Gametheory

Module 4
Game Theory
To accompany
Quantitative Analysis for Management, Tenth Edition,
by Render, Stair, and Hanna © 2008 Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Power Point slides created by Jeff Heyl © 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Introduction
 Game theory is one way to consider the

impact of the strategies of others on our
strategies and outcomes.
 The study of game theory dates back to 1944,
when John von Neumann and Oscar
Morgenstern published their classic book,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
 Game theory continues to be important today.
 Game models are classified by the number of
players, the sum of all payoffs, and the
number of strategies employed.
© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 2

Payoff Matrix (Table M4.1)
Store X’s Payoff Matrix
Y1 Y2
(Use radio) (Use newspaper)
X1
(Use radio) 3 5
X2
(Use newspaper) 1 -2
Table M4.1

Language of Games (cont.)
 A positive number in Table M4.1 means that X
wins and Y loses.
 A negative number means that Y wins and X
loses.
 The game in Table M4. 1 is biased against Y.
 Player Y would use the minimax criterion.

Language of Games (cont.)
 Game Outcomes
X1 (use radio) Y1 (use radio) X wins 3

and Y loses 3
X1 (use radio) Y2 (use newspaper) X wins 5

and Y loses 5
X2 (use newspaper) Y1 (use radio) X wins I

and Y loses I
X2 (use newspaper) Y2 (use newspaper) X loses 2

and Y wins 2

The Minimax Criterion
 A player using the minimax criterion will select

the strategy that minimizes the maximum possible
loss.
 The upper value of the game is equal to the
minimum of the maximum values in the columns.
 The lower value of the game is equal to the
maximum of the minimum values in the rows.
 If the upper and lower values of a game are the
same, this number is called the value of the game,
and an equilibrium or saddle point condition
exists

The Minimax Criterion (cont.)
 For the game presented in Table M4.2, the value

of the game is 3, because this is the value for
both the upper and lower values.
 The value of the game is the average or
expected game outcome if the game is played
an infinite number of times.
 An equilibrium or saddle point condition exists
if the upper value of the game is equal to the
lower value of the game.

Minimax Solution
Table M4.2 SADDLE POINT
Y1 Y2 Minimum
X1 3 5 3
Maximum of
minimums
X2 1 -2 -2
Maximum 3 5
Minimum of
maximums

Pure Strategy Games
 A pure strategy exists when ever a saddle point is

present.
 Using minimax criterion, we saw that the game in
Table M4.2 had a saddle point and thus is an
example of a pure strategy game.
 Another example of a pure strategy game is
shown in Table M4.3.
 Notice that the value 6 is the lowest number in its row
and the highest number in its column.
 Thus, it is a saddle point and indicates that strategy X1
will be selected by player X and strategy Y2 will be
selected by player Y.
 The value of this game is 6.

Example of a Pure Strategy
Table M4.3
Minimum
row number
Y1 Y2
X1 10 6 6
X2 -12 2 -12
Maximun
column number 10 6

Mixed Strategy Games
 When there is no saddle point, players will play each

strategy for a certain percentage of the time. This is
called a mixed strategy game.
 In a mixed strategy game, each player should

optimize the expected gain.
 Consider the game shown in Table M4.4. There is no

saddle point, so this will be a mixed strategy game.

Game Table for Mixed Strategy Game
Table M4.4
Y1 Y2
X1 4 2
X2 1 10
 We must weight the payoffs by the percentages

of the times to play each strategy to compute the
expected gain for each of the different strategies
that player X may choose.
Game Table for Mixed Strategy Game with
Percentages (P, Q) Shown
Table M4.5
Y1 Y2
Expected
P 1–P Gain
X1 Q 4 2 4P+2(1-P)
X2 1-Q 1 10 1P+10(1-P)
Expected
Gain 4Q+1(1-Q) 2Q+10(1-Q)

Mixed Strategy Games (cont)
 Solving this for Y, after we set the expected values
for Y and X equal, we have:
P = 8/11 and 1 - P = 1 – 8/11 = 3/11
 Thus, 8/11 and 3/11 indicate how often player Y will

choose strategies Y1 and Y2 respectively.
 The expected value computed with these

percentages is
1P + 10(1 - P) = 1(8/11) + 10(3/11) = 38/11 = 3.46

 Performing a similar analysis for player X, we

let Q be the percentage of the time that strategy
X1 is played and 1 — Q be the percentage of the
time that strategy X2 is played.
 Using these, we compute the expected gain

shown in Table M4.5.

 We set these equal, as follows:
4Q + 1(1 - Q) = 2Q + 10(1 - Q)
 Solving for Q we get
Q = 9/11 and 1 - Q = 2/11

 Thus, 9/11 and 2/11 indicate how often player X will
choose strategies X1 and X2 respectively.
 The expected gains with these probabilities will

also be 38/11 or 3.46.

Dominace
 The principle of dominance can be used to reduce
the size of games by eliminating strategies that
would never be played.
 Using the principle of dominance, we reduce the
size of the following game:
Y1 Y2
X1 4 3
X2 2 20
X3 1 1
Dominace (cont)
 In this game, X3 will never be played because X
can always do better by playing X1 or X.
 The new game is
Y1 Y2
X1 4 3
X2 2 20

Dominace (cont)
 Here is another example:
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4
X1 -5 4 6 -3
X2 -2 6 2 -20

Dominace (cont)
 In this game, Y would never play Y2 and Y3 because

Y could always do better playing Y1 or Y4.
 The new game is :
Y1 Y4
X1 -5 -3
X2 -2 -20

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Module 4

 Game theory is one way to consider the

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 2

Store X’s Payoff Matrix

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 3

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 4

X1 (use radio) Y1 (use radio) X wins 3

X1 (use radio) Y2 (use newspaper) X wins 5

X2 (use newspaper) Y1 (use radio) X wins I

X2 (use newspaper) Y2 (use newspaper) X loses 2

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 5

 A player using the minimax criterion will select

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 6

 For the game presented in Table M4.2, the value

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 7

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 8

 A pure strategy exists when ever a saddle point is

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 9

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 10

 When there is no saddle point, players will play each

 In a mixed strategy game, each player should

 Consider the game shown in Table M4.4. There is no

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 11

 We must weight the payoffs by the percentages

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 13

P = 8/11 and 1 - P = 1 – 8/11 = 3/11

 Thus, 8/11 and 3/11 indicate how often player Y will

 The expected value computed with these

1P + 10(1 - P) = 1(8/11) + 10(3/11) = 38/11 = 3.46

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 14

 Performing a similar analysis for player X, we

 Using these, we compute the expected gain

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 15

 Solving for Q we get

Q = 9/11 and 1 - Q = 2/11

 The expected gains with these probabilities will

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 16

 The new game is

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 18

 Here is another example:

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 19

 In this game, Y would never play Y2 and Y3 because

 The new game is :

© 2009 Prentice-Hall, Inc. 17 – 20

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