Economics of Strategy

Sixth Edition
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer

Chapter 2

Economies of Scale and Scope

Copyright  2013 John Wiley  Sons, Inc.

 Economies of Scale

Can create cost advantages

Can determine market structure and entry
Can affect the internal organization of firms
Can determine the horizontal boundaries of firms
 Economies of Scale

When the marginal cost is less than average cost,

there are economies of scale
Average cost declines with output
If average cost increases with output we have
diseconomies of scale
 U-Shaped Cost Curve

Average cost declines as fixed costs are spread over

larger volumes
Average cost eventually starts increasing as
capacity constraints kick in
U-shape implies cost disadvantage for very small
and very large firms
Unique optimum size for a firm
U-Shaped Average Cost Curve
 L-Shaped Cost Curve

In reality, cost curves are closer to being L-shaped

than U-shaped (Johnston)
Large firms are rarely at a cost disadvantage
relative to smaller firms
A minimum efficient size (MES) beyond which
average costs are identical across firms
L-Shaped Cost Curve
 Economies of Scope

It is cheaper for one firm to produce both X and Y

than for two different firms to specialize in X and Y
each
TC(QX, QY) < TC(QX, 0) + TC(0, QY)
TC(QX, QY) – TC(0,QY) < TC(QX, 0)
Production of Y reduces the incremental cost of
producing X
Some Sources of Economies of Scale/Scope

Spreading of fixed costs

Increased productivity of variable inputs
Saving on inventories
The cube-square rule
 Fixed Costs

Indivisibilities: Certain inputs can not be scaled

down below a minimum
Indivisibilities lead to fixed costs and thus
economies of scale and scope
Scale and scope economies may obtain at various
levels
 Product level

 Plant level

 Multi plant level

 Product Specific Fixed Costs

Research and development

Specialized equipment for production
Set up costs for production
Training expenses
Tradeoff Among Technologies
Tradeoff Among Technologies
 Economies of Scale and Specialization

“The division of labor is limited to the extent of the

market”
As markets increase in size, economies of scale
enables specialization
Larger markets support an array of specialized
activities
 Inventories

Firms carry inventory to avoid stock-outs

In addition to lost sales, stock-outs can adversely
affect customer loyalty
Bigger firms can afford to keep smaller inventories
(relative to sales volume) compared with smaller
firms
 Cube-Square Rule

Doubling the diameter of a hollow sphere increases its

volume eightfold, but the surface area only fourfold
In production processes, the cost of a vessel may vary
with surface area and its capacity with volume
Examples of Scale Economies due to the Cube-Square
Rule
 Oil pipelines
 Warehousing

 Brewing tanks
 Economies of Scale in Purchasing

It is less costly to sell to a single buyer (Example:

Group insurance is cheaper than individual
insurance)
Big buyers will be more price sensitive and may
drive hard bargains with the suppliers
Supplier may dislike disruption and may offer
better deals to bigger buyers
Small firms can join purchasing alliances
 Economies of Scale in Advertising

Large national firms may experience lower cost per

potential customer when compared with small
regional firms
Cost of production of the advertisement and the
cost of negotiations with the media can be spread
over different markets
Umbrella Branding and Economies of Scope

A well known brand like Samsung covers different

products
There are economies of scope in developing and
maintaining these brands
New products are easier to introduce when there is
an established brand with the desired image.
 Umbrella Branding - Limitations

Umbrella branding may not always help

 Example:In the U.S. Lexus is a separate brand
from Toyota
Conflicting brand images may cause
diseconomies of scope
Corporate brand name may be less
important than the individual product’s
brand as in pharmaceuticals
 Economies of Scale in R & D

Minimum feasible size for R & D projects and R &

D departments
Economies of scope in R & D; ideas from one
project can help another project
 Strategic Fit

Strategic fit is complementarity that yields

economies of scope
Strategic fit renders piece-meal copying of
corporate strategy by rivals unproductive
Strategic fit is essential for long term competitive
advantage
 Diseconomies of Scale

Beyond a certain size, bigger may not always

be better
The sources of such diseconomies
 Increasing labor costs
 Spreading specialized resources too thin

 “Conflicting out”

 Incentive and coordination effects

 Firm Size and Labor Cost

Workers in large firms tend to get paid more

than workers in small firms
Possible reasons
 Unionization is more likely in large firms
 Work may be more enjoyable in small firms

 Large firms may have to attract workers from far

away places
 “Conflicting Out”

Professional services firms may find it difficult to

sign up a client if a competitor is already a client of
the firm
When sensitive information has to be shared, such
conflicts may impose a limit to the growth of the
firm
 Incentive and Coordination Effects

When a firm gets large

 it is difficult to monitor and communicate with
workers
 it is difficult to evaluate and reward individual
performance
 detailed work rules may stifle the creativity of the
workers
 The Learning Curve

Learning economies are distinct from economies of

scale
Learning economies depend on cumulative output
rather than the rate of output
Learning leads to lower costs, higher quality and
more effective pricing and marketing
The Learning Curve
The Slope as a Measure of Learning Benefits

The slope of a process is the relative size of the

average cost when cumulative output doubles
A slope of 0.8 (the observed median) indicates that
the average cost will decline by 20% when the
cumulative output doubles
Learning flattens out over time and the slope
eventually becomes 1.0
 BCG’s Growth/Share Paradigm

Product life cycle model combined with an internal

capital market, with the firm serving as a banker
Use the cash generated by “cash cows” to exploit
the learning economies of “rising stars” and
“problem children”
BCG’s Growth/Share Matrix
 Learning Curve and Scale Economies

Learning reduces unit cost through experience

Capital intensive technologies can offer scale
economies even if there is no learning
Complex labor intensive processes may offer
learning economies without scale economies
 Why Diversify?

Diversification across products and across

markets can exploit economies of scale and
scope
Diversification that occurs for other reasons
tends to be less successful
Managers may prefer diversification even
when it does not benefit the shareholders
 Merger Waves in U.S. History

In the merger wave of the 1980s cash rich

firms grew through acquisitions. Leveraged
buyouts (LBO’s) were also used by private
investors.
In the mid 1990s through 2007 firms were
merging with “related” businesses and
private equity transactions were on the rise.
 Efficiency Reasons for Mergers

Economies of scale and scope

Economizing on transactions costs
Internal capital markets
Shareholder’s diversification
Identifying undervalued firms
 Dominant General Management Logic

Managers develop specific skills (Examples:

Information systems, finance)
Seemingly unrelated business may need
these skills
The logic can be misapplied when the skills
are not useful in the business I into which
the firm diversifies
 Internal Capital Markets

In a diversified firm, some units generate

surplus funds that can be channeled to units
that need the funds (internal capital market)
The key question: Is it reasonable to expect
that profitable projects will not be financed
by external sources?
 Diversification and Risk

Diversification reduces the firm’s risk and

smoothes the earnings stream
But the shareholders do not benefit from
this since they can diversify their portfolio at
near zero cost.
When shareholders are unable to diversify
(Example: owners of a large fraction of the
firm) they benefit from such risk reduction
 Identifying Undervalued Firms

When the target firm is in an unrelated

business, the acquiring firm is less likely to
value the target correctly
The key question is: Why did other potential
acquirers not bid as high as the ‘successful’
acquirer?
Winner’s curse could wipe out any gains
from financial synergies
 Cost of Diversification

Diversified firms may incur substantial

influence costs
Diversified firms may need elaborate
control systems to reward and punish
managers
Internal capital markets may not function
well in practice
 Managerial Reasons for Diversification

Managers may prefer growth even when it is

unprofitable since it adds to their social
prominence, prestige and political power.
Managers may be able to enhance their
compensation by increasing the size of their
firm
 Managerial Reasons for Diversification

Managers may feel secure if the

performance of the firm mirrors the
performance of the economy (which will
happen with diversification)
Manager controlled firms tend to engage in
more conglomerate diversification than
owner controlled firms.
 Corporate Governance
Shareholders are not knowledgeable
regarding the value of an acquisition to the
firm
Shareholders have weak incentive to
monitor the management
Acquiring firms tend to experience loss of
value indicating that acquisitions are driven
by managerial motives.
 Market for Corporate Control
Publicly traded firms are vulnerable to
hostile takeovers
Market for corporate control is an
important constraint on the managers
If managers undertake unwise acquisitions,
the stock price drops, reflecting
 Overpayment for the acquisition
 Potential future overpayment by the incumbent
management
 Market for Corporate Control

In an LBO, debt is used to buy out most of

the equity
Future free cash flows are committed to
debt service
Debt burden limits manager’s ability to
expand the business
 Market for Corporate Control

Gains in efficiencies in LBOs were

substantial
Even when firms defaulted on their debt the
net effect was beneficial
Corporate raiders profited handsomely for
taking over and busting up firms that
pursued unprofitable diversification
 Market for Corporate Control

LBOs may hurt other stakeholders

 Employees

 Bondholders

 Suppliers

Wealth created by LBO may be quasi-rents

extracted from stakeholders
Redistribution of wealth may adversely
affect economic efficiency
 Diversifying Acquisitions

Shareholders of the acquiring firms do not

benefit from the acquisitions
Negative effects on the acquiring firms are
more severe when:
 the managers of the acquiring firms were
performing poorly before the acquisition
 the CEOs of the acquiring firms hold smaller
share of the firms’ equity
Diversification & Long-Term Performance

Long term performance of diversified firms

appears to be poor.
A third to half of all acquisitions and over
half of all new business acquisitions are
eventually divested.
Corporate refocusing of the 1980s could be
viewed as a correction to the conglomerate
merger wave of the 1960s.
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