Asean Integration:: Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework
Asean Integration:: Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework
Asean Integration:: Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework Its Binding Agreements and Legal Framework
INTEGRATION:
ITS BINDING AGREEMENTS AND
LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
By:
1. Principal Agreements
These are legally binding agreements and may come under different names.
Treaty and convention are common. Intent to be bound is clearly stated in the
document
2. Supplementary Protocols
These are designed to further the objectives of existing agreements and are
legally binding.
To understand fully the meaning of ASEAN bodies and agreements, the following
abbreviations are fully interpreted as follows:
DAC
TAC
CEPT
DSM
AEC
ASC
ASCC
TABLE I
TYPES AND NUMBER OF ASEAN AGREEMENTS
WITH BINDING OBLIGATIONS
(1967-2007)
TYPESOFAGREEMENTS
NUMBER
Principal Agreements
54
Supplementary Protocols
24
Amending Protocols
21
TOTAL
99
TABLE II
ASEAN AGREEMENTS BY DECADE
1967-2007
PRINCIPAL
AGREEMENTS
AGREEMENTS
AMENDING
PROTOCOLS
1960s
1970s
1980s
21
1990s
14
29
2000s
20
13
38
TOTAL
54
24
21
99
PERIOD
SUPPLEMENTARY
TOTAL
In the 70s, a total of only 8 agreements were signed when Saigon was overrun
by Communist Military Forces in April, 1975, a compelling reason to deepen
integration arose. This gave rise to the 1976 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Those (3)
agreements were signed in the Summit: (1) The Declaration of ASEAN Concord
(DAC) which primarily addressed economic issues; (2) The Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation (TAC) focused on security matters and policy, and was more binding. It
was a reiteration of the principles of non-aggression renouncing the threat or use of
force, pacific settlement of disputes, and non-interferences. TAC also created a High
Council composed of a minister from each state to settle disputes; (3) The
Agreement Establishing the ASEAN Secretariat which was designed to provide an
organizational structure to ASEAN composed of a Secretary General and his staff.
The Secretary General is given the responsibility of facilitating and monitoring the
implementation of ASEAN activities.
Only 9 principal agreements were produced in the 80s. The signing of 12
protocols showed more willingness to modify the organization particularly by
building upon procedures in existing agreements such as the TAC and the one
establishing the Secretariat.
In the 90s, 14 principal agreements and 15 protocols were signed. Two binding
Agreements were signed in Singapore in 1992. These were the FRAMEWORK
AGREEMENT ON ENHANCING ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION (FAEAEC) and the
Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). The latter half of the
90s saw the membership expansion of the ASEAN.
TABLE IV
COMPLIANCE MECHANISM
MECHANISM
1.
2.
3.
4.
Dispute Settlement
Transparency
Monitoring
Sanctions
TOTAL
NUMBER OF AGREEMENTS
SPECIFYING MECHANISM
35
17
16
2
70
Table IV above cited shows that there are four kinds of compliance
mechanisms two of which, transparency and monitoring, essentially involve
early detection. According to Cockerham, the dispute resolution/settlement
mechanism can provide a disincentive to avoid compliance, as monitoring and
transparency facilitate early detection of non-compliance. Sanction is the most
powerful mechanism since it imposes direct penalties on defectors. Fifty
percent (50%) of the agreements provide for dispute resolution/settlement but
as already stated they are weak since they would often be handled through
negotiations or consultations.
Only the Protocols to the DSM provide for judicial settlement of disputes but
these only provide for ad hoc panels appointed by the SEOM and are not
permanently-constituted tribunals. Approximately 24% of the agreements provide
for transparency and 23% for monitoring. Only two agreements provide an
indication for possible sanctions for non-compliance, these are (1) the 1995
Treaty on Southeast Asia Nuclear Free Zone and (2) the 2004 Protocol on the
Enhanced Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In both instances, penalties for noncompliance are not clearly defined. Art. 14 of the Nuclear Free Zone Treaty states
that the Commission which supervises the agreement shall decide on any
measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation; on the other hand, while
the DSM Protocol is more specific, it is not as severe as expected. Like the WTO
mechanism, it authorizes retaliation in terms of suspension of concessions but
provides that full compliance is the desired goal. In effect, suspension is
temporary and must be lifted once the SEOM is convinced that compliance
standards are met.
As a conclusion, it is considered that the ASEAN Integration is definitely not
a rules-based but a relations-based system one that stresses non-confrontation
on key issues affecting the region. Concerns are addressed by negotiation,
consultation and consensus; one that tries to maintain a healthy respect for the
internal affairs of ASEAN member states through non-intervention or noninterference.
ASEAN
Harmonized
Tariff
Thank
you!