Obligations with a

Period
ART. 1193.
Obligations for whose fulfillment a day
certain has been fixed, shall be demandable only
when that day comes.
Obligations with a resolutory period take
effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the
day certain.
A day certain is understood to be that which
must necessarily come, although it may not be
known when.
If the uncertainty consists in whether the day
will come or not, the obligation is conditional,
and it shall be regulated by the rules of the
preceding Section.
OBLIGATION WITH A PERIOD

→ is one whose consequences are subjected

in one way or another to the expiration of
said period or term. (8 Manresa 158; see
Lirag Textiles, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
63 SCRA 374
[1975].)
PERIOD

→ is a future and certain event upon the arrival

of which the obligation (or right) subject to
it either arises or is terminated. It is a day
certain which must necessarily come (like
the year 2005; next Christmas), although it
may not be known when, like the death of a
person. (Art. 1193, par. 3.)
Period and condition
distinguished.
(1) As to fulfillment. — A period is a certain event which must happen
sooner or later at a date known beforehand, or at a time which
cannot be determined, while a condition is an uncertain event;

(2) As to time. — A period refers only to the future, while a condition

may refer also to a past event unknown to the parties;

(3) As to influence on the obligation. — A period merely fixes the time

for the efficaciousness of the obligation. If suspensive, it cannot prevent
the birth of the obligation in due time; if resolutory, it does not annul,
even in fiction, the fact of its existence. On the other hand, a condition
causes an obligation to arise or to cease. Because of this difference, a
period does not carry with it, except when there is a stipulation expressly
made by the parties, the same retroactive consequences that follow a
condition (see 8 Manresa 159-160.);
(4) As to effect, when left to debtor’s will.
— A period which depends upon the will of the
debtor empowers the court to fi x the duration
thereof (Art. 1197, par. 2.), while a condition which
depends upon the sole will of the debtor invalidates
the obligation (Art. 1182.); and

(5) As to retroactivity of effects.

- Unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the
arrival of a period does not have any retroactive
effect, while the happening of a condition has
retroactive effect.
KINDS OF PERIOD OR TERM
They are:
(1) According to effect:
(a) Suspensive period (ex die). — The obligation begins only from a day
certain upon the arrival of the period (Art. 1193, par. 1.); and
(b) Resolutory period (in diem). — The obligation is valid up to a day
certain and terminates upon the arrival of the period. (par. 2.)
(2) According to source:
(a) Legal period. — When it is provided for by law;
(b) Conventional or voluntary period. — When it is agreed to by the parties
(Art. 1196.); and
(c) Judicial period. — When it is fixed by the court. (Art. 1197.)
(3) According to definiteness:
(a) Definite period. — When it is fixed or it is known when it will
come (Art. 1193, par. 3.); and
(b) Indefinite period. — When it is not fixed or it is not known when it will
come. Where the period is not fixed but a period is intended, the courts are
usually empowered by law to fix the same. (see Art. 1197.)
ART. 1194. In case of loss,
deterioration or improvement of
the thing before the arrival of the
day certain, the rules in Article
1189 shall be observed. (n)
ART. 1195. Anything paid or delivered
before the arrival of the period, the
obligor being unaware of the period or
believing that the obligation has become
due and demandable, may be
recovered, with the fruits and interests.
(1126a)
Debtor presumed aware of period.

The presumption, however, is that the debtor knew that

the debt was not yet due. He has the burden of proving that
he was unaware of the period. Where the duration of the
period depends upon the will of the debtor (see Art. 1197,
par. 3.), payment by him amounts, in effect, to his
determination of the arrival of the period.
The obligor may no longer recover the thing or money
once the period has arrived but he can recover the fruits or
interests thereof from the date of premature performance to
the date of maturity of the obligation.
NO RECOVERY IN PERSONAL
OBLIGATIONS.
Article 1195 has no application to obligations to
do or not to do because as to the former, it is
physically impossible to recover the service
rendered, and as to the latter, as the obligor
performs by not doing, he cannot, of course,
recover what he has not done. (see 8 Manresa
166.)
ART. 1196. Whenever in an obligation a period is
designated, it is presumed to have been established
for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor,
unless from the tenor of the same or other
circumstances it should appear that the period has
been established in favor of one or of the other.
 Presumption as to benefit of period.
Art 1196 means that before the expiration of the period the
debtor may not fulfill the obligation and neither may the
creditor demand its fulfillment without the consent of the
other especially if the latter would be prejudiced or
inconvenienced thereby.

The tenor of the obligation or the circumstances may,

however, show that it was the intention of the parties to
constitute the period for the benefit of either the debtor or the
creditor. The benefit of the period may be the subject of
express stipulation of the parties.
Acceleration by debtor of time
of payment.

…unless the creditor consents, the debtor has no

right to accelerate the time of payment even if the
premature tender included an offer to pay principal
and interest in full. (De Leon vs. Santiago Syjuco,
Inc., 90 Phil. 311 [1951].)
Effect of acceptance
by creditor of partial payment.

The acceptance of a partial payment by a creditor

amounts to a waiver of the period agreed upon during
which payment should not be made. If no explanation is
given why the creditor received such partial payment
before the maturity of the obligation, it may be
presumed that his relinquishment was intentional, and
his choice to dispense with the term, voluntary. It is not
a mere forbearance. (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 950
[1958].)
ART. 1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but
from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the courts may fix the
duration thereof.
The courts shall also fix the duration of the period
when it depends upon the will of the debtor.
In every case, the courts shall determine such period as
may under the circumstances have been probably
contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the
period cannot be changed by them.
Court generally without power to
fix a period.
The period mentioned refers to a judicial period
as distinguished from the period fixed by the
parties in their contract which is known as
contractual period.
If the obligation does not state a period and no
period is intended, the court is not authorized to fix
a period. The courts have no right to make
contracts for the parties. (Tolentino vs. Gonzales,
50 Phil. 577 [1927].)
 Exceptions to the general rule.
Under Article 1197 (pars 1 and 2), there are two cases
when the court is authorized to fix the duration of the
period.
Article 1197 is part and parcel of all obligations
contemplated therein. Hence, whenever the court fixes
the term of an obligation, it does not thereby amend or
modify the same. It merely enforces or carries out the
intention of the parties. (Deudor vs. J.M. Tuazon and
Co., Inc., 2 SCRA 129 [1961].) It cannot arbitrarily fix a
period out of thin air for the law expressly prescribes
“that the courts shall determine such period as may
under the circumstances have been probably
contemplated by the parties.” (Art. 1197, par. 3.)
No period is fixed but
a period was intended.
…if no precise date is fixed, it is sufficient that the
time can readily be determined. In case the period
of extension is not precise, Article 1197applies.
(Pacific Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 173
SCRA 102 [1989].)
 Duration of period depends upon
the will of the debtor.
The court must fix the duration of the period to forestall
the possibility that the obligation may never be fulfilled or to
cure a defect in a contract whereby it is made to depend
solely upon the will of one of the parties. In fixing the term,
the court is merely enforcing the implied stipulation of the
parties. (Deudor vs. J.M. Tuazon and Co., supra.) A contract
whereby the proceeds of the sale of goods should be turned
over to the principal by the agent “as soon [they were] sold”
makes the obligation immediately demandable as soon as the
goods are disposed of; hence, Article 1197 is not applicable.
(Lim vs. People, 133 SCRA 333 [1984].)
LEGAL EFFECT WHERE SUSPENSIVE
PERIOD/ CONDITION DEPENDS UPON
WILL OF DEBTOR.
(1) The existence of the obligation is not affected although
the period depends upon the sole will of the debtor. It is
only the performance with respect to time that is left to
the will of the debtor.

(2) If the obligation is subject to a condition which depends

upon the will of the debtor, the conditional obligation is void
(Art. 1182.) because in such case, it is actually the
fulfillment of the obligation that depends upon the will of
the debtor. (see Art. 1308.)
 Separate action to fix duration
of period.
On obligations coming within the purview of Article 1197, the only
action that can be maintained is to ask the court first to determine the
term within which the obligor must comply with his obligation for the
reason that fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until
after the court has fixed the period for its compliance and such period has
arrived. The duration of the period should be fixed in an action brought
for that express purpose separate from the action to enforce payment but
such technicality need not be adhered to when a prior and separate action
would be a mere formality and would serve no other purpose than to
delay. (Concepcion vs. People, 74 Phil. 63 [1942]; Gonzales vs. De Jose,
66 Phil. 369 [1938]; see Tiglao vs. Manila Railroad Co., 98 Phil. 181
[1956]; Calero vs. Carrion, 107 Phil. 549 [1960]; Borromeo vs. Court of
Appeals, 47 SCRA 65 [1972]; Pages vs. Basilan Lumber Co., 104 Phil.
882 [1958].)
 Ultimate facts to be
alleged in complaint.
(1) Facts showing that a contract was entered
into, imposing on one of the parties an
obligation or obligations in favor of another;
and
(2) Facts showing or from which an inference
may reasonably be drawn, that a period for
performance was intended by the parties.
(Schenker vs. Gemperle, 5 SCRA 1042
[1962].)
Period fixed cannot be
changed by the courts.
(1) If there is a period agreed upon by the parties and it has already lapsed
or expired, the court cannot fi x another period. (Gonzales vs. Jose, 66
Phil. 369; Millar vs. Nadres, 74 Phil. 307 [1903]; Millare vs.
Hernando, 151 SCRA 484 [1987].)

(2) From the very moment the parties give their acceptance and consent to
the period fixed by the court, said period acquires the nature of a covenant,
because the effect of such acceptance and consent by the parties is exactly
the same as if they had expressly agreed upon it, and having been agreed
upon by them, it becomes a law governing their contract. The period fixed
in a final judgment is res judicata and as such forms an integral part of the
imperfect contract which gave rise to its designation by the court, and
thence, forward part of a perfect and binding contract. Consequently, the
court cannot change it. (Barretto vs. City of Manila, 11 Phil. 624 [1908].)
However, the parties may modify the term by a new agreement.
ART. 1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use
of the period:

(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he

becomes insolvent, unless he gives a guaranty or security
for the debt;
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the
guaranties or securities which he has promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties
or securities after their establishment, and when through
a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately
gives new ones equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in
consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period;
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond. (1129a)
When obligation can be demanded
before lapse of period.
The general rule is that the obligation is not
demandable before the lapse of the period. However,
in any of the five (5) cases mentioned in Article 1198,
the debtor shall lose every right to make use of the
period, that is, the period is disregarded and the
obligation becomes pure and, therefore, immediately
demandable.
The exceptions are based on the fact that the debtor
might not be able to comply with his obligation.
(1)When debtor becomes insolvent. —

(2)When debtor does not furnish guaranties

or securities promised. —

(3) When guaranties or securities given have

been impaired or have disappeared.—

(4) When debtor violates an undertaking. —

(5) When debtor attempts to abscond. —