The International Financial System
The International Financial System
The International Financial System
The International
Financial System
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-2
Exchange Market Intervention
Unsterilized:
Fed sells $1 billion of $, buys $1 billion of foreign assets
Federal Reserve
Assets Liabilities
Foreign assets + $1 b Currency or reserves + $1 b
(international reserves) (monetary base)
Results:
1. International reserves, +$1 billion
2. Monetary base, + $1 billion
3. Then analysis in Fig 1, E
t
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-3
Exchange Market Intervention
Sterilized:
To reduce MB back to old level, Fed sells $1 billion of
government bonds
Federal Reserve
Assets Liabilities
Foreign assets + $1 b Currency or reserves
$0 b
(international reserves) (monetary base)
Government bonds $1 b
Results
1. International reserves, +$1 billion
2. Monetary base unchanged
3. E
t
unchanged: no shift in R
D
and R
F
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-4
Exchange Rate Intervention, Sell $
1. Sell $, buy F: MB , M
s
2. M
s
, P , E
e
t+1
,
expected appreciation of
F , R
F
shifts right in Fig.
1
3. M
s
, i
D
, R
D
shifts left,
go to point 2 and E
t
4. In long run, i
D
returns to
old level, R
D
shifts back,
go to point 3: Exchange
rate overshooting
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-5
The Gold Standard
Currency convertible into gold at fixed value
Example of how it worked:
U.S.: $20 converted into 1 ounce
U.K.: 4 converted into 1 ounce
Par value of 1 = $5.00
If to $5.25, importer of 100 of tweed has two
alternatives:
1. Pay $525
2. Buy $500 gold (500/20 = 25 ounces), ship to
U.K., convert into 100 (= 25 4) and buy tweed
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-6
The Gold Standard
If shipping cheap, do alternative 2
1. Gold flows to U.K.
2. MB in U.K, MB in U.S.
3. Price level U.K., U.S.
4. depreciates back to par
Two Problems:
1. Country on gold standard loses control of M
s
2. World inflation determined by gold production
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-7
Fixed Exchange Rate Systems
Bretton Woods
1. Fixed exchange rates
2. Other central banks keep exchange rates fixed to $: $ is
reserve currency
3. $ convertible into gold for central banks only ($35 per ounce)
4. International Monetary Fund (IMF) sets rules and provides
loans to deficit countries
5. World Bank makes loans to developing countries
European Monetary System
1. Value of currency not allowed outside snake
2. New currency unit: ECU
3. Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
Key weakness of fixed rate system
Asymmetry: pressure on deficit countries losing international
reserves to M, but no pressure on surplus countries to M
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-8
Intervention in a Fixed Exchange
Rate System
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-9
Analysis of Figure 2: Intervention
in a Fixed Exchange Rate System
Since E
e
t+1
= E
par
with fixed exchange rate, R
F
doesnt shift
Overvalued exchange rate (panel a)
1. Central bank sells international reserves to buy domestic
currency
2. MB , M
s
, i
D
, R
D
to right to get to point 2
3. If dont do this, have to devalue
Undervalued exchange rate (panel b)
1. Central bank sells domestic currency and buys international
reserves
2. MB , M
s
, i
D
, R
D
to left to get to point 2
3. If dont do this, have to revalue
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-10
Exchange Rate Crisis
1. At E
par
, R
2
F
right of R
D
because
Bundesbank tight money keeps
German interest rates high
2. Bank of England could buy , i
D
, R
D
shifts right
3. When speculators expect
devaluation, E
e
t+1
, R
F
shifts
right
4. Requires much bigger
intervention by UK
5. When UK pulls out of ERM,
10%, big losses to central bank
20-11
International Financial
Architecture
Capital Controls
1. Controls on outflows unlikely to work
2. Controls on inflows may prevent lending boom
and financial crisis, but cause distortions
Role of IMF
1. There is a need for international lender of last
resort (ILLR) and IMF has played this role
2. ILLR creates moral hazard problem
3. IMF needs to limit moral hazard
Lend only to countries with good bank
supervision
4. Need to do ILLR role fast and infrequently
2006 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved
20-12
Monetary Policy:
International Considerations
1. Direct effects of FX market
When intervene, MB changes
2. Balance of payments considerations
When B of P is in deficit need M
s
3. Exchange rate considerations
When want lower E, need M
s