UNIT – V (Cont…)

NETWORK SECURITY

Prof. A. Q. Ansari
Department of Electrical Engineering
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

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SECURITY SERVICES

Network security can provide five services. Four of these

services are related to the message exchanged using the
network. The fifth service provides entity authentication
or identification.

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Security services related to the message or entity

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MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY

The concept of how to achieve message confidentiality

or privacy has not changed for thousands of years.
The message must be encrypted at the sender site and
decrypted at the receiver site. This can be done using
either symmetric-key cryptography or asymmetric-key
cryptography.

Topics discussed in this section:

Confidentiality with Symmetric-Key Cryptography
Confidentiality with Asymmetric-Key Cryptography

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MESSAGE INTEGRITY

Encryption and decryption provide secrecy, or

confidentiality, but not integrity. However, on occasion
we may not even need secrecy, but instead must have
integrity.

Topics discussed in this section:

Document and Fingerprint
Message and Message Digest
Creating and Checking the Digest
Hash Function Criteria
Hash Algorithms: SHA-1
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MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION

A hash function per se cannot provide authentication.

The digest created by a hash function can detect any
modification in the message, but not authentication.

Topics discussed in this section:

MAC (Message Authentication Code)

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DIGITAL SIGNATURE

When Alice sends a message to Bob, Bob needs to

check the authenticity of the sender; he needs to be
sure that the message comes from Alice and not Eve.
Bob can ask Alice to sign the message electronically.
In other words, an electronic signature can prove the
authenticity of Alice as the sender of the message. We
refer to this type of signature as a digital signature.
Topics discussed in this section:
Comparison
Need for Keys
Process
Services (includes Nonrepudiation) 7
ENTITY AUTHENTICATION

Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one

party prove the identity of another party. An entity can
be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity
whose identity needs to be proved is called the claimant;
the party that tries to prove the identity of the claimant
is called the verifier.

Topics discussed in this section:

Passwords
Challenge-Response

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MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY

Topics discussed in this section:

Confidentiality with Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Confidentiality with Asymmetric-Key Cryptography

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Message confidentiality using symmetric keys in two directions

• To be able to use the symmetric key cryptography, we need to find a

solution to the key sharing.
• This can be done using a session key.
• A session key is one that is used only for the duration of one
session.
• The session key itself is exchanged using the asymmetric key
cryptography. 10
Message confidentiality using asymmetric keys

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Problems with Asymmetric Cryptosystem
1. The method is based on long mathematical
calculations using long keys. This means that this
system is very inefficient for long messages.
2. The sender of the message still needs to be certain
about the public key of the receiver. e.g., in Alice-Bob
communication, Alice needs to be sure that Bob’s
public key is genuine; Eve may have announced her
public key in the name of Bob. THUS, A SYSYTEM OF
TRUST IS NEEDED.

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MESSAGE INTEGRITY
Encryption and decryption provide secrecy, or
confidentiality, but not integrity. However, on occasion
we may not even need secrecy, but instead must have
integrity.
For example, Alice may write a will to distribute her estate upon
her death. The will does not need to be encrypted. After her
death, anyone can examine the will. The integrity of the will,
however, needs to be preserved. Alice does not want the content
of the will to be changed.

Another example; suppose Alice sends a message instructing her

banker, Bob, to pay Eve for consulting work. The message does
not need to be hidden from Eve because she already knows she is
to be paid. However, the message does need to be safe from any
tampering, especially by Eve. 13
 Document and Fingerprint
• One way to preserve the integrity of the document is the
use of a FINGERPRINT.
• If Alice needs to be sure that the contents of her
document will not be illegally changed, she can put her
fingerprint at the bottom of the document.
• Eve can not modify the contents of this document or
create a false document because she can not forge
Alice’s fingerprint.
• To ensure that the document has not been changed,
Alice’s fingerprint on the document can be compared to
Alice’s fingerprint on file.
• If they are not the same, the document is not from Alice.

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Note

To preserve the integrity of a document,

both the document and the fingerprint
are needed.

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 Message and Message Digest
• The electronic equivalent of the document and fingerprint
pair is the message and message digest pair.
• To preserve the integrity of a message, the message is
passed through an algorithm called a hash function.
• The hash function creates a compressed image of the
message and that can be used as a fingerprint.

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Note

The message digest needs to be kept

secret.

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 Difference
The two pairs “document/ fingerprint” and “message/ message
digest” are similar with the following differences.
• The document and fingerprint are physically linked together; also,
neither needs to be kept secret.
• The message and message digest can be unlinked or sent
separately. And most importantly, the message digest needs to be
kept secret.
• The message digest is either kept secret in a safe place or
encrypted if we need to send through a communications channel.

Note

The message digest needs to be kept

secret.
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Creating and Checking the Digest
• The message digest is created at the sender site and is
sent with the message to the receiver.
• To check the integrity of the message, the receiver creates
the hash function again and compares the new message
digest with the one received.
• If both are the same, the receiver is sure that the original
message has not been changed.
• Here we assume that the digest has been sent secretly.

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Hash Function Criteria

1. A Digest is created from the message by a one-way hashing function.

The message must not be created from the digest.

Q. Can we use a conventional lossless compression method as a hashing

function?

Answer
We cannot. A lossless compression method creates a compressed
message that is reversible. You can uncompress the compressed
message to get the original one. 20
Q: Can we use a checksum method as a hashing
function?

Answer
We can. A checksum function is not reversible; it meets
the first criterion. However, it does not meet the other
criteria.

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Weak Collision Resistance
• It ensures that a message can not easily be forged.
• If Alice creates a message and a digest and sends both
to Bob, this criterion ensures that Eve cannot easily
create another message that hashes exactly to the same
digest.
• In other words, given a specific message and its digest,
it is impossible (or at least very difficult) to create another
message with the same digest.
• When two messages create the same digest, we say
there is a collision.
• In a weak collision, given a message digest, it is very
unlikely that someone can create a message with exactly
the same digest.
• A hash function must have weak collision resistance.
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Strong Collision Resistance

• It ensures that we cannot find two messages that hash to

the same digest.
• This criterion is needed to ensure that Alice cannot
cause problems by forging a message.
• If Alice can create two messages that hash to the same
digest, she can deny sending the first to Bob and claim
that she sent only the second.
• This type of collision is called strong because the
probability of collision is higher than in the previous case.

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 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA – 1):

• It is a revised version of SHA

• It was designed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST).
• It was published as a Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS).
• A digest of length N is created from a multiple-block
message. Each block is 512 bits in length.

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Message digest creation

•A buffer of N bits is initialized to a predetermined value. The algorithm

mangles this initial buffer with the first 512 bits of the message to create the
first intermediate message digest of N bits.
•This digest is then mangled with the second 512- bit block to create the
second intermediate digest.
•The (n-1)th digest is mangled with the nth block to create the nth digest.
•If a block is not 512 bits, padding (0) is added to make it so. 25
• When the last block is processed, the resulting digest is
the message digest for the entire message.
• The SHA-1 has a message digest of 160 bits (5 words,
each of 32 bits).

Note

SHA-1 hash algorithms create an N-bit

message digest out of a message of
512-bit blocks.

SHA-1 has a message digest of 160 bits

(5 words of 32 bits).
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MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION

•When Alice sends a message to Bob, Bob needs to

know if the message is coming from Alice or Eve. This
is called authentication.

•A hash function per se cannot provide authentication.

The digest created by a hash function can detect any
modification in the message, but not authentication.

•The digest created by a hash function is normally

called a MODIFICATION DETECTION CODE
(MDC). The code can detect any modification in the
message.
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 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
• In order to provide message authentication, we change the
MODIFICATION DETECTION CODE (MDC) to MESSAGE
AUTHENTICATION CODE (MAC).
• An MDC uses a keyless hash function; a MAC uses a keyed hash
function.
• A keyed hash function includes the symmetric key between the
sender and receiver when creating the digest.
• Alice, using the symmetric key between herself and Bob (KAB) and a
keyed hash function, generates a MAC.
• She then concatenates the MAC with the original message and
sends the two to Bob.
• Bob receives the message and the MAC.
• Bob separates the message from the MAC.
• He applies the same keyed hash function to the message using the
symmetric key KAB to get a fresh MAC.
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MAC, created by Alice and checked by Bob

• Bob then compares the MAC sent by Alice with the newly generated
MAC.
• If the two MACs are identical, the message has not been modified
and the sender of the message is definitely Alice.
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 Hashed MAC (HMAC)
• There are several implementation of MAC in use today.
• Some MACs have been designed using keyless hash function
such as SHA-1, known as hashed MAC (HMAC).
• HMAC creates a nested MAC by applying a keyless hash
function to the concatenation of the message and a symmetric
key.
• A copy of the symmetric key is prepended to the message.
• The combination is hashed using a keyless hash function,
such as SHA-1.
• The result of this process is an intermediate HMAC which is
again prepended with the key (the same key), and the result
is again hashed using the same algorithm.
• The final result is an HMAC.
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•The receiver receives the final HMAC and the message.
•The receiver creates its own HMAC from the received
message and compares the two HMACs to validate the
integrity of the message and authenticate the data origin.

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DIGITAL SIGNATURE
• Although a MAC can provide message integrity and
message authentication, it has a drawback.
• It needs a symmetric key that must be established between
the sender and the receiver.
• A digital signature on the other hand, can use a pair of
asymmetric keys ( a public one and a private one).

A digital signature needs a public-key

system.

• Digital signature can be achieved in two ways.

1. Signing the document
2. Signing the digest of the document.
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Signing the document

Note
In a cryptosystem, we use the private
and public keys of the receiver;
in digital signature, we use the private
and public keys of the sender. 33
 Signing the Digest
• As the public key is very inefficient in a cryptosystem if the message is
long, so in digital signature, where the message is normally long, we sign
the digest of the message, rather than signing the message itself.

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Services provided by the Digital Signature
• A digital signature can provide three out of the five
services for a security system.
1. Message Integrity: The integrity of the message is
preserved even if we sign the whole message because
we can not get the same signature if the message is
changed.
2. Message Authentication: Bob can verify that the
message is sent by Alice because Alice’s public key is
used in verification. Alice’s public key cannot create
the same signature as Eve’s private key.
3. Message Nonrepudiation: If Alice signs a message
and then denies it, Bob can later prove that Alice
actually signed it.
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• With the signature scheme presented so far,
Bob may face some problem.
• Bob must save the signature on file and later
use Alice’s Public key to create the original
message to prove that the message in the file
and the newly created message are the same.
• This is not feasible because Alice may have
changed her private/ public key during this time.
She may also claim that the file containing the
signature is not authentic.
SOLUTION: A Trusted Third Party may solve
many other problems concerning security
services and key exchange.
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Showing how a trusted party can prevent Alice from denying that she sent the message

• Alice creates a signature (SA) from her message M and sends the message, her
identity, Bob’s identity, and the signature to the CENTRE.
• The centre, after checking that Alice’s public key is valid, verifies through Alice’s
public key that the message comes from Alice.
• The centre then saves a copy of the message with the sender identity, recipient
identity, and a timestamp in its archive.
• The centre uses its private key to create another signature (ST) from the message.
• The centre then sends the message, the new signature, Alice’s identity, and Bob’s
identity to Bob.
• Bob verifies the message using the public key of the center. 37
• If in the future Alice denies that she sent the message, the centre can show
a copy of the saved message.
• If Bob’s message is a duplicate of the message saved at the center, Alice
will lose the dispute.
• To make everything confidential, a level of encryption/ decryption can be
added to the scheme.

DIGITAL SIGNATURE does not provide

1.Message Confidentiality, and
2.Entity Authentication.
• If confidentiality is required, the message
and the signature must be encrypted using
either a secret-key or public-key
cryptosystem.

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ENTITY AUTHENTICATION

Entity authentication is a technique designed to let one

party prove the identity of another party. An entity can
be a person, a process, a client, or a server. The entity
whose identity needs to be proved is called the claimant;
the party that tries to prove the identity of the claimant
is called the verifier.

Topics discussed in this section:

Passwords
Challenge-Response

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 Difference between Message Authentication and
Entity Authentication
1. Message Authentication may not happen in real time,
entity authentication does.
In Message Authentication, Alice sends a message to Bob.
When Bob authenticates the message, Alice may or may
not be present in the communication process.
On the other hand, when Alice requests Entity
Authentication, there is no real message communication
involved until Alice is authenticated by Bob. Alice needs
to be online and take part in the process.
Message authentication is required when an email is sent
from Alice to Bob. Entity authentication is required when
Alice gets a cash from Automatic Teller Machine (ATM).

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2. Message Authentication simply authenticates one message; the
process needs to be repeated for each new message.
Entity Authentication authenticates the claimant for the entire
duration of a session.
IN Entity Authentication, the claimant must identify herself to the
verifier. This can be done with one of three kinds of witnesses:
• Something Known: This is a secret known only by the
claimant that can be checked by the verifier. e.g., password,
PIN number, a secret key, and private key.
• Something Possessed: This is something that can prove the
claimant’s identity. e.g., passport, driver’s license, ID card,
credit card, smart card etc.
• Something Inherent: This is an inherent characteristic of the
claimant. e.g., conventional signature, fingerprints, voice,
facial characteristic, retinal pattern, handwriting etc.

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 PASSWORDS
• The simplest and the oldest method of entity authentication
is the password, something that the claimant possesses.
• There are two types of Authentication Schemes –
1. Fixed Password
2. One-time password
FIXED PASSWORD: The same password is used over and over
for every access. This approach is subject to several
attacks.
1. Eavesdropping/ Shoulder surfing : Eve can watch Alice
when she types her password.
2. Stealing a password: Don’t write it anywhere.
3. Accessing a File where the password is stored.
4. Guessing: Don’t keep a short password.
ONE TIME PASSWORD: A password is used only once. A one-
time password makes eavesdropping and stealing useless.
However, this approach is very complex.
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CHALLENGE RESPONSE (Entity Authentication)
• In password authentication, the claimant proves her identity
by demonstrating that she knows a secret, the password.
• However, since the claimant reveals this secret, the secret is
susceptible to interception by the adversary.

In challenge-response authentication,
the claimant proves that she knows a
secret without revealing it.

The challenge is a time-varying value sent

by the verifier; the response is the result of
a function applied on the challenge. The
response shows that the claimant knows
the secret. 43
• Challenge/ Response Authentication can be done in the
following ways:
1. Using a nonce (by symmetric key Cipher):
• The secret here is the shared key.
• The function here is the encryption algorithm applied on the
challenge.
2. Using a timestamp:
It uses the current time as value, which is time-varying
obviously.
3. Using a keyed hash function:
• Instead of using encryption and decryption for entity
authentication, we can use a keyed-hash function, Message
Authentication Code (MAC).
4. Using an Asymmetric-Key Cipher:
• Here the secret is the private key of the claimant.
• The claimant must show that she owns the private key related to
the public key that is available to everyone.
5. Using Digital Signature: here the claimant uses her private key
for signing instead of using it for decryption.
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1. Challenge/response Authentication Using a Nonce

1. The first message is not the part of challenge-response, it only informs the
verifier that the claimant wants to be challenged.
2. The second message is the challenge. And RB is the nonce randomly chosen
by the verifier to challenge the claimant.
3. The claimant encrypts the nonce using the shared secret key and sends the
result to the verifier.
4. The verifier decrypts the message. If the nonce obtained from decryption is the
same as sent by the verifier, Alice is granted access. 45
2. Challenge/ Response Authentication Using a Timestamp

The challenge message is the current time sent from the verifier to
the claimant. This supposes that the client and the server clocks are
synchronized.
Since the claimant knows the current time, there is no need for the
challenge message.
The first and third message can be combined.
As a result the authentication can be done using one message: the
response to an implicit challenge, the current time.
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3. Challenge/ Response Authentication Using a Keyed-hash Function

The figure shows a scheme using a keyed-hash function to create

a challenge response with a timestamp.
Here, the timestamp is sent both as plaintext and as text
scrambled by the keyed-hash function.
When Bob receives the message, he takes the plaintext T, applies
the keyed-hash function, and then compares his calculation with
what he received to determine the authenticity of Alice.

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4. Challenge-response Authentication Using Asymmetric-key

• Here the secret is the private key of the claimant.

• The claimant must show that she owns the private key related to the public
key that is available to everyone.
• Alice (Claimant) sends the message for challenge.
• Bob (Verifier) encrypts the challenge using the public key of the claimant.
• The claimant then decrypts the message using her private key and sends
back to Bob. Thus the response to the challenge is the decrypted challenge.
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5. Challenge/ Response Authentication Using Digital Signature

•Here the claimant uses her private key for signing instead of
using it for decryption.
•Bob uses a plaintext challenge.
•Alice signs the response.
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KEY MANAGEMENT

We never discussed how secret keys in symmetric-key

cryptography and how public keys in asymmetric-key
cryptography are distributed and maintained. In this
section, we touch on these two issues. We first discuss
the distribution of symmetric keys; we then discuss the
distribution of asymmetric keys.

Topics discussed in this section:

Symmetric-Key Distribution
Public-Key Distribution
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 Symmetric-Key Distribution
• We know that the symmetric key cryptosystem is very
efficient for long messages.
• If one person needs to communicate with N people, he/
she needs N no. of keys.
• If N no. of people need to communicate with each other,
a total of N (N-1)/2 keys are required.
• This means that if 1 million people need to communicate
with one another, each person has almost 0.5 million
different keys; and in total, almost 1 billion keys are
needed.
• This is normally referred to as the N2 problem, because
the no. of required keys for N entities is close to N2.
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• No. of keys is not the only problem.

• The distribution of keys is another.

• If Alice and Bob want to communicate, they need to somehow

exchange a secret key.

• If Alice wants to communicate with1 million people, how can she

exchange 1 million keys with 1 million people?

• Using the Internet is definitely not a secure method.

• A practical solution is the use of a trusted party, referred to as a Key

Distribution Center (KDC).

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Key Distribution Center (KDC):

• A secret key is established between KDC and each member.

• Alice has a secret key with KDC, which we refer to as KAlice.
• Bob has a secret key with KDC, which we refer to as KBob.
• Alice can send the confidential message to Bob in the following manner.
1. Alice sends a request to KDC, stating that she needs a session (temporary)
secret key between herself and Bob.
2. KDC informs Bob of Alice’s request.
3. If Bob agrees, a session key is created between the two.
4. The keys of Alice and Bob are used to authenticate Alice and Bob to the
center and to each other before the session key is established.
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5. After communication is terminated, the session key is no longer valid.
Note

A session symmetric key between two

parties is used only once.

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Creating a session key between Alice and Bob using KDC

1. Alice sends a message to the KDC to obtain a symmetric session key. This is an
unencrypted message that includes the registered identities of Alice and Bob.
2. The KDC creates a TICKET that includes the identities of Alice and Bob and the
session key, KAB. The ticket is encrypted using Bob’s key (KB). The encrypted
ticket along with a copy of the session key is again encrypted using Alice’s key
and sent to her. Alice decrypts this message and extracts the session key. She
can not decrypt the ticket as she does not have the Bob’s key.
3. Alice sends the ticket to Bob. Bob opens the ticket and knows that Alice needs to
send messages to him using KAB as the session key. 55
Public-Key (Asymmetric-Key) Distribution

In public-key cryptography, everyone

has access to everyone’s public key;
public keys are available to the public.

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Announcing a public key

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Trusted center

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Controlled trusted center

•A higher level of security can be achieved if there are added controls on the
distribution of the public key.
•The public-key announcements can include a timestamp and be signed by an
authority to prevent interception and modification of the response.
•If Alice needs to know Bob’s public key, she can send a request to the center
including Bob’s name and timestamp.
•The center responds with Bob’s public key, the original request, and the
timestamp signed with the private key of the centre.
•Alice uses the public key of centre known by all, to decrypt the message and
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extract Bob’s public key.
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY
• The Controlled Trusted Centre approach can create a
heavy load on the centre if the number of requests is large.
• The alternative is to create public-key certificates.
• Bob wants two things:
1. He wants people to know his public key, and
2. He wants no one to accept a public key forged as his.
• For this Bob can go to a Certification Authority (CA).
• The CA binds a public key to an entity and issues a
certificate.
• The CA has a well-known public key itself that can not be
forged.
• The CA checks Bob’s identification (using a picture ID along
with other proof).
• It then asks for Bob’s public key and writes it on the
certificate.
• To prevent the certificate itself from being forged, the CA
signs the certificate with its private key.
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Certification authority

• Now Bob can upload the signed certificate.

•Anyone who wants Bob’s public key downloads the signed
certificate and uses the public key of the center to extract Bob’s
public key. 61
THE END

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