Aspects of Chemical Security

Dual-use Chemicals

1
 Chemical dual-use awareness
Dual use chemicals: Chemicals used in industry or
everyday life that can also be used in bad ways.

2
 Dual-use chemical example: Pseudoephedrine

• Pseudoephedrine is a common
ingredient in cold medicines
• Precursor to crystal
methamphetamine
• Recipes for conversion
available on web

• Clandestine meth labs in US

during 2002
– Caused 194 fires, 117
explosions, and 22 deaths
– Cost $23.8 million for cleanup
– Dumped chemicals led to
• deaths of livestock
• contaminated streams
Illicit Methamphetamine Laboratory • large areas of dead trees and
vegetation

3
Dual-use chemical example: Cyanide

• Widely used in mining and

metal plating industries, but
is also a well known poison.
• Product tampering*
– Tylenol capsules
• laced with KCN
• 7 deaths, fall 1982,
Therence Koh/AFP/Getty Images Chicago, Illinois, USA
• Led to tamper-proof
product packaging
• Popular with criminals and
terrorists because it is
relatively easy to obtain
• HCN is Chemical Weapon
agent AC

4
 Dual-use chemical example: Pesticides
• Widely used in homes and • Dushuqiang (Strong Rat Poison)
agriculture, but also used to – Outlawed in China in the mid-
poison people. 1980s, but was still available
– Nanjing, China, Sept. 2002
• 38 people killed by poison in
snack-shop food, >300 sick
• Jealously by rival shop owner
– Hunan, China, Sept. 2003
• 241 people poisoned by cakes
served by school cafeteria
• Motive and perpetrator unknown
– Tongchuan City, Shaanxi, China,
April 2004
• 74 people poisoned by scallion
pancakes
• Motive and perpetrator unknown
– 5 other incidents reported
between 1991 and 2004

Ann. Emerg. Med., Vol. 45, pg. 609, June 2005

5
 Many lab/industrial chemicals have dual uses

• Dimethyl methyl phosphonate (DMMP)

– Flame retardant for:
• building materials, furnishings, transportation
equipment, electrical industry, upholstery
– Nerve agent precursor
• Thiodiglycol
– Dye carrier, ink solvent, lubricant, cosmetics,
anti-arthritic drugs, plastics, stabilizers,
antioxidants, photographic, copying,
antistatic agent, epoxides, coatings, metal
plating
– Mustard gas precursor
• Arsenic Trichloride
– Catalyst in CFC manufacture, semiconductor
precursor, intermediate for pharmaceuticals,
insecticides
– Lewisite precursor
From: Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Assistance Programme Manual (on CD)

6
 Dual-use Chemicals: Explosives

• Theft of conventional explosives

– Chemical suppliers
– Users such as mines or construction
sites
• Diversion of industrial or laboratory
chemicals
– Chemical suppliers
– Chemical factories
– Academic teaching or research
laboratories
– Disposal sites

7
Theft / manufacture of explosives: Fertilizer Bomb

• Ammonium nitrate
fertilizer and fuel oil
(diesel, kerosene)
• Used to bomb Alfred P.
Murrah building in
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
– with nitromethane and
commercial explosives
– 168 dead, including
children
– April 1995
• Favored by IRA, FARC,
ETA, etc.

Photo: US DOD

8
 Theft / manufacture of explosives: TATP
• Triacetone triperoxide (TATP)
• Invisible to detectors looking
for N-based explosives
• Made using acetone, hydrogen
peroxide, strong acid (HCl,
sulfuric)
• Favored by terrorists “Mother
of Satan”
– Sept 2009 arrest of N. Zazi,
NY and Denver
– July 2005 London suicide
bombs
– 2001 Richard Reid “shoe
bomber”
– 1997 New York subway
suicide bomb plot
CAS 17088-37-8

9
Diversion of industrial / laboratory chemicals:
Sodium azide

• Widely available from older

automobile airbags
– 1980s to 1990s
• Poisonous
• Reacts explosively with
metals
– Biological laboratory
drains have exploded from
discarded waste solutions
containing NaN3 as a
preservative.
• Has been found in
possession of terrorists

10
 Diversion of industrial / laboratory chemicals:
Bali bombing

• Amrozi purchased chemicals used to make bombs

• One ton of potassium chlorate* purchased in three
transactions from the Toko Tidar Kimia fertilizer and industrial
chemicals store in Jalan Tidar, Surabaya, owned by Sylvester
Tendean.
– Claimed he was a chemical salesman.
– Obtained a false receipt saying he purchased sodium
benzoate.
– Tendean lacked proper permit to sell this chemical, didn’t
know the chemical would be used to make a bomb.
• Details of Aluminum powder purchases not known

11
 Group Discussion

• What chemicals are of most concern for

diversion?
– Common laboratory/industrial chemicals that would be
targeted by someone for illegal reasons such as making
explosives, illegal drugs, or chemical weapons.

12
International Chemical Controls

13
 Organization for the prohibition
of chemical weapons (OPCW)

• International group headquartered in The Hague,

Netherlands
– https://www.opcw.org/index.html
• Chemical weapons convention (CWC)
– International treaty which bans the development,
production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical
weapons
• Promotes international cooperation in peaceful uses of
chemistry
• Protecting each other

14
 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

• International treaty which bans

the development, production,
stockpiling, transfer and use of
chemical weapons
– Entered into force in April
1997 with 87 State Parties
participating
– Today: 183 nations have
joined, 5 others have signed,
only 7 have not taken any
action.
• Each nation enacts
appropriate laws
• Each nation agrees to assist
other Member States

15
 CWC: Destroy existing stockpiles and facilities

• Twelve States parties have • As of August 2007, 42 of 65

declared CW production declared CW production
facilities. facilities have been certified
– Bosnia and Herzegovina as destroyed, 19 converted to
– China peaceful purposes.
– France • As of August 2007, 23,912
metric tonnes of CW agent has
– India been destroyed out of 71,330
– Islamic Republic of Iran metric tonnes declared.
– Japan • On 11 July 2007, the OPCW
– Libyan Arab Jamahiriya confirmed the destruction of
– Russian Federation the entire chemical weapons
stockpile in Albania.
– Serbia • Includes old and abandoned
– United Kingdom of Great CW munitions
Britain and Northern
Ireland
– United States of America
– another State Party

16
 CWC: Prevent spread or production of new
chemical weapons

• States declare and agree to inspections of many other chemical

facilities, depending on chemical type and amount produced
• Over 3,000 inspections have taken place at 200 chemical weapon-
related and over 850 industrial sites on the territory of 79 States
Parties since April 1997
• Worldwide, over 5,000 industrial facilities are liable to inspection

17
 CWC: Chemicals on schedules subject to
verification measures
• Schedule 1:
– Known CW agents
– Highly toxic, closely related chemicals, or CWA precursors
– Has little or no peaceful application
• Schedule 2:
– Toxic enough to be used as a CWA
– Precursor to or important for making a Schedule 1 chemical
– Not made in large commercial quantities for peaceful purposes
• Schedule 3:
– Has been used as a CWA
– Precursor to, or important for making a Schedule 1 or 2
chemical
– Is made in large commercial quantities for peaceful purposes
• Unscheduled Discrete Organic Chemicals (UDOC)
• Lists of scheduled chemicals follow: also in documents on CD

18
 CWC: Reporting requirements

• Use/transfer of these chemicals is allowed for research,

medical, or pharmaceutical purposes.
• Reporting requirements depend on facility type, chemical
types and amounts.
– “Other Facility” type, as defined in CWC documents, most
relevant here
– Amounts of chemicals that would require that your National
Authority approve the work and report your institution annually
to the OPCW
• Schedule 1: 100 g aggregate
• Schedule 2: 1 kg for 2A*, 100 kg for other 2A, 1 Tonne of 2B
• Schedule 3: 30 Tonnes
• UDOC: 30 or 200 Tonnes (lower number if contains P, S, or F)

Caution:
Your country might require reporting of lower amounts!

19
 Schedule 1 Chemicals
A. Toxic chemicals • (5) Lewisites:
• (1) O-Alkyl (<C10, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n- – Lewisite 1: 2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine
Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates, e.g. – Lewisite 2: Bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine
– Sarin: O-Isopropyl – Lewisite 3: Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine
methylphosphonofluoridate
• (6) Nitrogen mustards:
– Soman: O-Pinacolyl ethylphosphonofluoridate
– HN1: Bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine
• (2) O-Alkyl (<C10, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates, – HN2: Bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine
e.g. Tabun: O-Ethyl N,N-dimethyl – HN3: Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine
phosphoramidocyanidate • (7) Saxitoxin
• (3) O-Alkyl (H or <C10, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl • (8) Ricin
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr
or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding
alkylated or protonated salts, e.g. VX: O-Ethyl S- B. Precursors
2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl • (9) Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
phosphonothiolate phosphonyldifluorides, e.g. DF:
• (4) Sulfur mustards: Methylphosphonyldifluoride
– 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide • (10) O-Alkyl (H or <C10, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-
– Mustard gas: Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and
– Bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane corresponding alkylated or protonated salts
– Sesquimustard: 1,2-Bis(2- e.g. QL: O-Ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl
chloroethylthio)ethane methylphosphonite
– 1,3-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane • (11) Chlorosarin: O-Isopropyl
– 1,4-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane methylphosphonochloridate
– 1,5-Bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane • (12) Chlorosoman: O-Pinacolyl
– Bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether methylphosphonochloridate
– O-Mustard: Bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether

20
 Schedule 2 Chemicals
A. Toxic chemicals • (7) Arsenic trichloride
• (1) Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2- • (8) 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid
(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate and • (9) Quinuclidin-3-ol
corresponding alkylated or protonated salts
• (10) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
• (2) PFIB: 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2- aminoethyl-2-chlorides and
(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene corresponding protonated salts
• (3) BZ: 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate • (11) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
aminoethane-2-ols and corresponding
B. Precursors protonated salts
• (4) Chemicals, except for those listed in – Exemptions: N,N-
Schedule 1, containing a phosphorus atom Dimethylaminoethanol and
to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl or corresponding protonated salts
propyl (normal or iso) group but not further – N,N-Diethylaminoethanol and
carbon atoms, e.g. corresponding protonated salts
– ethylphosphonyl dichloride • (12) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
– dimethyl methylphosphonate aminoethane-2-thiols and corresponding
protonated salts
– Exemption: Fonofos: O-Ethyl S-phenyl
ethylphosphonothiolothionate • (13) Thiodiglycol: Bis(2-
hydroxyethyl)sulfide
• (5) N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)
phosphoramidic dihalides • (14) Pinacolyl alcohol: 3,3-
Dimethylbutan-2-ol
• (6) Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl
(Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates

21
 Schedule 3 Chemicals
A. Toxic chemicals
• (1) Phosgene: Carbonyl dichloride
• (2) Cyanogen chloride
• (3) Hydrogen cyanide
• (4) Chloropicrin: Trichloronitromethane
B. Precursors
• (5) Phosphorus oxychloride
• (6) Phosphorus trichloride
• (7) Phosphorus pentachloride
• (8) Trimethyl phosphite
• (9) Triethyl phosphite
• (10) Dimethyl phosphite
• (11) Diethyl phosphite
• (12) Sulfur monochloride
• (13) Sulfur dichloride
• (14) Thionyl chloride
• (15) Ethyldiethanolamine
• (16) Methyldiethanolamine
• (17) Triethanolamine
22
 Unscheduled discrete organic chemicals (UDOC)

• Also subject to CWC reporting, but

only for large amounts.

• "Discrete Organic Chemical” means

any chemical belonging to the class
of chemical compounds consisting of
all compounds of carbon except for
its oxides, sulfides and metal
carbonates, identifiable by chemical
name, by structural formula, if known,
and by Chemical Abstracts Service
registry number, if assigned.

From CWC text – on CD

23
 OPCW: Promotes international cooperation in
peaceful uses of chemistry

• Associates program
• Analytical skills development course
• Conference support program
• Research projects program
• Internship Support Program
• Laboratory Assistance Program
• Equipment Exchange Program

24
 OPCW: Protecting each other

• Each member state can request assistance from

other member states in the event of a threat or
attack, including chemical terrorism
• This can take the form of expertise, training,
materials, and/or equipment

25
 UN Security Council Resolution 1540

• Unanimously passed on 28 April 2004

• Member States:
– must refrain from supporting non-State actors in
developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing,
transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their delivery systems.
– must establish domestic controls to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons, and their means of delivery, including by
establishing appropriate controls over related materials.
• Enhanced international cooperation on such efforts is
encouraged, in accord with and promoting universal
adherence to existing international non-proliferation
treaties.

26
 Components of

Chemical Security

27
27
 Chemical Security Questions
• Is your facility secure?
• How easy would it be for someone to steal
chemicals?
• Are the chemistry workrooms, stockrooms,
classrooms and labs always locked and secure?
• Is someone always there when these rooms are
open?
• Do you check your orders when chemicals arrive
to be sure some chemicals are not missing?

28
Components of Chemical Security
• Physical security of site
• Personnel management
• Information security
• Management of chemical security activities
• Allocation of chemical security responsibilities
• Development of emergency plans
• Chemical security training

Goal: Ensure that you don’t accidently help a criminal

or a terrorist get dangerous chemicals

29
Chemical Security: Physical Site
LOCK UP!!

Controlled drugs

Chemical Surety Agents

Highly toxic chemicals

30
 Facility Characterization
Characterize the facility in terms of:
– Site boundary – Operating conditions
– Buildings (working hours, off-
(construction and hours, potential
HVAC systems) emergencies)
– Room locations – Safety considerations
– Access points – Types and numbers of
– Processes within the employees
facility – Legal and regulatory
– Existing Protection issues
Systems

31
 Facility Characterization
Facility characterization provides
important data that:
– Identifies locations and assets to be protected

– Establish what existing Protection System

components are already present at the facility

– Documents facility layout for use in analysis

32
 Chemical Security:
Personnel Management

• Guard against both Insider and Outsider threat

• Who checks people entering the building?
• Who has keys? How do they get authorized?
– Building
– Stockroom
– Individual Labs
• When someone leaves, do you make sure they
turn in keys?
- Don’t want people making duplicate keys

33
 Threat Definition

Threat classes:

• Outsiders—no authorized access

• Insiders—authorized access

• Collusion—between Outsiders and Insiders

34
What Might Motivate Adversaries?
• Terrorists • Insiders
– Ideology – Ego
• Criminals – Ideology
– Financial – Revenge
• Activists – Financial
– Ideology – Coercion

35
35
 Target Identification
• Determine the possible targets for the following
actions:
• Sabotage
– Identify vital areas to protect
• Theft of chemicals

• Theft of information
– Identify location of materials to
protect

36
36
 Chemical Security: information security

• How do you track chemical inventory?

– Is the information secured so unauthorized
people can’t read it or alter it?

• Would you know if:

– some toxic chemicals disappeared overnight?
– some toxic chemicals didn’t arrive?
– someone was ordered chemicals
in the name of your institution
but diverted them?

37
 Chemical Security:
Assign Responsibilities
• Identify people responsible for various chemical
security activities:
– Physical security, building modifications
– Chemical tracking and reporting
– Personnel and access management
– Information management
– Emergency planning
• Ensure they have the time and resources to do
the job.
• Integrate with chemical safety responsibilities.

38
 Chemical Security:
Professional Behavior
• Chemical professionals
use their scientific
knowledge in a
responsible manner.

• Chemical Educators
need to train their
students to use their
scientific knowledge in a
responsible manner.

39
Relationships between

Chemical Security

and

Chemical Safety

40
40
 Relationships Between
Chemical Safety and Security
• Chemical safety: Protect against accidents

• Chemical security: Protect against deliberate harm

Many practices are the same for chemical safety

and security, but there are a few areas of
conflict.

41
 Good Practices for Both
Chemical Safety and Security
• Minimize use of hazardous chemicals.
– Replace with less-hazardous chemicals, if possible.
– Reduce scale of experiments.

• Minimize supply of hazardous chemicals.

• Restrict access to hazardous chemicals.

– Know what you have.
– Know how to store, handle and dispose of what you have.
– Know who has access to materials, knowledge and expertise.

• Plan what to do in an emergency.

42
 Conflicts Between Chemical Safety
and Security: Information Sharing
Science generally means sharing information widely,
but this may not always be advisable.
• Safety • Security
– Label everything so people – Labels help identify targets
can recognize hazardous for theft or attack.
chemicals. – Sharing locations of
– Let community and chemicals can publicize
especially emergency targets for theft or attack.
responders know what – Sharing knowledge of
chemical dangers are there. chemical hazards could
– Share knowledge about inspire harmful behavior
chemical hazards so people (copy-cat criminals).
know to be alert.

43
 Conflicts Between Chemical Safety
and Security: Facility Exits

Locking exit doors is

secure, but not safe.
– For safety, people need to
be able to leave the facility
quickly and by many
routes. EXIT
– For security, you want to
control exits as well as
entrances so chemicals
(or equipment) are not
taken.

44
 Setting Priorities
• Labs need to be safe, secure and productive.
– Policies and practices need to be flexible enough to
allow for the uncertainties of research.
– Policies and practices need to align with local laws,
regulations, practices and culture. Can’t just copy
from somewhere else.

• Use risk-based security and safety measures.

– Can’t afford to defend against every imaginable
hazard.
– Identify threats, characterize facilities, identify
alternatives, analyze costs vs. performance.

• Be alert for suspicious activities or inquiries.

45
 All Chemical Facilities
Need to be Secured

• Small-scale research laboratories

- Many different chemicals used in small amounts.

• Large-scale manufacturing plants

- Limited types of chemicals used in large amounts.

• Security measures need to match facility and threat

- Can’t afford to defend against all imaginable threat.

46
Indonesian Regulation on Chemical

47