Capital Structure
Capital Structure
Capital Structure
⇒ 10.5 + 6 ⇒ 16.5%
Equation implies that the value of the leveraged firms equals the value of
an unleveraged firm plus tax saving resulting from the use of the debt.
The trade-off theory of capital structure is the idea
that a company chooses how much debt finance and
how much equity finance to use by balancing the costs
and benefits .
It states that there is an advantage to financing with
debt, the tax benefits of debt and there is a cost of
financing with debt, the costs of financial distress
including bankruptcy costs of debt
The trade-off theory states that the optimal capital
structure is a trade-off between interest tax shields
(benefit) and cost of financial distress.
Value of firm = Value if all-equity financed + PV(tax
shield) - PV(cost of financial distress)
The starting point is the value of the all-equity financed
firm illustrated by the black horizontal line in Figure .
The present value of tax shields is then added to form
the red line. Note that PV(tax shield) initially increases
as the firm borrows more, until additional borrowing
increases the probability of financial distress rapidly.
The cost of financial distress is illustrated in the
diagram as the difference between the red and blue
curve. Thus, the blue curve shows firm value as a
function of the debt level. Moreover, as the graph
suggest an optimal debt policy exists which maximized
firm value.
The trade-off theory states that capital structure is
based on a trade-off between tax savings and
financial distress costs of debt. Firms with safe,
tangible assets and plenty of taxable income to
shield should have high target debt ratios.
Developed by Jensen and Meckling
(1976)
Agency theory is a principle that is used to explain and
resolve issues in the relationship between business
principals and their agents. Most commonly, that
relationship is the one between shareholders, as
principals, and company executive, as agents.
Agency theory suggests that, in imperfect labor and
capital markets, managers will seek to maximize their
own utility at the expense of corporate shareholders.
Agents have the ability to operate in their own self-
interest rather than in the best interests of the firm
because of asymmetric information (e.g., managers know
better than shareholders whether they are capable of
meeting the shareholders’ objectives).
Agency costs are defined as those costs borne by
shareholders to encourage managers to maximize
shareholder wealth rather than behave in their own
self-interests. Such as
Expenditures to monitor managerial activities,
such as audit costs;
Costs which are incurred when shareholder-
imposed restrictions, such as requirements for
shareholder votes on specific issues, limit the
ability of managers to take actions that advance
shareholder wealth.
In addition to the agency conflict between
stockholders and managers, there is a second class of
agency conflict between creditors and stockholders.
Creditors have the primary claim on part of the firm’s
earnings in the form of interest and principal
payments on the debt as well as a claim on the firm’s
assets in the event of bankruptcy.
Creditors commonly write restrictive covenants into
loan agreements to protect the safety of their funds.
These arrangements involve time and money both in
initial set-up, and subsequent monitoring, these being
referred to as agency costs
It was initially suggested by Donaldson.
In 1984, Myers and Majluf modified
the theory
The pecking order theory has emerged as alternative theory to the
trade-off theory. The key assumption of the pecking order theory
is asymmetric information. Asymmetric information captures that
managers know more than investors and their actions therefore
provides a signal to investors about the prospects of the firm.
The firm will seek to satisfy funding needs in the following order:
Internal funds
External funds
Debt
Equity
There are three factors that the pecking order
theory is based on and that must be considered by
firms when raising capital.