously had beon cleaned out, would come under oneny fire from
both tho reverse slopes of the hill the-;;r had just tal(en and the forward
slopos of the hill they vrere assaulting, causing excessive casualties.
Often it vras more clifficult to advance d01ID the reverse slope than it was
to take the i'orrrard slope.
-5

Time of At,\:-ack
attacks should be either made at dawn or else not earlier than
two hours after The morning meal was often the only hot meal
that the troops were able to obtain. was carried on throughout
the day and darlcness often settled before the troops had a rest from pre
paring each nieht's defensive positions. Therefore, as a general rule, a
sufficient time should be allotted between daylight and the twe of attack
to allow a man to check his equipment, prepare a hot meal, and relieve
himself before his day's work. The advance should cease at least one hour
before dark in order for an adequate night defense to be established.
Relief of Assault Troops
Except in case of extreme emergency, troops should not be kept in
the front lines fighting in excess of two weeks. Vihen fighting the Jap
it is necessary to be as alert at nieht as during the day. Gradually
the troops become worn down and exhausted. This condition coupled with
accumulated losses and the strain of being under constant enemy shellfire
caused a physical and mental fatigue much greatly reduced the effective
ness of the organization. Daylight reliefs were found to be better than
night reliefs. On the day a relief is made, all advances should cease.
Pressure must be maintained by fire.
Attack of Fortified Ridges
lVhenever possible, fortified ridges should be attacked loneitudinally
even if it involves moving through an adjacGnt zone. In this manner, both
sides of the ridge are under assault at the same time. It vras found that
in this mannor the enoTIPJ could not make usc of his extensively prepared
reverse slope defenses, and his mortars vmuld come under our observation.
A t the same time a maximum amount of fire could be delivered on the enemy
and a minimum amount of fire could be directed at our attacking troops.
If parallel ridges are encDuntered, they should be attacked simultaneously.
Destroying Caves
Cave positions such as encountered on manAWA cannot be knocked out
by field artillery or air bombing. Often they cannot be neutralized. It
is necessary to reduce them by direct fire weapons, tanks and flame
throwers, and assaulting Infantry. E-18's should replace 57's in AT
COIS. Recoilless weapons should be added as extra weapons.
Time, usually 3 or 4 days, is necessary to soften up such positions
before they are by Infantry. Such a procedure will save time
in the long run and save casualties.
The entire front must be attacked sir.lultaneously. Higher Headquar
ters must insure that this is done. Coordination is much better than
cooperation.
Night Attacks Feasible
Carefully planned, lirnited objective night attacks are feasible.
Huch resistance "d.ll be by-passed. Reserve units must advance at da",m
to mop up.
-
--
Infantry and Tank assault teams are most effective in attacking cave
positions. They must be trained together to be fully effective.
All Infantry must be trained in clearing mine fields and booby
traps. Special training should be given to one squad per Co, the A &P
platoons, AT units and the Engineers. Jap mines may be found anywhere,
be of any type, and are usually vnthout pattern.
Usually the Jap cannot be maneuvered out of position. He must be
exterminated upon it and plans for this must be made. The fires of the
converging attackers must be carefully coordinated.
Enemy Attacks
Jap attacks or counterattacks are easily repulsed by alert troops.
They should be welcomed day or night. They may be repeated several
times. Infiltrators and suicide squads are a nuisance but are not
effective. An all-round defcmse consisting of mutually supporting,
strongpoints sholud be established at night. Defensive fires should be
shot in before dark. A tight perimeter is not necessary or effective
unless fighting in the jungle.
I
4.2" Chemical Hortars
The 4.2
11
Chemical Mortar units attached to the Div during the oper
ntion provided superior support and their fire was most effective in
neutralizing enemy positions located along the reverse slopos of key
terrain features. It is recommended that a Chemical Hortar Bn be
routinely attached to an Inf Div. This attachment should be made suf- J
ficiently prior to an Op'Jl'o,tion to permit adequate training with the Div.l
Close-support fire, to be effoctive, must be delivered in sufficient
volume to permit proper target coverage.
Communication
A Div voice command net, utilizing SCR-300'radios and linking all
three Regtl Commanders, the Div Control Officer, the advance Div CP
ashore and the Div CP afloat, proved to be the answer to the problem of
securing prompt reports from Regts ashore during the
ment and initial stage of tho operation before wire communication can
be established. The SCR-300 radio is capable of continuous operation
and can be hand-carried ashore regardless of beach conditions. In con
trast, tho SCR-l93 cannot go ashore until vehicles can be unloaded, and
even then it is difficult t.) keep near the front where it would draw
considerable fire. The SCR-284, while portable, places a tremendous
weight load on the radio team and, in addition, is not capable of con
tinuous operation on the mOVG. The SCR-300 net was flooded at times,
and two channels are needed to handle traffic with the greatest speed.
Friendly radio interference was seyere, especially vvi th the FM
radios (SCR-300, 500 and 600 series). This was due to excellent radio
conditions encountered on OKINAWA, and the large number of frequency
duplications necessary ,vith the troops present. It is bnlieved, hOlVuver,
that an improvement ..muld rosu..lt if all SCR-300 frequencies were allotted
to each Div. Adjacent Signal Officers could then adjust assignments to
-7
eliminate or reduce local interference between units.
War Dpgs
War dogs were of no value for scouting purposes, as the number of
civilians and American personnel in However, the "'81'
dogs did excellent work :in guarding Quartermaster supplies and civilian
enclosures. It is not believed that their attachment to a Div is
necessary.
SUPPLY, G-4
In this operation, the Shore Party was relieved by the Division
Supply Services of the establishment and operation of initial Beach
This innovation proved sound both in expediting the flow of
material across the beaches and in the initial issues to the troops.
There is no substitute for personal reconnaissance. 'The early
reconnaissance of made by the AC of S, G-4, together with Chiefs
of S.upply Branches enabled all branches to function immediately upon
landing and materially reduced the time spent in preparing beaches to
accept cargo. All Div supply personnel were callod ashore by Ht240 and
established in their respective dump areas before unloading of any cargo
began, '
Rations
Once again the assault rations (candy) proved of little value to
the troops. The lO-in-l and C rations were entirely satisfactory during
the initial phases of the assault landing; however, the 10-in-l ration
could be raaterially improved by the addition of fruit juices and by in
creases in the coffee, cream and sugar components. A canned bread similar
to Boston Brawn Bread should be substituted on one of the menus in place
of crackers. During the rest periods when troops are out of the line
and where kitchens have become established, tho B ration, which is then
issued, is unsatisfactory. Vlhile this ration is no doubt nutritionally
sufficient, it lacks variety and soon becomes unpalatable and
monotonous. All Rugtl s-4
l
s stress the need for supplementing the
coffee and bread components with increased allowances of lord, flour,
salt, baking po'wdel:', powdered milk and yoast.
Beor
During periods of rest or after conbat, beer should be
given a higher priority of unloading. Morale would be raised consider
ably, particularly anong battle-\Veary cioughboys, if beer was available
to i3sue to nen innediately upon their release front lines, Ice
. End ice cream are a necessity in tropical clinates.
,
Clothing
The conbat boot, used for the first tine in this operation, has
proved very successful, especially in rough and muddy terrain, and the
eliOination of leggings is highly desirable. A lighter weight HBT ,
unifOrtl for tropical and seni-tropioal cliJ'late is strongly "
-8
./

The breakdovJIl ratio in tariff sizes of fatigues should be revised to ,.,
include nore size 30, 32 mId 34 and less of size 38, 40 and 42. The
<rotton khaki clothing should not be carried into an operation by any
Div or subordinate unit. Excessive wastage results from prolonged
storage in duffle bags or Div stocks during the combat phase. Due to
rapid deterioration of protective clothing, it has not proved practical
for tho Div to steck and carry this item. It is recor.Jr.1ended that this
i ten be made available from base depots.
Equipping Replacements
Contrary to past experience, replaceJ:J.ents and personnel returning
froT.l hospitals were equipped excellently when received by this Div. In
r.lany cases they vmre too Yf81l equipped or were equipped with non':'essen
tial itens, and it was necessary to strip them of some of this additional
burden before they were sent forvrard to join assault units.
T ~ / p 8 i " r r i ter Repair
This Divan LEYTE and OKlNAW'A has naintained a typewriter repair
section ruld has been able to maintain tho typewriters of theDiv quite
satisfactorily. How'ever, no actual basis of issue exists for repair
parts, and special authorization for the drawing of such parts would
natorially assist this repair work.
Ordnance Maintenance
An ordnance neclium maintenance Co should replnce tho ordnance light
naintenance Co non assigned to an Inf Div. Since tho organization of the
ordnance light nnintunanco Co in tho Div under T/O &E 9-8, considerably
more arr,l8.Dent and conbnt vehicular equipnent has been added to the
organic Div equipnent, not to mention the additional units normalq
attached for anphibious operations. Following are sone of the nore
inportant additions: .
18 105m] Hovri tzer Motor Carriages I.. M-7
36 76J:1n Gun Hotor Carriages, M-ltl
52 HiGh Speed Tractors, M-5
100 Cargo Carriers, M-29C
Also, for a period of one year a medium tank Bn has been attached to this
Div.
It has been the exp(;l'ience of the Div that hiGher 'echelons of nain
tenance arc always overburdened durine an operation. Evacuation of
vehicles ruld heavy arnanent to these already crowded facilities results
in equipment being deadlined for long periods of tine, which is not at
all practical while an operation is in progress.
Due to the addition of tank-like vehicles to the Inf Regts" it is
also reconnended that each Regt be authorized one Heavy Wrecker, lD.Al.
At the present tine a Regt has no wrecker except the 2-1/2 ton truck
with a superstructure nounted thereon. This is entirely inadequate for
handling"vehicles such as the U-7 Hotor Carriage or the H-18 Motor
Carriage.
-9
------
,
Chemical SupplY'
It is recommended that CWS Class V supplies, other than flame-thrower
fuel, be handled through ordnance ammunition channels to facilitate its
procurement by assault units.
Smokeless Powder
The Japanese have a distinct defensive advantage over American troops
because of their use of smokeless powder. Snipers, machine guns, and even
large caliber weapons are very difficult to locate and oftan take a heavy
toll of American casualties before these weapons can finally be spotted
and knocked out. On the other hand, our weapons can easily be spotted
and immediately draw enemy fire, unless the firing positions are changed
frequently
Engineer Equipment
The Engineer equipment provided for this operation proved to be ade
quate for the large road building task which was so necessary on OKINAWA.
As a result of this operation, however, it is believed that each Engineer
Co should have a minimum of 2 Hyster Winches on either D-? or D-8 dozers,
and one motorized road grader. The number of power shovels issued to
the Bn proved to be in excess of needs, although most of them could be
used as cranes during staging operations. More spare parts for Engineer
equipment should be furnished and carried on assault shippir.g because
"deadlines
ll
due to lack of spare parts were tQl) frequent.
More Personne 1 Needed
Excess engineer equipment waS available and readily used during
this operation but no T/0 provision was mad.e for additional operators and
maintenance personnel to handle this equipment. A minimum of 2 operators
for each piece of Engineer equipment in the Engineer Bn, and s'll'ficient
maintenance personnel to caro for the maintenance of this equipment and
the Engineer equipment of other units with or attached to the Div is
absolutely necessary. The Div approached these requirements as nearly
BS possible by making some increases in maintenance personnel, but even
additional increases in personnel proved necessary. The following table
indicates the maintenance personnel requirements needed:
PER- PER
JOB TITLE SSN Tlo
SONNEL SONNEL SHORT
ADDED
Co Motor Sergeant 31.3 1 1 1 0
OPerator, Air Compressor . 081 1 1
2 1
Supply, Auto Parts
348
1
3 .3
0
Bn Motor Sergeant 813 1 1 1 0
Mechanic, Tractor 319 1
5
10 5
Sheetmetal Worker 201 1 0 1 1
Welder 256
2
3 4
1
Blacksmith
024 1 1 1 0
Electrician 078 1 0 1 1
Machinist
114 I
.3 .3
0
Auto 214

6 8
2
-10
I
\

<3 .
One additional lettered Co should be added to the Engineer Bn. The
present Bn satisfactorily support assault elements and at the same
time maintain the_roads to the rear.
Water Supply
Six portable water supply units and one mobile unit proved adequate
for all Divisional supply needs. It is recommended that all units within
the Div be provided with water trucks or trailers. The practice of dis
pensing water into five-gallon cans is unsatisfactory due to the result
ing traffic congestion around the water points. One 250-gallon water
trailer for each Co and at least one 1,000 gallon water truck for each
Regt would be desirable.
The gasoline cans substituted for water cans to carry processed
water for the assault proved to be entirely unsatisfactory. The combin
ation of residual preservative oil and rusting of the inner surfaces of
these gasoline cans rendered the water they carried unpaIntable. Proper
water containers in adequate quantities must be provided to handle
processed water for the assault landing.
Signal Equipment
This Div embarked short many items of signal supply, particularly
in wire and spare parts. Only the bare TIE of iV-110 wire V'as ava ilable
upon loading at LEYTE and no except that ,,[hich was issued on reel
equipment on CE-ll. The supply of field wire became critical by 9 April
(Lt8) and minimum wire communication waS kept operating only by borrow
ing v:ire from Corps and Army. Signal spare parts have never been ade
quate.Availability has never even approached the figures shown in
Signal catalogs SIG-7 and SIn-8 for second and third echelon maintenance.
EarlY in tho cnmpaign Tenth repair units did an excellent job of
handling overflow of repair Vi"ork, but their supply of spare parts soon
exhausted. As a result too much signal equipment deadlined
due to lack of SPare parts. Recreational radio eqUipment, such as the
R-lOO, ,1ere issued to the Div without any spare parts supply; and
sinco those sets are not as durable os tactical equipment, even more
spare parts and mnintenance is necessary.
Medical
'It was found during this operation that 3 litter squads were
entirely inadequate to handle the work of an Inf Bn medical section.
Casualties normally sustained by these litter squads constantly kept
their operating strength below the Tlo and this fact further reduced
their effectiveness and increased the need for additional personnel.
It was found necossary in all cases to augment the personnel of the Bn
medical sections from personnel of the Regtl medical detachment and
there'by provide a 4th litter squad for the Inf Bn. Two of the Inf
Regts modified the T/o of their medical detachment to include only 2
clerks, a supply sergeant, a detachment, first sergeant and an aid man
to service the Regtl special troops. The remaining men ',vere used to
reinforce the Bn
,J
Serum, albumen was procured from the Navy and was a definite asset
particularly during the assault. It is more compact than plasma, a
-11
I
i
larger quantity may be carried, and much time is conserved in its admin
istration .. It is further recommended that standard plasma unit be
increased from 300 cc's to 500 cc's.
m spite of many flies, fleas, and other insects, the use of DDT \
and ordinary rules of sanitation kept sickness to a ainimum. An ade- \
qUate water supply enabled proper washing of mess equipment. There \
were a few cases of dysentery and upset stomach. Planes spraying the
area with DDT powder materially reduced the number of insects.
Shipping
Shipping was inadequate to transport all TIE equipment, additional
items authorized, and the supplies ordered to be taken. Only that which
will be needed during the first five should be carried in assault
/
/
I
shipping. All TIE transportation is needed.
/
/
tr
e
Periodic Reports
Periodic reports from all staff sections should cover the same period,
preferably from 2000 to 2000. Much duplication exists in the reports of
G-l, G-4 and the various special staff sections. This can and should be
eliminated.
A Div daily paper published by the I & E Section was foune' most
desirable. Sufficient personnel should be provided by Tlo to publish
the same.
Publicity
Publicity has a great effect on morale. The Army was far behind the
Navy and the Marines. This tends to cause a friction between the services
which should not exist. This applies particularly to official and e
official releases. Releases by civilian correspondents usually fair
to the Army but genorally appeared later than other releases.
All units must provide their own security. Dawn and dusk patrols
around their positions are a necessity. All personnel, including medical,
must be trained in scouting and patrolling, and in the use of their
weapons.

. J. L. BRADLEY,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commnndlng
..12
lJISTRIBUTION LIST
ARMY UNITS
DIVIS ION UNITS
AG, Washington, D.C.
CG
1
USAFP 1 CG Div Arty 5
HUSAFPOA 2 cis
1
Ai...
1 G-l
1
2 G-2
1
1 G-3
1
1 G-4
1
at D*"
. :, ,,'.... , .

tnt

... ')'# 1 AG File 5 t " ,;.
: t, .,"'"

1
ItJtJ.
1 PRO
APO 331 1 co RCT 381 4
CO RCT 382 4
SCHOOLS CO RCT 383 4
CO Sp Tr
1
ANSCOL 1 Ho Co, 96th Div
1
C&GS School 1 796th Ord Co
1
Naval War College 1 96th QM CO
1
The Inf School 1 96th Sig Co
1
1
The FA School 1 96th Rcn Tr
The Armored 1 32lst Ensr Bn
1
Com Phib Tra Pac 1 32lst Med Bn
1
593d JASCO
1
NAVY r.UiRINE UNITS l122d Engr Gp
1
(
e
485th AAA Bn
1
CinCPOA 1 504th AAA Bn
1
,
ComPhibPac (CTF 51) 1 763d Tr.nk Bn
1
ComPhibGp 12 (CTF 55) 1 728th Amph Tree Bn
1
ComTransRon 14 (CTG 55.2) 1 788th Amph Trae Bn
1
CG III Phib Corps 1 780th Amph Tank Bn
1
CG 1st Mar Div 1 88th CmI Wpns Bn
1
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